Ancient Greek Coalition Warfare: Classical and Hellenistic Examples

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Coalition Warfare, the concerted co-operation of diverse armies, which belong to different states and follow different rules as to their training, tactics and operation, poses practical and conceptual problems, of which some could be experienced during the last one and a half decades with Western coalition forces fighting in the Balkans and in Afghanistan: There is the problem of language, which in the Western world has been largely overcome with English serving as command language and military interlingua. There used to be problems related to the different status of soldiers, with some of them being professional warriors, while other countries like Germany with armies consisting largely of conscript soldiers were restrictive in using them for intervention operations. There is, of course, the problem of command, or in Greek words: of the hegemon. Which country is to have the position of the supreme commander? Connected with this is the problem of political and strategic decision-making: Is the coalition partners' will in any way represented so that the coalition is a coalition (as opposed to a hegemonial structure under the command of but one nation and its will)? Last, but not least: What are the rules for sharing the burdens in terms of personnel, finances and material resources; are there effective means to force the members of the coalition to adhere to their mutually agreed obligations? Of course, this problem has ramifications also for operative and tactical principles: How far do the coalition partners go in adopting common tactical and operative principles, including principles to interpret military
experiences to eventually learn from them?

Most of these problems are far from being exclusive to modern coalition warfare. On the contrary: The fact that in the generation after Alexander commanders turned up who apparently specialized in commanding foreign mercenary forces (e.d.: Medeios of Larisa as a xenagos epi to xeniko¹) shows how important some of the aforementioned problems and the skills which are necessary to overcome them were in the warlike period of the diadochi. Polybius² gives an outright positive evaluation of Hannibal, especially because the latter was able to keep very heterogeneous coalition armies consisting of soldiers without common language, political aim or juridical status mobile and fighting, presupposing that what Hannibal did, namely holding large coalition armies together, is as difficult and demanding as any of the commander's task can be.

Rather than giving a full-scale account of coalition warfare in antiquity (from the Hellenes fighting Persians in 480/479 to the formation of two large coalitions, the Athenian and the Spartan, with diverse hegemones leading different coalitions in the 4th century and the Greek koina deriving a political conclusion from the coalition principle; with Macedonian and Hellenistic monarchs repeatedly establishing themselves as hegemones of more or less all-Greek coalitions, with Rome concluding and leading different leagues and coalitions and eventually establishing herself as the one and only hegemonial power in the Mediterranean) I shall in what follows describe how in the Greek world of the 5th and 4th centuries and the early Hellenistic period principles for the organisation and conceptualization of coalition warfare emerged. Since this world was a world of very diverse dialects but principally one leading language, the first of the abovementioned problems, the problem of language, does not play a major rôle in our sources. The other of the aforementioned problems, however, occur or emerge during this period.

As to the sources: Ancient historiography in general, and Greek historiography in particular, largely preserves the memory of memorable deeds of war. Even if this historiography evolves, creating different types and approaches to history: War remains an integral part of its contents, and therefore historiography forms one major source for the study of coalition warfare.

² Polybius XXIII, p. 13.
One peculiar source of knowledge about coalitions concerns their formation: In some cases, treaties about common defensive or offensive warfare or the formation of coalitions are preserved directly as inscriptions, in some cases information concerning these treaties is buried in the historiography. In any case: Many Statesverträge as collected by Bengtson and Schmitt are about coalition warfare and therefore are directly relevant to our subject. Symmachies, military leagues, form an integral part of ancient interstate relations and state-like federal institutions. Much that was regulated in the process of forming a symmachy concerned common warfare. Therefore, besides historiography, the texts of formative treaties are directly relevant to our subject.

What does historiography, what do the Staatsverträge tell us about coalition warfare in the Greek world in the 5th and 4th centuries and in the early hellenistic period?

