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Developing a Performance Measurement System for Security Sector Interventions

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Introduction

Broader and more comprehensive approaches to post-conflict interventions have been developed by both the security and development communities. Such comprehensive and ‘joined-up’¹ approaches have enjoyed huge gains at the policy and planning levels, particularly in wider security policy areas such as Security Sector Reform (SSR). Integrated planning cells, joint assessment teams and missions, joint doctrine and cross-Government steering committees all represent mechanisms which have facilitated the broader approach to security and development work and between two fields which – in the past – rarely interacted at both the strategic planning and operational levels.

Despite the gains felt at the policy and programming levels, the way in which such programmes are managed on the ground – and evolved, monitored and measured – still requires much work. Due to the multi-faceted nature of SSR with complex challenges associated with issues related to inter-dependencies, sequencing, change, cross-impacts and contingencies, there still exists a significant research gap exploring the broader management challenges of SSR interventions. Because the mainstay of research supporting SSR is undertaken primarily by specialists in the fields of conflict, development, political and global security studies, such management-related dilemmas for SSR specialists have not enjoyed deep investigation.

This paper explores the issue of performance measurement in SSR programmes. The work provides an overview of some of the ongoing challenges in operationalising the

¹ In this context, ‘joined-up’ refers to security-related institutions coming together in order to promote a more comprehensive approach to planning and operations supporting security and development objectives within both national and multilateral structures.

SSR debate and emphasises the importance of linkages between broader security-development agenda and tailored SSR programmes. Current performance-related work and ongoing activities in the wider SSR community are then reviewed. Lastly, the paper advocates for the utility of an adapted and simplified Balanced Scorecard approach to monitoring and measuring the progress of SSR programmes.

Background

The inter-dependent relationship between security and development is not in dispute. Numerous studies and publications² have all explored the mutual dependencies between the ‘softer’ security issues – including social and economic insecurities – and the ‘harder’ end insecurities felt at the more physical level, such as military threats, police brutality, human rights abuses and border conflicts.

Bilateral and multilateral actors have debated around this broader range of insecurities by entering discussions with their security and/or development counterparts to search for more appropriate solutions for the indigenous authorities who become the recipients of programmatic assistance funded by international aid. Over recent years, many donor organizations have reviewed their own impressions of this combined security and development agenda and have produced policy recommendations which work in support of their existing core competencies.

Notwithstanding the range of interpretations and approaches, SSR has evolved as a programme area which has won universal appeal from most western donor Governments. While inspired by the efforts of the United Kingdom, the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) holds the multilateral lead for SSR advocacy, as well as the development of principles and guidelines supporting the concept.³ In addition, and at the time of writing, regional and multilateral organisations including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are all now making efforts to develop their own SSR Policy.⁴ SSR is a valuable instrument that can facilitate short, medium and longer-term interventions which – whilst led by approaches more geared towards the security sector itself – are guided by and shaped according to a country or region’s longer-term development requirements. For this reason, in addition to the sheer breadth and depth of SSR and the linkages it has with broader national security objectives, it is necessary to be ‘strategic’ about SSR programming. In the longer-term, linkages made between SSR policy and national security policy will help promote greater policy coherence across a more effective international system.

² For example, see the work of Frances Stewart, *Development & Security*, CRISE Working Paper, May 2004; Robin Luckham and Gavin Cawthra, *Governing Insecurity*. Zed Books: London, 2004; and Paul Collier, *Development and Conflict*, Center for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, October 2004.

³ See the OECD’s 2005 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance, found at http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,2340,en_2649_33721_35319374_1_1_1_1,00.html

⁴ For further elaboration on what policy and activities each of these organizations are pursuing, see David Law (ed). *Inter-Governmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, DCAF Publication: Geneva, 2008.

Thus, at the policy level – and based on the good progress enjoyed by the evolving SSR concept - efforts must be made to promote further coherency and parallel progress at both the strategic policy and operational levels of SSR. To date, and with the exception of a few approaches mentioned in forthcoming sections of this paper, very little has been done to ‘operationalise’ the security-development nexus and the range of policy instruments supporting it. With such increased energy and levels of activity supporting SSR engagements, combined with disparities across a range of operational competencies, the way in which SSR programmes are monitored and evaluated becomes critical for the pursuit and achievement of longer-term security and development objectives.

Current developments in ‘operationalising’ more comprehensive SSR

One could argue that the evolving debate on SSR is becoming increasingly difficult to ‘operationalise’ due to a scarcity of tools and instruments to facilitate such innovative concepts. Aside from basic training for SSR practitioners⁵, effective programming appears to be driven largely by active SSR donors who work with experienced sets of personal and professional networks on the ground; and the movement of these networks from one theatre of operations to another. For example, much has been written on the simultaneous need for post-conflict police and military training programmes to be implemented alongside of wider governance programmes to ensure the appropriate, democratic and sustainable impact of the training.⁶ Similarly, it has been argued that post-conflict DDR programmes must also consider a range of economic and social indicators in order to address key challenges to promoting sustainable livelihoods for ex-combatants. Experts with such wider skill-sets required to support these interventions do not naturally gravitate towards each other (i.e. development economists and military reform experts). Until recently, the absence of guidance and tools supporting SSR interventions further added to the difficulties in bringing together the most suitable resources.

