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### Oil Resources, Militancy, and the Post-Amnesty Challenges in the Niger Delta, Nigeria

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#### Abstract

This paper argues that the exclusionary system of the indigenous people of the Niger Delta from the production and the distribution of oil resources is a factor that drives the militancy in the Niger Delta. The conceptual background to this argument is based on the analysis of the unmet demands of the Niger Delta people, which is cashed in on by the politicians and the youths to disrupt social order. The amnesty programme, as implemented by the government, is considered palliative if placed side-by-side with the critical demands of the oil communities. This paper identifies some technical problems of the post-amnesty programme, which constitute a challenge to sustainable peace. However, the author concludes that the main sources of threat to the fragile peace in the region are the non-involvement of the oil communities in the rehabilitation process; the revenue derivation percent; and the rebellious character of Henry Oka's faction of MEND. To mitigate conflict in the long-run depends on the capacity of President Jonathan Goodluck to mobilize material and human resources to improve on the lives of the Niger Delta people.

#### Background

Oil resources and the management of its wealth are central to the conflict in the Niger Delta, in Nigeria. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and de Soysa (2002) have shown that natural resource availability or natural resource abundance considerably increases the chances of civil conflict in a country. Ross (2004) observes that countries with 'point resources', such as minerals, have a high propensity for conflict, while Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2005) argue that the risk of civil war is limited to oil. In

general, oil-dependent countries have been shown to have a high risk of secessionist civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Ross 2003b, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler, (2005) assert further that the causal effect is that oil generates large, location-specific rents for the states or groups that might control the territory where oil is located. Furthermore, dependence on mineral rents exposes the state to shocks arising from world price volatility, discoveries, environmental violence and exhaustion, and it creates multiple paths that are linked to civil conflict. Ross (2003a) asserts that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria contains the key ingredients for a mineral-based conflict. It accounts for over 90% of the nation's oil revenue, and its gas reserves are seen as the next greatest potential revenue earner for the nation. The Niger Delta is populated by minority ethnic groups – Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa Ibom and Cross River States - these states are considered the core of the Niger Delta region. These Niger Delta states have been the scene of violent conflicts and have borne a disproportionate share of the cost of oil extraction, for which they are now calling for adequate compensation.

Long before 1956 when oil was discovered in the region in commercial quantities, the minority group of the Niger Delta region had been protesting against domination by three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba). In 1957, during the colonial administration, a four-man Minorities Commission, known as the Henry Willick Commission, was set up to address the genuine fears of the minorities in Nigeria. The Commission acknowledged that the fears of the minorities were real, but could not be resolved by the creation of states. The Commission recommended the inclusion of Fundamental Human Rights in the constitution to safeguard the interest of minority groups, and the establishment of Minority Areas and Special Areas to facilitate their social and economic development (Taiwo & Olaniyan, 1978). The Commission's report has been treated with levity; whilst a small number of commissions were set up, such as Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Communities (OMPADEC) and Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), they were largely ineffective and riddled with corruption.

Since independence, the social conditions of the Niger Delta people have been deplorable and inextricably linked to environmental degradation and poverty. Around 75 % of the rural population depends on natural resources for their livelihood. The Niger Delta is subject to environmental pollution from liquid, solid and gaseous wastes, linked to oil production. Atmospheric pollution caused by oil and gas development includes gaseous products of hydrocarbon evaporation and burning, as well as aerosol particles of unburned fuel (Nigeria-EU, 2010:73). Despite the high level of environmental degradation in the Niger Delta zone, the economy of Nigeria remains heavily dependent on oil and gas, which account for over a third of the gross domestic product (GDP). This is compounded by many years of political subjugation of the region and the denial of access to the central authority.

After years of apparent neglect and poverty, the Niger Delta people responded through an organized struggle against the state. While some groups, such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), used non-violent means in their struggle for increased minority and environmental rights, others such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Vigilante Service (NDVS); Niger Delta Patriotic Force (NDPF); Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer

Force (NDPVF); Itsekiri National Youths Council, (INYC); and several militia groups engaged in armed struggle. Their tactics ranged from attacks on oil installations; oil bunkering, hostage-taking of foreign and local oil workers, kidnapping of highly-placed government officials or their relatives, high level of militancy, and total guerrilla warfare against oil companies and government. The armed struggle was one phase that was meant to highlight the plight of the people.

It was under this condition of a total breakdown in law and order that the late President Yar'Adua granted general amnesty to all the militants who surrendered their arms to the government forces. In spite of this, there are apparent fears that the amnesty policy does not address the core issues driving the protest and conflict in the Niger Delta. The hypothesis is that if the amnesty programmes do not address the core demands of the Niger Delta people, it is likely that the community will relapse into more devastating conflict. This paper approaches the discourse from three major strands: First it analyzes the amnesty policy vis-à-vis the demands of the Niger Delta people. Second it examines the forces driving the conflict and third, highlights the policy-gap and the challenges of the post-amnesty programme.

## **Analytical Framework: Oil Resources, Exclusionary System and Conflict**

The scarcity or abundance of natural resources, as well as the role of economic agendas as a factor in conflict, has been explored by a number of scholars. Olatunbosun, (1975); Ajakaye, (1977); Fredund, (1980); Ahazuem and Falola, (1987); Olorode, (1998) and Collier and Hoeffler, (2005) have identified extractive industries (mining, lumbering and large-scale fishing) as having three fundamental attributes – high degree of profitability, very serious environmental consequences, and high propensity to cause conflict. Unlike the experience with forestry, tin mining and coal mining, the oil industry not only assails the environment, it substantially excludes local labour from the production and distribution of oil because of its high dependence on machine power (Olorode, 2000).

The link between natural resources and civil conflict has typically followed three approaches. The first theory is the 'Relative deprivation theory'. This links rebellion to atypical severe grievances arising from high levels of inequality, government repression and a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions (Gurr, 1971; Borjas, 1992; Cramer, 1999; Goodhand, 2003). This theory argues that it is the degree to which individuals or groups feel deprived from the *common good* – wealth, power, status, rights, security and resources that leads to anger and the likely aggression. The basic proposition is that:

The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity. Thus if a group feels an intense sense of relative deprivation with respect to a class of values important to it then it has considerable potential for violence. If the group feels that collective violence is a legitimate response to its anger, and that violence is the only means to alleviate the discontent, then the likelihood of violence is greater (Dowse & Hughes, 1972:411).

Deprivation may be due to lack of good governance, lack of institutional development, and a poor state of social service delivery to citizens. Nigeria, as a classical "rentier-state", diverts the oil wealth into personal/family accounts, and ignores socio-economic development of the

country, leaving sections of society poor. This increases the scope and the intensity of anger, aggression and conflict, not only in the Niger Delta region but also across the length and breadth of the country.

