Columbia International Affairs Online: Journals

CIAO DATE: 11/2008

Hezbollah: Lebanon’s Power Broker

The Journal of International Security Affairs

A publication of:
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Volume: 15, Issue: 0 (Fall 2008)


Robert G. Rabil

Abstract

Over the past decade, Hezbollah has undergone a major metamorphosis. From its origins as a radical sectarian militia in the 1980s, it has migrated into Lebanon’s political mainstream. In the process, Hezbollah has acquired the institutional trappings of a state and the capabilities of an army.

Full Text

Over the past decade, Hezbollah has undergone a major metamorphosis. From its origins as a radical sectarian militia in the 1980s, it has migrated into Lebanon’s political mainstream. In the process, Hezbollah has acquired the institutional trappings of a state and the capabilities of an army.

The Shi’ite group now stands squarely at the center of an Iranian-Syrian regional axis generated no less by Iran’s regional ambitions than by Syria’s regional weakness. The 2006 summer war between Hezbollah and Israel, which Hezbollah celebrated as a “divine” victory, completed the realignment of forces in the Middle East. The Middle East policies of Iran and Syria are now strategically linked to Hezbollah’s political preeminence in Lebanon.

Hezbollah doesn’t just rely on Iran’s financial and military support; it is also guided by Tehran’s clerical leadership. This condition has polarized Lebanon, deepening the divide between the Hezbollah-led opposition and the pro-U.S. March 14 forces. The Lebanese government and the international community now face the daunting challenge of disarming Hezbollah—and, by extension, checking the regional reach of Iran.

Hezbollah’s roots

The ideological foundations of what would come to be known as Hezbollah were laid in the 1960s and 1970s in Lebanon by three religious scholars: the Ayatollahs Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine and Imam Musa al-Sadr. The party’s Islamist ideology, however, was very much a reflection of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Jurisconsult), which would come to dominate in Iran in 1979. Neglected by the Lebanese government and underrepresented in the country’s confessional political system, these religious scholars sought to empower and unify Lebanon’s Shi’a community.

Their efforts were greatly aided by Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The Shi’a community, which had initially welcomed the Israeli troops, quickly mobilized against the “occupation” forces. The reason had to do with the connection made by many Shi’ites between Israel’s invasion and Iran’s successful model of Islamic revolution, which convinced them that armed struggle could be a vehicle for achieving political dominance.1

The seeds for a fundamentalist movement were thus sown in Lebanon. The jihadi program proved to be popular, offering an outlet for some Shi’ites unhappy with what they considered the progressive taming of their community’s main political movement, Amal.2 A breakaway faction of Amal led by Hussein Mussawi was the first to join the nascent Islamist movement. Before long, other Shi’ite fundamentalists from the Beka’a Valley, the south of Lebanon and the Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh followed. The result was the coalescence of the Party of God, or Hezbollah.

The movement immediately garnered attention in Tehran. Iran’s religious establishment perceived it, correctly, as a vehicle by which to expand its revolutionary principles to the Shi’a community in Lebanon and become a player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resulting financial and logistical commitment included the deployment of Iran’s crack Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, or Pasdaran) to train and indoctrinate Hezbollah’s cadres.

Tehran, however, could not do this on its own. Given Syria’s border with Lebanon and the latter’s considerable troop presence there (a product of the Lebanese civil war), Iran also needed the blessing of Damascus. This was not difficult to gain. Adamant about preventing Israel and its Lebanese allies from controlling Lebanon, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad blessed the Iranian infiltration—but not before establishing a cooperation framework that would govern the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. The main points of this 1982 deal provided that:

a) Damascus would secure the Beka’a Valley as an operational location to host Iran’s Pasdaran and set up training camps there;

b) Damascus would secure an overland route to ship Iranian weapons to these units in the Beka’a Valley and other locations;

c) Tehran would provide Hezbollah’s mujahideen units with training and monthly salaries, as well as taking care of benefits for their families; and

d) Tehran would help organize and institutionalize the Islamist party without devising separate plans with it.3

