THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

Number 14, Spring 2008

The New Europe

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Manuscripts should be sent to: 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 515, Washington, D.C. 20036. The Editor will consider all manuscripts received, but will assume no responsibility regarding them and will return only materials accompanied by appropriate postage. Facsimile submissions will not be accepted.

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Printed in the United States of America.

Editor's Note: The opinions expressed in *The Journal of International Security Affairs* (ISSN 1532-4060) are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JINSA.

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From the Publisher

The media leads the way. The people follow, and the politicians echo. That is the order of things today.

There used to be a time when the media prided itself on how objective and honest it was. It did not always succeed, but it at least seemed to try. Back then the slogan of the much-vaunted *New York Times* was "All the News That's Fit to Print." Today, that motto has become "All the News That We Choose to Print." The *Times* is willing to select, place and formulate news language in a way unimaginable just 20 years ago. The goal is to persuade rather than to report.

Even the news industry's conservative standard bearer, Fox News, is no longer what it used to be. It is not fair and balanced, just *relatively* so. It is an alternative to CNN and MSNBC, just like the *New York Sun* emerged as a necessary alternative to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Times* was a response to the *Washington Post*.

But the tragedy is that these are our main—and frequently our only—sources of information. The power of the media is so great that it can bring down or protect administrations. It can elect Presidents, Senators and Congressmen. Spare me your editorial endorsement; that is chump change compared to the support of those who put together the front page.

The media can determine foreign policy, and it can help to win or lose wars. It can bring about a recession, or it can bolster confidence in the economy.

In short, we live in a dictatorship of the media. It controls what we know, what we think, and what we buy. It is not Big Brother we have to fear so much as it is Citizen Kane. And if we are to be really free, we must lift the veil that blinds us.

With this in mind, please enjoy this copy of *The Journal*. We hope that, in some small way, it helps to lift that veil.

Tom Neumann
Publisher

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

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

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Editor's Corner

Europe, it has long been said, is America's most important and enduring international partner. There is much to lend credence to this argument. After all, the political, cultural and military bonds between the United States and its allies across the Atlantic have persisted for centuries, reinforced by economic cooperation and strengthened by periods of shared conflict.

Today, however, those bonds are changing dramatically. Political divisions and demographic pressures on the Old Continent, transatlantic discord over the Iraq war, and diverging views of new international security threats have all impacted the relationship between Europe and America, and not for the better. All of which has led some, like conservative columnist Mark Steyn, to conclude that—when it comes to the War on Terror and other 21st century challenges—America is well and truly alone.

It is more than fitting, therefore, that we turn our attention to the political and strategic changes taking place in Europe, and their implications for the United States. Our coverage kicks off with a feature article by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, who outlines the scope of the common struggle against radical Islam. From there, the Center for Security Policy's Alex Alexiev provides a comprehensive—and chilling—analysis of the demographic decline taking place on the Old Continent, and the concomitant rise of a radical, unassimilated Muslim political class there.

In her contribution, Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation explores the new threat to the historic Special Relationship between the United States and England: an increasingly assertive Europe. Astrid Coeurderoy of the European Foundation for Democracy, meanwhile, charts the rise of a new, more activist foreign policy in France. Georgetown University's Ulf Gartzke does the same for Germany, outlining how German Chancellor Angela Merkel has reversed her predecessor's populist, anti-American line.

For his part, Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explores the changing policies—and international postures—of the countries of "New Europe." Two European experts, Borut Grgic and Alexandros Petersen of Slovenia's Institute for Strategic Studies, contribute their recommendations for a new strategy for the continent's energy security. The Heritage Foundation's Peter Brookes demystifies the contours of the current debate taking place over European missile defense. And Victor Mizin of the Russian Academy of Sciences outlines the rationale behind Moscow's recent nuclear resurgence—and what it means for Washington. Our treatment is rounded out by a debate between two esteemed experts—Jamie Shea of NATO and the American Foreign Policy Council's E. Wayne Merry—over the continued relevance of the Atlantic Alliance in the 21st century.

With this issue, we are also pleased to introduce a new regular feature—one in which we solicit the "Perspective" of leading statesmen and policy experts on a range of contemporary national security and foreign policy topics. Our first interviewee is an auspicious one indeed: former Deputy National Security Advisor J. D. Crouch II, one of the principal architects of American missile defense policy. This edition of *The Journal* also features a trio of "Dispatches" from foreign experts from India, England and Iraq, as well as reviews of important works on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and Middle Eastern politics.

All in all, this issue of *The Journal*—like previous ones—offers a wealth of new critical thinking on some of the most important issues of the day. Thank you, as always, for taking part in the debate.

Ilan Berman
Editor

The Battle for Our Common Future

Michael Chertoff

Over the past year, the American public has been treated to a chorus of critics and skeptics who have downplayed the seriousness of the threats we face in the post-September 11th world. Former government officials like Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski have accused the Bush administration of hyping the War on Terror in order to promote a culture of fear. Others deny that we are at war at all.

But based upon the words and deeds of the terrorists themselves, we are very much at war. In 1998, Osama bin Laden made an open declaration of war that ended with the command "to kill the Americans and their allies—civilian and military, in any country where it is possible to do it." In the decade that has followed, bin Laden and his cohorts have done precisely that, plotting against the entire global system of security, safety and prosperity.

Their efforts belie the scope of the current struggle. We are at war with an ideology that is every bit as fanatical and ruthless as that of fascism or communism. Spread by a sinister network of cult-like entities that spans the world, this fanatical worldview sanctifies the torture and slaughter of innocents; it denies the dignity and humanity of its opponents; and it includes among those it targets mainstream Muslims who dare to reject its pseudo-religious message of intolerance and bigotry. From New York to London, from Madrid to Jerusalem, from Baghdad to Bali, this barbarous ideology has torn through nations, carving a bloody trail of death and destruction, leaving orphans and widows in its wake on nearly every continent.

The Honorable Michael Chertoff is the U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security. This article is adapted from Secretary Chertoff's October 17, 2007, address before Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, the site of Winston Churchill's famous 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech.

These extremists have proven themselves quite capable of waging the war that they have declared. They have been helped in part by 21st century technology, which has provided even small groups with enormous capability for destruction and damage. Radicals affiliated with al-Qaeda or the Taliban or other similar extremist groups—from North Africa to Iraq and South Asia—are fighting for, and sometimes achieving, control of territory that they use to train, assemble advanced weaponry, and perform experiments to develop ever deadlier ways of killing their enemies, and over which they impose their own vision of repressive law and seek to dominate local life.

We are fighting a battle not only of armaments, but of ideas. And therein lies our greatest strength.

And finally, through atrocities like the 9/11 bombings, the radicals have demonstrated that they are quite capable of visiting consequences upon us every bit commensurate with war. Their goal is clear; what our enemies want is "a dialogue with bullets and the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction." These, of course, are not my words; they are from an al-Qaeda training manual.

The nature of our enemies and the ideological threat that we face brings to mind Winston Churchill's famous dictum, uttered in 1946 in reference to a different threat, the Soviet Union, but equally applicable here: "There is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness."

Simply put, this is how ideological fanatics view the world. Whether it is Adolf Hitler or Josef Stalin, Osama bin Laden or President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, for every fanatic, weakness is provocation. That is why we must never fool ourselves into thinking that submissiveness is a path to peace.

The United States has heeded this counsel. Following 9/11, President Bush took decisive action, striking back against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, deploying our intelligence assets across the globe, capturing or killing terrorists on nearly every continent, and partnering with our allies on shared intelligence against this common menace. Without such steps, the United States would have doubtless faced other, equally devastating attacks over the past six years.

But there is another element in this struggle that is as important as strength: resolve. In his day, Ronald Reagan counseled that the United States should be "[n]ot warlike, not bellicose, not expansionist—but firm and principled in resisting those who would devour territory and put the soul in bondage."

Today, we can heed this advice by preventing our foes from attaining two monumental goals that they seek to achieve.

The first is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, chief among them nuclear weapons. Simply put, we cannot allow such a capability ever to pass into the hands of a global network of terror. For bin Laden and his fellow travelers are at war not just with America or the West, but with the values and principles, the habits and institutions of modern civilization. These extremist ideologues aim to destroy the modern world by unleashing the tools of modern technology in the service

of a violent, medieval ideology. Make no mistake: unlike rational foes that we have faced in the past, including the Nazis and the Soviet communists, this enemy, if it ever obtains a modern nuclear weapon, has every intention of using it.

The second goal of our ideological foes is to gain possession and control of nation-states. Just like the Nazis before they seized power in Germany or the Marxists before they took over in Russia, our enemies are seeking countries to conquer because they desire platforms from which they can launch other kinds of attacks. As we know, al-Qaeda ran Afghanistan through its surrogate, the Taliban, and that malignant alliance is part of what made 9/11 possible. Today, Islamic radicals seek to recreate such a safe haven in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Somalia and elsewhere. And that is why we must continue to work to ensure that they never acquire those platforms.

We are fighting a battle not only of armaments, but of ideas. And therein lies our greatest strength. Our enemies are animated by a fanatical ideology in which prejudice is lionized instead of condemned, and solving disputes through bombings is viewed as the preferred path to achieving consensus. We, on the other hand, believe in the power of reason, the great legacy bequeathed to us by our intellectual ancestors, including the forefathers of this country. In contrast to our enemies, many of them believed that when we look at the world through reason, we're not betraying faith in the Almighty, but are obeying a divine call to pursue knowledge and truth wherever they lead.

Through the liberation and exercise of reason, humanity has achieved more in the last three centuries than in all of its history. We have birthed modern science, we have conquered ancient diseases, we have freed people from poverty and starvation, we have triggered the information age, and we have made the world a better and brighter place.

We are heirs to the age of reason, locked in a struggle for hearts and minds over this very matter, a struggle whose outcome might well determine the fate of our civilization and this globe. We dare not walk away from this battle, and we cannot allow fanatics to drag parts of the world into a dark age of ignorance and fear, degradation and servitude, disrespect for women, and prejudice and contempt for those with whom there is disagreement.

We are not in a battle against religion, because as we have seen in the lives of some of the greatest men and women of our age, there is no necessary conflict between reason and faith. But we are indeed in a fight for our future, and it is this fight to which we must dedicate ourselves. It is not a struggle that will resolve itself easily. Like any other great ideological conflict, it will require perseverance, attentiveness, and faith in our own values. It also demands that we never allow wishful thinking or complacency to overcome the kind of clear-eyed, tough-minded approach embodied by leaders such as Churchill and Reagan. So let us stand firm in defense of our society, our civilization, and our humanity. And may we see the triumph of reason and freedom in the hearts and minds of the people of every nation, everywhere.

BETWEEN A CAUSE AND AN OUTCOME, THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT WORD: HOW.

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Stumbling Toward Eurabia

Alex Alexiev

In the summer of 2004, in an interview little noticed outside the country, the prominent academic scholar of Islam Bassam Tibi predicted a future for Germany that many decried as provocative nonsense at the time.[1] In ten years, Tibi said, Germany will be the scene of large running battles between police and gangs of marginalized Muslim youth, bringing cities like Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt to the brink of chaos. This will be the inevitable result, according to him, of a trend that is already visible. Muslims are not interested in integration. They are, in fact, obligated not to integrate by the radical Islamic ideology dominant in their communities, and live increasingly segregated in parallel societies. The main difference between 2004 and 2014, Tibi believed, would be that the highly marginalized Muslim population would have more than doubled to 10 million, *sharia* would have been gradually introduced in Germany and the Islam preached there would be even more radical and resemble Nazi totalitarianism.

Today, more than three and a half years later, a new study of attitudes among young Muslims by the German interior ministry would seem to confirm Tibi's fears. According to the survey, 44 percent of respondents have fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, 50 percent believe that "Muslims who die in the armed struggle for the faith (Jihad) go to paradise," and one in four is ready to engage in violence against non-Muslims.[2]

Alex Alexiev is vice president for research at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., where he focuses on Islamic extremism. He has over thirty years of analytical experience in the national security field with the Rand Corporation, Radio Free Europe, the Hoover Institution and the Hudson Institute.

Nor is such troubling evidence unique to Germany. At about the time the German study was being released, the Bishop of Rochester, Michael Nazir-Ali, spoke of the existence of Muslim no-go zones in Britain, described as areas dominated by radical Islamic ideology where people of different faiths reportedly face physical attacks. This phenomenon has been likened by Tory shadow Home Secretary David Davis to "voluntary apartheid" by Muslims, "shutting themselves in closed society, demanding immunity from criticism."[3] And just a month earlier, in the Paris suburb of Villiers-le-Bel, young Muslim rioters for the first time used firearms and Molotov cocktails to battle police in what was described by some in the media as an "urban guerilla war."[4]

Are these troubling developments part of an inexorable slide toward the Islamization of Europe that will make Tibi's dire predictions reality? Or are they, as many have argued, the predictable result of the long-term socio-economic neglect, racism and discrimination against Europe's Muslims that could be easily fixed with the proper policies? The answer to this question is of existential importance for the future of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and, indeed, Western civilization itself.

The demographics of twilight

The crisis now engulfing Europe is euphemistically referred to in scholarly papers as the "second demographic transition." What this innocuous term conceals is a phenomenon unprecedented in human history, namely the implicit refusal of large societies in times of peace to produce babies in numbers sufficient to guarantee their long-term survival.

While this trend seems to characterize the entire developed industrial world to one extent or another, it is especially pronounced in Europe, where it has become a continent-wide phenomenon.[5] Stated simply, European birth rates (known as "total fertility rate," or TFR) have collapsed to approximately 1.5 children per woman in 1995 from nearly twice that rate three decades earlier.[6] What this means, in practical terms, is that a sustained fertility rate of 1.5 in a society leads to the yearly loss of one-half percent of its population.[7] The cataclysmic long-term repercussions of such a development in Europe may be too far in the future to worry us here, but there are immediate and medium-term consequences to this phenomenon that should be of grave concern.

With a fertility rate of just under 1.5 percent for the past ten years, and no realistic prospect of any improvement in the foreseeable future, Europe has an annual deficit of over two million births to reach replacement levels. To the extent that the continent's population is increasing at all, it is mostly on account of legal and illegal immigration. As the smaller post-baby boom cohorts reach childbearing age, this deficit will widen still further, contracting the native European population by anywhere between 100 and 150 million—or a quarter to a third of today's EU-25 450 million—by mid-century.[8] This historically unprecedented population implosion will shrink Europe's share of the world population to barely four percent in 2050 from 12 percent in 1950.

Unfortunately, the dire implications of this trend will not wait until mid-century to manifest themselves, but will start wreaking havoc with Europe's socio-economic prospects in

the immediate future. This is because, long before significant depopulation begins to take place, low fertility ushers in a pervasive ageing process that ultimately renders the expensive but unfunded pay-as-you-go welfare systems of modern western societies unsustainable. Demographers refer to this key dependency as the "potential support ratio" (PSR), usually expressed in the ratio of individuals of working age (15-64) to the number of people of retirement age (65 and over) in a given society.[9] A more accurate measure is the actual number of working individuals available to support each retired or disabled individual through their taxes.

Until the late decades of the 20th century, these ratios were traditionally very high even in western societies, where the average age of the population remained under 30. But this is changing dramatically. By 2010, the number of elders (65 and over) in France and most other EU countries will outnumber people aged 0 to 14—a development that has never happened before in recorded history. By 2015, the 60-and-over cohort will represent more than a quarter of the population, and a decade or so later it will become twice as large as the group aged 0 to 24.[10] It is beyond question that with a projected nominal PSR of between 1.5 and 2 in 2030 and even earlier none of the EU countries would be able to sustain levels of prosperity anywhere near the ones they enjoy today unless their welfare systems are drastically reformed or dismantled.

Other less obvious but no less serious economic consequences of this trend will also begin affecting growth and prosperity in short order. Rapidly shrinking and ageing populations inevitably lead to decreasing demand for everything except healthcare and government services. Ageing societies thus place inordinate burdens on the public purse, while limiting consumption in the marketplace and negatively affecting the cost of labor, productivity, international competitiveness, innovation and foreign and domestic investment. Ultimately, if and when such societies are perceived as moribund, as they inevitably will be, one can expect massive out-migration of capital, companies and skilled individuals to more attractive locales. It is unlikely that this process will run its course without major political upheavals, because the logic of ageing welfare societies requires ever greater transfers of wealth from the depleted younger and poorer cohorts to the more affluent and electorally powerful "geezer" generations.

> In the past half century or so the Muslim population in Western Europe has exploded from less than a quarter million in the early 1950s to between 15 and 20 million today. And it is a rapidly growing population that has also become progressively radicalized.

There are, of course, a number of options Europeans have for mitigating negative demographic trends before the population implosion begins in earnest around 2020. All, however, involve considerable pain and attitudinal change that could doom them politically. To keep the potential support ratio from declining, Europeans could, for instance, raise the *de facto* retirement age from the current 58 years to 65 or 66, and/or increase the percentage

of the working population in the EU from its current level of 62 percent to the one prevailing, for instance, in Denmark (75 percent). That alone would add 32 million people to the workforce.[11] More drastic still (and therefore even less likely) would be deep cuts in welfare and pension benefits and the privatization of pay-as-you-go pension plans.

Apart from these short-term palliatives, there are only two possible long-term solutions that could theoretically prevent the dire consequences of the demographic crisis discussed above from becoming a reality—increasing the birth rate and immigration. And neither one is a likely panacea.

On the first point, there is a near-unanimity among demographers that raising European birth rates to the replacement value of 2.1 children per woman is virtually impossible in the short to medium term (10-20 years), and problematic even in the longer term. Moreover, even if replacement levels were to be achieved 30 years or more in the future, most of the negative demographic and socio-economic developments projected for 2050 will have taken place regardless.

This leaves immigration, and here again the picture is troubling. The official policy of virtually all EU governments is to discourage immigration from outside the EU except for highly skilled professionals and a few other categories, such as family reunification and political asylum. Despite these restrictions, significant legal and illegal immigration, estimated at over two million per annum, does take place and is the main reason Europe's population has not yet started declining. Unfortunately, it has not contributed to the amelioration of the continent's demographic and economic crises; rather, it is actually making things worse.

The problem with current immigration into the EU is very simply the fact that much of it places additional burdens on the social welfare system rather than contributing to its improvement. This is the case, as will be explained in greater detail below, because most of the new arrivals enter Europe either as part of the "migration chain," i.e., family reunification, "mail-order spouses," etc., or as illegal aliens. The vast majority in both categories lack job and linguistic skills and do not join the tax-paying labor force in any significant numbers, but rather work in the underground economy or enlist in the welfare rolls.

While studies have shown clearly that present immigrant populations to the EU from poor countries impose a net cost on their host societies, there is growing evidence that failed immigration and integration policies may present an even bigger political challenge. The most serious issue here by far is the extensive and ongoing radicalization of the burgeoning Muslim populations throughout the European Union.

The Muslim population explosion

Establishing even the basic facts about Europe's Muslim populations is often an arduous task because most European governments, with the notable exception of Britain, seemingly as a matter of principle, avoid collecting or publishing most relevant data of an ethnic or religious character. Nonetheless, using a variety of sources, it is possible to establish credible approximations of both the absolute numbers and fertility rates of Europe's Muslims.

What is beyond dispute is that in the past half a century or so the Muslim population in Western Europe has exploded from less than a quarter million in the early 1950s to between 15 and 20 million today. While that still represents only four to five percent of the EU-15 (370 million) population or three to four percent of the EU-25 (450 million), it is a rapidly growing population that has also become progressively radicalized.

Most EU governments have avoided openly debating this issue, except for rhetorical flourishes about the need to integrate the Muslim minority, and have focused instead on its implications for terrorism. Demographers and other experts, on the other hand, have conjured up the "Islamization" of Europe in the long term or, conversely, the possibility that Muslim birth rates will fall in line with the native ones over time and bring about a stable balance. Relatively little attention has been paid to the likelihood that the burgeoning Muslim communities, if radicalized and unintegrated, could have a dramatic impact on political stability in Western Europe long before "Islamization" takes place.

To understand the potential for such an outcome, it is important to first come to terms with some of the essential characteristics of the demographic momentum and the nature of the ongoing radicalization process of European Muslims.

Perhaps the first thing that needs to be pointed out is that discussions of whether or not Muslims will become the majority of the population in Europe by the end of the 21st century are largely academic. However, the possibility that radicalized Muslims who reject the European secular democratic order could become a dominant demographic factor among key age cohorts in 20 years or so is of huge political consequence. And despite the lack of definitive data, there are compelling reasons to believe that this could indeed happen.

As already mentioned, most European governments provide statistics on neither Muslim fertility rates nor total populations. Nonetheless, available data, however incomplete, shows beyond much doubt that 1) Muslims are dramatically younger as a group, 2) have fertility rates that are two or even three times higher than those of native Europeans, and 3) are growing fast on account of legal and illegal immigration.

Official British statistics from the 2001 UK census show, for instance, that 34 percent of the estimated Muslim population of 1.6 million was under 16 years of age, compared to approximately 20 percent of Christians, and over 70 percent of the former were under 34 years old, as compared to 40 percent of the latter. Less than five percent of Muslims were aged 65 and over, compared to 20 percent for Christians.[12] Overall, in 2001 survey, the average age for Muslims in the United Kingdom was under 27 years, while that of the white population was 38 (and projected to be 40 by 2007).[13] The same or worse ratio is likely to obtain in most of the other large EU members, such as Germany, Italy and Spain, all of which have lower birthrates than Britain.

The youthful and more fecund Muslim population, coupled with a tradition of getting married young, accounts for dramatically higher growth rates.[14] Though actual TFR numbers are not published, it is a fair assumption that they are high, probably between 2.5 and 3. This could be deduced both from the available

growth numbers for Muslims in some British towns and by the size of the average Muslim household, which was reported to be 4.9 in 1991.[15] Very similar fertility rates are reported in France, where according to figures for 1999 provided by the French statistical agency, INSEE, the main Muslim national groups had birth rates as follows: Algerians—2.57, Moroccans—2.97, Tunisians—2.90, and Turks—3.21.[16]

Overall, the probable European Muslim TFR of between 2.5 and 3.0 will result in a natural increase of the Muslim population of approximately 1.5 to 2 percent per annum. This corresponds to between 225,000 and 300,000 if the lower figure of 15 million is used, and between 300,000 and 400,000 if the higher 20 million figure is applied. This compares to the EU average TFR of 1.5, which, as mentioned, leads to a loss of two and a quarter million people per year throughout the continent.

The Old Continent is no longer just a transit point for terrorists; it has itself become a breeding ground for all manner of Islamic extremists and jihadists.

The second factor contributing to non-native population increase in Europe has traditionally been legal immigration. There have been two waves of post-World War II large-scale Muslim influx into Europe: "post-colonial" and "guest worker" immigration. The first involved the former citizens of the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, etc., who qualified for immigration. This is how large numbers of people from Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Algeria, Indonesia and elsewhere settled in Europe in the aftermath of decolonization. Then, as European economies recovered from war devastation, millions of "guest workers" were recruited as cheap labor for the booming economies of Western Europe in the 1950s and beyond. These two waves of immigration set the stage for today's large Muslim diaspora communities.

Large-scale legal immigration was essentially terminated in most of Western Europe after the 1973 oil embargo and the resulting economic crisis, but it was replaced over time by a different form of legal immigration which is much more difficult to control and which has been widely used and abused by Muslims to gain entry into Europe.

Demographers have coined a special term for this phenomenon: "chain migration." It was first instituted in most Western European countries as a humanitarian family reunification measure for the mostly single immigrants of the initial waves. In the meantime, as immigration for economic reasons has fallen off drastically, chain migration has become the most important method of gaining legal entry into the EU. The most commonly used approach is arranged or forced marriages, where European-born individuals are married off to partners back in the home country. Not only is the new bride/bridegroom allowed to join his/her spouse in Europe, but very often the entire family follows shortly, resulting in multiple new immigrants.

And, with the exception of Hindus and Sikhs, the vast majority of arranged marriages are practiced by Muslims. One German source estimates, for instance, that up to 80 percent of Muslim girls in a Hamburg Turkish community enter into

enforced marriage,[17] while in the United Kingdom 67 percent of girls between the age of 16 and 34 are reported to have their marriages arranged by their parents. Overall, various studies have shown that a clear majority of new immigrants from outside of Europe now arrive through family reunification. In the United Kingdom, which accounts for some 10 percent of the total EU Muslim population, for example, there were close to 50,000 new arrivals via spousal migration in 2001, most of whom were Muslims.[18] Muslim chain migration in all of the EU thus could be as high as half a million per annum, a figure that exceeds the natural population increase.

Arranged or forced marriages have yet another important effect in that they act as a major barrier to assimilation in European society. As political philosopher Francis Fukuyama has argued, and as the American immigration experience confirms, rates of marriage outside of one's group "correlate strongly with both assimilation and upward mobility."[19] By controlling and limiting their children's marriage choices, Muslim parents in Europe effectively undermine their chances for integration and economic betterment, at a significant cost to society.

The final quasi-legal immigration category that contributes significantly to the growth of EU's Muslim populations is political asylum. Granting political asylum to individuals persecuted in their native lands for the political views they hold is, of course, a noble and time-honored tradition in civilized nations. Unfortunately, European societies have allowed the right to asylum to be widely abused by millions that have no legitimate claim to it and use it simply as another convenient way of getting in.