To begin with a well-known example: The Greeks, anticipating the Persian invasion of 480, set up a defensive coalition. Greek envoys came together at the Isthmus of Corinth to deliberate about how to resist the ongoing invasion. Common institutions were created: Mutual pledges of help and assistance, a threat against all Greek states which collaborated with the Persians (they would be forced to give a tithe of their goods to the gods after the war), a general peace among the Greek partners (Herod. VII 132; 145-148; 172). Spies were sent out to enquire about the intentions of the enemies, and gradually they created a council of the commanders with a Spartan commander-in-chief to debate and decide about matters of common strategy. At Salamis, the Spartan Eurybiades as the supreme commander decided what to do. Εὐρυβιάδη ἐδοξε,
Herodotus writes, using the technical term for political decisions. According to Herodotus, two different strategic concepts competed with each other: the Spartan idea of encircling the Isthmus of Corinth and the Athenian idea of knocking the Persian fleet out of business, both meant to bring the Persian advance to a halt.

During the 5th century, in the Greek world several coalitions with defensive or offensive purposes were set up. Around 450 BC, for instance, the small Cretan cities of Tylissos and Knossos signed an alliance, after Peloponnesian Argos had negotiated between the two Cretan cities. The treaty which both parties signed contained a provision, according to which any of the parties depended upon a majority of common votes (including a third of the votes contributed by Argos as the guarantee state) for establishing new friendships or declaring war upon any other state. The treaty also stipulates mandatory help for both partners if the other is invaded, presupposing Argive military help, too. Argive expeditionary forces are to be maintained by the Knossians on Knossian soil, and by the Argives themselves if they happen to be on Tylissan territory: Obviously Argos took a lively interest in the establishment of friendly relations between Knossos and its neighbour Tylissos. One copy of the treaty which was on display at Argos, there are detailed provisions as to future gains of collaborative warfare: The Tylissians may plunder the territory of Acharnae, except for those portions which belong to Knossos; booty made by Aros and Tylissos on land is divided 2:1 with 1/10 given to Knossos; booty at sea is to be divided equally - the treaty

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5 Herodotus VIII, p. 64. The supreme command was certainly not established once and forever. Before Salamis, decisions are taken in a rather fluid way. At the battle of Salamis Eurybiades is described as the commander having supreme power (VIII 2: Τὸν δὲ στρατηγὸν τὸν τό μέγιστων κράτος ἔχοντα παρεῖχον τῷ Σπαρτῖτῃ Εὐρυβαδῆν Εὐρυκλείδεω). That one single commander should have the supreme command had been decided before Salamis; that it was a Spartan to take up this command was due to Sparta’s allies who refused to serve under an Athenian commander-in-chief (VIII 2). When fighting was resumed during the following year, however, the Athenians are described as consenting to the commander’s decisions (IX 46), presupposing that they could have chosen otherwise, and decisions in the war council at Plataea were merely collective decisions, in which the Athenians, due to their naval successes, played a greater role than ever before. This collective character of decision is clearly spelled out by Herodotus (IX, p. 51): Βουλευομένοις δὲ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ἐδοξε... 

6 Herodotus VII, p. 139. Herodotus’ contention that Athenian strategy was best is clearly spelled out in this context: Here I feel constrained to argue in favour of my opinion, which, as I know, the majority will dislike, but which, since I am convinced of its truth, I shall not withhold. If the Athenians had, for fear of the imminent danger, left their land entirely, or if they had, without quitting their country but remaining there, submitted to Xerxes, no one would have resisted the king by sea... For the notions of a Maginot style and the indirect approach cfr. H.Münkler, Die neuen Kriege, Hamburg (2002), pp. 207-221.
asymmetrically favours Argive-backed Tylissos over Knossos, whose citizens, contrary to the citizens of Tylissos, do not enjoy *gegktesis* at the other place. Of course, the treaty fixes the boundaries between the two poleis and declares them inviolable for both parties.\footnote{7}

