THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

Number 19, Fall/Winter 2010

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Ambassador Robert Joseph
Former Undersecretary of State for
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From the Publisher

I recently wrote an article in which I coined a new word, "gradualization." It is a word that should eventually find its way into the 21st century political lexicon. It is the alternative to revolution.

The word refers to a predetermined outcome that comes about so gradually that the populace accepts the change before it has realized just how much things have changed. Gradualization is accompanied by rhetoric to the effect that the agents of change have changed nothing at all.

There are many current examples of gradualization but a perfect and illustrative one is the change brought about by the AKP party in Turkey. When first elected, everybody said that this was the end of modern day Turkey and that Islamization is just around the corner. The Turkish military was poised to defend Turkey's constitution as it had done so many times before.

But there was no rapid change that allowed the Turkish military to react within the framework of its authority.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan learned from the failure of his Islamist predecessor, Necmettin Erbakan, who had almost immediately tried to make dramatic changes that challenged the secular constitution of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and, as a result, was forced by the country's military to step down.

Now move the clock forward several years and Erdogan has consolidated his power and there is a totally new Turkey. It is Islamized, and it still has further to go. Where it crossed over the line is hard to tell. But Erdogan knew where he was going from day one.

American Turkophiles, myself included, now view with nostalgia the old Turkey that used to be an ally. For the moment, that is history. Part of the problem was the perennial belief on the part of democracies that "it can't happen here." This makes the case for the old adage that "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance."

Just as some in the Arab community yearn for the glory days of the Caliphate, Erdogan and his crowd dream of a return to the days when the Caliphate emanated from the Ottoman Empire.

And who, in these dreams, is the Caliph? I suspect that in at least one dream his name is Recep Tayyip Erdogan.



Tom Neumann
Publisher

Go ahead. Try explaining to him that $2.9 billion would be better spent on an F-35 extra engine than on what our troops really need.

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Editor's Corner

This April, the Obama administration hosted a major summit of 47 world leaders in Washington. The topic on their agenda was singular, and timely: the security of the world's nuclear materials. The meeting highlighted the urgency of an issue that has steadily risen on the strategic agenda of the United States.

It is only fitting, therefore, that in this issue we tackle the subject with a series of articles examining the changing nature of proliferation, and America's response to it. Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation chronicles the dangerous arms race taking shape in the Middle East, as regional states scramble to acquire strategic counterweights to the emerging Iranian bomb. Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army War College takes a look at Russia's utilitarian approach to weapons of mass destruction—and how Moscow's peculiar take on proliferation hurts American (and global) security. Arms control expert Joshua Pollack then examines Syria's short, frenetic quest for an atomic capability, and how Israel stopped it. Former NSC staffer Carolyn Leddy probes the dynamics of North Korea's proliferation practices—and suggests a much-needed reboot of American policy toward the DPRK. From there, Tel Aviv University's Emily Landau explains the new—and dangerous—push in the global arms control community to eliminate Israel's policy of nuclear opacity. Keith Payne of the National Institute for Public Policy takes aim at the specifics, and the pitfalls, of the new arms control agreement recently concluded between Moscow and Washington. Longtime WMD expert Peter Pry then provides a trenchant examination of America's increasingly vulnerable strategic deterrent, and the ominous implications thereof. We conclude with an analysis by former Strategic Defense Initiative director Henry Cooper and Robert Pfaltzgraff of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis of how missile defense can help with the growing demands of counter-proliferation in the 21st century.

From there, we turn our attention to the enduring struggle against radical Islam, in an attempt to gauge how we are faring in the conflict formerly known as the War on Terror—and the future threats confronting the United States and its allies. *Middle East Quarterly* editor Efraim Karsh details how President Obama's vaunted outreach to the Muslim world has sounded a discordant note among its intended audience. Former CIA officer Ian Martinez provides a comprehensive and timely overview of the dynamics at play in what might just become the Middle East's next failed state: Yemen. General David Grange explores how the private sector can help in a "whole of government" approach to counterterrorism. Jon Perdue of the Fund for American Studies explains how, and why, radical Islam is gaining strength and adherents in the Western Hemisphere. Islam scholar Timothy Furnish introduces the reader to the opaque and influential Islamist movement Tablighi Jama'at. Sergei Markedonov, one of Russia's leading experts on the Caucasus, details the changing nature of the challenge confronting the Kremlin on its turbulent periphery. And military officer P.J. Dermer examines the shifting parameters of America's engagement in Iraq, and what is likely to follow America's withdrawal.

This issue also features a "Perspective" interview with Ambassador Robert G. Joseph, who served as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security under the Bush administration, as well as Dispatches from Morocco, Tunisia and Austria. We conclude, as always, with reviews of a quartet of timely books dealing with the U.S. national security debate, cyberwarfare, Palestinian terrorism and American counterinsurgency strategy.

Here at *The Journal*, we pride ourselves with providing foresight and insight into the changing global national security debate. With this issue, we hope you'll agree that we have once again done so.

Ilan Berman
Editor

The Post-Iran Proliferation Cascade

Peter Brookes

With the exception of a handful of capitals friendly to Tehran, and of course the Iranian regime itself, few now dispute the notion that the Islamic Republic of Iran is involved in a nuclear weapons program—and one that will, unfortunately, come to fruition in the next few years. News of Iran's seemingly-unstoppable drive for nuclear status is no real surprise, of course; despite four UN Security Council Resolutions condemning Iran and imposing punitive economic sanctions, Tehran continues to enrich uranium for those weapons virtually unhindered.

Making matters worse, Iran recently informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would move beyond the three to four percent uranium enrichment level normally used for reactor fuel, alarmingly increasing enrichment to 20 percent.[1] While not illegal under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran is a signatory, there is no benign reason to enrich uranium beyond those levels, leaving little doubt about Tehran's strategic intentions. It clearly puts Tehran on track to being able to enrich uranium to 80 percent or more—the levels needed for a nuclear weapon.

Putting a finer point on it, Central Intelligence Agency director Leon Panetta told an American national news program this summer that "[w]e think they [Iran] have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons."[2] The U.S. intelligence community now believes Iran will be able to weaponize this fissile material in the next one to two years.[3]

Peter Brookes, a Heritage Foundation senior fellow, is a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, Congressional staffer, CIA and State Department officer, and navy veteran.

American officials aren't the only ones worried. Intense suspicion over Iran's nuclear program, combined with nervousness over Tehran's already-capable short-range and medium-range ballistic missile arsenal, is increasingly palpable in the Middle East, where a dangerous domino effect is taking shape.

Regional restlessness

Commentators tend to focus on the United States, Israel, and Iran in the seemingly quixotic struggle to prevent Tehran from joining the once-exclusive nuclear weapons club. But Tehran's efforts are not taking place in isolation from the rest of the region; Iran's nuclear program increasingly is garnering the rapt attention of countries in the Middle East.

The consequences are potentially profound. When a country becomes a nuclear weapon state, its clout, leverage, prestige, and even legitimacy are bolstered significantly, often at the expense of others. In addition, the development of a nuclear deterrent, depending on the circumstances, can provide a state with a new degree of freedom to undertake policies that it might not otherwise be able to conduct due to political, economic or conventional military opposition. A dramatic development such as the one embodied in a nuclear breakout can shift existing balances of power, destabilize security situations, create or increase existing tensions, and infuse regional dynamics with additional levels of uncertainty.

Tehran's neighbors are justifiably concerned about the effect a new nuclear weapons state will have on the neighborhood—and how such a development will affect their own respective national security interests. Not surprisingly, questions regarding Iranian behavior in a post-proliferation environment are now generating significant discussion and debate, especially in the Middle East.

Geopolitically, some Sunni Arab states clearly feel threatened by the rise of a Shi'a Persian superpower in their midst, and are worried about Middle Eastern leadership shifting towards Tehran and away from the region's traditional centers of power, Cairo and Riyadh. Once in possession of a bomb, Iran could quickly become the region's dominant state, reasserting its long-lost place as a historical, cultural and political hegemon in the Middle East and even South Asia. It might also see an opportunity to redress what it perceives as pernicious discrimination against Shi'ism by Sunni-led states, animating Shi'ite minorities along the Persian Gulf, across the Middle East—and beyond. And, less challenged by conventionally-armed rivals, a nuclear Iran might flex some military muscle in the Persian Gulf, affecting commerce and the flow of energy through the Strait of Hormuz, a major regional chokepoint.

Of course, its new status might also encourage Tehran to increase its support for terrorist proxies such as Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, further roiling the region's security situation, especially for arch-nemesis Israel. If its recent, inflammatory language is to be believed, a nuclear Iran also might look for opportunities to engage Israel directly in some way on a conventional military level or, worse yet, opt for the unspeakable nuclear option. And while Tehran has been quietly meddling in the internal affairs of neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan for some time now, possession of a nuclear bomb might prompt it to play an even larger, more destabilizing role in those places.

Indeed, as a recent editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* noted, "The world's most open secret is that the Arab countries of the Middle East fear a nuclear Iran as much, and perhaps more, than Israel does."[4] And because they do, countries in the region are taking steps to protect their national interests and address the security dilemma that Tehran is creating in the Middle East.

Atomic aspirations abound

In just the last four years, no fewer than fourteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced their intention to pursue civilian nuclear programs—programs which, irrespective of their stated purpose, many believe are a hedge against the possibility of a nuclear Iran.

Possible Atomic Aspirants

Syria
United Arab Emirates
Jordan
Egypt
Yemen
Saudi Arabia
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Algeria
Libya
Morocco
Tunisia

Of course, it is possible that the intentions of these states are honest ones, spurred on by domestic energy needs. Not all countries are blessed with abundant natural resources, and consequently could be seeking an efficient and durable source of energy. There are even those that may be attempting to diversify their energy sources beyond simply oil and natural gas, or seeking to free up their energy reserves for profitable international export instead of costly domestic consumption. In addition, due to increasing concerns about climate change, some have come to see nuclear power, once considered an expensive investment, as an attractive alternative to fossil fuels, due to its reduced emissions and potential cost efficiency.

Intense suspicion over Iran's nuclear program, combined with nervousness over Tehran's already-capable short-range and medium-range ballistic missile arsenal, is increasingly palpable in the Middle East, where a dangerous domino effect is taking shape.

In some cases, it could also be an issue of national pride—a matter of keeping up with the nuclear Joneses; or even an effort to demonstrate to your neighbors and the world the scientific and technical achievement involved in developing, building, and safely operating a peaceful, civilian nuclear power industry.

Of course, developing an indigenous nuclear industry is a significant undertaking. A nuclear reactor can take a decade and three to ten billion dollars to build. Even more time and money is required if a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment capacity, is desired.

But such work is transformative. The development of scientific and technical capabilities for a civilian nuclear power program is instru-

mental to the subsequent building of the bomb. Even if it remains in compliance with the tenets of the NPT, a state can go quite a long way toward developing a nuclear program with a potential military dimension. Having the necessary nuclear infrastructure, especially that which would provide for a full nuclear fuel cycle, would allow concerned states to offset an Iranian nuclear breakout by possessing the theoretical potential to create a nuclear arsenal themselves.

Geopolitically, some Sunni Arab states clearly feel threatened by the rise of a Shi'a Persian superpower in their midst, and are worried about Middle Eastern leadership shifting towards Tehran and away from the region's traditional centers of power, Cairo and Riyadh.