Significant efforts have been made by the international development community to support the operational aspect of SSR. In 2006, through broad consultation with the global SSR community, the OECD-DAC developed the Implementation Framework for SSR (IF-SSR). The output came in a form of a handbook which is now widely disseminated both in hard copy and electronically through the efforts of the donor community which supported the exercise. The Framework offers valuable practical guidance to both policymakers and practitioners working on the full spectrum of SSR engagements. The IF-SSR is underpinned by the original Security System Reform⁷

⁵ The UK-based GFN-SSR-led SSR Practitioners Courses deliver 3-days of training to both experienced and inexperienced SSR practitioners. The target audiences in these groups comprise of both policymakers and practitioners and – as such – it is difficult within a 3-day time span to offer more than an introduction to the many constituent elements of SSR. While knowledge on such integrated and holistic approaches is helpful and required, more management-based training is required across all areas of SSR.

⁶ See Ann M Fitz-Gerald. SSR in Sierra Leone: An Information Document. (GFN Publication: London), 2004.

⁷ See the OECD-DAC Principles supporting Security System Reform, found at:

principles, provides good tactical and technical guidance for a range of programme areas, and offers an analytical tool for assessing the environment.

The IF-SSR has been subscribed to by many enabling partners of both multilateral and bilateral donors responsible for funding wider SSR interventions. Immediate response teams, civilian governance and conflict advisers, military commanders and the large number of consultants working on these issues will enjoy an expanded 'toolbox' which will combine nicely with the cross-sectoral and wider security-development analysis facilitated by an increasingly 'joined-up' government culture.

Similar to the evolution of SSR as a policy concept, the further development and application of the IF-SSR will require such programme-level guidance to merge with higher-level strategic agendas. In the past, the security and development 'tools' and 'options' have differed significantly and have not been integrated in a way which is 'user-friendly' to both communities. Development actors on their own have pursued reform and recovery programmes – or have drawn on enabling mechanisms for economic and social development - cast with such names as Sector-Wide Approaches (SAPs), Public Expenditure Management (PEM) programmes, Structural Adjustment Programmes and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), just to name a few. On the other hand, security actors have traditionally been mandated under options such as Chapter VI/VII peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian assistance. It is the view of the authors that the global SSR agenda has helped transform the traditionally development-orientated PRSP process into a strategic tool which can better 'operationalise' the combined security and development agendas of which SSR is one enabler. As such, a number of recently developed PRSPs have opened up the model's traditional development pillars to now include a security and governance aspect.⁸

However, only time will tell if – and how effectively - the combined security and development agenda achieves its goals through SSR programming. For example, for a PRSP process which embraces security, development and governance aspects, even some of the more short-term strategic benchmarks will not be realisable for 5-8 years – particularly in evaluating the sustainable nature of those benchmarks. Methodologies which assist in monitoring and evaluating progress made towards these benchmarks – in an evolving and dynamic way – could help keep the process on track and inform where supporting resources could be best placed.

Security Sector 'Management' and the importance of performance measurement

Prior to the publication of the IF-SSR, donor organizations employed a wider range of results-based management methodologies and the measurement models derived from them. The BOND Logical Framework became reputed as being a simple framework for deriving and reporting against a series of project benchmarks. The framework required contracting partners (including NGOs, private contractors, or other donor

⁸ The PRSP of both Sierra Leone and Uganda now includes security and governance categories, which are considered alongside of more traditional development concerns.

organizations) to identify strategic objectives of each programme or project, followed by Objective Verifiable Indicators (OVIs) and Means of Verification (MOVs); with the OVIs and MOVs being applied to each strategic objective and its related sub-objectives. This technique ensured that only realistic, actionable and achievable indicators were used for measurement purposes.

Whilst applauded for its simplicity, the Logframe model relies on the articulation of effective strategic objectives (and enabling project objectives) from which the indicators are then derived. Research undertaken in 2001 analysing a number of logframes created for development and humanitarian-orientated programmes questioned the robustness of the programme objectives contained in the logframes, and the extent to which the objectives reflected the core competencies of the contracting institutions rather than the wider linkages with the strategic objectives.⁹ This observation resonates with the recent words of Emery Brusset of Channel Research who – in a recent meeting of the Crisis Management Initiative – cautioned against the use of indicators as, in his view, it is rare that the right indicators are chosen; in addition, he also felt that it was easy to confuse objectives and indicators.¹⁰

The Logframe was further developed to include a ‘purpose to goal’ element which would enable the tool to be used more dynamically and throughout the life of a project. The ‘Output to Purpose’ (OTP) framework which evolved allowed for detailed commentary on progress in each of the areas outlined in the more traditional Logframe model.¹¹ The OTP framework also introduced the use of scoring to evaluate the likelihood of achieving the stated purpose/output by the end of the project, which could then inform decision-making on subsequent project phases.