This framework became the backdrop against which Hezbollah would evolve militarily, organizationally, and politically. Throughout the 1980s, militants associated to one degree or another with Hezbollah launched a campaign of terror targeting both the Multinational Forces sent in 1982 to oversee the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut and Westerners residing in the capital. Suicide bombers attacked the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in April and October 1983 respectively. Dozens of Americans and Europeans were taken hostage, and TWA flight 847 was hijacked in 1985. Though the Iranian government denied all involvement, enough circumstantial evidence pointed to involvement by high-ranking members of the regime in Tehran.4

But Assad’s support for Hezbollah’s terror activities was not unconditional. The Syrian president supported these acts of terror so long as they served Syria’s overall strategic goal of imposing its rule over Lebanon and enhancing its regional standing. When, on July 19, 1982, Hezbollah, acting under Iranian direction but without Syrian knowledge, kidnapped David Dodge, the acting president of American University in Beirut, Assad was furious and threatened to expel the IRGC from Lebanon.5 On June 17, 1987, Syrian troops beat Hezbollah members for kidnapping ABC correspondent Charles Glass near a Syrian checkpoint and, in the same year, Syrian troops, under the pretext of ending raging strife in West Beirut, shot 27 Hezbollah fighters.6

Still, on the whole, such tension was the exception rather than the norm. Over time, Assad would come to see Hezbollah not only as a “resistance movement” but also as a potential Lebanese political force.

The status quo was altered in 1989 with the death of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the ensuing shift in political focus that took place in Iran. At the same time, Syria, assisted by Saudi and Algerian mediation, brokered the Taif Accord, ending Lebanon’s civil war. Signed by a majority of Lebanese deputies on October 22, 1989, the accord amended the Lebanese constitution, conferring roughly equal powers on the country’s three main communities, the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi’a. The accord also recognized Syria’s “special relationship” with Lebanon, a trusteeship subsequently cemented by the May 20, 1991, Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination and the September 1, 1991, Lebanon-Syria Defense and Security agreement.7

In response, Hezbollah clerics such as Hassan Nasrallah and Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed were forced to adjust the party’s ideology. Although the mission of “Islamizing Lebanon” remained a central tenet, it became a long- rather than short-term objective. Hezbollah’s immediate challenge now was how to become a mainstream political party while maintaining its “resistance” role. By taking a position on the matter, Ayatollah Fadlallah, considered by many to be Hezbollah’s spiritual leader, tipped the balance against the party’s hard-liners. As a result, the ideologically inflexible Sheikh Subhi Tufeili and his followers seceded from the party, paving the way for Hezbollah’s entrance into Lebanon’s politics.

How Hezbollah operates

At the heart of the Islamist party is a group of radical clerics who studied in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf during the 1970s. They make up the party’s supreme religious organ, modeling it after the upper echelons of Iran’s clerical leadership. This organ came to be known as the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), and served as the repository of the organization’s legitimacy and power. Initially, the Majlis established seven committees dealing with political, judicial, ideological, military, financial, informational and social affairs for each of Lebanon’s three main Shi’a regions: Beirut, the Beka’a Valley, and southern Lebanon.8

In 1989, the party was restructured in order to better adapt to Lebanon’s changing circumstances. Two new organs were added, the Executive Council (Majlis al-Shura al-Tanfizi), which ranks below the Majlis al-Shura, and the Political Council (Maktab Siyassih), which provides political analysis and fosters relationships with the various political forces in Lebanon. It also coordinates the work of various committees under an organization registered with the Lebanese government as Jihad al-Bina’ (Reconstruction Campaign). The Reconstruction Campaign is headed by Qasem ‘Aliq.9

Further changes were adopted to meet the party’s development and organizational needs. A secretary general position was created and the Majlis al-Shura elected Sheikh Subhi al-Tufeili as the organization’s first Secretary General.10 A deputy secretary general position was also created. Membership in the Majlis al-Shura was reduced to seven to correspond more effectively with the party’s organization and assignments. The term of the Majlis was set at two years and various committees were incorporated in several councils. Two other organs, the Martyr Foundation and the Recruitment and Propaganda Desk, were developed to uphold and mobilize the party’s growing recruitment program and its social base of support.11

All of these changes culminated in the modern structure of the party and command leadership.