Indeed, some analysts see the construction of nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia as symbolic of Riyadh's dread over Iran's nuclear activities, and as a move which will surely deepen tensions between the cross-Gulf rivals. In fact, many are convinced that the development of an Iranian Shi'a bomb will inevitably be matched by a Saudi Sunni bomb. It has long been rumored the Saudis have a deal with the Pakistanis for access to its nuclear inventory, or the stationing of Islamabad's nuclear-capable missiles in the Kingdom in the likelihood of a change in Iran's nuclear status.[5]

Of course, while this is possible, it does pose a number of political and strategic dilemmas for Pakistan, such as the health of its relationship with neighboring Iran, and a potential dilution of its nuclear deterrent against rival India. Egypt, the long-standing leader of the Arab world, operates two research reactors, has significant scientific and technical capabilities on nuclear matters, and is interested in nuclear power. Of course, developing a nuclear program with a military dimension is a possibility; however, doing so would surely hurt its ties with United States, could increase tensions with neighboring Israel, and drain less-than-plentiful government coffers.

Other countries that have expressed an interest in nuclear power, such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, are likely doing so because of more local concerns. None of them have significant indigenous energy sources, and as a result are focused on the development of alternative energy sources. But that isn't true for all of the states that have launched atomic plans. Kuwait and Qatar have significant holdings of oil and natural gas, which makes their respective decisions to pursue a nuclear program difficult to explain in a context other than that of a hedge against Iran's growing capabilities.

And in some cases, these nuclear dreams have started to become reality. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country with the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East, last year completed a "123" agreement with the United States, paving the way for heightened nuclear cooperation and technology transfer between Washington and Abu Dhabi. During the Bush administration, Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia also signed Memoranda of Understanding related to nuclear cooperation that—if pursued by the Obama White House—could lead to additional agreements such as the one struck with the UAE.

Turkey, another major regional power and NATO member, is also considering its nuclear options. Since taking power in 2002, the country's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has plotted a friendlier course toward neighboring Iran, a country Ankara historically has seen as a competitor. But despite the current, warm ties, Ankara may eventually come to see Tehran as a regional rival that could "undercut Turkey's desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west," according to a 2008 Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[6] Indeed, a shift in Ankara's sentiments toward Tehran could incite interest in a nuclear program with a military dimension. And the current strains in Turkey's existing relationships with the United States and Europe may make such a decision less taboo than in the past.

Then there is Syria. Damascus was caught with its hands in the nuclear cookie jar when Israel destroyed its undeclared nuclear facility at al-Kibar back in 2007. That plant—likely a reactor capable of producing fissile material—was being built with North Korean assistance.[7] Of course, Syria's nuclear activities are not focused on checking Iran; indeed, given the enduring partnership between the two countries, Syria might be receiving nuclear assistance from Iran. Rather, Syria's strategic efforts are directed toward Israel.

Regional states are also banding together in pursuit of nuclear status. Most directly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar—is now said to be contemplating a joint nuclear program that would pool resources and share electrical power among member states.[8] And although some of the members' interest in nuclear issues is stronger than others, as evidenced by the existence of separate indigenous programs, many analysts believe this joint effort was sparked specifically in response to Iran's nuclear activities.[9]

But the nuclear option is not the only one being explored by states confronted with a rising Iran.

Countries in the region are looking to missile defense as a way to blunt the growing Iranian missile and nuclear threat.

Arms racing

Rife with rivalry and conflict, the Middle East is one of the world's most volatile regions. Considering the challenges confronting regional states, it is no surprise to see a robust arms trade under way. And Iran's ascent as a power is only accelerating this trend.

Indeed, defense spending in the Middle East is up 40 percent over the past decade, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an organization which closely follows global military expenditures.[10] SIPRI also claimed in an April 2009 report on "Recent Trends in the Arms Trade" that from 2004-2008, nearly 40 percent of American exports of major weapons systems went to the Middle East, including "207 combat aircraft and 5,000 guided bombs." Israel and the UAE were the region's main recipients, garnering 11 percent each of U.S. sales.[11]

During the same period, according to SIPRI data, 40 percent of France's arms exports went to the region as well, with the UAE its top weapons recipient, and the United Kingdom sent 10 percent of its exports

to Saudi Arabia alone.[12] (Russia, meanwhile, is believed to be selling billions of dollars in arms to Iran.)

One thing almost all observers do agree on is that once Iran goes nuclear, the Middle East will never be the same. Iran's nuclearization will, by necessity, entail a significant shift in the regional balance of power.

Oil-rich Saudi Arabia, which has often led the region in defense spending, continues to spend heavily on arms—over $40 billion in 2009, including advanced weapons systems such as smart bombs from the United States and Tornado fighters from the United Kingdom, even cruise missiles from European producers.[13]

But Riyadh is not the top arms client in the Middle East. That honor belongs to tiny UAE, which now ranks fourth in the world for weapons imports, including U.S.-made Patriot surface to air missiles, C-17 transport aircraft, helicopters, F-16 fighters, and multiple rocket launchers.[14] The reasons for Abu Dhabi's spending spree are unequivocal: according to the Emirati Ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Otaiba, "Out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran. Our military ... wake up, dream, breathe, eat, and sleep the Iranian threat."[15]

Some are looking to bring friends closer, too. Bahrain, a majority Shi'a country ruled by a Sunni monarchy, is unsettled about Iran's rise and the possibility of Tehran's interference in its domestic affairs, in the view of some analysts. As a result, Bahrain has given the United States permission to increase its presence at its Manama naval facilities.

And, of course, Israel, which sees a nuclear Iran as an existential threat, has also taken steps to deal with the growing challenge, including acquiring bunker-busting JDAMs and conducting air exercises simulating a raid on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. Rumors also abound about the possibility of the Israeli Defense Forces using Saudi airspace to conduct a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, which now seems increasingly plausible considering the poor state of relations between Israel and its one-time ally, Turkey, whose border once provided an alternative route to Iran.

Israel is also playing defense. Squarely in the crosshairs of Iran's nuclear and missile programs, it has developed and deployed the Arrow missile defense system, and is now seeking to expand its missile defense capabilities with a three-tiered program designed to deal with a full spectrum of rocket and missile threats.

Israel is not alone. Other countries in the region are looking to missile defense as a way to blunt the growing Iranian missile and nuclear threat. The UAE has made a multi-billion dollar request of the United States for THAAD (Theater High Altitude Air Defense) and the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defense system. Bahrain has also held discussions with the United States on missile defense. And Qatar and Kuwait have expressed interest in a missile shield, while Saudi Arabia has requested missile defense requirements analysis.[16]

The coming storm

There is little doubt today that Iran's rise, especially its troubling nuclear work, has stirred up a sandstorm of interest and activity. But whether Iran can actually be stopped

from crossing the nuclear weapons threshold to become the tenth nuclear weapons state is the subject of significant debate. The believed range and depth of Iran's nuclear program makes a limited military strike a difficult undertaking—one which may delay, but not derail, Tehran from its goal of assuming a seat at the global nuclear table.

One thing almost all observers do agree on, however, is that once Iran goes nuclear, the Middle East will never be the same. Iran's nuclearization will, by necessity, entail a significant shift in the regional balance of power.

While all parties would prefer a peaceful, diplomatic solution that would keep Iran's nuclear genie in the bottle, many in the region are taking deliberate steps to counterbalance what some see as the inevitable emergence of a nuclear Iran. Unless Tehran changes course, or is compelled to abandon its nuclear program, the Middle East may be bound for a destabilizing explosion of nuclear weapons-capable states and more dangerous times ahead. And that would be in the interest of no one—not even Iran.

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Israel is America's Enduring Partner

*In the Middle East, a volatile region so vital to U.S. interests, it would be foolish to disengage – or denigrate – an ally such as Israel.**

Lieutenant General Fred McCorkle, USMC (ret.)
Member of JINSA's Board of Advisors

*A strong, secure Israel is an asset upon which American military planners and political leaders can rely. Israel is a democracy – a rare and precious commodity in the region – and Israel shares our commitment to freedom, personal liberty and rule of law.**

General Lawrence Skantze, USAF (ret.)
Member of JINSA's Board of Advisors

* These quotes are part of a longer statement signed by these officers and 62 of their fellow retired American military leaders. To view that statement, which was reproduced in major newspapers, please go to: **www.jinsa.org.**

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Nonproliferation, Russian Style

Stephen Blank

A key component of the Obama administration's new "reset" policy is the idea that a new relationship with the Kremlin can elicit Russian support for U.S. nonproliferation efforts relating to Iran and North Korea. The logic is clear; nonproliferation has long figured as the Administration's highest priority, and Russia—a key strategic partner of the Islamic Republic and important regional interlocutor for the regime of Kim Jong Il—has the potential to play a key role.

To this end, the White House has recently granted Russia many incentives for its cooperation. It has agreed to accelerate negotiations on Moscow's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has resubmitted the U.S.-Russian treaty on civilian nuclear cooperation to Congress. Together with the Kremlin, it has issued a joint call for a nuclear-free Middle East. And it has acquiesced to a larger role for Russia in the diplomatic Quartet intended to facilitate the Arab-Israeli peace process.[1]

But is this approach justified? Does Russia really support U.S. nonproliferation goals, or even nonproliferation in general? A careful analysis indicates a very different and often antithetical Russian approach to these issues, and suggests that the belief in a shared threat assessment now being touted in Washington is sorely misplaced.

Dr. Stephen Blank is Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His latest book, co-edited with Richard Weitz, is *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow*, out now from the Strategic Studies Institute Press. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or any other branch of the U.S. government.

Misreading Russian attitudes

This misconceived approach is entirely our own fault. Moscow has made it abundantly clear that on proliferation issues it follows its own interests—interests that are qualitatively different from, and often opposed to, those of the United States. To be sure, Moscow opposes adding new members to the nuclear club and regards proliferation writ large as a threat.[2] But beyond that, it diverges from U.S. thinking. Indeed, proliferation ranks a distant fifth in terms of threats in Russia's new defense doctrine, behind a whole series of U.S.-inspired threats, among them NATO enlargement and the U.S. deployment of missile defenses.[3]

Also, unlike America, Russia evaluates proliferation issues not according to whether the regime in question is democratic, but on the basis of whether a country's nuclearization would seriously threaten itself and its interests.[4] Thus, when then-President Vladimir Putin—in an effort to assuage American fears over Iran—proposed in June 2007 to allow the United States to jointly manage the Russian missile defense radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, then-Russian General Staff Chief Yuri Baluyevsky downplayed the danger from Iran, insisting "this trend is not something catastrophic, which would require a global missile defense system deployed near Russian borders."[5] Accordingly, Moscow has tended to view American policy towards nonproliferation in jaundiced fashion, displaying a visible *schadenfreude* when North Korea tested missiles and then a nuclear weapon in July and October 2006. Or alternatively, Russian officialdom views Washington's insistence on nonproliferation controls largely as an effort to pressure competitors in the nuclear and arms markets.[6]

Due to its vulnerability, Russia's non-proliferation stance is much more cautious and flexible than that of the U.S. Indeed, Moscow sees both the DPRK and Iran as potential partners, not enemies, and therefore will not categorically oppose their programs as does Washington. To the contrary; similar to the way it was viewed by the Soviet leadership in the 1980s, instability in the Middle East is seen by the Kremlin as a headache for the United States that raises Moscow's worth as an arbiter and problem-solver.[7]

Moreover, given Russia's post-Cold War weakness it has been forced to confront other security threats that are incomparably more urgent to it than proliferation. These threats, as articulated by Alexei Arbatov of the Moscow Carnegie Center, include:

- Instability and conflict across the "post-Soviet space" and in the North Caucasus;
- NATO's continued expansion to the east, against strong Russian objections.
- The continuing stagnation of the Russian armed forces and defense industries, and Russia's growing conventional and nuclear inferiority to the United States and NATO;
- The threat of expanding Muslim radicalism in Central Asia;
- The ominous growth of China's economic and military power; and
- U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe.[8]

This is not to say that Russia is not worried about proliferation. Kremlin officials have made clear that the issue ranks high on their list of national security priorities. As Vladimir Putin told the BBC in June 2003, "If we are speaking about the main threat of the twenty-first century, then I consider this to be the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."[9] This concern isn't simply rhetorical. Russia has put a number of nonproliferation measures into play, among them key export control regulations and constraints on the transfer of WMD and dual use materials both inside and outside the country.

