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# Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations

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## Abstract

The immediate post-conflict environment requires a number of interventions from national and international actors. The international community has developed several mechanisms and methodologies to assist stabilization strategies that support the development of the wider peace process, or the transition from armed conflict to a stable peace. One of the most immediate interventions has become generically defined as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. This field continues to be defined and codified, for example, through the UN Integrated DDR Standards [1] and the OECD-DAC's Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (IF-SSR) [2]. The current international models require continued discussion and development on strengthening the linkages between DDR and SSR activities. As part of this discussion and development process this paper argues that there remains a need to understand the DDR process in a more holistic manner with two specific areas requiring greater attention: First, the process of DDR should be viewed as a continuation of the political dialogue, and not purely as a programmatic undertaking; second, it is essential that the concept of demobilisation be expanded to encompass the transformation of the organization in question, as well as the requirements of individuals. This paper therefore argues that an armed insurgent organization requires specialized and focused assistance to evolve from an armed insurgent organization into an entity that possesses a future role

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[1] See UN DDR Resource Centre at www.unddr.org
[2] For full text document fo the OECD-DAC IF-SSR Handbook, see http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf

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within a peaceful environment. Neither of these points is reflected in current DDR models, programmes or practices. By adopting these concepts the linkages between DDR and SSR activities will be strengthened.

# Introduction

The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or failure of this endeavour directly affects the long-term peacebuilding prospects for any post-conflict society. The exploration of the closely inter-woven relationship between peacebuilding and the DDR process provides a theoretical framework for this paper, which aims to present an assessment of the prevailing view of DDR processes as programmatic undertaking, and to expand upon the understanding of demobilisation.

The author has previously examined various DDR programmes planned or implemented in a number of countries over the last two decades (Knight, M. & Ozerdem, A. *'Guns, Camps and Cash'* Journal of Peace Research (2004): 499). Previous publications focused on three specific DDR issues: disarmament as a social contract; demobilisation without cantonment; and the relevance of financial reinsertion assistance. The analysis found that DDR initiatives adopted a 'guns-camps-cash' approach, which seemed to provide only a limited perspective for dealing with a wide range of complex issues related to the DDR process. Therefore, the author's question whether there is a need for a more comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its social, economic and political implications, and disarmament as a social contract was proposed as an alternative to the prevailing military-centred approach. The analysis also indicated a tendency towards the inclusion of cantonment in the demobilisation phase, regardless of whether it actually could have some negative impacts on the DDR process in general. The analysis questioned such concepts and approaches to demobilisation, suggesting an alternative understanding. Finally, the analysis focused upon the effectiveness of cash payments during reinsertion as a more valuable alternative to the provision of other material assistance, since this tends to be the most controversial aspect of the reinsertion phase.

The DDR of former combatants is part of the overall long-term peacebuilding process – the success of which depends on the holistic and integrated implementation of various post-war recovery programmes. International peacebuilding is now considered a critical instrument of the international community for addressing countries emerging from conflict, or countries under threat of violent conflict. An examination of conflict resolution literature points to a critical role for DDR in the resolution of civil conflict (Weinstein, 2005). More recently Bryden (2007) has argued that a growing awareness of the interrelationship between different elements of post-conflict peacebuilding requires conceptual clarity as a precondition for coordinated coherent and comprehensive interventions. He states:

The need to understand and operationalise the linkages between DDR and SSR is increasingly recognised. It forms part of a growing awareness of the imperative to provide more coherent and coordinated support from the International Community across the post-conflict peacebuilding agenda.
        (Bryden, 2007: pp27)

Traditionally, two types of DDR programme could be identified: those programmes which focus on demilitarisation and those programmes taking place in war-to-peace transitions (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996a). The former has involved a reduction in the number of military personnel following a decisive victory, attempting to reduce military expenditure in order to take advantage of the peace dividend. Large-scale downsizing as part of peacetime demobilisation initiatives were also considered under this heading. In the second scenario, no clear victor emerges and DDR becomes undertaken as part of a peace settlement. Within the latter scenario, the outcome of any DDR programme depends predominantly upon the political context in which it is carried out, and the political will amongst the belligerent parties remains the chief criterion for determining success (Knight, M. 2001).

