CIAO DATE: 11/2008
A publication of:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Ever since the Islamic Revolution 29 years ago, Iranians have sought to change the nature of their relationship with their government. These efforts, however, have so far been frustrated; a sense of political disenfranchisement, coupled with the false hope that Tehran’s theocratic regime can change from within, has blunted the efforts of those seeking to promote freedom in Iran. Those courageous voices that have emerged to promote liberty have fallen upon deaf ears in the West, and even among their own countrymen.
Ever since the Islamic Revolution 29 years ago, Iranians have sought to change the nature of their relationship with their government. These efforts, however, have so far been frustrated; a sense of political disenfranchisement, coupled with the false hope that Tehran’s theocratic regime can change from within, has blunted the efforts of those seeking to promote freedom in Iran. Those courageous voices that have emerged to promote liberty have fallen upon deaf ears in the West, and even among their own countrymen.
But does democracy actually matter? Aside from the arguable moral and philosophical imperatives, more than a few observers have questioned just why the promotion of democracy and human rights in Iran should be of global importance. The answer is simple: Iran today represents an existential threat to the international community, and greater economic and political freedom in the Islamic Republic could serve as a potent antidote.
The Iranian threat
According to U.S. government estimates, Iran is the “central banker” of international terrorism.1 Its support for insurgents and foreign fighters in Iraq, as well as for Hezbollah, Hamas and a bevy of other terrorist groups, is by now well documented. This cooperation may even extend to al-Qaeda; rumors abound that the Islamic Republic harbors al-Qaeda leaders, perhaps for future use as bargaining chips against the terrorist group or perhaps for some other purpose.
Iran also sees itself as a regional hegemon, and in keeping with that belief seeks geopolitical dominance throughout the Gulf and Central Asia. Consistent with this goal, it continues to play an unproductive role in Iraq, and to stir up the Shi’a populations of Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. And despite its early support for a free and stable Afghanistan, Tehran’s recent actions (including assistance to elements of the ousted Taliban movement) have seriously undermined NATO efforts there. Meanwhile, Iran’s continuing threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, seize oil fields in Iraq and target oil production facilities in the Gulf have had their intended effect, driving world energy prices higher and greatly improving the financial situation of the regime in Tehran.
Last, but certainly not least, is the issue of Iran’s nuclear effort. Despite what America’s various intelligence agencies appear to have said in the December 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), it appears all the more certain that Iran is pursuing a program that will eventually lead to the development of a nuclear weapon. Whether this program is intended to develop the capacity for a rapid “breakout,” or one designed for the actual production of a nuclear weapon is unclear, but either scenario presents the international community with a profound challenge. Absent some unexpected and dramatic intervention, it appears there is little that the world can do to stop Iran’s decades-long quest for atomic capability. Only now, as Iran stands on the nuclear threshold, does the international community finally appear ready to act. But, as world leaders are finding out, the West’s historical negligence cannot be negated by last-minute diplomatic appeals or hastily-applied economic sanctions.
Revolution, not evolution
Many strategies exist for addressing the concerns now posed by Tehran, but none are as potent—or as worrisome to Tehran’s self-appointed leaders—as harnessing the power of Iran’s own population. The answer to the question of how to curb Iran’s international misbehavior is fundamentally simple: change the nature of the relationship between the people of Iran and their leaders. Public opinion data from a variety of sources clearly indicates that the Iranian people want international integration rather than isolation, and that they seek the freedoms and opportunities available to their peers in other countries. These goals are in stark contrast to the ambitions of the ruling elites of Tehran.
This fundamental disconnect between the desires of Iran’s ruling elites and the country’s general population illustrates the distance between the regime and the will of its people. According to the findings of a poll carried out by the public policy group Terror Free Tomorrow ahead of Iran’s March 2008 parliamentary elections, the Iranian public strongly supports a more open and fully democratic system of government, with 86 percent of respondents in favor of “a political system for governing Iran” in which “all leaders… can be chosen and replaced by a free and direct vote of the people.”2 Indeed, according to the survey, the most important long-term goals Iranians have for their government, apart from the economy, are ensuring free elections and a free press.
But what are the forces that will bring about democratic change in Iran? There are two distinct theories on how the Iranian regime can change. The first is what might be called the evolutionary model, in which the regime reforms itself. However, after nearly three decades of rule by virtually the same theocratic leaders, and in the wake of failed attempts by former president Mohammad Khatami to bring about liberalization, the idea that the regime in Tehran can or wants to reform itself has been thoroughly discredited.
This leaves us with what might be considered a revolutionary model. Revolutionary change does not mean violent revolution; rather, it articulates the theory that absent an indigenous movement for liberalization that is independent of Iran’s theocratic regime, no reform of the system is probable—or even possible.