Beyond these approaches exists a range of result-based management (RBM) methodologies that have been developed by a number of bilateral and multilateral donors, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Having worked with RBM methodologies in the early to mid 2000s, UNDP’s SSR engagements now appear to be using indicators in support of impact assessments.¹² CIDA’s RBM approach was developed to explain how, why, when where and for whom it was spending Canadian tax payers dollars and who was benefiting from the resource¹³; however CIDA’s approach appears to be quite disconnected from strategic-level considerations.

The trend beyond RBM seems to be indicator and metric-driven, yet a retreat away from indicators based on enabling objectives to indicators based on principles

⁹ A M Fitz-Gerald, P Molinaro and D J Neal, “Humanitarian Aid and Organizational Management” in *Conflict, Security and Development*, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2001, pp 135-145.

¹⁰ Conference proceedings from the Crisis Management Initiative (CRI) meeting “Workshop on evaluation of crisis management operations: Methodologies and Practices”, 7 November 2007, Brussels, Belgium, p. 2.

¹¹ For example, see the Logframe for a 6-year project aimed to transform the Nigerian health system at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/procurement/nigeria-nslp/50-Paths-2006-OPR.pdf>

¹² For example, at the time of writing, UNDP plans to lead work in Kosovo in support to Security Sector Development in the development of a monitoring and evaluation and impact assessment system. See http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/3SD_MoIA_Communication_Consultancy_TOR_20071025.doc

¹³ CRI, op cit, p 2

underpinning the subject area in question. For example, the work of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) supports the development of a system of metrics that will assist in formulating policy and implementing strategic plans to transform conflict and bring stability to war-torn societies.¹⁴ The model focuses in on the issues that drive conflict as well as the indigenous capacity to resolve conflict peacefully and maintain stability. The indicators are then used to measure the progress made towards a set of basic tenets which effectively form the core values of mature democracies (e.g. stable democracy, rule of law, security, economic sustainability, social justice). The resulting metrics system is designed to identify potential sources of continuing violent conflict and instability and to gauge the capacity of indigenous institutions to overcome them. The intention is to enable policymakers to establish realistic goals, bring adequate resources and authorities to bear, focus their efforts strategically, and enhance prospects for attaining an enduring peace.

While the authors support the development of a performance system more aligned to strategic-level principles, the use of a western-based value system to support short-medium term results may not be appropriate, particularly in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the USIP model could be evolved to be more closely supported by the principles of a recipient country's national security strategy, and indicators which are derived from this. The approach is similar to the one promoted by the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, which argues that the human security concept is explained as a set of principles that form an operating framework, and which should influence the goals and methodologies of crisis management.¹⁵ One representative from the Centre has suggested that this begs the question of whether or not we require indicators for human security, which considers a broader range of security and development objectives.¹⁶

Two other ongoing and evolving pieces of work on performance systems were identified by this research: the "Measures of Effectiveness for Peace Operations Project" led by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and the "Measures of Effectiveness Framework for Reconstruction" led by the Canadian-based consultancy organization Peace & Conflict Planners. The work of the former is geared towards highlighting and framing the principles and concepts driving the questions which are asked when developing measurement systems, as opposed to focusing on the granularities of measurement.¹⁷ This arguably responds to some of the concerns highlighted above regarding the choice of appropriate indicators and the tendency to confuse indicators with objectives.

The second recent initiative takes military lines of operations in post-conflict reconstruction and – based on the feedback from soldiers operating in areas where this tool may be applied – develops measures and inter-related measures along the

¹⁴ See Craig Cohen. Report on Measuring Progress in Reconstruction and Stabilisation. USIP Publications: Washington, March 2006. Found at: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srs/srs1.pdf>

¹⁵ CRI, op cit, p. 2.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Based on discussions with Dr Sarah Meharg, Senior Research Associate, Research and Education Department, Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 5 March 2008, Shrivenham, UK.

different lines of operations (i.e. political, rule of law, human rights, governance, etc) for both civilian and military representatives to work towards based on context and relevant analytical input.¹⁸ The tool is offered in both hard and electronic form, the latter of which has been developed to assist in trials and in support of simulation exercises and training.