The evolution and codification of the SSR discourse has provided an overarching framework in which both these traditionally separate concepts of DDR can be located. The OECD-DAC definition of security systems is holistic and includes not only justice, finance and oversight bodies, but also guerrilla armies and private militia (OECD-DAC, 2007). Within this framework the traditional concept of demilitarisation has been expanded to encompass democratic oversight and financial management, and is understood as an SSR, state strengthening and conflict prevention process. Demilitarisation, as identified by Colletta et al (1996a) is therefore SSR within a benign environment. The OECD-DAC also identifies post-conflict environments as requiring specific approaches to SSR processes, with DDR programming identified as a core activity alongside SALW and transitional justice. Within this framework DDR remains a pivotal activity within the war-to-peace transition, placed within the wider SSR processes as a peacebuilding activity.

## DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) IN A PEACEBUILDING CONTEXT

Peacebuilding encompasses programmes ranging from micro level changes in the opinions and behaviour of conflicting communities to macro-level institutional changes that address the structural causes of conflict (Lily, 2002). 'An Agenda for Peace' defines 'peacebuilding' as "…an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:11). It is a holistic but distinct process, with numerous stages which require multi-sector efforts in order to achieve sustainable results. Potentially, the DDR of former combatants constitutes one such activity, and within the context of the war-to-peace transition it can have a number of important effects upon the wider transitional process.

The efficient implementation of the DDR programme can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally (Berdal, 1996).

Experience indicates that there is a symbiotic relationship between peacebuilding and the DDR process. Berdal (1996:73) refers to this relationship as 'interplay' and 'a subtle interaction'. Although a sustainable recovery after war cannot be achieved without a successful DDR process, conversely, without a successful peacebuilding process in general the viability of a DDR process would be questionable (Özerdem, 2002). Supporting this view, Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a: 18) highlight the relationship between economic reintegration of former combatants and the sustainability of the peace process. A successful long-term DDR process can make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and to the restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve a successful DDR process can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun.

Poorly conceived and executed DDR programmes can themselves also become a factor in the creation of future conflicts. The incomplete disarmament in Mozambique contributed to the proliferation of weapons not only throughout that country, but also in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi. By 1998, Mozambique constituted the single largest source of small arms to the South African domestic market (UNIDIR, 1999). Based on their experience in the Horn of Africa, Kingma & Grebrewold (1998:12) identify a number of situations in which the reintegration of displaced populations and former combatants may have an impact on the recurrence or development of conflicts. These include the absence of a functioning state and legal system, lack of economic opportunities, competition for natural resources, political marginalisation and the absence of appropriate conflict management systems, and the availability of light weapons. In other words, war-torn countries with demobilised combatants also run the risk of returning to conflict if they are not provided with a comprehensive DDR strategy.

Collier's (1994) micro- and macro-insecurity framework for possible threats presented by former combatants asserts that if demobilised combatants are not placed into employment or provided with skills training opportunities, the lack of an income source increases their propensity to commit crimes. Kingma (1999) cites the examples of Mozambique and South Africa where some demobilised combatants turned to banditry. Similarly, in countries such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua, former combatants were disposed to make their living through banditry after demobilisation (Weiss-Fagen, 1995). This is a particular concern when DDR processes fail. For example, the reports of increased levels of crime in Angola in the late 1990s were linked to the failure of the DDR programme either to remove weapons from society or to reintegrate former combatants in a manner conducive to establishing income activities (UNIDIR, 1999).

In conjunction with the macro-insecurity framework, if the grievances and frustrations of demobilised combatants are not addressed through a DDR strategy, former combatants can easily remobilise and pose security risks at a regional level, as happened in 1998 following the border clashes between Eritrea and Ethiopia. According to Özerdem (2002), some former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) are believed to have been involved in the 2001 Macedonian conflict between Albanian guerrilla groups and security forces (Ozerdem: 2002).