Contrary to what we might expect in the century after the joint Greek success against Persian invasion forces and during the build-up of two Greek coalition systems, one Athenian, one Lacedaemonian, such treaties are attested rather seldom in the sources. Except for Athenian regulations for rebellious partners in their alliance, we do not hear specifically about coalition warfare in interstate treaties before the Peloponnesian War, with the Spartan documentation of contributions to the Spartan war fund (427 BC) being the first example within a very small group. The document lists contributions by outstanding private persons, by associations like the Spartans at Chios, and by states like Ephesus or Melos. Besides money in Persian or Greek coins, the texts lists agrarian contributions like grain and dried fruit.\footnote{8} On the other, the Athenian side, it was also not before the Peloponnesian War that explicit provisions were made for coalition warfare in treaties establishing interstate coalitions. When Athens concluded an alliance with Halieis, a polis near Argos in the Peloponnesus, in 424/423 BC, the Halieis were to provide a ναύσταθμος (naval base) for the Athenians, zealously fight for the Athenian course and suppress piracy as much as they could, always side with Athens, refrain from making war upon Athens or her allies and refrain from giving monetary or any other support to her enemies. Athens on her part takes upon herself to defend Halieis and the rights of its citizens. One interesting provision entitles Athens to maintain a garrison on the territory of Halieis as long as the war continues; after a peace treaty will have been made, however, the Halieis will have the


right and the obligation to guard their territory themselves. Anything else which is legitimate and in the interest of Halieis they will get, the treaty concludes before it goes on to document the wording of the pledges and oaths. Similar the oaths and pledges which Athens and North-Aegean Bottiaia exchanged in 422 BC. In any case, these made sure both parties remained loyal to the alliance, regarding the same as friends and enemies as the other. What made Halieis especially valuable for the Athenians was its position as a harbour on the East side of the Peloponnesus, while on the other side it depended upon Athens for its defence.

In 420, Athens concluded a treaty with Argos on the Peloponnes, Mantinea and Elis in the West of the Peloponnes. This treaty was not limited to the ongoing war, but by a period of 100 years. The partners are to take the same sides with Argos, Mantinea and Elis and not to fight against Athens and her allies and vice versa. The Athenian allies are suitably called "allies over whom the Athenians rule" (line 5), while the allies of Mantinea, Elis and Argos are just termed "allies". Asymmetrical though this is, there lies a fundamental problem behind the stipulation that Athens and her allies conclude an alliance with the three poleis and their respective allies: the transitivity of alliances. In fact, there are two alliance systems which form a new alliance and for this they have to rely on mutual loyalty not only of the states directly entering upon this alliance; rather, they have to guarantee the loyalty of their respective partners towards their new allies and to rely mutually on the loyalty of their partners' partners.

From the military point of view, this treaty is rather detailed in describing the conditions under which joint action is to be taken. First of all: Whenever enemies invade the territory of one of the states, the partners have to provide as much aid as they possibly can, and after the retreat of the enemies they are to make war upon the invaders until all partners unananimously decide to end the war. Similarly, granting passage to any other military force requires the consent of all the other partners. The support forces called upon in times of war are to be maintained, fed and paid by the

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10 Inscriptiones Graecae I, p. 76. Transl.; Brodersen, p. 122.

sending partner during the march onward and backward and up to 30 days in the allies' territory, after which the state which demanded help has to pay for the expeditory forces: three oboles a day for an infantry soldier (hoplite, archer or light-armed), 1 drachma, i.e. double the amount for a mounted fighter. The *hegemonia*, the supreme command, lies with the state which demanded help, provided the war is being fought on its own territory. This is: During defensive action, direct concern and information advantages decide the question of *hegemonia*. In cases of joint (offensive) action, however, *hegemonia* is divided equally among the poleis concluding the treaty.

As we see: A pattern for joint coalition warfare and a set of typical stipulations for joint military action emerges during the 5th century and especially during the Peloponnesian War. Most important seems to have been the questions of supreme command, of financial support and of the mutual personal and financial obligations. In fact, the development, which started with the coalition of the Hellenes against Persia, went on after the turn of the century.

