CIAO DATE: 03/2014
Volume: 15, Issue: 2
March 2014
Arctic Security Order: Collective Security, Collective Defense, or Something New? (PDF)
Sten Rynning
This special issue will provide some answers to the question of what the future beckons for the Arctic in terms of order. It is of capital importance whether the Arctic tilts in the direction of cooperation or confrontation, and the authors of this book were asked not to provide firm answers, which would not be possible, but qualified assessments. They are each commendable on their own terms. Put together, they provide a fulsome overview and also an indication that the coming Arctic order may steer a middle course between cooperation and conflict whereby conflict is contained within sub-regional structures of conflict management.
Arctic Security - An Equation with Multiple Unknowns (PDF)
Rear Admiral Nils Wang
The inclusion of China, India, Japan, Singapore and Italy as permanent observers in the Arctic Council has increased the international status of this forum significantly. This chapter aims to explain the background for the increased international interest in the Arctic region through an analysis of the general security situation and to identify both the explicit and the implicit agendas of the primary state actors. The region contains all the ingredients for confrontation and conflict but the economical potential for all the parties concerned creates a general interest in dialogue and cooperation. The so-called ‘scramble for resources’ might be competitive but it will most likely be on commercial terms.
Understanding The Arctic Council: A 'Sub-Regional' Perspective (PDF)
Alyson J. K. Bailes
The peculiarities of the institutional framework in the Arctic place the Arctic Council, with its eight circumpolar member states, in a prominent and exposed position. It may most fairly be evaluated by comparing it with 'sub-regional' organizations that cover contiguous neighbour sets elsewhere, notably in Northern Europe. These turn out to share the AC's 'weaknesses', such as lack of military and legislative competence; but they also show similar strengths and, arguably, succeed by not constraining their members too closely. In institutional terms the AC is catching up on solutions already used by the North European groups, but handles indigenous peoples and the EU differently and must find its own answers for extra-regional (eg Chinese) interest.
China's Growing Interest in the Arctic (PDF)
David Curtis Wright
China is interested in the Arctic primarily for its natural resources and navigation routes, although there may never be an official policy declaration to this effect. (China also claims to have interests in scientific study and climate change in the Arctic, but these are not as important to China as the first two given here.) China wants to have influence in Arctic affairs and does not want to feel shut out by the A5. China is currently seeking this influence through cultivating partnerships with small Arctic powers. This follows a two-year period of Arctic policy recommendation by Chinese academics from 2009 to 2010. China's sense of exceptionalism makes it long to achieve this objective of influence by whatever means necessary short of military confrontation. China may, in the coming years, throw its weight around diplomatically if it does not like developments in the Arctic. China wants to be a player, a developer, a stakeholder in the Arctic region, and not just a customer. But it is highly doubtful that China would ever seek to have military bases or permanent military assets there.
The European Union – An Arctic Actor? (PDF)
Andreas Osthagen
Since launching its first Arctic communiqué in 2008, the European Union has strived to be accepted as a legitimate Arctic actor. Yet the EU's symbolic quest towards achieving observer status in the Arctic Council has proved disproportionately long and difficult. Despite starting out with lofty ideals about its Arctic engagement, the EU has been forced to re-adjust and modify its approach to the region. This chapter aims to explain why the EU has engaged in the Arctic in the first place and how it has gone about doing so, while also elaborating on the different contentious issues that has come about as a consequence of this engagement. To do this one must first conceptualise the EU as a foreign policy actor, as a tool for understanding the development of an EU Arctic policy.
The Quest for Resources – the Case of Greenland (PDF)
Bent Ole Gram Mortensen
The "new" Arctic – the Military Dimension (PDF)
Paal Sigurd Hilde
The growing international attention the Arctic witnessed from the early 2000s was initially garnered chiefly by ecological concerns on the one hand, and petroleum resources on the other. In 2007, however, the perception emerged in earnest that a race for the Arctic was taking place. This chapter examines the origins of this geopolitical interpretation of Arctic developments and analyses in detail one of its key aspects: the notion of an Arctic arms race. It surveys the Arctic-related, military investments of the five Arctic littoral states, as well as those of the United Kingdom, and concludes that there is scant evidence of an arms race in the Arctic. Moreover, it argues that much of the military investment in the Arctic must be understood in the context of the global interests of the US and Russia, and that of the opening Arctic.
Conclusion (PDF)
Sten Rynning
The Arctic Council is where we should direct our attention. First of all, it is where global standards meet regional power brokers. These standards are notably those embedded in the UNCLOS regime, and regional power brokers is an appropriate label among several because the members of the Arctic Council have singled out themselves as first among equals, as Nils Wang underscored in his article. The art of interpreting the fit between general rules on the one hand and particular conditions on the other inevitable involves a measure of politics. The eight full members of the Arctic Council will, to an extent, be able to make the law for the region. To be sure, UNCLOS involves a dispute settlement mechanism, but there is a lot of maneuvering involved in preparing cases for such settlement, including the preparation of ‘geological data’ and associated territorial claims. Moreover, if there are issues of dispute, and if the Arctic Council members take it upon themselves to sort out these issues, it will be harder for outsiders to challenge their agreement via the UNCLOS system.
Appendix: Conference on Arctic Security: Summary and Perspectives (PDF)
Henrik Linbo Larsen, Jakob Aroe Jorgensen
Summary of conference at the University of Southern Denmark, November 5, 2012: Exploring the Foundations for Arctic Order: Collective Security, Collective Defense, or Something New
Canadian Defence Spending – A Case Study of Mismanagement (PDF)
Jeffrey Gilmour
In 2010, the Harper Government announced the “Canada First Defence Strategy” whereby a list of required equipment was listed for our military. This included orders for support vehicles, search and rescue helicopters, a new fighter jet to replace the F-18 Hornet, support ships and Arctic patrol vessels plus a polar ice breaker for the Coast Guard. The replacement contract for the CH124 Sea King helicopter was already in the works with Sikorsky as the prime contractor