

consequences of its actions. As illustrated herein, the State of Israel is subject to explicit legal obligations: it bears the responsibility for reconstructing and maintaining the Gaza Strip. Bank rolling the occupation without demanding an end to its violations of international law is equivalent to tacit complicity on the part of the international community. . . .

We further note that, Israel's primary responsibility notwithstanding, international reconstruction materials must not be procured in Israel. The State of Israel must not profit from its illegal actions and the destruction it has wrought.

International assistance is most appropriate at the political level. It has become increasingly evident that international aid alone cannot resolve the conflict. In order to facilitate long-term development and recovery, political will and political action are required. All potential avenues that accord with humanitarian and human rights law must be pursued in order to ensure the State of Israel's compliance with international law. We call on the taxpayers of the international community to pressurize their governments, to lobby on behalf of the Palestinian people, and to ensure that their money is no longer wasted by governments willing to fund a school but not willing to take action in response to that school's destruction, or to ensure that the cement necessary for its reconstruction is permitted to enter Gaza.

International aid is currently being used to finance the consequences of an illegal occupation and the accompanying serious violations of IHL and international human rights law.

A4. UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, "WEST BANK MOVEMENT AND ACCESS UPDATE," JERUSALEM, MAY 2009 (EXCERPTS).

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the occupied Palestinian territories produces a biweekly report on movement and access to monitor the progress made since the 2005 U.S.-brokered Agreement on Movement and Access was signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (see Doc. A4 in JPS 136). The excerpts below come from the May 2009 movement and access update, an 18-page analysis synthesizing the biweekly reports in the period between September 2008 and end of March 2009.

Footnotes have been omitted for space considerations. The full report can be accessed online through www.ochaopt.org.

Executive Summary

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2. During the reporting period the Israeli authorities implemented a number of measures, which have eased the flow of Palestinian traffic on some of the access routes into four main cities: Nablus, Hebron, Tulkarm, and Ramallah. These measures included the removal of permit requirements for vehicles entering Nablus city; the opening of two junctions allowing more direct access to Hebron city; the removal of one checkpoint on the southern route into Tulkarm city; and the opening of a "fabric of life" alternative road easing access to Ramallah city from the west.

3. At the same time, there has been further entrenchment of various mechanisms used to control Palestinian movement and access and to facilitate the movement of Israeli settlers. The key elements of this entrenchment, as were observed during this and previous periods, are: the expansion of the alternative ("fabric of life") road network; the expansion of key staffed checkpoints; and the replacement of rudimentary obstacles (e.g., earthmounds) with more permanent ones (e.g., road gates and guardrails).

4. While some of these measures eased the flow of Palestinian traffic, they exact a price from Palestinians. For example, the "fabric of life" roads reconnect Palestinian communities that were disconnected due to the restricted access of Palestinians to a main road, or due to the obstruction of a road by the barrier, at the expense of reinforcing the exclusion of Palestinians from the primary road network and of undermining the territorial contiguity between different areas. The pavement of these roads entails the expropriation of private and publicly owned land, thus further shrinking the space available for Palestinian development.

5. In its most recent comprehensive survey, OCHA field teams documented and mapped 634 physical obstacles, including 93 staffed checkpoints and 541 unstaffed obstacles (earthmounds, roadblocks, road barriers, etc.). Twenty out of the 93 checkpoints are not always staffed, including some that are rarely staffed. The overall figure represents an insignificant increase of four obstacles, compared with the parallel figure at the end of the previous reporting period

(11 September 2008). However, despite the proximity in the totals at the end of both periods, the number of changes recorded during the current period (24 obstacles removed and 28 installed) was significantly lower when compared with the previous period (82 removals and 101 additions).

6. Though the total number of obstacles remains indicative of the widespread nature of the system of internal movement and access restrictions, this figure alone is insufficient to capture some of the most relevant developments and trends during the reporting period.

7. The West Bank barrier, in conjunction with its gate and permit regime, [is a] key component of the system of movement and access restrictions. Construction continued on various sections of the barrier during the period, albeit at a slower pace compared with past periods. The Israeli authorities requisitioned land and began leveling works toward the construction of four new sections, two of which are aimed at relocating existing sections, in compliance with decisions issued by the Israeli High Court of Justice more than three years ago. All four sections are located within the West Bank, rather than on the Green Line or in Israel, in contravention of the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in July 2004.

8. In addition, large areas between the barrier and the Green Line, in Salfit, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron governorates, were declared as "seam zone" and closed to Palestinians. Since 2003, monitoring of barrier-affected communities situated in the northern West Bank shows a significant reduction in access to agricultural areas situated between the barrier and the Green Line.

9. Access to East Jerusalem through the two main barrier checkpoints controlling access of Palestinians with entry permits from the northern and southern West Bank (Qalandia and Gilo) has been further constrained as a result of longer delays.

10. Israeli settlements remained the most important factor shaping the system of movement and access restrictions. This is reflected in the significant degree of overlap between the location of access restrictions (including the barrier) and the location of settlements and settlers' routes. The main trends observed during the reporting period include an acceleration in the expansion of settlements on the western ("Israeli") side of the barrier, along with the maintenance

of all settlement outposts and the expansion of some; a deterioration in access of Palestinian farmers to agricultural lands located in the vicinity of some settlements, due, among other reasons, to an increase in settler violence; and the imposition of harsh restrictions (including prolonged curfews) on individual villages in the northern West Bank, following incidents of stone throwing at settlers' vehicles.

11. Access of farmers and herders to areas in the Jordan Valley and in the eastern slopes of Bethlehem and Hebron governorates that were declared in the past as closed military zones or as nature reserves was further constrained as a result of an increase in the enforcement of restrictions by the Israeli authorities. Approximately 28 percent of the West Bank is designated either as closed military zones or as nature reserves.

12. Overall, the easing observed during the period in the flow of Palestinian traffic in some areas falls short of a genuine improvement in access. This is reflected not only in the lack of change in the total number of closure obstacles, but also in the parallel implementation of other restrictive policies and measures, including the expansion of the barrier and Israeli settlements. Moreover, in contrast to assurances given by the government of Israel regarding the temporary nature of the system of movement and access restrictions, measures adopted during this and previous periods indicate a further entrenchment of this system. As a result, the space available for Palestinian development is increasingly constrained. . . .

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B1. HIZBALLAH SECRETARY GENERAL SAYYED HASAN NASRALLAH, SPEECH ON EGYPTIAN ACCUSATIONS OF HIZBALLAH ACTIVITIES ON GAZA BORDER WITH EGYPT, LEBANON, 10 APRIL 2009 (EXCERPTS).

Hasan Nasrallah devoted his usual Friday televised address to responding head-on to the Egyptian government's dramatic announcement two days earlier of a Hizballah network operating in Egypt to spread Shi'i ideas and prepare hostile operations threatening public security. While forcefully denying the charges as made, the speech is important for its confirmation, with detail, of Hizballah's involvement in transporting weapons and ammunition across the border into Gaza the month before Operation Cast Lead. Nasrallah's