David Law maintains that there is “no overarching systems on performance measurement for SSR. Moreover, information on the unintended objectives of programmes can be difficult to come by.”¹⁹ However, in November 2007, the non-government organization Saferworld – an organization whose work contributes richly to the SSR policy debate – launched a three-year project to support the implementation of OECD-DAC policy and guidance on SSR through technical support and accompaniment which will be carried out in cooperation with interested DAC member states.²⁰ The project will not only cover issues of outcome and impact but also aspects of process and ‘principles’. It will no doubt inform performance measurement implications for the IF-SSR and the training which now supports the IF-SSR Handbook. As such, the output from this work would be used by IF-SSR training programmes which have yet to incorporate a systematic approach to performance management.²¹ At the time of writing, the Saferworld project is still in the process of unfolding and thus surveying and reviewing the current performance frameworks adopted by a range of institutions and organizations.

In summary, while there have been some frameworks developed which enable practitioners to measure the degree of success enjoyed by a security-development-based programme – and for monitoring developments against specific benchmarks – most of these tools can only be used in isolation at the single programme level. In addition, most of the tools are detached from broad strategic level priorities, which would no doubt present challenges for consolidated and complex programmes like SSR whose constituent elements are so intricately linked to a range of strategic level issues. As such, in their most basic form, these tools could offer only limited utility in addressing the challenges outlined above concerning the breadth and depth of SSR programmes. Notwithstanding the importance of knowing the extent to which an individual or team has succeeded in their efforts to develop a country’s security sector, it is essential to observe the simultaneous progress in development-related aspects of security-related issues which – if left unattended – may adversely impact on the overall programme. This is particularly the case in the longer-term and during more benign conditions when the health of such development variables takes primacy over former security concerns. SSR experts know only too well the impact of one area making progress without the other. For example, many analysts question the extent to which the new Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces – whilst much stronger, more combat capable and operating with a reasonable level of civilian

¹⁸ Based on discussions with Peace & Conflict Planners, 7 March 2008, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

¹⁹ David Law, *op cit*, p 240

²⁰ Based on discussions with Simon Rynn, Saferworld, London (Simon Rynn is the point of contact for the 2007 Saferworld project “Towards a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Security System Reform”).


²¹ Based on a review of the *OECD-DAC Training Module on Security System Reform and Governance: Workbook for Trainers*, OECD, 2007.

oversight – can in the longer-term sustain a situation whereby a significant portion of the defence budget is dependent on donor funding despite such progress made in the promotion of national security.²²

As mentioned above, the OECD-DAC's IF-SSR Handbook provides SSR policymakers and practitioners with the first detailed road map on more holistic SSR processes. The Handbook is underwritten by internationally-recognized SSR principles and norms which, as Brozka argues, “can provide development donors with a means of measurement by which to evaluate even partial activities in support of security sector reform.”²³ This supports broader principles of public service accountability which, as Pearce argues, should be “subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other public service.”²⁴

Borchert suggests that, since its inception in the 1990s, SSR activities have gone through two distinct stages (as depicted below on Figure 1) He suggests that it is now appropriate to introduce a third stage, which will focus on two key issues: “the provision of those capabilities that are needed to address the new security challenges and the security sector actors’ ability to cooperate with each other at the national and international level.”²⁵

Figure 1 Three Generations of SSR



Source: Borchert, 2003

²²Based on discussions with donor representatives currently based in Sierra Leone.

²³Michael Brzoska, *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No 4, November 2003, p. 47.

²⁴A. Hurwitz and G. Peake, 2004, *Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practice since the 1990s*, New York: International Peace Academy, quoted in Pearce, *Case study of IDRC-supported research on security sector reform in Guatemala: Final report*, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, February 2006.

²⁵Heiko Borchert, Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI), “Work which focuses on how to advance security sector reforms with the help of a new assessment and development framework”, a paper prepared for the *Annual Conference of the Working Group ‘Security Sector Reform*, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Berlin, 15-17 June 2003).

In taking the ‘third generation’ of SSR activities forward, Borchert proposed that review processes for security sector activities be created and supported by a detailed open-ended list of assessment criteria which covers three core dimensions of democratic governance, capability provision and co-operability.

- Democratic governance
 - Security sector guidelines and goals
 - Security sector legislation
 - Security sector management
 - Role of the civil society
- Capability provision
 - Security sector description (quantitative aspects)
 - Mission and role of the security sector actors
 - Security sector capacity building
 - Capabilities
 - Procurement
- Co-operability
 - Joint security body
 - Standards
 - Planning and development
 - Training and exercises²⁶

In a study focused on the Palestinian security sector, Bocco, de Martino and Luethold²⁷ suggest that understanding how the public views the security sector and its activities is important for good governance because public perception surveys assess the quality of governance and can evaluate the direction of future reforms. They suggest that public perception surveys are also a step towards greater inclusiveness in the management and oversight of security issues and a means for establishing public accountability of the security sector. They believe this is important because “the security sector, more than any other public sector, has a tendency to resist public input and oversight.”