Finally, the Muslim populations in Europe are augmented by large-scale illegal immigration, which may be the most important quantitative factor presently. Exact figures are not available, but various sources allow a credible estimate of both the overall number of illegal immigrants residing in Europe and the yearly flows. There is, for example, considerable evidence that the unauthorized immigrant population in southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece) alone exceeds the three million mark. Italy, France and Portugal have at least another million and a half immigrants between them. Northern Europe with Germany, Great Britain and a few others with significant Muslim populations almost certainly host another three million or so. And, given the very large size of this illegal immigrant contingent, it is reasonable to conclude that the half a million new arrivals per year estimated by EU authorities is unrealistically low. Rather, judging by the number of illegals apprehended by border controls in various European countries, the actual influx is at least twice as large.

Unlike political asylum, which is mostly a Muslim affair, illegal immigration to Europe attracts people from every corner of the world, from China to Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, after the drying up of Eastern Europe as a major source of undocumented immigrants to the EU in the past few years, Muslims now make up a clear majority of the yearly influx of over a million.

All in all, natural increase, chain migration, asylum seekers and illegal immigration put together easily contribute over a million to the growth of the EU Muslim population every year, and that is probably a very conservative estimate. The Muslim

population is thus set to increase by at least 50 percent every decade, and will likely double from its current level by 2020—and double again by 2035. By that year (and possibly earlier), the majority of young people in most large European urban centers will be Muslims.

Major demographic shifts are, of course, nothing new in history. Nor is the replacement of one dominant culture with another on account of a new demographic balance necessarily a cause for concern *per se*. Unless, of course, that new culture is dominated by the hateful, obscurantist and inherently violent Islamist creed that does not intend to coexist peacefully with others.

Radical Islam resurgent

As with any complex sociopolitical phenomenon, the radicalization of European Muslims has been the result of a combination of political, economic and social factors and policies. The stage was probably first set by the stubborn, if totally unrealistic, belief of European governments that the millions of Muslim "guest workers" they imported as cheap labor were indeed guests, and were sooner or later going to go home voluntarily. Thus, for many years, no European government entertained the possibility of long-term settlement for the immigrants, nor took even elementary acculturation and assimilation measures.

That neglect, coupled with European xenophobia and latent racism, restricted the immigrants' housing options to dilapidated industrial areas or public housing in large cities and preordained the emergence of Muslim ghettoes. The ghettoization of the Muslim immigrants and their progressive isolation from mainstream European society received another major impetus from the multi-cultural dogmas that became the order of the day in Western Europe in the 1980s and beyond. The "temporary" guest workers were thus encouraged to maintain their separate ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities and organize separate sports and cultural institutions, and even alternative labor union and political organizations.

No government policy, however, has had a greater and more negative effect on those immigrants than the "social market" policies that became the norm in the EU. As the post-1973 oil crisis put an official end to the "economic miracle" post-war era in Europe, the welfare state policies began to impose ever greater burdens on the economy in terms of government intervention, rising payroll taxes and minimum wages and rigid labor laws designed to protect highly paid and pampered skilled and unionized workers and punish the young and unskilled by making them unemployable. At the same time, generous welfare checks, housing benefits, child subsidies and free health care made it economically more attractive for many to do nothing rather than do minimum wage jobs. Inevitably, this state of affairs bred resentment, alienation and lawlessness. And as it did, those with a distinct non-European culture, like the Muslims, progressively decoupled physically and emotionally from the larger society around them. It is in these alienated Muslim enclaves throughout Europe that radical Islam found fertile soil for its siren call.

This process of encapsulation, which began in earnest with the second generation of Muslim immigrants in the 1970s, coincided with the coming of age of radical Islam in the Middle East and South Asia. The next three decades saw the massive

infiltration of radical Islamic influence into Europe, spurred by an influx of foreign radicals from groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and massive amounts of Saudi money.[20] This alliance facilitated the takeover of British Muslim organizations, and helped erect a huge network of Wahhabi-controlled institutions, including over 1,500 mosques, 150 Islamic Centers, 202 Muslim colleges and 2,000 Islamic schools.[21] As a result, there is hardly a city of any size in the West that does not have a Saudi-controlled institution preaching extremism and spewing hatred against Western civilization and, directly or indirectly, advocating its destruction. And in Europe's increasingly isolated, impoverished and discontented Muslims, the Wahhabi message has increasingly found resonance. The end result is by now painfully clear: a pervasive radicalization of European Muslims is taking place throughout Western Europe.

The immediate repercussions of this troubling phenomenon are already visible. The Old Continent is no longer just a transit point for terrorists; it has itself become a breeding ground for all manner of Islamic extremists and jihadists. With hundreds of European-born and -raised extremists documented to have already taken part in terrorist activities in all the hotbeds of jihadism worldwide, this is and should be a matter of serious concern. But the more profound challenge posed by the quasi-totalitarian Islamist ideology now on the march within the EU is to Europe itself. For, if the kind of radical, uncompromising and violence-prone worldview currently on display in Muslim ghettoes remains dominant among European Muslims as they become a majority of the Continent's young, urban population, it is difficult to see how Europe can remain a modern democratic and secular polity.

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Is the Special Relationship Still Special?

Sally McNamara

America has found its strongest, most enduring alliance in its Special Relationship with Great Britain. This relationship has been defined by consistent and recurring cooperation, systematic engagement, and enduring bilateral relations that emerged from common values and obvious interests. Mutual recognition of the value of democratic government, the rule of law, individual rights, and the market economy are combined with a single historical and cultural experience until 1776, continued cultural intermingling since then, and a common language. America and Britain, in other words, have a relationship of both "blood and philosophy."[1]

However, there is now a third party in this marriage: Brussels. As scholar Douglas Johnson has noted: "The United States, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union (EU) form a triangular relationship that simultaneously conditions and threatens the U.S.-UK relationship, as the UK must participate in European affairs."[2] How Britain navigates the Special Relationship while at the same time dealing with this increasingly assertive supranational body will have massive geopolitical consequences in the years ahead.

The ties that bind

Over the years, the Special Relationship has faced repeated challenges, and always emerged unscathed. On occasion, each country has put its national

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interest above that of the other. But these instances have not fundamentally threatened the relationship. In their day, for example, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan notably disagreed over the U.S. invasion of Grenada, but still went on to cooperate fully in fighting—and eventually winning—the Cold War.

In fact, the Thatcher-Reagan era demonstrates some of the most enduring features of the Special Relationship. Thatcher's ability to be both a steadfast partner and cautionary critic of the United States was not simply a demonstration of her mastery of statecraft; it was a testament to the strength of the alliance itself. Shared beliefs do not prevent quarrels, even among allies. More often than not, however, they yield the right result for both sides. Critics saw Reagan's eventual support for the British liberation of the Falkland Islands as a departure from America's long-held Monroe Doctrine. But Reagan came to see that supporting Britain's claim had greater merit and value than did supporting the existential, geographical pull of Argentina.

Today, the passivity that marked the Special Relationship in the post-Cold War era has given way to a period of frenetic cooperation between the United States and United Kingdom in the War on Terror. The recurring pattern is of each finding the other a necessary, indispensable ally in times of need, regardless of left-right orientation or prevailing political conditions.

Ultimately, the Special Relationship is so special because the shared values and common interests that bind the two countries reach far beyond the philosophical utopia of European Union (EU) elites dreaming of a European superstate. The common political, diplomatic, historical, and cultural values shared between Americans and Britons actually mean something. What's more, Britain and America are actually prepared to defend these values—with military force if necessary. Common values mean something only if both parties are ready to defend them. It is significant that Winston Churchill coined the term "Special Relationship" in 1946, after Britain and America had spilled horrendous amounts of blood and expended copious treasure in an unwavering defense of their shared values during the Second World War.

The underlying traditions and history of cooperation between Britain and America essentially negate any short-term threat to this enduring alliance. Indeed, while it was the French who proclaimed "Nous sommes tous Américains" in the wake of 9/11, it is Anglo-American political, cultural, military, and diplomatic solidarity that has outlasted this initial show of strength from America's Continental friends.

Three's a crowd

Today, however, the Special Relationship faces a new challenge. The EU's relentless supranational drive has demanded a surrender of British national sovereignty in areas such as trade, the economy, and even defense.

The institutional and political constraints demanded by further European integration will severely limit Britain's ability to make foreign policy, especially in international alliance-making. In political, diplomatic, and financial terms, no good has come from limiting Britain's geopolitical outlook to the European continent, and certainly no benefit can be derived from deeper EU absorption that limits Britain's historical and proven links with the United States.

But doing just that is very much on the minds of European officials. Large

parts of the EU policy agenda—such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)—are designed precisely as counterweights to American "hyperpower."[3] Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the perceived need for another power to counterbalance the United States has consistently motivated advocates of European integration.

The 2006-7 investigation by the European Parliament into America's rendition policy demonstrates the frequently anti-American direction of EU policymaking.[4] The EU believes that supranational institutions like itself and the United Nations should be the sole arbiters of the use of force and should determine the rules of engagement for both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. This thinking was further displayed by the EU in the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, with powerful European nations, including France and Germany, actively seeking to obstruct American foreign policy. EU accession countries were even threatened with delays to their membership for supporting the war.[5] It was a clear—and ominous—signal: Europe had issued a direct challenge to a sovereign foreign policy decision of the United States in an effort to contain American power.

Underlying this stance is a fundamentally different global outlook: one that views "multilateralism as the best means to solve global problems."[6] The EU believes that diplomacy trumps all other foreign policy tools in addressing international threats, and sees economic sanctions and military operations as "a last resort."[7] Brussels is likewise an enthusiastic proponent of the International Criminal Court, global abolition of the death penalty, the Kyoto Protocol and various international treaties which are inimical to U.S. interests. Under the recently-signed European Reform Treaty this phenomenon will get worse. Just as the EU has become an increasingly confrontational trade actor unafraid to square off against Washington, Europe will become more aggressive in the foreign policy arena.

In this regard, it is vital the U.S. recognize the value of its pre-existing bilateral partnerships. It is equally vital that the United States heed the warning signs about how far the EU actually is prepared to go in its effort to centralize foreign policymaking. In its desire to create 'One Europe,' the European Security and Defense Policy has already created duplicate security structures to NATO and threatens traditional alliance-building by the United States. Under such conditions, as Henry Kissinger notes, American interests will inevitably, even if unintentionally, lose out:

> When the United States deals with the nations of Europe individually, it has the possibility of consulting at many levels and to have its view heard well before a decision is taken. In dealing with the European Union, by contrast, the United States is excluded from the decision-making process and interacts only after the event, with spokesmen for decisions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States has not participated at any level… Growing estrangement between America and Europe is thus being institutionally fostered.[8]

Neither Britain nor America should view deeper EU absorption as preferable to Britain's historic and proven links with the United States. The EU's foreign policy agenda, led by the CFSP and an independent

defense identity, is clearly designed to serve as a counterweight to American global leadership. Britain, for its part, should no longer risk its enduring alliance with the United States to pander to anti-American sentiment in Europe. Or, as Sir Winston Churchill so simply put it: "Never be separated from the Americans."[9]

The Special Relationship is so special because the shared values and common interests that bind the two countries reach far beyond the philosophical utopia of European Union (EU) elites dreaming of a European superstate.

Popularity and principle

Another major challenge to the Special Relationship is posed by rising levels of anti-American sentiment in Britain. Favorable opinion toward the United States has dropped from 83 percent in 1999-2000 to just 56 percent in 2006.[10] The British press regularly ridiculed Tony Blair as President George W. Bush's poodle, and Blair's successor and Her Majesty's opposition have both jumped on the America-averse bandwagon. The Conservative Party even went as far as calling for Britain to adopt a less "slavish" relationship with America.[11]

Worryingly, anti-Americanism is just as widespread among the British public as the political classes. In a June 2006 YouGov Poll, just 22 percent of respondents thought current American policy was helping to make the world a better place, while 65 percent said U.S. policy was making it worse. And a whopping 74 percent of those surveyed thought American actions were contributing to greater instability in the Middle East.[12] A 2007 poll reveals similar sentiments, with incredible hostility toward American actions on the world stage. An overwhelming majority of Britons disapproved of American policy toward Iraq (82 percent), its treatment of detainees at Guantánamo and other prisons (76 percent), as well as other issues, such as its approach to global warming (79 percent).[13]

Such hostility has been perpetuated by a distinct public relations deficit. Neither Blair nor Bush properly made the case for the fruits of the Special Relationship, which has in fact operated to mutual advantage in this new era of transnational terrorism. Undoubtedly, the plots to detonate liquid explosives on up to 10 transatlantic flights in summer 2006 were foiled only because of key transatlantic intelligence exchange and cooperation. As Prime Minister Blair said at the time, "There has been an enormous amount of cooperation with the U.S. authorities which has been of great value and underlines the threat we face and our determination to counter it."[14]

No incident more ably illustrates the depth and breadth of the Special Relationship in comparison to the illusory EU alliance than the 2007 Iranian seizure of 15 Royal Navy personnel. While Britain's European neighbors scurried to protect their sizeable investments with Tehran and refused to specify any retaliatory measures in support of a fellow EU member, the United States gave Britain an unequivocal demonstration of its support, conducting its largest naval exercise in the Gulf since 2003.[15] Through its deployment of aircraft and warships, America effectively gave Britain a security guarantee that it would stand shoulder-to-shoulder at any cost during this major international incident.

Both sides need to make the case for the Special Relationship much more aggressively, demonstrating the effectiveness and substantial value of the close British-American cooperation. Both sides could learn from the golden days of Thatcher-Reagan, as well as those of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, each of whom regarded the other as an indispensable partner and all of whom made cooperation a politically viable policy.

The muscle behind the alliance

A close and unwavering military relationship goes to the heart of why U.S.-UK ties are so special. In his seminal post-war "Sinews of Peace" speech, Winston Churchill said that interoperable capabilities, personnel exchanges, and doctrinal commonality were the linchpins of the Special Relationship.[16]

But these ties are clearly under threat from the European Union's integrationist ambitions. Commentator Christopher Booker argues that the integration of British military arrangements into the European Union represents a fundamental threat to the current status quo between Washington and London:

> The nature of this new military relationship with her European partners will make it increasingly hard for the UK either to fight independently or to cooperate militarily with the U.S. That "special relationship" which has been the cornerstone of British defense policy from the time of the Second World War up to the recent U.S.-British coalition in Iraq will be at an end.[17]

British academic Richard North maintains that the "secret" realignment of the UK's procurement policy demonstrates the gulf opening up between the UK and the United States.[18] North notes that two competing and incompatible high-tech warfare systems are being developed by America and Europe, and points out Britain's systematic realignment toward the latter. Procurement is abstract, technical, and politically nontoxic, rarely making the front pages, but this does not mean that a wider political agenda is not at work. "For those who would seek to see a European army replace NATO," British Shadow Defense Secretary Liam Fox has observed, "defence procurement offers the perfect means of undermining the Special Relationship by stealth."[19]

The EU understands Churchill's thesis very well. The European Security and Defense College, established in 2005 for the exchange of key military personnel among EU member states, will be critical to fostering shared camaraderie and doctrinal understanding of the EU's approach to security and defense policy in the longer term. The development of personal and professional relationships between British and American military personnel has sustained the Special Relationship for many years, just as America's International Military Education and Training Program has been a successful tool of U.S. defense policy more generally.

The EU's relentless supranational drive has demanded a surrender of British national sovereignty in areas such as trade, the economy, and even defense.

With stretched defense budgets and the enormous costs associated with modern high-tech weaponry,

defense expenditures must take on a more global character. As the technological revolution rolls on, the interoperability of defense systems will likely become not just desirable, but essential to joint military efforts. In this respect, jointly funded, interoperable projects which arbitrarily exclude non-EU countries do not make sense. In the age of digital warfare, procurement decisions are absolutely critical, but the EU has made them as political as they are strategic. With Europe's dual desire to create a stronger defense industrial base and to advance an alternate warfare system, the procurement agenda has become skewed against sensible military budgeting and toward the EU's narrow agenda.

As EU military planners aggressively pursue an integrationist agenda, the Special Relationship will undoubtedly suffer as British independence as a military power (and buyer) is constrained. If Britain continues to relinquish the most critical elements of sovereign statehood to Brussels—the right to military action and autonomous foreign policymaking—the British government will become little more than a local authority, either unable or unwilling to partner with the U.S. on military missions, even when they clearly serve Britain's national interest.

Neither Britain nor America should view deeper EU absorption as preferable to Britain's historic and proven links with the United States.

The economic case for the Partnership

It should not be underestimated how heavily the UK is invested in the United States and vice versa. The U.S. is Britain's top destination for overseas investment. The UK is equally America's biggest trading partner in services, and the top destination for its foreign direct investment. In fact, over the past decade, the UK has accounted for around a third of America's entire overseas investments in the EU.

However, the power of Brussels to interfere in this strong relationship should not be taken too lightly. As the largest trading partner of the EU as a whole, the United States is greatly affected by the regulations being churned out by Brussels. Further centralization of power in Brussels presents the U.S. with long-term challenges in its economic relationship with Europe.

Firstly, European elites continue to dogmatically defend the European social model against global competition. For example, in February 2007 a group of nine EU member states issued an open declaration calling for stronger social, environmental, and work protections, which will only serve to further sap economic growth.[20] As America's biggest trading partner, the EU's failure to enact free-market reforms and to reach agreement on wide-ranging socialist provisions such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights will automatically have a negative effect on the U.S. economy.

Secondly, the EU is acting as the world's greatest regulator. Research from Open Europe recently found the EU's current body of law—the *acquis communautaire*—to be a staggering 170,000 pages long, over 100,000 of which have been produced just in the last 10 years.[21] Günther Verheugen, European Commission Vice-President for Industry and Enterprise, estimates that the cost of regulation in the EU amounts to €600 billion, or

about 5.5 percent of total EU GDP, contrasting with published estimates from the European Commission stating the trade benefits of the Single Market to be just €165 billion.[22] The EU has a profound inability to undertake serious economic reform despite numerous pledges to do so. Nor is there any indication that it has a desire to do so. Indeed, the EU is now taking its growth-sapping formula global. According to the *International Herald Tribune*, it is now the EU that determines the antitrust regime for big American companies.[23]

The EU's control of member states' trade policies also places limits on the freedom of economically like-minded countries to the U.S., such as Britain, to fashion trade policies more consistent with their bilateral interests. Britain generates 16 percent of EU-27 GDP,[24] and is one of just three EU countries whose working-age population is set to increase in the next half century.[25] Britain's export markets inside the EU are shrinking while its export markets outside the EU, including that of the U.S., are growing.[26] With its entrepreneurial Anglo-Saxon economic model, strong Commonwealth ties, English language and powerhouse financial capital, Britain is increasingly damaged by Brussels' excessive regulations and statist model.

Still special after all these years

"We are with Europe, but not of it," Winston Churchill famously remarked in 1953. "We are linked but not comprised. We are associated but not absorbed. And should European statesmen address us and say, 'Shall we speak for thee?', we should reply, 'Nay Sir, for we dwell among our own people.'"[27]

If Britain continues to relinquish the most critical elements of sovereign statehood to Brussels—the right to military action and autonomous foreign policymaking—the British government will become little more than a local authority, either unable or unwilling to partner with the U.S. on military missions, even when they clearly serve Britain's national interest.

The Special Relationship demonstrates that common interests can overcome past enmities and occasional conflict. Britain and America have stood shoulder to shoulder in the hardest of times and continue to enjoy the fruits of a solid relationship. As my colleague at the Heritage Foundation, Nile Gardiner, has stated, "The U.S.-British alliance continues to operate as a strikingly successful partnership of two great nations built on the solid foundations of a common heritage, culture, and vision."[28]

This history suggests grounds for optimism for the future, in spite of today's considerable anti-American feeling in Britain. The anti-Americanism of the 1980s gave way to the British- and American-led victory in the Cold War. The passivity of the 1990s gave way to a post-9/11 period of enormous diplomatic and military unity. Hostility and indifference are temporary. The common interests and values that drive the Special Relationship have proven enduring time and again. And, whatever the ups and downs, that is not likely to change.

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Turning the Page

Astrid Coeurderoy

Since the second half of the 20th century, an independent, U.S.-distant approach has driven French foreign policy. Under this "Gaullist line," France has long aimed to position itself as the middleman in European and international politics.

Today, however, a new wind is now blowing on the Élysée. In his now famous August 27th speech, new French President Nicolas Sarkozy affirmed that French foreign policy "will be guided by French values and will above all protect French national interests." But it has quickly become clear that Sarkozy envisions a more activist approach to a host of international issues—from European Union affairs to Franco-American affairs—than his predecessor.

Administrations, they say, are defined as much by their supporting characters as they are by their lead actor, and the Sarkozy government is no different. President Sarkozy has made clear that he sees a higher international profile for Paris—one involving a key role on most major international issues. It is not coincidental, therefore, that he has appointed as his chief diplomat Bernard Kouchner, a man with a reputation of getting the job done. A former volunteer doctor and founder of Médecins Sans Frontières, Kouchner is a human rights pioneer, and a champion of the policy of humanitarian intervention.

Sarkozy's selection of Kouchner for the post of Foreign Minister is emblematic of the changes under way in French foreign policy. France has embarked upon a new diplomatic line—one which, as Kouchner himself described to *The*

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Economist, "is more than a change of style." This new French *realpolitik* is not simply a change in diplomatic tone; the substance of French foreign policy is changing. After forty years of officially sanctioned pro-Arabism, anti-American sentiment and the Gaullist desire to act as a balancer between Moscow and Washington, Paris is now focused on strengthening its relationship with the United States.

A brand new day

Such changes are already afoot. Unlike his predecessor, Sarkozy clearly plans to achieve his political objectives while strengthening his country's partnership with the United States. Since taking office, he has begun taking stronger positions on issues that are key priorities for the United States: Iran, the fight against terrorism, the confrontation between Islam and the West, Russia, and China.

This change in attitude was evident during Sarkozy's November 2007 trip to Washington. During his address to the U.S. Congress on that occasion, Sarkozy declared that:

> …the U.S. are [sic] one of the rare countries in the world with whom we did not fight…. Americans came to help us twice and we ourselves helped them a long time ago. We share the same values, we are neighbors from the Atlantic side, and they are the first economic, military and monetary power…

Mr. Sarkozy reassured Congress that such improved relations will lead to much closer cooperation on a host of international issues, including Iran's nuclear program, the Middle East peace process and Lebanon. And there are certainly reasons for optimism on that score. Despite his domestic environment, which is generally hostile towards America, there can be little doubt that Sarkozy is pursuing a more conciliatory and strategically compatible foreign policy line on a number of fronts.

The Middle East

Like his predecessor, President Sarkozy has signaled his intention to maintain strong diplomatic and economic ties with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, however, he has demonstrated a commitment to improving and strengthening relations with Israel, a country which was clearly maligned and neglected during former President Chirac's openly pro-Arab tenure. He plans to do so by stepping up France's role as an "honest broker" in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, supporting the creation of a Palestinian state while simultaneously safeguarding Israel's security. At the same time, Sarkozy has been careful not to weaken France's historic standing in the Middle East, as indicated by his January 2008 visit to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha.

In Sarkozy's view, a *status quo* in the region would only strengthen Hamas and other regional radicals, including Hezbollah. Accordingly, Lebanon and Syria are also major focal points of French foreign policy. France, a long-standing friend of Lebanon, is a strong advocate of its full freedom, independence and sovereignty as envisioned in UN Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701. And France has been playing an active role in the dialogue among Lebanese political forces during that country's contentious selection of a new president. Syria's continued interference in this process through intimidation and the actions of its terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, have led to growing frustration on the part of

senior French officials, resulting in the suspension of diplomatic relations between Damascus and Paris.

Then there is Iran. Breaking with Chirac's conciliatory approach to the Islamic Republic, Sarkozy has adopted an unequivocally strong stance. With the backing of Foreign Minister Kouchner, he has made clear that the emergence of a nuclear Iran is unacceptable to France. And while there have been no further public elaborations of how France intends to tackle the current international impasse over Iran's nuclear ambitions, Paris has traditionally never hesitated to pursue hard-line policies when the country's national security interests were at stake. To be sure, this scenario is complicated by France's commercial interests in Iran, and it remains to be seen how the balance between economics and national security will be struck. Overall, however, it is clear that the French and U.S. positions on Iran are converging; France has become significantly more assertive in its calls for sanctions (while also leaving open the option for negotiations should Iran choose to comply with its international obligations).

As for the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, France is now unquestionably playing a more constructive role. On Iraq, while it has not changed its overall position critical of the rationale and justification for the war, the French government is now advocating a policy that would help isolate extremist groups, launch a process of national reconciliation and devise a plan for the withdrawal of foreign troops. In Afghanistan, meanwhile, France has committed more than 2,000 ground, naval and air support troops to stability operations in the former Taliban stronghold. And this number is poised to increase, with additional deployments specifically tasked with training the Afghan army.

Russia and Eurasia

The French government, like most others in the West, is currently following the worsening domestic situation and rising authoritarianism in Russia with significant concern. During his state visit to Russia last October, President Sarkozy made a point of signaling his worries on that score, meeting with representatives of human rights organizations and pro-democracy activists.

