CIAO DATE: 10/2014
Volume: 6, Issue: 2
September 2014
Designing Cabinets: Presidential Politics and Ministerial Instability (PDF)
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
This article proposes a set of arguments about the strategic use of cabinet appointments by executives in presidential systems. Although recent work has greatly improved our understanding of government formation in presidential countries, most changes to presidential cabinets happen throughout the lifetime of a government and remain poorly understood. I argue that presidents use cabinet changes in response to unexpected shocks and to adjust their governments to changing political and policy circumstances. Weak presidents are more likely to use this strategic resource, which means that ministerial turnover should be higher when a president’s formal authority is weak and he or she has low political support and popularity. To test these claims, I have assembled an original dataset that records individual cabinet changes in 12 Latin American countries between 1982 and 2012. The data provides strong support for the theory.
Pastor Paulo vs. Doctor Carlos: Professional Titles as Voting Heuristics in Brazil
Taylor Chase Boas
In low-information elections, voters are likely to rely on heuristics when choosing candidates. Based on survey experiments conducted prior to Brazil’s 2012 municipal elections, I examine the effect of candidates’ professional titles, such as “doctor” and “pastor,” on voting behavior. Using the “pastor” title in one’s electoral name tends to decrease vote intention, although evangelical Christians respond positively while members of other religious groups are repelled. The broader at-mosphere of political competition between Brazilian evangelicals and Catholics helps explain the presence of both out-group and in-group cueing effects. The “doctor” title has a positive effect on vote intention that appears to be mediated by the positive stereotypes, such as intelligence and competence, associated with members of this profession.
The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case
Hirokazu Kikuchi, Germán Lodola
What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators’ decisions on national policies? Do legislators’ own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors’ parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators’ office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small.
Civil–Military Relations in Brazil: A Reassessment (PDF)
Scott D. Tollefson, Thomas Charles Bruneau
This article analyzes Brazilian civil–military relations using a framework that directs attention to the institutions of not only democratic civilian control, but also of military effectiveness and efficiency. The article argues that democratic civilian control over the armed forces in Brazil is exercised by a wide variety of mechanisms, many of which are not specifically designed for this purpose, but are instead part of a vast array of institutions that exercise control and oversight over public bureaucracies in general. Military prerogatives that were once high are now moderate or low, and there is currently no question of civilian control of the armed forces. However, several questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the armed forces. The article also emphasizes the importance of civilian staff assuming responsibilities in defense, as they have in virtually all other areas of government policy.
Evaluating Theories of Decision-making on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal (PDF)
Aldo Fernando Ponce, Lydia Brashear Tiede
High courts with abstract review powers to find laws unconstitutional may provide a strong check on other political actors and influence public policy if the judges in these courts are impartial decision makers. This paper tests existing judicial decision-making theories in relation to the behavior of judges on the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal who are selected exclusively by Congress. Taking advantage of an original data set of judges’ votes on the Tribunal, we find that the origin of the law and whether the enacting governments at the national and subnational levels are still in power at the time of judicial review are important determinants of judicial behavior. Judges’ own political loyalties seem to have no perceived effect on decision making, which suggests that political affiliations are trumped by strategic concerns of judges due to the institutional design of the Tribunal as well as the political context in which it operates.