One of the primary conditions for ensuring an effective relationship between peacebuilding and a DDR process is the coordination of activities. Experience shows that a wide range of programmes are carried out by a variety of agents, preferably, but not necessarily coordinated by a single vision for the future. Reflecting on the issue of coordination, the UNDP (2001) explained that in 2001, there were a number of different DDR activities taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) such as the UN Mission to the DRC (MONUC), which was mandated to carry out DDR activities applicable to the foreign armed groups only. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNDP and other organisations were conducting various DDR and development activities in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, the Bureau National de Mobilisation et Reinsertion (BUNADER) - a DRC government initiative - began implementing a pilot project targeting vulnerable groups. In addition to these, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) was providing additional support to the demobilisation of child soldiers. Unfortunately, it is stated that all of these activities were taking place independent of each other.[3] Such uncoordinated disparate approaches have now been brought together by the publication of the UN IDDRS.

In the framework of the peacebuilding-DDR relationship, there are also a number of issues related to social and cultural norms and psychological impact that should be borne in mind. First, social reintegration involves the re-establishment of family and community ties that play a significant role in the success of reintegration programmes. According to Kingma (2000), in a number of cross-cultural experiences there is a pattern of more successful reintegration in rural than in urban areas. This trend is explained by the likelihood of having stronger supporting societal networks in rural than urban areas. For example, in the rural areas of Ethiopia, a key factor for successful social reintegration was the acceptance and support by the community as well as their extended families (Ayalew & Dercon, 2000).

Second, armed conflicts also affect cultural norms and reciprocal relationships in a society. For example, women as both fighters and war-affected civilians acquire new roles during the war. However, women are usually expected to return to their traditional roles after the war. Kingma (2002) makes linkages between this attitude and the high divorce rate in Eritrea where about one third of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) were women. The analysis of socio-economic and demographic data on former combatants in Guinea-Bissau and Eritrea has also shown that female former combatants were more vulnerable than their male counterparts (de Watteville, 2002). Consequently,

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Tegegn (1992) emphasizes the importance of providing female former combatants with special assistance to enable them to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life.

Finally, the trauma of war can have a profound psychological impact on the population, particularly on children, both as soldiers and civilians, affecting their social and emotional development (El Nagar, 1992). The World Bank (2002) argues that the reintegration of child-soldiers should emphasize three key components: family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity. This is illustrated by the example of Sierra Leone where the whole DDR process was seriously disrupted by the outbreak of renewed fighting, and many child soldiers whose distinctive needs had been neglected by the process, returned to the conflict in April 2000.

## State of Play

An analysis of the DDR programmes existing in the world during 2006, by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (2007), states that during 2006 over 1,255,510 former combatants participated in a one way or another in at least one of the phases of a DDR programme. The analysis goes on to estimate that the total cost of the twenty DDR programmes comes to some US$ 2 billion. Concurrent to these programmes the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs published its final report on the 'Stockholm Initiative on DDR', and stated:

Notwithstanding the hope that DDR programmes will make a significant contribution to peace processes, the fact is that about half the countries emerging from conflict risk reverting to violence and, to an even larger extent, violence merely changes form and might even increase in the post-conflict period. (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006)

With a backdrop of a 50% failure rate, costing US$ 1 billion and the disparate and uncoordinated attempts at DDR within the DRC highlighted previously, the United Nations Inter-Agency Working group on DDR published the IDDRS. Within this understanding of DDR it is stated:

The aim of the DDR process is to contribute to the security and stability in post-conflict situations so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with **political**, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from ex-combatants being left without livelihoods or **support networks, other than their former comrades,** during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development. (IDDRS, pp2.10)

The concept of DDR as a political endeavour and the support networks of ex-combatants, are two areas which are highlighted in the quote above, will be analysed in the section below. The Stockholm Initiative on DDR concludes with the assertion that although

DDR is an important part of the political process, it has continued to be divorced from the political considerations and neglected as a political tool of a peace process (Swedish MOFA, 2006).  The UN's Briefing Note for Senior Managers IDDRS states that DDR is essentially a politically driven process, that many DDR programmes stall or are only partially implemented because of the political climate.   The success of the DDR process is therefore dependent on the political will of the parties to **enter** into the process in a genuine manner.  (UN 2006b, p3)

