CIAO DATE: 11/2008
A publication of:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
The United States has had close ties to Saudi Arabia and its ruling family since the formation of the Saudi state in the early 1930s, when American oil companies began to survey the vast inhospitable sandy terrain of that country in hopes of finding oil deposits. They did, birthing a relationship between two countries divided by religious, political, social, economic and educational values. Frankly put, Saudi Arabia and the Unites States have nothing in common other than the fact that the former has oil and the latter needs it to lubricate the engines of its military and economic might.
The United States has had close ties to Saudi Arabia and its ruling family since the formation of the Saudi state in the early 1930s, when American oil companies began to survey the vast inhospitable sandy terrain of that country in hopes of finding oil deposits. They did, birthing a relationship between two countries divided by religious, political, social, economic and educational values. Frankly put, Saudi Arabia and the Unites States have nothing in common other than the fact that the former has oil and the latter needs it to lubricate the engines of its military and economic might.
Saudi Arabia is ruled by an absolute monarchy whose legitimacy depends on coercive governance based on an austere interpretation of Muslim texts which label non-Muslims “infidels” and non-Sunni Muslims “heretics.” The U.S. is the most democratic country in the world. And yet, the two entered into a business contract known as “oil for security” atop an American warship in the middle of the Suez Canal in 1945. And, although autocratic Saudi Arabia and democratic America could not be more different politically, socially, religiously, educationally and economically, that relationship has held up rather well over the span of some 60 years.
But this opaque relationship, already in decline in the mid 1990s, was shattered on September 11, 2001. The terrible events of that day, and the substantial Saudi role in it, have led many to call into question the prudence of continued partnership between Washington and Riyadh.
And yet, complete disengagement is not an option, especially at a time when the Saudi monarchy is losing control at home and influence in the Gulf and globally. Given global demands for oil and the abundance of this commodity under the control of the House of Saud, the next U.S. administration will have to deal with Riyadh in some fashion, not only to protect what some have called “our largest single overseas private enterprise,”1 but to moderate world energy prices and to meet unprecedented global demands. But what kind of stability is the U.S. willing to ensure in Saudi Arabia to meet this goal, and at what price?
Reshuffled deck
Today, Saudi Arabia’s waning global influence can be seen in its recent efforts to grab regional and international attention. The June 2008 energy meeting in Saudi Arabia and interfaith meeting in Spain in July 2008 were designed to show the world that the Saudis are both leaders of the Muslim faith and controllers of the world’s energy supply. However, both conferences failed to convince anyone, including Saudi citizens, of anything other than that they were public relations ploys aimed at increasingly skeptical audiences in the West.
Iraq is one reason. The former Ba’athist state seems to be emerging from its internal conflicts, in which the Saudis have played a major negative role, both directly and indirectly. Riyadh’s role has been driven by tactical and strategic considerations. In the wake of the Hussein regime’s collapse, the Saudis supported their Sunni brethren in Iraq in order to ensure a strong Sunni presence within the Iraqi government, which the Saudis could use to oppose any unfriendly policies toward the Saudi royal family emanating from Baghdad. More important, a democratic Iraq at the heart of the region would pose a real threat to the autocratic Saudi regime, something the Kingdom sought to forestall by exerting an influence over the country’s prospects for pluralism. With Iraq moving unmistakably toward stability, however, these policies have now become double-edged swords, breeding discontent among the majority of Iraqis and diluting Saudi influence in Iraq and beyond.
Other factors are also chipping away at the House of Saud’s strategic and economic importance to the U.S. Chief among them is the global energy market, and Riyadh’s declining role in it. In recent years, more than a few experts have argued that Saudi oil fields have peaked, and urged the international community to pressure the Saudi government to allow independent experts to examine its reserves. New players in OPEC and on the Middle East political stage, meanwhile, are increasingly thinking beyond Saudi Arabia in economic terms. Iraq, for example, is said to have as much or more oil than the Kingdom. Once the Iraqis solve their internal problems, something that seems increasingly probable, and start focusing on repairing and modernizing their oil facilities, they could produce enough oil to render Saudi influence irrelevant. The procurement of other energy alternatives by oil consumers, as well as the growing independence of other Gulf rulers, will reduce the Saudis’ political and economic influence still further.
The Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda,” meanwhile, has shaken the foundations of U.S.-Saudi relations in a fundamental way. Under private, and for the first time public, pressure from the Bush administration, the Saudi government introduced limited political reform initiatives between 2003 and 2005.2 These included the passage of royal decrees establishing a governmental human rights association and human rights commission, a committee to fight corruption, limited media association, national dialogue, and permitting Saudi reformers to petition the king. Limited municipal elections were also held in 2005 (although women, all citizens under 21, and all military and security personnel were excluded). For Saudi Arabia, these primitive steps represent a seismic shift in a country considered the property of one family, the House of Saud. Even these cosmetic gestures, however, could never have happened were it not for the pressure exerted on the Saudi princes by the Bush administration, the President himself, and by Condoleezza Rice, the first Secretary of State with the courage to tell Arab regimes that the days of unconditional American support for them and their repressive policies were over. As she put it publicly in 2005:
For 60 years, we often thought that we could achieve stability without liberty in the Middle East. And ultimately, we got neither. Now, we must recognize, as we do in every other region of the world, that liberty and democracy are the only guarantees of true stability and lasting security.3
Secretary Rice had a supporter in her stance on the issue: President George W. Bush. Regardless of his unrelenting critics, and there are more than enough to go around, Bush believes that liberty is a universal value that belongs to all peoples, regardless of race, gender, religion, tradition and region. He correctly understands that U.S. interests, as well as international peace and security, are best secured by free peoples who share common values. ”When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence,” he has said. “This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased.”4 Powerful statements against tyranny from the President of the United States, himself a member of a family that is known for having close ties with the Saudi royal family, have rattled the foundations of the regime and given unprecedented moral support for Saudi reformers. Such pressure, the steady decline of Saudi standing internationally and regionally, terrorism, and internal discontent have all impacted U.S.-Saudi relations adversely, and have increased the instability of the Saudi monarchy and society.
Internal fissures
Domestically, Saudi Arabia is a society riven by terminal conflicts, albeit ones that are forcibly suppressed. It suffers from multiple and chronic religious frictions, segregation of the genders, high unemployment (especially among youth and women), heavy-handed censorship, as well as a total ban on all forms of assembly other than in mosques under the vigilant eyes of the government’s religious police, the Motawein. Corruption runs rampant throughout government agencies and the public sector. It has persisted despite a royal appointed commission to address it,5 perpetuated by the fact that the main source of corruption, the royal family’s control of the national revenues, industry, public utilities and the national treasury, remains a taboo topic. Social processes are also sclerotic; very little can be done without the intercession of a wastah (middleman), from seeing a doctor, purchasing airline tickets, getting a government job, to applying for a passport. Bribery of the wastah is an inherent part of the system.
Severe gender segregation is likewise a major social infirmity—one which is becoming increasingly explosive. Very little direct contact occurs between the sexes outside of the family unit. This results in the lack of an integrated, harmonious, collaborative, and united society. One of this system’s destructive consequences has been the rise of intense female resentment toward their male relatives and the institutions that enforce gender separation. This is not to deny that customs play a role. However, the intensity of this gender separation—and the related suppression of female identity—has given official cover to all males, bureaucracies, employers, and rapists to discriminate and abuse women as they wish. Contrary to the excuses of the government and its ferocious religious police, which cite religious and cultural norms, the marginalization of women is actually deeply rooted in Saudi male culture, insecurity and obsession with women’s sexuality.
Denial of the rights of women represents a fundamental abrogation of responsibility on the part of the Saudi government. Excluding most Saudi women from the work force frees the regime from creating jobs, a good healthcare system, public transportation and equality in education for half of its population. The underpinning of this dubiously designed system is to give Saudi male citizens power over their female counterparts, deliberately enforcing women’s loyalty to the ruling family and its institutions because the only course of action available to them is going to the king to beg for mercy and justice when their male relatives misbehave.
