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Rethinking Post-War Security Promotion

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Abstract

The intensity and complexity of post-war violence routinely exceeds expectations. Many development and security specialists fear that, if left unchecked, mutating violence can potentially tip 'fragile' societies back into war. An array of 'conventional' security promotion activities are regularly advanced to prevent this from happening, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and other forms of security sector reform (SSR). Meanwhile, a host of less widely recognised examples of security promotion activities are emerging that deviate from – and also potentially reinforce – DDR and SSR. Innovation and experimentation by mediators and practitioners has yielded a range of promising activities designed to mitigate the risks and symptoms of post-war violence including *interim stabilisation* measures and *second generation* security promotion interventions. Drawing on original evidence, this article considers a number of critical determinants of post-war violence that potentially shape the character and effectiveness of security promotion on the ground. It then issues a typology of security promotion practices occurring before, during and after more conventional interventions such as DDR and SSR. Taken together, the identification of alternative approaches to security promotion implies a challenging new research agenda for the growing field of security and development.

Introduction

The security and development sectors are seized by the issue of bringing stability to 'feral', 'fragile' and 'war-torn' states. Together with reinforcing the rule of law, good (enough) governance and democratic elections, a clutch of multilateral and bilateral donors routinely promote conventional security promotion activities to ease the 'transition' from war to peace.[i] Activities such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and other forms of security sector reform (SSR) – notably arms control, mine action and transitional justice – are now familiar pillars of the post-war recovery and reconstruction edifice. They are considered by many experts to be central to bolstering state stability and advancing the peace-building project. More ominously, concerns are mounting that these interventions are, at best, falling short of expectations and in some instances doing more harm than good. Scholars disagree, however, whether their shortcomings can be attributed to external factors (e.g. the 'ripeness' of the post-war setting) or intrinsic weaknesses of conventional security mechanisms themselves.

A critical literature is emerging that questions the ambition and possible over-stretch of the peace- and state-building enterprise.[ii] Social scientists are vigorously interrogating the benchmarks, metrics, and indicators of success[iii] and the real dividends of peace agreements[iv] and peace-keeping[v] in preventing 'peaceful' countries in returning to war. Development and security practitioners are adopting a more critical perspective, in some cases challenging the basic assumptions underpinning the 'fragile state' and 'state-building' paradigms. Some critics are beginning to ask whether essentialist categories such as 'state fragility' and 'post-conflict' adequately capture the complex risks and symptoms of armed violence on the ground.[vi] Others are questioning whether the state is even the most appropriate referent for designing security promoting interventions, and are urging for more focus on 'fragile cities' and 'ungoverned spaces' in and around the urban metropolis instead (Sassen 2008). These semantic debates generate immediate consequences for policy and practice.[vii]

The aetiology of post-war violence is undergoing a critical re-appraisal. Social science researchers and epidemiologists are documenting how the spatial, temporal and demographic dynamics of post-war violence stray from linear and predictable trajectories.[viii] Rather, they are finding that post-war violence often mutates and assumes new characteristics – including political, predatory and communal dimensions – that are potentially mutually reinforcing. 'Classic' efforts to promote security and stability in the aftermath of war – including the introduction of peace agreements[ix], peace keeping forces[x], DDR and SSR – are on their own unable to reign in post-war violence. Moreover, some security specialists fear that the grafting-on of such interventions from above can gloss over important complexities below.[xi] It is now widely accepted that the premature and formulaic resort to conventional security interventions without sufficient accounting for local contextual factors can potentially do more harm than good.[xii]

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More optimistically, a growing number of scholars are identifying opportunities for improving practice.[xiii] If security promotion is to be made more effective, they argue, interventions must be crafted on the basis of a sound analysis of the contextual (pre-) determinants shaping post-war violence to begin with. This article follows closely in their footsteps and proposes a range of macro- and micro-determinants that should be carefully accounted for in security promotion activities of any type. More radically, it describes the emerging *practice* of security promotion from the field, including a host of embryonic interim stabilisation interventions and second generation security promotion activities designed to prevent and reduce armed violence in the aftermath of war. Although nascent and untested, many of these initiatives represent a new horizon for stabilisation missions and offer a progressive agenda for the development and security sectors.

Conventional security promotion

Conventional security promotion activities such as DDR and SSR are considered a *sine qua non* of contemporary peace support and recovery operations.[xiv] Prior to the 1980s, disarmament and demobilisation schemes and certain efforts to extend the 'rule of law' were conceived and executed by and for the security establishments and shaped by the geo-political imperatives of Cold War cooperation. Specifically, DDR was frequently directed exclusively at former soldiers and in some cases liberation or guerrilla movements.[xv] As multilateral and bilateral involvement in peace support operations expanded, the first UN-sanctioned DDR operation was launched in Southern Africa in the late 1980s, with additional missions soon taking off in Central America and the Balkans in the 1990s.

Meanwhile, efforts to strengthen the security sector were quietly pursued by inter-governmental arrangements. These activities tended to be limited primarily to military support and the discrete provision of technical assistance. During the 1990s in the context of the 'new defence diplomacy', multilateral and bilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) began promoting democratic civil-military relations in the 'transitional' countries of Central and Eastern Europe. With the entry of other actors such as the European Union (EU), non-military elements of the security sector were targeted such as the police, border guards and judicial institutions.[xvi] Civilian police (CIVPOL) components attached to UN peace support operations emerged, with growing emphasis on rule of law and judicial reform.