So, when the Athenians concluded an alliance with neighbouring Boiotians and with the Locrians in 395 BC, the mutual obligation is stipulated that a state, coming to the aid of the other state, is to help \( \pi\alpha\nu\tau\iota\ \sigma\theta\varepsilon[\nu]\varepsilon, \textit{with full force}, \) according to what need the state who is under attack from another state has announced. The same principle is used in the symmachy between Athens and Chios in 384 BC, in which, however, not the need of the attacked state, but the possibility of the state sending aid is defined as the limit for help: \( \pi\alpha\nu\tau\iota\ \sigma\theta\varepsilon[\nu]\varepsilon\ ]\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\ \tau\delta\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\tau\omicron\nu, \textit{with all force according to what is possible}. \) Explicitly, these principles of cooperative warfare with full force to aid and defend each other was repeated and cited in the invitation which the Athenians sent out to the Greek states in 377 BC to conclude with them the Second Athenian Confederacy; the relation between Athens, according to this text, should be like the relations between Athens and her allies Chios, Thebes and others. From the warfare point of view, the principle of lending aid with full force is rendered as: \textit{If someone, with aggressive intentions, moves in the direction of those who have concluded this alliance, either by land or by sea, the Athenians and all the other allies will help the victims by land and by sea with}


13 *Inscriptiones Graecae II et III*, p. 34.; Brodersen, p. 214.
It seems weird that in these treaties of the fourth century regulations which concern the publication and corroboration of the texts their costs require much more space than stipulations concerning military organisation and financial contributions for the military. Some, but not all of this may be due to the fragmentary state of these texts, because when in the same year of 377 the Athenians accepted Chalkis and Methymna into their coalition, in the nearly completely preserved text of the treaty with Methymna there is only one additional regulation, and this concerns the military command structure: The envoys of the Methymnaeans and the Synhedroii, the members of the coalition's representative body, the strategoi, the commanders of the infantry, and the hipparchoi, the commanders of the cavalry, mutually are to promise each other loyalty.

As with the Peloponnesian War, the expansion of Macedon became another era in which the concepts of coalition developed rapidly. When Philipp II concluded the Corinthian Alliance with the Greek powers which he had recently subdued, the provisions for the military coalition constituted by this alliance were much more detailed than in the earlier Athenian examples. Of course, the states were not to make war upon each other; but they are to promise to make war upon anybody who breaches the κοινὴ εἰσόνη (general peace) and to help holding up the βασιλεία (kingship) of Philipp II; this stipulation is the more significant since Philipp himself in official documents was normally not called βασιλεὺς, but made sure Amyntas IV, for whom Philipp merely acted as a regent, was more and more pushed aside. The Corinthian Confederacy was therefore also an instrument to secure Philipp's position in Greece as well as in Macedon. Especially detailed are the regulations about military contributions and military command: The aims and purposes of joint wars are to be defined by the κοινὸν συνέδριον, the representative body, and by order of the ἡγεμὼν, the military commander. This hegemon was to be Philipp as a person, and the text of the treaty simply assumes no contradictions to occur between what the hegemon and what the synhedroi decide.

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16 Inscriptiones Graecae II et III.; Bengtson, II, p. 403, esp. II. pp. 17-22: ἄν δὲ τὶς ποιῇ τι] παράσπονδ[ον]
the *hegemonia* at land and at sea was transferred upon Philipp, who for this purpose most probably was elected *strategos autokrator*, supreme military commander with plenipotentiary power and the authority to start and end wars, and that the purpose for the joint operation was to revenge upon the Persians what these had done to Greek sanctuaries in 480/479 BC, i.e.: more than 140 years earlier; we also know that it was up to the *synhedrion* to officially decide about a joint war. It was probably the task of the *synhedrion* to assign to any one of the single poleis the size of the contingent it had to contribute to the common operation against Persia, and the task of the *strategos autokrator*, i.e. of Philipp, to announce and to enforce these contributions.\(^7\)