As concerns Russia's neighbors, French diplomacy is already distancing itself from former President Chirac's era, during which commercial interests and security of energy supply trumped the promotion of democratic reforms and respect for the rule of law. That policy had led to tolerance for Russia's plans to maintain a belt of limited-sovereignty countries on its border. France's new, more principled stance became clear when, similar to other NATO countries, it tacitly accepted the Bush administration's plans for a missile defense deployment in Europe—an effort regarded by Russia as an unacceptable interference in its geopolitical sphere of influence.

Asia

Although France's foreign policy priorities are by and large "Euro-Atlantic," rising powers such as China and India are also receiving significant attention. President Sarkozy's visit to China last November was an indication that, in spite of his lack of familiarity with Asia, he understands the strategic importance of the region.

With China, the challenge will be how to reconcile France's long-

standing commercial and economic interests in the PRC with Beijing's systematic violation of fundamental human rights and the absence of basic democratic institutions there. During his state visit, President Sarkozy was all smiles and diplomatic niceties. But at some point, France—like other democratic countries—will need to draw a line between commercial and national security interests and continuing to support authoritarian regimes by doing business with them.

Human rights and Africa

Given its long-running relationship with the continent, it is no surprise that Africa remains an essential priority of French foreign policy. As Paris sees it, African development can be achieved through a balance of economic prosperity and security. The current genocide taking place in Darfur—as well as many other crisis areas in the region—represents a major obstacle to such development. In the case of Darfur, France has adopted an assertive diplomatic approach designed to mobilize the United Nations out of its current, stalled position. The recent UN Security Council authorization of the creation of a hybrid UN/African Union security force was a significant achievement for France, and one that Paris hopes will spur other European countries to adopt a more activist role in this and other crises. As the foregoing makes clear, President Sarkozy seems keen to restore a moral dimension to French diplomacy.

Islam and the West

President Sarkozy's priorities include the promotion of an open-minded and tolerant interpretation of Islam, both within France's Muslim communities and countries in the Muslim world themselves. As part of this vision, he has introduced the concept of a future "Mediterranean Union," which would bring together the European Union (particularly its southern members) and Middle Eastern and North African countries. The plan would be to establish a union among the members based on four pillars: 1) environment and sustainable development; 2) intercultural dialogue; 3) economic growth and social development; and 4) security of the Mediterranean region (including the fight against terrorism).

For now, this partnership is only theoretical. It is not at all clear how Sarkozy's envisioned Mediterranean Union would work in practice, and how it could work in parallel with existing EU initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy. But Sarkozy seems to believe that such a "union" could play a role in heading off a potential confrontation between Islam and the West.

Reactions from European capitals (as well as Mediterranean countries themselves) have so far been generally skeptical. The reality is that this initiative is seen very much as an alternative to Turkey's membership in the EU and a way of controlling illegal immigration from Northern Africa. After all, President Sarkozy has been quite explicit in his belief that "we must see Europe's relations with Turkey through this Mediterranean Union" and his contention that "if Europe wants to have an identity it must have borders and, therefore, limits."

Europe

None of the above is to suggest that Sarkozy is not as invested in Europe as his predecessors. France, a founding member of the European

Union, was and remains a staunch supporter of the "European idea." Paris is invested in maintaining its influence over key European policy decisions and debates, such as those over the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), agriculture and transport. In view of its upcoming six-month term of office as President of the European Union, France is going through a process of internal consultations aimed at developing the vision for Europe's way forward. Although the adoption of the revised EU Constitutional Treaty last December was largely a success resulting from close Franco-German cooperation, it is very likely that it will contribute to France's popularity during its Presidency of the European Union later this year.

And France has a clear vision for Europe's future. On security and defense, President Sarkozy is a vocal advocate of Europe's military independence, and of the need for Europe to assume responsibility for its own security. Together with immigration, security and defense policies will be among the priorities of the French presidency of the EU later this year. Sarkozy's stance is very different from that of Jacques Chirac, who viewed European defense as a means of rivaling NATO and countering American power. Sarkozy, by contrast, is keen to prove to the United States that Europe will remain an ally even if it becomes militarily stronger and more independent. This approach is pragmatic; the reality is that it will take Europe a very long time (if ever) to become militarily independent from the United States, and to develop its own "European" foreign and defense policies.

Moving forward

In the few months since his election to the French presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy has already distinguished himself. Like all of his predecessors, Sarkozy wants France to become stronger at home and gain greater influence abroad. But the presidential rhetoric has changed: in his speeches, Sarkozy does not mention *grandeur* or *gloire*, both staples of the Chirac-era discourse. Instead, he uses "less ambitious" terms such as France's influence and role.

President Sarkozy is certainly a political risk-taker, and so far his gambles are paying off. As of this writing, just over 100 days since he took office, Sarkozy has managed to persuade the European Union to adopt a "simplified treaty," given a diplomatic push to peacekeeping efforts in Darfur, floated the idea of a "Mediterranean Union," helped to free Bulgarian nurses on death row in Libya, and issued a stern warning to Iran. And the French people are taking notice. According to a recent survey by French pollster TNS Sofres, 71 percent of French citizens think Sarkozy's first 100 days have been positive, and three out of four approve of his view of France's place in the world.

The message is unmistakable: France is back. Under Sarkozy's direction, France is moving beyond the Chirac era and beginning to be taken seriously again on the international scene. To be sure, great challenges lie ahead. But, at least for the moment, France's new head of state appears to be up to the task.

Berlin's Best Hope

Ulf Gartzke

Since taking office in November 2005, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has racked up an impressive foreign policy record. First and foremost, Merkel moved quickly to repair transatlantic relations with Washington, which had been badly damaged over the Iraq war under former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's Red-Green government. While European politicians on the Left have repeatedly resorted to anti-American rhetoric as a crucial element of successful election campaigns, Germany's conservative CDU/CSU parties firmly believe that strong political and security ties with the United States are an indispensable pillar of German foreign policy. And after Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac essentially turned 10 Downing Street and the Élysée Palace into lame-duck residencies, Chancellor Merkel's early effort to reach out to Washington paid off, with her emerging as President Bush's most important partner in Europe.

Second, Merkel decided to recalibrate Berlin's approach vis-à-vis Paris. In sharp contrast to her populist predecessor, who had essentially outsourced German foreign policy to the French in the run-up to the Iraq war, Merkel made it clear from the outset that she would not be taken for a ride by Chirac and company. The same still applies, in principle, to current hyperactive French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose constant attempts to steal the political limelight from his German counterpart have caused marital strains in the much vaunted *"couple franco-allemand."*

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Third, Merkel adopted a tougher line toward Russia, not shying away from criticizing Moscow's aggressive foreign policies and its nasty crackdown on political rights and press freedoms at home. In spite of Germany's growing energy dependence on Russia, Merkel dared to pursue a principled, values-based foreign policy, thus breaking with the far-too-chummy "men's friendship" that had developed between Gerhard Schroeder and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Fourth, Chancellor Merkel's international leadership role was further bolstered by the fact that Germany held both the EU and G-8 presidencies in 2007. During her six-month stint at the EU helm, Merkel paved the way for the new "Reform Treaty" to replace the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty, pushed through binding post-Kyoto CO_2 reduction targets for the 27-nation bloc, and even managed to stay cool in the face of harsh anti-German/anti-EU attacks by her ultra-conservative populist neighbors in Poland.

Up until now, these foreign policy accomplishments have offset a rather lackluster domestic performance (complete with a derivative economic policy and growing opposition to her handling of internal affairs from the SPD). For better or for worse, Merkel has been dubbed Germany's "globe-trotting chancellor." But this state of affairs is beginning to change. Germany's next general elections—to be held by the fall of 2009—are looming large on the political horizon. Since the fall of 2007, German politics in general, and within Merkel's "grand coalition" in particular, has become noticeably more polarized. Fundamental differences between the CDU/CSU and the SPD have sharpened, and not only over domestic issues. Increasingly, it is clear that the two political factions have radically different visions for Germany's foreign policy.

More robust on Russia (and China)

Political differences between the CDU/CSU and the SPD over how to best deal with President Putin's Russia are nothing new. Back in 2002-2003, German conservatives were already highly critical of then-Chancellor Schroeder's alignment with Paris and Moscow in opposition to the Iraq war. Subsequent attempts by Schroeder to form a "strategic partnership" with Moscow were greeted with suspicion by the CDU/CSU, which viewed the initiative as a dangerous departure from Berlin's long-standing Atlanticist posture. Schroeder's glossing over of the Russian government's crackdown on political rights and press freedoms is also well documented. At one point, he even famously referred to the Russian leader and former KGB spy as a "flawless democrat."

Shortly before losing the early general elections he called in 2005, Chancellor Schroeder signed a landmark energy deal with President Putin to build the 750-mile Nord Stream offshore gas pipeline stretching from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea. Scheduled to become operational in 2012, the pipeline will transport Russian gas directly to Western Europe, thus bypassing countries such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland, with whom Moscow has had serious energy conflicts in recent years. The Polish government in particular was outraged at the fact that neither Putin nor Schroeder had consulted Warsaw before signing the pipeline deal. Today, Germany already imports more than 40 percent

of its natural gas from Russia, a share that is bound to rise even higher in the coming years. Finally, Schroeder's decision to become chairman of the Russian-controlled Nord Stream consortium after leaving office came under a great deal of criticism at home and abroad since it was widely viewed as an unprecedented, inappropriate blurring of state and private affairs.

Upon taking office, Chancellor Merkel engineered a clear departure from her predecessor's unabashedly pro-Moscow policies. As a gesture of goodwill, she made a point of inviting Poland to connect to the Nord Stream pipeline (although the offer was unfortunately rejected by the populist Kaczynski administration in Warsaw). Merkel also adopted a tougher line vis-à-vis Moscow and decided to speak out against deteriorating political conditions within Russia, as well as the continuing atrocities being committed by the Kremlin's proxies in Chechnya. During her official visits to Russia, Merkel made sure to meet with prominent human rights NGOs and dissidents in an effort to send a clear signal to Putin that she, unlike Schroeder, was not willing to look the other way when it seemed convenient and opportunistic. And in early December 2007, Merkel, in striking contrast to French President Sarkozy, pointedly refused to congratulate Vladimir Putin on his party's crushing "success" in the Russian parliamentary elections. The message was clear: in Berlin's view, the elections in Russia had failed to live up to proper European standards.

This confrontational approach towards Russia is certainly not without its critics. At the SPD party convention in late October 2007, foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier—who previously served as Chancellor Schroeder's chief of staff and was a key player in confronting the Bush administration over Iraq—sharply criticized Merkel's Russia policy, charging that she seemed "to always look fearfully at how newspaper headlines back home" would view her relationship with President Putin. Merkel, of course, knows quite well that a principled, values-based foreign policy is supported by large segments of the German population, especially young people, women, and the well-educated. These are all crucial demographics that traditionally lean heavily towards the SPD/Greens and who could potentially swing the next elections in favor of Merkel's conservative CDU/CSU parties.

> Increasingly, it is clear that the CDU/CSU and the SPD have radically different visions for Germany's foreign policy.

In essence, the main thrust of the SPD's criticism of Merkel's Russia policy has been that she publicly provokes and antagonizes one of Germany's most important political, economic, and energy partners in the pursuit of short-term domestic political gain—namely, by holding Moscow to naïve and unrealistically high Western democratic and human rights standards. In the process, the argument goes, Merkel also directly threatens Germany's energy interests precisely when Germany most needs reliable external suppliers.

Merkel's Asia policy, in particular with regard to China, has opened up another major foreign policy fault line within the governing "grand coalition." Unlike her predecessors, Gerhard Schroeder and (to a lesser extent) Helmut Kohl, Merkel does not view China exclusively through

the narrow prism of business, trade, and economic opportunity. To be sure, German global players such as Volkswagen, Daimler AG, and Siemens have been very successful in China for many years, and continue to heavily expand their manufacturing and market presence there. At the same time, though, Merkel is arguably the first German chancellor who recognizes the growing economic, political, and even military challenges posed by the PRC.

Political relations between Berlin and Beijing suffered a major blow on September 23, 2007, when Merkel became the first German chancellor ever to meet with the Dalai Lama. The Chinese government was particularly outraged by the fact that Merkel received the exiled Tibetan leader at her official Berlin residence. The message was unmistakable: while reaffirming her government's continued commitment to the "One China" policy, the German Chancellor was not willing to sacrifice her own political beliefs and principles on the altar of close political and economic ties with a rising China.

Just one month later, a strategy paper on Asia prepared by the CDU/CSU Bundestag group offered new insights into the conservatives' big-picture thinking about the world's most populous and most dynamic region. According to Dr. Heinrich Kreft, a senior CDU/CSU foreign policy advisor who helped shape key elements of the document, Germany's Asia policy had been too narrowly focused on China and its economic potential for far too long. By emphasizing the importance of strong bilateral ties with other key democratic countries in the region—including India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—the new Asia strategy argues, in essence, that Berlin and the EU should opt for a much broader and more values-based foreign policy approach that takes full account of Asia's growing political and economic weight on the global stage. The Merkel government thus, in the words of the CDU/CSU paper, views China as both "a strategic challenge and an opportunity for Germany and Europe." It clearly recognizes that the astonishing economic success of China's authoritarian regime increasingly poses a new ideological challenge to the West's paradigm of liberal democracy and free markets. By strengthening Germany and Europe's political and economic ties with Western-oriented democracies in Asia, the CDU/CSU parties want to avoid the possibility that a rising, authoritarian China becomes the kind of powerful model that other countries in the region and beyond feel tempted to follow.

Back home, this approach to Asia is very popular. Meanwhile, parts of the SPD, as well as some opposition politicians, have raised a chorus of objections to this "Americanophile foreign policy," which they blame for "serious power-politic[s] conflicts between Russia/China, and Germany." Instead, they advocate a more nuanced geopolitical positioning of Germany. This strategy is partly motivated by traditional anti-American left-wing reflexes. It is also, however, an attempt to prepare for the time when America's "unipolar moment" comes to an end.

Flashpoint: Afghanistan

In October and November 2007, respectively, the German parliament voted overwhelmingly to extend the Bundeswehr's ISAF and OEF mandates in Afghanistan for another year. While more than three-quarters of all MPs backed the continuing

deployment of up to 3,500 troops and several Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, they did so despite the fact that the Afghanistan operation is increasingly seen as a lost-cause mission with little moral legitimacy. In fact, public opinion in Germany, like in Canada, has turned firmly against the ISAF/OEF missions, with recent surveys indicating that two-thirds of all Germans favor an immediate military withdrawal.

For Chancellor Merkel and her conservative CDU/CSU allies, the Bundeswehr's bloody, seemingly open-ended Afghan engagement is a potential political time bomb—one with the power to blow up ahead of the next federal elections in 2009. The domestic debate triggered by NATO's January 2008 request to deploy several hundred additional German infantry troops as part of the Alliance's Quick Response Force (QRF) in northern Afghanistan is further proof that Afghanistan represents arguably Merkel's biggest foreign policy vulnerability. The SPD and the Greens are already stocking up on election campaign ammunition, arguing that the QRF mission there backed by the CDU/CSU is a "combat mission" of a completely "new quality."

So far, only the post-Communist Left Party has called for the Bundeswehr's pullout. But many left-wing MPs from the governing SPD party, and even some CDU/CSU legislators, under strong pressure from their local constituents, are openly critical of the Afghanistan mission. The Greens are divided, with some MPs voting for the ISAF extension. Meanwhile, the free-market FDP party, the CDU/CSU's putative future coalition partner, is also increasingly skeptical of the Afghanistan mission.

Given this highly charged domestic political context, demands from abroad that German troops leave the "safe" parts of northern Afghanistan to support terrorist-hunting operations in the South are misplaced. They play directly into the hands of those who want a complete German military pullout. If Germany's continued military presence in Afghanistan were to be perceived as the product of American pressure, the public case for sustaining the German mission there would fall victim to left-wing demagogues waiting to play the potent card of latent anti-Americanism. There already exists a widespread perception in Germany that the Bundeswehr's Afghan deployment is, above all, part of President Bush's "global war on terror," a.k.a. the neocon crusade.

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How can the Afghanistan conundrum be solved? There are essentially two options. The first one—politically tempting but strategically dangerous—would be for the governments concerned to cave in to public pressures and pull out of Afghanistan. In the short term, such a move, supported by large segments of public opinion in Germany, Canada, and elsewhere, would defuse a situation that could potentially contribute to electoral defeat at the hands of disgruntled voters who no longer believe in the moral legitimacy and military necessity of the Afghanistan intervention.

The risk of this course of action is that Afghanistan will once again become a failed state, a haven for international terrorists and drug lords, with potentially devastating consequences for international security.

The second option is to go on the offensive and try to convince public opinion at home that the military mission in Afghanistan is a cause worth fighting for. Germany, for instance, only narrowly escaped disaster in September 2007 when a group of Islamic terrorists (including two German converts), who had been trained at al-Qaeda camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border, were arrested before they could set off massive car bombs at the Frankfurt airport on the sixth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. But making the case for the Afghanistan mission directly is a risky strategy that demands brutal honesty and strong political leadership. The harsh reality is that we are unlikely to successfully transform Afghanistan into a thriving Western-style democracy. Rather, a realistic litmus test should be to make sure that the country can never again serve as a terrorist haven.

Finally, and most importantly, political leaders from the relevant NATO countries can no longer afford to remain silent about why fighting in Afghanistan is justified in terms of our core national security interests. Even conservative critics agree that for far too long Chancellor Merkel preferred not to take a strong stand in Germany's acrimonious Afghanistan debate. For example, only in the fall of 2007, after criticism of her failure to visit the troops, did she finally decide to go there. With al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the rise in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, as well as mounting public opposition in Germany to the Bundeswehr deployment, such a defensive and reactive stance ultimately carries huge potential political and military risks, both at home and abroad.

Reading the political tea leaves

Despite having hit quite a few political bumps in recent months, Chancellor Merkel's term in office has already exceeded the expectations of friends and foes alike. Today, Angela Merkel—once dismissed by hardcore conservatives as "the divorced, childless, Protestant woman from former East Germany"—is fully in charge of the CDU/CSU camp. Going into the next election cycle, she faces no credible internal contender and is recognized as the conservatives' best vote-getter. After all, Merkel's personal approval ratings have consistently been at or above 50-60 percent; that is, much better than the figures for the overall CDU/CSU-SPD "grand coalition" (30-35 percent).

As Germany approaches its next general elections, which will most likely be held in the fall of 2009, the CDU/CSU and the SPD will step up efforts to accentuate the differences in their political stances, mobilize their respective bases, and reach out to potential swing voters. For the SPD, this will mean moving further to the left and continuing its anti-reform drive. It likely will also continue to trend in an anti-American foreign policy direction. The SPD knows very well that its last-minute victory in the closely contested 2002 elections was, above all, due to Chancellor Schroeder's opportunistic use of the pacifist, anti-American card in the run-up to the controversial Iraq war. Looking ahead, opportunities for this card to be played again exist over Germany's policy towards Russia—especially if somehow linked to the SPD's strong

opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe, which has been rejected by about 90 percent of the German population. The same is true for the Bundeswehr's Afghanistan mission, which is now opposed by two-thirds of all Germans. Growing military losses there will increase calls for a swift pullout.

If a Democratic administration takes over the White House in January 2009, life should get easier for Merkel and her CDU/CSU parties, as the Left will likely have fewer opportunities to follow its anti-American instincts. Furthermore, Merkel would receive a major domestic political boost if the next U.S. administration (Democratic or Republican) were to agree to legally binding CO_2 reduction targets. After all, the Chancellor's international leadership role in tackling global climate change is extremely popular back home. For the conservative CDU/CSU parties, unlike the SPD, consistent and strong ties with the United States are an indispensable cornerstone of German foreign policy. In an age of Islamic extremism, rising Asian power, and the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, there can be no doubt that a unified transatlantic alliance is necessary to ensure that our fundamental values of democracy, freedom, and open economies prevail.

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Europe's Rising East

Janusz Bugajski

Predictions for much of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) nearly two decades ago, when the Soviet bloc was disintegrating, were basically of two sorts. The "end of history" scenario envisioned rapid democratization and economic liberalism for the region as a whole. This, however, proved too optimistic a prognosis. The second scenario posited a "return of history," a reversion to perpetual ethnic conflict and interstate turmoil. But this ended up being too sweeping and pessimistic a forecast. Instead, the CEE has witnessed marked diversity, not only in the pace of domestic transformation and democratic consolidation, but also in differing approaches to national security and foreign policy.

Today, the Central Europeans, the Baltic states, and the countries of the eastern Balkans are almost all fully institutionalized Europeans, having attained both NATO and EU membership. But their responses to new security challenges, and their evolving roles in those two key international institutions, are all distinctly different. In fact, the CEE region no longer forms a unified bloc of states. Instead, a dividing line has emerged between the wider Baltic region and that of Central Europe.

The former, which includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, feels more vulnerable to pressures from Russia. As a result, it has become increasingly assertive in trying to focus EU policy eastwards, and has voiced greater commitment to the transatlantic relationship and a strong American role and pres-

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ence in Europe. These countries have attempted to mobilize support within the EU for a more effective "Eastern Dimension" that goes beyond the tentative European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) adopted so far by the EU, which keeps the former Soviet satellites at arm's length.

Regardless of partisan coloration, these governments are preoccupied with curtailing Russian expansionism. To this end, they have sought to engage more closely with the remaining Eastern European states that are most vulnerable to pressure from Moscow. They favor enlarging both NATO and the EU eastward. And they are adamant about keeping the U.S. closely engaged in European affairs, especially as a counterweight to an increasingly assertive Russia.

By contrast the latter, Central European, group—which includes Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic—has adopted a more circumspect position in its "eastern" policy. Its governments are more focused on deepening EU integration and pursuing economic development. As a result, Central European priorities consist of minimizing defense spending, merging into the EU mainstream, and discarding any significant foreign policy ambitions of their own.

The Central-Eastern European (CEE) region no longer forms a unified bloc of states. Instead, a dividing line has emerged between the wider Baltic region and that of Central Europe.

Increasingly, each CEE capital carries out its own calculus, weighing specific national interests on a range of political, security, and economic issues with those of its neighbors, its regional partners, and the West European (WE) capitals, and gauging the impact on broader EU interests and on transatlantic relations. Those that see more immediate security threats in their neighborhood, or feel that the older EU capitals will not sufficiently defend the interests of new members, tend to be more Atlanticist. They view the U.S. as more capable of providing political and security assistance. Others, however, toe a more nuanced line, responding to domestic public sentiment that is not well disposed toward foreign military engagements or the perceived loss of national sovereignty.

The new shape of European security

Much like the rest of Europe, the CEE countries now face new security threats and complex foreign policy challenges, ranging from ethnic tensions and mass migration to organized crime, international terrorism, weapons proliferation, and energy insecurity. (Some also view the lack of political stability, state weakness, and insufficient international integration among their neighbors as latent security threats.) But in many respects, their most serious security challenge lies in devising cohesive and complementary policies that bridge the divisions between the U.S. and the EU.

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the U.S. has focused intensively on global security threats. The EU, by contrast, has been preoccupied closer to home, with its own institutional enlargement and integration. The results have been pronounced; the countries of the EU are increasingly ambivalent concerning what global role they should play on

the world stage, and at what cost. Not surprisingly, the Continent has seen a significant decline in support for strong American leadership in world affairs in recent years.

This does not mean that Europe does not have global ambitions. Far from it; many Europeans would very much like for the EU to develop into a major power largely independent of the United States. But, as a practical matter, very few are willing to increase defense spending in order to realize such a goal.

CEE countries have been deeply affected by this trend. Although most are, in the main, more pro-American and Atlanticist than their counterparts in Western Europe, public opinion and political positions have unmistakably begun to shift in a more Eurofocused direction.

Expanding continental institutions

Two forces—European accession and NATO enlargement—play a pivotal role in this regard. With regard to the former, the CEE states bring much to the table. Provided the accession process goes as planned, the coming years could see the emergence of a coherent set of new EU states that remain strong Atlanticists. This, in turn, will aid in Europe's transformation into a politically cohesive, economically competitive, and strategically vital region that can complement and work together with Washington to confront a long list of common challenges.

The EU remains a work in progress, however, and its final shape and structure cannot be easily predicted. A central debate in the CEE has revolved around the future of EU integration and the contours and content of the Union's emerging foreign and security policy. Some CEE capitals worry that their interests would be ignored by the larger WE states, a fear that has reinforced their Atlanticism. Not surprisingly, there is concern in many corners about the drive by some on the Continent to bypass NATO and duplicate its military structures through the development of autonomous military forces.

But this push for a separate and distinct European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is not without its appeal. Even the staunchest Atlanticists in "New Europe," such as Poland, have increasingly begun to view ESDP as an opportunity of sorts, the chance to create a credible European pillar and prevent the renationalization of European security policy. The emerging EU defense structure has therefore been supported in Poland and other CEE states as a means of creating a more effective partner for the U.S. The central premise has been that the EU should acquire greater military power and cohesion in order to be able to cooperate more effectively with Washington. To this end, Warsaw has backed the creation of the post of EU foreign minister and endorsed the development of the Union's security strategy. It has also become more open to the idea of enhancing the EU's autonomous planning capacities and has supported the creation of a European planning cell at NATO Headquarters.

Officials do not see these initiatives as a duplication of NATO, but as a form of complementarity. The key, from the CEE perspective, is the development of a cohesive European foreign and security policy that supplements NATO, rather than competes with it.