The second theory is the Rational-decision theory, which focuses on the economic opportunities that resource availability presents for rebellion. Rebellion is seen as an outcome of kleptocratic rivalry, or as an industry that generates profits from looting (Grossman 1999), or as a quasi-criminal activity (Collier, 2000). In this theory, rebellion is motivated by greed and is assumed to occur only when rebels can profit from it. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide two recent empirical investigations of the rational choice theories, which explain rebellion as the outcome of rational decision-making subject to the constraint of the labour market. The risk of rebellion increases as per capita income, educational level of the citizens, and economic growth decline. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), the supply of rebels increases if the state is 'weak' and cannot effectively police its territory. At a quick glance one is tempted to reason in line with rational choice theory, given the multiple number of rebel groups (about 30 groups in Niger Delta, (See Appendix A)) and the report that rebel groups involved in the Niger Delta conflict participated in oil bunkering (stealing of oil) and kidnapping for ransom. It is believed that some organized groups among them earned up to US \$1 billion per year from large-scale 'bunkering' in Nigeria (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005). However, to argue from this perspective is to limit the scope of the Niger Delta conflict to individual greed, ignoring a wide range of communal needs and interests which are at play. First, as Mkankawire (2002: 187 cited in Ikelege, 2005:213) points out, nowhere in Africa has a band of criminals grown into a rebel movement. Thus the opportunism for primary commodity predation is not the cause of violent conflicts. Second, the assertion by Fearon and Laitin (2003) that the supply of rebels increases if the state is 'weak' and cannot effectively police its territory, may not be applicable to the Nigerian State. This is because in all oil-producing communities in Nigeria there is a strong presence of military and police detachments, as well as systematic state repression, sometimes taking the form of extra-judicial killings (Ibeanu, 1999). Therefore, the 'state weakness' could not have been the cause of the Niger Delta conflict; rather, it is the strong presence of state forces in the region that is the *raison d'être* for the increase in rebellious activities.

The third explanation is the Marxian social production and reproduction theory. The theory has four main assumptions on conflict: the first assumption is that in the production system, there must be some group(s) to make binding decisions on what is produced, distributed, and exchanged. Those who decide what to produce and distribute also control social production to their favour, and are often more satisfied with the production and distribution than others within the system. The second assumption is that those who do not decide what to produce are generally at the receiving end of the social production system. They have the least of what is produced and they are often not satisfied, therefore, would like to change the system in their favour. The third assumption is that both those people who decide and those who do not decide on the production and distribution system struggle to attain and remain in a favourable position in the social production process so that their needs can be met. It is in this struggle for survival and security that human beings find and/or define allies and opponents, be it within or outside their family, clan, tribe, nation, class or profession. This is at the root of societal conflicts, with violence generally being deployed against these perceived opponents. And as long as the needs of all have not been satisfied, within a defined standard, there are bound to be conflicts (Ogban-Iyam, 2005:15-17). The fourth assumption is that the control of oil resource by a select few to the exclusion of the majority of the citizens has also resulted in the monopoly of political power by the elite. This breeds its own form of conflict, first among the political elite across the six geo-political zones (South East, South South, South West, North Central, North West and North East) for the control of

oil resources and political authority. The second source of conflict arises from spontaneous riot and demonstration by the masses to express their anger against alienation from oil resources and power.

The social production and reproduction theory does not only have more explanatory power to the Niger Delta conflict, but also agrees with the four major attributes of extractive industries: profitability, exclusion of local group(s), environmental consequences and conflict (Olatunbosun, 1975; Ajakaye, 1977; Fredund, 1980; Ahazuem and Falola, 1987; Olorode, 1998; Olorode, 2000). The linkage between the exclusion of local resource owners and environmental violence is much more real than the issues of causal relation. The oil resources determine the funding for the state and freedom fighters, the multiplication of violence and violent institutions, the proliferation of arms and the strong presence of the federal forces bent on maintaining supplies of critical minerals.

## Key Issues of the Conflict

Often, the cause of all armed or violent conflicts within states appears to stem from demands by various communities for the recognition of their own specific identities – ethnic, linguistic or religious. The conflict therefore is a divergence in opinion on how the state should be run, how social and economic development should be distributed, or how power should be distributed within the state. The Niger Delta demands can be gleaned from the various declarations of the communities, such as *Ogoni Bill of Rights*; the *Kaiama Declaration of Ijaw National Congress*; the *Ogbia Declaration* and the *Ikwerre Charter*. The *Kaiama Declaration* by *Ijaw National Congress* summarized their concerns:

...the political crisis in Nigeria is mainly about the struggle for the control of oil mineral resources which account for over 80% of GDP, 95% of national budget and 90% of foreign exchange earnings. From which, 65%, 75% and 70% respectively are derived from within Ijaw nation. Despite these huge contributions, our reward from the Nigerian state remains avoidable deaths resulting from ecological devastation and military repression (*Kaiama Declaration*, 1998).

The response from successive governments has been quite palliative and plenty of promises have been made. But the international community considers corruption as a major problem. According to an estimate by the World Bank and Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the staggering sum of "US\$400-500 billion has been stolen through corruption under successive governments since oil exports began in the country 50 years ago" (Coventry Cathedral, 2009:134 ).

The resolution of the conflict is dependent on how the central government responds to the demands of Niger Delta people. Appendix B illustrates the demands of the Niger Delta people and the responses by the Government of Nigeria. The table also includes the recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee set up by government before the amnesty policy.

The Niger Delta Technical Committee report is instructive and fundamental in four related ways. First, the Technical Committee was set up by the Federal Government to articulate the needs of the region, and the 45 committee members were drawn from the nine states of Niger Delta. The committee's terms of reference are to

- collate, review and distill the various reports, suggestions and recommendations on the Delta, from the Willinks Commission report (1958) to the present;
- summarize the recommendations for government action;
- appraise the summary recommendations and present detailed short-, medium- and long-term suggestions;
- and any other recommendations that will help it achieve sustainable development, peace and human and environmental security in the Delta region” (International Crisis Group, 2009:7).

The committee members were appointed by the government while the committee members independently elected their Chairman.