This treaty was renewed in 336 by Alexander the Great when the latter had succeeded Philipp after Philipp had been murdered. From the preserved stele of this renewed alliance treaty we learn that in the original treaty there had been regulations about pay, provisions and logistics much like in the Athenian treaties with Argos and Mantineia of 420, i.e. from the time of the Peloponnesian War. For every light-armed man, one drachma was to be paid a day and provisions (*sitos*) for 10 days in case of a common war. These are figures about twice as high as those from the treaty between Athenians and her allies from the Peloponnesian War. As is the case with the Philipp treaty, later sources oscillate between calling Alexander a *hegemon* and a *strategos autokrator*, with Diodorus making it probable that he was in fact elected *strategos autokrator* by the *synhedrion* of the Corinthian League, while the Amphictyons ascribed to him the τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονία, a title providing legitimacy for the objective, to

\(^7\) Cf. Diod. XVI 89, pp. 1-3; Justin. IX, pp. 5,1-7: assignment of the contingents by a decision of the coalition's *senatus*. Philipp as *hegemon*, Philipp's *hegemonia*: Demosthen. XVIII (*De corona*), p. 201; Aeschin. III, p. 132; Polyb. IX, pp. 33,7: ὡς ευφρενίσθην ὄντα τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ κατὰ γῆν αὐτὸν ἠγεμόνα καὶ κατὰ θάλαταν εἰλοντο πάντες. Philipp's official title, however, seems to be noted en passant by the anonymous author of the *Chron. Oxyrh.: The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*. Published by the Egypt Exploration Society in Graeco–Roman Memoirs. London (1898-), I, p. 12; F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (*FgrHist*), Berlin (1923-), F 1 (5), pp. 31-32: ... κατὰ δὲ τὸν τέταρτον τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέληθεν θόντες Φιλίππον αὐτοκράτορα τοσα στρατηγῶν εἰλαντο τοὺς πρὸς Πέρσας πολέμου.
revenge damages done to Greek sanctuaries one and a half centuries before.18

Thus, the Corinthian alliance reveals the importance of ideological categories, of the overarching rôle of the hegemon and of the rules to distribute the financial and personal burdens of coalition warfare among the members of the coalition. From Athens in the Peloponnesian War until Alexander in 336 BC, this was most effectively done under the control of a hegemonial power, and even the Greeks who in 480 concluded an alliance against Persia, put themselves under a Spartan hegemony, while attempts at negotiating a more complex pattern involving Syracuse, according to what Herodotus, possibly anachronistically tells us, was not successful. Also, the example of Alexander’s Corinthian League shows how essential for a coalition like this it is that the hegemon can effectively enforce upon the partners a valid obligation to intervene into other peoples’ affairs, as is repeatedly pointed out by a Pseudo-Demosthenian speech on Athens’ relationship with Alexander.19 The coalition also entitled Alexander to request from the allies as many warships as he thought appropriate20, while he effectively paid the army when the initial phase of the war as stipulated by the alliance had ended: Every fighter of the Greek contingents after the army had been disbanded officially after the defeat of Dareius received one talent per cavalryman and ten mines per infantryman as the lump sum of their pay.21

On two occasions in the Hellenistic period monarchic leaders tried to re-create the Corinthian league: In 319 BC, Philipp III Arrhidaeus and Polyperchon, and in 302 BC, Demetrius Poliorcetes. While the return of the exiled and territorial claims figured prominently in the 319 treaty,22 the 302 treaty is more significant from the military history point of view. In the synhedrion, the single states are represented differently on the basis of size or fighting power - like in the representative constitutions of contemporaneous koina. The treaty is especially explicit about the functionaries of the coalition: There is the supreme commander, like in the predecessors, Philipp-Alexander-