Critics of such an approach claim that Iran is already a democracy. They typically point to the country’s periodic, skewed elections as proof. But true democracy is about more than elections; it includes freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of religion. By any unit of measure, Iran fails those tests. Its electoral events are not free and fair, its media are not independent and religious overtones deeply color the political process. Perhaps most significantly, the country’s political elite remains unelected and unrepresentative. Iran’s Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, retains power without a political mandate from the general public—immune from public opinion or recall. The power and role of the Supreme Leader is at the core of the Islamic Republic because it is the Supreme Leader and not the President who exercises ultimate authority. Yet the recent Terror Free Tomorrow poll noted above found that almost nine in ten of those surveyed want the most powerful official in Iran to be held accountable to the voters. Alas, it is unlikely that their views will change the current system.
The building blocks of Iranian democracy
How, then, can such change be accomplished? Looking at Iran from the outside, practitioners can see many of the indicators necessary to promote democratic change.
First, nearly half of the population (48.8 percent) is under 24 years of age,3 and as a result has little or no personal relationship with the foundational event of the current theocratic regime: the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Common belief holds that this lack of emotional or ideological connection to the revolutionary period makes Iranians more susceptible to democratic change. Additionally, this age group is more susceptible to economic concerns, and there is significant evidence that they are increasingly worried over Iran’s economic woes.
Second, Iran has a highly educated population. Nearly 18 percent of Iranians have completed some type of post-secondary schooling.4 Iran has a literacy rate of nearly 77 percent.5 This is particularly true of Iranian women, some 73 percent of whom have had access to secondary education.6 In addition, Iranians enjoy widespread access to information technology tools. The importance of this cannot, and should not, be overlooked. According to a recent quarterly public opinion poll conducted by the Foundation for the Promotion of Democracy, 58 percent have ready access to the Internet. That figure jumps to over 80 percent for those with a university-level education. The same survey found that over one-half have access to banned satellite television.7 And although government censors have placed restrictions on Internet usage and attempted to ban satellite dishes, Iranians have succeeded in skirting these constraints as a result of their thirst for information from the outside world.
Third, the building blocks of dissent are present within Iranian society. Although they have for the most part been excommunicated from the official political system, traditional political centers of gravity—including organized labor, students and oppressed minorities (women, ethnic and religious minorities)—continue to exist. Given their historic roles, these organized groups can be expected to lend their hand to the cause of Iranian freedom. Other traditional groups, such as Iran’s “baazari” (merchant) class, also appear to have issues with the current regime’s political outlook and its corrupt economic practices.
Finally, public discontent with the regime’s policies is running high as well. Since April 2008, domestic public opinion has shifted dramatically, with a majority (57 percent) of respondents in a recent poll of Tehran residents saying Iran is moving in the “wrong direction.” Iran’s deteriorating economy is seen as the main factor behind this shift in opinion; nearly 79 percent of Iranians polled said economic issues are the most important problem facing Iran today, and nearly 80 percent indicated that the economic situation in Iran is either fairly or very bad (a 15 percent increase since April 2008).8
Yet a number of impediments exist as well. Most importantly, no organized political opposition seeking democratic reform currently exists. The sparse real opposition that does exist lacks the strong and charismatic political leadership necessary to effect change. Absent charismatic leaders or organizations to rally around, the ability of new or more dynamic movements to emerge as real forces for change is minimal.
The global Iranian diaspora has the potential to be one of the greatest assets to those within Iran seeking political change. But it has been divided by disparate personal and political interests and infiltrated and coerced by Tehran. Rather than use their access and assets to help bring about political change, most Iranian émigrés have assimilated into their host countries and all but turned their backs on the democracy activists within Iran. For all its rhetoric to the contrary, this group appears to rely on others to resolve Iran’s democracy deficit for them.
Then there is the “revolution fatigue.” Today, many of Iran’s liberals are disheartened, having put their faith in former President Mohammad Khatami’s failed promise to liberalize Iran’s social and economic policies. Khatami’s eight-year reign ended in 2005, without any real progress. His apologists claim he had little or no ability to implement intended reforms. Those who are less forgiving believe he never intended to pursue them in the first place. Either way, the Khatami era was marked by dashed hopes for social liberalization, and has contributed to broad disillusionment among Iran’s liberals about their ability to influence the regime. The resulting sense of political inevitability has blunted a good many attempts at liberalization and subsequent efforts to forge new democratic movements.
The economy plays a key role in this inertia. Although $140-a-barrel oil has helped buoy President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s populist agenda, economic survival still consumes the daily lives of most Iranians. Per capita GDP has grown at a rate of approximately two percent annually,9 but it is still far below that of Iran’s regional neighbors. A skyrocketing inflation rate (officially pegged at over 25 percent10) coupled with unemployment at 12 percent11 has ravaged personal income. In a recent poll of Tehran residents, 77 percent stated they do not feel they are economically better off this year than last year.12 Those that are able to focus on matters beyond economic issues are able to do so only through the largesse of the state, which makes their interest in upsetting the economic applecart minimal. It is simply an exercise in line with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; survival issues are the first to be focused on; once they are achieved other issues become a concern. When you are worried about inflation, paying the rent or feeding your family, political needs become a lesser priority. In this, the economic frustration and disenfranchisement of Iranians cuts both ways. It may cause discontent with the current regime, but it keeps the political ambitions of many on hold.