One of the factors determining the success or otherwise of a DDR processes is not the will to enter the process (within the war to peace transition this is often evident with the signing of a peace agreement) but rather the maintenance of the political will.  In a comparative analysis of peace agreement provisions that address paramilitary groups and programmes for DDR, the Public International Law and Policy Group states that political goals, such as constitutional or legislative reform, are conditioned upon the completion of DDR programmes (PILPG, 2006).  Within this view the requirement to maintain the political will is paramount to the success of the wider peace process and transition from conflict to peace, all of which is conditional upon a successful DDR process.  The requirement to maintain the political will of the parties to implement the DDR process would thus seem to be of paramount importance.  Yet, in the Escola de Cultura de Pau analysis of DDR programmes in 2006, it is stated:

In the great majority of cases (13) the decision has been made to opt for the creation of a National Commission for the DDR (NCDDR), with **the military component playing a predominant role in this, either because the Commission itself is coordinated by the Ministry of defence, or due to the existence of a military sub-commission**.      (ECP, 2006, pp7)

The involvement of a national military within the implementation of the DDR process produces a number of challenging issues regarding the intent of a military in the immediate post-conflict environment, and the perspective of the international stakeholders' understanding of a DDR process that allows a heavy military involvement.  When examining the overriding purpose of DDR, the removal of weapons, the dissolution of command structures and the return of combatants to civilian status, these outcomes mirror the purposes of counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the State's military.  DDR offers the possibility of achieving counter-insurgency objectives without the violence; hence, war by other means.    Recalling that peace agreement provisions that address paramilitary groups and programmes for DDR are often conditional upon political goals, such as constitutional or legislative reform, (PILPG, 2006), then the predominance of the military in implementing bodies could be argued to be ill-conceived, and ultimately counter-productive to the wider peacebuilding objectives.

The literature on DDR concepts, design and implementation correctly asserts that national leadership and institutions should have the leading role and political responsibility for the DDR of ex-combatants (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006).  The UNIDDRS (2006) states that one of the key characteristics of DDR is that it should be nationally owned.  "The primary responsibility for the successful outcome of

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DDR programmes rests with the national and local actors, and national stakeholders are responsible for planning, coordinating and running institutions set up to manage different aspects for the peace agreement.."    (UNIDDRS, 2006, pp2.10)

The predominant perspective of international stakeholders towards the DDR process that results in a heavy military involvement is that once the peace agreement is signed, and mechanics of the DDR process are defined, the implementation becomes predominantly a programmatic undertaking.  As asserted in the UN briefing to senior managers, the success of the DDR process is therefore dependent upon the political will of the parties to **enter** into the process in a genuine manner (UN, 2006b).  An alternative perspective for international stakeholders would be to view the implementation of the DDR process as a continuation of the political dialogue that led to the peace agreement, and approach the implementation as an inherently political undertaking.  Within this view the process and structures established to enact DDR are correctly viewed as the political arena in which the belligerent parties to the conflict continue the process of dialogue with the intent of cementing the commitments that would lead to a sustainable peace.  Through this perspective of the DDR process the structures and membership of these structures would be conceived and established based upon the requirement to **maintain the political** will of the two parties.

## Conceiving Demobilisation

The understanding of demobilisation has been one of the most contentious issues within the development of the concepts of DDR.  Representing the World Bank's understanding of DDR programmes, Colletta (1996(b)) describes demobilisation as the first part of the DDR process.  'It consists of the following segments: cantonment (sometimes termed "assembly" or "quartering"), pre-discharge orientation, discharge, transportation, and post-discharge orientation' (Colletta 1996(b):12).    Echoing    an    evolving    UN understanding, Berdal (1996) states:

Demobilisation is understood here as the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, as the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state.  It covers a number of activities associated with establishing and maintaining an assembly area.  These include: surveys of soldiers' needs and aspirations; medical examinations, counselling; initial reintegration packages; and transport to the community of choice. (Berdal 1996: 39)