Since the 1990s, DDR and SSR interventions were launched in a growing array of post-war contexts and assumed an expanding range of goals. In the case of DDR, these ranged from efforts to diminish the prospects for war recurrence[xvii], reduce military expenditures, and re-assert the state's monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion to more micro-objectives including the collection and destruction of weapons, neutralising spoilers, shattering command and control of factions and

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promoting sustainable livelihoods. As for SSR, interventions were focused not just on improving and restructuring service delivery and 'right sizing' military and police entities, but also ensuring civilian management and democratic accountability over the entire security sector, strengthening the rule of law, enhancing transparency in procurement and budgeting, providing training in the police use of force and human rights, and investing in community policing and relevant civilian institutions.[xviii]

Considered indispensable to peace- and state-building, DDR and SSR operations soon began to expand in reach and multiply in number (see Figure 1). A growing number of UN agencies and development organisations began to assume a more assertive role in such activities.[xix] Unsurprisingly, categories of recipients or 'beneficiaries' soon rapidly extended beyond a narrow preoccupation with ex-combatants and military, police and justice officials to account for 'vulnerable groups' (e.g. dependents, women, children, infirm) and 'communities' to which erstwhile soldiers might be returned. Conventional security promotion soon began to reflect a wider process of institutional transformation and, in certain cases, wholesale social engineering (Pouligny 2004).[xx] As prescriptions for more comprehensive and integrated approaches took hold in the late 1990s, security promotion activities were linked with other thematic priorities, from poverty reduction and good (enough) governance to food security and transitional justice.[xxi]

Figure 1. Distribution of DDR programmes: 1989-2008

Source: Muggah (2009)

Efforts soon turned to standardizing and professionalizing DDR and SSR and ensuring it adequately reflected security *and* development priorities. While each was characterised by separate policy and epistemic communities, in the case of the former, the most recent initiative includes the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) (UNWG 2006). Assembled by an UN-working group between

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2004 and 2006, the IDDRS laid out a list of standards and procedures in twenty four chapters.[xxii] Another standard-setting exercise designed to distil lessons and good practice from DDR was the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR).[xxiii] Key themes emerging from these exercises included the political dynamics of DDR during peace negotiations, the role and influence of specific contextual factors in shaping the timing and sequencing of conventional security interventions, and the centrality of 'local ownership' in the design of relevant programmes.[xxiv]

In the case of the SSR, donors and policy makers aligned with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) developed a handbook on security *system* reform (OECD 2007). [xxv] Designed to encourage more engagement from development agencies in the 'system' of public security delivery, the guidance quickly assumed a gold standard against which future interventions would be assessed, designed, supported, monitored and evaluated. Even certain governments traditionally wary of multilateral approaches to security promotion, including the United States, supported doctrinal shifts that mirrored key prescriptions issued in the handbook.[xxvi] While the standards and guidance featuring in the IDDRS and the handbook may well enhance coherence and integration in the long term, the vast majority of on-going initiatives have yet to benefit from these 'best practices'. In fact, as the cases of Afghanistan, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan and others amply reveal, many DDR and related SSR interventions simply failed to lift off.[xxvii]

Conventional security promotion interventions are routinely confounded by a host of factors in post-war settings. On the one hand, they typically confront resistance from above, that is, national governments, warring parties, elites and international agencies, some of whom can be deeply invested in monopolising certain forms of violence to shore-up patronage networks. As is well known to policy makers and practitioners, DDR and SSR interventions are likewise conditioned by strategic competition between and amongst multilateral and bilateral donors who may be preoccupied with geopolitical and sector-specific interests. On the other hand, the security promotion enterprise is invariably influenced by an array of local power brokers and civil society actors from below.[xxviii] The extent to which these agents are invested in the benefits of violence (or peace) and the post-war economy will shape their preparedness to promote legitimate security on the ground.[xxix] Since such interventions are fundamentally about (re)establishing the state's monopoly over the means of legitimate coercion, politics and power-sharing – especially in the emerging security sector – necessarily resides at the heart of the enterprise.

Determinants of security promotion

In thinking through options for post-war security promotion, it is useful to revisit the factors shaping post-war violence. We distinguish between macro- and micro-level determinants that condition insecurity in post-war

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states. Macro-level factors include, *inter alia*, the *character of war and post-war environments*; the *configuration of the peace process*; and the *capacity and reach of governments*, particularly in relation to service provision. Micro-level determinants here refer to the *absorptive capacities of affected communities*, especially in relation to livelihoods and property rights; *the character, cohesiveness and motivations of a heterogeneous constellation of armed groups and combatants*; and the *timeliness and appropriateness of specific entitlements* issued in the course of security promotion (see Figure 2). In the rush to design and implement interventions, many of these macro- and micro-level determinants are not adequately taken into account by decision-makers and practitioners.

Figure 2. A typology of macro- and micro-determinants

Macro	Causes, dynamics, duration and after-effects of armed conflict
	Nature of peace process including whether it was imposed, mediated, or a function of victor's justice
	Governance capacity/reach of the state and service-delivery capacities of public authorities
Micro	Absorptive capacities, especially labour market access and productive assets (property, capital)
	Character, cohesiveness and motivations of armed groups and receptor communities
	Security promotion entitlements such as monetary incentives, area-based assistance or related services

Macro-level determinants

Whether a country or society emerges from an internal war, a war of independence, a cross-border war or a state of generalized collective violence, matters fundamentally in shaping the parameters of security provision. Different *armed conflict 'types'* – whether cross-border or internal and long or short, ideological, identity and or environmental scarcity driven – also feature different underlying causes, risk factors, interests and dynamics. The nature of an armed conflict will inevitably shape the level of trust and confidence of particular warring parties to the terms of the post-war dispensation. For example, in ideological armed conflicts such as the Maoists in Nepal, political, population, and territorial control were key objectives. In such cases, conventional micro-disarmament will be a non-starter. Rather, the storage and management of arms (within reach of the Maoists), the 'professionalisation' of the Maoist army (in preparation for military integration) and 'democratisation' of the national Nepali army (redistribution of power in the security sector) were more plausible objectives.[xxx]

The *nature of a peace process* as well as attendant parameters and funding mechanisms invariably shape the suitability and character of specific security promotion options. As such, the way in which an armed

