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Over the last few months, Israel and Syria—through Turkish mediation—have resumed some sort of peace talks. Despite the volume and frequency of these overtures at the moment, this round of “peacemaking” will not break precedent; meaningful progress is highly unlikely. Instead, it fits a pattern of previous such efforts—overtures which led nowhere or even ended in the opposite, namely escalation (as in 1995-1996 and 1998-1999). Neither the Israeli nor the Syrian government is currently positioned to enter real peace talks. But each, for its own reasons, has a great momentary interest in talking about talks with great vigor.

The drama began on the eve of the Arab summit in Damascus last April, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that he would take seriously any indications from Syria that it is interested in peace. It was a curious moment for such a declaration, coming as it did only a day or two after Vice President Dick Cheney had visited Israel, and at the moment the United States, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were vigorously trying to isolate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for sabotaging any movement toward the election of a new Lebanese president. Yet, in the days that followed, it became apparent that this was no shot out of the blue.

Israel’s motivations

Almost every Israeli government has sent such trial balloons to Damascus, so little is new this time around. In all previous cycles, Israel has offered Syria the return of the entire Golan Heights. As such, neither Olmert nor his current foreign minister and potential successor, Tzipora “Tzipi” Livni, is breaking with precedent in either seeking talks with Syria or outlining broad concessions in order to reach an agreement. That said, there are several theories being floated in Israel’s press and official circles—let alone in American analytical shops—that this time may be different, and that Syria now may truly be interested in peace.

First, the constant threat of another flare-up along Israel’s northern border—emphasized once again in recent weeks as tensions mount over Hezbollah’s deployment of more advanced anti-aircraft defenses—has placed pressure on the Israeli government to test the diplomatic waters. Many have noted that Israel cannot allow itself to be put in the same position as before the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Egypt had sent peace overtures which Israel ignored, leading to suspicions that the country’s second most deadly war could have been avoided. In order to dispel any future doubts, Israel must answer any peace overture from Damascus so that war can be avoided if the overture is genuine, or fought with moral confidence if it is not.

Second, there is a school of thought in Israel—of which Foreign Minister Livni appears to be a big proponent—which holds that the Syrian-Iranian relationship is increasingly strained as Iran becomes ever more overbearing, intrusive and destructive in its relations with Damascus, in effect placing President Assad in a position similar to the one in which Egyptian President Anwar Sadat found himself in 1972, when he realized his relationship with the Soviets was suffocating rather than nurturing. These Israelis see Iran’s non-Arab and Shi’ite essence, not to mention its Islamist aims, as dangerous to Assad’s grip on an Arab-Sunni Syria anchored to the secular Ba’athist party. As a result, they believe that Syria is ripe for a “Sadat-like” moment, in which Assad will bolt from the Iranian sphere just as Sadat bolted from the Soviet orbit. There are strong voices in the United States, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice herself, which appear to embrace such a view as well.

Indeed, some seem to think they see signs of just such a rupture emerging. As Tel Aviv’s Ha’aretz newspaper reported: “The announcement of the renewal of negotiations between Israel and Syria will have an immediate effect on Iran’s status in the region, senior Israeli sources say. The officials note that Iran has not yet responded publicly to the talks. ‘It seems the Iranians are in shock,’ one of them said.”1

These Israelis may be right, but so far Syria itself does not seem to think of these talks in terms of splitting with Iran. Nor does it hold out any hope of such a schism in the future. As Imad Mustafa, Damascus’ envoy in Washington, said in late May: “Raising the issue of Syria’s exceptional ties with Iran is an attempt to rock the boat and stir a commotion that suits the ideological mentality of the U.S. administration and the neoconservatives, as well as some of the Zionist Arabs who have turned Iran into their enemy and are on best terms with Israel, or are calling for such terms… Syria will not distance itself from Iran because our ties with Iran are… [linked] to deep historic, cultural, social, and religious ties, common interests.”2

Syria’s president himself doused any hopes of such a potential rupture with Tehran several months earlier. In a May interview with an Italian paper, when asked if as part of the treaty with Israel, Syria would answer Israel’s request that Damascus distance itself from Tehran and expel Hamas and Hezbollah, Assad responded: “It would be an absurd question, and [if asked] we would not be able to make peace. How would Israel react if we demanded that it rupture its relations with the United States?... In [so] far as Iran goes, the answer is still more dismissive. [Iran] is our old ally; there is no reason for turning our shoulders away from them.”3