None of this is to say that NATO has become irrelevant. To the contrary, NATO enlargement is seen

in the CEE as a practical method to reinvigorate the transatlantic link and create a larger pool of interoperable countries. NATO expansion has also given Washington additional voices of support within NATO's decision-making process. Nevertheless, whenever the American-European relationship has become troubled, the new Alliance members have found themselves caught between American and EU expectations.

The reduced role of NATO since 9/11 has been greeted with some concern in several CEE capitals, which fear that the organization may become lame and ineffective without American resolve. During the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, it quickly became clear that the U.S. attached little value to collective Alliance decision-making. This led Polish and other officials to warn against NATO turning into a mere "toolbox" for the U.S. in its varied security missions—a development that would relegate the Alliance to the role of a reserve force for Washington, and eliminate it altogether as a serious security player.

Caught between missile defense and a hard place

Another contentious issue is that of missile defense. Over the past two years, Washington has gone public with plans to place components of its emerging missile defense system—designed to defend against possible attacks from Iran or other rogue states—on the territory of Poland and the Czech Republic. Under plans now being discussed among Washington, Warsaw and Prague, Poland would become the site of anti-missile interceptors, while the Czech Republic would house early warning radars.

Opposition to the initiative has emerged from all sides. Some neighboring EU states claim that the deployment of such defenses is unnecessary—and even provocative. Others contend that missile defenses for the Continent, if and when they are built, should be constructed with the consensus of all NATO states. Russia, meanwhile, has accused the United States of launching a new effort to neutralize its nuclear capabilities and to encircle it, and has placed growing pressure on Eastern Europe to back away from Washington's planned deployment.

The CEE states therefore find themselves caught in the middle of a new international confrontation. Both Warsaw and Prague seem to favor the U.S. missile defense system, calculating that it could entail stronger security guarantees from Washington. However, a prolonged period of negotiations lies ahead before radar sites will be deployed in the Czech Republic and missile batteries positioned in Poland. And in the meantime, rising public skepticism about the strategic utility of missile defense is visible in both countries, as is local concern over the international repercussions of their participation.

Russia, rising

As the foregoing suggests, the biggest challenge to Europe and transatlantic ties might just come from the east, where the past several years have seen the reemergence of an increasingly assertive—and belligerent—Russia.

Europe has struggled to formulate an appropriate approach toward this trend. The Baltic group has been at the forefront of those states that seek a more activist policy toward Moscow. Polish spokesmen believe that the Union should show greater concern over anti-democratic tenden-

cies in Russian politics. The Baltic governments also seek a more concerted NATO response to counter persistent provocations on the part of the Kremlin (such as violations of Baltic airspace and attempts to destabilize incumbent governments there). CEE capitals have been particularly concerned that Russia is seeking to create fractures in the EU by pursuing differing approaches toward the WE and the CEE countries and using its bilateral ties with the former to undermine the latter.

As of yet, however, no common EU strategy has emerged toward Russia. A contingent of older EU members, including France and Germany, has been apprehensive about provoking disruptive conflicts with Moscow and is willing to overlook both negative trends in Russia's domestic politics and Moscow's confrontational foreign policies. The priorities for Paris, Berlin, and Rome in particular have centered on guaranteed energy provisions, a growing Russian market for their exports, and foreign policies that do not create conflicts with Moscow. In their view Russian political stability, strong central control, and territorial integrity helps ensure European security regardless of the state of democracy within Russia and Moscow's relations with its immediate neighbors.

CEE states have not been so sanguine. They have watched with increasing trepidation as Moscow pursues a neo-imperialist policy toward several neighboring countries. Poland and the three Baltic countries in particular consider themselves frontline states facing growing security challenges to their east. None of these governments are supportive of Russia's membership in either the EU or NATO, and are suspicious about close organizational partnerships with Moscow. In response, they have tried to limit Russian dominance on a number of fronts, most prominent among them energy policy. CEE capitals have backed alternative supplies and routes for gas and oil from the Caspian Basin as a way of reducing dependence on Russia, and have vehemently opposed the construction of the new Nord Stream pipeline by Germany and Russia that would bypass Poland and the Baltic states.

Drawing the CEE closer

In theory, all of the countries geographically and politically defined as European states are candidates for EU membership. And all, apart from Belarus and Russia, view their accession to the EU as a strategic objective and priority. However, the EU has not yet set post-Soviet states such as Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia on an accession track through association agreements, as it has with the Western Balkan countries. Warsaw and other CEE capitals have pushed to have the status of these countries upgraded as a stepping-stone to eventual EU entry.

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), devised in 2003 as a "Wider Europe" concept, lays the groundwork for closer cooperation between the EU and its neighbors. EU leaders have underscored the importance of the ENP in promoting democratic reform, the rule of law, and institution building. They contend that in the economic arena the ENP helps to deepen trade relations, enhances financial and technical assistance, promotes participation in EU programs, and gives each country a link with the Union's internal market.

And yet, despite the ENP, the EU has displayed a reluctance to contemplate further enlargement. With the recent slowdown in EU economic

growth, political and public support for further institutional expansion has weakened. Paris, for instance, has announced that any future member would need to be approved by a French referendum—a decision that could delay or derail the accession of various states. The debate in several other EU states, meanwhile, has focused on the limits of EU expansion and a search for an acceptable definition of Europe's ultimate borders.

The European Parliament has been more outspoken. In March 2006, it endorsed a report recommending that all countries bidding for membership should be given a "European perspective," which would include a "privileged partnership" until entry is secured. Nonetheless, some CEE leaders see this as nothing more than a stall tactic on the part of an EU uncertain about their inclusion. And they worry about the creation of durable dividing lines between themselves and the rest of Eastern Europe, which they claim would seriously damage inter-state relations, undermine economic development, obstruct structural reform, encourage Russian revanchism, and unsettle a wider region.

Indeed, Poland and the Baltic countries have sought to generate a more intensive focus on Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia in both the EU and NATO. They are firm supporters of both NATO and EU expansion, and advocate greater efforts to provide embryonic democracies with a sufficient incentive and momentum to pursue extensive reforms to reach EU standards. Warsaw and several other CEE capitals, for their part, have asserted that the EU and NATO must provide a clear message of openness to new European members. Otherwise, the momentum for reform may expire and these vulnerable states will succumb to negative Russian influence and regional insecurity.

Moscow, meanwhile, has displayed a determination to undermine NATO, EU, and U.S. influence in what it considers to be its primary sphere of interest in the "post-Soviet space." It has accused a number of Western governments of undermining Russian national interests and plotting to stage a "colored revolution" in Russia itself along the Ukrainian and Georgian models.

A new role for "new Europe"

All of this should matter a great deal to Washington. American interests require dependable and predictable partners within the EU and NATO. Such allies would help prevent the EU from developing into a potentially hostile bloc that might oppose U.S. policies on several foreign policy fronts. It is therefore in the U.S. national interest to have a coherent and united set of European allies that can complement the projection of American political authority, economic strength, and military power.

The challenge for Washington is to transform the EU into a partner that complements U.S. strategic goals rather than obstructing or diverting from them. And here, the countries of the CEE are poised to play a pivotal role. In the new post-post-Cold War world, where Russia and the West now confront each other in numerous arenas, from the status of Kosovo and the missile defense shield to the future of the OSCE, the CEE states are both the objects of Russia's assertive policy and new tools by which Western nations can counter it—harnessing NATO and the EU in the process.

Escaping Gazprom's Embrace

Borut Grgic & Alexandros Petersen

In the first month of 2008, Russia's state-controlled natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, ticked off two more European countries that will rely almost entirely on Moscow for their everyday energy needs. On January 18th, Russian President Vladimir Putin, accompanied by his anointed successor, Gazprom chairman Dmitri Medvedev, pressured the government in Sofia into signing an energy deal with Russia and providing its backing for the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Bulgaria, and further into Europe, undercutting EU- and U.S.-backed plans for a pipeline from Turkey. Then, a week later, Serbian President Boris Tadic, accompanied by his prime minister, visited Moscow and signed on the dotted line, allowing Gazprom to acquire a 51 percent stake in Serbia's national oil company (NIS). The ambitious move not only strengthened energy links between the two Slavic nations, but bolstered ties between the two most vocal opponents of independence for Kosovo.

Such developments highlight the stark reality now faced by decisionmakers in Brussels and other European capitals. They must choose between the status

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quo, energy overdependence on an assertive Moscow, or a new future: alternative routes from alternative sources, such as the Caspian region.

The situation is dire. Europe's substantial—and growing—energy needs have made its leaders chronically unable to resist the lure of Russia. Not just Bulgaria and Serbia, with their traditional ties to Russia, but Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia have all been seduced by the siren song of easy energy from the Kremlin. Some have argued that these governments cannot be blamed for arrangements that facilitate heating and light for their citizens. But it has become abundantly clear that these deals come at a steep cost: the unity of the EU itself. Every exclusive bilateral deal with Russia jeopardizes another European state and countless commitments to interdependence. Every agreement that increases the continent's dependence on Moscow weakens Europe's geopolitical leverage and undermines the European project itself. Reversing this trend requires that Europe develop a coherent and effective strategy for improving its energy security.

Gazprom's march into Europe

Overdependence on any country for key energy supplies is unwise, but the EU is uniquely vulnerable in this regard. It is the world's greatest energy importer, and the largest consumer without significant energy reserves. European countries depend on Russia for their oil consumption, anywhere from 30 percent for Belgium to 85 percent for Bulgaria, with the figure always far higher than the next largest source. For gas, they are dependent from 32 percent (for Italy) to 100 percent for Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. This dangerous dependence, moreover, is on the rise as coal, lignite, peat and other sources are progressively depleted.

Given Moscow's recent assertive foreign policy moves, such as claiming the North Pole and flying nuclear bombers to Scotland and Guam, as well as the Kremlin's track record of using energy for political gains against Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and EU-member Lithuania, one would think that European decisionmakers would be rushing to ameliorate the continent's overdependence on Russia. Indeed, a recent poll by the German Marshall Fund found that 59 percent of Europeans "expressed concern about Russia's role as an energy provider," while 56 percent "expressed concern about Russia's behavior toward its neighbours."[1] But as a practical matter, little is being done to decouple Europe from this energy embrace.

The government of Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin, for example, seems unable to provide the leadership that could stem Gazprom's march into Europe, even though the majority of Germans are wary of Russia's approach to neighboring states. Her government is still moving ahead with plans for the Nord Stream gas pipeline, agreed to by her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, and President Putin. This exclusive project would bypass the Baltic countries and Poland, and has drawn protests from Finland and the Scandinavian countries for being environmentally questionable. Never mind that a few weeks before Schroeder stepped down as Chancellor in order to chair the board at Nord Stream's Gazprom-controlled construction consortium, the German government guaranteed $1 billion of the project's costs. Never

mind also that Schroeder's boss is a former Stasi officer who worked with Mr. Putin while he was stationed in Dresden with the KGB.

Gazprom has been busy on other fronts as well. For some time, it has been attempting a takeover of Hungary's MOL energy company. Simultaneously, it has pursued Austria to accept a deal to create a Gazprom hub within Europe at Baumgarten.

The deal with Serbia was a masterful illustration of the nexus between geopolitics and energy that is central to Gazprom's activities in Europe. Gazprom paid 400 million euros for a majority stake of a national company valued at 2 billion, no tender, no transparency, and no questions asked—not even by the EU. Plus, Moscow knows that the value of NIS will only increase if Serbia joins the EU, despite the section of the deal that required Serbia not to upgrade NIS refineries to European standards for another five years. While we can not be certain of the final arrangements, the draft deal included the stipulation that Gazprom would have the right to a 51 percent stake in all gas infrastructure in Serbia, with access to 100 percent of its capacity. In return, Moscow seems merely to have reinforced its empty vow to veto any UN resolution recognizing Kosovo's independence.

These and other steps constitute a concerted and holistic strategy on the part of the Kremlin, one which *Russia in Global Affairs* editor Fyodor Lukyanov has described as follows: "Wherever possible, it is necessary to increase Russia's presence in Europe, either inside the EU or in countries that have a chance to join."[2] Connecting the dots from here is easy. In pursuing this strategy, Gazprom, and thereby Russia's leadership, is putting the pieces in place not only to pit the states of the continent against one another, but to geographically split Europe in two through a line that stretches from Bulgaria through Serbia, Austria and Italy. Such a cordon of energy dependents, with Hungary and Greece as extra fortification, could prevent the flow of energy from alternative sources through Turkey into the EU, effectively cutting the member-state aspirant off from the Union, and diminishing its prospects as a crossroads for Europe's energy imports from the south and southeast.

Brussels fiddles as Moscow divides and conquers

To be fair, the EU Commission has since at least 2005 acknowledged the dangers involved in facilitating Gazprom's continental ambitions. European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, along with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, has called on the governments of European member-states to "speak with one voice" when confronting Kremlin-controlled energy interests.[3] However, not only has their advice fallen on deaf ears in some of Europe's most powerful capitals, they themselves have failed to push harder for unified rhetoric and synchronized action. While, for the most part, the EU Council sets the agenda and the Commission implements it as best it can, Barroso and his deputies have not played the important coordinating role needed to enact a strategy to ameliorate Europe's energy security woes. Instead, while Mr. Putin was shaking hands with the Bulgarians and Serbs, the Commission was busy setting overly-ambitious targets for member-states to curb their carbon emissions.

Make no mistake, the vibrant discussion now under way in Europe about the continent's carbon footprint and reductions in the use of fossil fuels is immensely positive, for both ecological and practical reasons. If the Commission's minimum target is met, and 20 percent of the continent's energy is produced from renewable energy sources by 2020, Europe will have gone a long way toward bettering its energy security. But Brussels still lacks a unified approach for addressing the energy problem of today—Gazprom's policy of divide and conquer within Europe—as opposed to that of tomorrow.

Aside from Gazprom's expansionist and overtly geopolitical activities, it is in the interests of European decisionmakers to be fully aware of exactly who is in charge. While Gazprom is not entirely state-owned, its individual investors do not present a brighter picture, nor do they control the majority share. Take Suleyman Kerimov, Gazprom's largest private stakeholder. The "Sage of Dagestan," one of Russia's notoriously criminalized republics, is also known as "Russia's richest civil servant." Among other troubling activities, the Duma deputy—who owns a 4.5 percent stake in the energy giant—has been implicated in the Iraqi Oil-for-Food scandal.[4]

Further inroads by Gazprom, in other words, will not lead to a European energy sector of the kind policymakers in Brussels seek: devoid of corruption, depoliticized and properly regulated. Indeed, no Russian energy enterprise operating today meets these criteria. But Gazprom and its many subsidiaries are worse than most, known for some of the industry's most egregious environmental practices and lacking the kind of corporate social responsibility that goes hand in hand with Brussels' environmental priorities.

The scramble for the Caspian

In the scramble for the energy-rich Caspian, meanwhile, Europe is in last place. Despite the fact that Europe's need to diversify its energy imports is more acute than that of America or China, Europe lags behind both—and all are trying to catch up to Russia in securing energy reserves under the Caspian seabed and in surrounding Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The greater Caspian region holds the world's third largest reserves of hydrocarbon energy. Yet, despite the fact that Russia, with its own vast reserves, taps this energy and sells it to Europe at more than double the domestic price, the EU has neglected to act in its own interest in the region.

Turkmenistan, isolated for almost two decades under the rule of Saparmurat Niyazov, the self-styled Turkmenbashi (leader of all Turkmen), is experiencing an awakening of sorts under his successor, Gurbanguli Berdimukhammedov. The country's vast gas reserves under the Kara-Kum desert, estimated at anywhere from 2 trillion to 20 trillion cubic meters, are being targeted by Russian and international energy companies, mostly American. China is also heavily involved in this game, possessing the only on-land gas drilling license, and offering to sign contracts committing to 30 years of energy imports from the former Soviet republic. And while Russia views and acts in the region as if it were its backyard, Berdimukhammedov has inched toward the West. The Turkmen leader made a point of visiting Brussels in

November, and has begun to improve ties with Azerbaijan in an attempt to restart regional action toward a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline.

The current Slovenian EU Presidency has the vision and tools to plant Europe's initial stake in the Caspian scramble. Dmitri Rupel, Slovenia's foreign minister, who is heading the presidency, and Danilo Turk, the country's new president, are both experienced diplomats who can bring important skills to the table in orienting EU priorities toward the Caspian. However, if action is not taken immediately, the EU could risk attempting too little too late. Such was the case in the 1990s, when a similar scramble ensued for Azerbaijan's initial energy offerings. Through a major and multifaceted diplomatic effort that involved close partnerships with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, the U.S. was able to realize the so-called pipedream of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and its sister project for gas, the South Caucasus Pipeline. Despite its relative inaction in spurring the endeavor, Europe has benefited tremendously—indeed, more than the U.S.—from the alternative routes generated as a result. Yet it does not seem to feel the need to repeat that successful exercise.

It would do well to do so with a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to Turkmenistan and an enhanced oil exchange with Kazakhstan. An effort of similar vigor is needed to realize Nabucco, from Turkey through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria and the rest of Europe. The Nabucco project is perhaps the most relevant for Europe this century. Other ideas, such as reversing the existing Ukrainian Odessa-Brody pipeline and extending it to Gdansk, as well as the White Stream project that could bring gas directly from Georgia to Romania across the Black Sea, should be supported as well. Every effort should be made to develop independent European access to the Caspian energy market. But these projects will only be commercially viable if alternative sources in the Caspian region are cultivated.

A new Caspian strategy for Europe

If it acts now, Europe is in many ways best placed to engage the region. Not only are the energy-rich governments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and (increasingly) Turkmenistan eager to develop "multi-vector" strategies that provide them with several foreign policy options, but Europe is often mentioned as the favored choice in this context. Russia's shadow is one that Caspian states would generally prefer to avoid, but have a hard time doing so. China presents interesting economic opportunities, but is politically incompatible. And the U.S., for better or worse, is seen as a somewhat discredited and distracted actor—fumbling between promises of empowerment and dissonant criticism about governance. While Iran wields some influence in ethnically-linked Tajikistan, its ambitions in the region do not match its capabilities. And while Turkey's involvement is positive, it is viewed in the region first and foremost as the gateway to Europe. Despite its organizational weaknesses, therefore, the EU has an opportunity to step into the Caspian utilizing its strengths: dialogue, soft power, investment and development—not to mention a major market for energy exports.

However, to do so, European decisionmakers must approach the region in a coordinated fashion.

So far, the Caspian Sea's western shore, the South Caucasus, has been engaged largely through the European Neighborhood Policy, while the eastern shore, Central Asia, has had contact with the EU through the TACIS development program and the German Presidency's Central Asia strategy. Not only have these approaches not gone far enough, they have been configured in such a way as to unnecessarily split the region.

The stakes are high. While individual energy reserves in Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan at first glance do not seem overwhelming, the Caspian region as a whole presents a major energy source to rival Russia, Iran and even the Gulf states. The EU, supported by key member-state governments, must therefore develop a Caspian-centered policy for the region. Practical steps to be taken now could include immediate consultations by the Commission with former U.S. diplomats and Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish officials involved in the realization of the "world's biggest energy project," the aforementioned BTC pipeline, in the face of enormous Russian and Iranian pressure. Such discussions could yield insights into how to create new momentum in the construction of the Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipelines. The Council also could launch a task force of experts on EU-Caspian energy dialogue in order to ensure that the EU stays competitive amongst other interested parties. The EU could also collapse its special offices for Central Asia and the South Caucasus into one department: the EU's Special Envoy for the Caspian region. Finally, Brussels and the states of Europe can position themselves in the Caspian as the most qualified brokers to achieve the regional "synergy" currently pursued by the EU in the Black Sea.

These steps should not be undertaken as a matter of European benevolence. Rather, Europe *needs* the Caspian to ameliorate its overdependence on Russia and strengthen continental interdependence. European decisionmakers cannot afford to ignore the reality that Russia's increasingly assertive foreign policy behavior is a manifestation of its self-image as an "energy superpower," or that Europe's indolent facilitation of that status progressively undermines its leverage and unity. If Europe does not commit collectively to a Caspian-centered strategy, the continent will gradually splinter, and only one aspect will unite all its states—dependence on Gazprom and the Kremlin leadership for the stuff of life: fuel for cooking, heat in the winter, and light in the dark.

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2. As cited in Brian Whitmore, "Russia: Gazprom's Advance into Europe Continues," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 25, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/01/f2269a3e-1135-4c4b-add3-6951838b6aa7.html.
3. As cited in Anne-France White, "Barroso Calls for Strong EU Energy Policy," theparliament.com, November 20, 2006, http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200611/ae62ded5-0e8a-4327-a1c5-4b7e15a6bc3c.htm.
4. Jules Evans, "A Rollercoaster Ride with the Caucasian Billionaire," *The Spectator* (London), February 24, 2007, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3724/is_200702/ai_n18632496.

The Case for European Missile Defense

Peter Brookes

After seemingly endless rounds of talks with its Polish and Czech counterparts about fielding a missile defense system in Europe, the United States made some progress in early February when Warsaw and Washington jointly announced they had reached an agreement—*in principle*—to move forward with the deployment of ten interceptors in Poland.

The devil, without a doubt, is in the details. The Poles are pushing for a deal which includes American support for bolstering their air defenses (likely in the form of PAC-3 batteries), a reflection of their fears of rising Russian animosity. (The Czech Republic also has to come to agreement with the United States, but will likely move in concert with its Polish neighbors.)

With Iran continuing to enrich uranium, the possibility of "loose nukes" in Pakistan, and a spate of ballistic missile tests (by Russia, China and Iran, among others) over the past year, the announcement of an agreement is undoubtedly good news. Concluding a deal this year will serve to bolster transatlantic security and protect the United States and Europe from the growing threat of long-range ballistic missiles and the unconventional payloads they may carry.

But this deal will not go unopposed. Public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic is shaky, NATO member countries are not fully on board, and the Russians will continue their vociferous opposition. The Kremlin has not been shy about expressing its opinion that a European missile defense system is a serious threat to Russian interests. Indeed, days before the Warsaw-Washing-

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ton deal was announced, almost as if anticipating a breakthrough in talks, a top Russian general said Moscow may restructure its military presence in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, which borders both Poland and Lithuania, in response to missile defense plans for Eastern Europe.[1] This is sure to rattle nerves in the region.

American angst

Despite the Kremlin's growling, the Bush administration sees the deployment of a missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic—also known as the "third site"—as critical to blunting the growing worldwide ballistic missile threat, protecting the homeland and defending its European allies. Indeed, as President George W. Bush said in a speech at the National Defense University in late October: "The need for missile defense in Europe is real and I believe it's urgent."[2]

But it is also a race against the clock. The recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the supposedly dormant state of Iran's nuclear weapons program notwithstanding, the American intelligence community believes Iran could have an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking the United States by 2015.[3] (Notably, the NIE's findings are the subject of considerable debate at home and abroad; if its critics are correct, an Iranian missile could be mated with a nuclear warhead by this time as well.) These estimates, of course, do not take into account the possibility of a Manhattan Project-like effort by Iran, which could decrease the time needed to reach initial operating capability for either the missile or nuclear program. Nor do these dates take into account outside assistance, which might accelerate both programs. The most likely candidates for making that happen are North Korea (both missiles and nuclear) or the remnants of the Pakistani A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network.

According to the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA), if the green light were given today by all concerned to break ground for the Eastern European missile defense sites, the earliest the system could be fully operational would be 2013.[4] The inking of final agreements and likely American congressional debates over funding will only push that timeline out further.

Indeed, the ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation trend, in general, is not positive. Ten years ago, there were only six nuclear weapons states. Today there are nine. Twenty-five years ago, nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, 27 do. Concerns about Iran's programs will only exacerbate the situation, as countries—especially those in the Arab Middle East—seek to balance Iran's rise. Of course, none of these arguments are likely to convince the Russians of the need for missile defenses in Eastern Europe.

Russian reluctance

Russian-American relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall have not really changed all that much. During the Cold War, the security relationship was characterized as one of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Today, it's still MAD—but now the relationship is one of mutually assured distrust. And nothing is making Russia's ties with the United States or Europe more suspicious—and contentious—than the simmering disagreement over Washington's plans to deploy anti-missile capabilities in Eastern Europe.

Although the Kremlin agreed to move beyond the Cold War strategic

balance of power with the signing of the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin has had a significant change of heart about missile defenses, especially those of other parties. Indeed, Putin drew parallels at an October European Union (EU) summit between the plans for an Eastern European missile shield and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which saw the two sides go to the brink of nuclear war.[5] A day later, the commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, warned that Moscow could restart the production of short- and medium-range missiles on short notice if directed, raising fears of rising major power tensions.[6]

Russia strongly objects to the U.S. proposal to install a high-tech X-band radar in the Czech Republic and deploy ten ground-based interceptors in Poland, claiming the defensive missile system would cause an "arms race" and turn Europe into a "powder keg." The Kremlin also insists the limited system would undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent, despite the fact that a Russian land-based nuclear strike on the United States would not be launched on a trajectory over Poland, but would fly toward its American targets over the North Pole, or Iceland and Greenland, depending on the targets.

