CIAO DATE: 06/2012
Volume: 14, Issue: 1
Fall 2011
Editorial (PDF)
Christine Leppard, Abe Roof
The War Hitler Won: The Battle for Europe, 1939-1941 (PDF)
Robert Citino
From 1939 to 1941, circumstances handed the Wehrmacht a perfect opportunity to fight Bewegungskrieg: short, sharp campaigns within the friendly confines of central and eastern Europe, with its relatively short distances, temperate climate, and highly developed road and rail infrastructure. When it came to operational-level maneuver warfare under these conditions, the Wehrmacht was without peer. None of this was new in Prussian or German history, and indeed the exact same description might be applied to Prussian armies under Frederick the Great. The summer of 1941 saw the opening of the war's main event. Operation Barbarossa was the greatest undertaking in military history, and German success in the opening weeks was amazing. With the Panzers ranging far and deep, the Wehrmacht sealed off one immense encirclement of Soviet forces after another: at Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk. By December, the Germans stood outside Moscow. They had inflicted four million casualties on the Red Army, about 3 million of whom were prisoners, and to many observers, the Soviet Union seemed finished. Indeed, Germany had conquered the continent. What we might call the "Great European War" of 1939-41 was over. It was the war that Hitler won.
German Counterinsurgency Revisited (PDF)
Charles D. Melson
Regular (external) war is, by way of underlying concepts, between nations using the entire spectrum of the people, army and state. In irregular (internal) war, some parties are neither independent states nor state sponsored actors, as in the case of rebellion against a foreign occupying power. It can also be conflict within a nation such as a revolution or civil war. Regular and irregular conflicts can take place together, separately, or even on a sliding scale. Subversion, sabotage, terrorism, partisan or guerilla fighting are techniques and are not ends in themselves, and are all regarded by Clausewitz as tactics and the ultimate school of the soldier.How do these terms and concepts illuminate the German suppression of rebellion in occupied territories during World War II? This question will be examined in three parts: 1) background from Clausewitz through the World War (1831-1932); 2) doctrine that was available in Nazi Germany (1933-1945); and 3) practice from examples in Yugoslavia (1942-1944). By focusing on the question of "what," rather than "who, when, or where," This paper uses "reverse engineering" to understand final doctrine and experience rather than strict chronological development. In doing so, it offers a tool to consider specific cases of internal conflict during this global war.
Nicolas Virtue
The Axis in the Second World War has been dubbed a "dysfunctional coalition." Its members failed to develop unified political objectives, joint planning, or a coherent grand strategy for the conduct of the war. As Richard DiNardo demonstrates, the lion's share of the blame must fall on Germany's shoulders; Hitler's ideological ambitions left little room for others, the Germans balked at supplying their allies with much-needed technology, and German liaison officers frequently came across as arrogant. While historical studies of the Axis coalition tend to focus on strategy and frontline operations, the Axis partners also came into contact with one another in occupied territories throughout Europe. Here, well away from the main fighting, coalition relations were even worse. This article will examine the Axis coalition in occupied Europe from the perspective of the Italian Second Army in Yugoslavia.
Craig Stockings
There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was an Italian military disaster of the highest order. For all of the ethnic slurs and cultural stereotyping levelled at Italian military performance in North Africa by historians and popular authors, the last 70 years has seen relatively little research effort invested into identifying the real military disadvantages under which Mussolini's soldiers in this theatre fought. When understood as a product of measurable and objective military factors, like the issue of leadership for example, the rout of the 10th Army takes on an entirely new complexion. The subsequent reputation of Italian soldiers as embarrassing battlefield liabilities in the Western Desert in this period is unfair. This overlooks the handicaps they fought under, and often ignores the bravery displayed in spite of them all. Like the Australians, the Italians in the Western Desert were ordinary men, no more and no less. In truth, it is singularly unsurprising that so many were killed or surrendered without putting up much real resistance. They faced challenges and conditions that would have handicapped troops from any country.
Mike Bechthold
On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. it is clear that operations in the Western Desert had a significant impact on the development of British and American tactical air doctrine in the Second World War and beyond. Air Vice-Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander of the Northwest Africa Tactical Air Force (previously the Desert Air Force) made a presentation to the assembled group of generals and other senior officers. Coningham made some very important statements in his speech and his ideas were to become the cornerstone of American and British tactical air doctrine for the rest of the war, and indeed, into the post-war period. These statements made by Montgomery and Coningham were to become the basis for Anglo-American tactical air doctrine for the remainder of the war, and indeed, many of the tenets of that doctrine are as relevant today as they were in 1943. Seventy years on, it is clear that operations in the Western Desert had a significant impact on the development of British and American tactical air doctrine in the Second World War and beyond.