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conflict is terminated (whether imposed, negotiated or mediated by a third party) is a critical factor conditioning the willingness of various parties to enter into collective action. To the extent that there is a clear victor, certain elements of security sector reform can be (temporarily) postponed as the terms for power sharing and control (e.g. composition and rank allocation) within the security sector are less open to 'negotiation'. As will be discussed at length below, *military integration* can precede SSR and DDR as was the case in Cambodia absorbing Khmer Rouge, Funcinpec, and other smaller factional forces and with a modest number of *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) 'defectors' serving in clandestine roles in Colombia (Colletta et al. 2008). In the Philippines, many Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines after the 1996 peace accord were later deployed in integrated units on the front lines against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Governance capacity, justice provision and the reach of the state are other factors that are central to the dispensation of security. Security and justice provision are (in theory) public goods, even if frequently privately administered. The legitimacy bestowed on a government and its security apparatus are thus frequently measured by the extent to which they can supply real and perceived (national and human) security. In many post-war environments, the absence of publicly-administered security can lead to the creation of liminal and un-governed spaces – often filled with alternative forms of private security provision (Muggah forthcoming). A credibility gap emerges where states are unable to provide a minimum of (public) security to returning combatants and communities, or though restructured military and police organs. Even so, it should be recalled that in many environments the state has no history of transparently or evenly delivering security and justice throughout its territory and people may neither expect nor demand enhanced service delivery.

Micro-level determinants

Another challenge facing traditional security promotion activities such as DDR relates to ensuring their sustainability. In the case of DDR, 'reintegration' is often focused narrowly on the skills and needs of individuals and their immediate dependents. More attention is devoted to the type, timing and appropriateness of basic entitlements than to the *labour absorptive capacity of local areas for reintegration*. Nevertheless, the economic base and market opportunities available in specific post-war contexts may play a more decisive role in shaping the outcomes of DDR and SSR.[xxxi] Muggah (2009) detected that the generally positive outcomes of Ethiopia's demobilisation and reintegration programme (2001-2003) was shaped not by individual hand-outs or even vocational training, but by the absorptive capacity of areas of return. Although climactic factors such as drought distorted production and local markets, most local economies were not ravaged by the cross-border war with Eritrea which had been confined to the north.[xxxii] This stands in contrast to national and sub-national economies of southern Sudan, Angola, Liberia or Sierra Leone all devastated by decades of war and where absorptive capacities were frayed and depleted.

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Another micro-factor influencing the potential for security promotion relates to the *social and cultural characteristics and motivations* of affected communities, former armed groups and erstwhile violence entrepreneurs. For example, the nature and breadth of social capital in a particular community and the levels of human capital, extent of social cohesion, and aspirations of senior commanders and rank and file, are all hugely significant factors shaping the design, execution and outcomes of security promotion. In the case of Afghanistan, Aceh and Timor-Leste, DDR was undertaken in an instrumental fashion: it explicitly sought to reshape the rationalities, techniques, and organising practices of armed violence. But in each of these settings, conventional security promotion neglected the variegated interests of armed groups and receptor communities and many gains quickly evaporated (Muggah 2009).

An additional micro-level determinant of post-war violence relates to the *entitlements* introduced as part of a security promotion initiative. Proponents of DDR, for example, often unconsciously assume a number of biases in the provision of incentives and allocation of assistance. Inputs are frequently monetised and provided to individuals rather than groups or communities, inadvertently generating tensions with those who perceive violence entrepreneurs being 'rewarded'.[xxxiii] In many cases, entitlements assume a 'rural bias' with presumptions of a return to an idealised bucolic agricultural existence. Such programmes may fail to take account of the displacement and migratory patterns of former combatants, many of whom may have come from, or settled in, cities. The predictability of such entitlements is at least as important as the quantity of assistance. Where inputs are promised but not delivered on time, they can contribute to moral hazard. When promised assistance does not materialise in a consistent or routine fashion, material (and social) conditions of households and individuals can also deteriorate. Where training and other inputs are offered after the fact, individual may have little incentive to continue the course without the means to invest.

Promoting security after war

Although the number and intensity of armed conflicts appear to be in decline since the early 1990s[xxxiv], post-war violence simmers on. More positively, certain lessons associated with preventing and reducing armed violence in multiple contexts are being learned.[xxxv] There is evidence that over the past decade, security promotion activities are adjusting to the dynamic landscapes of post-war armed violence. Both 'second generation peace-keeping'[xxxvi] in the wake of operations in the former-Yugoslavia and Somalia and more recent 'stabilisation'[xxxvii] missions following interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have emphasised the value of joining-up military and civilian activities. Against this backdrop, security promotion interventions have also been transforming and adapting as practitioners seek to reduce incoherence and competitive friction, but also because they explicitly recognise how DDR and SSR processes on their own are ill-equipped to reduce post-war insecurity. Conventional DDR and SSR operations focused more narrowly on stability and civilian accountability over the agents and means of

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violence are being complemented with novel interim stabilisation interventions and second generation security promotion activities.