Nor is Iran showing any sign of indigestion, let alone the “shock” those Israeli officials seem to observe over the issue. In fact, the same week as those Israeli officials were talking to Ha’aretz, Iran signed a new defense pact with Syria—one which included numerous cooperative ventures and even joint training of the Syrian and Iranian militaries.4 During the signing ceremony, Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, stressed that the “relations between Syria and Iran are strategic and based on firm principles” and “that all the attempts to harm the special relations between the two countries have failed.” Referring specifically to the negotiations between Syria and Israel, Najjar said: “Any decision Syria makes to regain the occupied Golan is a wise decision from our point of view because the restoration of the occupied Golan is a right for the Syrian people. Iran will support Syria in its effort to regain its occupied territory.”5 And a day or two before that, in a meeting with the top military advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, Syria’s defense minister, insisted that Iran and Syria were not splitting, and that “Tehran and Damascus share common views on regional issues.”6

This, however, is no deterrent for those in Jerusalem and in Washington who believe Syrian-Israeli peace is actually possible. For these observers, the inability to finalize a deal so far—despite the seemingly ripe conditions of the mid-1990s—is seen as a function of the heavy price Damascus will pay for any such agreement. Specifically, for Syria to extract itself from Iran’s orbit will involve great risks. Iran, which is intricately involved in propping up the Assad regime, will be able to use those same structures to bring it down. For this reason, Syria needs to receive the benefits of peace up front, while diminishing and delaying the costs. This means that Syria needs to publicly be able to say it will get the Golan Heights back, and have all the financial and security arrangements necessary to replace those provided by Iran in place, before it commits to peace.

The obstacle to this approach is that Israel negotiates like a Western country: it wants give-and-take (a quid pro quo) conducted according to the rules of reciprocity. Israel cannot commit itself to giving up the strategically important Golan Heights unless it gets a guarantee for a fundamentally different relationship with Syria in return. Thus, the “peace” train never leaves the station.

However, there are some—notably those in the Israeli opposition—who do not believe Olmert really is interested in peace. They attach to Olmert’s moves a purely political motive. This is an aspect worth contemplating even now that Olmert is about to relinquish his party and the premiership to either Foreign Minister Livni or Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz. Even before his current legal troubles (a bribery investigation involving New York billionaire Marvin Talansky), which drove him ultimately to resign, Israeli papers had been filled with stories that Olmert had been seeking to finalize an Israeli-Palestinian framework agreement before November 2008, following which he could call snap elections and finally shake off the political stigma surrounding his government’s questionable performance in the 2006 Lebanon war. As such, many in Israel’s opposition suspect that Olmert’s political considerations transcended the narrower danger to his personal stature emanating from the Talanasky scandal, and were anchored in the deeper problem the Kadima party as a whole faces in justifying its continued leadership after its lackluster performance in war and foreign policy for its last two-and-a-half years in office. These considerations will continue to plague Kadima after Olmert’s departure, and serve as a source of distinct pressure on his successor. Another consideration—and one that also will affect Olmert’s successor—is the danger of a hostile press, which tends strongly toward a pro-peace process position. Part of Olmert’s calculations (and perhaps those of Ariel Sharon before him) may have been to ingratiate himself with the pro-peace press, and thereby preempt their hostility by politically reinventing himself as a peace-seeking hawk. Over the past half year, these pressures translated into a Palestinian peace process, which became a matter not only for the political survival of Olmert, but of Kadima as a whole. A framework deal, no matter how rickety, offered a shot at political resurrection. Now that Olmert himself may be leaving the scene, the same calculus may affect the still-ruling Kadima party which he had headed.

And yet, the chances of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal have been receding. In April, Olmert himself admitted that it is unlikely that any such agreement would still be possible before President Bush leaves office. To salvage his position, these ungracious interpretations claim, Olmert turned to the Syrian track as a way of generating political momentum and keeping his ruling Kadima coalition afloat.

