

DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE MATERIAL

INTERNATIONAL

A1. THE GENEVA INITIATIVE, SECURITY ANNEX TO THE GENEVA ACCORD, GENEVA, 15 SEPTEMBER 2009 (EXCERPTS).

On 15 September 2009, the private Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative known as the Geneva Initiative published 13 detailed annexes to the Geneva Accord, the draft framework for a final status agreement between Israelis and Palestinians unveiled in 2003. The Geneva Initiative was launched by former Israeli justice minister Yossi Beilin and then Palestinian Authority (PA) minister Yasir 'Abid Rabbuh in their private capacities in 2001. The original accord, while immediately rejected by then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, was met with considerable international backing, but never formed the basis of any official negotiations.

The 423 pages of annexes, which expand on the main provisions of the Geneva Accord with the aim of turning them into implementable measures, cover everything from security and borders, through water and the environment, to Jerusalem and an international presence. An important area not tackled is the refugee issue, with the relevant annex indicating that "work on elaborating some of the technical aspects relating to this solution ... remains to be concluded." The annexes were reportedly presented to Israeli president Shimon Peres, PA president Mahmud Abbas, U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton, and, according to some reports, have been unofficially examined by the Pentagon, the White House, and the foreign ministries of various countries.

The excerpts below are from the 16-page security annex, which was reportedly drafted to reflect both the Dayton mission and Benjamin Netanyahu's requirement of a demilitarized state (see Doc. C1 in JPS 153). The full annexes can be found online at www.geneva-accord.org. Footnotes have been omitted for space considerations.

1. Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Transfer of Responsibility

1. Israel shall complete withdrawal of all its military and security personnel and

equipment, and all persons employed to support them, and all military installations including minefields laid by Israel, from the territory of the State of Palestine, except as otherwise specified in this annex, not later than 30 months [after] the entry into force of this agreement.

2. The withdrawal will be implemented in three stages:

- a. The first stage will include the northern part of the West Bank. ... This stage will be implemented not later than 9 months [after] the entry into force of this agreement.
- b. The second stage will include [areas of the West Bank east of the separation wall]. This stage will be implemented not later than 20 months [after] the entry into force of this agreement.
- c. The third stage will include the remaining territory of the State of Palestine [areas between the separation wall and the Green Line] and will be implemented not later than 30 months [after] the entry into force of this agreement.

3. Israel will maintain for an additional 36 months a deployment of one mechanized infantry battalion in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the MF [Multinational Force]. The battalion will be stationed at a camp agreed upon by the parties and the MF.

4. The main elements of the battalion will consist of:

- a. 800 troops with their personal weapons.
- b. 60 armored personnel carriers.
- c. 6 mortars.
- d. 50 anti-tank missile launchers and 100 anti-tank rocket launchers.

5. The battalion will not operate outside its camp.

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8. The IVG [Implementation and Verification Group] shall facilitate, monitor, and verify the execution of the withdrawal stages.

9. Israel will notify the IVG and the Palestinian police at least two weeks before of its intention to withdraw from every subarea. The IVG will convene a joint co-ordination meeting with the IDF [Israel

Defense Forces] and the Palestinian police, and will deploy observers to monitor Israeli withdrawal and transfer of responsibility to Palestinian security forces.

10. In each phase of withdrawal the Palestinian security forces will prevent any attempt of armed elements operating from Palestinian territory to interfere from the areas under its responsibility with the Israeli withdrawal.

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2. Early Warning Stations

1. Israel may maintain two Early Warning Stations [EWS] in Ba'al Hatzor/Jabal al-'Asur and Eval Mountain/Jabal 'Ibal for the purpose of operating passive and active electronic and optical monitoring equipment. The land of the two EWS as delineated by existing fence will be operated by Israel and will be under Palestinian sovereignty. . . .

2. Ba'al Hatzor/Jabal al-'Asur site will be staffed by up to 150 operators and protected by 50 guards, including all shifts.

3. Eval mountain/Jabal 'Ibal site will be staffed by up to 50 operators and protected by 50 guards. The guards and the other personnel will be allowed to carry personal weapons, including all shifts.

4. The MF will deploy to each site an infantry company that will be responsible for perimeter security of each EWS. The internal security in each site will be the responsibility of Israel.

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6. The MF shall monitor and verify that each EWS is being used only for operating the above specified equipment.