Findings from the Palestinian Survey measured the following:

- Feeling of security (% yes)
- Reason for insecurity by place
- Trust in security sector organisation overall
 - Trust in armed forces by place of residence
 - Trust in the judiciary system by place of residence
 - Trust in Sharia courts by place of residence
 - Trust in Clan-based law by place of residence
- Importance of security sector organisations reform
 - HR training of police and security forces
 - Fighting corruption and nepotism

²⁶ Ibid, p 6-7

²⁷ Ricardo Bocco, Luigi de Martino, Arnold Luethold, *Palestinian Public Perceptions of Security Sector Governance: Summary report*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) Geneva, 14 October 2005.

- Independent institutions visiting all places of detention
 - Trial security personnel responsible for HR violations
 - Improve training of police and security forces
 - Have an ombudsman investigating citizens' complaints
 - Strengthen PA supervision over the security apparatus
 - Increase the control of the Palestinian Legislative Council
 - Dissolve non-official armed groups
 - Replace security officials
 - Unify Security Services
- Improvement of Rule of Law

The report identifies a number of areas which can be usefully measured. Table 1 summarises the material and measures identified in the study:

Table 1

Objective	Top Level Measures	Sub Level Measures
Reputation	Feeling of security by population Trust in security sector organisations	Trust in Armed Groups Trust in the judiciary system
Reform of security sector organisations	Public support for SSR	HR training of police and security forces Fighting corruption and nepotism Independent scrutiny Trial security personnel responsible for violations Improve training of police and security forces Dissolve non-official armed groups Replace security officials Unify Security Services
Accountability	Increased oversight	An ombudsman investigating citizens' complaints Improvement of Rule of Law

Source: S. Jackson adapted from Bocco, de Martino and Luethold, Palestinian Survey

While the measures presented above support strategic objectives which reflect widely accepted SSR principles and norms, one could argue that the Logframe goes further in providing means of verification (MOV) which makes the performance assessment realistic and achievable (despite the fact that the use of public opinion surveys offers one type of effective MOV). However, it is the view of the authors that beyond the fairly straightforward measurement of security and development-related targets is the

need to promote a more ‘balanced’ strategic-level approach to the management of security sector interventions; an approach which informs time horizons and, therefore, sequencing challenges of both security and development-related work. The more consolidated and balanced approach suggested would also promote a more effective form of local ownership, capacity-building and sustainability which – as some authors argue – still remains the weak point of the global SSR initiatives.²⁸

Developing a concept for a more balanced form of measurement for security sector programmes: The Balanced Scorecard

Recent research supporting approaches to measuring security sector work has identified the Balanced Scorecard as the tool to use for results measurement due to the perception that “it is a balanced system of indices for effectiveness and has been widely accepted in the management of small, medium and large organizations from private and public sector all over the world.”²⁹

The Balanced Scorecard concept has been remarkably successful since its development in the early 1990s, being adopted by tens of thousands of organisations and is one of the few management initiatives which has ‘staying power’ (over the average initiative lifetime of less than ten years). Indeed, the Harvard Business Review in its 75th Anniversary issue named the Balanced Scorecard as being one of the most important management concepts introduced via articles in the magazine.³⁰ Although the Scorecard was initially designed as a performance measurement tool, trials proved that that it also had utility as a tool for strategy and communication. Kaplan and Norton³¹ stated that the tool “translates an organisation’s mission and strategy into a comprehensive set of performance measures that provides the framework for a strategic measurement and management system.” It is currently viewed as a framework that can translate strategy into operation; ensure clarity of the strategy; communicate the strategy, form the basis of a more effective management process and link long-term strategy with short-term activity. In addition, The Balanced Scorecard Institute gives a number of reasons for having a performance management system in an organisation which include:

- Improves the bottom line
- Allows alignment of strategic activities to the strategic plan
- Provides rational basis for selecting what improvements to make first
- Identifies (and draws on) best practice

²⁸ Evert and Lindquist, 2001 *Discerning Policy Influence: Framework for a Strategic Evaluation of IDRC-Supported Research*, quoted in Jenny Pearce, *Case study of IDRC-supported research on security sector reform in Guatemala, final report*, February 2006, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

²⁹ Valerija Shalamanov and Irena Nikolova “The Role of Research in Security Sector Transformation”, a publication supported by NATO Scientific Division in the framework of Science for Peace Programme Centre of Excellence in Operational Analyses, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 2005.

³⁰ Harvard Business Review, September/October, Vol 75 No 5, 1997.

³¹ Kaplan, R., Norton, D., *The Balanced Scorecard*, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.