18 Hiller von Gaertringen, p. 329; Bengtson, II, p. 403 II; Diodor. XVII, pp. 4,1-2; 4,9; Arrian., Anab. I 1,2; Plut., Alex, pp. 14,1-2.
19 Ps.-Demosthenes XVII (On the treaties with Alexander), pp. 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 15f., 19, 26, 28, 30.
20 Plut., Phoc., pp. 21,1: Γράψαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου περὶ τριήρων ὡς ἀποστείλωσιν αὐτῷ, καὶ τῶν ἡπόρων ἔνισταμένων, τῆς δὲ βουλῆς τὸν Φωκίωνα λέγειν κελευούσης, „λέγω τοῖς τοῖς ὑμῖν ἐπεν „ἡ τοῖς ὑμῖν κρατεῖν ἢ τοῖς κρατοῦσι φύλος εἶναι.”
21 Diod., XVII, pp. 74,3.
22 Diod. XVIII, pp. 56,2-8. Samos and Oropos were assigned to Athens.
type of treaty. Then there are the ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι, the supervisors of the common security infrastructure, and it is far from clear whether these are representatives of the single members of the league or professional functionaries of the league; at least, they are different from the synhedroi, the representatives proper of the single states.23

The re-enactment of the Corinthian League of 302 BC took place to establish friendship (φιλία) and a military alliance (συμμαχία) for unlimited time; all participants declared to have the same friends and enemies, to refrain from territorial gain against each other. From the military point of view especially important is the regulation that there is to be held a continuous session of the synhedrion as long as the κοινὸς πόλεμος, the common war, continues, and there is to be a 50% quorum for the validity of synhedrion decisions.24 There are special prerogatives of the kings with regard to decisions on warfare: The kings appoint the supreme commander, the strategos, and it is up to the strategos (possibly in connection with the synhedrion) to decide if and how long a synhedrion session lasts in times of war. Until the end of the war, the king’s representatives are to preside over synhedrion meetings. Somehow, the synhedroi and the strategos decide about the financial contributions of single cities, and there is a catalogue of financial sanctions for cities not meeting their requirements in terms of military personnel: half a mine a day for a cavalryman, 20 drachmae for a hoplite and 10 drachmae for every light-armed. The cities’ representatives and their decisions in the synhedrion are to be made immune with regard to their cities,25 while the functionaries of the league's synhedrion, the prohedroi, are to be responsible for their actions, i.e. for their either executing or not executing the decisions of the synhedrion.

This coalition was, strictly speaking, never put into practice; it was short-lived. Its immediate purpose was to fight the war against Kassander, after Demetrios Poliorcetes had secured for Antigonus Monophthalmos and for himself control of Cyprus, the Aegean and of large portions of mainland Greece. However, in the year following the conclusion of the treaty, in 301, the competing diadochs concluded an

23 Ps.-Demosth., XVII (On the treaties with Alexander), p. 15.
25 Supplementum epigraphicum graecum, XXV, p. 381; Hiller von Gaertringen, 1, p. 68.
alliance\textsuperscript{26} and crushingly defeated Antigonus and Demetrius, killing the first and forcing the latter to retreat, while the new Corinthian League became obsolete.

If we look at the military alliances, which the Greeks mostly called symmachies, between 480 and 301 BC, we observe a development of the instruments to conclude such alliances. While the Greeks in 480 BC were largely improvising, mimicking as it were the monocratic Persian command structure and creatively inventing a council to take decisions in a quasi-representative fashion, prolonged wars like the Peloponnesian War, the projected war upon Achaemenid Persia and the 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} wars of the diadochi induced a tendency to establish hierarchical structures to enforce the will of a hegemon upon a possibly reluctant community of allies. The hegemonial character of these coalitions, whose establishment was a matter of imminent war, and which, despite their sometimes apparently limitless duration, were in practice of a duration limited by the exigencies of actual war, can be seen clearly, if compared to an alternative to the establishment of war coalitions, I mean the creation of quasi-federal systems like the Achaean League or the Lycian League with much more political integration than the symmachies could provide, but which to describe in detail goes much beyond the scope of this paper, or if compared to kinds of treaties which establish more balanced relationships between the partners.

