CIAO DATE: 02/2011
Volume: 12, Issue: 2
Winter 2010
Editorial (PDF)
Terry Terriff, James Keeley, John Ferris
Welcome to the Winter 2010 issue of The Journal of Military and Strategic Studies (JMSS). You have been specifically selected to join our forum and to receive quarterly issues of this Journal. (To be removed from the list, please refer to the instructions at the end of this email.) You may link to the JMSS at http://www.jmss.org As one of the few electronic journals dedicated to the study of security related issues in Canada, we are pleased to provide a forum in which security issues can be examined and discussed. This issue of The Journal of Military and Strategic Studies presents a diverse set of articles. The commentary, by Dr. Sandro Gaycken of the University of Stuttgart investigates the issue of cyber deterrence, by examining Matthew Sklerov’s idea that states have a right and obligation to prevent non-state actors, acting from within their states, from committing armed attacks to the best of their abilities. I
Sandro Gaycken
Cyber deterrence is clearly important. Secure passive cyber defense is impossible, so deterrence is the only feasible path. However, deterrence is pointless without attribution. This is logical from a strategic point of view. If retaliation does not hit the attacker, he will not be deterred. And it is of legal importance as well. Retaliation against the wrong actor is unjust and a crime of war. Thus attribution is a necessary condition for the law of war. An attacker has to be identified and, to make it an armed attack and not just a criminal act, the attacker has to be a state actor. This last problem, the attribution of agency, is what Matthew Sklerov addresses centrally in his recent paper, Solving the Dilemma of State Response to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent.1 The problem stems from an actual and pressing situation. Hackers from Russia or China attack other countries in what could be considered armed attacks. However, the attacks have never been attributed to these states as Russia and China denied any involvement claiming that private hacker groups, not under their control, were responsible. Many observers now share the opinion that this is only half-true. At least, both countries seem to tolerate the attacks on foreign, non-allied states. Yet it is impossible to prove. Without proof, it is not possible for the victim states to retaliate and deter future actions against them. As these attackers are officially criminals, the law of war forbids deterrence. Sklerov calls this the “response crisis”.
Russia, the United States, and the New Cold War (PDF)
Bohdan Harasymiw
The phrase ‚New Cold War,‛ referring to the strained nature of United States-Russia relations, especially since Vladimir Putin’s coming to power in the year 2000, has become widely disseminated in commentary on world politics today. Journalists, pundits, and even politicians keep referring to, denying, or debating its existence. Many unquestioningly accept its appropriateness in explaining the two states’ foreign policies. Partisans of one blame the other for its initiation and continuation. It has almost become a term of opprobrium, making its validity problematic. What, if anything, does it mean?
Evaluating Military Balances Through the Lens of Net Assessment: History and Application (PDF)
Thomas Skypek
For senior statesmen and their advisers, the task of evaluating external security threats and identifying strategic opportunities is a perennial challenge. This process is an exercise familiar to all states and is the antecedent of effective national strategy and policy. It requires significant intellectual effort, curiosity, creativity, and a tolerance for uncertainty in the exploration of alternative futures. But this task has vexed statesmen throughout history, who have frequently misperceived the threats and behavior of their competitors.2 This article examines one contemporary approach the United States has employed to understand the complex state-based military and security threats confronting it: net assessment.
Arctic Energy Resources and Global Energy Security (PDF)
Peter F. Johnston
In recent years the world has become gripped with concerns about climate change and its impact on Arctic ice as well as the perception that increasing global energy consumption might surpass the capacity of energy markets. These seemingly unrelated issues come to a nexus in the Arctic region2 since melting ice coverage has led some analysts to believe that previously inaccessible oil and gas deposits may now be accessible permanently or periodically.3
After Afghanistan: Sustaining Support for Canadian Hard Power (PDF)
Colin Robertson
Drive down Wellington Street, past the Parliament Buildings and, almost directly across from the Supreme Court are a pair of buildings buttressing both sides of Lyon Street. Built in the aftermath of World War II, the East and West Memorial Buildings once housed the Department of Veterans Affairs. Their architect had a sense of both history and the neighborhood. It is reflected in their chateau style, copper roofs and stone facing – not the usual cinder-block approach of later government buildings. Spanning the street and connecting the two buildings is an Arch. Chiseled into it, in both official languages on both the north and south side, is this inscription: ‘ALL THESE WERE HONOURED IN THEIR GENERATIONS AND WERE THE GLORY OF THEIR TIMES’
Reflections on the Military Armoury Disaster In Mozambique, March 2007 (PDF)
A. O. Banjo
By definition, an armoury is a building used primarily for storing arms and military equipment, especially one which serves as headquarters for military personnel. Thus, an armoury is a military structure or facility where weapons and equipments for the use of the armed forces are stored. It is also a complex constructed for repairing, receiving, storing and issuing of weapons and ammunition. Ammunition is a generic military term meaning an assembly of a projectile and its propellant. If a disaster is broadly defined as an unexpected, low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of an organisation or community and characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution1, then an armoury disaster can be defined as an unexpected, high-impact rapidly disruptive event caused by the detonation of high caliber, sensitive, stored military weapons, which are neither risk-free nor immune from unintended consequences.