CIAO DATE: 11/2008
A publication of:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Egyptian politics are in a state of stagnation. Despite numerous promises of reform in recent years, the government of president Hosni Mubarak has failed to embark upon a genuine opening of the political system, and hopes for reforms have faded.
Egyptian politics are in a state of stagnation. Despite numerous promises of reform in recent years, the government of president Hosni Mubarak has failed to embark upon a genuine opening of the political system, and hopes for reforms have faded.
It was not always this way. In 2005, the Egyptian regime showed some willingness to consider political reform, and after much internal and external pressure embarked upon a program of constitutional amendments that culminated in the country’s first multi-candidate presidential elections.
From the start, however, it was clear that the Mubarak regime had stacked the deck. On a practical level, the new rules made it almost impossible for the country’s opposition forces to field a viable candidate. Presidential contenders affiliated with a particular platform are now required to have served in a leading body of their party for at least one year prior to the elections, while their party must have existed for five years, and possess at least five percent of seats in the People’s Assembly, the lower house of Egypt’s parliament. Independent candidates, meanwhile, must gather 250 signatures from members of parliament and other elected bodies in order to be considered viable.1 These regulations handed the initiative to the incumbent regime, which could interfere in the legislative elections in order to prevent some parties from gaining the five percent of seats required.
Nevertheless, they also provided an opening for some opposition groups to make significant gains. In the 2005 legislative elections, for example, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats, about six times more than the legal opposition parties combined. But this victory came at a high price; it allowed the regime to slow down the pace of reform, countering any external pressure by arguing that the only viable alternative to the status quo were the Islamists.2
The political playing field
Egypt has several opposition parties, but most are small and have no political influence. The main opposition parties are the liberal Neo Wafd, the leftist Tagammu Party, the pan-Arab Nasserite Party and its splinter faction, al-Karama. In addition, two other liberal parties have been created over the last five years: the Tomorrow Party and the Democratic Front. The first is a splinter from the Wafd; the second a splinter from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).
These political parties have limited representation in Parliament, holding just three-and-a-half percent of seats combined.3 They continue to suffer from various limiting regulations, such as a complicated rally licensing system and an unfairly small stake in state-owned media. Parties are allowed to publish and sell newspapers; the Wafd party owns one of the main Egyptian dailies, and others have smaller weekly newspapers. However, these have little influence in a country which relies heavily on radio and television due to illiteracy rates of over 30 percent.4 Political parties are also banned from any activity or promotion of ideas on university campuses.
Their activities are governed by the “Parties Committee,” which is in charge of issuing licenses to new parties and has the power to freeze existing parties. This committee, in turn, is controlled by the upper house of Egypt’s parliament, the Shura (Consultative) Council, which is itself dominated by Mubarak’s ruling NDP.
Furthermore, the Emergency Law, which has been in force since 1981, was again extended in May of 2008. It allows the police to hold people without charge for extended periods of time, and enables the authorities to refer civilians to military courts, where defendants have fewer rights.5 Although in practice the Emergency Law has not been directly used against opposition parties during the Mubarak era, it still represents a major potential threat to any movement towards democracy.
In this environment, no legal political party can flourish. They are composed solely of headquarters and newspapers. Their ability to organize is constrained, and they lack access to the real mass media. Moreover, representation in parliament is limited by a plethora of rules and regulations, as well as by widespread irregularities during elections.
Then there is the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian government began its current crackdown on Egypt’s most powerful Islamist movement during the November 2005 legislative elections. Throughout the Mubarak regime, relations between the regime and the Brotherhood have been ambivalent. But before 2005, despite a few tense periods, the organization was more or less tolerated by the regime, even though it was not granted any legal status.
Indeed, up until the November 2005 legislative elections, the Brotherhood enjoyed an unprecedented level of freedom. According to one Brotherhood official, none of its members were in jail, and the state-owned largest daily paper, Al-Ahram, had adopted a more conciliatory stance, opening its pages to the organization’s leader6 and abandoning references to the group as “illegal.” In the run-up to the elections, the Brotherhood was even allowed to use the slogan “Islam is the Solution,”7 even though Egyptian law prohibits the use of religion in electoral campaigns. It could even be argued that there was an electoral symbiosis of sorts between the Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime, since the organization did not field candidates in districts where key regime figures were running for reelection.
