CIAO DATE: 07/2014
Volume: 15, Issue: 3
June 2014
The (Re)-Gathering of the Russian People? (PDF)
James Keeley
Eight hundred years ago, the Mongol conquest of Kievan Rus’ left Russians divided among many subordinated principalities and polities. Over time, the Grand Duchy of Muscovy brought them together under its sway, laying the foundation for the Russian Empire. Over time, the Tsars extended their reach, to the marshes on which St. Petersburg was built in the north, in the south to a port at Sevastopol in the Crimea, to another on the Pacific, Vladivostok, and to the heart of Central Asia. It is useful to remember this history, lest we imagine that recent events in the Ukraine simply point to the prospect of a renewed Cold War, and as we consider the possible effects of sanctions on Russia. Is Russia trying to dominate its surroundings? Yes, as it has done for hundreds of years, as well as the past decade. Is it trying to recoup regionally what it lost with the collapse of the USSR? Yes, but not just by a policy of annexation -- compliant neighbours may be enough (or better) in some cases, though perhaps not for the Black Sea Fleet and for strategic areas with a substantial Russian-speaking population. Will sanctions reverse this policy? Probably not. If sanctions last for decades, but Crimea remains Russian, will Russians see the price as worthwhile? Centuries-old geopolitical objectives, strengthened by a centuries-old sense of history, may trump economics.
The Disciplinary Gaze of the Camera's Eye: Soldiers' Conscience and Moral Responsibility (PDF)
Erella Grassiani, Desiree Verweij
Even though the concept of conscience is complex and multi-interpretable , it is still widely seen as the prime source of morally responsible behavior and often referred to as the ‘internal witness’ and as such the moral guide of our actions. However, what happens to conscience in the practice of violent conflict in the post-modern era? In such an era where it seems that nothing we do stays unseen it is interesting to look at what happens to soldiers’ conscience and their moral responsibility when they are being watched ; when their actions are ‘witnessed’ by outsiders armed with cameras. In this article we will explore these questions by a further discussion of the concept of conscience in military practice and relate it to the disciplinary gaze, introduced by Foucault. We will subsequently use ethnographic research, the case of Israeli soldiers serving in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), to discuss the actual practice of the disciplinary gaze and its counter gaze in military practice. In order to do this we will outline three different kinds of gazes that Israeli combat soldiers are subjected to in the OPT. We will argue that in some situations an outside gaze, such as the camera of a reporter or the presence of human rights organizations can indeed influence or trigger the conscience of soldiers and their behavior. However, in other situations such gazes are ineffective. We believe that the answer to this difference lies in the normalization of violence by the soldiers and the ways in which their conscience is ‘numbed’ by their routine work in today’s conflicts.
The Limits and Implications of the Air-Sea Battle Concept: A Japanese Perspective (PDF)
Matsahiro Matsumura
To cope with China’s rapid military buildup in the maritime East Asian theatre, the U.S. has shown forth a rudimentary operational “Air-Sea Battle” concept that aims to produce qualitative advantage through the joint use of air and naval power. It emulates after the “Air-Land Battle” concept that was designed to outdo the quantitative advantage of Soviet military power in the continental European theatre. This paper will first discuss on China’s emerging military strategy characterized by “Anti-Access and Aria-Denial” (A2AD), in the context of its evolving grand and defense strategies. Then it will analyze the limits and implications of the Air-Sea Battle vis-à-vis China’s A2AD, with a focus on their political and strategic dimensions that are hardly factored in the current debate. The study will present a policy proposal for the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan according to optimistic, realistic, and pessimistic scenarios.
Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both? (PDF)
John Dreyer, Neal G. Jesse
Neutrality is a difficult position to maintain in a hostile international system. Switzerland is often seen as a successful case of neutrality, managing to both remain neutral and avoid conflict for centuries. This paper examines the possible reasons for the success of Swiss neutrality. It also positions the Swiss experience in comparison to other neutral states. Building upon and consolidating previous research and thought, we define three attributes that allow the Swiss to successfully maintain their neutrality. First is the armed deterrent worked into the national culture; armed neutrality is not just a policy position but a way of life for many Swiss. Second is the idea of Swiss neutrality as a collective good in that Switzerland is a safe haven for humanitarian and diplomatic exchanges. Finally the Swiss benefit from a history of neutrality that has been enshrined into international law and custom. We conclude by noting that the experience of Swiss neutrality is not normal, rather it is a successful outlier that has succeeded in preserving its status in times of war and peace. Moreover, we posit that exploring the reasons for its success can help us understand neutrality better and also the potential of small state foreign policy.
Nowhere May They Roam: Ottoman Area-Denial Operations and Lessons for the Strait of Hormuz (PDF)
Tim Choi
On March 18th, 1915, a combined fleet of British and French battleships attempted to force their way through the Dardanelles, the southern half of the Turkish Straits that connected the Mediterranean with the Black Sea. “Attempted” is the key word, for it was a spectacular failure. Two of the greatest navies in the world had failed to enforce their will upon the puny and seemingly obsolete forces of the Ottoman Empire, sparking the infamous and bloody Gallipoli land campaign.