In fact, according to the MDA, the proposed kinetic kill vehicle designated for deployment in Poland is simply not fast enough to catch a Russian land-based ICBM in a tail-chase scenario. These interceptors, therefore, would have no capability against Russia's sea- or air-based deterrence capabilities. (Interestingly, at the time, Moscow did not object to the U.S. decision six years ago to deploy missile defenses at California's Vandenberg Air Force Base and Alaska's Fort Greely to counteract the still-evolving North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threat.)

The Bush administration sees the deployment of a missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic—also known as the "third site"—as critical to blunting the growing worldwide ballistic missile threat, protecting the homeland and defending its European allies.

Possibly more fearful of the radar, which Moscow believes could give NATO intelligence on Russian maneuvers and weapons testing, Putin suggested to Bush last spring that the United States and Russia share an early-warning radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, instead of building the Czech radar. But the leased, Soviet-era facility will not even come close to matching the American radar's tracking capabilities, according to expert estimates.

Putin has also suggested the United States put its Eastern European missile defense interceptors in Iraq or Turkey instead of Eastern Europe. As well, Russia recommended that the United States target Iranian missiles using U.S. Navy Aegis-class ships, equipped with the upgraded SM-3 missiles. (The latter is, in fact, a viable option. On the positive side, there are fewer political-military issues like basing to deal with, since U.S. Navy ships would be operating in international waters. But there are technical questions about the capabilities of current interceptors, concerns about ship deployment schedules, and, of course, no lack of parochialism within the U.S. Department of Defense.)

Not getting any traction on those offers, Putin made another counteroffer while with Bush in Maine in early July: a regional missile defense with a radar facility in southern Russia under the control of the NATO-Russia Council. In October, Defense Secretary Robert Gates made his own rejoinder, offering that the Eastern European system would not be activated until the United States and Russia could agree that an Iranian threat existed. (Hearing howls of protest from inside the Beltway about leaving U.S. national security to Russian discretion, Washington has since backed away from that idea.)

Russian anxiety about the Eastern European missile shield is more likely about the placement of the system in what it perceives as its old stomping grounds than any real strategic concerns.

Making matters worse, Moscow has threatened to vacate a number of arms control treaties on account of the missile defense facilities in Eastern Europe, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) accords. It made good on its threat to leave the latter in December 2007. The INF Treaty may be the next to fall.

Yet despite the proposals, counterproposals and threats of vacating treaties, neither Washington nor Moscow seems willing to abandon its position for—or against—the planned Eastern European sites. But it's not just about the United States and Russia.

European unease

All of this political jousting over missile defense is having an effect on the security debate in Europe, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as within NATO. In Poland, domestic public opinion is not entirely convinced about the need for missile defense. The Poles are less enamored with America than they were previously, partly as a result of the protracted conflict in Iraq. They also question the threat emanating from Iran, nor do they want to be dragged into a dust-up between Washington and Tehran.

Not surprisingly, the Polish national security establishment—worried about taking a ration of Russian wrath without appropriate compensation—wants to extract all it can from the United States for allowing the placement of interceptors on Polish soil near Slupsk on the Baltic coast. Although positive about closer defense ties with Washington, and by extension NATO, Warsaw has not been subtle about wanting deal "sweeteners" in exchange for hosting the missiles. The Poles have expressed interest in PAC-3 and THAAD missile-defense systems, defense modernization assistance and more intelligence-sharing, among other issues. Poland is already the largest recipient of U.S. military aid in Europe, but it has lingering concerns about the commitment of the NATO Alliance to its defense should Russia want to play rough (not surprisingly, considering the Polish experience with its British and French allies in World War II).

The X-band midcourse radar in the Czech Republic, to be located in the Brdy military district near a former Soviet base west of Prague, is not without controversy either. While the ruling government supports the

missile defense radar, concerns exist among the Czech public, especially about the system's environmental and health effects. Czech opposition parties are calling for a national referendum on the issue—and for the European Union and NATO to play a larger role in European missile defense plans.

NATO has generally considered the talks among Washington, Warsaw and Prague to be bilateral issues, and has chosen not to interfere. Indeed, in general, NATO has expressed support for missile defense in Europe, especially against short- and medium-range missiles. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated after the April North Atlantic Council meeting: "There is absolutely a shared threat perception between the allies. Allies all agree that there is a threat from ballistic missiles."[7] Subsequently, at a meeting of NATO's 26 defense chiefs in June 2007, the Alliance agreed to assess the political and military implications of missile defense in Europe in a report due in February.[8] The NATO summit in Bucharest this spring could therefore be a key meeting for missile defense on the continent.

While NATO is actively studying short- and medium-range ballistic missile defense programs for Europe, France and Germany have expressed concern about the deployment of assets "in theater" that are not controlled by NATO. The European Parliament has also asked for a say on missile defense. Europeans fear that missile defense will provoke Moscow on other thorny issues, such as Europe's energy security, which is heavily dependent on Russian natural gas, or on the question of Kosovo's independence from Serbia, which the Kremlin opposes, and on future NATO expansion (e.g., Ukraine and Georgia).

Moscow will try to make missile defense a wedge issue to divide Europe, undermine NATO and weaken transatlantic relations, all while carving out a sphere of political and military influence for itself.

But Russian anxiety about the Eastern European missile shield is more likely about the placement of the system in what it perceives as its old stomping grounds than any real strategic concerns. The supposed threat from missile defense could also provide a convenient excuse for the $200 billion defense build-up the Russian military is now undergoing following years of abject neglect of the once-mighty Red Army. Not even taking into account the sea and air legs of its strategic nuclear triad, the Kremlin should realize that the currently configured system could not deal with a massive Russian nuclear assault on the United States.

It is likely the Kremlin will try to leverage public sentiment in Eastern Europe and NATO countries to get impressionable, democratically-elected governments to back down on missile defense. Moscow will also try to make missile defense a wedge issue to divide Europe, undermine NATO and weaken transatlantic relations, all while carving out a sphere of political and military influence for itself. Worst of all, Russia might deepen its nuclear cooperation with Iran, beyond building and fueling Iran's Bushehr reactor, as a bargaining chip against missile defense. Notably, both Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made trips to Tehran in October within weeks of one another. It was

the first visit of a Russian leader to Iran since Stalin met with the Allies in Tehran in 1943. Military sales, such as the highly-capable S-300 air defense system, have also been recently rumored to be in the works, adding to previous deals for Russian equipment.

It appears the Russians will do all they can to prevent the deployment of missile defense in Eastern Europe—maybe all of Europe. Although hope may spring eternal, it is unlikely an increasingly confident Kremlin is going to change its position.

Hosting a transatlantic missile defense system will deepen, and further unify, the security relationship between European NATO members, especially Poland and the Czech Republic, and the United States, enhancing our mutual national security against external threats from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Best defense

In recent years, the United States decided that leaving itself deliberately vulnerable to any weapon system or state, as it did during the Cold War, was foolish. And rightfully so. Deliberate vulnerability can lead to perceptions of weakness, inviting provocation or aggression from another nation or transnational actor. In addition, being perceived as weak and vulnerable can lead a potential adversary to use threats, intimidation, "blackmail" or coercion to achieve its objectives. In a day when North Korea is a nuclear weapons state and Iran is still very likely on the path to becoming one, the chance that these weapons will be used against peaceful nations is a troubling but very real possibility.

Every state has an undeniable right to self-defense—and it only makes sense that all reasonable, necessary steps are taken to protect one's national security. It is even more logical if the capability is emerging to do so, as witnessed by over 30 successful missile defense tests to date by the United States alone. As these tests have shown, hitting a bullet with a bullet in the atmosphere, or even in space, is in fact possible.

But even though rogue states like North Korea and Iran are good examples of the need for missile defense today, developing and deploying such capabilities is not about the missile or a weapon of mass destruction threat from a single country, or even several. Rather, missile defense is about protection from these weapons no matter where the threat comes from, now or in the future.

There are other advantages to fielding a missile defense system in Europe for the United States, too. Hosting a transatlantic missile defense system will deepen, and further unify, the security relationship between European NATO members, especially Poland and the Czech Republic, and the United States, enhancing our mutual national security against external threats from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. And despite the range of concerns about missile defense, it should be emphasized that missile defense is a defensive—not offensive—weapon. Indeed, the dominant design of the missile defense interceptor warhead does not even contain an explosive charge; traveling at 15,000 miles per hour, it destroys the missile warhead by the sheer force of the collision. Therefore,

the idea that missile defense is an offensive system, as many have suggested, is patently false. In a way, missile defense is like an umbrella; it is only needed *if* it rains.

This means that missile defense threatens no one. Missile defense only undermines the capability of one country to threaten or attack another with its ballistic missiles. The idea that the deployment of missile defenses in Europe will provoke an attack against Poland, the Czech Republic or any country that hosts them (including the United Kingdom or Denmark, which have missile defense radars) is a canard meant to encourage passivity. Defensive systems do not provoke attack. It is vulnerability or weakness that invites attack, not resolve and strength.

The United States—and others—have made it clear to Russia that missile defense does not threaten Russian security. Talks have emphasized that missile defense is part of an expanding effort in Europe to counter the growing ballistic missile threat—wherever it may come from. Of course, Russia should not expect to have a veto over European or American security—nor should that right be surrendered by the United States or Europe. Indeed, Moscow would do better to turn with its protests toward Tehran and Pyongyang, capitals that are driving the need for missile defense because of their growing offensive ballistic missile capability. Moreover, some security analysts have speculated—though cautiously—that the successful deployment of such effective defenses may one day convince countries like Iran and North Korea that their pursuit of missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be abandoned as futile endeavors. Mutually assured destruction or massive retaliation should not be the only policy options.

In the end, it is clear: missile defenses will improve America's security, and that of Europe, against the growing challenge of ballistic missiles and their unconventional payloads. It is high time the Americans, Poles and Czechs strike a final deal for deployment, enhancing both transatlantic ties and our common security.

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Russia's "Nuclear Renaissance"

Victor Mizin

These days, Kremlinologists are once again immersed in the persistent post-Cold War question of "who lost Russia."[1] Whatever one might think about the future course of Russia, now emerging from its much-touted presidential elections, it is obvious that the Kremlin is bent on restoring the country's image as a great power on a par with the United States and Europe.

In this calculus, nuclear weapons matter a great deal. The conventional wisdom in Moscow is that Russia, "rising from its knees" in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of its citizens, must be a strong, independent great power with a foreign policy of its own. Not surprisingly, the country's leadership is overtly promoting the modernization of its strategic weapons potential—a capability which is increasingly perceived in Moscow (and elsewhere) as the major facilitator of an independent role in global affairs. This is being done primarily for domestic or PR considerations. But Washington's foreign and military policies also play a significant part in the Kremlin's stratagems.

Fear and loathing in Moscow

Russian experts and politicians today harbor a great deal of suspicion regarding Washington's intentions.[2] They claim that since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has pursued an aggressive policy toward the "post-Soviet states"—one aimed at encircling Russia with military bases, deploying

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missiles on its borders, toppling allies in Central Asia, and inciting internal turmoil in the Commonwealth of Independent States (and Russia itself) through "orange revolutions" fomented by U.S.-backed "pro-democracy" groups. This perceived policy, according to Russian officials, is a reflection of American power that has gone unbridled for too long. As Russian President Vladimir Putin put it in his landmark 2007 address in Munich, "The unipolar world, in which there is one master, is… pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within." It is also a state of affairs that "stimulates an arms race" in response.[3]

Russian commentators have been quick to take up this call, blasting the "unilateral and illegitimate military actions" of the United States, its "uncontained hyper-use of force," and its "disdain for the basic principles of international law." Moscow's spin doctors tend to ignore the fact that the West, in turn, is repulsed by the rollback of democracy that has taken place in Russia.

Russia's efforts to boost the power and reach of its nuclear forces are of even greater significance than the more public displays of Russian rising might.

It is clear, moreover, that the anti-Western campaign in Russia is only in its early stages, and will be raging for several more years to come. Its longevity is a reflection of the fact that anti-Western orientation has become the main ideological line of the current Russian regime. Moscow's recent moves away from Western values and the deterioration of its cooperation with Europe and the United States should be seen in this context.

This domestic urge has influenced Moscow's attitudes toward weapons procurement and nuclear issues. It may be tempting to disregard Russia's recent moves toward "strategic modernization" as mere insignificant bluster. After all, the United States still can assuredly dissuade a nuclear attack from Russia, and is largely immune to any conceivable Russian strategic threat. Yet, a closer look suggests that Russia's recent moves are part of a more profound shift in the country's military/strategic priorities.

In recent times, Russia has suspended its obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and threatened to walk out of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Perhaps the most telling sign of Russia's new, more confrontational strategic posture, however, has been the resumption in August of last year of "combat patrol" by Russian bombers in the vicinity of NATO airspace. Naval vessels from Russia's Black Sea and Northern Fleets have also resumed their patrol missions in international waters. And the tempo of Russian military exercises has risen, with some of the largest taking place within the framework of the Russian- and Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These serve as overt reminders that Russia seeks a return to global status. Just as importantly, they appear to be wildly popular with a Russian public craving a great-power role for their country.[4]

In this vein, Russia's efforts to boost the power and reach of its nuclear forces have been less conspicuous. But they are of even greater significance than the more public displays of Russian rising might.

Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin has endorsed an extensive strategic rearmament plan, worth $200 billion over the next seven years, and entailing massive, unprecedented procurement of advanced weaponry (including a new generation of advanced ballistic missiles).[5] This expansion is already under way; official defense procurement by the Russian state jumped from approximately $2 billion in 2000 to $7.5 billion in 2005 and $9.5 billion in 2006.

Nuclear Russia, resurgent

Nuclear forces are the pride of the inferiority-complex-stricken Russian military. So the revitalization of Russia's nuclear triad is enormously significant from both a practical and an ideological perspective. Indeed, Russia's focus on such capabilities is consuming a significant part of the country's defense budget, while the conventional arsenal of the Russian army remains decrepit and declining. Russia's armed forces received just 31 T-90 tanks in 2003; by way of comparison, during the same period 310 such tanks were exported to India alone.[6]

In contrast, tactical nuclear weapons have received considerably more attention from the Kremlin. So have Russian efforts to defeat U.S. missile defenses, the latter through the development of a maneuverable hypersonic missile with an unpredictable flight trajectory (a multiple warhead version of Russia's advanced "Topol" intercontinental ballistic missile is also allegedly being developed). These efforts, fueled by skyrocketing revenues from the global sale of oil and natural gas, stand in stark contrast to the situation that prevailed at the end of the 1990s, when Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces were among the principal casualties of the country's imploding economy.

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This is not to say that Russia's strategic modernization plans are without their setbacks. While the "Topol-M" has been the only strategic nuclear weapon added to Russia's arsenal since the end of the USSR, its rate of production and commissioning has fallen substantially behind schedule. Indeed, the planning and construction of Russia's missiles was and is rather chaotic and jerky. The R-30 "Bulava," or SS-NX-30, a naval version of the land-based Topol-M ICBM, is experiencing protracted difficulties, and will not be deployed any time soon. The building of the nuclear-powered submarine "Yury Dolgoruky," the first boat of Russia's new *Borey 955*-class strategic nuclear submarines, is also far behind schedule.

Yet there is no mistaking that work on these projects is more intensive than ever. Russian elites have become fixated on U.S. plans to deploy a third missile defense site in Europe, and are actively working to counteract this development. Most Russian specialists now concur that the European basing site will become an integral part of America's nuclear capability, and therefore will pose a direct threat to Russia's national security. In response, Moscow has threatened to retarget nuclear missiles on Europe, and the Russian public in

general is wholeheartedly supportive of the Kremlin's vocal opposition to U.S. "encirclement." On the whole, the official propaganda campaign now under way against U.S. missile defense is reminiscent of those of the mid-1980s, portraying belligerent American actions as the cause of a new arms race.

Russian officials have a tendency to portray their shipments of sophisticated weaponry and dual-use items to states such as China, India, Iran and Syria as legitimate transactions carried out in compliance with nonproliferation and export control norms. But the rationale for these ties is not strictly economic.

All of which is highly significant. It suggests that Russian generals still view a nuclear war with either the U.S. or NATO as theoretically possible and consider the latter their main strategic adversaries. On a very basic level, then, nothing has really changed since Soviet times.

Luckily, the next cold war is not quite upon us. Moscow does not have the necessary clout to control its half of the world. Some nationalistic impulses aside, neither does it now have an ideology fundamentally antagonistic to the capitalist West. The segment of the Russian strategic arsenal still targeting the United States and NATO has dwindled considerably over the past decade-and-a-half, and will be further reduced in the years ahead, either as a result of bilateral agreement or through the simple attrition of hardware. And politically, Russia's elites depend too much on established relations with the West, where their monies are secured and where their families reside or vacation, to sever their links with American and its allies.

Forging a new nuclear relationship

This, then, is the current state of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, in which dialogue may be continuous but is mired in mistrust, suspicion and mutual recriminations. Both countries remain locked in their Cold War military postures, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) continues to be an underlying premise of Moscow-Washington ties.

Should Russia's discomfort regarding its loss of military superpower status be taken into account, or simply ignored? How can the United States and Russia move from "nuclear parity" or "stability" toward a new strategic framework in which Moscow will become a reliable ally of the West? These questions will undoubtedly animate the next American president's approach to relations with Russia. The answers may differ, depending upon the inhabitant of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, but one thing is clear: the United States cannot simply ignore Russia. It is and remains a major global player, by virtue of its nuclear status, its permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, the sheer vastness of its resources, and its remaining strategic capabilities.

In many respects, the issue of missile defense holds a number of the answers U.S. policymakers seek. At its core, Moscow's current opposition comes from the perception that U.S. efforts are in essence transient, and reversible. Once the Kremlin is finally persuaded that U.S. missile defenses are in fact inevitable,

Russia—despite its objections—will abide by (and perhaps even participate in) American efforts, sanctioning some kind of limited deployment of strategic defenses.

Beyond this détente over missile defense, however, additional steps are needed. Nuclear weapons naturally will continue to play an essential role in the military doctrines and political undertakings of both countries, as well as those of other nuclear powers. What is needed is a new, coherent doctrine of "collaborative, nonprovocative nuclear defense" built around three main pillars.

Disarmament

There is a more or less stable bipartisan consensus in the United States regarding the usefulness of the "Global Partnership" (GP) nonproliferation initiative and its predecessor, "Cooperative Threat Reduction" (CTR), the so-called Nunn-Lugar programs in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Both Congress and successive presidential administrations are fully aware of the importance of the continuation of these efforts as part of what former Defense Secretary William Perry has termed "defense by other means."[7] Nevertheless, there is a certain reluctance to extend the scope of CTR beyond its traditional bounds. And many U.S. policymakers have supported the notion that such disarmament assistance should be linked to changes in Russia's policies on a number of domestic and foreign policy issues. The result has been inertia on a number of important GP/CTR projects, which have fallen victim to a lack of funding and political support.

Under the plan envisioned by policymakers in Washington, Russia in the future will gradually begin to assume greater responsibility in joint disarmament programs, and eventually start investing substantial funds of its own in such efforts. As a practical matter this means that, like so many other issues in contemporary Russia, the fate of disarmament depends directly on the status of domestic reforms. After all, a government in Moscow that is committed to pluralism and accountability is more likely to be a stable security partner—including on issues of proliferation and nuclear disarmament. What is needed, therefore, are pragmatic suggestions for U.S. decisionmakers about how current GP/CTR programs—from chemical weapons destruction to the much-touted "nuclear cities initiative"—could be upgraded, and how new initiatives could be created to assist Moscow in neutralizing the imminent dangers from its WMD–related assets and industries.

> Ultimately, the choice is Russia's to make. It can continue as a semi-capitalist "clone" of the USSR, complete with Bolshevik-style policy patterns. Or it can become a "normal," authentically democratic state and ally of the West.

Domestic energy development

Such a revitalized nonproliferation partnership could facilitate Russia's own civilian nuclear revival. Nuclear industry is one of Russia's commercial trump cards; Russia currently controls about 40 percent of global reprocessing capacities. But domestic utilization of nuclear power for energy generation has lagged behind the times. President Putin

is now seeking to correct this deficit, launching an ambitious program to raise the share of nuclear energy in Russian total energy consumption from the current 16 percent to 25 percent by 2030. The reasons are pragmatic; by 2015, experts say, Russian oil and natural gas supplies will decline significantly, necessitating new forms of energy. To achieve this goal, however, Russia must build 40 additional reactors to supplement the 23 active now. And that requires from $30 to $40 billion in additional funding—financial assistance that could, under the proper circumstances, come from the United States.

What is needed is for Washington to show respect for Moscow's growing international clout, and its status as an equal—or almost equal—geopolitical partner. The key is persuading the increasingly independent-minded Kremlin that acting as a "good cop" does not automatically mean that it is carrying the water for Washington.

Nuclear transfers

Many of Russia's military and foreign policies still smack of traditional Soviet attitudes. This is especially evident in Moscow's external partnerships. Though promoting good relations with Western states is vital for Russia's economic interests, Moscow has tended in practice to tilt toward countries of proliferation concern.

Russian officials have a tendency to portray their shipments of sophisticated weaponry and dual-use items to states such as China, India, Iran and Syria as legitimate transactions carried out in compliance with nonproliferation and export control norms. But the rationale for these ties is not strictly economic. Under the ideological banner of "multipolarity," Moscow is promoting its own network of alliances, for the purpose of offsetting current U.S. "unilateralism" and shoring up its position vis-à-vis the West.

There is no question that this arrangement has commercial appeal in Moscow. After all, most of the critical WMD-linked technologies and sophisticated weaponry sought after by rogue states were in fact produced or designed in Soviet times. The negligible "production cost" of such items makes them continuously competitive on the global market.[8] Thus, for comparatively minor sums, rogue states can obtain usable Soviet-vintage weapons—or worse. The revenues generated as a result of such sales are substantial, and have led some Russian officials to conclude that trade with rogues (even at the risk of a major international scandal) is worth the risk. All of which has bred a domestic climate inhospitable to U.S. nonproliferation initiatives.

Ultimately, the choice is Russia's to make. It can continue as a semi-capitalist "clone" of the USSR, complete with Bolshevik-style policy patterns. Or it can become a "normal," authentically democratic state and ally of the West. But the United States can facilitate Russia's choice by offering a "bailout" package of sorts to the Russian leadership—one that compensates Kremlin elites for the loss of their clientele in Damascus and Tehran. Such a strategy would require the United States to do three things:

1. To actively engage Russia in political dialogue and practical programs/projects to promote global nonproliferation, specifically with the goal of thwarting attempts of

global terrorism to gain access to the still unsecured WMD-related assets of the "post-Soviet space."

2. To promote collaboration between U.S. companies and their Russian/CIS partners in the defense/space/high-technology sectors as a way of more closely monitoring—and influencing—compliance with nonproliferation norms.

3. To enforce accountability on the Kremlin should it engage in questionable proliferation practices by "naming and shaming" suspect Russian entities and prosecuting any WMD-related assistance given to terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah or rogue states like Iran and Syria.

Learning to live with Moscow

As the foregoing makes clear, Russia could surely play a special role in world affairs if the proper conditions are present. What is needed is for Washington to show respect for Moscow's growing international clout, and its status as an equal—or almost equal—geopolitical partner. The key is persuading the increasingly independent-minded Kremlin that acting as a "good cop" does not automatically mean that it is carrying the water for Washington. Indeed, for Moscow, a more constructive international stance toward issues such as nonproliferation is politically prudent. It has the power to mend bilateral relations soured in recent months by Russia's assertive foreign policy as Washington transitions to a new—and potentially very different—presidency.

Russia would obviously expect rewards for its good behavior—chief among them a recognition of its global importance. Because of its growing international stature, Russia is unlikely to be content with the role of a "tutored undergraduate," or accept any kind of financial buyout. Rather, America and its allies will need to work with, and adapt to, Moscow's growing international presence. This will not be an easy thing for the West to do, because of Russia's imperial past as well as its ambitions for the future. But on a number of fronts, chief among them those of nuclear security and strategic stability, the benefits of a more pragmatic approach would be substantial.

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Facing the Future

Jamie Shea

Preserving international security in the 21st century is harder than it was in the 1990s. In those days, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the international system as a whole seemed to be moving towards democracy and a free-market economy, even if it was ridiculously premature to proclaim "the end of history." The problems which inevitably arose from time to time were not that difficult to manage. Intervening in the Balkans, for instance, was really a matter of political will. Once the NATO allies had overcome their hesitations about using air power against Milosevic in Bosnia and later on in Kosovo, military victories were achieved relatively quickly. In short, the NATO allies had the power to determine outcomes, even if common vision and will were often lacking. There were no major countervailing forces willing and able to frustrate the policy goals of the Alliance.

But the 21st century is shaping up to be very different. America and Europe's leverage over world events is not what it used to be. Western man no longer rules the world, and the Western model is no longer seen as the only one to be followed. The United States is overburdened both economically and militarily. Europe, meanwhile, still lacks global reach, despite almost two decades of enlargement and internal political integration. The classical West still has intrinsic advantages: its creativity and power to innovate, as well as the sophistication

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of its economies, financial markets and societies. But it can no longer dominate through power or example alone. At the same time, Asia is on the ascent; four of the world's top ten companies are now Chinese. And, since the impact of the sub-prime lending crisis on the Western financial system, we have been only too happy to accept over $69 billion from the sovereign wealth funds of China, Japan and the Gulf States to recapitalize our leading investment banks.