Ultimately, however, there may have been a difference between Olmert and his potential successor, Foreign Minister Livni. Olmert was likely making neither the sort of grand strategic move nor the purely cynical maneuver that either the “peace camp” or the opposition suspects. First, any grand initiative for peace would represent the sort of strategic imagination and boldness which Olmert has hitherto failed to demonstrate on other fronts. Moreover, there is an awareness in Jerusalem that the chances for peace between Syria and Israel are not as ripe as they appear. As Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz said in April, “The moment that the Golan Heights gets into the Syrians’ hands, it means Iran will be in the Golan Heights. Close your eyes and think about what kind of threat that is for Israel.”7 Given sentiments like these, a grand peace move, if genuine, would have until now potentially threatened to unravel a Kadima coalition as much as secure it. And Olmert could hardly be tempted to take a step which creates, or threatens to create, a bigger problem than the one he currently faced. As such, when he finally “gave up” and announced his intention to step down, his focus on the Syrian track faded. While some politicians would take a moment like that to act with strategic boldness, Olmert seems to have become less interested in a Syrian grand gesture.

But Foreign Minister Livni does seem interested in the Syrian track, and out of a grander concept. Her attention to the Syrian track seems to be picking up just as Olmert’s is fading, with reports emerging in the Israeli press before Olmert announced that he would step down that the Israeli government was deadlocked in a disagreement between Olmert and Livni. Immediately after Olmert announced his intention to resign, however, Livni came out publicly and suggested Israel would be willing to cede the strategically important Golan Heights to Syria in a peace deal—a sign during the campaign for leadership of the Kadima party (and the premiership) that she is staking her political future and identity around the effort to reach such a deal.

Syrian motivations

While Olmert may be motivated by local political concerns, and Livni by a debatable assumption of Syrian motivations, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is driven by more geostrategic ones. Simply put, Syria has had a bad run in the last year, and that bodes ill for a tyrant whose survival rests on an image of omnipotence. Syria now faces pressure along several fronts, in addition to the ones noted in Israel’s press, for which it would need to “change the subject” to buy a strategic respite and counteract international pressure. Syria came out of the 2006 Lebanon war with a newfound confidence (and belligerence), a strong suspicion that Israel as a regional force was spent, and even threats to take back the Golan Heights by force. But the two years since have not been good for Damascus.

In Iraq, the Sunni tribes through whom Syria worked to encourage the insurgency have aligned with the United States. As a result, Syria is in danger of having the Sunni entities on its border view Damascus and its alliance with Iran as a greater threat than the United States. Indeed, many of those tribes have a large presence in Syria and constitute a sizeable chunk of Syria’s majority Sunni population. In short, while until now, Iraq’s Sunnis saw Syria as their protector, they may start seeing Syria as an enemy, leaving Damascus sitting atop a political powder keg.

In Lebanon, Syria has also suffered setbacks. In the spring of 2007, pro-Syrian groups (the March 8 movement) launched an ongoing demonstration in Beirut with the aim of bringing down the pro-Western government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The ability of the movement’s leader, Michel Aoun, to mobilize Christian support was critical to the success of this offensive. But, despite high hopes in Iran and Syria, the demonstrations foundered because Aoun failed to deliver on his promises. Having failed to effectively split the Christian community, the March 8 movement was forced to embrace a more modest goal: to split the Sunni community and keep the Shi’ites unified in support of Hezbollah.

Then, a few months later, came the defeat of the Fatah al-Islam terror group by the Lebanese army, which exposed a weakness in Syria and its strategy from which Damascus has yet to recover. Syria and Iran had hoped to pit the Lebanese government against the Palestinians, and therein split Lebanon’s Sunni ranks by unleashing the al-Qaeda-like Fatah al-Islam group in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp. What stunned the Syrians, and set back their plans to shore up this important flank in preparation for wider confrontation, was that Lebanon’s Sunnis universally sided with Lebanon’s government against the Palestinians.

Then there is Syria’s (now defunct) nuclear program. In the aftermath of Israel’s September 2007 air strike, Syria has been left in a precarious situation. The disclosure of Damascus’ clandestine program has exposed Syria to a dangerous set of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and legally-binding actions by the UN Security Council that could ultimately leave it as beleaguered as Tehran, or even Saddam’s Iraq.