Probably in 263/262 BC the Aetolians and the Akarnanians concluded such a treaty, which not only settled a couple of border disputes, but also established isopolity between the two leagues with the citizens enjoying equal and common citizenship in the territories of both leagues, and a mutual promise of military help against external aggressions which amounted to 10000 infantrymen and 100 cavalry to be deployed within six days or, in case of more intense danger, 30000 infantry in 10 days with at least a third of the infantry being of the heavy hoplite type. There are detailed ascriptions of the responsibilities for the deployment of these troops: In case of the Akarnanians, the strategoi and synhedroi, being their highest officials, are to collect and send the troops, while the archontes, the functionaries of the Aetolians do the same for the Aetolian troops. Pay and provisions are to be provided by the sending state up to 30 days, after which the receiving state has to provide pay and food for the soldiers, whom it requests for help. For this obligation of the receiving state to sustain the soldiers in a

\textsuperscript{26} Bengtson, II, p. 447.
period exceeding one month, there is a maximum tariff: a Corinthian stater per
cavalryman and day, two drachmae for a heavy infantryman, 9 obols for a lighter-
armed (half-thorax) and 7 obols for a light-armed. The supreme command goes to on
whose territory the war is fought; so there is a principle of knowledge and direct
personal interest established for the question of hegemony.

This is certainly a more equal alliance than the ones led by Athens or by the early
Hellenistic monarchs. The immediate context for the conclusion of this alliance was,
according to H.H.Schmitt, the flight of Alexander II of Epirus from Macedonian troops
into Akarnania during the Chremonidean War, which induced the Aetolians to forget
for the moment their rivalry with their neighbours to conclude a protective alliance
with them against Macedon and the imminent Macedonian danger. Later, the Aetolians
forgot about this treaty.\footnote{Bengtson, p. 480; and H.H.Schmitt ad. loc.}

In the Greek world, the hegemonial type of coalition treaties with one power,
and even one person merely dictating the military needs was probably more productive
than the rather egalitarian one described here. A prominent example for the
hierarchical type is the treaty between the Achaean League and Antigonus Doson of
224, according to which Antigonus was elected \(\alpha\υ\tau\omicron\kappa\omicron\rho\alpha\tau\omicron\ \iota\gamma\epsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\nu\) by land and sea,
which meant he became the sole commander of league's military, and the league took
upon itself to sustain the troops on the Peloponnesus, not to network with competing
monarchs in any way and to entitle the \(\text{hegemon}\) to call meetings of the league's
\(\text{synhedrion}\). These competences later went over to Antigonus' successor Philipp V\textsuperscript{th}\footnote{Bengtson, p. 504.}, and
they were extended to a much larger \(\text{koinon}\) of Greek \(\text{koina}\), including not only the
Achaeans, but also Epirus, Phokis, Macedon, Boeotia, Acarnania and Thessaly, i.e.: all
larger territorial entities and \(\text{koina}\) in Greece with the only exception of Athens, Elis,
Messenia and the Aetolians.

In this league of leagues, Antigonus was the \(\text{hegemon of all the coalition members},\)
and as such was succeeded by Philipp V\textsuperscript{th}. Antigonus held the supreme command of all
troops, decided quarrels between the members of the league and called sessions of the
\(\text{synhedrion}\). It was up to the latter to accept new members or to decide upon war and

\footnotesize{\bibitem{Bengtson, 2012}} Bengtson, p. 480; and H.H.Schmitt ad. loc.
\footnotesize{\bibitem{Bengtson, 2012}} Bengtson, p. 504.
peace. It seems, however, as if common offensive wars needed the consent of the single states.29

Leaving aside political and juridical aspects like sympolity and common economic interests and development: Coalitions to fight wars in Greece were especially effective in terms of durability and military success, the more hierarchical or hegemonial they were, and the more they were entitled to force upon their members obligations to fulfill common military duties, and they were the more so, the more the coalitions were created in situations of imminent military danger and war, as most of them were, in fact, from the outset.

29 Bengtson, p. 507; and H.H.Schmitt ad. loc.
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