Such evolution and adaptation is suggestive of an element of experimentation and pragmatism. There is evidence that a growing number of security and development actors are registering and responding to risks on the ground – a process more ominously described as the 'securitization of development' (OECD 2008a; Easterly 2008; Duffield 2001). Together with mainstream post-war SSR activities such as mine clearance, truth and reconciliation interventions and international criminal courts, interventions seeking to promote safety and security are flourishing. In some cases, ssecurity promotion activities once confined to war zones are now being applied in ostensibly non-war environments.[xxxviii] And while evidence of 'success' of these newer practices remains comparatively thin, albeit no less meagre than of other conventional security promotion activities, these interventions potentially complement and reinforce conventional strategies. At a minimum, these security promotion activities – many of them long-underway – expand the menu of options available to prevent and reduce armed violence (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. A typology of security promotion activities

	Type	Examples
Interim stabilisation	Civilian service corps	South African Service Corps and the Kosovo Protection Corps
	Military integration arrangements	Brassage process of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), UNITA in Angola
	Transitional security forces	Afghan Militia Forces, Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq
	Dialogue and sensitization programmes	Rwandan *Ingando*-process, Labora farm experiment in Northern Uganda
	Differentiated forms of transitional autonomy	Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Mindanao Autonomy Zone in the Philippines
Second generation	Community security mechanisms	Community security fund in Sudan, community violence reduction in Haiti, safer-cities in Macedonia
	At-risk youth and gang programmes	Gang violence reduction programmes in El Salvador, education and recreation programmes in Brazilian favelas (slums)
	Weapons for development	Weapons in exchange for development in Bosnia, Albania, Mali and Niger
	Weapons lotteries	Weapons and violence reduction for lotteries in Haiti, Mozambique and the Republic of Congo
	Urban renewal and population health programmes	Targeted slum development in Caracas (Venezuela), health-based interventions in Medellin and Cali (Colombia) and Kingston (Jamaica)

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Interim stabilisation

There are many reasons many negotiated peace agreements collapse within five years (Bell 2006). In many cases, reversions occur because the conditions are not ripe in the immediate fragile post-war environment for the implementation of conventional disarmament and demobilisation, key security sector reforms or the social and economic reintegration of former combatants. In their haste to declare peace and promote exit strategies,[xxxix] mediators and negotiating parties may forego the detailed planning and programming required of carefully timed and sequenced *interim stabilisation measures* that accompany conventional security promotion.[xl] Alternatively, such interventions may not even be put on the table by peace mediators and negotiating parties[xli] owing to the vested interests of powerful elite and armed groups.

Interim stabilisation measures are part of broader transitional integration process that seeks to balance adequate security with necessary development. While there is nothing intrinsically benign about such interventions, they can create and sustain a 'holding pattern' focused on transitional mechanisms that keep former combatants cohesiveness intact within a military or civilian structure, buying time and creating space for political dialogue and the formation of an enabling environment for legitimate social and economic reintegration to transpire (Colletta et al. 2008).[xlii] They are designed in such a way as to avoid the unintentional creation of security vacuums in the early stages of post-war transition.

Interim stabilisation measures feature clear and immediate objectives. These are to: dramatically reduce armed violence; consolidate peace and real and perceived security; build confidence and trust and; buy time and space for the macro conditions to ripen for more conventional security promotion activities such as DDR and SSR to take hold, including second generation initiatives. Buying time and space is more important than it may at first appear. In most cases, it is critical to continue practical dialogue among warring parties in order to develop a conventional DDR or SSR framework that outlines parameters for specific interventions. Likewise, time is required in order to constitute bureaucratic structures, policies, and legal instruments essential to DDR and SSR including defence reviews, national security strategies, military laws, reintegration commissions, veterans' policies and bureaus, amnesties and peace and justice legislation.[xliii]

There are at least *five emerging types of interim stabilisation measures*. These include the (i) establishment of civilian service corps; (ii) military or security sector integration arrangements; (iii) creation of transitional security forces; (iv) dialogue, sensitization programmes and related halfway-house arrangements; and (v) different forms of transitional autonomy. These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In most cases, interim stabilisation measures integrate elements resembling the characteristics of two or more of these categories. The end goal of these activities is to ensure the conversion of potential spoilers into stakeholders during the fragile and political distribution of power (particularly with regard to the security sector) and the attendant detailed preparations for the management of arms and armies to an armed conflict.

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Civilian service corps arrangements are usefully illustrated with the cases of the South African Service Corps and the Kosovo Protection Corps. These transitional organisations transform former military groups into transitional civil-military entities (e.g. reconstruction brigades, environmental protection-civilian conservation corps and natural disaster prevention and response corps) through the maintenance of social structures and cohesion but with changed functions and leadership (maintaining control but reshaping command). While far from perfect, they nevertheless address the pressing need to employ and occupy former combatants in some form of controlled, meaningful civilian activity. While they must be carefully managed, these types of arrangements may allow the time and space required for the political process and security situation to consolidate and early recovery efforts to generate greater labour absorption potential in the economy, while at the same time allowing individuals to strengthen their life and vocational skills as they ease into civilian life.

The strategy of *military or security sector integration* is common in many societies emerging from war.[xliv] It is a key interim stabilisation mechanism for 'right-sizing' military and policing structures and ensuring that potential spoilers and legitimate servicemen and women are provided with an ample livelihood. Military integration is exemplified by the *brassage* process (a transitional unification of divergent militia and vetting processes) in the formation of a new army in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the tandem integration and reintegration programme in Burundi, and the integration and subsequent demobilisation of the rebel group UNITA in Angola (Colletta et al. 2008). Variations of the strategy have also been employed in many of the other war and post-war zones (e.g. Colombia[xlv], Rwanda, Uganda[xlvi], the Philippines and Afghanistan) where military integration and the consolidation of security within a single unified national security apparatus preceded a more structured demobilization of rebel groups.

The creation of *transitional security forces* is another interim stabilisation measure. It addresses the often urgent need for temporary stabilisation, legitimate employment of former combatants, and immediate cohesion (mutual self-help) that many former combatants require. The formation of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) bringing together the various militias under a single decentralised force and uniform payroll in Afghanistan in the immediate wake of the fight with the Taliban is one clear example of a transitional security force. Many of these combatants were later demobilised and or integrated into the new national Afghan security system (Ponzio 2007).[xlvii] Of course, such risks involved in not eventually integrating such forces into the national security apparatus and or assisting them to obtain sustainable livelihoods is always there and needs to be carefully managed.