As has been highlighted at the beginning of the paper, the context in which DDR programmes are implemented should inform the objectives and structure that the programme adopts.  Alusala (2007) contends that in order to achieve an effective outcome, each DDR programme should be based on a clear understanding of the dynamics underpinning the particular post-conflict environment.  In a study of seven countries implementing DDR programmes, the World Bank (1993) states:

…success or failure [of the DDR programme] is intertwined, to varying degrees, with the political backdrop in which they take place…The more ambiguous the conflict and its termination, the more susceptible the DRP [Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme] seems to be to becoming embroiled in factional disputes. (World Bank 1993: vii)

The study continues by stating that the case studies highlighted very different dynamics of a DDR programme which is carried out during peace time, with a clearly established government in power. This stands in contrast to a DDR programme undertaken in the context of a war-to-peace transition, which is characterised by some loosely controlled factions and some form of power-sharing in the government. The contexts highlighted at the beginning of the paper identified two scenarios: demilitarisation and the war-to-peace transition. The context for consideration within this paper continues to be exclusively the war-to-peace-transition following the signing of a peace agreement.

Demobilisation has predominantly been understood to be the second stage of the DDR process, following disarmament; its form and functions vary according to context. Tanner (1996: 171) states that '…demobilisation, [sic] refers to the disarmament and dissolution of the force structures and the transition of combatants to civilian status'. Within this understanding disarmament is an element within demobilisation and not a prerequisite to the combatant entering the demobilisation phase of the DDR programme. Berdal (1996) defines demobilisation in slightly different terms to Tanner stating that:

Demobilisation is understood here as the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, as the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state. It covers a number of activities associated with establishing and maintaining assembly areas. These include: surveys of soldiers' needs and aspirations; medical examinations, counselling; initial reintegration packages; and transport to the community of choice. (Berdal, 1996:39)

Berdal does not locate disarmament either before, or as an element of demobilisation. Rather he specifies the objective of demobilisation as the dissolution of the fighting forces, and continues by highlighting the required activities to achieve this. Colletta's (1996) understanding of demobilisation differs by stating that it is the first stage of the DDR process – a point which supports Berdal's definition of the elements comprising demobilisation. More specifically, Berdal states that "demobilization is the first part of the DRP (Demobilization and Reintegration Programme) process that a combatant passes through. It consists of the following segments: cantonment (sometimes termed "assembly" or "quartering"), predischarge orientation, discharge, transportation, and postdischarge orientation. "(Colletta 1996(b))

Colletta's (1996) understanding of demobilization is informed by the evidence from a number of case studies of countries that have implemented DDR programmes. This understanding is therefore intended as a best practice guide in establishing an integrated DDR. As with Berdal, Colletta includes cantonment (sometimes termed "assembly" or "quartering") as an element within demobilisation. However, the specific objectives of a

particular demobilisation phase are often dictated by the context in which it is to be undertaken. Defining the objectives of the demobilisation phase by activities that must be undertaken appears to presuppose the contextual setting and the objectives of the DDR programme, and precludes alternative implementation strategies being undertaken. Berdal (1996:39) states the objective of demobilisation as being the

…formal disbanding of military formations…'.(Berdal 1996:39). Tanner's (1996) definition of demobilisation, with exception of the inclusion of disarmament, represents the predominant view that 'demobilisation, [sic] refers to the disarmament and dissolution of the force structures and the transition of combatants to civilian status' (Tanner 1996:171).

Discussions and debates concerning the purpose and meaning of demobilisation culminated with the publication of the UNIDDRS (UN 2006), which states: "DDR programmes should support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens. This process starts in the demobilisation phase, during which **the structures of armed forces and groups are broken down** and combatants formally acquire civilian status." (UN 2006a, pp2.10)

Within all understandings of demobilisation there is either an explicit statement that the structures of the armed forces should be dissolved, or an implied understanding that this can be achieved through processes involving encampment and the targeted distribution of assistance to individuals. When considering DDR within a context of war-to-peace transition, this requires the dissolution of the structures of the insurgent organisation. In previous publications (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004 and Knight, M. 2001) the author has argued that cantonment or encampment as part of a demobilisation process runs counter to the stated objectives of dissolving the command structures. "Ironically, the cantonment of combatants reinforces the command structures that the process is intended to dissolve….the former combatants are concentrated and isolated from the community when the objective is, in fact, to dissipate and integrate them within the community. " (Knight, M & Ozerdem, A, 2004, pp508)