Transitional Fossils of the Atomic Age: Regulus and Sea Master (PDF)
Edward Andrew Kaplan
Transitional Fossils of the Atomic Age: Regulus and Sea Master
Preparing for Peace in Time of War: Canada and the Post-Hostilities Planning Committees, 1943-1945 (PDF)
Monique Dolak
Preparing for Peace in Time of War: Canada and the Post-Hostilities Planning Committees, 1943-1945
Andrew Godefroy
Throughout the twentieth century, even when not at war, professionally-minded citizen armies continued to think about future conflicts; in particular what they might be like, where they might take place, against whom, and if possible, why. As well, armies that were smart enough to think ahead did what they could to be ready for the next conflict through engagement in strategic foresight activities, the investigation of new ideas and concepts, the examination and assessment of emerging trends, the creation of new doctrines, and the development of robust physical, intellectual, and social capital within their standing armies. Finally, commanders would often seek to train their soldiers for tasks both probable and possible, knowing all the while that despite the best efforts and preparations it would be impossible to fully anticipate every possibility, and therefore, mitigate all future risk.1
Helmut R. Hammerich
Military historians love studying battles. For this purpose, they evaluate operation plans and analyze how these plans were executed on the battlefield. The battle history of the Cold War focuses first and foremost on the planning for the nuclear clash between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Although between 1945 and 1989-90 the world saw countless hot wars on the periphery of the Cold War, the “Cold World War,” as the German historian Jost Dülffer termed it, is best examined through the operational plans of the military alliances for what would have been World War Three. To conduct such an analysis we must consider Total War under nuclear conditions.
Mark Shannon
Germany's defeat in the First World War came as a profound shock. While the
nation was stunned by the peace settlement that followed, the military was faced with
the inescapable reality that their approach to fighting a prolonged industrialized
conflict was flawed. The years following Germany's defeat found the army in search of
reasons for its failure. The officer corps sought to analyze its experience with "total war"
and to draw the correct lessons from it. In this way, the army could prepare for the war of
the future, secure in the knowledge that any repetition of the First World War could be
avoided. In short, the German armed forces began the detailed process of distilling
relevant military lessons from the conflict and applying them to their perception of a
future war. While many of the lessons learned and studied had to do with tactics and
technology, it is the purpose of this analysis to examine the strategic debate that ensued.
Regardless of how strategy would be formulated in the coming years, it maintained at
its heart one simple objective that is best summarized in a conversation between
General Walther Reinhardt and Colonel Albrecht von Thaer in January 1919. Thaer
expressed his pessimism for the coming years but Reinhardt, a liberal officer who was
about to assume command of the War Ministry disagreed. He openly stated that "the
goal is and remains a free Germany, hopefully restored to its former borders, with [the]
The Past as Future: The US Army's Vision of Warfare in the 21st Century" (PDF)
Terry Terriff
Today the US Army is engaged in the effort to learn the appropriate lessons from the wars it has been engaged in since the autumn of 2001 and to think through what type of force it needs to be, with what kinds of capabilities, in order to prepare for further future conflicts in the 21st Century. Estimating the character of future conflicts, and then preparing one’s forces appropriately, is not an easy task. A critical line of argument today is that the vision of future warfare the Army developed in the decade plus following the end of the Cold War left it ill-prepared for the wars it found itself conducting in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an article published in 2007, US Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling very pointedly, and very boldly for a serving officer, contended that, “throughout the 1990s our generals failed to envision the conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly.”1 The US Army’s operational experiences in the first decade of this century, particularly in the early years of the long conflict in Iraq, suggest that it marched eyes wide shut through the decade of the 1990s into the 21st Century.
A Reflection On Leadership: A Comparative Analysis Of Military And Civilian Approaches (PDF)
Bernd Horn
Leadership is difficult. Similar to any endeavour that involves human interaction it is mired in the complexities of human behaviour, motivation and personality. Leadership is not a one size fits all activity. It is dependent on the approach and personality of the leader, on those being led, as well as the respective situation and circumstance. While everyone appreciates strong leadership, finding true, inspirational leaders is not all that easy or common whether in the military, public or private sector. Importantly, military and civilian leaders each bring their own strengths and weaknesses to bear and a lot can be learned by examining both styles concomitantly.
Oguntoyinbo Deji
All through the ages, Shakespeare’s literary oeuvre has occupied a canonical status in world literature, primarily because of its universal relevance in terms of thematic preoccupation, characterization, and setting amongst several literary components. Though widely regarded as the greatest writer in the English language and the world’s pre- eminent dramatist, Shakespeare has been translated into every major living language and is performed more often than any other playwright. His
The history of the Persian Gulf has always been characterized by conflict. It has been an arena for intervention by several world powers at one time or another. Many countries have defended their economic and political interests in this region, in no small part because it is one of the main oil reserves in the world. Moreover, it is also the largest exporter of oil. Therefore, it can be seen as the "jugular vein" of the global energy system, and so it has become an important area from a geostrategic point of view. The interests of several contemporary powers intersect here, from Western countries to
Michael Carl Haas
Among the grand narratives of international relations in the early 21st century, China’s ascendancy and potential challenge to the US-led word order is now the most dominant, and perhaps the most compelling. Ostensibly the latest instalment in an unceasing sequence of great powers’ rise and fall, it resonates deeply with specialist and non-specialist audiences alike. Central aspects of the emerging Sino-American competition – diplomatic, economic, and military – have been addressed at length in a VOLUME 15, ISSUE 3, 2014 263 | P a g e variety of fora and from widely diverging perspectives. Yet, up to now, few analysts have formulated anything resembling a coherent, prescriptive framework for how the United States and its allies should approach the increasingly confrontational dynamics that mark the defining great power relationship of our time.
Paul Ramsey
For understandable reasons, historians have consistently tried to clear the waters by reducing the complexities of the First World War. This process has been vital in understanding the origins of the war, its conduct, victory and conclusion, and in shaping the historiography. Moving beyond earlier fixed interpretations, for the last twenty years the idea of a ‘learning curve’ has played a major role in explaining British success in the autumn of 1918. Yet, its explanative power is limited in three significant ways. Firstly, war and strategy is reciprocal; the battlefield is an interactive play of forces, and not simply the play of one side. Secondly, friction resulting from this and multiple other interactions means war is complicated and winning is difficult. Thirdly,