But the perceptions of those dangers as they affect Russia differ greatly. Iran is a major consumer of Russian arms, which helps the military-industrial sector to survive, given many years of limited defense orders for the Russian armed forces. Iran likewise is an extremely important geopolitical partner, a growing "regional superpower" that balances the expansion of Turkey and the increasing U.S. military and political presence in the Black Sea/Caspian region and Middle East, and simultaneously contains the expansion of Sunni radicalism into the North Caucasus and Central Asia.[10] Russia also views Iran as the dominant regional power in the neighborhood who can project power into the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf.[11] As for Korea, Russia fears that a major conflict involving the DPRK would destabilize the region more than it does North Korean possession of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in 2008 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made clear that his government saw North Korea's nuclear weapons as a threat to the international order, whereas Iran's potential nuclearization was not.[12]

Moscow has made it abundantly clear that on proliferation issues it follows its own interests—interests that are qualitatively different from, and often opposed to, those of the United States.

Keeping the ayatollahs close

For the U.S., Iran represents a key test case of Russian commitment to nonproliferation. The Obama administration has invested enormous time and effort in obtaining Russian support for sanctions against the Islamic Republic, based upon the conviction that it needs Russian support to curb Iran's proliferation threat. Thus, spokesmen like Michael McFaul of the National Security Council have pointed out that if Russia wanted an adversarial relationship with the U.S. on Iran there are many things that it could do to worsen our situation.[13] Based on such an understanding, President Obama has voiced his optimism that the U.S., with Russian (and Chinese) cooperation, will be able to successfully pass and then implement "tough, strong sanctions" against Iran.[14]

Even before the Obama administration took office, Russia had made some positive movements in this regard. It withheld delivery of the S-300 from Iran, despite the conclusion of a commercial contract for the advanced Russian air defense system back in 2007.[15] It likewise repeatedly deferred completion of the Bushehr plutonium reactor until August 2010, citing technical and economic snags.[16] These actions have served to rile the Iranians, as have Medvedev's hints of possible sanctions.

Yet instances of meaningful opposition from Moscow to Iran's nuclear will to power are few and far between. Despite its warnings to Iran to come clean on its nuclear program, Moscow still formally opposes the imposition of "paralyzing sanctions" against Tehran. Instead, Medvedev speaks publicly of "smart sanctions" and has clarified to Washington that Russia will support only measures that 1) induce Iran to stop enrichment and weaponization, and 2) advance Russian interests.[17] Moreover, the smart sanctions that Moscow now advocates would not rise to the level of an arms or energy embargo on Iran.

Since Iran's nuclear program kicked into high gear over the past half-decade, Moscow has offered nuclear reactors to no fewer than 13 Arab states as part of its efforts to advance its economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East—hardly a contribution to nonproliferation.

Indeed, although Moscow grudgingly went along with the latest round of multilateral sanctions passed by the Security Council in June, it has vociferously opposed the supplemental measures applied by the U.S. and EU since then. And in mid-July, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko and Iranian Oil Minister Masoud Mirkazemi jointly announced a thirty-year road map for bilateral cooperation in oil and gas.[18] The deals mapped out as part of that partnership are considerable, and include cooperation on the transportation, swaps, and marketing of natural gas; sales of petroleum products and petrochemicals; and Russia's establishment of a $100 million liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant to supply remote regions of Iran.[19] Most recently, in August 2010, Moscow formally inaugurated the plutonium reactor at Bushehr, making the Islamic Republic a *de facto* nuclear power—and greatly complicating Western efforts to dissuade the Iranian regime from further nuclear development.

This state of affairs should not have eluded U.S. commentators. For, as John Parker observes in his masterful study of Russo-Iranian relations,

> No matter how much Russia and the United States might share security concerns over Iran's nuclear program and expanding influence in the Middle East, a common approach by Washington and Moscow was always undercut by Russia's rivalry with the United States' other interests in Iran, and the historical approach to dealing with that country.[20]

That historical approach, as Parker demonstrates, is one that acknowledges Russia must always have close relations with Iran as a neighbor even though it could ultimately represent a threat. Indeed, already in 1993, Moscow recognized Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs might one day represent a threat to its territory, neighbors, and vital interests.[21] But its reaction was greater engagement, not isolation; indeed, the Russian government's continued sales of weapons to Iran after 1992 was driven in no small part by the recognition that an unbridled Tehran had the potential to disrupt the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even possibly Afghanistan.[22] Economic calculations to keep defense industry

markets and preserve that sector of its economy were also present, with Russia harboring a long-standing (and probably not unfounded) belief that if it did not sell weapons to Iran, Europe and the U.S. would do so.

Arms sales to Iran, in other words, have always been an arrow in Moscow's quiver aimed at preventing Iran from pursuing a policy inimical to its interests. And from the Kremlin's point of view, this approach has succeeded handsomely.[23] To openly renege on outstanding contracts, such as the S-300 surface to air missile, not only causes financial losses and Iranian anger and distrust of Russian promises, it also opens the door to Iranian retaliation. Therefore Russia finds it difficult to take Western concerns seriously.

In turn, taking Russia seriously means acknowledging that Russia's robust economic interests in Iran and the nuclear, energy, and defense industry lobbies that benefit from those interests greatly influence Moscow's policies. And beyond those lobbies, Russia's fundamental strategic interests lie in promoting Iranian-U.S. hostility, rather than cooperation. Official Russian statements advocate strengthening Iran's role as a legitimate actor in a Middle East security system, even as Iranian leaders threaten to destroy Israel and promote state-sponsored terrorism. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has even gone so far as to insist that Iran be invited to participate in any security system for the Black Sea region.[24]

Russia, meanwhile, is reaping the dividends. Since Iran's nuclear program kicked into high gear over the past half-decade, Moscow has offered nuclear reactors to no fewer than 13 Arab states as part of its efforts to advance its economic, political, and strategic interests in the Middle East—hardly a contribution to non-proliferation. The lesson is clear. For over a decade, Russian pundits and officials have openly stated that they want Iran to be a partner of Russia, lest the U.S. consolidate its position as the leading foreign power in the Middle East.[25] Iranian-American hostility precludes such a consolidation and permits Russia to exercise influence by supporting the maintenance of a system of controlled tension there.

Opportunity within adversity on Korea

While the Kremlin appears to be increasingly upset by Iran, particularly following revelations of a secret Iranian nuclear facility in Qom, Russian officials from President Dmitry Medvedev on down have publicly expressed far more concern about North Korea. Throughout 2009, Russia's mounting anxiety about trends on the Korean peninsula was palpable, encapsulated in Medvedev's expression of "great alarm and concern" in response to the DPRK's April-May nuclear and missile tests,[26] and his warnings that Pyongyang was more dangerous than Iran because of its international isolation.[27] Moscow even deployed its new S-400 air defense system in the Russian Far East on fears that North Korea might launch more missiles that could go awry, or that the Kim regime might even provoke a major conflict in Northeast Asia.[28]

Still, this has not translated into a sterner Russian stance toward Pyongyang. To the contrary, Moscow has consistently counseled moderation towards North Korea, been very cautious about sanctions, and steadfastly argued for a resumption of multilateral diplomacy despite North Korea's provocative nuclear

and missile tests. Likewise, Moscow has steadily argued against military action, hinted that sanctions might be lifted if the DPRK rejoined the talks, suggested that the IAEA become involved with this issue, and proclaimed its willingness to provide economic assistance.[29] At the root of these overtures is the belief, articulated by Moscow's envoy to South Korea, Gleb Ivashentsov, that the United States is to blame for the unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula, and that Pyongyang's behavior is the product of "ultimatums and sanctions" on the part of the international community.[30]

Yet even here, Moscow sees opportunity within adversity. Kremlin officials have made clear that they view the proliferation crisis in East Asia as generating a need for regional and collective security institutions based on equal security—i.e., those erected at the expense of U.S. leadership. In other words, while North Korea represents a serious crisis threatening Russia's Asian territory, it also offers Russia a chance for gains at Washington's expense.

The Korean example is not an anomaly. Rather, it fits perfectly with Alexei Arbatov's 2008 depiction of Russian thinking about proliferation. To wit:

> For Russia the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by India and Pakistan and the prospects of further proliferation are adding some new elements to a familiar and old threat, rather than creating a dramatic new one as is the case with the United States. The USSR and Russia have learned to live with this threat and to deal with it on the basis of nuclear deterrence, some limited defenses (like the Moscow BMD system and national Air Defenses) and through diplomacy, which is used to avoid direct confrontation (and still better, to sustain normal relations) with new nuclear nations.[31]

Based upon this logic, Russia's response to Indo-Pakistani proliferation has been similarly low-key. Instead, Russia regards vertical proliferation (the qualitative improvement of systems within countries) with greater alarm than it does horizontal proliferation (the diffusion of WMD and ballistic missile technology to a growing number of states). Russia's posture thus effectively is the photo negative of that of America, which expresses greater alarm at horizontal proliferation than that of the vertical variety.[32]

Proliferation by design

Clearly, as the foregoing summary suggests, and as Kremlin officials themselves have made abundantly clear, Russia takes a more utilitarian view of proliferation than does the U.S. While it now appears prepared to go part of the way toward a new arms control compact with Washington, Moscow is not likely to support the decisive measures needed to address the threats posed by both Iran and North Korea.

To the contrary, Kremlin maneuvers suggest strongly that Russia is attempting to preserve its partnerships with both Pyongyang and Tehran. There are even signs that Russia is trying to sell reactors to Pakistan, supposedly the greatest proliferation threat that it perceives. Needless to say, this is a very strange posture indeed for a government that supposedly opposes proliferation and supports the objective of global nuclear disarmament.

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

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Tracing Syria's Nuclear Ambitions

Joshua Pollack

The first indication that something unusual had happened in a remote corner of the Middle East was an item published on the afternoon of September 6, 2007, by Syria's official state news agency. Israeli aircraft had infiltrated Syrian airspace early that morning, it reported. According to a Syrian military spokesman, air defense units chased away planes that dropped "ammunition," but did no damage.[1] Israeli officials had little to say in reply. "I don't know what you are talking about," Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told the press.[2]

It fell to an unexpected source to start spelling out the nature of events. In a message carried a few days later by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang condemned Israel for its "dangerous provocation," denounced the "intrusion," and extended "full support and solidarity" to the Syrians.[3] Although it mostly mirrored the Syrian announcement, the North Korean statement contained some of the first accurate details about the incident, alleging that Israeli Air Force planes had dropped bombs in Syria's northeastern desert. (The exact location and effects of the bombing were left unstated.) The North Korean condemnation also raised eyebrows for having been issued in the name of the Foreign Ministry—a distinction used by Pyongyang to call attention to more serious declarations.