Second, the committee’s report is neither too radical and unrealistic, nor pro-establishment. The report strikes a balance in many areas, such as revenue derivation formula, road construction, employment and sustainable environment. The report approached the issue from an incremental or a gradual development standpoint. Third, the Government approach to the Committee’s recommendation is to be ‘cautious’. Though it has not adopted the report, the Government has started implementing some of the recommendations, such as the release of Henry Okah<sup>1</sup> and the Amnesty programme. Fourth, the recommendations have drawn modest praise and considerable criticism from the region. MEND states that “the Technical Committee’s *report in part does reflect some of our thinking as well as that of our affiliates*” but that it had expected more “candour (and) punch”; the report was “drafted with some caution, perhaps not to rock the boat with the Northern ruling class”, and failed to deal with “some key issues, such as fiscal federalism, which is on everyone’s mind” (ICG, 2009:10).

These demands and the subsequent response from Government have defined the character of the conflict in the Niger Delta, both in the present and in the future. The government of the Nigeria interprets the demands of Niger Delta Communities as rebellious, an economic sabotage, and a threat to national security, the Niger Delta communities consider the option of armed struggle as the outcome of the central government’s failure to develop the region and/or grant the communities right of control over their natural resources.

## Arms Running and Militancy in the Niger Delta

Arms proliferation is an important factor in any organized conflict, war, militancy, or guerrilla warfare. The conflict in the Niger Delta has been sustained partly by the easy access of militants to arms and ammunition. The large quantity of arms in Africa has been attributed to a series of internal conflicts, making Africa a viable market for arms dealings. Records show that an estimated seven to ten million illicit small arms and light weapons float in West Africa (Hazen and Horner, 2007:80), while an estimated one million (Ebo, 2006:1) to three million (Obasi, 2002:69) small arms and light weapons are in circulation in Nigeria.

The large quantity of sophisticated arms in the Niger Delta region can be explained from three perspectives: communal weapons; political mercenaries; and oil theft:

<sup>1</sup> Henry Okah is the factional leader of The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The Nigerian government released Okah on 13 July, 2009, as part of the amnesty. He has remained intransigent and obstinate over the Niger Delta demands for resource control. He plays an important role in determining the future of conflict in the region.

First, inter-ethnic or communal conflicts have been prevalent in the region, with conflicts arising over the ownership and control of land and water, or over how to share the benefit from Federal Government or Oil Companies. Sometimes, the Oil Companies and the Federal Government set the communities against each other; in this circumstance, most communities in the Niger Delta have community arsenals with which they defend themselves against other ethnic group(s). There have been conflicts between Ijaw and Itsekiri, Itsekiri and Urobo, Ijaw and Ilaje, Kalabiri and Nembe, Okpoma and Brass. Several other conflicts continue to simmer and smolder in the region. For instance, Ateke Tom, known as the 'godfather', is the leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante Service, (NDVS) and the Niger Delta Patriotic Force (NDPF) was created in his Okirika home, Rivers State. The NDPF was created to defend the Rivers State in a long inter-ethnic war with their Eleme neighbours over the ownership of the land where the Port Harcourt refinery was built (*Tell* magazine, Nigeria, October 12, 2009, p.23). Ateke Tom vigilante group acquired more sophisticated weapons and transformed into freedom fighters against the oil companies and the Nigerian State.

Second, politicians escalated the arms race and conflicts, just as the *caudillo* system (bands of armed men) played a significant role in the militarism in Latin America (Needler, 1977). Political godfathers and aspiring politicians have promoted and used the militia groups to exert power and influence, attain political office and provide an environment of conflict to screen other illegal activities, such as the theft of crude oil. In the Niger Delta, before 1999 and the return to civilian government, the bulk of weapons were dane guns, double barrel guns, and other locally made weapons. But between 1999 and 2003, the Niger Delta was littered with modern and sophisticated weapons used by cult groups for political reasons (*Human Rights Watch*, 2005, *Tell* magazine, Nigeria, October 12, 2009, p.23). These cult groups were financed and maintained by politicians. After the 2003 elections, cult groups who were employed as political thugs refused to return their guns, and used the weapons at their disposal to engage in oil bunkering.

Third is the oil bunkering account, which was an immediate fall-out of political mercenary in the Niger Delta. The cult groups employed the weapons they used for political mercenaries to engage in oil bunkering, and in the process became rich and recruited more youths into their fold. Also, the ships that brought the illegal crude oil also came in with guns sourced from war-torn parts of the world, especially the Middle East and Africa, like Congo, Uganda, Angola, Rwanda and Liberia (*Tell* magazine, Nigeria, October 12, 2009, p.23). The policy of allowing the oil companies to have private forces to guard oil installations also increases the arms handling by private individuals in the region. This is to improve the capacity of the youths who provide security for the business to thrive in the creeks. Oil companies have also provided payments directly to communities to ensure oil operations are permitted to continue without disturbance. Such payments are often used by disaffected youths to improve their arsenals (International Crisis Group, 2006:25). It is not only oil companies that provide payment for "security services". Various organizations operating in the Niger Delta, such as construction companies, also receive these "security services" – the funds from which are used to purchase arms.

The three sources of illegal arms and ammunition increased the circulation of weapons in the region and this accounts for the amount of weapons surrendered at the various disarmament points (See Appendix A). The majority of the people are concerned that the arms surrendered were only the militants' unserviceable guns. Furthermore there are concerns that the numbers of arms surrendered were an insignificant percentage compared to what the militants have in their arsenal. This fear was confirmed by one of the ex-militants, who asserted that:

Even the govt knows we can't submit all our weapons. If na you, you go submit everything? Na small, small my broda. One of the militant says they do not trust govt "at all, so it would amount to suicide to diminish their capacity to defend themselves" (*TELL*, (Nigeria) Magazine, October 12, 2009 p23).

Peoples' fears have been confirmed, based on the resurgence of militancy in the region.

## **Amnesty Programme and the Disarmament of Militants**

Typically, amnesty is a general pardon from punishment for the commission of a criminal offense. It is often conditional upon the beneficiaries returning to obedience and duty within a prescribed period. According to *Encyclopædia Britannica* (2008) amnesty is typically granted for political crimes against the state, such as treason, sedition, or rebellion. It is generally addressed to classes or communities and takes the form of a legislative act or other constitutional or statutory act of the supreme power of the state. Technically, an amnesty differs from a general pardon in that the latter simply relieves from punishment whereas the former declares innocence or abolishes the crime. A Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) process is largely seen as a technical exercise, geared toward reducing the potential threat posed by a sizeable population of individuals with military skills to democratization and sustainable peace.

Essentially, the Niger Delta Amnesty policy consists of three stages. The first is the disarmament of the militants and the capture of biometric data through the completion of a form. The data includes a basic social and historical profile of the ex-militants with the aim to extract as much information as possible from the ex-militants. The second stage involves the rehabilitation of the ex-militants, which is expected to last for a period of about 4 weeks for each group and will entail reorientation, counseling and moral/spiritual regeneration of the ex-militants. The final phase consists of training the ex-militants and giving them the opportunity to acquire more skills. The Ministry of the Niger Delta conducted a survey of the needs of the militant youths in the Niger Delta region for proper skill placement.