All of this changed, however, when it became clear that the Brotherhood was making important gains in the polls. The regime’s response was a crackdown on the organization’s activities and freedom of action. (Notably, the Brotherhood’s gains were not completely counterproductive for the ruling regime; they provided a strong argument against liberalization and democratization, insofar as it could now be argued that any changes to the current system would result in rule by the Islamist organization.) By the end of the elections, the regime had once again blacklisted the Brotherhood and arrested several of its members. It also moved against the group’s economic infrastructure, closing down about 70 businesses that provided funding for the group and its members, including the organization’s deputy supreme guide, Khayrat al-Shater.8 Yet despite these difficulties, the 88 members of parliament that belong to the Brotherhood still remain active within the Egyptian legislature.
Not having a legal status has proven both difficult and useful for the group. The regime can arrest its members at any time on the grounds of belonging to an illegal political organization. Yet not having a legal status also accords the Brotherhood more freedom than that enjoyed by legal political parties; they cannot be dissolved by the regime, there is no interference in the selection process of its leadership, and there is no state control over organizational finances. One manifestation of this independence is the Brotherhood’s ubiquitous presence on Egyptian university campuses.
Far and away the largest and most important party, however, is the ruling National Democratic Party. The NDP, headed by President Hosni Mubarak, is the heir of Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union, which was renamed by the late President Anwar Sadat in the 1970s in order to distinguish it from its pan-Arabist predecessor. Despite the party’s socialist ideology, it has increasingly espoused liberal economic policies. The NDP uses state resources to ensure that the party continues to dominate Egyptian political life.
In the last few years, the NDP has witnessed a certain degree of internal reform, as well as an elevated domestic and international profile. This can be credited to Mubarak’s son, Gamal, who heads the party’s powerful Policies Committee, and who has infused the NDP with unprecedented dynamism. As part of this process, many veteran party leaders have been sidelined and replaced with a new generation far more successful in carrying out free market economic reforms. On the political side, however, progress has been more halting; the party has become adept at using the rhetoric of political reform without genuinely delivering substantive changes.
There is a large amount of speculation about the role that Gamal Mubarak and the NDP will play in the post-Hosni Mubarak transition. The rise of Gamal within the NDP has been taken by many as a sign that he is being groomed as his father’s successor. However, the Egyptian regime is backed by the military, and any presidential transition will have to take into account the will and opinion of that institution, the best organized in the country. It will be the ultimate arbiter of the future role of Gamal Mubarak and the NDP.
Developments, domestic and foreign
Perhaps the most important development in the Egyptian political landscape has been the increased involvement of civil society and unions in the protest movement. In late 2004, Egyptians began to organize regular demonstrations against the re-election of Mubarak and protests on several other political issues. The Kefaya movement, a grassroots protest group, played an important role in breaking down the “wall of fear” surrounding the Egyptian population. And, although Kefaya’s importance has subsequently diminished, its spirit of protest is still alive and well.
One of the main issues that has served to mobilize Egyptians in recent years is the lack of independence of the judiciary. A series of demonstrations, sometimes violent, have made public the call for more freedom for the judicial branch of government. Many other groups, such as the Lawyer Syndicate, the Journalist Syndicate and the Union of University Professors, have also organized demonstrations on issues important to each.
These changes amount to a radical break from the past. For more than 50 years after Nasser’s 1952 military coup, such behavior was unthinkable. Today, however, demonstrations and strikes take place regularly, representing a new dynamic in Egyptian political life. They are an avenue through which Egyptians can voice their opinions and grievances on issues relevant to their professions.
The regime’s reaction to these protests has varied. Depending on the situation, the Mubarak government is at times violent, at others conciliatory. In general, however, this culture of protests is a healthy development, providing for a more direct dialogue between Egyptians and their government.