Within days, Western reporters had published multiple, conflicting rumors about the event, including allegations of a North Korean connection to a secret

Joshua Pollack is a consultant specializing in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. He writes a monthly column for the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, and is a regular contributor to the ArmsControlWonk blog.

nuclear program in Syria. When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad finally acknowledged the destruction of a Syrian facility, he described the target as being of no real importance, simply a group of empty military buildings still under construction. He also denied interest in "any nuclear activity."[4]

But new reports soon began to appear in the American news media alleging that Israel, after lengthy consultations with the United States, had indeed attacked a North Korean-made nuclear facility in the desert. By late October, the website of ISIS, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., had published commercial satellite photographs of a box-like structure, tucked into a remote *wadi* (canyon) alongside the Euphrates River near the town of Dayr al-Zawr. The length and width of the "box" resembled the proportions of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, where North Korea had produced plutonium for its first nuclear test the previous year.

Faced with these suspicions, an anonymous Syrian official conceded to American journalist Seymour Hersh that North Korean construction workers had been at the scene of the bombing, which he described as a manufacturing plant for "low tech" missiles. Another Syrian source hinted to Hersh that the project might have been related to chemical weapons.[5] Earlier, Syrian officials allegedly had told a Turkish delegation that the building had been a missile depot.[6]

In April 2008, American intelligence officials finally confirmed the existence and destruction of a secret nuclear reactor built in Syria with North Korean assistance, a project that may have begun as early as 1997, under the rule of late leader Hafez al-Assad. The officials released an audio-visual presentation with detailed photographs of the facility, first while under construction and then while being demolished after the attack. Construction had started in 2001; at the time of its destruction in 2007, the officials explained, the reactor was nearly complete, but had not been fueled.[7]

Curiously, that may be where the rest of the world is content to leave matters. Despite having joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-weapons state in 1969, Syria has faced no identifiable penalty for its clandestine nuclear program other than the destruction of the reactor itself. By comparison, NPT violations by North Korea and Iran have faced widespread condemnation and multiple rounds of international sanctions. Israel, which is not a member of the NPT, has faced increased pressure to join the treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is charged with confirming NPT member states' compliance with nuclear safeguards, has not pursued the Syrian matter aggressively, and has been hobbled by a lack of cooperation from Damascus.

Foreign governments have not pressed the Syrians in public; the United States was largely silent until its April 2008 presentation, and has added little to it since then. At the time, a senior administration official explained the earlier secrecy as part of an effort to avoid starting a war by painting Syria into a corner. Only once the danger had "receded," the official explained, was it responsible to discuss the matter in public.[8] The Syrian government, for its part, continues to deny the allegations.

WMD in Syrian strategy

The September 2007 incident provided a glimpse into the evolving strategic logic of the world's sole remaining Ba'athist state. Although

Syria has rivalries with other Arab states and a history of disputes with Turkey, Syria's central motive for acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) seems to be the need to offset Israel's conventional military power.

This point is not always spelled out by Syrian leaders, who often cite Israeli nuclear capabilities when hinting at their own motives for possessing WMD. However, the record shows Syria's most fundamental military requirements to be twofold: counteracting Israel's superior air power, and deterring any possible advance into Syria by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) armored units.

The IDF overran the Golan Heights during the 1967 Six-Day War and came within a short distance of Damascus during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Accordingly, the Syrian military received its first SS-1 "Scud-B" missiles from the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. Syria also imported Soviet SS-21 "Scarab" missiles shortly after the 1982 Lebanon War, when Syria lost dozens of Soviet-made fighter aircraft in a one-sided engagement with the Israeli Air Force, and IDF land forces plunged deep into Lebanon, close to most of Syria's major cities.

It was presumably with these experiences in mind that Bashar al-Assad once told an interviewer, "Yesterday's situation is not today's and I do not believe any clever official in the Zionist entity can ignore the essential developments that have taken place in the methods of confrontation, the most prominent of which is the ability to transfer the battle into the enemy's territories."[9] Similarly, Foreign Minister Walid Moallem recently warned that any future war "will move to the Israeli cities," a clear reference to Syria's missile capabilities.[10]

An early version of this policy was unveiled at an Arab summit in 1974 by Bashar's father and predecessor, Hafez al-Assad, who gave it the name *al-tawazun al-istratiji*—"strategic parity" or "strategic balance." Originally, the idea referred to the achievement of parity between Israel and the Arab states as a group, but as Egypt withdrew from the confrontation and Iraq became embroiled in its war with Iran, the elder Assad's conception of parity became increasingly focused on the narrower Israeli-Syrian arena.

Less obviously, Syria's strategy of deterrence against Israel also supports the regime's survival against internal threats. Syria's authoritarian government faces two major challenges at home, each of its own making. First, although Syria has a Sunni Muslim majority, the government has become the patrimony of the Assad family, which belongs to the Alawite minority. Indeed, Syria is almost as famous as Saddam Hussein's Iraq for its repressive government and sectarian politics. Although the country has not experienced a successful coup since Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970, the brutally suppressed uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama in the early 1980s underscores the basic fragility of the regime's position.

Second, Syria's economy is stagnant even by regional standards. Despite some diversification of the economy in recent years, promises of far-reaching reform, such as eliminating price controls and ending the preferential lending practices of state-controlled banks, have yet to materialize. So long as statist policies provide the government with opportunities to mollify the public and reward internal allies, they are unlikely to be abandoned, even if the economy as a whole continues to underperform.

A government that represents the interests of a small minority and offers the rest neither freedom nor prosperity must still offer something; in Damascus, that "something" is continuing to confront Israel long after the other Arab states have quit the arena. Carrying the banner of the Arab cause provides the Assads with a claim to regional leadership greatly out of proportion to Syria's population, economy, or territory, and grants them popular legitimacy that they would otherwise lack. It presumably dissipates some of the pressure for economic liberalization, since a permanent war footing explains and justifies a lack of prosperity. Syria carries out this policy of confrontation rhetorically and materially, by allying with Iran, hosting most of the Palestinian "resistance" organizations (including Hamas) in Damascus, and channeling arms and support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Without the ability to deter Israel, Syria would find it impossible to sustain such a belligerent posture without courting more wars and defeats.

Syria's strategic deterrent has been built through a series of foreign partnerships beyond the Arab world. In the early 1980s, Syria came to see the USSR, which supplied it with missiles and warplanes, as a more important ally than the other Arab states. But as the Soviet Union began to crumble in the late 1980s, the Syrians were compelled to look further afield. Starting in March 1991, Damascus imported North Korean Scud-C missiles, whose 500-kilometer-range can reach any point in Israel from southern Syria.[11] (These imports also provided the option of striking Baghdad from western Syria, which may have seemed prudent after the "Wars of the Cities" between Iraq and Iran during the late 1980s.) Syria also sought more advanced missiles from China and Russia in the 1990s, but these suppliers proved more susceptible to American pressure than the North Koreans.

North Korea has also proven far more willing than other sellers to transfer the basis of an independent missile production capability to its customers, Syria included. Over the last decade, working with what the U.S. intelligence community describes as North Korean and Iranian assistance, Syria has developed Scud-D missiles with a 700-kilometer-range, which allows missiles located deep inside Syria to reach anywhere in Israel.[12] The Scud-D is reportedly accurate enough to be useful against airfields and other military targets, and not only against cities. This improvement may contribute to Israeli concerns about a possible transfer of Scuds from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The intelligence community also reports that Syria has produced a chemical weapons stockpile, with air-dropped bombs, warheads for artillery rockets, and warheads for ballistic missiles.[13] Syria's chemical arsenal allegedly has been produced under the cover of the same civilian research center that is reported to oversee ballistic missile development, the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS). The Syrian chemical arsenal appears to consist of sarin, mustard gas, and possibly VX nerve gas. Some of Syria's Scud missiles are reportedly armed with submunition-dispensing warheads filled with sarin or other agents.[14]

Although Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, it has wrapped a veil of secrecy around its chemical weapons program, offering only oblique forms of public acknowledgment. While European suppliers seem to have played more

important roles in selling Syria chemical precursors and equipment suitable for producing chemical-warfare agents, some sources claim that North Korean experts have participated in the development of chemical warheads for Syrian ballistic missiles.[15] Asked in early 2009 whether North Korea or Iran were involved in Syria's chemical weapons efforts, President Assad responded with a non-denial, saying, "We work trustingly together with many countries on research programs."[16]

This aspect of the Damascus-Pyongyang relationship is opaque, and details tend to emerge only in fragments. A handful of reports in late September 2007 described a fatal accident at a Syrian military facility, said to involve a Scud missile with a chemical warhead, possibly with North Korean technicians present.[17] These claims echoed a similar report from May 2004 in the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun*. According to *Sankei*, a massive train explosion in North Korea involved Syrian technicians from CERS, who had been transporting "large equipment." North Korean military personnel in protective suits allegedly removed debris from the section of the train that had carried the Syrians and their cargo.[18] Less ominous but better attested was a different interrupted transaction: four shipping containers full of nuclear-biological-chemical protective suits in transit from North Korea to Syria were seized in a South Korean port in 2009.[19]

Seemingly the only WMD-based rationale that Syrian officials have not offered for the building at Dayr al-Zawr would be biological warfare. Syria is not believed to possess biological weapons, although the United States has alleged that Syria has engaged in "BW-related activities" of the sort prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention. A hint of interest was also dropped in the form of an article on biological warfare that appeared in an Iranian military journal in late 1999 under the name of Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas.

Investigating Syria's atom

The sole organization with the authority to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities in NPT member states is the IAEA. But the nuclear watchdog played no such role in Syria for the better part of a year after the Israeli air raid. The situation was haunted by two previous crises: first, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, when IAEA and UN inspectors were still working on verifying Iraq's declaration of its past WMD activities; and second, the long-running investigation of Iran's nuclear program, which had failed to compel Iran to stop sensitive nuclear activities that had commenced under cover of secrecy. Recalling Iraq, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei feared a collapse of the nonproliferation regime if states resorted to force based on privately held suspicions. The leaders of the United States, Israel, and other states, meanwhile, feared that a protracted investigation would only give Syria time to obfuscate and entrench its nuclear program.