Analysts and practitioners have often presented different issues that impinge on rehabilitation planning and implementation. A common problem is that the reintegration phase often occurs too late in the process. If disarmament and demobilization have been concluded, the government may feel less urgency in investing in rehabilitation, and even more reluctant to provide further funding for the reintegration of ex-combatants (Poulligny, 2004:199). The difficulty in registering ex-militants for the rehabilitation process, especially in a conflict situation where every youth is armed, presents a major problem because of the eligibility criteria to enter into the rehabilitation camp (UNDP, 2005; *The Guardian* (Nigeria) newspaper, November 8, 2009, p71). This often leaves a large number of demobilized militants out of the rehabilitation exercise. Studies have shown that in many post-conflict situations, as much as 70% of the local population that participated in the conflict may be unemployed. The Niger Delta ex-militants remain among some of the most disadvantaged groups in terms of employment. There have been complaints that reintegration packages are directed at the wrong job skills. McKay and Mazurana, (2004) have identified poor understanding of the experience of women and girls in DDR processes. Since female ex-combatants do not fit the traditional stereotypes of a woman, they tend to attract the greatest social opprobrium in the post-war period. These women are most likely to slip through the net or be ignored in the reintegration processes and become either social outcasts, who barely survive on the margins of society, or an increased security threat in the subsequent months and years.

In addition to the challenges outlined above, there are difficulties in adjusting to rehabilitation programmes, skill acquisition and proper placement; corruption and mismanagement of fund; managing the Internally Displaced Population (IDP) and incomplete disarmament (Sessay et al 2009:87; *The Guardian*, Newspaper August 8, 2010:63). Marshall (2005) postulates that such problems result in approximately 60% of countries relapsing into armed conflicts after the disarmament and demobilization processes.

The emerging factors in the Niger Delta post amnesty processes tend to re-enforce the flaws identified in rehabilitation literature. For instance, it is apparent that the ex-militants are disillusioned with the exercise. This is informed by a number of street demonstrations. This was especially evident with the demonstration in Abuja over the ex-militants' poor documentation, unacceptable skill acquisition and their low level allowance (*Nigerian Inquirer*, July 8, 2010). Also, there is the reported diversion of about ₦775million from the rehabilitation fund into unrelated issues (*Punch* (Nigeria) newspaper, April 17, 2010:1). The prospect for recidivism has been manifested in the recent threat from MEND to end its cease-fire and return to the creek (*The Guardian Editorial* (Nigeria) February 7, 2010:24), the killing of the leader of the 'outlawed group' Soboma George and the deployment of soldiers to get rid of illegal refineries and oil bunkering by disillusioned ex-militants of the region (*Nigerian Inquirer*, May 4th, 2010). All these are frightening indicators that the post-amnesty programme is unraveling.

## **Post-Amnesty: Policy Implications and the Challenges for Sustainable Peace**

The Amnesty granted to the militants of the Niger Delta by the late President, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua has been widely acknowledged as the high point of his administration. Many writers, organizations and countries have paid eloquent tribute to the Amnesty; the Joint Annual Review of the Development Cooperation between Nigeria and the European Union describes the Amnesty programme this way:

The biggest government achievement in 2009 was the amnesty offered by President Yar'Adua to militants in the Niger Delta. A large number of militant leaders and their followers surrendered the arms and subscribed to the amnesty process (Nigeria-EU, 2010:6).

The former Special Adviser on media and publicity to the late President, Mr. Olusegun Adeniyi, has described how the charm and humility of Yar'Adua won the hearts of freedom fighters:

One of the reasons Mr. Okah bought into the amnesty process was principally due to the disposition of President Yar'Adua in their first encounter. Perhaps only few leaders would have the temperament to absorb what Okah told the President that night about what he described as the 'crazy arrangement' in Nigeria vis-à-vis Niger Delta people" (The Essential Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. *The Guardian*, Sunday, June 6, 2010 pp30-31).

Also, Ateke Tom confessed that he embraced the amnesty because of the sincerity of President Yar'Adua in solving the Niger Delta problem (*The Guardian*, Nigeria, Sunday, October 4, 2009 p72). Notwithstanding the surrender of arms, renunciation of violence and the rehabilitation programme the amnesty programme, has fundamental problems. For example, many fighters are still in possession of arms (AFP, 23 October 2009), while the ex-combatants are roaming the streets (*The Guardian* (Nigeria) January 1, 2010 p9) and the

fragmented Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) still has the capacity to regroup.

At this point, this paper will examine the apparent policy-gaps and challenges to sustainable peace in the region. This will be done under five broad sub-headings: alienation of the Niger Delta communities; crisis of confidence; poor planning/corruption; the MEND factor and the ex-leaders of the militant groups; and the 2011 presidential election and peace in the Niger Delta.

## **Alienation of Community Members from the Amnesty Programme.**

The community members who did not participate in the conflict are an important factor in conflict resolution and rehabilitation process. They bear brunt of the armed conflict, such as the destruction of their farmlands and residential homes, displacement of people and loss of life and other valuable property in the course of the conflict. The presupposition, therefore, is that the community members should be major stakeholders in the conflict resolution process. The armed militants are known by their immediate neighbours, community members and families. In addition, the cause of the conflict stems from the alienation of the community members from their land and the resources therein.

One of the best practices in relation to the DDR process is that you do not over concentrate on only those individuals who are armed combatants; otherwise you create an impression that you are rewarding them. In addition to armed combatants, there are other individuals, referred to as part-time militants, who may not have been in the camp, but they indulged in militant activities and yet they are ignored in the whole process.

There are fundamental demands from the Niger Delta region, among which are: ownership and control of the oil resources; re-definition of the relations between the oil companies and host communities; reversal of the Land Use Act and the Petroleum Decrees; self determination; withdrawal of the army and the Joint Task Force from the communities; increasing the derivation formula to 50%, and others. What the amnesty offers to the community does not meet its demands; apart from the Federal Government proposal that oil producing communities be given a 10% stake in the Nigerian share of oil and gas Joint Ventures (JV) (Nigeria-EU, 2010:15) which has a semblance to the Niger Delta demands, others such as construction of East-West highway (on-going); construction of the Atlantic Coastal Highway (details are being worked out); and the construction of the East-West Rail Line running through Calabar-Uyo-Port-Harcourt-Yenagoa-Warri-Benin-Lagos (the first phase will start from Calabar to Benin) (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) Sunday, November 8, 2009, p73); are not the demands of the community.