- Supports better and faster budget decisions and control of processes
- Visibility provides accountability and incentives based on real data
- Permits benchmarking of process performance against outside organisations
- Allows estimation of costs more accurately for future projects³²

Whilst the rationale put forth by the Institute is not cited in the security sector literature, it is clear from the reports, discussion papers and early models and frameworks discussed above, that there is recognition of the requirement. In an SSR programme, most of the applicability and benefits derived from this rationale are obvious but perhaps some warrant further elaboration. The alignment of strategic activities (and thus strategic benchmarks) to the strategic plan is necessary when the organization in question may be a multi-faceted multi-membered international organization, or indeed a ‘coalition of the willing’, held together by one individual or a team of representatives. Taking the SSR mission from this organizational perspective allows one to appreciate that different performance measurement systems can exist at both the technical, programme and strategic level and can be extremely different across these levels. Lessons from the past have indicated that SSR programmes need to be rooted in a wider national recovery strategy, a wider sustainable development framework and a recipient country’s national security agenda. This magnifies the need for SSR performance systems to be derived at the strategic level of analysis and across many different pillars of activity.

The point concerning the way in which the Balanced Scorecard draws on good practice is also attractive to an industry which is currently adopting ways of archiving lessons learned from past experiences. Indeed, as with many public sector organisations, while progress has been made in ‘identifying’ lessons, less success has been achieved in ‘learning from lessons’. Having a tool which usefully receives input from knowledge system of lessons learned goes farther than most stand-alone tools and frameworks which are often divorced from any other related institutional mechanisms. The last point concerning the accurate estimation of costs is also important for the SSR industry in terms of gauging future commitments from donors as well as managing the expectations of the indigenous authorities. The complexities inherent in financing SSR programmes would also support a system which could inform decision-making concerning future funding.


The traditional scorecard concept measures organizational performance across four areas, which include financial, customers, internal business process and learning and growth. For private sector use, the financial perspective has been traditionally seen as the ‘big ticket area’ and, as such, has been placed at the top of the scorecard and used as the pinnacle which the other three perspectives support. In a private sector context then, the key question in this area is “how do we look to our shareholders?”

The key questions which emerge from the other perspectives are summarized in Figure 2 on a very generic presentation of a scorecard. The customer perspective questions how the organization is viewed by its customer; the learning and growth perspective remains committed to future investment; and the internal business

³² Arveson, Paul, Balanced Scorecard Institute, www.balancedscorecard.org, 1998, accessed 3 April 2007

perspective concerns itself with enabling processes which must be prioritised in order to reach the goals set out in the financial perspective contained in the top box.

Figure 2 Generic Balanced Scorecard for Private Sector



Source: S. Jackson, Adapted from Kaplan and Norton

In explaining the use of Balanced Scorecards for strategy, Kaplan and Norton³³ state that “strategy implies the movement of an organization from its present position to a desirable but uncertain future position. Because the organization has never been to this future place, the pathway to it consists of a series of linked hypotheses. A strategy map specifies the cause and effect relationships, which makes them explicit and testable”. Kaplan and Norton³⁴ used the concept of ‘strategy maps’ to develop Balanced Scorecards. These depict the inter-linkages and mutual dependencies between all the goals and objectives of each separate perspective. They explain that:


[...] the Balanced Scorecard makes a unique contribution by describing strategy in a consistent and insightful way. Before the development of strategy scorecards, managers had no generally accepted framework for describing strategy: they could not implement what they could not describe well. So the simple act of describing strategy via strategy maps and scorecards is an enormous breakthrough.

A typical representation of a strategy map has been included below in Figure 3:

³³ Kaplan and Norton quoted in Niven, Paul R. *Balanced Scorecard Step by Step: Maximising Performance and Maintaining Results*, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc, 2002, p 164.

³⁴ Kaplan, R., Norton, D. *The Strategy Focused Organization*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001.

Figure 3 Example of a Generic Strategy Map



Source: S. Jackson

Nair³⁵ suggests that “the map draws on four or more perspectives that remind the organization of the key elements to operational effectiveness and strategy translation. It also shows the relationships (by the arrows) that documents the hierarchy or network of influences and dependencies to strategy achievement.”

Kaplan and Norton³⁶ recognized that the original design for the Balanced Scorecard was difficult to use in the public sector as the customers are not always clearly defined nor is the financial perspective about delivering profit. Therefore the cause and effect that can be drawn from strategy maps was not applicable. Early thoughts suggested that both the customer and financial perspectives should be at the top of the scorecard. However, many organizations have, as Kaplan and Norton suggested, tailored the scorecard to fit their needs. For example, the UK Ministry of Defence adopted the scorecard in 1999, developing its first usable scorecard in 2000.³⁷ As its use of the scorecard has matured, so has the tailoring, so that the outline scorecard we see today now resembles the strategic management diagram shown in Figure 4. The perspectives clearly illustrate how the purpose or role (outcomes) of the organization is achieved through its resources (in a broad sense) and the activities (enabling processes) it undertakes. The future capability perspective feeds into both the resources and activity perspectives to ensure that the purpose/outcome will continue


³⁵ Nair, M. *Essentials of Balanced Scorecard*. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2004, p28

³⁶ Niven, op cit, p 297

³⁷ Presentation at Defence Academy of the UK, by Directorate of Performance and Analysis, MoD, February 2002

to be achieved in the future. This scorecard format has been used successfully in a number of other organizations, major charitable foundations³⁸ and forms an excellent basis for a strategic plan.