On October 15, the IAEA Secretariat announced that it had "no information about any undeclared nuclear facility in Syria," declaring with evident frustration that it "expects any country having information about nuclear-related activities in another country to provide that information to the IAEA."[20] And in a televised interview later that month, ElBaradei acknowledged being "very distressed" about the air raid, "because we have

a system. If countries have information that the country is working on a nuclear-related program, they should come to us. We have the authority to go out and investigate. But to bomb first and then ask questions later, I think it undermines the system and it doesn't lead to any solution to any suspicion, because we are the eyes and ears of the international community."[21]

Almost eight months after the air raid, on April 24, 2008—the same day that the U.S. intelligence community finally briefed Congress and the news media about the details of the Syrian reactor—the American ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna received an urgent cable instructing him to brief the Director-General.[22] In a later interview, ElBaradei called the delay "unacceptable," and again lamented the use of force: "Of course, we could toss out everything in the way of collective security systems that we have built up since World War II and say: Let's go back to the Middle Ages and pull out our clubs. This is a decision that must depend upon the international community of nations. I am horrified by how little protest the military action in Syria has triggered."[23]

Only at this point did the investigation commence. Because Syria has yet to sign an agreement giving safeguards inspectors wide-ranging access (an "Additional Protocol"), the IAEA began by seeking permission to visit locations not declared by Syria to be nuclear sites. On May 2, the IAEA sent a letter to Syria announcing its intent to dispatch inspectors from Vienna. After a long delay, the Syrians consented to the visit, and the IAEA team arrived in Damascus on June 22. The group visited Dayr al-Zawr the next day. The Syrians described it as a non-nuclear-related military facility, but refused to provide documentation to support this claim. Nevertheless, the inspectors were able to take samples of microscopic particles at the site, turning up traces of uranium. Confronted with the evidence in October, the Syrians insisted that the traces must have come from Israeli weapons, alluding to the depleted uranium munitions used by some militaries.[24] However, the particles were chemically processed natural uranium, not depleted uranium.[25]

The uranium traces proved to be so plentiful that they could only be explained by a substantial amount of uranium at the site at the time of the bombing, although there were not enough to indicate a fully fueled reactor. One plausible theory was that the Syrians had brought a "test assembly" to the site to ensure that the fuel channels were properly configured. Suspicions quickly arose that the possible test assembly might have been removed from the Yongbyon complex and sent to Syria, but Siegfried Hecker, a distinguished former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory who has visited Yongbyon on multiple occasions, confirmed that nothing was missing from Yongbyon as of February 2008. The processed uranium apparently had come from somewhere else.[26]

Dayr al-Zawr was not the only site the IAEA had sought to visit. Through satellite photographs and "other information," presumably meaning tips from foreign governments, the IAEA had also identified three other locations of interest in Syria and requested access to them in its letter of May 2. The Syrians never responded to this request, but the IAEA did observe, based on satellite photographs, "that landscaping activities and the removal of large containers took place shortly after the Agency's request for access."[27]

Stonewalled concerning undeclared sites beyond Dayr al-Zawr, and denied plausible answers to its questions about Syria's suspicious acquisitions activities, the IAEA intensified its scrutiny of Syria's declared nuclear facilities. In August 2008, inspectors took samples at the small research reactor supplied by China in the early 1990s. In May 2009, the results came back: traces of chemically processed natural uranium were present in the "hot cells," equipment used for the safe handling of small amounts of irradiated material. It was increasingly apparent that Syria had obtained a uranium supply that it had kept a secret. The location of the traces also hinted at small-scale experiments with reprocessing.

Initially, the Syrian authorities explained that the hot cell uranium traces reflected the accumulation of sample and reference material routinely used for scientific experiments, and could also involve contamination from a shielded transport container.[28] After this story fell through, the Syrians conceded that they had imported small amounts of uranyl nitrate without declaring them to the IAEA, and also mentioned domestically produced "yellowcake" uranium as a source of the traces.[29]

These admissions intensified the IAEA's suspicions about what might have been taking place at the three mystery sites, especially since Syria had larger amounts of uranium to work with; during a July 2004 visit to a plant near the city of Homs that extracts uranium impurities from phosphoric acid, IAEA inspectors had noted the presence of "some hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake."[30] This amount would not be sufficient to fuel a Yongbyon-type reactor, which requires about 50 tons of uranium, but it would be more than enough to support experiments in chemical conversion (for making fresh fuel) and reprocessing (for separating plutonium from irradiated fuel).

In March 2010, the IAEA undertook a complete inventory of all uranium stored at MNSR. At this point, the Syrians acknowledged that they had conducted previously undisclosed experiments in uranium conversion and irradiation.[31] Syria had been secretly experimenting with some of the technologies necessary for fueling a reactor and separating plutonium.

The IAEA's work in exposing Syria's concealed nuclear activities remains incomplete. For Director-General ElBaradei, Damascus was the aggrieved party, and was to be considered "innocent until proven guilty" even while it changed its story and withheld cooperation from safeguards inspectors. ElBaradei's successor, Yukia Amano, has not expressed similar views about Syria, but has continued to move cautiously. The glacial pace of the international investigation has led to calls for the IAEA to invoke a "special inspection," a rarely used tactic that would legally oblige Syria to cooperate. The IAEA's reluctance to use this power has allowed the Syrians to block access to the three mystery sites and to prevent the IAEA from returning to Dayr al-Zawr for a second look. The IAEA has also refrained from preparing a formal finding of noncompliance, which would place Syria on the docket of the UN Security Council.

The risk of exercising these options is that they may provoke Syria to refuse all cooperation, and to threaten to exit the NPT—the strategy chosen by North Korea after the IAEA's invocation of the special inspection authority in 1993. The editor of a Syrian newspaper close to the government has even hinted

at a replay of this scenario, asking why Arab states should not consider nuclear weapons of their own.[32] Until recently, however, it has appeared that no member states would urge Amano to initiate a special inspection. By one account, official Washington considered Syria's nuclear program to have been successfully disrupted, and preferred to avoid a confrontation.[33] But after years of obstruction, the mood has finally begun to shift. In early August, the U.S. ambassador to the IAEA called for the Agency to consider a special inspection.[34]

An Iranian connection?

Questions still left unanswered include how far Syria had progressed toward uranium conversion and reprocessing, and who was giving Damascus assistance in this area. North Korea is not the only potential partner, or necessarily even the most desirable one: Iran also has experience with these technologies, especially uranium conversion.

Connections between Iran and the Syrian nuclear project have been asserted before, but not spelled out in any detail. According to a report in the German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel*, a high-ranking Iranian defector to the United States revealed that Iran was "apparently funding a top-secret nuclear project in Syria, launched in cooperation with the North Koreans," about which he knew nothing more. Without mentioning a source, the same report also mentions a visit to Damascus in 2005 by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, an Iranian engineer who appears to have been deeply involved in an effort to design a missile re-entry vehicle suitable for a nuclear warhead.[35] The IAEA has questioned Iranian officials about foreign travel by Fakhrizadeh "and other people known to be involved in Iran's nuclear programme" between 1998 and 2001; the Iranian side has acknowledged that the trips occurred, but denied any relationship to the nuclear program.[36]

Although there is no conclusive evidence, it is possible that a connection exists between Syria's secret nuclear program, and a facility established in 1999 in southern Iran to mine and mill uranium ore. The amount and whereabouts of the uranium produced at Iran's Gchine mine are unknown, but its declared maximum capacity runs to 21 tons a year, enough to produce a load of fresh fuel for the Dayr al-Zawr reactor every two and a half years.[37]

There also may be connections between Dayr al-Zawr, Gchine, and a group of concealed nuclear and missile research projects described in a set of Iranian documents apparently passed to the IAEA by German intelligence. The documents link the company that established the Gchine facility, called "Kimia Maadan," to a secret uranium conversion effort called the Green Salt Project. Making green salt, also called uranium tetrafluoride, could serve more than one purpose, but it is a necessary step in manufacturing fuel for a Yongbyon-type reactor. The same set of documents also describes weaponization research, including Fahkrizadeh's reentry-vehicle project. All of the programs mentioned in the documents have what the IAEA calls "administrative interconnections."[38]

The Iranians have (unconvincingly) denied the authenticity of most of these documents, and even if they are completely legitimate, it does not guarantee that Gchine and Green Salt are connected to Syria. Still, these puzzle pieces connect well enough that the resulting picture gives pause.

Possible Syrian motives

Because Damascus continues to deny the existence of the North Korean-designed nuclear reactor near Dayr al-Zawr and has curtailed its cooperation with the IAEA, no authoritative account exists of the Assad regime's motives or decision to seek nuclear weapons. With due caution and an appreciation for how much remains unknown, it is at least possible to describe some potential Syrian motives for acquiring nuclear weapons by examining the manner and timing by which Syria sought to produce fissile material.

Four main possibilities emerge. First, Syria may have long sought nuclear weapons as part of its pursuit of regional leadership, but took decades to find the right partner (or partners) in North Korea (and potentially Iran as well). Second, the Assad regime may have sought to compensate itself for the loss of its nuclear-armed superpower ally, or for a perception that its chemical weapons arsenal had lost efficacy as a deterrent. Third, the Assads may have seen the North Korean nuclear program as a successful adaptation to difficult circumstances, and decided to follow suit. Fourth, Syria may have been hosting an "offshore" program jointly owned with North Korea, Iran, or both. These possibilities are not necessarily entirely mutually exclusive: the truth could involve elements of more than one of the ideas presented here.

The first possibility that emerges from this record—a "supplier" hypothesis—would involve a long-standing interest in nuclear weapons, perhaps as old as Assad's "strategic parity" concept, that had only started to come to fruition after the right supplier came along. Based on an analysis of the nuclear histories of Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, and Egypt, Etel Solingen concludes that attempting to acquire nuclear weapons is in fact the norm in the Middle East; for Arab states, this pursuit appears motivated primarily by a competition with each other for regional leadership. More generally, Solingen finds that nuclear-weapons programs tend to be associated with inward-looking states with closed economies that need not attend closely to the sensitivities of the international community.[39] This perspective would be consistent with decades-long Syrian nuclear-weapons ambitions that only neared success after the appearance of one or more foreign partners that were sufficiently capable, affordable, and immune from third-party pressures.

A second possibility, a "rebalancing" hypothesis, centers on the disappearance of Syria's nuclear-armed superpower ally. Syria effectively lost the backing of the USSR by the time of Hafez al-Assad's visit to Moscow in April 1987, when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev asked Syria to repay its debts, and reportedly advised Assad to abandon the goal of strategic parity with Israel.[40] Regardless of the exact timing, this turn of events may have inspired Assad to move ahead on his own with a nuclear-weapons program, or to redouble previous efforts.

Both the "supplier" and "rebalancing" hypotheses leave at least one key question unanswered: why, if Syria was so determined to pursue nuclear weapons, would it have taken so long to move from the purchase of North Korean missiles, first delivered in 1991, to the joint construction of a reactor, agreed upon in 1997? One potential answer involves the greater sensitivity involved in a clandestine nuclear trade, which may have required time to build up trust. For comparison, North Korea exported

missiles to Pakistan in 1994, but does not appear to have shipped uranium hexafluoride—which Pakistan's A.Q. Khan subsequently reshipped to Libya—until around 2000.

Third is the "exemplar" hypothesis. It is possible that the North Koreans provided Syria not only with nuclear technology, but with an example of how an isolated, authoritarian state with a weak economy could survive in an American-dominated international environment. The Syrian regime faced a difficult situation in the 1990s, having just lost its main ally and arms supplier, and having witnessed the abrupt end of the authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe, not to mention the alarming dissolution of a multi-confessional state in Yugoslavia.

The prospect of new sources of foreign aid may have encouraged Damascus to join the American-led coalition assembled against Iraq in 1990, and to participate in the regional peace talks convened in Madrid in 1991. These dramatic gestures took pressure off the Syrians, and helped instill a perception in Western leaders that Syria, like Egypt in the late 1970s, could be courted and brought into the moderate camp through a peace treaty with Israel. But an extensive process of American mediation throughout the 1990s foundered in the face of Syrian inflexibility.

North Korea also pursued negotiations in the 1990s, but its possession of nuclear facilities and a small stockpile of plutonium strengthened its hand. Pyongyang was able to engage with the United States as a counterpart, not just a mediator. It managed to extract aid from both Washington and Seoul, simultaneously easing internal pressure for reform and providing the best available guarantee against external threats. North Korea's nuclear program may even have contributed to the successful transition of power from father to son in 1994. All of these advantages would have looked enviable to the Assads in the mid-to-late 1990s.

Fourth is the "offshore" hypothesis, which would credit North Korea with much of the initiative for Dayr al-Zawr. Because North Korea had frozen its facilities at Yongbyon as part of an agreement with the United States, it might have had an interest in resuming the production of plutonium in some other, far distant location. Notably, the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework was negotiated in 1994 by the founder of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, who died later the same year. His son and successor, Kim Jong Il, does not seem to have cared for the Agreed Framework, and may have sought a way to evade it.