Syria’s woes are not solely external. A recent study8 by the U.S. government’s Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has noted telltale signs of critical failures in a number of Syria’s economic sectors of late. The first is the food industry. Between April 16 and 29 the Syrian government halted exports of key food items: semolina, lentils, beans, wheat, barley, and tomatoes. Just before that, the regime decided “to support the agricultural sector and encourage farmers to increase production.” It also took measures to ensure all produce “is sold to government marketing establishments,” suggesting Assad’s regime is worried about black market activity which wrests authority and power from the centralized regime.

Syria’s difficulties may also extend into the energy sector. As the OSC study recounts, even Syrian government publications admit the country’s current oil production has dropped significantly—from 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) in the 1990s to about 380,000 bpd today—and further declines are predicted by 2012. Further, since May, the Assad regime has reduced diesel subsidies and raised the price of unsubsidized diesel. And late last year, the regime admitted fuel subsidies in 2007 had “inflict[ed] a daily loss on the state of 750 million [SYP] (approximately 14 million U.S.D),” and that number was expected to increase in 2008 to “more than 60 percent of the state’s general budget” and 14 percent of the state’s GDP. In response, the government sought to soften the fuel price hike by raising the salaries of civil and military employees as well as the pensions of retired civilians and military veterans by 25 percent, and by guaranteeing “every family” 1,000 liters of subsidized fuel per year. But so far, it is not clear that these subsidies will do the trick. In early May, many private bakeries closed for two days because owners could not obtain subsidized diesel, leading to “unprecedented crowds” and long lines outside a number of state-owned bakeries. Even government-owned dailies felt the need to allow the publication of pictures of long bread lines near Damascus.

Syria’s transportation, construction and agricultural sectors—hit hard by the fuel cost increases—have also been affected. In May, the Al-Watan newspaper reported “chaos” in the transportation sector as rate increases did not accompany the price hikes, leading bus drivers to go on strike to protest. A few days later, contractors threatened to halt work on public projects as the hike caused production costs to rise by “100-200 percent.” And farmers in Al-Hasakah Governorate—Syria’s largest cotton producer—threatened to stop cultivation because costs had more than tripled.

The Open Source Center report concludes that since the spring, the Syrian government and media have evinced a fear that these “shortages and rising costs in the food and energy sectors are creating the potential for public unrest, despite the government’s attempts to reassure the public that its efforts to deal with the problems are effective. Recent protests over the government’s handling of the diesel fuel issue suggest that public discontent is likely to grow should the economic situation deteriorate further.”9

When in a bind, talk peace

As a result, Damascus—as it has each time earlier when it has lost strategic initiative or found itself in a precarious position—has floated the idea of peace with Israel. Assad’s expectation is that not only Israel, but the United States and Europe as well, will drop all other pressure on Damascus in order to test the promise of normalization. By the time Damascus’ intentions are exposed as dishonorable, and the moment when all other issues which had placed Syria on the defensive have passed, Damascus will have safely regained its strategic footing and moved onto the offensive again. In short, Damascus is periodically interested in talking about peace as a tactical diversion, while it strategically rehabilitates itself and tries again to digest Lebanon. But it is not interested in peace itself.

Genuine peace, after all, offers the Syrian regime little. First, breaking with Iran would imply a break with Hezbollah as well. For Syria to turn its strongest asset in Lebanon into a mortal enemy would be a strategic blow of unimaginable proportions for Damascus. Moreover, normalization with Israel would also tear from Syria its leadership role on the Palestinian issue. Without these allies, Syria would be in a difficult position to continue to assert itself as the guardian of Arab pride and defiance, which continue to be the cornerstones of its governing ideology and the justification behind its militarization and sacrifice.

Second, Syria is a minority regime ruling through terror. Such regimes cannot survive any crack in the façade of their brutality, since it is the only currency which keeps them afloat. Assad understands that the United States will eventually demand improvements in human rights and majority enfranchisement, both of which can threaten not only his regime but the survival of his broader Alawite community.