MEND, like other stakeholders, is concerned that there appears to be no positive movement signaling willingness by the political class and the government to address the fundamental grievances that encouraged militancy in the first place. Henry Okah, the leader of MEND, in an answer on how to stop militancy in Niger Delta, envisioned good faith from the government. Specifically he states:

A good faith plan. The government should involve the communities in a good faith plan in which they are made stakeholders or joint venture partners. When a community has a stake in an oil project, they would police the project jealously. They would not allow their own boys to destroy their own project. And why would a militant go to

destroy his own project? (*The Guardian* (Nigeria) August 30, 2009, p77)

There are fundamental problems of the Niger Delta which the amnesty policy is required to address. If these key issues are not resolved, the government will continue to face groups of angry youths as the same social system will continue to produce anger amongst these social groups. The amnesty package appears as a clear device to avoid the main issues at stake.

## **Poor Planning and the Unpreparedness and Corruption of Government Officials**

There were a number of problems with the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, especially with respect to the integration project. Most of the difficulties arose from a lack of adequate planning and coordination to implement programs effectively. The rehabilitation process is expected to be a comprehensive exercise, to contain skill acquisition, citizenship training programmes and a socialization process to mentally disarm and psychologically re-orient the ex-combatants. This aspect of the amnesty has been trapped in the web of slow, government bureaucracy, as reported in the local newspaper:

Rehabilitation plans had been scanty, even as the camps are not ready to house militants. Capacity building had not been factored into the disarmament programme, as it is reported that the camps, when they eventually open to admit ex-militants on November 11, would only take about 1,500 inmates. Government had since shown signs of incapacitation when the huge crowd of returnee militants that turned up at the Benin centre was quickly dismissed by government officials as not being part of the original arms-bearing militants who were courted to drop arms. As soon as amnesty deadline was over, and the crowd was beyond government's imagination, it appeared there was an attempt to begin to trim the figures early (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) November 8, 2009, p71).

Studies of demobilized combatants have found that a large percentage are unemployed, with most either being dependent on family members to provide them with money, food, and shelter. Without this they will return to oil bunkering and militant activities, which are more lucrative. The inability of the rehabilitation programme to include all demobilized militants and provide a viable alternative measure portends a danger to the amnesty offer. Attesting to this is the July 8, 2010 demonstration by ex-militants, in Abuja (the capital city of Nigeria). The demonstration was over poor documentations, unacceptable skill acquisition and less attractive allowance paid to them (*Nigerian Inquirer*, July 8, 2010). Related to this are the corrupt practices of the government officials who are responsible for implementing the post-amnesty programmes. This has been the concern of the Niger Delta people, as the tendency of 'who grabs what' has relegated the real issue to the background. The sum of ₦50 billion was approved, and ₦10 billion has been released (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) newspaper, July 26, 2009 p23, *Punch* (Nigeria) newspaper, April 17, 2010, p1). The *Punch* newspaper stated further that "about ₦600 million was believed to be unaccounted for", while an "alarming sum of ₦175 million was said to have been spent on lunch alone by the former managers of the amnesty programme" (*Punch* (Nigeria) newspaper, April 17, 2010, p1). The diversion of funds has resulted in series of threats, protests, and rampage by ex-militants, and this in turn affects their training and skill acquisition placements.

## Crisis of Confidence

A major set-back to the amnesty is the adoption of the 'home groomed or indigenous Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR)' system. It is strange to talk of a 'home groomed' programme when a member of the Presidential Amnesty Committee acknowledges that she is ignorant of what DDR entails and 'was dead opposed to any international involvement' (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) November 8, 2009, p76). The 'home groomed' amnesty programme is against the wishes of the ex-combatants. It has generated a crisis of confidence in the genuine intention of the government and the whole exercise of peace-building in the Niger Delta region. The crisis of confidence is based on three related factors; first is that DDR is a United Nations developed concept and programme, that has been applied successfully by the UN for many years in African countries like Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia. There is hardly any local content of DDR as it applies to procedures and processes, more especially as DDR has heavy financial implications that require international funding. Second, the Niger Delta people and ex-militants requested the involvement of international organizations, such as United Nations and the reconciliation centre, Coventry Cathedral in the disarmament and demobilization, because it enhances the principle of neutrality in conflict resolution.

How can the ex-combatants trust the Nigerian government to play the role of the mediators when it is part of the conflict? That is why there is a lack of trust in the process, because the government is playing a double role. On what basis are militants handing over arms to a party with whom they are involved in a conflict? Third, crude oil and gas are international commodities, not only on the basis of their consumption but also their production and distribution. Multinational corporations like Shell, Agip, Exxon-Mobile and Chevron are important stakeholders in Nigerian crude oil. Nigeria's oil is vital for global energy security; the security of the Gulf of Guinea is likewise a requirement of international maritime trade. Nigeria's partners, including the U.S., the UK and other leading members of the G8 and European Union (EU) are dependent on the availability of oil. Given these facts, the international community has an important role to play - ranging from funding, technical assistance, confidence building mechanism, to monitoring - in the implementation of the amnesty programme. The government insistence on handling the Niger Delta crisis strictly as an internal matter falls short of international best practices of DDR. This has resulted in the very low level of mutual trust, and credible and sustained progress.

## MEND Factor and Leaders of the Freedom Fighters

The Niger Delta conflict is complex. Its complexity lies in the fact that it has created large armies of local leaders who survive on the conflict. Therefore, much of the success of the amnesty and rehabilitation depends on how the post-amnesty programme incorporates the ex-combatant leaders. The leaders of militant groups are as numerous as the ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. Among the leaders are Henry Okah; Ateke Tom; Mujahid Asari Dokubo; Government Tompolo; Soboma George; Ebebiwakei Victor (a.k.a General Boyloaf); Fara Dagogo; Commander John Togo; Solomon Ndigbare (a.k.a Osama bin Laden); Ngologolo Toroma; Sobomabo Jackrich (a.k.a. Egbripapa); Young Shall Grow; and Jomo Gbomo (See Appendix A). It appears that most of the leaders did not surrender their arms and as such their fate is unknown. "Even the government knows we can't submit all our weapons" (TELL (Nigeria) magazine October 12, 2009, p23). Thus the ex-leader still possesses the capacity to continue the conflict. The recent killing of Soboma George, the leader of the 'Outlawed group' suggests that all is not well, and that ex-combatant leaders are idle and their lives are not safe.

