CIAO DATE: 05/2013
Volume: 11, Issue: 3
Spring 2009
Guest Editorial (PDF)
P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Is Canada's sovereignty "on thinning ice"? Are new circumpolar threats undermining Canadian security? As debate swirls around these questions, due to an allegedly impending "perfect storm" coalescing around climate change, a so-called "race" for arctic resources, and increased militarism,1 we might be wise to remember that policy-makers have been grappling with these questions for decades. This special issue of the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies offers four perspectives on historical and contemporary developments, spanning the Second World War to the twenty-first century.
Developing a Coherent Plan to Deal with Canada's Conundrum in the Northwest Passage (PDF)
Captain (Navy) James Cotter
Imagine the media storm surrounding a 10,000-gallon oil spill at the entrance to the Northwest Passage. The Canadian public would be incensed and would question what the federal government could have been done to prevent such a horrific environmental disaster. For this reason, the time has come for Canada to develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy to attain control over its Arctic waters and to put in place monitoring and enforcement capabilities that mitigate the increasing risk that such a disaster might occur. Canada's federal government has put in place some controls to establish responsibility for the Arctic waters; however, its interventions have rarely been pre-emptive but rather sporadic and reactive as they were to events such as the voyages of the SS Manhattan and USCG Polar Sea. Mounting scientific evidence confirms that the polar ice cap is melting. Although this trend does not mean that the Arctic waters will be navigable this decade, forecasters suggest that they will be navigable by mid-century. This gives Canada both cause and time to implement a comprehensive plan. Furthermore the geopolitical situation suggests the need for a coherent continental security plan and Canada has the opportunity to establish effective controls that also satisfy US concerns. The time is right to develop and implement a comprehensive plan that builds upon a whole-of-government framework. This plan must recognize the legal context of Canada's sovereignty claim over these waters, can draw upon a myriad of existing policy options, and must utilize a whole-of-government approach. In this way, Canada can establish effective conditions for de facto stewardship over the Arctic waters through regulations and monitoring.
In Defence of Defence: Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (PDF)
LCol. Paul Dittmann
The regional importance of Canada's Arctic has been traditionally anchored in its resource base while its remoteness has both hindered resource development and provided a security buffer to southern Canada and North America. Since the mid-19th Century, Canadian military activity in the Arctic has oscillated between intense and moderate periods and is now once again on the rise. Due to the inherent characteristics of experience, training, capacity, presence, resources, and timeliness of response, this article argues that the Canadian Forces is most appropriately leading the Government of Canada's response to existing and emerging Arctic security and sovereignty challenges. A series of policy recommendations are presented to enhance Canada's current response to these challenges.
The Polaris Incident: "Going to the Mat" with the Americans (PDF)
Peter Kikkert
During the early Cold War, as the Soviet menace placed Canada in between two hostile superpowers, the Canadian government decided to take steps to ensure that its sovereignty and national interests were not threatened by the Americans in the new strategic environment. Using the controversy surrounding Operation Polaris as its focus, this article examines the extent to which the Canadian government actually defended its sovereignty and rights against American intrusions in the early Cold War. Although the Canadian government approved Polaris, the Americans quickly overstepped the boundaries of the project. The Polaris incident was an American transgression against Canadian sovereignty and against the model for defence negotiations established up to that point. The resolution of the dispute, however, safeguarded Canada's sovereignty and solidified a relationship that was built on cooperation, respect, and informal and open dialogue.