Bomber Harris and Precision Bombing – No Oxymoron Here (PDF)
Randall Wakelam
Criticisms as to the efficacy or lack thereof of the RAF's strategic bombing campaign against Germany have been fuelled in Canada in recent years first by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's docudrama miniseries, The Valour and the Horror, in the mid 1990s and more recently by a debate over the wording of the Bomber Command panel in the new Canadian War Museum. The essence of these debates centres on the morality of Sir Arthur Harris's apparently bloody-minded city busting tactics compared to the US Army Air Forces' ethical and restrained precision bombing of military and strategic target systems. This article aims to demonstrate that Harris and his advisors were in no sense the intellectually inflexible and anti-technologically minded donkeys that many have and continue to claim them to be. It will highlight the role of operational research in identifying both the technical and tactical problems which plagued the Command and how the commanders and senior staff at High Wycombe accepted and used the scientists' advice in attempting to employ the limited resources of the bombing force to best advantage.
'Steel my soldiers' hearts': El Alamein Reappraised (PDF)
Jonathan Fennell
North Africa is where British and Commonwealth forces learnt how to defeat the Wehrmacht. It had taken three long years before Britain and her allies celebrated their first decisive victory on land against Germany, at El Alamein, in November 1942. In many ways, the dynamics of the critical campaign in North West Europe, between 1944 and 1945, cannot be understood without first understanding the processes that led to victory in North Africa. Secondly, in a global conflict often characterised by brutality, North Africa represents an oasis of chivalry and sanity, an environment where, in the main, war was contained away from innocent civilians. North Africa is different because it is uncomplicated by ideology and extermination. Finally, North Africa is interesting because the reasons for Allied success are controversial and still debatable. After close to seventy years of scholarship, the causes of Eighth Army's success at El Alamein are still contested. This paper directly addresses the issue of the morale of Eighth Army during the critical months of fighting in 1942. It makes the case that there was a morale crisis in the summer of 1942 and that it severely affected Eighth Army's performance. It argues that this crisis was turned around in dramatic fashion in the run up to the battle of El Alamein and that this turnaround played a decisive role in influencing the outcome of that battle. It also proposes a reconsideration of the roles of leadership and materiel in victory at El Alamein in light of the findings presented.
Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations? (PDF)
Harold R. Winton
This article assesses the efficacy of Effects-Based Operation by examining the Battle of the Bulge by relating the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as EBO to determine the extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO.
A neglected story: German prisoners of war in Italy (1945-1947) (PDF)
Fererico Niglia
The story of the detention of German prisoners in Italy transcends the experience just of the German army; it represents also an important moment for the story of many Italians. In Italian contemporary historiography what has been called the "saga of the vanquished" is gathering momentum. After a long period characterized by the ideological prohibition of studying the ‘wicked', in the last two decades historians and writers of history are paying increasing attention to the people and groups that decided to remained loyal to Fascism. In this perspective a comprehensive assessment of the structures and rules that characterized the Allied camps in Italy can also contribute to a better understanding of the story of Fascist prisoners in the hands of the Anglo-Americans, and on the impact of Allied policies on an Italy which was both ally and ex-enemy; liberated and conquered. The experience of the internment of German prisoners after liberation represents, paradoxically, a significant moment both for the process of epuration from Fascism and the building of neo-fascist identity.
The Second War in Every Respect: Australian memory and the Second World War (PDF)
Joan Beaumont
The Second World War stands across the 20th century like a colossus. Its death toll, geographical spread, social dislocation and genocidal slaughter were unprecedented. It was literally a world war, devastating Europe, China and Japan, triggering massive movements of population, and unleashing forces of nationalism in Asia and Africa that presaged the end of European colonialism. The international order was changed irrevocably, most notably in the rise of the two superpowers and the decline of Great Britain. For Australia too, though the loss of life in the conflict was comparatively small, the war had a profound impact. Yet for all this, the Second World War is relegated to a secondary place in the Australian national memory of war vis-à-vis the war of 1914-18. It is a lesser war in every respect. Why this is so, when the war itself was fought on such a monumental scale globally, is addressed in this article. The subordination of the Second World War is ultimately attributable to the fact that the signifier of ‘ANZAC' leads in the imagination and national mythic representation not to any battle or experience of 1939-45 but to 25 April 1915. ANZAC is now irrevocably entrenched in the national political culture as a complex secular signifier of identity and belonging to the nation.
Adam Lajeunesse
Gordon P. Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia. Boulder, CO and London, UK: Lynne Rienner, 2009. (PDF)
Brian Bertosa