CIAO DATE: 02/2011
Volume: 12, Issue: 3
Spring 2010
Fear and Loathing in Afghanistan? (PDF)
Terry Terriff
The passing tempest towards the end of June that led to the relief of US General Stanley McChrystal as commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan was both fascinating and disturbing. Much of the initial focus of the public debate focused on whether Gen. McChrystal should or should not be relieved because of the apparent distain of his command staff for their civilian leadership. The apparent split in opinion among media commentators on this question apparently existed even within the administration of President Barak Obama, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly admitted he advised the president that Gen. McChrystal should be kept in post lest removing him slow down or even halt the momentum of the new counterinsurgency strategy. The revelations in the Rolling Stone article, ‚The Runaway General‛, put President Obama in a ‚damned if he did and damned if he didn’t‛ position; on the one hand the president ran the risk of appearing weak if he did not dismiss Gen. McChrystal, while on the other hand he ran the risk that the removal of the general could have an adverse impact on success in Afghanistan for which he would ultimately be blamed. The President, however, demonstrated considerable political deftness in accepting Gen. McChrystal’s resignation and nominating Gen. David Petraeus, currently heading up Central Command, to replace him.
Barry Zellen
On April 28, 2009, a delegation of Inuit leaders from Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and Russia presented the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty in Tromsø, Norway, where the Arctic Council was meeting. This historic declaration represented the Inuit response to their exclusion eleven months earlier at the May 2008 Ilulissat Summit of top foreign policymakers among the Arctic rim states, and reflects a formal, if not aggressively forceful, rejection of the modern state’s latest effort to shape the destiny of Arctic without the participation of the Inuit.
Canada and Missile Defence: Saying No to Mr. Bush (PDF)
Don Barry
On 24 February 2005, Prime Minister Paul Martin ended months of speculation by rejecting President George W. Bush’s invitation to participate in his administration’s ballistic missile defence (BMD) program. Martin had come to power in December 2003, intent on joining as a means of improving defence cooperation with the United States in the wake of Canada’s decision not to endorse the US-led war in Iraq that had strained relations between Bush’s administration and Jean Chrétien’s government.2 But his plan was thwarted by several factors: public disapproval of the war, which by the time Martin took office had hardened into opposition to Bush’s foreign policy; the June 2004 general election that reduced Martin’s government from majority to minority status; opposition within Martin’s Liberal party and among Liberal, New Democratic Party (NDP) and Bloc Québécois (BQ) members of parliament (MPs); and the ambiguous stance of the Conservatives, who had previously supported Canada’s involvement. Also contributing to the decision were the Bush administration’s non-committal approach to the negotiation, its failure to respond to Canadian concerns about US protectionism, and the president’s ill-advised public intervention in the missile defence debate during his visit to Canada in late 2004.
Northern Europe's Arctic Defence Agenda (PDF)
David Rudd
During the 1970s and 1980s, the land, air, and maritime spaces above the Arctic Circle were considered by allied planners to be of immense strategic importance. The possibility of a nuclear exchange between the super-powers transiting over the polar regions spurred efforts to maintain a robust early warning and aerospace defence posture. The need to counter Soviet naval and air movements in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic likewise prompted NATO allies to adopt defence strategies that would proactively engage Soviet forces close to their bases, while reinforcing NATO’s northern flank with rapidly-deployable ground and air units. Although the non-aligned Nordic states firmly maintained their status, there is some evidence to suggest that they were not aloof from the East-West stand-off, and were consulted on territorial defence planning by their NATO neighbours.2
Terrorism in Canada: Victims and Perpetrators (PDF)
Alex Wilner
‚Our imagined terrorist cell was initiated by an overseas source,‛ explains Major-General Edward S. Fitch, recently retired from the Canadian Forces (CF), in discussing preparations for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games (V2010).2 ‚They sent one man to Vancouver circa 2004,‛ he continues, ‚about one year after it was announced the city would host the 2010 Games.‛ After settling in, the foreign operative found ‚an apartment and a simple, low profile job‛ in the city and began to ‚plan, recruit, train, conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and build improvised explosive devices (IED).‛ Over time, the operative assembled a terrorist cell of local Canadians, each recruit bringing ‚useful skills‛ to the operation, familiarity with Vancouver, Whistler, and surrounding areas, and an ability to blend into Canadian society. Over the subsequent months and years, the cell began acquiring weapons and other materials ‚through legal means‛ to use in their attacks. They remained discreet, followed the law, and avoided detection.
Contemporary Threats to Canada and the Canadian Forces (PDF)
Scott Fitzsimmons
Over and above the widely acknowledged threats of international terrorism and the Afghan insurgency, Canada and the Canadian Forces face a number of pressing threats from state and non-state actors, which range from the physical to the fiscal. This paper highlights threats posed by private security contractors in Afghanistan, pirates off the Horn of Africa, foreign states in disputed areas of the Arctic, and the current economic downturn within Canada. Each section of the paper highlights one or more specific threats posed to Canada and/or the Canadian Forces and discusses existing and proposed attempts to address these threats.
Stephen Wittels
Like many of its member-states, the United Nations (UN) did not have a clear place in the world when the Cold War ended. For forty years, great power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union had relegated this organization, originally founded upon Wilsonian ideals of collective security, to the task of monitoring ceasefires.1 When the wall fell, many in the west believed that the UN was poised to realize its potential and could, thus, be relied upon to contain and diffuse conflict in the post-Cold War order.2 Unfortunately for all parties involved, this proved to be overly optimistic. As missions in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda all made manifestly clear, the UN was unprepared to restore order in situations of pervasive violence.
The Geopolitics of Chinese Energy Security (PDF)
Kelly Ogle
One way of understanding the modern world is to view it as broken up into rival political and economic blocs that compete for resources and markets through political, economic, and military power.1 Several well known scholars in the field of energy security, such as Daniel Yergin, Erica Downs, Carlos Pascual, and Ann Myers Jaffe, agree that energy policy is an integral part of a nation’s external trade, foreign relations, and security policy. Today, governments of energy-consuming nations worldwide are concerned about the security of their energy needs more so than at any other time since the oil crises of the 1970s. Additionally, issues such as environmental stewardship, corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and human rights are factors in the contemporary energy debate.
Military Linguistics: Russian in the Red/Soviet Army (PDF)
Nathan Hawryluk
The development of military linguistics, a field similar to military anthropology or military history, would benefit the disciplines of linguistics and strategic studies. For linguists interested in society, the military offers another cultural group with which to contrast civilian society and a format for examining how institutions shape communication. Linguistic studies can aid strategic studies by explaining how discourse reinforces military culture and hierarchy, as well as the interaction between military and civilian society.