Yet the current state of affairs in Egypt cannot be viewed in isolation from the shifting balance of power in the region. In an effort to counter Iran’s increasing influence over Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, Cairo has forged stronger alliances with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The reasons are practical—and local. Syria exerts extensive influence in Egypt’s regional affairs through its leverage over Lebanon via Hezbollah and its Christian allies, as well as over Hamas in Gaza. The increased involvement of Syria with Iran is therefore viewed by Egypt as an infiltration of Iranian influence into Egyptian regional politics and hence a national security threat.
Egypt is the only Arab country that has not restored diplomatic relations with Iran since the fall of the Shah in 1979. The dethroned Shah is even buried in Cairo, were he was granted asylum before his death in 1980. Relations between the two countries have been tense ever since, with limited official visits and no formal diplomatic ties. Lately, relations had begun to warm, until in June the Iranians produced a movie about the death of President Sadat which glorified his murderers. This incident ended any hope of rapprochement with Iran. In early July, the Commission of Arab Affairs in the Egyptian parliament issued a statement declaring the movie offensive and an interference in Egyptian affairs.9
The road ahead…
Despite over 50 years of authoritarianism, Egypt’s political system contains several key components of a working democracy. The country is the oldest nation-state in the region, with defined borders that have hardly changed at all since ancient times and a population that has always perceived itself as Egyptian, even during foreign rule under the Roman, Byzantine, Abbasid and Ottoman empires. It has been centrally ruled since antiquity, and has never been divided. In its modern history, it was the first country in the region to establish a legislative assembly (in 1866) and a multi-party constitutional monarchy (in 1923). Despite the current authoritarian regime, Egyptians are familiar with the democratic concepts of parliament, political parties and elections—even if they lack confidence in a political system that has marginalized them since the 1952 coup. In addition, Egypt is a country with two main religions: Islam and Christianity. A democratic system is the only guarantee for equality of all citizens of all religions.
In 2005, the push for democratic reform centered on elections. In retrospect, this turned out to be premature. Although free and fair elections are vital to any healthy democracy, they need to be preceded by reforms that level the political playing field. Only then will all political forces have equal opportunity to disseminate their ideas, and elections be truly competitive.
All of this highlights the need for Egypt to evolve gradually and consistently, rather than to change abruptly. The best case scenario would be genuine cooperation between the regime and opposition movements through a constructive national dialogue, with the president and the military acting as guarantors of the democratic transition. Reforms should focus on increasing freedom of expression, the independence of the judiciary, venues for political expression, freedom for establishing parties and NGOs, and abolition of the Emergency Law—which must not be replaced by a permanent anti-terrorist law that could be just as repressive. Finally, reforms should be followed by a period of transition designed to prepare the country for an increased role by the parliament, which is necessary to balance the powers now invested in the president. From there, Egypt can finally proceed with free and fair elections.
…and America’s role
Washington has a critical role to play in this process. Relations between the U.S. and Egypt remain durable, despite some turbulence over the pace of political reform. Egypt is the second largest recipient of U.S. aid, boasting a financial package of nearly two billion dollars annually, a testament to its role as a key strategic ally.
But this commitment is becoming harder to sustain. Over the past several years, Washington has been under increasing pressure to balance its criticism of Egypt’s political system with the maintenance of its security ties with the current regime. In practice, the United States has tended to prioritize the latter over the former. Since 2006, it has become less vocal about Egyptian political reforms in return for a greater effort from Egypt in controlling its volatile border with Gaza.
Such an approach is understandable, given the American interest in securing the Palestinian Authority. But it is also short-sighted. A more pluralistic Egypt would serve as a more dependable strategic ally and political force multiplier for the U.S. To this end, American policymakers can and should support specific issues that would foster better governance in Cairo. The key lies not in supporting a specific political group or movement, but rather working towards better governance for all Egyptians.
Such steps are logical. Political reform in Egypt is a necessity for local, regional and international stability. Increased political participation and greater levels of freedom will restore the faith of Egyptians in their government, and decrease the political and economic frustrations that could lead to radicalization. Given Egypt’s pivotal regional role, and its importance to the United States, preserving the status quo is simply no longer an option; the political system has to evolve.
Khairi Abaza is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. His work focuses on political reform in the Arab world, the spread of terrorism and the influence of the media in politics.