Other interim arrangement includes *dialogue, sensitisation programmes, and halfway house arrangement*s. This category is illustrated by the Rwandan *Ingando*-process, through which former combatants were gathered in camps for 'problem solving sessions' dialogue sessions recounting the causes and taking ownership of the tragedy, exposing mutual myths and stereotypes, and endeavouring to rebuild trust after the deep trauma of the genocide in the spring and summer of 1994.[xlviii]

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Many of the characteristics of this category can also be seen in the examples of Labora farm experiment, an agricultural collective in northern Uganda[xlix] and the creation of a non-governmental organisation for former AUC paramilitaries in Colombia.[l] The effects of long term economic and social marginalisation and stigmatisation are addressed in half-way house arrangements, be they agricultural farms or newly created NGOs to enable a re-socialisation process and adjustment of mindsets and behaviour.

The effects sought by establishing various interim stabilisation mechanisms can also be obtained by allowing a certain level of a*utonomy during a transitional period*. The primary example of such schemes is the agreement between the Government of Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, with Hun Sen's Win-Win-Policy.[li] In this case, social cohesion, local control over governance (including security) and natural resources, and livelihood were exchanged in a clearly defined time period (e.g. three years) for a public affirmation of loyalty to the state.

The above examples of interim stabilisation are particularly effective when existing command structures are reshaped (emphasizing civilian authority) while control and cohesiveness of the rank and file combatants are maintained until conditions are ripe for social and economic reintegration and or military integration. This approach typically plays out at three tiers: at the *state* level as it establishes power sharing and attendant institutional, legal and bureaucratic frameworks for transitional governance; at the *community* level where sensitisation, transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms are established; and at the *individual* level by way of personal security guarantees, a sense of agency and legitimacy through transitional employment, the re-establishment of property rights (asset base), and or life skills training and social-psychological support.

The effectiveness of interim stabilisation arrangements depends on a careful assessment of the local context and an appreciation of the many macro- and micro-level determinants that shape post-war violence. Ground level and cultural realities play a fundamental role in conditioning the parameters of intervention strategies, highlighting again the importance of effective and longitudinal diagnosis and analysis.[lii] There is of course no one-size-fits all approach to promoting post-war security: a range of incentives and organisational or institutional arrangements are possible (ranging from non-governmental agencies, political parties, rural agri-business, urban public service delivery to military, police, customs and intelligence service integration). Moreover, there is recognition that interim stabilisation arrangements should be tightly connected to the over-arching peace- and state-building framework and that there are adequate provisions for financing, coordination, and monitoring.

Second generation security promotion

Second generation security promotion approaches are fast emerging as alternatives and compliments to DDR and SSR, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.[liii] In contrast to conventional security promotion – particularly DDR – they tend to be evidence-led, focusing at the outset on identifying and mitigating demonstrated risk factors, enhancing resilience and protective factors at the metropolitan and community-levels, and constructing interventions on the basis of identified needs. The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for example, have been quietly supporting second generation security promotion under the auspices of reducing household/community violence and poverty for over a decade. Second generation approaches are also inherently 'integrated' in that they bring together a combination of sectors and disciplinary perspectives to address risks and outcomes of post-war violence.

Second generation security promotion activities deliberately shift the focus from top-down and deterrence-based interventions designed and executed by outsiders to activities that actively map out and respond to the agency of perpetrators, group cohesion, and the legitimacy of interventions on the ground. From Southern Sudan to Colombia[liv], El Salvador and Haiti, examples of second generation approaches include: (i) *community security mechanisms*, (ii) *schemes focusing on 'at-risk' youth and gangs*; (iii) *safer-community and safer-city activities;* and (iv) *weapons for development activities and weapons lotteries*. A salient feature of these second generation security promotion interventions is the manner in which they complement and potentially reinforce ongoing conventional interventions such as DDR and SSR and offer locally-tailored solutions.

Community security mechanisms tend to emerge in reaction to, or independently of, DDR activities grafted into UN-mandated peace-support operations. By virtue of their proximity to affected communities, field-based practitioners typically harbour more sensitivity to local contextual factors than do decision-makers and peace negotiators who formulate conventional security packages. Community security mechanisms tend to promote area-based approaches to security promotion, promote collective incentives to enhance compliance, and harness indigenous power brokers and agents of change. 'Community security funds' and 'violence reduction committees' such as those promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Southern Sudan and Haiti may be developed explicitly by municipal authorities in concert with public and private security entities, research institutions and civil society actors.[lv] Community security mechanisms therefore assume integrated and multi-sector approaches. They purposefully build (from the ground up) confidence and legitimacy through enactment by affected populations themselves. It is important to note that their durability and reach may also depend in large part on robust and decentralized public and private authority structures – institutions that may indeed be severely compromised or weakened by protracted armed conflict.

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Likewise, community-driven *gang and gang-related violence reduction activities* in post-war states of Central America can also be categorised as second generation security promotion. For example, interventions focused on so-called *clikas* and their subgroups connected to the *Mara Salvatrucha* or *Barrio Dieciocho* were launched from San Salvador (El Salvador) to Los Angeles (US) (Muggah and Stevenson, forthcoming). Community-led activities such as 'homeboy industries' in the US or the 'center for formation and orientation' in Honduras seek to enhance the resilience of violence-plagued communities. Specifically, they aim to reinforce coordinated public and private sector responses and to provide mentorship, risk education, and alternative livelihoods for would be perpetrators and victims–particularly boys and young men, in poor and marginal communities in countries such as Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala (WOLA 2008).[lvi] They offer important alternatives to enforcement-based *mano dura* approaches that are dangerously popular in the region (WOLA 2008 and Jutersonke et al. forthcoming).