The Majlis al-Shura serves as the highest office in the party, wielding power and deciding all matters on the basis of consensus. If no consensus is reached among the seven members of the council, then Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, decides the outcome. The Majlis al-Shura includes the party’s command leadership:

The Majlis al-Siyassih (Political Council) handles Hezbollah’s relations with Lebanon’s other political players and parties. It provides political analysis and oversees the group’s external relations. The public and informational committee was incorporated into this council, which is headed by Sheikh Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed. Sheikh Mahmoud Qumati is its deputy director.

The Majlis al-Tanfizi (Executive Council) handles the party’s daily activities, streamlines the decisions of the Majlis al-Shura and supervises the party’s organizational procedures. It also oversees all cultural, educational, social, and professional affairs. It is headed by Hashem Safi al-Din, a relative of Secretary General Nasrallah. Muhammad Yaghi, a former Hezbollah MP, serves as al-Din’s executive assistant.

The Majlis al-Qada’ (Judicial Council) settles the party’s disputes and decides organizational matters. It also decides matters related to shari’a law (Islamic law). It includes various judicial representatives, and is headed by Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek, the Ayatollah Khamenei’s official representative in Lebanon.

The Majlis al-Tashri’i (Parliamentary Council) includes the party’s deputies (MPs) in Lebanon’s parliament. It examines proposed legislation brought before the parliament, oversees the party’s relationship with the government, and manages and supervises the party’s coalitions. It toes the party’s political line, and serves as a mouthpiece for its positions. It is headed by MP Muhammad Raad.

The Majlis al-Jihadi (Jihad Council) oversees what the party calls “resistance activity.” This council is separate from other councils and organizations, and is directly linked to the Majlis al-Shura. It enjoys what the party calls “strategic ambiguity”; even the party’s MPs have no knowledge about the council’s resistance activities. Secretary General Nasrallah heads the council and is assisted by a deputy, whose name is not disclosed for security reasons. Reportedly, notorious terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyeh headed the council before his assassination in Damascus in February 2008.

The Jihad Council is divided into three units. The Security Organ is in charge of protecting the party’s leadership, carrying out internal and external surveillance, and engaging in internal and external operations. Al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War) organizes and plans suicide missions throughout the world. Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Resistance) oversees the party’s militia, which has the ability to mobilize over 25,000 members.

It is believed that the Jihad Council is linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Pasdaran. Two Iranian officials have played a key role in coordinating with and arming Hezbollah. The first is Qassam Sulaymani, chief of the Pasdaran’s Quds Force (Jerusalem Force). The second is Ali Larijani, the former Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and now the speaker of the Iranian parliament.

Following the summer 2006 war with Israel, two more organs were added to the Jihad Council: the Auxiliary Units (an irregular militia) and the Lebanese Defense Brigades, which were created to include non-Shi’a members in order to give the “resistance” a cross-sectarian, nationalist outlook.

Outgrowing the patron-client relationship

The year 2000 marked a new phase in Hezbollah’s evolution. Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the south of Lebanon undercut the legitimacy of Syria’s presence in the country. In the aftermath of Israel’s withdrawal, Hezbollah exerted a claim to Lebanese sovereignty over disputed border areas such as the mountainous Shebaa Farms and the hills of Kfarshouba.12

Then, on June 10, 2000, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad passed away after 30 years in power. He was succeeded by his son Bashar, who—while observing the rules governing Syria’s relationship with Lebanon and Hezbollah—set about enhancing Hezbollah’s political status and power. He did so by receiving Nasrallah warmly in Damascus, and by supplying Hezbollah with sophisticated weaponry, including from Iran. This rapprochement accelerated after the United States launched military operations against Iraq in March 2003, thereby shattering the regional status quo. Both Iran and Syria sought to prevent the United States from creating a new regional order that could threaten their rejectionist regimes.