Some of them are questioning whether turning in their arms was a mistake. The President of Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Chris Ekiyo, said

“We are beginning to ask questions if we actually took the right decision. Those at the helm of affairs already know the problem and we should not be at the planning phase at this time implementing an agenda that must have been proffered since 2007 till date. It has been 30 days since we accepted the amnesty programme. We are tired of meetings” (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) November 8, 2009, p71)

The recent declaration by the MEND that it was returning to the creeks to resume its militant activities, is a frightening indication of the unraveling of the amnesty programme. This point was reiterated by MEND in its statement calling off the three-month-old ceasefire. MEND, like other stakeholders, is concerned that there are no positive movements signaling willingness by the political class and the government to address the fundamental grievances. It is necessary to ascertain the attitudes of some of the well-known leaders of ex-combatants who surrendered last year. So, where are General Boy Loaf, Ateke Tom, Government Tompolo, and others? Have they become history? MEND is returning to the creeks; what is the response of amnesty committee? Henry Okah and his MEND faction have not hidden their disdain for the Federal Government, the oil companies and the amnesty offer. He said “his group would continue its campaign against the oil companies, who they want out of the land” (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) Sunday, November 8, 2009, p26). To show its readiness to fight, MEND breached its 56-day cease fire on the 19<sup>th</sup> Dec 2009 by attacking a major Shell/Chevron crude pipeline, involving 35 of MEND’s fighters, armed with assault rifles, rocket launchers and heavy caliber machine guns in Abonemma, Rivers State (*The Guardian*, December 20, 2009, p1); and on 30 January, 2010 MEND threatened attacks on oil installation and oil service companies due to the failure of government to engage the Niger Delta militants on ‘true dialogue founded on a sincere desire to bring justice to the people’ (*The Guardian* (Nigeria) newspaper, January 31, 2010, p1).

The unsettled leaders of ex-combatants and MEND’s bellicosity are food for thought. The signs are clear that the politicians will fall back on these leaders to achieve their political agenda. The reduction in conflict in the region is not so much based on the merits of the amnesty programmes, but on the ex-militants and their leaders’ desires for a modicum of freedom to enjoy their loots before the 2011 political power struggles. MEND is ready to resume on the path of aggression as long as the intransigencies of the factional leader, Henry Okah, are not contained and the demands of the Niger Delta people are not addressed.

## **The 2011 Presidential Election and Peace in the Niger Delta**

The relative peace in the Niger Delta region is a ‘time bomb peace’, peace achieved not through dialogue. Furthermore, any conflict resolution that imposes peace, especially in a resource related conflict, can hardly endure. Nevertheless, whenever there is an implied “loss”, the peace may not be as stable and sustainable. The amnesty by the federal government was basically due to the dwindling revenue from oil, through the disruption of oil exploration and exploitation by the militant activities. It was not initiated based on the genuine demands of the oil communities nor on the objective conditions of the oil communities – environmental damages, poverty and displacement of people from their ancestral land.

The fragile peace is sustained by two critical factors. First, is the ascendance of Dr. Jonathan Ebele Goodluck, who is from the Niger Delta region, to the position of the President of

Nigeria. There is this sense of belonging, by the people of Niger Delta region, that they are having a stake in the central state authority and power. Therefore, there is an unwritten message not to 'undermine their own brother in state power': This language is preached by the community leaders to the youth. This explains the recent meeting by the leaders of ex-combatants in Akwa Ibom, and the leaders resolved thus:

Oil producing region will boil if Jonathan was not given the chance to continue in office. For the fragile peace in the country to stand the test of time, Nigerians must allow Jonathan to complete the eight year tenure of the late president Yar'Adua. If Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan is not allowed to continue beyond 2011, there will be serious conflict in the country (*Daily Sun* (Nigeria) August 23, 2010 p11).

The second factor is war weariness and the combatants' desire for freedom to enjoy their oil loot. Life in the creek had been very uncomfortable for most of the combatants, and this is rather incongruent for their degree of wealth. What made the violent struggle in the Niger Delta attractive is the unfettered access to steal crude oil in large quantities and for the combatants to sell this valuable resource. The estimation of the gain, according to Chief Frank Kokori, a one-time chairman of oil workers in Nigeria and a Niger Delta indigene, is that a "militant leader makes about N200 million in a month; that's the leader. But for the junior ones, each makes at least between N5, N10, or N15 million in a month" (*The Guardian*, (Nigeria) November 8, 2009, p75). The report by *Tell* (Nigeria) magazine stated that after ex-combatant leader Government Tompolo, surrendered his arms and ammunition, he entered and rode in a Hummer Jeep, in company of his pretty wife, to his village. Therefore, the ex-combatants have made so much illicit money through oil bunkering and ransom from kidnapping, that the relaxation of hostility is a recipe to savour their wealth.

## Conclusion

This paper examined the complex nature of oil resources and conflicts from within the Niger Delta, and identified oil resources as both the mainstay of the economy and the reason for intransigence of militant youths in the region. The militant youths have taken advantage of the lack of basic facilities, environmental pollution and the excruciating poverty among the oil producing communities to rebel and indulge in oil theft. The Presidential amnesty, as implemented, is pacific in nature. But it has neither addressed the core demands of the community people nor helped to contain militancy in the region. The postulation is that the rehabilitation camp of the ex-militant has been turned into a recruitment venue for political mercenaries and also provides a rendezvous for ex-militants to strategize their next line of action. The amnesty has three fundamental challenges before it: first, the failure to involve the international community in the amnesty package; the international community would have served as a quality control agency and fended off the crisis of confidence with regard to government sincerity. It would have ensured that the processes in place meet international standards in terms of transparency. The issue of militancy in the Niger Delta is already an international conflict, the arms and ammunition are supplied by the international community, and they are not produced in the Niger Delta. Also, the oil companies are multinational economic establishments, and therefore the international community should be part of the solution to the crisis. Second, the government focused so much on guns and militants, but did not focus on the communities and victims of this crisis. The focus on gun is a major lacuna, because the youths who did not take up arms are left out in the amnesty policy, and they continuously agitate for inclusion at every given opportunity. Third, there is no well thought-out post-amnesty plan. The announcement of amnesty was done without legislation and a fiscal budget, and therefore, government's funding of the entire process is merely *ad*

*hoc*. For a sustainable peace in the Niger Delta, the government must devise measures to manage these challenges. Otherwise ex-militants will go back to the creeks to prepare for a more devastating conflict that may likely take the form of secession.