The Islamic Republic has also deftly played the nationalism card. In particular, the Ahmadinejad government has used nationalistic tendencies to generate popular support for its nuclear program, which is being operated in defiance of the international community. But the regime’s strategic use of the issue runs much deeper; Iran’s ayatollahs have made the pursuit of liberty an act of treason, likening the promotion of human rights and democracy to siding with the enemy at a time of war. They have also encouraged a fervent belief among Iranians that unless you stand with the regime you are against the state. This false dichotomy, coupled with the tremendous coercive power available to the regime (manifested through the scores of official and quasi-official security forces tasked with preserving “social order”), has all but quelled internal dissent.
Helping the Iranians
In this equation, the international community has a critical role to play: most directly, greater support to Iranian reformers through public statements and pressure on Tehran to respect human rights. The countries of the West must make clear, alone and together, that concerns with Iran’s human rights record are not simply issues of bilateral relations, but rather a matter of growing concern for the international community as a whole.
These words should be matched by deeds. The international community has a range of diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal through which it can bring pressure to bear on Iran for its human rights violations. These measures must be used judiciously, or they will lose both prestige and purpose. But if they are, they can help deter the regime in Tehran from its current, horrific assault on the human rights and personal liberties of ordinary Iranians, and simultaneously raise international awareness of Iran’s record of domestic misconduct. Equally important, such “naming and shaming” (and an accompanying credible threat of international repercussions) could provide a measure of protection for human rights and democracy activists within Iran, protecting them from future abuses at the hands of their regime.
To help more fully inform Iranian public opinion, it is also necessary to increase unbiased forms of information. Iran’s media environment, after all, is strictly controlled and tightly regulated. The international community should help fill the resulting informational void across a number of platforms (Internet, radio, television, cell phones and emerging technologies). The goal of this programming should be to inform as well and as to entertain, and by doing so to provide core constituencies inside Iran with impartial information about how the world views their government and to place issues critical to them in proper context.
Iranians also need greater opportunity to interact with the international community. Historically, people-to-people exchanges have served the backbone of democracy promotion, providing emerging leaders abroad with insights into—and an appreciation of—democratic ideals and individual values. And while many see such exchange programs as a softer form of political support, engaging future stakeholders has the ability to mitigate xenophobic tendencies and can have a critical impact at crucial tipping points in a democratic transition.13
In this calculus, far and away the most controversial step is the provision of material support to Iran’s various democratic movements. It is unrealistic to assume that Iranian activists can help bring about fundamental change in a repressive society without a broad spectrum of moral, technical and financial assistance.
Such aid should not be free, of course. It should be tied to concrete commitments by Iranian reformers to respect human rights, political freedoms and freedom of speech. Support for more divisive elements (among them ethnic elements or those labeled as foreign terrorist organizations) may be expedient in the short term, but it contradicts the long-term interests of the United States and its allies: to create a political system that respects and incorporates the opinions and views of a wide range of constituencies in Iran.
It is clear that the opportunity for political change in Iran must be indigenous. Just as clearly, however, the West should not shy away from engaging the global Iranian diaspora as part of its support for these efforts. The diaspora can play a vital role in communicating with the Iranian population, as well as supporting and engaging reform elements there. The international community’s engagement of the diaspora could empower them to greater action.
There are several reasons why the West should connect with these elements. First, communication with groups and individuals within Iran is difficult for the international community, whether they have a presence in Iran or not, but individuals in the diaspora do it frequently, talking to family members and friends still in Iran. Second, given the sensitivity of Iranian activists about working directly with the international community, doing so through the diaspora provides a buffer that can help shield activists in Iran from Tehran’s ire. Such support, however, should be measured and closely monitored. It must be provided to those that share our vision of a truly free and open Iran, not those that simply seek to swap one regime with another or to install themselves in power without a competitive political process.
So far, however, the international community has failed to match its rhetorical support for such an outcome with tangible commitments. Instead, the world’s diplomats—ever the optimists regarding the possibility of reaching compromise with the Islamic Republic—have all but neutered nascent efforts to promote freedom in Iran in an ongoing attempt to reach some sort of rapprochement with Tehran.
This constitutes a losing bargain. History has repeatedly shown that only when the interests of Tehran and its interlocutors converge does Iran maintain its negotiated commitments. Such an approach also risks legitimizing abroad a government that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of its own people.
The cost of this backsliding is high indeed. By backing down from our commitment to support political transformation in Iran, we have undermined our credibility as promoters of freedom, not only in Iran but throughout the Middle East. We have also reinforced the historically conspiratorial view of the United States held by ordinary Iranians. For, in our willingness to negotiate with the current regime in Tehran, we have reinforced the perception that America, far from confronting Iran’s tyrannical theocracy, is eager to appease it.
David M. Denehy is the Chief Executive Officer of Global Strategic Partners, a multifaceted international consulting firm. Previously, Mr. Denehy was a Senior Advisor in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs of the United States Department of State, where he served as the Iran Freedom Agenda Coordinator (2005-2007).