There is no evidence that a multipolar world has to be one of balance of power diplomacy and competing military blocs. But it would also be a mistake to rely on globalization and economic interdependence alone to uphold world order and peace. History teaches us that with economic power eventually comes military power. This year alone, China plans to deploy 15 rockets and launch 17 satellites and again to send astronauts into outer space. This comes on top of its successful test of an anti-satellite weapon against an inactive meteorological satellite last year. Russia too is rapidly increasing its defense spending and fielding new generations of nuclear weapons. Both countries are also pursuing a more active and visible naval presence beyond their territorial waters. We can also see other emerging international actors who are acquiring the technological and scientific base to project significant strategic power in the 21st century. What is clear is that military power is also diffusing globally, even if it is doing so less rapidly than economic power and individual wealth. The key challenge of Western diplomacy will be to recognize the new status of these emerging (or, perhaps more accurately, re-emerging) major powers but persuade them to use that military and economic power to solve common security challenges rather than for national prestige or self-assertion.

There are two simple lessons that the NATO allies need to draw from this unsettling new world. The first is that what in the 1990s was strategically desirable has today become a strategic imperative. NATO must be united and stay united in pursuit of its core objectives. Unity will not always guarantee success, but division will always guarantee failure. It therefore is no surprise to see the United States and Europe now working overtime to put a multitude of differences—over the Iraq war, the Middle East peace process, international terrorism and climate change—behind them and reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship. Thus, in its final months, the Bush administration is pursuing peace in the Middle East, compromising on climate change, and softening its stance on Iran. In return, its counterparts in Europe are gradually sending more forces to Afghanistan, moving towards recognition of the independence of Kosovo, and signaling their readiness to contemplate additional sanctions against Iran. These developments tell the story; the United States and Europe are the closer to strategic convergence today than at any time over the past decade.

The second lesson that the NATO allies are drawing from the global diffusion of power is that they need to have a better and clearer grasp of their common priorities, and then devote resources to meeting them. The past few years have seen a large number of missions but often without either the commitment or the resources to be successful. The United States has committed the bulk of its forces to Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas the Europeans have focused on the Balkans, Zaire or Chad, or supporting the UN in Lebanon or

in responding to calls by NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan. All these missions assuredly have their strategic or humanitarian justification; but competing for the same scarce assets, such as helicopters, transport aircraft and engineering units, is a recipe for strategic incoherence and runs counter to the principle that as power becomes scarcer, it has to be used more selectively.

New priorities

Clearly, we are heading towards a multipolar world, where the West no longer holds a premium on geopolitical power. Less well understood is how to ensure that that world is one where common problems are tackled collectively, and the future of humanity is seen as more important than the parochial interests of the nation-state. Multipolarity without multilateralism could well mean a return to the competing alliances and balance of power diplomacy of the 19th century.

Now more than ever, America and Europe need an institution through which to build a transatlantic consensus on how they are going to tackle the macro-challenges of the 21st century. That organization is NATO. Indeed, on both sides of the Atlantic we can now see signs of efforts to reinvigorate the Atlantic Alliance. This focus makes good sense; after all, it is much easier to transform an existing organization than to invent a new one.

But NATO's future relevance cannot be based on the mere fact that it exists. Institutions are not just networks or meeting places; they have to produce more than the sum total of their parts and find answers to pressing challenges. This is why, over the last two decades, NATO has undergone a major process of transformation, deploying its forces beyond Europe, enlarging its membership to include a number of formerly communist countries, and linking up with organizations such as the United Nations, the African Union, the World Bank and the European Union.

NATO, moreover, has recognized that this process of transformation is not a one-off effort, but a continuing process of adaptation to a rapidly changing environment. This said, each phase of history brings its own specific challenges, which an organization like NATO needs to overcome if it is to be able to move on to the next phase of its evolution successfully. At the moment, there are four specific goals for NATO that will dominate the agenda at the Alliance's next summit meeting in Bucharest at the beginning of April.

First and foremost, NATO has to get its mission in Afghanistan on the right track. It is the most demanding and ambitious that the Alliance has ever undertaken, and one which the United States in particular is watching closely.

At the same time, NATO has to finish the job in the Balkans. This entails inviting more countries of that region to join its ranks, and putting the others on the path to integration into both NATO and ultimately the European Union. This issue is very much a holdover from the 1990s, but the current tense situation in Kosovo demonstrates the perils of NATO disengagement and stalled integration, which could foster a relapse into ethnic violence and quests for partition.

Another key challenge for the Alliance is to embed itself firmly into the operational structures of the international community, something which NATO experts call "the comprehensive approach." In contrast to the Cold War, when it depended only on its own membership to maintain

forward defense and nuclear deterrence, NATO can no longer carry out its missions alone. To be sure, NATO can send forces to the Balkans or Afghanistan. But if it cannot persuade the United Nations or the European Union to undertake civil reconstruction, it risks becoming bogged down in those places for a very long time. So NATO has to be able to cooperate closely with these other organizations, and to avoid turf fights and arguments over who leads.

Finally, an activist posture abroad depends on greater security at home. NATO cannot stay on the sidelines as new threats (including terrorism, proliferation, cybercrime and energy politics) emerge. Quite simply, allied nations will not send troops to the Hindu Kush if they feel that NATO is not doing enough to defend them at home. This means that NATO has to get back to basics and to its core Article 5 business of protecting its populations.

A chance for renewal

2009 will mark the 60th anniversary of NATO, and the moment when the new U.S. administration is expected to recommit to the Alliance in a ceremonial summit. But if this is to be a moment which equips NATO for the next 60 years, rather than merely recalls the successes of the past, the Alliance will have had to have made significant progress in the four key areas identified above. How can this be achieved?

With regard to Afghanistan, NATO has to be clear to its publics that its commitment is long term, and that there is no quick fix if we are to avoid a relapse of the country into its pre-9/11 status as the world's principal terrorist training camp. Even in more benign environments such as the Balkans, stabilization and reconstruction will take at least 20 years. In Afghanistan, it could take as long—or longer. Afghanistan is also one single strategic theater, and NATO has responsibility for every part of it. Therefore all allies must be willing to take on all of the jobs required, whether they involve counterinsurgency or humanitarian relief. At the moment, it is too easy for individual allies to develop their own image of Afghanistan based on whether they have troops in a quiet spot or in a more dangerous location. If NATO is to be successful, it must not only be able to generate the necessary forces to go to Afghanistan but make sure that it is able to rotate them. It is much easier for an ally to take on a commitment if it knows that it will be replaced in six months to a year by someone else and not be left stuck with a mission indefinitely. Allies need also to lift the caveats on the deployment of their forces, which currently dictate that commanders do not have the full use and benefit from even the limited number at their disposal. The only viable exit strategy is a sustainable Afghan National Army and Police able to hold the Taliban at bay and provide security to the local population. This means that the European Allies need to invest much greater resources in training and education, a task which currently is being performed overwhelmingly by the United States alone.

The real issue, however, concerns the "comprehensive approach." There is too widespread a perception that Afghanistan is NATO's task, and that other international organizations can follow different priorities elsewhere in the world. But soldiers are not civil servants in uniform and NATO is not a development agency. As in the Balkans, it needs the involvement of the UN to develop the economy and

local institutions, and it needs a much larger EU element in training the police. The proposed appointment by the UN of a new High Level Representative for Afghanistan is an encouraging sign that this message is finally getting through. Rather than follow different priorities and timelines, the international community must coordinate better and work as one team, just as our populations need to understand that Afghanistan is not a "war of choice" in a faraway place but a country that is directly linked to their own security.

Accomplishing the second task, stabilizing the Balkans, should be easier. If the Bucharest Summit agrees to extend membership invitations to Croatia, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it will be a powerful message that the West is not suffering from enlargement fatigue, and sees enlargement as a security gain rather than a risk. Already, the prospect of a new round of NATO enlargement is encouraging Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro to ask for new forms of partnership with the Alliance. Moving the entire region towards Euro-Atlantic integration is the best way to convince Serbia that retreating into sullen nationalism over Kosovo is a political and economic dead end.

It would also be a potent signal for countries further afield, such as Ukraine and Georgia, that NATO's open door is truly open—something which could help the forces of reform maintain the upper hand in those places. Ukraine and Georgia have been through much domestic turbulence of late, but both have recently held elections which have restored democratic reformist governments that are now considering participation in NATO's Membership Action Plan. So an ambitious enlargement at Bucharest will provide major encouragement for them to stay the course, notwithstanding a more assertive Russia and even if it is difficult at the moment to give a time-frame for when they will be able to join either NATO or the EU.

Kosovo is and doubtless will remain a difficult issue, all the more so because not all NATO allies are convinced of the wisdom of recognizing its declaration of independence. In the short run, lancing the boil in Kosovo will produce new tensions, not only between Serbs and Kosovars but also between Serbia and many NATO countries. But the current status quo is untenable; to date, uncertainty over Kosovo's ultimate status has nurtured and sustained ethnic disputes throughout the region. Building a new state in Kosovo and focusing the energies of Kosovars on real domestic reform rather than gaining independence will need a long-term commitment.

The next challenge, namely making sure that NATO has the right networks of relationships to operate effectively, is also something that should be solvable. The international community cannot be effective if NATO allies speak with one voice in the North Atlantic Council and another in the European Union Council. It does not make sense for 21 NATO nations that belong to the European Union to designate Afghanistan as a life-and-death issue for the Alliance but then not even mention it in their EU Summit Declarations. This type of "strategic schizophrenia" does not reflect the fact that NATO and the EU have complementary assets, the former stronger militarily and the latter more endowed financially and in terms of civic reconstruction.

Fortunately, and despite more than a few jokes in Brussels about

the NATO-EU relationship's being a "frozen conflict," the two organizations do seem to be moving closer together. The EU will shortly take over from the UN in overseeing civil administration and police reform in Kosovo, which will necessitate much closer contacts with NATO. Moreover, the willingness of new French President Nicolas Sarkozy to bring France closer to NATO and encourage a closer NATO-EU dialogue suggests that this growing proximity has the potential for lasting political closeness. What will be essential, however, will be to give NATO and the EU in future a common base of assets, such as forces, headquarters, key enablers like transport, aircraft and helicopters, and deployable civil and military personnel. Currently NATO and the EU are duplicating each other far too much in developing their own separate military structures—a luxury that the defense taxpayer should no longer be willing to accept.

The news also looks more positive on the NATO-UN front. NATO and the United Nations are currently negotiating a declaration on cooperation that could be ready by Bucharest. The UN also is increasingly turning to NATO for help in Africa or to handle humanitarian emergencies such as after the earthquake in Pakistan three years ago.

As these signs suggest, the Alliance has been highly successful in developing a network of partnerships that now extends across the globe. When NATO meets with its partners at the Bucharest Summit, the Heads of State and Government of over 60 countries and from four continents will be around the table, including from Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. The latter countries all contribute to NATO's mission in Afghanistan; indeed, today nearly 15 percent of the forces deployed on NATO's missions are from partner countries. They see NATO as a reliable partner which offers them participation in commands and planning in exchange for their contribution. At a time when the world is fragmenting politically, the ability of NATO to develop these partnerships and move them into a permanent relationship based on interoperability and common training can be a rare bridge builder across religious, ethnic and even political dividing lines.

The final task—the need for NATO to be rebalanced—takes us back into difficult territory. Countries that do not feel secure at home will be reluctant to engage their troops abroad. A few years ago, many analysts believed that the only purpose of NATO after the Cold War would be as an organizer of expeditionary missions to manage crises abroad or rebuild failed states. Living safely within their borders, our populations did not see NATO as necessary for homeland defense. But this situation has changed dramatically in recent years, in the wake of energy cut-offs and power failures in Europe, crippling cyber attacks in Estonia, a resurgent Russia and the high visibility given to Iran's nuclear and missile programs.

Missile defense is the most immediate issue in this regard, given that the United States has already entered into negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic, two NATO members, about deploying radar and interceptors on their respective territories. Initially Washington had excluded the Alliance from its direct bilateral dealings with these countries, but has recently decided that NATO is its preferred forum for taking the missile defense issue forward. In the end

it is better to discuss security issues within established structures than to invent ad hoc formats which could give rise to suspicions and misunderstandings. This is in and of itself another forceful argument in favor of NATO's continuing relevance. But the Alliance also needs to do more to recognize the future likelihood of proliferation threats and reaffirm the indivisibility of Allied security. If a missile defense shield in Europe is not only technically feasible but also politically desirable, the solution has to be a NATO one covering all Allies. At the same time, a clear message of NATO's renewed interest and commitment to arms control and an offer to Russia to consult on the future shape of the non-proliferation regime could help to lead the current highly sensitive political discourse over missile defense in Europe in a positive direction.

Of course, it is one thing to define credible policies for meeting new security challenges; it is quite another to develop the military capabilities to meet those challenges. Capabilities are the core business of NATO, and here the Alliance will need to do a better job of improving the usability of its forces for new operational commitments. From common funding for deployable infrastructure and communications to greater investments in expeditionary forces, the Alliance and its members must do more. Fortunately, the case for a robust military reorganization is more salient than ever. For the foreseeable future, European countries will live with the paradox that military deployments and strategic risks are going up while their respective defense budgets remain static or even decline. As such, NATO's value as a practical defense problem solver will be a test of its credibility.

Continued relevance

Whenever the issue of the relevance of an institution comes up, the first impulse of observers is to make comparisons with the organization's immediate competitors. This is often a false comparison; international organizations have their intrinsic strengths and weaknesses and their comparative advantages. That said, relevance is not a permanent state of affairs. Nor is it preordained by nature or politics. It derives from whether an organization is handling important business and providing a concrete product that moves the world forward. The key questions, therefore, are as follows. First, is NATO engaged in stabilizing crucial areas of strategic importance for the security of the West? And, second, is it acquiring the tools that it needs to do these missions successfully?

If we look at what NATO has been able to achieve in the Balkans and Afghanistan, despite the daily difficulties and occasional setbacks—and what it has learnt from these experiences—the answer to both questions is "yes." To be sure, NATO has always had, and will always have, its critics. But the proper method by which to judge NATO is on its merits, as well as its utility. And on that score, the Atlantic Alliance is unequivocally moving in the right direction.

An Obsolete Alliance

E. Wayne Merry

It is axiomatic that nothing in government is so long lasting as temporary measures. Policies, programs and appropriations initiated to respond to a transitory issue take on lives of their own, spawning institutions which not only outlive their purpose but themselves create new problems to justify their continued existence.

On the international stage today, the most egregious example of this principle is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An alliance created in response to the devastation of the Second World War in Europe and the onset of the Cold War is now approaching its seventh decade, two generations beyond the restoration of Europe's economy plus a large measure of European unity and a full generation beyond Gorbachev's acceptance of failure in the Cold War. Over the years, NATO has turned its back on its inherently defensive and conservative origins to become a shameless hustler after engagements to justify its own perpetuation. Rather than defending European territory or deterring threats to North Atlantic interests, NATO has followed with a vengeance the advice of Manfred Woerner, its Secretary General in the early 1990s, that it "must go out of area or go out of business."

A cynical American might still accept NATO as a useful complement to other international engagements, except that NATO has become a net liability to the United States and one this country need no longer sustain. NATO's contributions to our interests are more apparent than substantive, while the costs of our transatlantic welfare program remain huge. Worst of all, NATO

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subordinates American power and influence to European interests and preferences under the false rubric of "shared values."

What is an "alliance" anyway?

Any discussion of NATO should begin with clarity about what it is. NATO is an alliance, based on the Treaty of Washington of 1949. It began as an alliance should, in response to the real and shared security requirements of its members, and undertook mutual obligations to assure their interests. Unfortunately, the words "alliance" and "ally" currently are employed without precision or even meaning. An alliance is a concrete undertaking of states in a defined context to do certain things if required. The best alliances (albeit not all) are codified in treaties, so there can be reference to what its purposes are—and are not. The Founders of the American Republic were rather fussy in this regard, wishing to spare this country the frivolous and often secretive deals among monarchs which engendered almost unending inter-state violence in the Europe of their day. The North Atlantic Treaty was the product of difficult and protracted negotiations (the record of which is now largely declassified) and was subject to serious scrutiny and debate by the United States Senate before achieving ratification.

The Washington Treaty is purely defensive; nothing in it can legitimize use of force other than in response to a direct attack against its members. Article V, contrary to popular myth, does not even commit its members to the use of force. The Treaty is not a substitute for U.S. constitutional prerogatives, nor for the role of the Security Council under the United Nations Charter (to which the Treaty often defers). The Alliance is, therefore, conservative in the most precise sense of the term: it is a mechanism for sharing risk. The Treaty is not expansive in either purpose or geographic application (so-called "out of area"). Those who want NATO to play an ever-increasing role as global policeman or intervention force should, if they are honest, seek renegotiation under Article XII to give the Alliance these additional functions and obtain ratification by national legislatures. A "global NATO" without such treaty revision is nothing short of a silent political *coup d'état*, and a clear demonstration that its supporters care little about legal constraints, whether international or American.

Sadly, recent transatlantic "dialogue" has trended in the opposite direction. NATO is now routinely portrayed as a mechanism to combat global warming, for international law enforcement, as a substitute for other international treaties (such as that on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons), and for a variety of humanitarian purposes. A case in point is a recent study by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, whose European and American authors explicitly advocate an almost unlimited agenda for "the transatlantic alliance."[1] The authors use the term "alliance" interchangeably with "partnership," "relationship" and even "solidarity." These are *not* the same thing, however, and to treat them as synonymous warps rational policy debate.

Any war will do

Conflating the Alliance with other transatlantic issues is pernicious, but it has deep roots. NATO lost its basic *raison d'être* years ago, as Europe's need for American troops ended long before the Cold War did. The European members of NATO

collectively dwarfed the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact within a generation of the signing of the Treaty. However, proposals for a reduction in American forces, such as from Senator Mike Mansfield in the early 1970s, elicited near-hysterical denunciations from European governments which, with few exceptions, had never met even their rather modest military obligations to the Alliance.

However, NATO really went off its rails with the Soviet collapse, which left it without threat or legitimate purpose. Although by logic NATO should have voluntarily followed the Warsaw Pact into history, the survival instinct which unites amoebas and bureaucracies prevailed. NATO took on a mentor role for the militaries of its former adversaries, prepared to become a peacekeeping strike force, and expanded inexorably eastward. In doing so, it exacerbated inter-state tensions with Russia, rather than ameliorating them. There was almost no debate as to whether the United States even had a legitimate security role in post-Cold War Europe, or if it was not time for Europeans to reassume responsibility for their own continent.

For NATO, the collapse of Yugoslavia was a gift from heaven. The largest European state which had sat on the fence during the Cold War ironically supplied the rationale for a Cold War alliance to become an international peacemaking force, something its founders never conceived and the U.S. Senate never would have ratified. The fighting in the western Balkans certainly challenged Europe in many ways (such as refugee flows), but it did not threaten its security—at least not as defined by Article V. More to the point, the Yugoslav wars did not compromise the security of the United States at all. Whatever our humanitarian concerns, the Republic was not endangered. Managing the Balkan mess was therefore appropriately a job for Europe, not NATO.

The ensuing "hour of Europe" was a sad display of bickering and indecision, with poor appreciation of Balkan realities and faulty application of force in a fraught political environment. (Europeans who gloat over our mismanagement in Iraq might recall their own in Bosnia.) However, the capacities of the European powers were more than adequate to the task. Sadly, after decades of deference to the United States on almost all things military, the Europeans were unwilling (not unable) to muster the force necessary to restrain fifth-rate Balkan powers. What the Europeans did want, as one of their diplomats bluntly put it, was "American blood on the ground" in Yugoslavia.[2] They wanted Americans to do the dirty work, again.

Supporters of NATO rejoiced at the opportunity to demonstrate its continuing "relevance." They ignored the lack of legal authority for the Alliance to intervene in Balkan ethnic fighting (although some governments, notably that of Germany, did require parliamentary approval for their respective roles). While the misuse of NATO in Bosnia was bad enough, the ensuing conflict over Kosovo was much worse. An American president took the United States to war with a foreign state (Serbia) which had not attacked or threatened us, and proclaimed legitimacy for doing so not in the Constitution nor in the United Nations Charter, both of which do contain applicable authority, but in the North Atlantic Treaty, which does not.

The public relations rationale for NATO's first actual use of force was even more inverted than the legal legerdemain. On both sides of the

Atlantic, the Kosovo war was justified as a way to preserve NATO's "credibility." Ponder that logic: a defensive alliance initiates a non-defensive war to give itself legitimacy, or at least the appearance of viability. In short, NATO bombed Belgrade to show that it could bomb. The rationale for war was weakened still further by the scare tactics and inflation of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, where brutal villains abounded on both sides, and because NATO ignored far more pressing humanitarian crises elsewhere.

These precedents are frightening. Where, now, is the limit to what may be justified under the rubric of NATO? What prevents a future American president from initiating war via NATO for almost any purpose, anywhere? The implications for our republican form of government are daunting.

NATO lost its basic *raison d'être* years ago, as Europe's need for American troops ended long before the Cold War did.

Allies, auxiliaries or hangers-on?

However, critics might protest, does not NATO greatly enhance American power in the world? Is not NATO, as some have expressed it, a "toolbox" for the United States to supplement our own forces? The record on both scores is decidedly mixed.

Europe remains a net security consumer from America. Despite the large forces maintained by the European states and the existence of some excellent units, their collective security quotient is fairly modest. European militaries remain organized on a national—rather than regional—basis, with vast duplication, overlap and waste of resources. Many European "militaries" exist more for prestige and domestic job creation than for force projection. Indeed, the very concept of projecting military force remains toxic in many European countries and in almost all political parties of the left. In Germany, conscription actually supplies more young men to the national health program through alternative service than it sends to the armed forces.[3] While the much-vaunted "European pillar" of NATO can tabulate more soldiers, tanks and airplanes than we, the effective whole of Europe's forces remains much less than the sum of its parts.

The American security contribution to Europe is not free, and the balance is clearly in Europe's favor. Europe absorbs more security from the United States than it contributes. European elites are well aware of the benefits they enjoy from NATO and of the transfer of wealth which the American working class through its taxes and sons provides to the European middle and upper classes. Whenever there is American discussion of closing or reducing U.S. facilities or deployments in Europe, the European reaction is negative and couched in terms of money, not security. The Americans provide a low-cost service which frees European public funds for more popular programs, such as subsidized health care and opera. So, when Europeans acclaim the "shared values" of NATO, it may be the value of American manpower and defense spending they enjoy sharing.

As there is no credible military threat to Europe now or on the horizon, NATO justifies itself through "out-of-area" operations, although the Treaty is explicitly limited to

"the North Atlantic area." Under the "NATO as toolbox" concept, Europeans should be useful auxiliaries for America's non-European engagements. However, experience shows the "toolbox" is not always Washington's to employ—and may not contain the appropriate tools anyway.

After all, an alliance is only as good as its performance in a crisis, and NATO has shown several times it can stymie American efforts to mobilize European support. Even during the halcyon days of the Cold War, our European allies refused U.S. requests to use our NATO bases or even to overfly their territory when the issue involved the Middle East (i.e., the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya). U.S. forces labored under allied restrictions even on routine operations which might offend Europe's southern neighbors. Nor did the United States receive NATO support in either Persian Gulf war, although a number of members participated on a national basis. European governments refused U.S. efforts to involve NATO because operations against Iraq were not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. The lesson is clear: Europeans can and do say "no" when Washington wants to use NATO for purposes they do not share.

A model not to follow

Afghanistan is often portrayed as the acid test of the "new NATO," and in perverse ways it is. Afghanistan was appropriately America's war, not Europe's. We had been attacked and pursued our attackers to their refuge. Washington did not want to remake Afghanistan, but to destroy al-Qaeda. Over time, however, objectives have shifted. Today, bin Laden and his senior associates remain at liberty, while the Taliban is resurgent in many parts of the country. This happened because the United States did not follow through on its initial military success, but diverted into a "nation-building" mission of dubious utility. Had the United States concentrated on its limited initial goals in Afghanistan, the local population might reasonably have seen its self-interest as linked to ours. A prolonged occupation by foreigners, by its very nature, must eventually exhaust its welcome.

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Ironically, NATO participation in Afghanistan has contributed to this failure. The offer of European forces encouraged American policymakers to turn away from the pursuit of al-Qaeda and its local allies—a job that should have been the top priority of the U.S. defense establishment until achieved. Sadly, however, U.S. operations in Afghanistan quickly assumed secondary importance to preparations for the Iraq war, and were starved of specialist personnel and key resources during critical months of the campaign. It is difficult to believe Washington would have done this had it not expected NATO to pick up the slack. While European governments certainly did not seek such an outcome, the practical effect of NATO engagement in Afghanistan was to allow the United States to fumble in that conflict, at incalculable long-term cost.

Many European units deployed to Afghanistan contain high-quality

personnel who have done excellent (and often heroic) work. However, the governments which sent them were always more interested in influencing Washington than in transforming Afghanistan. (Whether the latter is possible or even desirable is another issue entirely.) Indeed, the very invocation of Article V for the first time after 9/11 was highly dubious, as the Treaty obviously envisages an attack by a state, rather than a terrorist group. Many previous attacks on European territory by Palestinian groups had not provoked NATO's retaliation on Middle Eastern countries sheltering them. Nor was Article V invoked in response to IRA attacks in the United Kingdom, including one in 1984 which almost killed much of the British government including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (and the Alliance did not contemplate occupying Ireland).