## **Note about the author**

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## Appendix A

### ARMS AND AMMUNITION SURRENDERED BY EX-MILITANTS

#### Commander Ngologolo Toroma

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	quality	date submitted
1.	mg riffle	3	22/08/2009
2.	ak 47 riffle	4	"
3.	lar riffle	1	
4.	g3 riffle	6	
5.	sterling smg riffle	1	
6.	g3 empty magazine	6	
7.	ak 47 empty magazine	4	
8.	smg empty magazine	1	
9.	9mnlive ammunition	16 rds	
10.	7.62 short live ammunition	121 rds	
11.	7.62 ball live ammunition	291 rds	
12.	dnamites nitrocellulose	11/2 3kg	
13.	improved explosive device	1	

**Commander Pius Wariya**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	ak 47 riffle	2	22/08/2009
2.	ak 47 empty magazine	2	22/08/2009

**General Ogun Boss**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	ak 47 riffle	31	22/08/2009
2.	ar riffle	1	22/08/2009
3.	rocket launcher	1	22/08/2009
4.	mg riffle	1	22/08/2009
5.	g3 riffle	3	22/08/2009
6.	lar riffle	1	22/08/2009
7.	fcn riffle	1	22/08/2009
8.	mark 4 riffle	2	22/08/2009
9.	dynamite stike	1x2kg	22/08/2009
10.	anti personnel rocket accessory	1	“
11.	electric detector	4 pieces	“
12.	non electric detector	17 pieces	“
13.	ak 47 empty magazine	105	“
14.	ar empty magazine	5	“
15.	g3 empty magazine	2	“
16.	lar empty magazine	7	“

17.	walkie talkie	2	“
18.	icon walkie talkie	2	“
19.	base set	2	“
20.	walkie talkie charges	3	“
21.	Binocular	1	“
22.	camouflage uniform with trousers	6	“
23.	Hats	2	“
24.	t. shirt	1	“
25.	2yds of camouflage		“
26.	7.26mm short live ammunition	2,228rds	“
27.	7.26mm ball live ammunition	199rds	“

**General Iheme Ebite**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	mg riffle	1	22/08/2009
2.	ak 47 riffle	3	22/08/2009
3.	g3 riffle	3	“
4.	mg empty magazine	1	“
5.	g3 empty magazine	3	“
6.	ak 47 empty magazine	20	“
7.	7.62mm ball live ammunition	45rds	“

8.	7.62mm short live ammunition	277rds	“
9.	short nickers camouflage uniform	4	“
10.	bullet proof jacket	1	“
11.	Home-made bomb	8 pieces	“
12.	canister (tear gas)	1	“
13.	charms		“

### **Inatimi Eleberi**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	ak 47 riffle	1	22/08/2009
2.	locally made pistol	1	22/08/2009
3.	ak 47 empty magazine	2	“
4.	7.62mm live ammunition	5rds	“

### **Peace Advocate**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	brownie pistol	1	22/08/2009
2.	brownie pistol empty magazine	1	22/08/2009
3.	7.6mm live ammunition	6rds	“
4.	lar riffle	1	“

**General Africa**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	ak 47 riffle	70	22/08/2009
2.	assault riffle	7	22/08/2009
3.	lar riffle	8	"
4.	fnc riffle	1	"
5.	sterling smg riffle	2	"
6.	smg model 12 riffle	1	"
7.	g3 riffle	9	"
8.	smoke pistol	1	"
9.	rocket launcher	5	"
10.	mg riffle	10	"
11.	gp mg riffle	6	"
12.	special single barrel gun	1	"
13.	gun boat	4	"
14.	pirotechnic (smoke signal)	10 pieces	"
15.	anti personnel rocket and accessories	5 units	"
16.	tear gas canisters	2	"
17.	brandy riffle	2	"
18.	7.62mm short live ammunition	11705 rds	"
19.	7.62mm ball live ammunition	2851 rds	"
20.	gp mg live ammunition	266 rds	"

21.	5.56mm live ammunition	2350 rds	“
22.	ak 47 empty magazine	289	“
23.	assault type 60 empty magazine	23	“
24.	fnc empty magazine	2	“
25.	g3 empty magazine	12	“
26.	lar empty magazine	7	“
27.	camouflage bullet proof jacket	20	“
28.	camouflage uniform	26 pairs	“
29.	army helmet	2	“

**Commander Sunder Olomu**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	g3 riffle	1	22/08/2009
2.	ak 47 riffle	1	“
3.	double barrel	2	“
4.	single barrel	2	“
5.	g3 empty magazine	2	“
6.	ak 47 empty magazine	1	“
7.	5.56 live ammunition	5rd	“
8.	7.62 live ammunition	9 rds	“
9.	live cartridge	2	“
10.	dynamites improved explosive devices (ied)	10	“

11.	strands of safety fuse	2	“
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**Commander Lagos 21/08/2009**

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	Quality	date submitted
1.	g3 riffle	1	21/08/2009
2.	ak 47 riffle	9	”
3.	k.2 riffle	1	“
4.	lar riffle	1	“
5.	lg riffle	2	“
6.	pump action gun	2	“
7.	ak 47 empty magazine	44	“
8.	g3 empty magazine	1	“
9.	k2 empty magazine	1	“
10.	lar empty magazine	2	“
11.	95rds of chain bullet of mg 7.62mm short		“
12.	5.56mm live ammunition	166rds	“
13.	7.62mm ball	18rds	“
14.	7.62mm short	1314rds	“

**Gen. Osei Clever**

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	Quality	date submitted
1.	mg riffle	1	21/08/2009
2.	ak 47 riffle	5	“

3.	lar riffle	6	“
4.	g3 riffle	9	“
5.	Barrera pistol	1	“
6.	k2 riffle	1	“
7.	pump action gun	2	“
8.	mg empty magazine	4	“
9.	ak 47 empty magazine	6	“
10.	k2 empty magazine	1	“
11.	lar empty magazine	3	“
12.	7.62mm live ammunition	29	“

**Commander Lammy**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	g3 riffle	3	21/08/2009
2.	mg riffle	6	“
3.	lar riffle	1	“
4.	betteta riffle	3	“
5.	fnc riffle	1	“
6.	ak 47 riffle	2	“
7.	sub machine gun riffle	1	“
8.	pump action	5	“
9.	local made single barrel	5	“
10.	double barrel riffle	1	“
11.	local made double barrel pistol	1	“

12.	gun boats without board engine	2	
13.	smg empty magazine	1	“
14.	mg empty magazine	5	“
15.	anti riot grenades	2	“
16.	roll of dynamites with 2 fuses	6	“
17.	aa cartridges	50	“