Meanwhile, encouraged by rapidly unfolding events in the region, many Lebanese sought to reclaim their country from Syrian occupation. The Lebanese question was placed on the international stage with the co-sponsorship (by the U.S. and France) and subsequent passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon and for Hezbollah to be disarmed.13 While Damascus sought to extend the mandate of pro-Syrian president Emile Lahoud, former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt began to rally anti-Syrian politicians.14

In an attempt to nip this growing anti-Syrian campaign in the bud, the Assad regime is believed to have ordered the assassination of Hariri. The subsequent killing on February 14, 2005, sparked escalating mass protests, with approximately 1.5 million Lebanese (roughly over third of the whole population), taking to the streets on March 14th to demonstrate for Syria’s withdrawal in what became known as the “Cedar Revolution.”15 On April 26, 2005, under significant international pressure, Syrian troops were forced to withdraw from Lebanon. But Damascus’ influence did not end there: bombings, assassinations, and violent clashes followed in subsequent months, as Syria attempted to demonstrate that it retained strategic reach. Damascus also continued to arm Hezbollah (as well as Palestinian radical groups active in Lebanon such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah-Intifada) at precisely the time that a debate about its disarmament was beginning to rage in Beirut.16

At the heart of this Syrian policy was the belief that only the Shi’a Islamist party Hezbollah could help Damascus reclaim its “historical” role in Lebanon. The Syrian army’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the consolidation of an anti-Syrian nationalist alliance, bringing together a majority of Sunnis, Christians and Druze under the banner of the March 14 forces, profoundly undercut Syria’s position. At the same time, Iran’s involvement in Lebanon was deepening, and doing so at the expense of Syria’s position there.

It is in this context that the summer 2006 war erupted between Hezbollah and Israel. The hostilities ended on the basis of a seven-point plan and UNSCR 1701, which increased the number of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troops in southern Lebanon and called for the dismantling and disarming of all militias. Despite the destruction wrought upon both Lebanese infrastructure and Hezbollah’s members, the group’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, declared a “divine” victory and called for a national unity government and a new electoral law, asserting that the resistance had dealt a blow to American Middle East strategy.17

Post-conflict crisis

As a result, whatever semblance of national unity Lebanon had exhibited during the summer crisis dissipated. Recriminations and counter-recriminations became a staple of Lebanese politics. A struggle for control of the state reemerged, with the government and its allies attempting to implement UN Security Council resolutions and elect a president who was not pro-Syrian. Hezbollah, meanwhile, sought veto power over government decisions under the pretext of national unity, with an eye toward changing the political structure in Lebanon so as to make it commensurate with Shi’a plurality.

The impetus for this effort came from none other than Iran. Throughout his shuttle diplomacy to Beirut, Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki described the system as outdated because it discriminated against the country’s Shi’a population. He argued instead for a new formula based on an equal distribution of political power among Christians, Sunnis and Shi’a to replace the present system that divides power equally between Christians and Muslims.

Iran’s arguments had an effect. Before long, pro-opposition Shi’a ministers began to resign from the cabinet in the belief that the Lebanese government would no longer be legitimate without the representation of the Shi’a community. The government, however, did not collapse. Rather, a wave of assassinations of anti-Syrian figures, including the November 2006 killing of minister Pierre Gemayel, son of former president and Phalange party head Amin Gemayel, emboldened the government to officially ask the United Nations to proceed with the international tribunal. The opposition, in turn, called for a national unity government and threatened to take to the streets. Hassan Nasrallah, rebuffed by the government, called for a sit-in before the Grand Serail, the premier’s official residence in downtown Beirut, sharpening the struggle for Lebanon and the battle of wills between Nasrallah and his ally in Lebanon’s parliament, Michel Aoun, on one side, and pro-Western Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and Rafik Hariri’s son Saad, now a major political figure, on the other.