This parallels the power of the religious police, who enforce daily prayers, dress codes, men’s haircuts, fasting during Ramadan, gender segregation and the disruption of any gathering of more than two or three people. As the government’s arm of repression against the Saudi people, the religious police are empowered to arrest, incarcerate, beat and in some cases kill people in front of their loved ones.6 These sadistic government operatives are not free agents; they cannot exceed the power given to them by their feared handler, Interior Minister Prince Naif. Yet the majority of the Saudi population, expatriates and U.S. officials see the religious police as unruly religious fanatics who act independently of the wishes of the royal family—a perception purposely fostered by the ruling regime to present itself as a moderate one constrained by religious radicals. In reality, the survival of the House of Saud is closely tied to the power of the religious police, whose job it is to keep a vigilant eye on the activities, movements, and conversations, public and private, of the population over which it is empowered to preside and intimidate.
Nor is Saudi Arabia’s energy wealth a panacea. True, the Saudi government pocketed $192 billion during the first six months of 2008 from oil revenues.7 But these dividends are not distributed evenly or spent prudently. In spite of the country’s unprecedented income from oil, and the small size of the Saudi population (estimated at between 12 and 26 million, due to lack of scientific statistics), unemployment remains high. Thirty percent of males and at least 80 percent of females in the Kingdom currently do not hold jobs.8 What makes these high unemployment figures unsettling and potentially explosive is the nature of the unemployed. They are mostly educated young Saudi men and women, ranging in age between 20 and 25. They are restless and discontented, and an easy target for terrorist recruiters, who prey on their boredom and bleak vision of their future under the current regime. These Saudis, in other words, feel powerless, helpless and hopeless. Al-Qaeda has exploited this emotional void, giving them important, albeit destructive, tasks to start and finish and promising them heavenly rewards if they die fighting against the Saudi government and its allies in the West.
The potential applicant pool is large. It is estimated that 50 percent of the Saudi population is below the age of 20.9 And unlike their parents, who were born in tents and grew up in poverty, this generation of young Saudis is accustomed to modern amenities, and exposed to the social liberties their age group enjoys regionally and globally. This is a recipe for social, political and economic disaster if the Saudi system does not start investing heavily in their future—and providing them with a stake in the fate of their homeland.
In addition to high unemployment, social services in Saudi Arabia are poor. Electricity and water shortages are frequent. The health care system is inadequate as a result of official negligence, corruption and poorly-equipped staff, many of whom have private practices on the side where they make more money. Education is likewise sub-par; the Kingdom’s best universities were ranked near the bottom of the University of Shanghai’s 2006 survey of the world’s 3,000 top universities—above only Somalia and Djibouti.10 Eighty percent of Saudi students graduate with irrelevant religious and liberal arts degrees.11
This explains why most technical jobs are performed by expatriates who are imported from countries that are much poorer than Saudi Arabia. With only an estimated eight percent of school curricula allotted to the hard sciences, the Kingdom suffers from a chronic deficit of technical and specialty training. This reality affects the country’s progress and drains its wealth to pay for millions of expatriate laborers and technocrats, while Saudi citizens sit, idle, untrained, neglected and unemployed. This environment is ripe for social, political and economic unrest—the outcome of which could have far-reaching implications for the Saudis and the global economy.
Evolve, or face the consequences
The results of these dynamics are unmistakable. In spite of its omnipresent security apparatus, and the expenditure of billions of dollars on a multitude of infrastructure projects, the Saudi royal family is increasingly disconnected from its population. Part of this reality is generational. The Saudi people, especially the youth, have become more educated and exposed to new and empowering global values. This inexorable whittling away of old habits has changed Saudi perceptions of themselves and the world around them, as well as their role and place in the global community. Disturbingly, the system has failed to respond to these realities and meet even the minimum expectations of its citizens. To the contrary, the official response has been a reversion to old religious, tribal and regional habits. This has widened the divide between the Saudi regime and its citizens, and spurred growing efforts to overthrow the monarchy. During the first five months of 2008 alone, more than 700 alleged terrorists—which the regime terms elfiah althallah, or “stray deviants”—were apprehended by Saudi authorities.12 Put another way, this averages 120 people per month whose objective is believed to be the overthrow of the ruling family.