Having encouraged and shielded the process of European unity, America should not now worry that Europe is unable to live in peace. How Europeans would then choose to transform NATO into a European regional security system is entirely for them to decide, not for us.

What made the terrorist attacks of September 2001 different for NATO was concern by Europeans that American attention would turn away from them. The goal for European governments was to "prove" NATO's continuing worth to increasingly skeptical Americans. The solution was modest national contingents in Afghanistan under NATO auspices. In reality, many of the deployments fell short of commitments and have operated under national rules of engagement which severely restrict their utility on the ground. Nonetheless, the policy was a success, in that it is cheaper to send a few men to Southwest Asia than to replace the huge American security subsidy of Europe. That some Europeans serve in Afghanistan with distinction cannot obscure the ulterior motives which sent them there.

Thinking the eminently thinkable

What would a post-NATO European security system look like? Would it not revert to the endemic conflict of previous centuries without an American *ordnungsmacht* to enforce peace, or might it not fall prey to Russian domination? Neither fear reflects reality.

European integration, while imperfect, has effectively eliminated armed conflict among its participants, while almost the least militarized power in the Western world today is once-menacing Germany. That a unified Germany threatens none of its neighbors and feels threatened by none of them is a great historic achievement, for which the United States can rightfully assume some credit. Whatever its shortcomings, the European Union is unlikely to collapse if American uniforms were no longer on the continent. Having encouraged and shielded the process of European unity, America should not now worry that Europe is unable to live in peace. How Europeans would then choose to transform NATO into a European regional security system is entirely for them to decide, not for us. The legatees of Talleyrand, Palmerston and Bismarck are up to the job.

The principal security concern for many Europeans is Russia. Yet Russia, though in a resurgent nationalist phase, is incapable of major military adventures. Behind the glitter of oil and gas wealth is a country with 170 deaths per 100 live births (the corresponding figure for Italy is 103/100).[4] The twin crises of demographics and health are the central challenge for Russia in this century, even if its leaders have their eyes fixed on restored greatness. No country can be expansionist with a fertility rate at half of replacement, a rapidly shrinking conscription pool of young men weakened by endemic childhood vitamin and calcium deficiencies, and an economy based largely on commodity exports. It is noteworthy that little of the oil and gas money amassed by the Kremlin in recent years has gone to the Russian military, or is planned to. The Russian Army has not even replaced the conventional equipment and munitions it expended in Chechnya, while the planned construction of new strategic missiles and submarines will result in a still faster decrease of the country's nuclear deterrent force than took place under the tenure of Boris Yeltsin. The Russian Air Force must worry not only about aging aircraft but even more about aging pilots, while all the armed services continue to hemorrhage young officers and officer cadets, who correctly foresee a life of penury in uniform. As a military power, then, Russia is in a position to saber-rattle toward its former Soviet possessions, but not much more.

To be sure, Russia does have other instruments of national policy. Whereas in the late nineteenth century it was said in Russia that it had only two friends, its army and navy, today those have been replaced by oil and gas. To the evident surprise of many Europeans, Russia's leaders employ their limited national assets as means of influence and geopolitics rather than as strictly commercial undertakings. This demonstrates only that Europeans, who often like to lecture Americans about dealing with Moscow, still see what they want to see in Russia. Europe will face continuing challenges in dealing with Russia on energy issues, but three realities are clear. First, NATO is of no use in that calculus; there is nothing in the Alliance arsenal that can affect hydrocarbon pipeline routes, throughput, price or availability. As an American labor leader once said, you cannot dig coal with a bayonet. Second, Europe has none to blame but itself for its difficulties with Russia. The European Union dwarfs Russia by any relevant index, but can only exercise its strategic weight if it does so united. This is a European, not a transatlantic, task that Europe must face up to. Third, global energy markets are changing rapidly. Russia will decline as a petroleum exporter while its piped natural gas exports will face real competition in price and availability from liquefied gas. To be sure, Russia is and will remain a problem for Europe, but not one of mass armies or nuclear intimidation. The appropriate responses to Moscow now and for the foreseeable future are political and economic, not military.

European purposes in NATO are clear: to subordinate American power and resources to their interests and to maintain a mechanism by which to constrain the United States.

The dubious value of "values"

What purpose, then, does NATO now truly serve? According to its adherents, the Alliance is a mechanism for exporting democracy and a vehicle for "shared values." The signatories of the 1949 Treaty would surely have reacted to such rhetoric with incredulity. The member states vary widely in their forms of democracy, but all share basic rule of law and citizen rights. While such concepts warrant wider application in the world, recent experience casts doubt whether they can be successfully promulgated at gunpoint. Modern militaries are good for a number of things, but persuading other cultures to emulate our own is not one of them. In any case, America's military has commitments far beyond its reduced force structure. If this country is to have armed forces able to fight and win our wars (which inevitably will come again), we need to let them concentrate on that ultimate task.

Whether superpower or hyperpower, the United States does not possess limitless power. We need not maintain a foreign obligation just because we did so in a very different past.

European rhetoric about "values" to justify NATO plays on enduring American gullibility. The underlying message is "you should support and subsidize our security, doing tasks we are quite capable of if we chose to spend the resources, because thereby we together are spreading American 'values' around the world." One could admire the cleverness of this gambit were it not so shameless. European elites do not share American values and never have. This is true of both the political right and left. America represents a rejection of European values, which revolve around inherited national identities and a social order defined by inherited social classes. America is a created nation (many Europeans deny we even are a nation, or could be), revering individual liberty and opportunity, and rejecting class warfare as unnecessary and destructive. The European right always detested America as a threat to the legitimacy of their neofeudal privileges and inherited status. The European left dislikes the American experience because it challenges their faith in social revolution and the class struggle. The popular American notion that our country was widely admired in Europe in the past is false. Europeans as individuals have often done so, and many have chosen to join us. But Europe as a whole, and elites especially, long disliked and feared America as inimical to their own way of life and their centrality in world affairs. Europeans embraced America when they needed us, not to emulate us. That many Europeans today, especially among the best-educated, define themselves in anti-American terms is a reversion to an historic norm, rather than a departure from it.

NATO was a continuation of Europe's need for American power to prevent its own systemic collapse. In two World Wars (both of European origin) and the Cold War (the product of European ideologies), Europe could not bring order out of chaos without imported power. Europeans sought to harness American resources to serve European interests. In the First World War, French and British military and political leaders planned to use our

troops in their own force structures and were genuinely shocked when informed the Americans intended to fight under their own flag and command. European leaders in both wars conceived of the United States as comparable to their own colonies and dominions, albeit larger and richer. For them, America was an extension of Europe and a replacement for deficits of European manpower and money. Despite greatly altered circumstances, this basic perception remains: America is (or should be) essentially European and the servant of Europe. Americans see their country and themselves in quite different terms, however. Certainly, the United States has been a European power for most of the past century, but it is not a European country, society or culture. America is not European, and there the "shared values" rationale for NATO dies.

An America able to say "No"

European purposes in NATO are clear: to subordinate American power and resources to their interests and to maintain a mechanism by which to constrain the United States. Whether a European policy judgment may be wise in any particular case is largely irrelevant. The subordination of American policy is a clear infringement of our national sovereignty and freedom of policy choice. If our policies are ill conceived or executed, it is our responsibility to rectify them, rather than to surrender our judgment to that of Europe, whose historical record is hardly one that bears emulation.

Europe today is inward-looking and regional in ambition, while the United States (for better or worse) has global interests and responsibilities. Any reasonable assessment of the century ahead indicates our future is more likely to be linked with the emerging destinies of Asia than of Europe. It is noteworthy that our image is significantly more favorable in most Asian societies than in European ones; there is a basic affinity between Asian countries and our own, if we can recognize it. Even the American demographic is shifting away from European origins at a rapid pace, making America increasing a global nation of nations. Europeans hate this trend, for it foretells an America that will cease to feel the historical European affinities from which they profit so much.

> Security is the most fundamental aspect of public affairs, and European unity can never become fully mature until Europeans provide it for themselves. NATO is not a vehicle for European security integration; it is an impediment to it.

The transatlantic relationship ("relationship," not "alliance") will doubtless remain of immense importance to the United States. Europe and North America are linked by a dense web of economic and other ties which remain robust and are likely to thrive for generations to come. Together we constitute something like half the global economy and most of the developed world. However, economic relationships do not require military ties to flourish. To believe they do is Cold War thinking, not supported by either American or European history. No other country defines its external economics as inexorably linked

to military deployments and alliance obligations. America need not and should not do so.

Whether superpower or hyperpower, the United States does not possess limitless power. We need not maintain a foreign obligation just because we did so in a very different past. It is often noted that America possesses much more of the world's wealth than our share of its population, but rarely is the liability side of the ledger shown. Today, the asymmetry of America's global security obligations in comparison with those of other centers of wealth and power is striking. Our commitments are excessive, both when gauged against our capacities and the benefits accrued to the Republic. Obviously, some global burdens come with a global role, but there must be reasonable limits based on a sober assessment of national interest and of the capacities of other countries.

After almost a century of carrying Europe's water, it is time to stop. The Washington Treaty obligated this country to NATO for 20 years (Article XIII); thus, for almost four decades our role has exceeded our commitment. Europe is more than capable of looking out for itself and maintaining security in surrounding areas, including the Mediterranean and Black Seas plus much of Africa. Europe has the institutions, talent, technology and finances to manage the security of its corner of the planet. If (as seems likely) Europe does not choose to play a broader global security role, that is probably just as well. A provincial Europe is not a bad thing. What is not sustainable is that a restored Europe should remain a security protectorate of the United States. Security is the most fundamental aspect of public affairs, and European unity can never become fully mature until Europeans provide it for themselves. NATO is not a vehicle for European security integration; it is an impediment to it.

America remains the global leader in many fields including military power, but that is a national asset better husbanded than expended. Our armed forces need replenishment and a wiser choice of commitments. European security is one military burden America can and should lay down.

1. Dana H. Allin et al., "Repairing the Damage: Possibilities and Limits of Transatlantic Consensus," International Institute of Strategic Studies *Adelphi Paper* no. 389, October 2007.
2. Private conversation with the author, 1996.
3. See, for example, "Defense Economics Reform IV: Budgets and Expenditure Choices in the Post Cold War," Conference sponsored by the Conference Center of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the NATO Economics Directorate; Wildbad Kreuth, Germany; September 15-18, 2002.
4. M. G. Field, "The Health Crisis in the Former Soviet Union: A Report from the 'Post War' Zone," *Social Science and Medicine* 41, no. 11 (1995), 1469-1478.

PERSPECTIVE

"Tough Choices Ahead": An Interview with J. D. Crouch II

Dr. J. D. Crouch II served from January 2005 to May 2007 as Deputy National Security Advisor to President George W. Bush. Before that, Dr. Crouch served as the U.S. Ambassador to Romania, where he worked to expand democracy in Eastern Europe, increase cooperation between the United States and Romania in the global war on terror, and foster Romania's incorporation into Western security institutions such as NATO and the European Union. Earlier, from August 2001 through October 2003, Dr. Crouch served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

On February 2, 2008, he spoke with *Journal* associate editor Jim Colbert about missile defense, the challenge of Russia and the future of U.S. policy toward Iran.

One of the Bush administration's most significant achievements since taking office in 2001 has been to move the United States closer to being defended from ballistic missile attack. You were one of the principal architects of the administration's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001, and of the capabilities that the United States has begun to put into place since then. What do you see as the major missile defense milestones of the past seven years?

Obviously, the most important thing was to move beyond the Treaty, and to do so in a way that did not create a crisis in our relationship with Russia. That was effectively achieved, if you look at the date of the withdrawal announcement and the subsequent announcement by President Putin that, while they were not happy with it, they were going to continue to reduce their nuclear forces. This gave lie to the argument that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would return us

to an arms race situation with the Russians, and took a lot of potential political sting out of the decision, both here and abroad. Most importantly, it liberated the engineers and scientists who had been working on missile defense under the ABM Treaty from having to work around its various restrictions—some of them clearly articulated, some of them ambiguously so. That lifting of constraints has enabled us to do things in a rational way and increase the effectiveness of our defenses.

Another major accomplishment was the decision to begin a deployment of initial capabilities. The most significant aspect was that it forced the United States to think through the command and control arrangements for missile defense, and to begin to get the military involved in the operational aspects. It conceptually broke through the barrier that we had on strategic missile defense; until then, it was essentially a research and development program, and therefore not really taken very seriously within the uniformed military. The assigning of Strategic Command to the overall missile defense mission, and its integration into the mission sets for Northern Command and Pacific Command, were all important developments.

These efforts have been quite controversial. In particular, the administration's recent attempts to enlist Poland and the Czech Republic as partners in a European basing site have become the subject of considerable debate abroad—including within the European Union. How important is European participation to American missile defense efforts?

The so-called "third site" envisions the placement of a small number of interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. These could be used to protect the United States from potential ICBM-range systems, particularly those emanating out of Iran. But it also would be able to protect Europe from ICBM-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems emanating either from Iran or other sources, although not Russia. From a strategic standpoint, this closes a gap in our coverage, and begins to provide the West with some leverage over Iranian missile systems, which continue to be fielded and tested.

So, from a technical standpoint, as well as a strategic/military standpoint, it has value. But it is, again, a very modest deployment, and certainly not something that is capable of threatening the Russian Federation, nor should it be viewed as such. Despite the rhetoric out of Moscow these days, this is not a system that would have any capability against their strategic deterrent.

At the political level, it is quite important that the United States be seen as being deeply involved with—and able to be an ally of choice for—European nations. Right now, the Iranian ballistic missile threat may seem theoretical to Europeans. But if, in fact, the day comes when the development of the follow-on "Shihab" systems puts European capitals under threat, the situation would likely be very different. One can imagine a very stressful situation if Iran were able to directly threaten America's closest allies, and the United States would either not be able to defend them or only able to threaten retaliation.

Now that the "third site" has been announced, it is critical that the United States go forward with it. A lot of our European allies who have spoken out in favor of the deployment are expecting us to. But the controversy is there; it is there principally because the Russians have seen an opportunity to drive a wedge between the United States and our allies. Unfortunately that resonates with some in Europe, particularly in a post-Iraq environment.

You mentioned Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has condemned the Bush administration's plans and taken a number of confrontational strategic steps in response, including withdrawing Russia from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty last year. Is a modus vivendi with the Kremlin on missile defense really possible?

The Russians are going to act in their own interest. That means there are areas where we can cooperate with Moscow, and where we in fact are cooperating. But there are also areas where we are not going to be able to cooperate.

For example, the Russians have pegged their decision on the CFE Treaty to the "third site." Yet if somehow that were to go away, the Russians would not, in fact, reverse their decision. They had been complaining to us about CFE Treaty limitations long before there was any decision to deploy a "third site." Indeed, the Russians have not been in compliance with that agreement for years. Their withdrawal, therefore, is in fact a *de jure* representation of what they had been applying *de facto* for the past decade, back into the Clinton administration.

While there may be political cover for the Kremlin to argue it is withdrawing from the CFE Treaty or taking other sorts of actions as a result of missile defense, the reality is that Moscow sees the deployment as an opportunity to drive a wedge between us and our allies. As long as they see it that way, there is very little prospect of cooperation on missile defense.

The United States has offered extensive cooperation with the Russians in a wide variety of different areas relating to missile defense. We have tried to put every possible *hors d'oeuvre* on the table, just to see what Moscow might be interested in. There are probably some in Russia, perhaps in their military-industrial complex, who are interested in the technical aspects of such cooperation. But the overriding political imperative not to cooperate with the United States on strategic missile defense seems to have won the day, and probably will continue for as long as President Putin and his hand-picked successors are in power.

Speaking of Russia, it is no secret that relations between Moscow and Washington have grown increasingly frosty over the past two years. U.S. officials have repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the growing authoritarianism of the Putin government, as well as its neo-imperialist impulses toward the countries of Eastern Europe and the "post-Soviet space." What changes do you see taking place in Russian foreign policy, and what challenges do they pose for the United States in the years ahead?

What we are seeing is not so much a change in Russian policy as its enablement as a result of Russia's return to the status of a fairly wealthy country. I am not of the view that Russia is going to try to recreate the Soviet Union. But the jury is out on that, and we will have to see what direction Moscow finally takes. There's probably a position somewhere in the Russian political spectrum that would like to do that. The current group in power is not quite that ambitious, however. What they are trying to do is to ensure that they blunt any further NATO expansion, weaken the Atlantic Alliance by driving wedges between the United States and our European allies—and among them, as they have successfully done between Eastern Europe and Central and Western Europe.

We will no doubt continue to see that kind of activity. But this is not a return to the Cold War. Russian policy does not have the ideological component that it did during the Cold War. It does, however, have its own set of challenges and dangers that we are going to have to manage.

It is a key reason why the United States has to stay engaged in Europe, stay engaged in NATO, and continue to develop the political, diplomatic and military capabilities to remain the ally of choice. Moving forward on the "third site" is an important element of that.

Finally, Iran. The new National Intelligence Estimate(NIE) on Iran issued by the U.S. intelligence community this past December—with its key judgment that Iran halted its work on nuclear weapons development in 2003—has ignited a heated debate at home and abroad about Iranian capabilities and intentions. Can you put the NIE in strategic context?

If you look closely at the Iran NIE, what it really says is that there are three major aspects to Iran's nuclear weapons program. One of those was the weapon design capability, which the drafters claim to have evidence was frozen at some point in 2003. But they do not say at what state weapons design was frozen, whether we would know if it were unfrozen, or how long it would take if it were unfrozen to complete the work. They also go on to say that the crucial piece that the Bush administration has been worried about, the so-called "long pole of the tent" in developing nuclear weapons—that is, the capability to create fissile material either through uranium enrichment or through the creation of plutonium—continues, and probably will be expanded. In other words, the thing we worry about most, and the thing that is the hardest to do in the development of nuclear weapons, is continuing. The third thing we are seeing the Iranians continue to develop is delivery systems—particularly missile systems—for these capabilities. So the NIE leaves a lot of questions unanswered.

However, the administration's concerns about Iran are not just related to its development of nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime—as distinct from the Iranian people—is a key enabler of terrorism throughout the Middle East. This includes suborning democracy in Lebanon through its Syrian allies. They have been supporting destabilizing terrorist activities in Iraq, which have helped fuel the cycle of sectarian violence there. And they have been the principal supporter in recent years of obstructionist elements that try to keep a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement from emerging. So there are lots of reasons to be concerned about the authoritarian and expansionist ideology of Iran. You mate that up with the potential to have a nuclear weapon, and it is clear why the concern is there.

Nevertheless, post-NIE, the White House will be waging an uphill battle in crafting a comprehensive, multilateral approach to Iran. What is the Bush administration's strategy likely to be in the months ahead, and what role does Europe play in it?

Clearly, the political fallout from the NIE is going to make it more difficult to hold together any anti-Iran coalition. You are going to continue to see the U.S. trying to work with our European partners on Iran, but it is going to be in a more difficult context. It is going to be more difficult for the IAEA to be a willing and helpful player in this context as well. But it was going to be hard anyway; several resolutions have increased sanctions on Iran, yet these do not seem to have worked. There are some pretty tough choices ahead, in other words, either for this administration or the next one.

DISPATCHES

The Politics of Nuclear Cooperation

C. Uday Bhaskar

NEW DELHI—The proposed civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the United States is now some 32 months old. Since it was first floated by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in July 2005, it has roiled Indian politics in an unprecedented manner, becoming a lightning rod for opposition parties to give voice to their views about the United States, nuclear weapons and Indian foreign policy.

At one point in late 2007, it seemed as if the Congress-led UPA (United Progressive Alliance) coalition government in New Delhi might even fall, with Left parties threatening to pull out over the "operationalization" of the deal. As of this writing, the nuke deal hangs on by a slender thread. Indian officials remain committed to the agreement, but are quick to point out the difficulties associated with it. "No, I have not given up," Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee told a reporter in January. "We are working on how we can proceed… of course time is running out… but one cannot help it. Either you lose majority (by going ahead with the deal)… and if a government loses majority, nobody is going to have an arrangement with a minority government."

Therein lies the crux of the current problem. The two communist parties in India are vital for the UPA coalition in the Indian parliament's 543-member Lok Sabha (Lower House). In the May 2004 elections, Congress won just 145 seats, while its main rival, the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) obtained 138 and the two communist parties secured a combined 53 seats. Logically, therefore, Congress has been forced into an uneasy political partnership of necessity.

The inherent ideological tensions in this alliance came to the fore when the nuclear deal began to gain traction. The agreement is radical and innovative; it

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seeks to revive the long-estranged bilateral relationship between India and the United States by transforming the central bone of contention between them—the nuclear nettle—into an area of potential cooperation. As part of the deal, India would be accorded exceptional international status, staying outside the NPT and retaining a modest nuclear weapons program, even as some of its nuclear facilities were brought under IAEA safeguards. In return, the U.S. would facilitate India's admittance into the global civilian nuclear loop. This was as "win-win" as it could possibly get for the U.S, for India, and for global nuclear security.

But in order for the arrangement to be realized, many complex steps had to be taken—beginning with a change to existing U.S. law that prohibited any nuclear commerce with India. This was perceived to be a nearly impossible task, given the strong non-proliferation constituency within the United States. But the Bush visit to New Delhi in March 2006 provided the necessary political push, leading to the passage of the Hyde Act nine months later.

The next step was the mutually acceptable conclusion of a "123" agreement between the two countries. Again, domestic critics on both sides felt that this was not possible. But in a highly commendable, albeit protracted, set of negotiations, officials from both sides were able to come to terms on such a deal.

When the draft text was formally announced, the political opposition in India became more strident. While the text of the 123 agreement was fair to both sides, the BJP and Left parties took strong exception to certain provisions, including those that established penalties on India for future nuclear testing, and the implication that an important secondary goal of the deal was about "containing" China.

The BJP concerns have been curious. In its day, the NDA government—of which the BJP was a major part—had carried out the May 1998 nuclear tests while simultaneously improving relations with the U.S. The result was a groundbreaking new bilateral strategic dialogue called the NSSP (Next Steps in Strategic Partnership). But now, with the Congress-led UPA having negotiated the best possible deal to end India's nuclear and technological isolation, the BJP has changed its tune. Its objection is ostensibly about forfeiting India's right to test again and the constriction of India's strategic autonomy—neither of which is valid from an objective standpoint.

For their part, India's two communist parties—while formally part of the UPA coalition—have used the same arguments, and added a new one: that the deal would lead to a growing proximity to the "imperial" power, the U.S. Such a state of affairs is at complete variance with the political ideology of the Left, which prefers a closer relationship with Iran and China over a rapprochement with America. Here, the political orientation appears reminiscent of the decades of the Cold War, with the Indian Left firmly anti-American and pro-Chinese in its ideological orientation.

What is clear is that the principal opposition to the realization of the nuclear deal stems from the inflexible position adopted by two of India's major political parties in recent months. Their intransigence has everything to do with their respective political differences with the Congress party.

Yet there is still reason for cautious optimism. Indian public opinion in the main is supportive of improved ties with the U.S. And, at the end of the day, there is hope that this may compel India's bitter political rivals to establish some sort of *modus vivendi*.

Downing Street Blues

Michael Gove

LONDON—Normally, when politicians make predictions, events conspire to make them look foolish. But there was one forecast from a politician in 2007 which has been uncannily accurate. Presciently, precisely and painfully so.

Interviewed on the BBC at the beginning of last year, British minister David Miliband reflected on the unpopularity of the then Prime Minister, and tried to suggest that unpopularity was just a feature of incumbency. In a year, he predicted, people would be saying, "Wouldn't it be great to have that Blair back because we can't stand that Gordon Brown."

Less than a year later, Miliband is Foreign Secretary, sitting at Gordon Brown's right hand, and both find their government mired in unpopularity, barely at the level in the opinion polls which marked Blair's nadir. And what makes their position all the more tragically ironic is the casual assumption, previously held by so many in their party, that a simple change in personnel at the top and a new direction in foreign policy would be the basis for a political revival.

In the waning days of Blair's term, the standard view on the Left chalked Labour's unpopularity up to his support for the Iraq war. And the breaking point for many in the party, when they began openly to agitate for Blair's removal, came when he showed sympathy for Israel when it was attacked by Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. Blair's fall is thus seen as intimately linked with his positioning on foreign affairs. And the expectation within the Labour party and the broader Left was that Gordon Brown would win back popularity by charting a different course.

Brown, for his part, has responded to this trend. From the moment he took over, he sought to signal a different direction in foreign policy, one which explicitly acknowledged the legitimacy of the criticism of Blair from the Left.

So Mark Malloch Brown, a United Nations functionary who had been sharply critical of Blair over Iraq and Lebanon, was made a Foreign Office minister. His new Cabinet colleague Douglas Alexander, freshly appointed to the post of International Development Secretary, flew to Washington to give a speech in which he was critical of using "military might" rather than alliances as a measure of achievement. The speech was interpreted, understandably, as a further distancing of the new Brown team from the Bush doctrine.