7. In each EWS there will be a liaison office of the MF and a Liaison office of the Palestinian police. These offices will be manned 24 hours a day by up to 3 persons in each office.

8. The arrangements set forth in this article shall be subject to review in ten years, with any changes to be mutually agreed. Thereafter, there will be five-yearly reviews whereby the arrangements set forth in this article may be extended by mutual consent.

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3. Defense Characteristics of the Palestinian State

1. Palestine shall be a nonmilitarized state, with no armed forces other than a strong security force, including police

forces, marine police, gendarmerie-type forces, internal security organs, intelligence organizations, and border security forces.

2. The MF shall protect the territorial integrity of the State of Palestine and serve as a deterrent against external attacks.

3. The following categories of weapons will not be allowed to be purchased, owned, used, or manufactured by anyone in Palestine:

- a. Tanks
- b. Armored vehicles other than up to 400 wheeled armored vehicles that will be used by the Palestinian Security Force (PSF) and equipped only with the weapons allowed to be carried by the PSF
- c. Rockets
- d. Guided missiles
- e. Anti-aircraft weapons
- f. Anti-ship weapons
- g. Artillery systems
- h. Mortars
- i. Mines
- j. Machine guns above 7.62-mm caliber
- k. Laser weapons or other radiating weapons
- l. Combat aircraft, combat helicopters, and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]
- m. Armed naval vessels other than light boats (up to 25 tons) armed with light weapons up to 7.62-mm machine-guns
- n. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

4. Anti-armor weapons, explosives, and grenades of the PSF will be kept under MF's storage control and will only be used with the MF's permission.

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7. No individuals or organizations in Palestine other than the PSF, the organs of the IVG, including the MF and the EWS, may purchase, possess, carry, or use weapons except as provided by Palestinian law.

8. The MF shall monitor and verify compliance with this article. The MF will keep a registry of all weapons imported to Palestine or manufactured in Palestine. The PSF will notify the MF about any purchase, manufacture, or import of weapons in Palestine. . . .

9. No armed militias will be allowed in Palestine. Political movements and organizations will not be allowed to purchase, possess, carry, or use weapons.

10. The PSF mission includes preventing destabilization and upholding the

integrity of and respect for the State of Palestine and shall:

- a. Maintain border control;
- b. Maintain law and order and perform police functions;
- c. Perform information gathering and security functions;
- d. Prevent any act of violence;
- e. Conduct rescue and emergency missions; and
- f. Supplement essential community services when necessary.

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5. International Border Crossings

1. The following arrangements shall apply to border crossings between the State of Palestine and Jordan, the State of Palestine and Egypt, as well as airport and seaport entry points to the State of Palestine.

2. All border crossings shall be monitored by joint teams composed of members of the PSF and the MF equipped with modern imagery and detection equipment. These teams shall prevent the entry into Palestine of any weapons, materials, or equipment that is in contravention of the provisions of this agreement.

3. The MF representatives and the PSF will have, jointly and separately, the authority to block the entry into Palestine of any such items. . . .

4. This arrangement shall be reviewed by the IVG after 5 years to determine its continuation, modification, or termination. Thereafter, the Palestinian party may request such a review on an annual basis.

5. In all passenger terminals, for thirty months starting at the date of transfer of the crossing to Palestinian control, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and up to 12 Israelis in each terminal, utilizing remote control TV cameras that will cover the area of the security and customs inspections and the border control area. The Israeli-MF group will have a direct communication link to the PSF and MF joint teams to be used to request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action when the Israeli team suspects that there may be a breach in the inspections and/or entrance of goods or materials in contravention of the provisions of this agreement is allowed. These goods or materials will not be allowed to pass until these further

inspections and appropriate actions take place. . . .

6. For the following two years, these arrangements will continue in a specially designated facility located in the offices of the Israeli Airports Authority in Ben-Gurion Airport, utilizing remote control video cameras and an appropriate direct communication link. . . .

7. In cargo terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing remote control video cameras that will cover the area of inspection of the goods and a direct communication link to the MF-PSF team. The Israeli side may request that the MF-PSF conduct further inspections and take appropriate action. If the Israeli side is not satisfied by the MF-PSF action, it may demand that the cargo be detained pending a decision by an MF inspector. The MF inspector's decision shall be binding and final, and shall be rendered within 12 hours of the Israeli complaint.

8. For the following three years, these arrangements will continue from a specially designated facility in Ashdod port, utilizing remote control video cameras and a direct communication link.

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