Meanwhile, *'safer-community' and 'safer-city' initiatives* are other examples of second generation security promotion. In some cases, innovative urban design and the effective use of the built environment by city planners, architects, social scientists and community leaders can contribute to a reduction in the opportunity for predatory violence and related fear of victimisation (Moser 2006, 2004). Interventions that support 'territoriality' by fostering neighbourhood interaction and vigilance, 'surveillance' through the identification of hot spots, 'hierarchy of space' through the encouragement of use and ownership of public spaces, 'target hardening' through the strategic use of physical barriers and security devices, 'environment harmonising' by reducing space for conflicting groups, and 'image maintenance' through creating well-maintained spaces all appear to enhance local resilience against violence.[lvii] Other safer-community activities that consciously integrate youth reportedly improve routine safety and security.[lviii]

Second generation interventions consciously engender local ownership and locally legitimate approaches by focusing on existing institutions rather than forming new national bureaucratic structures. They also advance a distinctly demand-side approach to arms control as compared to the supply-side emphasis of conventional security promotion activities (Brauer and Muggah 2006). The introduction of *'weapons for development'* projects in the Albania, Republic of Congo, Mali and Liberia, *'weapons lotteries'* in Mozambique and Haiti's slums, and 'gun free zones' in South Africa and Brazil all offer a multi-pronged approach to preventing and reducing armed violence.[lix] Rather than focusing exclusively on the tools of violence, the emphasis is on the motivations and means shaping their misuse. At the very least, such activities can complement the strengthening of national regulatory frameworks associated with civilian arms ownership; weapons stockpile management or even civilian oversight over the security sector.

It is important to take stock of the lessons emerging from second generation security promotion activities. In all cases, an underlying principle is the scaled-back and facilitative role adopted by international agencies. Central to their effectiveness is locally generated evidence and analysis. Instead of recreating new national-level institutions such as

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commissions or focal points or relying on blunt instruments – second generation security promotion activities are forged on the basis of formal and informal cooperation with existing (including customary) sub-national institutions. Where possible, the initiative, control and responsibility of overseeing interventions reside in the hands of local partners. Local ownership is a hallmark of such initiatives. Although many second generation initiatives are nascent and empirically-demonstrated evidence of their effectiveness is only gradually being assembled, they potentially offer a radical departure from more traditional approaches to encouraging post-war security.

Concluding reflections

Multilateral and bilateral donors are preoccupied with identifying the most effective route to stability, security and violence reduction and state-building in the aftermath of war.[lx] Security-promotion and peace-building interventions routinely feature DDR and other forms of SSR as critical stop-gaps to stem post-war violence. Normative and operational standards and principles are rapidly emerging that seek to define lessons learned and codify best practices. Most of these activities are promoted through a state-centric framework with a view of ensuring the reach of effective public security and neutralising violence entrepreneurs. Notwithstanding the growing appetite for such activities, there is meagre evidence that DDR and SSR yield effective outcomes during (or after) the transition from war to peace.

A recurring challenge facing proponents of security-promotion relates to tailoring interventions to local political and economic realities on the ground. Accounting for key contextual variables in the design, execution and evaluation of conventional security promotion has proven frustratingly difficult. By contrast, interim stabilisation and second generation security promotion initiatives are consciously established on the basis of existing realities and capacities *in situ*. They are deliberately crafted from the political, economic and social facts on the ground and may not always draw exclusively on state institutions, much less the prescriptions and expertise from the headquarters of multilateral and bilateral security and development agencies. Taken together, they offer bottom-up, area-based approaches to security promotion, drawing on a combination of individual and collective incentives to enhance compliance while harnessing indigenous power brokers and agents of change.

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Endnotes

[i] See, for example, OECD (2008a, 2008b).

[ii] See for example Dobbins et al. (2005), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Zuercher (2006), Fortna (2008), and Muggah (2009).

[iii] See, for example, the work of Richard Caplan on Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation at: http://cis.politics.ox.ac.uk/research/Projects/consolidation_peace.asp.

[iv] See, for example, Regan (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2006), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Stedman et al.et al. (2002).

[v] Fortna (2008) observes correctly that measuring whether peacekeeping 'works' is not straight-forward. In fact, peacekeeping is not 'applied' to war-torn states at random – but rather where there is ample political will for peace and where chances for success are comparatively high. A simple comparison of whether (and how long) peace endures with and without peacekeeping would therefore throw up misleading results.

[vi] An impediment to better diagnosing and therefore responding to the dynamics of post-war armed violence is semantic. There are routine disagreements over basic definitions of 'conflict' and 'war' on the one hand, and 'post-conflict' and 'post-war' on the other. While a debate persists amongst conflict specialists over the heterogeneous and diverse characteristics of different types of 'war', it is useful to recall that 'conflict' is a socially-embedded and even necessary condition of all societies. In other words, notwithstanding the popularity of the term in policy-making and practitioner circles, there is in fact no such thing as a 'post-conflict' society. See Muggah (forthcoming).

[vii] For example, the Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries Group of the World Bank has purposefully avoided 'defining' post-conflict contexts. Operational protocol 8.5 (now 8.00) used to include certain specific metrics, but these have since been revoked. Thus, there is no agreement as to whether a post-conflict situation should be defined as a situation involving a ceasefire, a peace agreement, a peace support operation, a sharp reduction in the incidence of collective violence, victor's justice or other variables. For a review of these concerns, consult Muggah and Krause (2009).

[viii] See, for example, Geneva Secretariat (2008).

[ix] Bell (2006) distinguishes between pre-negotiation agreements (e.g. 'talks about talks'), framework and substantive agreements (e.g. 'aimed at installing ceasefires to reduce violence'), and implementation/re-negotiation agreements (e.g. 'development of key aspects of peace frameworks').

[x] Fortna (2008) notes that peacekeeping missions are not all alike and can be divided into smaller 'observation missions', 'inter-positional missions', 'multidimensional missions' and more robust 'peace-enforcement' missions.

[xi] See, for example, Hanggi and Scherrer (2007).