Concerns about a civil war (which could spill over into regional strife between Shi’a and Sunni factions) mounted, as did worries about the political influence wielded by the key figures in the 14 March forces. This led the government and its allies to forgo the constitutional formula of electing a president with a simple 50 percent-plus-one parliamentary majority (something that would neutralize Hezbollah and Syria) and instead support a compromise candidate.

The commander of the Lebanese army, Michel Suleiman, became that default candidate. But the Hezbollah-led opposition exploited this shift to introduce several new demands, which cumulatively would have given it exponentially greater power in any national unity government. Predictably, the Siniora government and its allies rejected this proposal. Simultaneously, it deepened its investigation into the assassination in Lebanon of anti-Syrian figures and representatives of political movements. These efforts undoubtedly unnerved Damascus and its allies, and touched off a new wave of assassination of senior Lebanese intelligence and army officers.18

Against this violent and unstable background, Lebanon plunged into political crisis. The immediate cause of outright civil strife came in the form of two decisions taken by the government on May 5, 2008. One removed airport security chief Brigadier General Wafiq Shuqeir from his post over his alleged links to Hezbollah. The other, more dramatic measure made the private communications network set up by Hezbollah illegal and unconstitutional—a move that was tantamount to criminalizing the Islamist party. The response from the Shi’a militia was immediate. Nasrallah described the government’s decision as a “declaration of war” and asserted his readiness to use force to protect the “weapons” of Hezbollah.19 He followed with a swift military onslaught on west Beirut. The pro-government groups were no match for Hezbollah’s well-equipped and well-trained fighters. Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt were virtually put under house arrest. Hariri’s television station and newspaper, al-Mustaqbal, were taken off the air and destroyed, respectively. The fighting then expanded to some Druze areas and to the northern city of Tripoli. And Hezbollah, despite sustaining a number of casualties, was the clear victor.

An Arab diplomatic delegation led by the foreign minister of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, traveled to Beirut and held intensive meetings with Lebanese leaders to defuse the crisis. On May 15th, pending the launch of a national dialogue in Doha, the government reversed its two decisions in “the view of the higher national interests,” a move which marked the end of hostilities. The subsequent agreement reached in Doha gave in to nearly all opposition demands. A clear sign of this capitulation was the fact that, although the Doha agreement provided for upholding the sovereignty of the state throughout Lebanon, it did not address the question of Hezbollah’s weapons.20

What next?

There can be little doubt that Hezbollah scored a crucial political victory. But a closer look at the dynamics of these cataclysmic events suggests that this victory is ephemeral and could signal two momentous results: the beginning of the end of Hezbollah as a model “resistance” movement in the Muslim world, and the end of Lebanon as a confessional nation-state.

True, the decision to deem Hezbollah’s communications network illegal was about the potential of the Islamist party to compete with the state over revenues from private cellular lines as much as about security considerations. But to many Lebanese, this network confirmed beyond a reasonable doubt Hezbollah’s objective of strengthening and expanding its “state within the Lebanese state” to the point of making it an overt Iranian satellite. The Islamist party has now used its weapons against Lebanese groups, thereby debunking its own myth of being a resistance movement.

No less important—and contrary to the view of many pundits who proclaimed Hezbollah’s “victory” as evidence of its capacity to impose its will on Lebanon—the fighting exposed the party’s limitations. Hezbollah’s advance into the Druze areas of the Chouf and Mount Lebanon was not cost-free, and Jumblatt’s decision to stand down may have had as much to do with his concerns about preventing intercommunal infighting as with a lack of firepower. In much the same vein, Hezbollah’s advance into Tripoli was swiftly checked by a broad bloc of the city’s major movements, which banded together to secure the area. In addition, and notwithstanding the grumbling among some allies of Hezbollah, the party received sharp criticism for its actions from the spiritual leaders of both the Sunni and Druze communities.21 In the aftermath of these events, Hezbollah’s decision—expressed by its deputy secretary general—to return “to doing politics openly, without preconditions”22 should be seen as a recognition of both the movement’s newly revealed limitations and the prohibitive price of seizing power in Lebanon.