The literature, definitions and hence focus of DDR processes retains an overarching concentration upon the individual's transition from a combatant to a civilian status. The UNIDDRS (2006a) defines the United Nations' approach to DDR as being characterised by five principles, the first of which is that DDR is 'people centred' (UN 2006a). This is reflected in the definition of demobilisation as 'the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups' (UN 2006a). The definition continues by stating that the first phase of demobilisation 'may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose.' (UN, 2006a). The focus remains on the release of the individuals from the command structures, with the implied intent that cantonment and the release of individuals will result in dissolution of the structures. Ironically, there is also an understanding that the removal of the command structure presents an immediate threat to the overall stability and peace objectives of DDR processes: "It [DDR] aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from ex-combatants being left without

livelihoods or **support networks, other than their former comrades,** during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and development." (UN 2006a, pp2.10)

There is growing evidence from countries that have experienced DDR processes, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Eritrea, East Timor, Northern Ireland and Namibia that 'former comrades' will retain a support network, in the examples cited veterans associations have become significant political actors. In a study of three DDR processes following insurgent conflicts in Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, Dzinesa (2006) concluded that "the governments that had failed to properly reintegrate ex-combatants later found themselves with a price to pay, as restive ex-fighters threatened national stability." (Dzinesa, 2006)

The study highlights that in each of the three examples perceived grievances - often associated with benefits related to reintegration - galvanised 'veterans' to demonstrate against governments. In the case of Namibia, 16 years following the end of hostilities, Rupiya wrote:

On Tuesday, 5 June 2007, some 100 former freedom fighters of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) marched on the recently established (2006) Ministry of Veteran Affairs in the Windhoek city centre, demanding large cash payments and other forms of compensation for their role in the liberation of Namibia. (Rupiya, 2007)

The evidence suggests that despite the explicit requirement for demobilisation to dissolve or 'break down' (UN 2006a) command structures, these structures survive as networks often evolve into political organisations centred on veterans' grievances.


## Demobilisation and Transformation

The Public International Law and Policy Group (2006) paper on DDR and comparative State practice, concludes:

Within the context of DDR many peace agreements address the legal status of paramilitary groups as political and military entities….peace agreements often provide these groups with substantial political representation in transitional governments. In other situations, former members of paramilitary groups are permitted to join new or existing political parties….In other states, political goals, such as constitutional or legislative reform, are conditioned upon the completion of the DDR programmes. (PIL&PG, 2006, pp11)

Within contexts where the formal peace agreement specifies the political and governmental role of the insurgent organisation, the dissolution of the same organisation, within a demobilisation process, would run counter to the evolution of the wider peace process. Within the context where a state's military dominates the structures established to implement a DDR process, the effect upon the insurgent organisation to be demobilised could be more acute, creating suspicion as to intentions and resulting in

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difficulties within the full implementation of the DDR process and wider evolution of the peace process. Even within contexts where the peace agreement distinguishes between armed military structures and political structures of an insurgent organisation, with the DDR process clearly focused upon the military elements, experience suggests that the social networks and bonds that comprise the command structure will continue to exist and operate after demobilisation.

The immediate post-peace settlement period is one of great anxiety and threat to an insurgent organisation and the individual combatants as new skills are required to survive and prosper within the new peaceful environment. The present understanding of the DDR process is designed to deal with the individual's transition from combatant to productive and peaceful civilian, with the implication that the command structures will be dissolved or 'broken down' (UN 2006a, pp2.10). Experience suggests that the command structures will continue to exist as social networks and bonds created through shared experiences, and that such structures retain the capacity to remobilise combatants or disturb the progression of the peace process (Dzinesa, 2007). Therefore, a more holistic view of the demobilisation element within a DDR process would incorporate the inclusion of targeted specialist assistance for the insurgent organisational structures as well as assistance for individual combatants in order to facilitate the transformation of the organisation from a military organisation into a civilian entity. Such organisational assistance for transformation would not be appropriate within all contexts; the necessity for this type of assistance would depend upon two factors, (i) the provisions of the peace agreement, and (ii) the characteristics of the organisation.