A similar line of thinking could extend to Iran. From Tehran's point of view, developing and transferring nuclear technologies to Syria, or locating joint facilities there, unlike any nuclear facility found in Iran, would serve a valuable purpose: it would backstop their own efforts with an alternative technology in an unlikely location. Even if nuclear work in Iran were to meet insurmountable technical hurdles or be detected and disrupted, the "offshore" program in Syria could continue.

Is the program finished?

To a greater or lesser extent, all four possibilities above involve a serious determination by Damascus to make fissile material in secret. None is very reassuring. There is no obvious reason that the bombing of Syria's nearly completed reactor would unravel its motivation to go nuclear, especially given the lack of consequences for the first, thwarted

attempt. After Israel bombed Iraq's reactor in 1981, the Iraqis switched to a harder-to-detect uranium-enrichment program; Syria could do something similar. One question is whether it has access to any uranium-enrichment technology.

In a 2007 interview, Bashar al-Assad claimed to have previously rejected an advance from Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, who sold gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, and also attempted to sell them to Iraq. According to Assad, "In early 2001, someone brought a letter from a certain Khan. We did not know whether the letter was genuine or a forgery by the Israelis who wanted to lure us into a trap. We rejected it anyway. We were not interested in having nuclear weapons or a nuclear reactor. We never met with Khan."[41]

Beyond general skepticism, there is some reason to doubt Assad's version of events. According to one report, Khan traveled to Beirut in the mid-1990s to meet a senior Syrian official.[42] It is possible that Khan made multiple approaches to Damascus, first under Hafez, then under Bashar. While there is no indication that any arrangements were concluded, the Syrians do appear more familiar with the Khan network than Bashar lets on. Syria was recently named as one of seven countries said to be courting former members of the Khan network. The list also includes Iran and North Korea.[43] With Khan himself out of business, one or both of these countries are Syria's most likely partners for pursuing enrichment technology.

For the United States and other supporters of the nonproliferation regime, the ideal outcome would be for Syria to follow Libya's path: to come clean about its past activities, betray its partners, and make new arrangements for its security. But for reasons already discussed here, this scenario appears quite unlikely, and Washington's patience has started to wane. At some point, perhaps not very far in the future, Syria will face a tougher, less forgiving stance from the international community.

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Tackling Pyongyang's Proliferation Trade

Carolyn Leddy

U.S. administrations come and go, but nothing ever really changes with respect to American policy toward North Korea. For decades, a static and risk averse U.S. approach has enabled the Kim dynasty in Pyongyang to endure. U.S. policy remains hostage to the faulty premise that the regime of "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il can be persuaded to voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons capability and forswear its illicit proliferation activities.

But such an assumption is deeply flawed. North Korea's nuclear weapons provide the ultimate guarantee of survival for that decrepit and insular Stalinist regime. Moreover, there has never been any credible intelligence or tangible demonstration from Pyongyang that it is committed to denuclearization. Continuing to allow this flawed hypothesis to underpin American policy only serves to undermine U.S. national security, and to stymie our strategy on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States must jettison once and for all the carrot and stick approach that has failed repeatedly to alter the Kim regime's perception of the intrinsic value of its nuclear weapons program. There may not be a silver bullet solution for ending North Korea's nuclear program and continued proliferation activities. But the absence of a foolproof strategy does not render the United States powerless to confront North Korea. To the contrary, the United States and the international community must commit themselves to a pragmatic strat-

Carolyn Leddy served in the administration of President George W. Bush from 2003-2007 at both the Department of State and as Director for Counterproliferation Strategy on the National Security Council staff. In 2007, she participated in a U.S. delegation site survey of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility.

egy that punishes North Korean belligerence—one that protects against North Korean intransigence and prevents further proliferation activities by the regime in Pyongyang.

Pyongyang's proliferation habit

It is common knowledge that North Korea engages in a variety of illicit activities, from counterfeiting U.S. currency to the production of imitation cigarettes, in order to generate hard currency for its cash-strapped regime. But it is North Korea's sale of nuclear and ballistic missile technology that poses the gravest threat to international security.

It should come as no surprise that the Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as one of North Korea's best customers. Pyongyang and Tehran have an extensive history of military relations, including ballistic missile assistance and cooperation dating back to the 1980s. Indeed, North Korean technical assistance has been instrumental in the development of Iran's indigenous ballistic missile program, and Iran is suspected to have modeled its *Shahab-3* missile on North Korea's *Nodong* ballistic missile technology.

Furthermore, North Korea and Iran are suspected of having collaborated on the development of North Korea's *Taepodong-2* ballistic missile. Pyongyang is reported to have shared test data with Tehran shortly after the *Taepodong-2* test launch in 2006.[1] Several North Korean entities have been designated by the United States for illicit proliferation activities, including ballistic missile assistance to Iran.[2] And last year, Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly, head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency (MDA), testified before Congress that North Korea and Iran have exchanged information on avionics, propulsion technology, and related materials for ballistic missile development.[3]

Moreover, there are serious concerns regarding the extent of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. There have been unconfirmed reports that Iranian officials were present during North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006.[4] In addition, Iranian scientists were said to be working alongside North Korean and Syrian technicians at the al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria prior to its destruction by Israel in September 2007.[5]

Iran is not North Korea's only Middle Eastern client, however; Syria is another well-known consumer of DPRK missile technology. Over the past two decades, Syria is suspected to have purchased nearly 100 *Scud-C* missiles from North Korea. And Syria is known to often serve as a transshipment point for missile technology bound for Iran from North Korea. In 2008, the United States made public classified information documenting years of covert nuclear assistance provided by North Korea to Syria for the construction of a nuclear facility.[6] Photos taken of the al Kibar facility in Syria prior to its destruction reveal that the facility closely resembled North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear facility.

North Korean nuclear proliferation, however, significantly predates its cooperation with Damascus. In 2004, uranium hexafluoride—the feedstock for uranium enrichment—was recovered in Libya after dictator Muammar Qadhafi voluntarily abandoned Libya's nuclear program. While the evidence remains inconclusive, there is some indication that the nuclear material recovered in Libya may have originated in North Korea.

Then there is North Korea's own nuclear potential. Pyongyang's plutonium program is well-known, and has been documented extensively. But comparatively little is known about the extent of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program, which North Korea admitted to the United States in 2002. Traces of highly enriched uranium were reportedly found on documents handed over by North Korea to the United States in 2008, raising considerable concern.[7] For good reason; the mastery of uranium enrichment could provide North Korea not only with an alternative path to nuclear weapons, but also present Pyongyang with yet another potentially lucrative proliferation revenue stream. And whereas the Yongbyon-like nuclear facility under construction in Syria was fairly visible, the transfer of nuclear material or the construction of an underground uranium enrichment facility by North Korea would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect. Furthermore, North Korea has large deposits of naturally-occurring uranium which could serve as a source for other states, namely Iran, which is reported to have limited deposits of uranium ore.

In addition to its lucrative nuclear and ballistic missile sales, North Korea generates significant revenue from the sale of conventional armaments. It is estimated that North Korea generates more than $1 billion a year from exports of conventional armaments, including small arms and light weapons.[8] North Korea's clients are manifold, but African states deserve special mention; Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa are all acknowledged past customers of the Kim regime's arms sales.

The recent interdiction by South Africa of a shipment of tank parts bound for the Republic of Congo from North Korea illustrates the methods employed by Pyongyang in an effort to evade United Nations sanctions: the manifest of the Congo-bound shipment reportedly indicated that the cargo was loaded on a container in the Chinese port of Dalian; a French shipping company based in Malaysia was used to transport the cargo; the cargo manifest indicated that the contents of the shipping container included spare parts for a bulldozer; and the illicit items were reportedly hidden among sacks of rice and other non-prohibited items.

The Obama administration has contended that the greatest threat to the United States and its allies is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But, like his predecessors, President Obama has failed thus far to demonstrate the requisite political will to impose meaningful consequences on Pyongyang for its illicit proliferation activities.

The Congo shipment provides a telling glimpse into how Pyongyang carries out its nefarious business. North Korean entities and trading companies routinely provide false information on the origin and destination of illicit cargo, including nuclear-related and ballistic missile technology. Cargo manifests are falsified routinely and prohibited items are concealed among legitimate goods such as household items. In addition, North Korea often employs multiple intermediaries and transit companies in order to increase the difficulty of identifying the point of origin, tracking the movement,

and locating the intended destination of the cargo. Constantly wary of international surveillance, North Korean entities and front companies routinely change names, phone and fax numbers as well as office locations to evade detection. In addition, North Korea is suspected of using air freight, including the national airline—Air Koryo—to transport highly sensitive nuclear-related equipment and ballistic missile technology.

To facilitate these activities, Pyongyang has forged extensive links with criminal networks the world over. Legitimate trading companies and businesses are often used wittingly and unwittingly to conduct illicit activities for the Kim regime. In recent years, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office in North Korea was complicit in the procurement of sensitive technology for Pyongyang. The UNDP office also provided access to hard currency to North Korean officials in violation of UN procedures and was closed down by the UN in response to these revelations.[9]

North Korea's proliferation practices, and its customers, are relatively well-documented. Yet the international community continues to do the bare minimum to confront North Korea's proliferation activities. As a recently released United Nations sanctions committee expert panel review reveals, North Korea continues to engage in illicit proliferation activities while international implementation and enforcement of North Korean sanctions remains woefully inadequate.[10]

New administration, same approach

The Obama administration has contended that the greatest threat to the United States and its allies is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and related materials. But, like his predecessors, President Obama has failed thus far to demonstrate the requisite political will to impose meaningful consequences on Pyongyang for its illicit proliferation activities. And absent U.S. leadership, the international community will continue to fail to confront North Korea's nuclear program with any seriousness of purpose or sense of urgency.

For far too long, U.S. policy prescriptions have fallen short of adequately addressing North Korea's nuclear weapons program and illicit proliferation activities. The rhetoric from Washington condemning North Korean acts of belligerence—from Pyongyang's first nuclear test in October 2006 to its second nuclear test in June 2009 to the recent torpedo sinking of the South Korean naval vessel *Cheonan*—has been predictably robust. But, time and time again, the strong condemnations of North Korea's nefarious activities fail to elicit a comparable policy response from the United States and the international community.

The failure of U.S. policy to match its rhetoric in seriousness and resolve serves to weaken the credibility of American deterrent capabilities against the Kim regime. Moreover, it undermines U.S. nonproliferation policy at a time when the international community confronts a regime in Tehran that is inching closer and closer to attaining a nuclear weapons capability. The United States and the international community must consider carefully the choice of words in confronting Pyongyang, because these words reverberate in Tehran too. And the failure to impose consequences on North Korea for illicit proliferation activities is a powerful

signal to other would-be proliferators and nuclear aspirants that such activities will be tolerated by the international community.

Arguably the most glaring case of this policy confusion is the failure of the international community to punish North Korea for its nuclear proliferation to Syria. In response to North Korea's first nuclear test in October 2006, then-President George W. Bush issued a declaratory statement condemning the nuclear test and laying down a marker for North Korea regarding future nuclear proliferation activities. But this declaratory policy proved hollow when North Korea blatantly crossed the U.S. red line by constructing a nuclear facility in Syria and did not face meaningful consequences for it.

U.S. and international options for confronting North Korea's nuclear program are admittedly limited because of the delicate balance of security in East Asia. But the constraints do not preclude all options. In fact, there are a number of tools at the disposal of the United States and the international community. One of the most potent remains the multitude of defensive and financial measures to target illicit North Korean proliferation activities.