Third, Syrian ambitions, along with those of Iran, may have been frustrated in recent months in Iraq and to some extent in Lebanon. Overall, however, Damascus still sees Tehran’s star as rising, and that of Israel and the United States as falling. Indeed, Hezbollah’s moves in Lebanon in late May, including the occupation of Beirut, are a clear signal that Syria (and Iran) is going back on the offensive. Ultimately, Damascus still believes the United States lacks the will to persevere in the rough and tumble politics of the Middle East. As a result, Damascus would be hard-pressed to see the logic behind trading the Persian stallion for the lame Anglo-Saxon donkey.

Fourth, those who argue that Damascus is so dependent on Iran’s largesse and security apparatus for survival are correct. Indeed, it is so much so that it is inconceivable that Damascus would see any money or security assistance as capable, grand, or clever enough to counteract the deadly, massive and sophisticated Iranian structures which operate in Syria and have entrenched themselves over nearly three decades. It was one thing for Sadat to expel intrusive Slavs in 1972, but quite another for Syria to expel Iran’s agents of influence.

Fifth, Damascus is not as interested in the Golan Heights as it is in Lebanon. Bashar al-Assad labors under the burden of losing his father’s signal achievement—the successful takeover of Lebanon in 1975-1976. Trying to get the Golan back, which his father never did, is a distant second priority.

Ultimately, the Syrian regime cannot escape its fate as an Alawite government in a Sunni land. The moment it fails the Sunni majority, it delegitimizes its stewardship and puts its stability in peril. Any move to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist would trample on the key mechanism through which this regime (and the Alawite community upon which it is built) has justified itself among Sunnis since 1969: pan-Arab nationalism. In short, Syria’s pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric is an essential part of its legitimacy to rule over its Sunni majority. The regime cannot cede pan-Arab or Sunni “rights” in the name of the Sunnis and still expect to be considered legitimate, let alone to survive.

Structural impediments to peace

In short, Olmert and Livni may be right about understanding Assad’s humiliation, but way off the mark on what they believe moves Assad in response. Indeed, Assad evinced great confidence and a willingness for war before last fall. But that confidence was punctured by several setbacks, including the reassertion of Israel’s deterrence capability in September 2007. Assad’s humiliation induced caution—and perhaps even averted a war which seemed to be around the corner early last summer. Damascus was left wondering whether Olmert’s previous myopia had been replaced—along with Israel’s chief of staff and defense minister—by strategic clarity and determination. That, rather than any back-channel sign of Jerusalem’s benign intent, is what has convinced Damascus that it needs to tread carefully.

But Israel’s peace overtures would do more than simply help erode the isolation Assad now feels. They would be read by Damascus as weakness, and would convince Assad of Israel’s reversion to mediocrity. The result would be Syria’s reinvigorated effort to defy and escalate, rather than retreat quietly, as Israeli leaders seem to hope.

Indeed, Syria is acting consistently with previous rounds. Its peace feelers today, as in the mid-1990s, are tactical diversions designed to restore to Damascus the initiative it has lost in recent months to pursue its strategic aims. And that, more than anything else, would explain why Tehran is signaling that “it is not worried by the talk about the resumption of talks between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights.”10

 

Footnotes

1. Yossi Verter, “Olmert: Not Sure How Long I’ll Be PM, But Won’t Give Up Peace Talks,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), May, 23, 2008.
2. Imad Mustafa, Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), May 21, 2008.
3. Gianni Perrelli, “Bashar al-Assad: Vi Offro La Pace,” Espresso (Rome), May 8, 2008.
4. IRNA (Tehran), May 27, 2008.
5. SANA (Damascus), May 28, 2008.
6. Ibid.
7. Eli Lake, “Israeli Leader Warns Against Golan Giveaway,” New York Sun, April 29, 2008.
8. “Analysis: Syrian Officials, Media Reflect Economic Woes, Potential Unrest,” OSC Analysis, May 15, 2008.
9. Ibid.
10. “Iran Has No Objection to Syria-Israel Talks for Golan Return,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), April 29, 2008.

 

David Wurmser is the founder of the Delphi Global Analysis Group, which does political risk analysis and research for the financial community. Before founding Delphi, Dr. Wurmser was senior advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, focusing primarily on Middle East and proliferation issues. Before that, he was a senior advisor to Under Secretary of State John Bolton. From 1996-2001, Dr. Wurmser headed the Middle East Studies program at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.