None of this has stopped Hezbollah from thinking big, however. In the aftermath of its creeping coup, the Shi’ite militia has articulated a new, regional vision for its “resistance.” Thus Hassan Nasrallah, in a speech after the signing of the Doha agreement, emphasized the importance of resistance in “methodology, culture, will and action,” downplayed the possibility of an American strike on Iran or an Israeli offensive against Syria, outlined a new strategy for liberating Shebaa Farms, exhorted the forthcoming government in Lebanon to “reconcile the project of reconstructing and building the state with the project of resistance…,” and reaffirmed his pride in being a member of Iran’s Velayat-e faqih.23 The message was clear: Hezbollah’s model of military confrontation had proven successful, and the organization was now focused on the transformation of the Lebanese state.

But one should not mistake pursuing these policies with the ability to implement them. Despite the obvious recent setback, the United States still has the necessary leverage to frustrate Hezbollah’s ambitions. The first step is reestablishing its credibility vis-à-vis Lebanon’s democratic government. During the conflict, the Siniora government’s reliance on the United Nations and international mediation was a clear sign of a loss of confidence in American strategy in the region.24 This partly explains the swiftness with which the morale of the March 14 forces collapsed in the face of Hezbollah’s onslaught. Washington, therefore, must demonstrate its willingness to adopt a more active role in stabilizing Lebanon and helping to dilute Hezbollah’s power, even as it presses the March 14 forces to adopt a more robust, independent posture.

Here, Hezbollah has given the Lebanese opposition a crucial opening. The organization’s myth of resistance has now been debunked in the eyes of many Lebanese and Muslims. Insofar as Hezbollah may attempt to identify itself in that fashion, the March 14 forces should press the issue, insisting that the arms of Hezbollah have been used against Lebanese forces. They should also launch an international effort to bring about an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa Farms and the hills of Kfarshouba, for practical reasons. Hezbollah has predicated the legitimacy of the resistance on tangible results, mainly liberating occupied land. Though Hezbollah could raise other issues in order to justify keeping its arms, its rationale as a resistance movement would be severely weakened once Israel withdrew from these territories. Washington, for its part, should provide the Lebanese military with training and logistical support as a way of building up both morale and capacity.

This should be followed by the development of a long-term strategy designed to weaken the hold of Hezbollah over its main base of support, Lebanon’s Shi’a community. In devising this strategy, Washington will need to address three issues: the development of southern Lebanon, amendment of the electoral law, and a widening of the political debate in Beirut.

Washington could help the government of Lebanon compete with Hezbollah’s social infrastructure in majority Shi’a areas by helping to launch development projects and extending governmental services throughout these areas. It could also reintroduce the idea of proportional representation, according to which independent Shi’a political figures could be elected in proportion to votes cast in their favor, as a way of amending the current correlation of political forces.25 Lastly, Washington has every interest in trying to set up a mechanism by which to expand the political debate in Lebanon so as to include proponents of its own views and those of the Shi’a and other communities who are not affiliated with established parties.

While such a strategy may not compel Hezbollah to disarm in the near future, it will help rob it of its raison d’être and force it to decide whether it is a spearhead for Iran’s national interests or a Lebanese political movement. A great deal will rest on what it chooses.