### Commander Area

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	Quality	date submitted
1.	g3 riffle	5	27/08/2009
2.	k2 riffle	1	“
3.	fnc riffle	1	“
4.	mark 4 riffle	2	“
5.	Dane gun d barrel	1	“
6.	Dane gun single barrel	1	“
7.	dynamite launcher	2	“
8.	g3 empty magazine	2	“
9.	mark 4 empty magazine	1	“
10.	fnc empty magazine	1	“
11.	live cartridges	27rds	“
12.	7.62mm special live ammunition	36rds	“
13.	7.62mm auto live	16rds	“

	ammunition		
14.	9mm live ammunition	5rds	“
15.	unclassified live pistol ammunition	3rds	“

**Commander Ayaye Agelli**

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	quality	date submitted
1.	rocket launcher	1	29/08/2009
2.	pump action gun	4	“
3.	fnc riffle	1	“
4.	locally made pistol	1	“
5.	double barrel gun	1	“

**Eward Youdiwei**

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	Quality	date submitted
1.	fnc riffle	2	28/08/2009
2.	pump action	4	“
3.	Rpg	1	“
4.	double barrel	1	“
5.	7.62mm short live ammunition 7.62mm auto live ammunition 9mm live ammunition	700rds	“

6.	rpg bomb	1	“
7.	rpg launcher	1	“
8.	Dynamites	6 sticks	“
9.	dynamite cup	21	“
10.	fnc empty magazine	3	“
11.	live cartridge	1	“

**Commander Ngologolo**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	mg riffle	3	27/08/2009
2.	ak 47 riffle	4	“
3.	lar riffle	1	“
4.	g3 riffle	6	“
5.	sterling smg riffle	1	“
6.	g3 empty magazine	6	“
7.	ak 47 empty magazine	4	“
8.	smg empty magazine	1	“
9.	9mn live ammunition	16rds	“
10.	7.62mm short live ammunition	121rds	“
11.	7.62 ball live ammunition	291rds	“
12.	dynamites nitrocellulose	11/23kg	“
13.	improvised explosive device	1	“

**The Young Shall Grow**

<b>s/no</b>	<b>type of weapon/ammunition</b>	<b>Quality</b>	<b>date submitted</b>
1.	ak 47 riffle	30	5/09/2009
2.	ak machine gun	3	“
4.	fn machine gun	1	“
5.	dpl mg	4	“
6.	mark 4 riffle	1	“
7.	Smg	5	“
8.	k.2 riffle	1	“
9.	rpg 7	2	“
10.	pump action	3	“
11.	signal pistol	9	“
12.	locally made short pistol single barrel	3	“
13.	g.3 riffle	21	“
14.	English made single barrel	4	“
15.	hmg (high machine gun)	4	“
16.	agl (automatic grenade launcher)	2	“
17.	7.62mm (sp) ball	2,350rds	“
18.	7.62mm (sp) link	71rds	“
19.	7.62mm rim balls	1967rds	“
20.	7.62mm rim balls	2,500rds	“
21.	7.62mm rim link	340rds	“
22.	7.62mm nato balls	11,616rds	“

23.	7.62mm nato metal link	329rds	“
24.	k.2 riffle ammo (223 Remington)	1,530rds	“
25.	.50mm link	2,440rds	“
26.	.40mm h.e. (for a.g.l.)	54rds	“
27.	rpg 7 bomb (big size)	2rds	“
28.	rpg 7 bomb (small size)	3rds	“
29.	anti-riot bomb	88rds	“
30.	ak 47 magazine	155	“
31.	fn magazine	9	“
32.	g3 magazine	17	“
33.	rpg 7 charger	5	“
34.	smg magazine	3	“
35.	mark 4 magazine	1	“
36.	agl/hmg accessories	9	“

**Commander Monday Toromo**

s/no	type of weapon/ammunition	Quality	date submitted
1.	g3 riffle	1	08/09/2009
2.	fnc riffle	1	“
3.	7.62mm short live ammunition	29 rds	“
4.	g3 empty magazine	1	“

**Source: TELL (Nigeria) Magazine. “Niger Delta: The Arms; Time Bomb” pp24-26**

## Appendix B

### The Niger Delta Communities' Demands and Government Response

Demands of the Niger Delta Communities	Niger Delta Technical Committee Recommendations	Government Responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ownership and control of the oil resources;</li> <li>• fiscal federalism,</li> <li>• re-defining the relations between the oil companies and host communities,</li> <li>• self determination and resource control,</li> <li>• withdrawal of the army and the Joint Task Force from the communities,</li> <li>• increase derivation formula to 50%,</li> <li>• reversal of the land use act and the Petroleum Decrees,</li> <li>• sovereign national conference,</li> <li>• political and economic autonomy,</li> <li>• master plan for rapid infrastructural</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• increase immediately the Delta's allocation from oil and gas revenues from the present 13 per cent to 25 per cent, to be dedicated largely to new infrastructure and sustainable development of the region;</li> <li>• complete within six months initial steps to support a process for disarming youths involved in militancy, including a comprehensive ceasefire and pull-back of forces; bail (with a view to an eventual negotiated release) for Henry Okah; credible amnesty conditions; a negotiated undertaking by militant groups to stop all kidnappings, hostage taking and attacks on oil installations; and formation of a Demobilisation,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 15% derivation to oil producing states;</li> <li>• creation of special agencies or commissions for Niger Delta development such as Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC); Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC); etc;</li> <li>• establishment of Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs;</li> <li>• creation of special military force such as Joint Task Force (JTF) to contain militancy;</li> <li>• granting of Amnesty for</li> </ul>

<p>development in the Niger Delta region.</p>	<p>Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) Commission;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• improve the operational integrity of security forces and police in the Delta sufficiently to assure communities and businesses about their safety;</li> <li>• establish by mid-2009, with state and local governments, a Youth Employment Scheme (YES) to give at least 2,000 young people community work in each local government of the nine Delta states;</li> <li>• complete by June 2010 the work to turn the East-West Road from Calabar to Lagos into a dual carriageway and the construction of at least a link road to the coast in each state, backed by a fully funded roads maintenance program;</li> <li>• ensure by June 2010 a total of 5,000mw of power for the</li> </ul>	<p>the Niger Delta Militants;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (DDR) Commission;</li> <li>• 10% stake in the Nigerian share of oil and gas Joint Ventures (JV) for oil producing communities.</li> </ul>
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	<p>Delta region;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• strengthen independent regulation of oil pollution, including work towards an effective environmental impact assessment (EIA) mechanism, and end gas flaring by 31 December 2008, as previously ordered by the federal government; and</li><li>• rehabilitate all health care facilities and give free medical care to those 65 and above, children under five, and pregnant women, as well as free drugs to malaria patients.</li></ul>	
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