## When to Engage

The premise of this paper is that armed non-state actors, referred to as insurgent organisations, require specialist and targeted assistance within the immediate post peace settlement period to assist their transition from an armed insurgent organisation to a civilian entity. The process through which this assistance could be delivered is a DDR programme, which at present predominantly focuses upon the needs of the individuals, excluding the organisation. An expanded model of DDR that included assistance for the transition of the organisation would allow for the delivery of targeted transformational organisational assistance. The situations where this type of assistance is relevant, and could contribute to the evolution of the peace process, would depend upon careful analysis of the type of agreement reached and the organisation to be potentially assisted.

For transformational organisational assistance to be relevant the peace agreement would require a base assumption that the post settlement political landscape included the insurgent organisation. The organisation's involvement in the continued political process would be defined within the agreement, as well as an articulation of the political process agreed. The agreement could, for example, specify that the insurgent organisation become a political party and participate within a democratic process. The basis of such agreements would normally require the insurgent organisation relinquishing violence as a means to achieve its goals, and instead engage in purely peaceful political endeavours to

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achieve its objectives. The integrity of such an agreement requires the insurgent organisation to be able to meaningfully engage in peaceful politics, which would require a transformation of the organisation in order for it to adapt to the new environment.

The characteristics of the insurgent organisation would also decide whether transformational organisational assistance would be relevant. Not all insurgent organisations are the same; there is varying degrees of cohesion, organisation, control over members, articulation of political vision and structures. The core difference, when considering whether to engage, is the distinction between a political and military wing - and the reality of those divisions. For example, The Communist Party of the Philippines, has a very clearly articulated and structured military wing within the New Peoples' Army. The political element of the Communist Party of the Philippines has clear primacy in relation to the military wing of the New People's Army, with the two elements being separate entities. Any potential peace agreement would legitimately seek to DDR the military wing, whilst leaving the political wing to pursue its political goals. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) - a separatist insurgency in Indonesia - is an organisation without such a firm structure or division. In effect the GAM is a grassroots rebellion consisting of nebulous networks and is - as the name suggests - a movement, predominantly bereft of structures. There was a clear articulation of the military wing of this movement, but in effect there was never a clearly defined distinction between military and non-military. The ability of such a disparate entity to transform, or in this case form, itself into a functioning political mechanism was always weak. The GAM represents a clear example of an insurgent organisation for which transitional assistance in the post peace settlement period would have strengthened the integrity of the subsequent political process. An understanding that is supported by Beeck (2007) who states on the transformation of GAM: "If the failure of the reintegration measures and further instability factors result in a split within GAM, low level violence in the intermediate term could be the result." (Beeck, BICC, 2007:pp 53)

## Conclusion

The international community has evolved a number of mechanisms and methodologies, with the overriding purpose of stabilising environments and supporting the development of the wider peace process, or transition from armed conflict. The most immediate interventions are generically defined through Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. This paper has positioned DDR within the evolving SSR framework, and has focused exclusively upon implementing DDR within war-to-peace transitions, when it is conceived within the peacebuilding discourse. The author has argued for the need to understand the whole DDR process as a continuation of the political dialogue process, and not purely as a programmatic undertaking. Within this understanding, it has also emphasized that the concept of demobilisation should be expanded to include the requirements of the insurgent organisation, as well as the individuals. An armed insurgent organization requires specialized focus and assistance to evolve from an insurgent organization into an entity that possesses a future role within a peaceful environment. A thorough analysis of the peace agreement and the insurgent

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organisation will indicate if such assistance is relevant and/or necessary. By adopting these concepts as practices, the linkages between DDR and SSR activities could be strengthened by providing continuation of the political dialogue process and facilitating the involvement of a key stakeholder in the longer term SSR process.

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