Figure 4 The Balanced Scorecard as a Strategy Tool



Source: S. Jackson (developed to teach basics of strategic management to newly appointed Majors on Intermediate Command and Staff Course, Land, 2005)

Niven³⁹ suggests that “the choice of perspectives for your Balanced Scorecard should ultimately be based on what is necessary to tell the story of your strategy....” In reviewing tools available for public sector measurement use, Bontis *et al* contend that, while all tools come with advantages and disadvantages, the Balanced Scorecard approach is effective for comparative purposes:

[...] the main intuition behind the Balanced Scorecard is nothing short of genial: the creation of a system of measurement that would enable organisations to keep track of many dimensions in a systematic way is an incredibly powerful concept. The rigidity and the lack of reporting on employees they describe is due to their view that organisations will stick with the original four perspectives although they identify that Kaplan and Norton mention that the perspectives should not be seen as a straightjacket. So, if the scorecard is adapted, these two disadvantages disappear. In addition, if a common scorecard framework is used across a sector, then comparisons become possible.⁴⁰

³⁸ Examples in the United Kingdom include: UK Ministry of Defence Defence Management Board and Air Force, Land and Navy scorecards, The Health Foundation, Facilities Management Group, and the Defence Procurement Agency

³⁹ Niven, *op cit*, p 98

⁴⁰ Bontis *et al*

Public sector and not-for-profit organizations seek to achieve broader missions aimed at improving society and as mission-focused organizations, they must change the architecture of the Balanced Scorecard, elevating the role of mission and customers and reducing the influence of financial indicators⁴¹. According to Nair⁴², the art of understanding the relationship among the key perspectives (strategy mapping) is crucial, if organizations are to master the interrelationships between strategic intentions and the underlying operational actions that enable these intentions. A good example is the Oregon State Government which has adopted the scorecard to improve performance and accountability. It is used to ensure focus on the 20-year strategic plan entitled 'Oregon Shines' and using cause and effect strategy maps allows it to align multi-agencies goals and measures on issues such as child well-being⁴³.

Developing a concept for a more balanced form of measurement for security sector programmes: The Balanced Scorecard

The scorecard approach is advantageous to many transitional societies where security and development issues drive the national agenda. It allows one to maintain perspective of short-term security priorities that would help to maintain progress; a combined resource funding the overall timescale; combined overall objectives and desirable outcomes; the development of the relevant stakeholders, and the longer-term issues that would naturally flow from the sustainable development side of the equation.

Whilst past practitioners have applied the scorecard methodology primarily to organizations and institutions, the ideas could also be applied to a large and complex programme, which in itself acts as an institution, often in the absence of any more formal indigenous institution or authority on the ground. The more traditional Balanced Scorecard could also be adapted to prioritize the customer – and for SSR programmes, the 'societal' – perspective as such programmes places the safety and security of society as the central unit of analysis. Thus, with 'society' serving as the 'big ticket item', the more conventional financial perspective sits squarely in support of the goals embedded in the societal perspective.

If the overall objective within the 'societal perspective' becomes the provision of a safe and secure environment in a way which promotes sustainable development, then the goals contained within this perspective may align with those drawn from agenda such as PRSPs, the UN Millennium Development Goals, and perhaps those related to international laws and principles guiding such things as transparency, human rights and the use of force.

⁴¹ Niven, Paul R., 2002, *Balanced Scorecard Step by Step: Maximising Performance and Maintaining Results*, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc, p293

⁴² Nair, M., 2004, *Essentials of Balanced Scorecard*, Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, pp 26-27

⁴³ Ibid, pp 55-56

The left side of the scorecard could be concerned with an ‘internal’ programme perspective and therefore with the enabling activities which must be internally driven to achieve the societal perspective. These may then include such sub-programmes like an international peacekeeping mission, justice reform, sector-specific (i.e. agrarian) micro-credit programmes, disarmament programmes, police reform, and programmes promoting civilian oversight of the security forces. Such a list is not exhaustive and is only meant to illustrate how a wide range of both security and development-driven programmes can be accommodated here as ‘enablers’.


The right side of the scorecard would be concerned with resources, including people, infrastructure, donor funding and possibly equipment. In considering such funding collectively – and how such resources are applied to both security and development goals - practitioners can observe the potential dangers in, for example, an overspend in equipment for the security forces in a way which may restrict necessary funds supporting infrastructure to house personnel and equipment. Wider observations may also identify areas where excessive resources allocated to security-related issues could be better reconciled with the manpower required for evolving development programmes which may – in the longer term – contribute significantly to funding the sustainability of the security forces.

