CIAO DATE: 08/2013
Volume: 5, Issue: 1
June 2013
New Directions in Legislative Politics (PDF)
Mariana Llanos, Magna Inácio
This special issue, "New Directions in Legislative Politics," comes at a crossroads in a research field that, on one hand, has already contributed substantial empirical knowledge and been engaged with theory-building, and on the other hand, still remains in its early stages.
Latin American Legislative Politics: A Survey of Peer-Reviewed Publications in English (PDF)
Eduardo Alemán
This study discusses basic trends in articles on legislative politics in Latin America published in twelve journals between 2000 and 2010. It examines the distribution of the articles over time and by journal, the authors' institutional affiliations and patterns of collaboration, the frequency with which various countries are studied, and common approaches and topics. The articles in this set are all peer-reviewed and published in English.
Item Vetoes and Attempts to Override Them in Multiparty Legislatures (PDF)
Valeria Palanza, Gisela Sin
This paper analyzes the dynamics of vetoes and veto overrides in the context of a multiparty legislature using an original dataset from the period 1983-2007 in Argentina. We argue that the President can use an "item" or "partial" veto to selectively delete articles, while keeping enough distributive goods in the bill to break up the coalition responsible for its passage, thereby eliminating support for an override. Our research reveals that total vetoes - which affect all legislators equally - are more likely to be overridden than partial vetoes. Contradicting the received wisdom that in multiparty legislatures override attempts are more likely under a divided government, we find that override attempts are more likely in plurality governments. We use case analyses to illustrate the main arguments developed in this paper.
Daniel Chasquetti
Since the return to democracy, Uruguayan presidents have built cabinets of varying natures (majority and minority coalitions, majority and minority parties). Most studies on presidential government assume that the partisan composition of a cabinet is a good predictor of the performance of a government's legislative program. In this paper I test this hypothesis using Cox and McCubbins' (1993, 2005) party cartel theory. The results confirm that six of the eight presidential cabinets' legislative performances were consistent with theoretical expectations, while two were deviant cases. This article also provides a theoretical explanation for these two outliers, highlighting the importance of legislative parties, the presidential style of government, and preferences as regards legislative initiative.
Does Women's Presence Change Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Argentina, 1983–2007 (PDF)
Juan Pablo Micozzi, Mala Htun, Marina Lacalle
In scores of countries, the adoption of gender quotas has boosted the numbers of women elected to national legislatures. How does the growing presence of women affect legislative behavior regarding women's rights? Using an original dataset of all the bills submitted to the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007, we analyze the relationship between women's presence in Congress and the introduction and approval of bills related to women's rights. Our dataset allows us to compare three periods with varying levels of women's presence in both legislative chambers (the first without quotas, the second with a quota in one chamber, and the third with full quota implementation in both chambers). Our results confirm the necessity of distinguishing between the process of legislative behavior and its outcome. We show that many more women's rights bills were introduced when women held a greater share of seats in both chambers. However, the approval rates of these bills actually declined. Despite their greater presence, women continue to be marginalized in the legislature and to suffer reduced political efficacy.
Malapportionment and Geographical Bases of Electoral Support in the Brazilian Senate (PDF)
Taeko Hiroi, Pedro Neiva
This paper analyzes the relationship between malapportionment and electoral bases of support for Brazilian senators. The conventional wisdom asserts that malapportionment contributes to the "politics of backwardness" - that it facilitates clientelism and hinders issue-based campaigns, reducing electoral competition and producing geographically concentrated patterns of votes. Our study partially confirms, yet partially refutes this wisdom. Our research indicates that malapportionment affects the competitiveness of elections: senators from overrepresented states tend to dominate their key municipalities electorally, whereas senators from underrepresented states tend to share their core municipalities. In addition, underrepresentation increases the likelihood that leftist candidates will be elected. These findings are consistent with the traditional understanding. However, contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that senators from underrepresented states tend to exhibit geographically concentrated patterns of electoral bases, whereas those from overrepresented areas show much more scattered bases of support. Hence, our findings suggest that the relationship between malapportionment and elections may be more complex than commonly acknowledged.