[xii] See, for example, Colletta et al. (2008) and Muggah (2009).

[xiii] See, for example, Ozerdem and Jacoby (2008).

[xiv] It is worth emphasising that while SSR is a 'contested concept ,particularly regarding understandings of the scope of the security sector', it is often used in a 'broad' sense to include DDR, small arms and light weapons control and mine action. See, for example, Hanggi (forthcoming).

[xv] Specifically, interventions such as DDR emphasised the collection and decommissioning of small arms, cantonment, support packages, and various forms of vocational training. These activities were frequently accompanied by conventional arms collection by the United Nations.

[xvi] It is useful to note that despite the growing interest in security sector reform in the 1990s, most interventions were not labelled as such. See, for example, Hanggi (forthcoming).

[xvii] It is often said that countries coming out of civil war have a nearly 50 per cent risk of sliding back into war within the first five post-conflict years. The figure has generated controversy, but also considerable enthusiasm among donors. It

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was first circulated in the academic world, the United Nations system, and the international donor community, and was used as a justification for the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. However, the broad acceptance of this figure stands in contrast to its general validity. The 50 per cent figure was established as part of an inquiry at the World Bank into the economic aspects of armed conflict that was led by Paul Collier and associates (Collier et al.et al., 2003). Various authors have suggested that this figure is misleading and probably too high. Revised figures point to a 20–25 per cent risk of conflicts recurring, based on the use of alternative datasets and independent retesting of the original data (Suhrke and Samset, 2007). Even the authors of the World Bank study revised their earlier figure downward to 40 per cent (Collier et al. 2006: 14).

[xviii] It should be emphasised that according to some specialists, SSR explicitly includes the disbanding (or integration) of non-statutory armed forces, DDR, humanitarian de-mining, redressing of past crimes and reconciliation. See Brzoska and Law (2006) and Bryden and Hanggi (2005).

[xix] See, for example, CORDAID (2008).

[xx] The OECD-DAC (2007; 20) handbook, for example, describes how SSR implies the transformation of the security system 'which includes all actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributes to a well-functioning framework'.

[xxi] See, for example, OECD-DAC (2008a, 2008b, 2008c).

[xxii] The IDDRS will be undergoing updating and review in 2009 and 2010.

[xxiii] The aim was to define predictable frameworks for successful implementation and organised as an international working process – with non-governmental and UN involvement.

[xxiv] It also advocated that mediation, programming and terminology associated with DDR be sensitive to historical, economic, social and cultural circumstances (www.sweden.gov.se/siddr).

[xxv] It should be noted that 'security system reform' is frequently used by 'development actors' to describe the multi-sector nature of security and justice sectors (OECD 2007). Likewise, some agencies such as the UNDP refer to 'justice and security sector reform' in order to emphasise the linkages between the respective sectors. Some observers fear that this conflation could unintentionally lead to the 'securitization' of the justice sector. See, for example, Hanggi (forthcoming).

[xxvi] In 2003, the US army published its doctrine for stability operations (post-war). The manual reflected a general disinterest in DDR. Appearing weeks before the invasion of Iraq, it recognised 'disarmament' as a 'typical flashpoint' (US Army 2003: 1-14). Its only words on the subject were to warn commanders that 'the mandate may require the PE (Peace Enforcement) force to disarm or demobilize the belligerent parties. These tasks are complex, difficult, and often dangerous' (US Army 2003, p. 3-07). In 2008, the new doctrine on stability operations is much more sensitive to the challenges of post-war military occupation and security provision. Influenced by experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and other less conspicuous missions, DDR is embraced as a major element in state-building. Considerable space is devoted to the issue - an entire Chapter (US Army 2008 chapter 6). Moreover, in contrast to the early doctrine, it states that often the post-war situation: 'requires disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating personnel associated with armed forces or belligerent groups before and as part of SSR. Military forces can expect to assume a primary role in disarmament … The DDR program is a critical component of peace and restoration processes and is accounted for in initial planning…The DDR program is a central contributor to long-term peace, security, and development' (US Army 2008, p. 6-4, 6-21). What is also curious is the way the US situates DDR as a subset of SSR. It implies military ownership and control over

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programmes more typically associated with UN mandates, though this does not minimise the importance of the shift in doctrinal focus.

[xxvii] It is important to stress that many of these aforementioned interventions were initiated before the IDDRS and OECD SSR handbook were fully developed and disseminated.

[xxviii] Policy makers typically undertake cross-sectional conflict analysis, drivers of change assessments, and other diagnostics to better understand these dynamics.

[xxix] Hanggi (forthcoming) observes how the privatisation and internationalisation of the provision of security is more common in post-war environments, together with the strong presence of armed non-state actors whose political ambitions and economic stakes are considerable.

[xxx] In another example, sub-national armed conflicts such as that of the Moros in Mindanao or the Tamils in Sri Lanka tend to be more identity than ideology driven, allowing for some form of *de facto* if not *de jure* governance and territorial control (e.g. ancestral domain in the case of the Moros or regional autonomy in the case of the Tamils), maintenance of social cohesion (identity), and legitimacy within an accepted national government, may form the basis of an interim stabilization measure (Colletta et al. 2008). Colletta et al. (2008) has also observed that in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge started as an ideological struggle and gradually transformed into a resource struggle, making limited control over territory and resources a basis for an interim stabilisation measure in the de facto granting of 'limited autonomy' in the northwest of the country as played out through the Hun Sen government's 'Win Win Policy'. Similarly, the war in Colombia has shifted somewhat from an ideologically driven conflict to a resource control and criminalisation of the national economy.

[xxxi] Of course, the extent to which international agencies and outside investment impacts the economic environment – for better (through injection of credit and capital) or for worse (through inflation) are also important considerations.

[xxxii] Likewise, in the case of the Ugandan and Mozambique DDR programmes of the early 1990s, the availability of arable land and desire of most combatants to return to farming informed successful economic reintegration to a large degree.