Weather Stations in the Canadian North and Sovereignty (PDF)
Gordon W. Smith
A network of weather stations was established in the Canadian North during World War II, mainly by the United States, to supplement the thin scattering of Canadian stations that were already there. These weather stations were for the most part set up not specifically as projects in their own right, but rather as supportive elements in connection with the large enterprises in both the Northeast and Northwest which held the spotlight at that time. Thus, in the Northeast the weather stations were established mainly as adjuncts to the air routes designed to facilitate the delivery of planes to the European theatre of war. In the Northwest, they were similarly designed to help in the flying of planes to the U.S.S.R. and they were also considered to be essential supplements to the huge projects which were being carried to completion in that area. During the later stages of the war, and following it, the United States embarked on a massive withdrawal from these northern projects, and almost complete American abandonment of the weather stations took place as part of this general withdrawal. After only a short interval, however, the Cold War was looming on the horizon; and the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, began to fret once again about the safety and security of their northern regions. Partly because of this growing sense of danger, but also for economic, scientific, and technical reasons not directly related to the Cold War, there was a revival and expansion of activity in the North. As had been the case during the war, the United States was the chief instigator and principal participant in most of this activity. A major feature of it was the further development of the existing system of meteorological services, which involved both the reactivation of abandoned stations and the establishment of new ones, as well as extension to regions not previously covered. By far the most sensitive new region, in relation to both the Cold War and Canadian-American relations, was the remote, most northerly part of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.
The Role of Canadian Armed Forces in Defending Sovereignty (PDF)
E.B. Wang
The role of the Canadian Forces (CF) in asserting sovereignty is often tied to the old maxim that presence is 9/10th of the law. Surveillance and “boots on the ground” are commonly bound up with Canada’s credibility in “defending” its sovereignty. By implication, a more robust CF presence is essential to “using or losing” our Arctic. There has, however, been little to no supporting justification given to substantiate this accepted wisdom. Recent legal opinions are obviously classified and cannot be analyzed, so history helps to illuminate the issue. Discussions from the early Trudeau era on the role of the CF in protecting and maintaining sovereignty –the military’s first priority according to the then-prime minister, just as it is to the current one – reveal that improved military capabilities do not translate into stronger sovereignty claims.
Mark Zuehlke
To the Editors, It is a dicey proposition to assign a book review to an author whose previous work is in direct competition with the book being reviewed. There is always the chance the reviewer won’t have the maturity to get over himself and engage the text objectively. Sadly, this appears to have been the case with Mark Zuehlke, who has published a book about Canadians in the Spanish Civil War and reviewed my book Renegades: Canadians in the Spanish Civil War for the most recent issue of the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Before he even addresses the content of Renegades, Zuehlke draws dark conclusions about the book based on the supposed symbolism of its cover photo. If Zuehlke had reviewed the European edition of my book, whose publishers chose a different cover, he would presumably have been forced to think up a whole new line of attack. Zuehlke also has a go at the title of my book and employs a dictionary to list the various meanings of “renegade.” When he finally gets around to saying something about what I wrote, rather than exploring the hidden meaning of eye patches in a cover photo and the etymology of the title, Zuehlke accuses me of exaggerating the involvement of the Communist Party and likens me to a character in a Bullwinkle cartoon who believes a Martian invasion is a Communist plot. Serious scholars can decide for themselves whether Zuehlke’s accusations have any merit. I will only say that the conclusions I draw are based on years going through declassified documents from the archives from the Communist International. When I say that the majority of Canadian volunteers were Communists, it’s because I have established the party affiliation for almost 900 of them (in addition to researching a multitude of other biographical details about almost 1,700 men). Zuehlke had access to material from these archives when he researched his own book but made comparatively little use of it. The documents he did consult were those that are available on microfilm at Library and Archives Canada – a valuable resource, but a fraction of what’s out there. This is a shame, and not just because it detracts from his own publication. He might also have saved himself some embarrassment when reviewing mine. In an effort to pad out his Bullwinkle analogy, Zuehlke cites the example of the Canadian volunteer Bill Williamson, who, Zuehlke says, was not a Communist but an “adventurer.” In fact, Williamson was a proud party member. If Zuehlke had spent the time that I have combing through the Comintern documents, if he had traveled to Britain and listened to the almost 20 hours of interviews with Williamson at the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive in London, he would have known this, and lots more besides. Perhaps he finds such painstaking research dry and tiresome. Michael Petrou Ottawa February 9, 2009