True, Brown panicked when the speech was reported in particularly negative terms, and authorized a briefing in which Alexander was slapped down. But Alexander was only reflecting Brown's own inner instincts, as the world saw later when Brown himself visited the U.S. for his first summit meeting with President Bush. In place of the personal warmth of the Bush-Blair relationship, the new British premier opted for a rigidly impersonal approach. This passionless

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take on the "special relationship" was supposed to signal to the British Left that Brown shared their distaste for the cowboy in the White House, while also reassuring middle England that he nevertheless knew how to maintain a functioning working relationship with the world's largest power. But the impression left in most people's eyes was of a man who, having coveted leadership all his life, now seemed incapable of giving a lead. Whereas Blair's Atlanticism was born from conviction, Brown's seemed wholly shaped by calculation.

And it is calculation, of a peculiarly inept kind as it happens, which has marked all of Brown's other foreign policy positions. On Iraq, his principal aim has been to signal to domestic opinion his willingness to bring troops home as quickly as possible. So anxious was Brown to communicate that message that he tried to overshadow the Conservative Party Conference by making an announcement on troop reductions, only for subsequent analysis to show he had misled the public about the real level of withdrawal to take place.

Because Brown has been so fixated on the electoral front, he has failed to effectively articulate the importance of Iraq to the broader war against Islamist terror. And, by making his sole metric of success the speed with which he can draw down troops, an unflattering comparison can be drawn with the series of successes, in reducing casualties and containing al-Qaeda, secured by the U.S. "surge."

On the other principal front of the War on Terror, Afghanistan, he has been scarcely more impressive. Just before Parliament broke for the Christmas recess, Brown's team suggested that he would be willing to "talk to the Taliban." But when Brown actually made his statement to the House of Commons, no such offer of negotiation was made. Presumably, Brown had been told in the interim that going public with a desire to talk peace, while British troops were in the midst of intense warfighting, would only signal to the Taliban a fatal lack of resolve at a crucial time. Nevertheless, press reports at the end of 2007 claimed British officials are already negotiating with the Taliban. If correct, this would cast doubt not only on the prime minister's trustworthiness, but on his judgment.

The West's enemies have developed a sophisticated understanding of when, and how, leaders lack the resolution for the long struggle against jihadist violence. And it is striking, in that respect, how poorly Brown compares with his predecessor in his understanding of how to show steel in response. Whereas Blair understood, and explained clearly in his speeches, the ideological roots of Islamism, Brown has never given a proper explanation—of the kind his office demands—of the nature of the jihadist threat. This is true even though, after terrorist attacks were thwarted during his first weeks in office, Brown had the perfect platform to outline the totalitarian nature of the ideology, which can make killers out of doctors. He chose, however, to retreat behind tired old boilerplate.

Indeed, in a perverse sense, the policy positions adopted by the Brown government may be furthering jihadi interests. Brown argues consistently that it is through addressing material poverty that terrorism can be beaten. Addressing global poverty is indeed an urgent issue. But Brown's analysis risks playing into the jihadist narrative that their cause is sustained by global injustice.

Given how far Brown has traveled from the Blair position on foreign affairs, and done so with such little electoral benefit to show for it, perhaps it is worth

reassessing the Blair legacy. Rather than failing abroad, perhaps it is the failure of the Labour government to keep Britain competitive, the books balanced and the public services improving which has led to unpopularity at the polls. And while Blair was leading on foreign policy over the last few years, was it not the brooding figure in the Treasury, Brown himself, who was happy to style himself "domestic overlord"?

Gordon Brown may soon find, therefore, that the record which finally sinks Labour is not his predecessor's, but his own.

Winds of Change

Joel D. Rayburn

BAGHDAD—Most change in Iraq is incremental. For those of us working here in Baghdad, engrossed in the day-to-day details of a particular portfolio, change doesn't really register until we step back and mark where we are against where we began. My own frame of reference dates from December 2006, when I first visited Baghdad just a few weeks before the President announced the decision to "surge" U.S. forces into Iraq to deal with a security situation that was spinning out of control. Baghdad was on the verge of a sectarian civil war that Iraqi politicians seemed powerless or unwilling to halt, while Anbar province was in the grasp of a potent insurgency. The mood at MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy was bleak, and a sense of resignation prevailed among the strategists and staff.

Against this backdrop, the current situation in Iraq seems remarkable. The past year has seen a dramatic improvement in Iraq's security: deaths among Iraqi civilians and Coalition troops last month were about 80 percent lower than in December 2006. Notably, the situation has improved the most in the areas that were worst in December 2006. The formerly hellish Anbar province now sees fewer than two attacks of all kinds on any given day, while Baghdad, where Coalition troops and Iraqi forces once discovered dozens of corpses each morning, now sees fewer than a half dozen successful attacks on an average day. This reduction in violence has allowed a return to something approximating normal life and routine commerce. For Iraqis, Baghdad and Anbar no longer feel like war zones, and simple survival is no longer the order of the day. The Coalition, meanwhile, now tackles problems with an energy that was missing in late 2006.

No single factor explains these changes. The Coalition, the Iraqi government, the Iraqi people, and the enemy all played a part.

The arrival of 30,000 additional U.S. troops in Iraq during the first half of 2007 was absolutely critical to the reduction in violence. Even more important, though, was that Coalition leaders chose to employ them, and all of our forces, differently: rather than concentrating on large bases, our troops moved into Iraq's neighborhoods and stayed there in order to secure the population for the first time since this war began. Meanwhile, once the final "surge" brigade arrived last June, Coalition and Iraqi troops launched a campaign to seize al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI's) sanctuaries ringing the city of Baghdad. The months since have seen al-Qaeda brought under unceasing pressure in these areas, some of which had not been patrolled by Coalition or Iraqi forces for several years. Since the "surge" truly got under way last summer, AQI's leadership cadre has been pushed further and further from the capital, its strategy derailed.

We should also remember that the "surge" was not just a Coalition affair: the Iraqi government deployed an additional 100,000 soldiers and police in 2007.

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This has made a huge difference on the battlefield, and the Iraqi security forces will grow even further in size and capability over the coming year. In southern Iraq in particular, the growth of the Iraqi Army and police is enabling the Iraqi government to assert increasing control in key cities that have long been under the sway of militias.

Perhaps the most significant development of the past year, however, is that the Iraqi people collectively rejected the extremist groups that brought the country to the brink of civil war. Repulsed by AQI's brutal tactics and nihilism, Sunni Arabs turned against al-Qaeda in large numbers, forming local volunteer groups that are now working with Coalition and Iraqi forces to deny AQI the sanctuaries it requires to operate. After a rampage of almost five years, al-Qaeda has discovered it cannot resist the phenomenon of local people helping to establish and maintain their communities' security.

At the same time, Shi'a Arabs throughout Iraq were repulsed by the thuggery of Shi'a extremists operating under the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) banner. In a seminal moment last August, elements of JAM attacked government forces standing guard over a religious festival in the holy city of Karbala. Publicly shamed by this outrage, Moqtada al-Sadr ordered a "freeze" on JAM activities that has continued to this day, and which has helped to greatly reduce attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces.

None of this means that the war is over yet. The progress we've seen is not irreversible. A still-dangerous al-Qaeda in Iraq is desperately attempting to reestablish a base in northern Iraq, and this means there is hard fighting ahead for the Coalition and the Iraqi government. Similarly, Shi'a extremists continue to target Iraqi government leaders and officials in an effort to dominate the Iraqi state, and they must be dealt with if Iraqis are to have a real chance at living under the rule of law. The coming campaign against these threats will have a great bearing on whether the Coalition is able to further reduce its presence in Iraq beyond the already-planned reduction of the five "surge" brigades.

Perhaps the best hope for Iraq is that the Iraqi people seem to have made a psychological shift. Weary of war, they grab hold of any opportunity to assert Iraqi unity, such as the Iraqi soccer team winning the Asia Cup, or people celebrating Ramadan in the streets without fear of car bombs for the first time in years. Now the Iraqis look to their government to do its part by translating what has happened in Iraq's neighborhoods into political reconciliation at the national level.

We in the Coalition look for the same, and we use every tool at our disposal to encourage, cajole, and warn our Iraqi partners to change the old zero-sum Iraqi political culture. But a national compact is not going to materialize overnight. Five years of experience in Iraq instructs us that the Iraqis will need our sustained commitment to get where we want them to go. Remember: most change in Iraq is incremental.

Book Reviews

Looking Back to Look Forward

Asaf Romirowsky

Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 672 pp.

The enormity of September 11th, the massive scale of destruction and loss brought about by calculated suicide hijacking and a desire to kill for the sake of killing, forced America to open its eyes and take a closer look at the Middle East. More than any other single event over the past few decades, 9/11 has been responsible for generating questions about the nature of U.S. involvement in the region.

That involvement is anything but new. Michael Oren's latest book, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present*, delves into America's relationship with the Middle East since the American Founding. In the process, it systematically and effectively demolishes the myth that U.S. involvement in the Middle East is a modern phenomenon. Instead, as Oren illustrates, the entanglements of the Middle East stretch as far back as the Barbary Wars of the early Republic.

From then through the current quandary in Iraq, Oren argues, three themes have dominated every American encounter with the Middle East. The first is "power," defined by Oren as military force and economic influence. The second is "faith," and the clash between a deeply Protestant Republic and the Muslim Middle East. The last is "fantasy": the misperceptions and deceptions about the region that have inspired so many Americans, from businessmen to presidents.

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Some may be skeptical of this triumvirate. But those that are face the daunting task of finding another unifying theory for America's involvement in the region. After all, the U.S. consistently has provided the Middle East with advanced technology, democracy or mediation for peace, and supported a Jewish state as something that is both desirable and sustainable.

There are some foreign policy minimalists who would like to believe that hatred towards America, as well as American involvement in the Middle East, began when George W. Bush came to office, and that it will depart with him. Nothing could be further from the truth. Thanks to Oren's research, we learn that the notion of American support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was already being discussed in 1844, put forth in a best-selling book entitled *Visions of the Valley* that called for the United States to spearhead an international effort to establish a modern Judean state. The book was authored by one Professor George Bush, a direct ancestor of two later American presidents bearing the same name. This sentiment was also reiterated by Abraham Lincoln, who in his day said that "restoring the Jews to their national home in Palestine... is a noble dream and one shared by many Americans." Thus, support for a Jewish homeland represents one of the basic—and most enduring—elements of America's engagement with the region.

Others highlight the 1920s, when the American people became enamored with oil and demanded equal access to this precious commodity in the Middle East, then controlled by the French and British. Consequently, the U.S. government obtained a 23.75 percent share in the Iraq Petroleum Company, marking a turning point for American business in the region. Some eight decades later, U.S. involvement in the Middle East has come to revolve ever more closely around this most precious of commodities.

Over the years, the fantasy notion of the Middle East as the romantic culture of veils and flying carpets became so ingrained in American pop culture, fashioned by stories like *A Thousand and One Arabian Nights* and Hollywood blockbusters such as "Indiana Jones" and "Hidalgo." But, as Oren explains, this fascination is hardly new. It has been over a century since the Middle East made Mark Twain famous when his collected dispatches from the Holy Land, *The Innocents Abroad*, became the biggest bestseller in America in the late 1800s. "It sold more books than the Bible," Twain characteristically quipped.

The United States emerged as a force to be reckoned with in the Middle East during the early twentieth century. But, says Oren, the three lenses—power, faith and fantasy—continued to apply. According to him, Woodrow Wilson's ambivalent reply to Arab and Zionist calls for self-determination after World War I, Harry Truman's rapid recognition of Israel three decades later, and every American reaction to a predicament in the Middle East, from Suez in 1956, the 1967 Six-Day War to the Islamic mayhem in Iran in 1979, were all viewed through one of these prisms.

This history matters a great deal. In order for America to become a better and more effective actor in the Middle East, it needs to understand how the region has played a definitive role in shaping American identity. The creation of the U.S. Constitution,

the making of the U.S. Navy, and the composition of the Star Spangled Banner all bear the indelible mark of America's encounter with the Middle East. And today, in the era of global terrorism and America's response to it, our ties to the region will only continue to increase. As such, Oren's is an indispensable work, one that brings vital historical understanding to how Washington interacts with that most turbulent of regions—and provides insight into how to establish a more stable and durable U.S.-Middle East relationship.

Turf War

Ilan Berman

VALI NASR, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 287 pp.

It has been nearly five years since President George W. Bush stood on the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq. During that time, the United States has gotten a first-hand education in the complex ideological and religious frictions that simmer below the surface in the Muslim world. And while the Bush administration's "surge" has now helped the Coalition regain the initiative in the former Ba'athist state, it has become abundantly clear that if Washington and its allies hope to maintain—and, better yet, to expand—their influence in the region as a whole, they still have a great deal to learn about what makes its inhabitants tick.

Along comes *The Shia Revival*, Vali Nasr's masterful survey of the politics of Shia identity. Part history tome, part theological primer, *The Shia Revival* is an indispensable glimpse into what most Muslims know well but Westerners all too often do not: the internal divisions within Islam, and the historically marginalized role of the Shia in Muslim politics. "The divide between Shiism and Sunnism is the most important in Islam," Nasr explains. "The two sects parted ways early in Muslim history, and each views itself as the original orthodoxy." The resulting bloody rivalry has shaped centuries of Muslim politics from Asia to the Levant.

But *The Shia Revival* is intended to be much more than simply a reference work—and therein lies the problem.

"Where you stand depends on where you sit," the old proverb suggests, and Nasr's is a case in point. Himself a Shiite and the son of a prominent Islamic scholar, the author is convinced of his sect's moral and intellectual superiority, as well as the righteousness of its will to power. Nasr's narrative plays heavily on the positive role of the Shia in Middle Eastern politics as champions of modernity and democracy. By contrast, he paints a damning portrait of Sunnis, accusing them of the brunt of Islamic fundamentalism plaguing the world today.

The starkness of this depiction requires a bit of creative license. After all, the one country commonly recognized as the world's leading state sponsor of international terrorism is the one at the epicenter of the Shia revival: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nasr's narrative, however, minimizes the destabilizing role that Iran has played on the world stage since the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the Islamic Republic in 1979. Of course, Nasr cannot completely

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disregard the Islamic Republic, but his minimalist approach seems for all the world to be the product of necessity. Quite simply, Nasr needs to downplay the pernicious nature of the militant movement now in power in Tehran because it poses a challenge to his portrayal of Shiites as pristine, quietist underdogs.

Naturally, this tends to color Nasr's depiction of Iran's role in regional instability. In his telling, the relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran is one of unequivocal antagonism. The truth, however, is a good deal more complex. While there is certainly no love lost between Tehran and the bin Laden network, they can and have cooperated in the past. Thus, al-Qaeda's late, unlamented lieutenant in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, took refuge in Iran multiple times between the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and his death in mid-2006. And there are still, by all accounts, a number of high-value al-Qaeda targets under "house arrest" in Iran—where anecdotal evidence implies they are residing quite comfortably. All of which suggests that, for all of their strategic and sectarian differences, Iran and al-Qaeda are not nearly as distant as Nasr makes them out to be.

Most problematic of all, however, are the policy prescriptions woven subtly throughout *The Shia Revival*. Nasr's argument is clear and unmistakable. The rise of the Shia is an inexorable force, a causal factor in the changing politics of the turbulent Middle East. For him, this is a benign—indeed, beneficial—turn of events. "The Shia revival constitutes the most powerful resistance and challenge to Sunni extremism and jihadi activism within the region," Nasr writes.

Perhaps this is because, as Nasr sees it, the interests of the United States and those of the Shia are inextricably intertwined, as encapsulated by his highly-dubious assertion that "War on America is now war on Shiism, and war on Shiism is war on America." The not-so-subtle message is that the West should stop worrying and learn to love *Pax Irannica*.

Such a prescription may be music to the ears of Iran's ayatollahs. But to American policymakers, now struggling to retain strategic leadership in one of the world's most turbulent regions, it is a recipe for marginalization and decline. Simply put, an America that acquiesces to—and accommodates—the regional primacy of Iran cannot be a credible champion of the struggle against radical Islam.

And that is precisely what makes the Shia revival, and *The Shia Revival*, so problematic. Nasr has undoubtedly done observers of the region a major service by chronicling and demystifying the sectarian schisms now visible in Iraq and beyond. But his conclusion, that the political ascent of the Shia (and, by extension, of Iran) should be embraced unequivocally, is too simplistic by half. That it advocates such an approach suggests *The Shia Revival* is not only a chronicle of the partisan clash of ideologies taking place within Islam; it is an example of it.

Tracking the Dragon

Randall G. Schriver

JOSHUA EISENMAN, Eric Heginbotham and Derek Mitchell, eds., *China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 232 pp.

In their 1967 classic folk-rock song, Buffalo Springfield sang the verses, "There's something happening here; What it is ain't exactly clear." Such are the sentiments of many U.S. policymakers when analyzing the so-called "rise of China." The "something" we know to be happening is the emergence of China onto the world stage—a development that our own National Intelligence Council opined "is similar to the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a powerful U.S. in the early 20th century, and will transform the geopolitical landscape with impacts potentially as dramatic as those in the previous two centuries."

We also know that associated with China's emergence is a rapidly changing Chinese approach to foreign policy. PRC leaders have shed the principles upon which Deng Xiaoping shaped China's foreign policy in the modern era—principles such as "bide our time, build our capabilities" and "never take the lead." Today, China pursues its interests through more creative and proactive diplomacy. In addition, China has greater capabilities and a widening "toolbox" available to it in its pursuit of its foreign policy goals. The net effect is that China is choosing deeper engagement and involvement with the outside world, and is increasingly effective at promoting its interests, even in instances where its interests clash with those of the United States and other established powers.

What is not clear—perhaps even to its leaders themselves—are China's intentions once it has acquired power and influence. Yet such knowledge is essential for crafting a sophisticated and effective U.S. policy. Simply put, Washington needs clarity regarding both China's capabilities and its intentions as Beijing comes into its own.

Now, thanks to *China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, we have some help on that score. Edited by China scholars Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham and Derek Mitchell, *China and the Developing World* is an important foundation for helping assess China's actions over the last several years in a number of key regions around the globe.

Perhaps it is the case that most published volumes are the end result of a great deal of hard work. Even so, *China and the Developing World*

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stands out as a remarkable effort, for several reasons.

First, it should be recognized that achieving a clear understanding of Chinese foreign policy and strategic intent—and articulating those findings in a straightforward manner—can be highly problematic. The Chinese government remains opaque and suspicious of outsiders, and thus is reluctant to be transparent about such matters. China does not publish an official national security strategy, nor does it even have a national security council to articulate such a strategy. Furthermore, Chinese leaders are often in the business of purposefully obscuring the actual intent behind their actions. Thus, the effort is not simply one of mining data and sifting through it; a keen analytical eye is also needed in order to exercise "oversight" on the data collection and ensure results are not tainted by Chinese manipulation.

Second is the political environment associated with the topic addressed in the book. Today, the "rise of China" is a hotly debated issue in policy and academic circles, and often elicits as much emotion as it does objective reasoning. China watchers eagerly consume every new offering, and in short order will declare a book as being "pro-China" or "anti-China." *China and the Developing World* defies such easy categorization. It is dispassionate, objective, and unassailable in its analysis. The editors and contributing authors have found the razor-thin strip of middle ground between the "China bashers" and the "panda-huggers," and given us just the facts.

Third, *China and the Developing World* is one of the first books to give us a clear story line regarding China's influence in the developing world. Discussing the "rise of China" is not particularly helpful in the absence of hard data. To understand "influence" in foreign policy terms is to understand sources of leverage, and the relative influence of countries vis-à-vis others. By virtue of examining China's activities region by region (and in many cases, country by country), as well as placing these developments in proper historical context, we now have a tool for assessing the trend lines associated with China's emergence as a more influential global actor.

Finally, the editors should be applauded for building a volume around contributing authors who can all be described as "young scholars." When it comes to China, there is great merit to seeking such voices from the "new generation." After all, China's emergence presents us with the defining challenge for the generation to come. As such, it is a subject that deserves the attention of the best and the brightest who are in the earlier stages of their academic and policy careers.

In many ways, then, *China and the Developing World* is the start of a larger conversation. Eisenman, Heginbotham, Mitchell and the volume's contributing authors leave plenty of room for further research. Indeed, they themselves note that in order to understand the net effects of China's emergence, one will need to observe and track them over time.

The U.S. government seems to agree. "China faces a strategic crossroad," the Pentagon noted in its 2006 annual report to Congress on Chinese military power. "It can choose a pathway of peaceful integration and benign competition. China can also choose, or find itself upon, a pathway along which China would emerge to exert dominant influence in an expanding sphere… the future of a

rising China is not yet set immutably on one course or another." Books like *China and the Developing World* are an important resource for American policymakers seeking to determine exactly which option Beijing is leaning toward.

Expecting the Unexpected

Adam Lovinger

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, ed., *Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 198pp.

Over the past few decades, forcing events, strategic surprises and wild cards have exacted a heavy toll. The near-instantaneousness of Pearl Harbor, 9/11, and some natural disasters—as well as the "slow surprise" of HIV/AIDS, which circled the globe for nearly fifty years before being recognized as a pandemic—all serve as examples of the certainty of uncertainty in global politics.

Yet, until recently, when the U.S was blindsided by such low probability high impact (LPHI) events, there was little debate about how governments could prepare for similar future occurrences. "Acts of God," as they are often dubbed, have historically been deemed both unstoppable and impractical to plan for.

Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics is an insightful and thought-provoking effort to engage—and to predict—the problems faced by decisionmakers and analysts confronted by uncertainty. It is also an attempt to offer some sound suggestions on what may practically be done to prepare ourselves for future such events. This contribution to the growing literature on the nature and impact of LPHI uncertainties comes at a welcome time, given the varied nature of looming potential threats we face: WMD attacks on cities, catastrophic climate change fallout, or even mass destruction caused by an asteroid's hitting Earth, among others explored by the authors.

Edited by Francis Fukuyama, *Blindside* features such high-profile contributors as Anne Applebaum, Eliot Cohen, Josef Joffe, Walter Russell Mead and Itamar Rabinovich. It begins by offering a theoretical framework explaining why anticipating and preparing for blindside events has historically proven so difficult.

The first problem has to do with getting present-day decisionmakers, faced with a host of quotidian exigencies, to take seriously certain potential LPHI events. If told some potentially catastrophic event has a low probability of occurring, officials tend to do little or nothing—even if such an event would prove catastrophic, should it take place. The difficulty of convincing decisionmakers that a surprise is even possible, much less getting them to imagine what can be done in response, is even more difficult when such scenarios challenge conventional wisdom.

Second, even if this first hurdle is overcome, the investment needed to hedge against LPHI events is expensive. Since policymakers, financiers and politicians—particularly those on

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two- and four-year election cycles—are under great psychological and institutional pressure to maximize the impact of their limited resources for near-term gains, the case for allocating resources for low-probability catastrophes is a hard sell.

The third difficulty derives from the fact that decisionmakers tend to be biased in one direction or another, depending upon their profession. A crucial causal factor underlying the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, for example, was a widely held false sense of security generated by high returns and market confidence, which lulled investors into complacency regarding basic economic fundamentals. In the U.S., this optimistic bias is aided by the moral hazard of government policies which allow financial institutions to fully benefit from profitable markets while enjoying protection from too hard a fall should things not work out as hoped. This view is also found among politicians, who express a bias toward optimism and confidence when faced with ambiguity, downplaying risks they cannot control and portraying risks as nothing more than challenges to be overcome through skill and determination.

Conversely, pessimistic worldviews are often held by government bureaucrats, particularly those working in national security positions. There, accurately predicting positive events largely goes unrewarded while failing to anticipate negative developments is punished, particularly by Congress and the press. Perhaps no other organization is as institutionally prone to such biases as the intelligence community, which harbors a very human tendency—masterfully elucidated some years ago in Roberta Wohlstetter's landmark book *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*—to find intelligence consistent with prevailing worldviews, cognitive biases, long-held mental models and self-interest. These cognitive frailties prevent early recognition of blindside events with consequences encapsulated by George Orwell's observation that "sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on the battlefield."

Fourth, even if decisionmakers decide that something must be done to head off LPHI catastrophes, the act of preparing for such events—much less allocating resources to deal with them—potentially exposes them to ridicule and lost votes. As the authors point out, over the past 20 years many "well-known commissions" predicted that terrorists would attack the World Trade Center again, airplanes could be used as weapons, and Osama bin Laden would orchestrate attacks on the symbols of U.S. power. But politicians and bureaucrats responsible for such matters predictably focused their attention elsewhere rather than expend limited resources to prevent some unlikely future catastrophe.

Finally, this negative incentive structure is compounded by the probability that even if a particular LPHI event is planned for, and action is taken ahead of time to head it off, no political credit will be forthcoming. If President Bush had invaded Afghanistan to prevent 9/11 before it happened and destroyed al-Qaeda, the U.S. would likely be even more ridiculed internationally, while voters, egged on by Congress, would likely seek retribution at the polls for the Administration's warmongering. The end result is a type of "tragedy of the commons" effect, where no planning is usually done.

From there—with the use of case studies as diverse as national security, finance, energy, and health—the book moves on to focus on recom-

mendations for planning for, and mitigating the fallout from, blindside events if and when they occur. The volume's conclusions are clear and helpful. LPHI events—particularly strategic surprises—often exhibit recognizable signs, may be identified before they arise, and thus mitigated as long as appropriate resources are expended throughout the process.

These findings should be heartening for officials in Washington. They suggest that, despite the myriad challenges involved in doing so, getting decisionmakers to focus on—and plan for—blindside events could help make them not so unexpected after all.

THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

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