The full potential of defensive measures to deter North Korea remains relatively untested. During the Bush administration, the seizure of $25 million in illicit North Korean funds in Macao's Banco Delta Asia (BDA) served as an early effort at financial pressure, and a glimpse into the potential effect such measures could have on the Kim regime. But the Banco Delta Asia sanctions had scarcely begun to take effect when they were abruptly halted in favor of diplomatic outreach via the Six-Party Talks framework.

The incident exposes one of the fundamental flaws of U.S. policy toward North Korea—the absence of U.S. political will and resilience to stay the course. The Bush administration squandered an opportunity to send a clear message to North Korea and other would-be proliferators by returning tainted funds to the Kim regime in exchange for empty promises.

Writing last year in the *Wall Street Journal*, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph underscored the devastating effect of the Bush administration's retreat from its North Korea defensive measures strategy. "The spectacle of American diplomats pleading for foreign banks to facilitate the return of the assets from Macao, some of which were known to stem from the North's proliferation activities, could not have been more pathetic or, ironically, more damaging to the prospects for diplomacy," wrote Joseph.[11]

Today, the Obama administration should move expeditiously to renew the fledgling international sanctions regime and reinvigorate defensive measures directed toward North Korea. As the recent UN expert panel report noted, sanctions can have a significant impact on North Korean illicit activities.[12] But in order for them to do so, a renewed commitment on the part of the international community to implement and enforce such measures with greater consistency is necessary. According to the UN report, North Korea continues to engage in proliferation-related and other illicit activities in contravention of UN sanctions resolutions.[13] Moreover, experts have found evidence indicating that North Korea continues to engage in nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities with Iran, Syria and Burma.[14] These

revelations are a damning indictment of the failure of the international community—and particularly of U.S. leadership—to ensure enforcement of sanctions on North Korea. The results, as Israeli President Shimon Peres recently noted, is that the North Korean "duty-free" shop for nuclear and ballistic missile technology remains open for business.[15]

Hitting Pyongyang where it hurts

A reinvigorated strategy must begin with redoubled efforts to target and expose states, entities, and individuals providing both explicit and implicit support to North Korea's proliferation activities. As the UN report noted, the list of UN designated entities and individuals involved in Pyongyang's illicit activities is incomplete, and does not capture the full inventory of known facilitators.[16] Nor is the breadth and scope of the Kim regime's vital revenue streams, such as the sale of small arms and light weapons, encapsulated in UN sanctions under Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874. Accordingly, the United States may consider conditioning future assistance to African states on their discontinuation of military relationships with North Korea, including the purchase of conventional armaments from Pyongyang.

Additionally, the United States should target North Korean "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il's personal finances and assets. The U.S. Treasury Department should be given greater latitude to target global financial institutions, entities, and individuals that continue to provide safe haven for the assets of the Kim regime—and by doing so, provide aid and comfort to the Stalinist state. Such an expansion of powers should be buttressed by the recognition that, whether or not North Korean revenue is linked directly to illicit proliferation activities, every dollar generated by Pyongyang provides for the continued existence of the Kim regime.

Washington should also focus upon North Korea's key political players. The Kim regime's continued grasp on power is due in part to the loyalty of the country's political and military elite. To a certain extent, Kim Jong Il sustains this loyalty by providing access to luxury goods such as alcohol and electronics. Accordingly, UNSCR 1718 prohibits the export of luxury goods to North Korea. But there is ample evidence that—notwithstanding that prohibition—such commodities continue to flow to Pyongyang, particularly across the porous Chinese border. Many North Korea watchers scoff at restricting this trade, and consequently have adopted a cavalier attitude regarding its implementation and enforcement. Of course, stemming the flow of luxury goods to North Korea is unlikely to topple the regime. But any effort to increase the difficulty or financial costs for Kim to acquire such items is an important element of a sound North Korea strategy.

The recent appointment of U.S. State Department nonproliferation official Robert Einhorn to oversee North Korean and Iranian sanctions implementation is an encouraging signal that the Obama administration may have taken to heart some of the lessons from the previous administration's failure on the North Korean front. Still, it remains to be seen whether Mr. Einhorn will have the requisite support from the White House and officials involved in North Korea policy to pursue sanctions implementation and enforcement.

Nonproliferation and counter-proliferation officials were largely sidelined from the development and implementation of policy toward North Korea during the latter part of the George W. Bush administration. This marginalization resulted in an ineffective North Korea policy devoid of a strategic perspective and absent an appreciation for the broader impact on the global nonproliferation regime. It is an error that must be corrected, since North Korea policy does not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, Iran's continued defiance of the international community in its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability is a sobering reminder of the global consequences of not holding proliferators to account.

In this regard, no country looms larger than China. There is near unanimity among North Korea watchers that China is a key player in efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. But Beijing's reticence to pressure the Kim regime remains a thorny and complex challenge for the United States. China's reluctance is understandable; it stems from the fact that genuine pressure on Pyongyang could create a flood of refugees across the Chinese border—and heighten instability within China itself. In addition, Beijing remains wary of the impact a unified Korean Peninsula is likely to have on its own strategic position in East Asia.

In large part because of these considerations, U.S. diplomatic efforts thus far have failed to persuade China of the gravity of the threat to international security posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program. But Beijing holds considerable leverage over Pyongyang. China is North Korea's largest trading partner, and the porous border between the two countries remains a primary transit route for UN prohibited items to North Korea. China, in other words, is in a key position to exert pressure on North Korea to change course.

So far, the U.S. approach has been hampered by excessive deference to Beijing's concerns—deference in no small measure bred by America's own deep (and unbalanced) trade relationship with the PRC. But there may be a window of opportunity emerging on that score; the international community is growing increasingly frustrated with China's reluctance to act as a "responsible stakeholder" for issues of global concern, even as its international assertiveness continues to expand. If the United States can reinvigorate international sanctions against North Korea, the opportunity may present itself to compel China to do more.

Undoubtedly, confronting China's North Korea policy is a complex and uncertain task. But if the Obama administration seeks to seriously stem the proliferation emanating from the North, it will need to ratchet up pressure on the PRC. Consequently, it may be time for the United States to review its diplomatic strategy with China. In doing so, the United States should consider imposing consequences on China for continued explicit and implicit support for the regime in Pyongyang. Moreover, the United States may consider putting Beijing on notice that it will be held accountable for any negligence that results from North Korea's proliferation of nuclear material to other rogue states or terrorist groups.

Time and time again the United States has allowed the latest provocation by Pyongyang—whether a nuclear test or ballistic missile launch—to paralyze its policy efforts. Moreover, American policymakers

remain reluctant to run the risk of antagonizing the Kim regime. So long as U.S. policy toward North Korea continues to fail to apply and sustain pressure consistently on Pyongyang, efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula will continue to be unsuccessful. And the global nonproliferation regime will remain subject to the whims of Pyongyang.

Washington's approach must start with Beijing, but it cannot end there. Moving forward, the United States must rebuild the tattered international consensus surrounding the Kim regime's status as a pariah, and reinforce the stigma of conducting business with such an unscrupulous regime. Doing so will require a patience and force of will that the United States has been reluctant to display in its past dealings with Pyongyang.

The primary objective of U.S.-North Korea policy must remain the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But pragmatism needs to dictate the U.S. approach in coming months and possibly years. Moreover, policymakers must harbor realistic expectations regarding the potential impact of an enhanced defensive strategy. North Korea's nuclear status is not necessarily a *fait accompli*, and it is a fallacy to suggest that pursuing a pragmatic strategy that punishes, protects against, and prevents further proliferation requires *de facto* acceptance of a nuclear North Korea. In the final analysis, the only foolhardy North Korea strategy is one that continues to advocate the failed carrot-and-stick approach of the past several decades.

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The NPT's Challenge To Israel

Emily B. Landau

Calls for Israel to end its policy of nuclear ambiguity and join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty are certainly not new or unprecedented. Demands for the Jewish state to join the NPT have been voiced throughout the Middle East ever since the treaty came into force in 1970. Israel's policy of ambiguity in the nuclear realm similarly has often been the target of complaints from Arab states. As long ago as the early 1990s, the convening of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group as part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process created a formal framework for Arab states to increase pressure on Israel on the nuclear issue.

Over the past year, however, there has been a new peak in both the frequency and intensity of rhetoric intended to pressure Israel to join the NPT. This has emerged against the backdrop of efforts to prevent Iran from moving toward a military nuclear capability, and the idea that all Middle East states should be treated equally in the nuclear realm. This trend culminated in the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, or RevCon, which produced a final document that singled out Israel, and called for a conference on the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) for the region in two years.

A claim of double standards

In both conceptual and practical terms, Israel's policy of ambiguity and the

Dr. Emily B. Landau is Senior Research Associate and Director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), at Tel Aviv University. She teaches nuclear arms control at Tel Aviv and Haifa Universities.

question of accession to the NPT are actually two distinct issues. Ending ambiguity relates solely to the question of Israel's openness about its nuclear policy. As such, putting an end to this policy could simply mean that Israel would adopt an open, rather than secret, nuclear stance. Indeed, this is what the few advocates of this position in the Israeli public debate seem to be referring to when they call for discontinuing an approach they claim isn't fooling anyone. Whether based on the belief that secrecy is something that should be shunned on moral grounds, or an assessment that Israel could gain more in practical terms by adopting an Indian/Pakistani approach, these commentators aren't advocating that Israel give up its nuclear option.[1]

But when similar calls come from other states in the Middle East, the implication is very different. Those demanding that Israel increase transparency and end its so-called nuclear "deception" invariably couple this with a call for Israel to join the NPT. Of course, the only way for Israel (or any of the other states outside the treaty) to join the NPT is as a non-nuclear weapon state; therefore the call for Israel to join the NPT is necessarily a call for Israel to disarm itself of whatever nuclear capability it is assumed to have. The conflation of the two conceptually distinct messages underscores that the parties voicing them have little interest in transparency as such, nor are they seeking a confidence-building measure and/or a means to enhance the extent of Israel's cooperation with the international community. Rather, they consider the removal of ambiguity a move that will significantly boost their case that Israel must join the NPT—and of course disarm.[2]

A major impetus for the greater attention that has been directed of late toward Israel's ambiguous nuclear posture is the intensifying international discussion over the best means for stopping Iran's march to the bomb. The argument that has increasingly been made is quite straightforward: why is so much pressure directed at Iran when it is not even a nuclear state, whereas nuclear Israel is allowed to escape international scrutiny and pressure? Simply put, why is one state allowed what another is denied?

At the official level, the most clear-cut statements in this vein are coming from three states in the Middle East: Egypt, Turkey, and of course Iran itself. But the trend is creeping more and more into the unofficial public debate in the West as well: in media commentary, at professional conferences and meetings, and other unofficial forums. With the prospects for stopping Iran looking less and less favorable, it is not surprising that some attempts are being made to divert attention in other directions, perhaps as a means of minimizing the sense of impending failure.

This shift of focus to Israel has dovetailed over the past year with an additional development that has also encouraged greater attention to Israel's assumed nuclear capability, albeit inadvertently: U.S. President Barack Obama's nuclear disarmament agenda. The new American approach to nuclear arms control—presented by Mr. Obama in April 2009, in a speech delivered in Prague—underscores an across-the-board nuclear disarmament logic, which has had the side-effect of strengthening the hand of those who would argue that Iran and Israel can and should be placed on equal footing in the nuclear realm, and vis-à-vis NPT obligations.