 

  1. For more details see Robert G. Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 43-80.
  2. Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri, had incensed radical Shi’ite clerics by joining the National Salvation Committee established in June 1992 by Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, not least because the coalition included Bashir Gemayel, Israel’s main ally in Lebanon.
  3. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 38.
  4. For more on this episode, see Augustus Richard Norton, “Walking between Raindrops: Hizballah in Lebanon,” Mediterranean Politics 3, no. 1 (Summer 1998), and Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).
  5. Robert Baer, “It’s Not Syria’s Problem Anymore,” Newsweek International, August 14, 2006.
  6. For a Hezbollah account of the incident, see Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 240.
  7. For more details, see Rabil, Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon, 127-132.
  8. See Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movements in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis and Ideology (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1986), and Marius Deeb, “Shi’a Movement in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Iran and Syria,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (April 1988).
  9. The Reconstruction Campaign led a great effort to assess the level of destruction wrought by the 2006 summer war on Shi’ite areas, and to rebuild damaged houses. Some four hundred architects and 4,000 volunteers reportedly have been undertaking this reconstruction project.
  10. Subsequently, in May 1991, Sheikh Abbas al-Mussawi succeeded al-Tufeili as Secretary General. He was assassinated by Israel in February 1992. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah succeeded him and remains the party’s Secretary General. Sheikh Naim Qassem is Deputy Secretary General.
  11. Funded largely by Iran, the Martyr Foundation doles out money to the families of Hezbollah’s “martyrs.” The Foundation is headed by Sheikh Jawad Nour al-Din, a member of the Majlis al-Shura. The Recruitment and Propaganda Desk is divided into three branches: a network of preachers who indoctrinate and mobilize young Shi’ites to the cause of Hezbollah; Al-Hawzat (circles of learning), which operates as an instrument to access and recruit young Shi’ites; and a network of media outlets, including newspapers, radio and television stations, to propagate Hezbollah’s message and actions. See Nizar Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” Third World Quarterly 14, no. 2 (June 1993).
  12. Gary C. Gambill, “Syria and the Shebaa Farms Dispute,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, May 2001.
  13. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559, September 2, 2004.
  14. Daily Star (Beirut), January 29 and February 3, 2006.
  15. The demonstration of March 14 also took place in response to a demonstration on March 8 organized by Hezbollah to express thanks to and solidarity with Syria. Approximately half a million Lebanese participated in this earlier demonstration.
  16. See Serge Brammertz, Fourth Report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), June 10, 2006.
  17. Nasrallah’s speech was aired on the party’s television station, al-Manar, on September 22, 2006.
  18. A departure from the pattern established in February 2005 by Rafiq al-Hariri’s killing is exemplified by the car bomb assassination of the army’s chief of operations, Brigadier Francois Haj, in east Beirut in December 2007. The same month, Samir Shehadeh—the head of an intelligence unit closely involved in the UN-led investigation—was wounded by a roadside bomb south of Beirut. He was replaced by Wissam Eid, who himself was subsequently killed in January 2008.
  19. As cited in Al-Intiqad (Beirut), May 8, 2008.
  20. See, for example, As-Safir (Beirut), May 22, 2008.
  21. An adaptation of this section appeared in OpenDemocracy, May 21, 2008.
  22. See Qassem’s statement in NowLebanon, May 15, 2008, http://nowlebanon.com/Print.aspx?ID=43028.
  23. As cited in Al-Intiqad (Beirut), May 27, 2008.
  24. The consensus among key members of the March 14 forces is that U.S. strategy in the Middle East suffered a severe blow in the 2006 summer war. This line of thought is based on discussions by the author with supporters of and members of the March 14 forces, including an interview with a key member on June 4, 2008. This view was also broadcast by Nuhad al-Mashnuq in an interview with Marcel Ghanem on LBCI, June 5, 2008.
  25. A critic of Hezbollah, Ahmad al-Asa’d, son of former speaker of the house Kamil al-As’ad and chairman of the Lebanese Option Gathering, asserted that he could not win a parliamentary seat under the present electoral law even though he received a significant number of Shi’a votes in the recent elections. Interview with the author, Boca Raton, Florida, February 6, 2008.

Robert G. Rabil is director of graduate studies and an assistant professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. He is the author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) and Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East (Praeger, 2006). The author extends his deep gratitude to the Florida Society of Middle East Studies for its continuous support.