[xxxiii] In many cases, as in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Afghanistan, cash incentives may be rapidly spent by former combatants or appropriated by middle- and upper-ranking officers.

[xxxiv] See, for example, Human Security Report (2006).

[xxxv] See, for example, http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2005/0422_postconflict.html for lessons from the US government in Iraq and Afghanistan.

[xxxvi] Second generation peace-keeping began in the early 1990s and featured large military and civilian personnel deployments. These were the first examples of multifunctional missions in which political, military, humanitarian, and electoral components were coordinated and fully integrated. In contrast to 'first generation' missions which were composed of smaller and more lightly armed contingents, 'second generation' missions included larger contingents of civilian and military personnel, with fewer constraints tied to geographic representation, and more emphasis on interoperability, efficiency and unity of command and control.

[xxxvii] The UK government, for example, has developed a 'stabilisation unit' to support countries 'emerging from violent conflict'. Core objectives are to prevent and reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes that contribute to stability, and prepare for non-violent political and developmental processes and bargaining. Crucially, stabilisation implies joint military and civilian support, with a focus on reinforcing the 'legitimacy and capability of the state, and tangible benefits to the population to underpin confidence in the state and the political process'. See http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/

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xxxviii The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, is presently undertaking limited 'protection' functions in a number of Brazilian *favelas*. Activities focus on family reunification, prison visitations, mediation between 'armed groups' and the police, certain forms of care and treatment for the injured, and training for the police in the proportionate use of force. Correspondence with ICRC officials in Geneva, Colombia and Brazil, December 2008.

xxxix See, for example, PBC (2008).

xl A recent three country (Colombia, Uganda and Cambodia) exploratory study (Colletta et al.et al. 2008) financed by the Swedish Government as a follow-up to the SIDDR accents the importance of assessing contextual factors, unbundling reintegration processes, and identifying those *interim stabilization measures* which support sufficient security in the short-term in order to create the enabling conditions for sustainable development in the long-term.

xli See, for example, the work of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue at http://www.hdcentre.org/projects/negotiating-disarmament for a review of mediator approaches to promoting DDR and other forms of security promotion during peace negotiations.

xlii This is not to be confused with reinsertion or sustainable reintegration.

xliii There is a need to create space for participants in conventional security promotion. As expectations of peace dividend begin to rise, time may also be required to allow the state to reinforce its capacity and reach, to promote community involvement in local security provision and to facilitate opportunities for markets to regenerate and allow for rapid labour absorption.

xliv See, for example, Hanggi (forthcoming); Hanggi and Scherrer (2007); and Hoddie and Hartzell (2003).

xlv Note for example Colombia's introduction of soft or civil policing whereby demobilized former *Autodefensas* Unidas de *Colombia* (AUC) combatants serve as unarmed civilian police along side traditional armed government police and intelligence in urban areas such a Medellin (Colletta et al. 2008).

xlvi In Uganda, it also appears to be moving in this direction as Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) defectors often emerge as frontline Ugandan army fighters in the Congo and the Sudan, and local militia under government auspices. See, for example, Muggah (2006).

xlvii The more recent experience with the Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq is yet another example whereby local militia with strong ethnic, religious or tribal 'identity' roots were incorporated into local community security forces. In this way they were provided with recognition and paid a salary. Local tribal or culturally-based leadership was assured through a loose national command structure. It was expected that they would later be integrated into more formal security forces and or demobilized when other local security, governance, and economic conditions ripened, though of course a poor handling of this transition, and a failure to account for critical historical and structural factors shaping patterns of grievance, could generate new challenges (Roggio 2007).

xlviii See Rusagara (2004).

xlix See, for example, Colletta et al. (2008).

l See, for example, Muggah (2009).

li See, for example, Colletta et al. (2008).

lii See, for example, Kinzer (2008).

liii See, for example, Muggah (2005) for a review of second generation security promotion.

liv In Colombia, for example, a rash of evidence-based programmes focusing on temporary alcohol and weapons-carrying restrictions, interventions focusing on prospective gang members and urban renewal contributed to the fastest decline in homicidal violence ever recorded in the Western hemisphere. See, for example, Small Arms Survey (2006).

lv See, for example, Muggah (2007).

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[lvi] Other gang-violence reduction programmes that appear to have contributed to sharp reductions in armed violence in the US include 'Identity' (Montgomery County, Maryland), Community Mobilization Initiative (Herndon, Virginia) and Gang Intervention Partnership (Columbia Heights, Washington DC). Examples of Central American activities include Group Ceiba (Guatemala), Paz y Justicia (Honduras), Equipo Nahual (El Salvador) and others. See, for example, WOLA (2008).

[lvii] Prominent examples of this in post-war contexts include work undertaken by Saferworld, the Balkan Youth Union (BYU), the Centre for Security Studies – Bosnia-Herzegovina (CSS), CIVIL and the Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) in South Eastern Europe. See, for example, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Creating_safer_communities_De c06_%20English.pdf.

[lviii] Examples of how youth can be engaged range from participating in bicycle and foot patrols, neighbourhood watch, and early warning systems to advancing crime reduction education, prevention strategies, and escort services. See CSIC (2006).

[lix] See, for example, Muggah (2006, 2005), Small Arms Survey (2005), Kirsten (2005) and Atwood et al. (2005) for a review of these second generation approaches.

[lx] The World Bank President Robert Zoellick (2008) noted that 'too often, the development community has treated states blighted by fragility and conflict simply as harder cases of development. Yet these situations require looking beyond the analytics of development to a different framework of building legitimacy, governance, and the economy. This is not security or development as usual. Nor is it about what we have come to think of as peace-building or peacekeeping. Securing development is about bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition for conflict to peace then to ensure stability so that development can take hold over a decade and beyond. Only by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence.'