The Learning/Growth and Future perspective could retain its position at the base of the scorecard and encapsulate priorities related to education, training, and sector-specific investment plans. These goals account for the parallel efforts which must persist in order to maintain momentum across all other perspectives of the scorecard. For example, if a development concern – and perhaps a root cause of conflict – for a particular developing country lies in the export of social capital to western countries (for example, in the case of some African countries which lose valuable and skilled human resources from national health sectors to countries like the UK, Canada and the US), then a sector-specific investment plan supporting the health sector becomes of paramount priority. Similarly, for some countries, the sustainability of good governance and civilian oversight programmes becomes very much dependent on the level of awareness and acceptance of the advantages of civilian oversight. One African academic maintains that – despite recent gains made in the promotion of security reforms and development programmes – certain African countries which have pulled through numerous SSR programmes still suffer from a culture which is still not entirely comfortable with the notion of civilian oversight of the security forces.⁴⁴

There are a number of ways that this modified and adapted Balanced Scorecard could be presented diagrammatically. The basic top-level scorecard with the key questions that are asked is shown in Figure 5, which reflects the outline originally designed by Kaplan and Norton.

⁴⁴ Based a presentation delivered by Professor Eboe Hutchful to the Masters in Defence Administration course, Cranfield University, the Defence Academy of the UK, May 2005.

Figure 5 Proposed SSM Balanced Scorecard




Source: Jackson and Fitz-Gerald, 2008

The key advantage of applying the scorecard to a security-development programme which encompasses such supporting programmes like SSR is that the methodology accommodates resource limitations as well as risk. Thus, it serves as a model which strives for something which is ‘good enough’ and not ‘idealistic’. In addition, it caters to swings and fluctuations in a range of core areas over time, which is typical of a far-reaching integrated security-development programme. For example, poor progress in one particular enabling activity which is supporting the overall goals embedded in the ‘societal perspective’ can be partially compensated for by bolstering another related area which might help preserve such things as confidence-building measures, the earmarking of resources, and the promotion of higher levels of awareness in order that problems in one area do not upset overall progress.

The strategy map concept is also useful for identifying inter-dependencies between a range of issues and tasks. This is particularly important as SSR engagements become considered in highly volatile environments where practitioners only have access to very few entry points – and perhaps less sophisticated forms of traditional entry points. With such few options in sight, the strategy map derived from the Balanced Scorecard approach could offer ongoing prescriptive and diagnostic guidance as well as serving as a performance management tool. For example, if one donor Government was prepared to initiate very small-scale SSR activity based on capacity-building within the operational police forces, a well-developed strategy map could indicate any other emerging political voices which may come as a result of this initial engagement. This knowledge could help to further augment the initial measures in order to preserve overall progress and both the short-term and longer-term priority areas in terms of enabling processes and investment and learning. Thus the tool could provide valuable information guiding the ‘sequencing’ of processes and the use of

resources based on a number of potential entry strategies. A proposed strategy map is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6 Proposed Strategy Map for SSM



Source: Jackson and Fitz-Gerald, 2008

Conclusion

While it is widely accepted that the concept of SSR has been well-developed and analysed at the policy and academic levels, operationalising this concept has been challenging due to a lack of implementation methodologies which cater to the multi-faceted, inter-dependent, and sequential complexities inherent in these programmes. The international development community has gone some way in responding to the need for operational methodologies and guidance by producing the IF-SSR Handbook. In addition, the more comprehensive approach taken to developing PRSPs which target both the security and development agendas has also been valuable at the strategic planning level.

Despite these developments, and due to the sheer breadth and depth of SSR, there is a need to remain strategic in approaches to SSR programming. As such, all aspects of SSR management should analyse specific programme areas according to wider

strategic objectives rooted in national security, international development, and national recovery frameworks. This is true for many aspects of SSR management, including measuring performance, implementing change, sequencing, resourcing and more. To date, the most useful performance frameworks supporting conflict, development and humanitarian interventions have either existed solely at the project level, or are developed and used retrospectively as an assessment tool to measure impact. Measuring the performance of an SSR programme is central to the assessment of its sustainability and, as such, requires a balanced approach in order to maintain sight of the wider strategic perspectives.

This paper advocates for the use of an adapted Balanced Scorecard framework to support SSR interventions. The use of a ‘second generation’ Scorecard developed as a strategy map clearly shows the overall goals and how resources and processes are used to achieve them. Such a common framework can provide the ability to see progress towards SSR strategies and goals and prioritise the use of resources, whilst permitting benchmarking of performance and the sharing of best practice. While this paper argues for the merit in using the Balanced Scorecard approach – and the advantages its central tenets bring to contemporary SSR challenges at the operational level - further research should advise on how such Scorecards could be developed across a range of transitional societies. It is also recommended that the tool be promoted in SSR training packages as one option supporting a performance measurement system that can be developed at the strategic level of engagement, utilize lessons learned and good practice, and usefully inform a number of other areas including plausible entry points, future resourcing and sequencing strategies.

“Measurement is the driver of the next direction, not just the documenter of today’s position.”⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Nair, op cit, p 2.