

government preferred to teach Hamas a lesson rather than negotiate a new cease-fire and the release of Shalit. I understood that the leaders believed that they could bring about a regime change in Gaza, even if this was not the stated goal of the war. Why would we negotiate with Hamas if we expected to bring about the fall of Hamas?

Over the past days the media has been filled with reports that there is a new breakthrough in the talks for the release of Shalit: "Hamas is willing to link the end of the economic siege with the release of Shalit." When I read this, I said to myself—enough lies and spins. . . .

If the transition government of Olmert does bring Shalit home before the new government is formed, it will pay the exact price that it could have paid nearly 950 days ago. The price then was as unreasonable as it is today; the problem is that there is simply no other way of bringing Gilad home. Hamas has not changed its price. The war in Gaza did not create any positive developments. It has not changed the price. It has not enabled a new breakthrough. It has weakened the moderate leadership of Abbas. It has weakened the moderates in Gaza. It did not achieve the goals that our leaders hoped it would.

The war was supported by 94 percent of Israelis because they really believed it was a "war of no choice." Lies, lies, and lies. There was a choice. That choice was made—our leaders preferred war regardless of the cost. We don't negotiate with terrorists. We won't talk with Hamas. . . . That is the doctrine of the government. Now we can talk with Hamas? Isn't that what the government is doing today? Perhaps the talks are not direct, but we are negotiating with Hamas. The agreement that will be reached will be exactly what I proposed to Olmert, Barak, and Livni ten days before the war began.

C2. AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN, INAUGURAL STATEMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER, JERUSALEM, 1 APRIL 2009 (EXCERPTS).

Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu ("Israel Is Our Home") party, was appointed foreign minister in March 2009 in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud government coalition, which formed nearly six weeks after the Knesset elections of 10 February 2009. Lieberman, who ran under the slogan "no loyalty, no citizenship"—demanding that Arab citizens of Israel

pledge allegiance to the Jewish state or be expelled and calling for the "annihilation" of Hamas—won an unprecedented fifteen seats, beating out Labor to become Israel's third-largest party in the Knesset.

Lieberman, a settler and immigrant from the former Soviet Union, caused a stir with his first speech as foreign minister, in which he declared the road map to be the sole document binding Israel to its pledges post-Oslo. The full text of the speech can be found online at www.mfa.gov.il.

. . . .
The claim that what is threatening the world today is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a way of evading reality. The reality is that the problems are coming from the direction of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.

What is important is to maintain global and regional stability. Egypt is definitely an important country in the Arab world, a stabilizing factor in the regional system and perhaps even beyond that, and I certainly view it as an important partner. I would be happy to visit Egypt and to host Egyptian leaders here, including the Egyptian foreign minister—all based on mutual respect.

I think that we have been disparaging many concepts, and we have shown the greatest disdain of all for the word "peace." The fact that we say the word "peace" twenty times a day will not bring peace any closer. There have been two governments here that took far-reaching measures: the Sharon government and the Olmert government. They took dramatic steps and made far-reaching proposals. We saw the disengagement and the Annapolis conference.

Yisrael Beiteinu was not then part of the coalition, Avigdor Lieberman was not the foreign minister and, even if we had wanted to, we would have been unable to prevent peace. But none of these far-reaching measures have brought peace. To the contrary. We have seen that, after all the gestures that we made, after all the dramatic steps we took, and all the far-reaching proposals we presented, in the past few years this country has gone through the second war in Lebanon and Operation Cast Lead—and not because we chose to. I have not seen peace here. It is precisely when we made all the concessions that I saw the Durban conference, I saw two countries in the Arab world suddenly sever relations, recalling their ambassadors—Mauritania and Qatar suddenly became extremist.

We are also losing ground every day in public opinion. Does anyone think that

concessions and constantly saying “I am prepared to concede” and using the word “peace” will lead to anything? No, that will just invite pressure, and more and more wars. “*Si vis pacem, para bellum*”—if you want peace, prepare for war; be strong.

We definitely want peace, but the other side also bears responsibility. We have proven our desire for peace more than any other country in the world. No country has made concessions the way Israel has. Since 1977, we have given up areas of land three times the size of the State of Israel. So we have proven the point.

The Oslo process began in 1993. Sixteen years have passed since then, and I do not see that we are any closer to a permanent settlement. There is one document that binds us and it is not the Annapolis conference. That has no validity. When we drafted the basic government policy guidelines, we certainly stated that we would honor all the agreements and all the undertakings of previous governments. The continuity of government is respected in Israel. I voted against the road map, but that was the only document approved by the cabinet and by the Security Council—I believe it was Resolution 1505. It is a binding resolution and it binds this government as well.

The Israeli government never approved Annapolis, neither the cabinet nor the Knesset, so anyone who wants to amuse himself can continue to do so. I have seen all the proposals made so generously by Ehud Olmert, but I have not seen any results.

So we will therefore act exactly according to the road map, including the Tenet document (see Doc. D2 in *JPS* 121) and the Zinni document. I will never agree to our waiving all the clauses—I believe there are 48 of them—and going directly to the last clause, negotiations on a permanent settlement. No. These concessions do not achieve anything. We will adhere to it to the letter, exactly as written. Clauses one, two, three, four—dismantling terrorist organizations, establishing an effective government, making a profound constitutional change in the Palestinian Authority. We will proceed exactly according to the clauses. We are also obligated to implement what is required of us in each clause, but so is the other side. They must implement the document in full, including—as I said—the Zinni document and the Tenet document. I am not so sure that the Palestinian Authority or even we—in those circles that espouse peace so

much—are aware of the existence of the Tenet and Zinni documents.

When was Israel at its strongest in terms of public opinion around the world? After the victory of the Six-Day War, not after all the concessions in Oslo accords I, II, III, and IV. Anyone who wants to maintain his status in public opinion must understand that if he wants respect, he must first respect himself. I think that, at least from our standpoint, will be our policy.

UNITED STATES

D1. THE ISRAEL PROJECT, “25 RULES FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION,” APRIL 2009 (EXCERPTS).

The Israel Project (TIP), a pro-Israel media consulting firm “devoted to educating the press and the public about Israel while promoting security, freedom, and peace,” commissioned Republican pollster and political language expert Frank Luntz to craft a language strategy for “visionary leaders who are on the front lines of fighting the media war for Israel” to talk to Americans with the aim of “winning the hearts and minds of the public.” Luntz’s first Global Language Dictionary for TIP was published in 2003; the 2009 Global Language Dictionary is the result of revisions based on research conducted in 2008.

The 117-page document is available in full at www.docstoc.com/docs/8303274/The-Israel-Projects-2009-Global-Language-Dictionary; the following excerpts are taken from chapter 1.

The 25 Rules for Effective Communication

This manual will provide you with many specific words and phrases to help you communicate effectively in support of Israel. But what is the big picture? What are some general guidelines that can help you in your future efforts? Here are the 25 points that matter most:

1) Persuadables won’t care how much you know until they know how much you care. Show empathy for BOTH sides! The goal of pro-Israel communications is not simply to make people who already love Israel feel good about that decision. The goal is to win new hearts and minds for Israel without losing the support Israel already has. To do this you have to understand that the frame from which most Americans view Israel is one of “cycle of violence