This is why Saudi analysts and reformers, as well as some at the highest levels of the U.S. government, are convinced that it is only a matter of time before opposition to the Saudi dynasty succeeds in taking over or creating enough chaos that it forces the U.S. and others to intervene militarily to ensure the safety of the vast Saudi oil facilities on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf. Many Saudis, including members of the royal family, predict tumultuous times in the near future unless the root causes of the problems in Saudi Arabia are addressed. They argue that unless Saudi institutions are overhauled to reform rampant corruption, steps are taken to prevent the national treasury from being treated as the Saudi family’s personal property, the disenfranchisement of the people—especially women and religious minorities with religious ties to Iran—is allayed, and the arbitrary judicial system made more accountable and transparent, conditions will continue to deteriorate.
So far, the House of Saud has been able to hold the line, tenuously. Through its ferocious security apparatus and ubiquitous informant networks, the Saudi royal family has been able to preempt domestic upheavals by discontented citizens, and avert court quarrels. But increasingly, internal and external trends have begun to pierce the once-impenetrable royal veil. Not only do disputes and disagreements over policies and jockeying for political position now unravel publicly, some royals are calling for an egalitarian distribution of power, not only among different branches of the large family but with the commoners as well.
All of which suggests that, while the Saudi ruling dynasty may not be on the verge of imminent collapse, it has never been more unstable, divided and vulnerable. Opposition to the present system is real, intense, and widespread. Suppressed, but deeply rooted, resentment of the Saudi ruling family’s repressive policies, extravagant lifestyle, and mismanagement of public wealth, nepotism, and use of its lethal Wahhabi brand of Islam to justify and enforce its autocratic policies has percolated among most Saudis since the inception of the state in 1932. Simmering discontent is visible on an ever-larger scale, especially since September 11, 2001. Global reactions to the Saudi role in the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. has generated unprecedented global condemnation of the Saudi government’s institutionalized religious extremism, which advocates intolerance of non-Muslims, oppression of women and religious minorities and deprivation of Saudi youth. The September 11th attacks empowered Saudis in all walks of life to demand changes of their government’s policies and practices at home, in the region and the international community. For instance, many Saudi citizens resented and even publicly condemned the government’s support for Sunni insurgents in Iraq.
To President Bush’s credit, his administration, especially during its first term, publicly advocated the empowerment of the Saudi people—with tangible results. It would be a colossal mistake if the next President fails to build upon these early successes. There is much to be done. Should he choose to do so, the next President could identify and focus on the privatization of all government industries and public utilities, and on religious freedom for all peoples. He could advocate the transformation of the currently toothless Majlis al-Shura into a freely elected legislative national parliament. And he could emphasize the need to empower Saudi women, and to transform the religious and educational institutions in Saudi Arabia. The President is also in a position to advocate the removal of the judicial system from the hands of religious extremists, the criminalization of all religious incitement, the promotion and protection of a free press and expression of thought, the removal of all forms of censorship, and the establishment of non-governmental civil institutions, accountability and transparency. These steps can be taken incrementally, without plunging the country into disorder, despite the fears of the Saudi royals.
Most important, however, is for the next President to confront the deadly Wahhabi ideology being spread abroad by the Saudi government. This too can be defeated, if the United States commits itself to empowering reformers, elevating women, and transforming Saudi institutions. It will find assistance and support from millions of Muslim allies, who similarly yearn for these values and loathe the intolerant and oppressive Saudi brand of Islam. The Saudi government must understand that the United States shares this common vision with the rest of the Muslim world, and is prepared to act upon it.
Ali Alyami is Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, located in Washington, DC. He is an advocate of human rights and a promoter of non-sectarian democratic reforms in his native homeland of Saudi Arabia.