Atomic inequality

The "equality norm" being promoted as the primary justification for increasing pressure on Israel deserves closer scrutiny. There are good reasons to dismiss attempts to equate Israel and Iran in the nuclear realm. At the most basic level, Iran is a member of the NPT that took upon itself an obligation to remain non-nuclear, whereas Israel made the choice to remain outside the treaty, which it believes cannot address its unique security concerns.

Moreover, Israel and Iran are different in some very important respects. They have vastly different records of behavior toward their domestic populations, as well as in the regional and international spheres. The very fact that the focus is on nuclear weapons cannot justify discounting these differences in favor of a position that advocates treating them as virtually identical entities. These differences matter.

The argument for a differential approach gains additional strength from the fact that Iran is specifically threatening Israel in a manner that goes to the latter's very existence as a legitimate state. Ignoring the fact that there is no basis for conflict between the two states, territorial or otherwise, the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 declared Israel its mortal enemy. It proceeded to direct the most malicious rhetoric toward Israel, including repeated denials of its right to exist. In fact, these threats underscore the basic rationale for Israel's nuclear deterrent: an insurance policy against threats to its very existence.

Indeed, the grounds for challenging the idea of "equality," and advocating a differential approach to Israel and Iran, can actually be traced to the conceptual roots of the NPT itself. At its inception, the NPT legitimized two important normative values: "equality" and the "right of self-defense." With regard to the former, even though the NPT enshrines a basic *in*equality among states by defining two categories of members—nuclear and non-nuclear—it nevertheless underscores the equal *obligation* of all members to work toward the goal of a nuclear-free world. Thus, alongside the commitment of non-nuclear states to maintain their status, nuclear state parties also pledged to work toward disarmament. By leaving the identity of the state outside the boundaries of the treaty, and focusing solely on nuclear weapons as such, the NPT did not create any space for treating one differently from another based on its commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament.

But the rival norm inherent in the NPT alters this picture. To understand the status of the "right of self-defense" under the treaty, one must revisit the reasoning behind the initial decision to base it on two categories of states. The question is why nuclear states were unwilling to immediately disarm, and why non-nuclear states were compensated for remaining non-nuclear—with the offer of cooperation in the civil nuclear realm, a commitment on the part of nuclear states to work toward disarmament, and an exit clause from the treaty in case their "supreme interests" were jeopardized by "extraordinary events." Henry Sokolski explains that this was because it was recognized and accepted at the time the NPT was formulated that nuclear weapons actually have considerable strategic value. And because all states have an inherent right to self-defense, if a state was willing to compromise this right (by agreeing not to pursue nuclear weapons), it deserved to be compensated.[3]

Thus security and self-defense are implicitly recognized by the

NPT, and the right of self defense, especially when a state's supreme interests are jeopardized, constitutes a rival value to that of equality. Over the years, however, equality became the dominant norm in NPT discourse, whereas the right of self-defense—though implicitly upheld by the treaty's provisions—was completely sidelined. Still, the enduring importance of the security value of nuclear weapons continues to be reflected in the behavior (if not the rhetoric) of states. Brazil and Argentina, for example, both joined the NPT only relatively late in the game (Argentina in 1995 and Brazil in 1998), after they had resolved their political rivalry. Settling this facet of their relations was a necessary prerequisite for settling the question of their respective nuclear advances. Obama himself, in the context of his Prague disarmament speech, clarified that while this was the vision, the U.S. still views nuclear weapons as vital to its national security for the foreseeable future.

A corrosive quid pro quo

For Israel, however, matters have gotten increasingly complicated over the past year. New and important evidence of the Iranian regime's military nuclear intentions made the situation more and more acute, but a diplomatic solution remained elusive due to Iran's continued rejection of U.S. (and broader "P5+1") diplomatic overtures. At the same time, the Obama administration was expressing strong rhetorical support for the equality norm embedded in the NPT, to the point that it advocated doing more to meet its own disarmament commitments. The implicit message to Israel was that it needed to make at least some minimal concession in the nuclear realm in order to secure the support of the Arab states for putting more pressure on Iran.

The full impact of the growing insistence on a greater focus on Israel culminated at the 2010 NPT RevCon, with Egypt's massive campaign to pressure the U.S. to accept its Middle East agenda—one which placed specific demands on Israel. Coming on the heels of the "New START" agreement between the U.S. and Russia, as well as Washington's much-publicized Nuclear Security Summit, it was clear that the Obama administration would accept nothing less than a proclaimed success for the RevCon. The stage was set for political blackmail, which was exactly what Egypt was counting on. Cairo explicitly threatened to block consensus on any decision at the RevCon if its Middle East agenda focusing on Israel was not accepted.

The Egyptian threat to bring close to 120 non-aligned states in line with its position presented a clear dilemma for the Obama administration. While not averse to asking Israel for some indication of willingness to broach the nuclear issue, the administration strongly rejected Egypt's agenda aimed at forcing Israel's hand regarding its policy of ambiguity and membership in the NPT. But because of its renewed commitment to disarmament, it found itself trapped by the normative precepts of this approach. The equality norm was especially strong within the framework of NPT discussions. This constrained America's ability to advance arguments about Israel's unique security concerns in order to convince the Egyptians to back down. Ultimately, the U.S. gave in to some (although not all) Egyptian demands, resulting in a final document in which Israel alone was named, Iran was not mentioned, and the idea of a conference on a WMDFZ in 2012 was included.

But then something interesting happened. Almost immediately after the final document was adopted, official U.S. statements strongly attacked the communiqué for doing what the U.S. had just hours before reluctantly agreed to: singling out Israel and failing to mention Iran. The White House further clarified that the U.S. would object to any steps that would endanger Israel's security.[4] It was as if the administration were saying: "If we can't challenge the Egyptians from within the RevCon, then we'll step outside the conference and say what we really think." The message of support to Israel, and the commitment to uphold its policy of ambiguity in the nuclear realm, was reiterated and significantly bolstered when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with President Obama in Washington in early July.[5] Ultimately, the "right of self-defense" norm seemed to carry the day.

Refocusing on Iran

In the final analysis, it would probably be fair to say that the NPT—and its accompanying RevCon documents—are what states make of them. And while the preceding analysis demonstrates the impact of normative precepts on the behavior of states and the outcome of the conference, political positions and commitments of strong actors hold more sway—at least in the short to medium term. So while Egypt was able to make headway at the conference, it is the strength of the U.S. commitment to Israel that will determine whether its "success" translates into something more concrete down the road.

While NPT documents can and do serve as precedents and as platforms for increasing pressure at future RevCons, at present the Obama administration's firm commitment to Israel's security and to its policy of nuclear ambiguity are more important than what appears in the final document. Here, it's interesting to note that the Arab states take their cues from the U.S., and not necessarily in the manner one might expect. The common wisdom of the Obama administration had been that in order to increase the prospects for gathering a coalition of Arab states against Iran, Arab grievances against Israel would have to be addressed. Yet recent developments give reason to believe that when the U.S. indicated a decrease in its commitment toward Israel's policies—and adopted a harsher approach toward it—it may have been interpreted by Arab states as a green light to press Israel on nuclear matters.

Now that the U.S. has firmly expressed its ongoing commitment to Israel's security and the means by which to ensure it, Arab states might conclude that their message is likely to fall upon deaf ears, resulting in a diminution of pressure. This would be very much in line with the findings of a study of Arab perceptions of Israel's nuclear image which charted both the content and frequency of Arab reactions to Israel's nuclear program from 1960 to the early 1990s.[6] In that survey, there was a clear dynamic according to which the nuclear issue was purposely "played up" and "played down" in correlation with assessments about whether increasing attention to Israel had a realistic chance of producing results. When it was judged that these efforts were unlikely to engender change, there would be a noticeable decrease in the overall amount of statements and commentary devoted to this issue.

More importantly, and somewhat paradoxically, it could be *this* dynamic—rather than the one whereby the U.S. tries to appear

more even-handed in its nuclear approach—that may stiffen Arab opposition to Iran's nuclear advances, and decrease the focus on Israel. Indeed, in the weeks following the NPT RevCon, there has been a noticeable increase in concern from Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf, over the Iranian nuclear program. This has included hints of a willingness on the part of Saudi Arabia to turn a blind eye to Israel using Saudi airspace in order to carry out military action against Iran, and a statement attributed to the UAE ambassador to the U.S. that military action against Iran would be preferable to Iran gaining the bomb.[7] While these media reports were officially denied by the states in question, they are in line with opinions expressed at unofficial levels in at least some of the Gulf states. Moreover, the UAE immediately supported the fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran, and expressed its commitment to do more to adhere. Other reports note an increased level of concern in Egypt and Jordan as well.[8]

But while pressure on Israel to join the NPT is highly unlikely to materialize, the same cannot be said about the idea for a conference on a WMDFZ in the Middle East.[9] As opposed to the NPT—which focuses solely on the weapons, underscoring the equality norm—a regional process is where the hard realities of inter-state relations in the Middle East can be directly addressed by the participating parties. Taking regional realities into account in arms control efforts is the only way to advance more effective arrangements for the Middle East. It is in this arena that Israel must focus its energies, and concentrate its arms control efforts, in the years ahead.

1. Avner Cohen, for one, often targets the morality issue, whereas others point to the benefits of being an openly declared nuclear state, such as enhanced deterrence. For a collection of positions of Israeli analysts on this issue, see "Should Israel End Nuclear Ambiguity?" *Ynet*, April 15, 2010, and Leslie Susser, "Israel's Policy of Ambiguity Comes under Fire," *Jerusalem Post*, May 26, 2010. See also Avner Cohen's forthcoming book, *The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb* (Columbia University Press, October 2010). It is noteworthy that focusing solely on the secrecy aspect of ambiguity risks ignoring more significant features of Israel's nuclear policy that are served by ambiguity: namely the restraint and responsibility that Israel has exercised over the years in the nuclear realm and that have become the hallmark of its nuclear deterrent posture.
2. Official U.S. policy, of course, also calls on all states outside the NPT to join the treaty, including Israel. But this policy stems from its position with regard to the treaty, and not to any particular state. Indeed as far as Israel in particular is concerned, additional U.S. statements have clarified repeatedly that regional conditions in the Middle East would have to change dramatically before Israel would be able to consider actually joining.
3. Henry Sokolski, "Taking Proliferation Seriously," *Policy Review* 121, Oct-Dec 2003, 51-64.
4. See "Obama Slams NPT's Israel Focus," *Jerusalem Post*, May 30, 2010.
5. "Obama Backs Israel on Nuclear Conference," Agence France-Presse, July 6, 2010.
6. Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, *Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture* (Tel Aviv: Papyrus Publishing House, 1994), 167-170 (Hebrew).
7. For reference to Saudi Arabia, see: Hugh Tomlinson, "Saudi Arabia Gives Israel Clear Skies to Attack Iranian Nuclear Sites," *Times of London*, June 12, 2010; for the UAE ambassador's remark, see Eli Lake, "UAE Diplomat Mulls Hit on Iran's Nukes," *Washington Times*, July 6, 2010.
8. On the UAE position re UN sanctions, see Samir Salama, "UAE Tightens Noose on Front Companies," *Gulf News*, June 21, 2010. On the position of Egypt and Jordan, see Yaakov Katz, "Cairo, Amman Worried about Iran Nukes," *Jerusalem Post*, July 9, 2010.
9. For some principles that should be applied to this conference, see Emily B. Landau, "A Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Shaping the Contours of Discussion toward 2012," Heinrich Boell Stiftung, July 6, 2010, http://www.boell.de/intlpolitics/security/middle-east-weapon-mass-destruction-free-zone-middle-east-9625.html.

Off to a Bad START

Keith Payne

Serious students of strategic forces and deterrence know that the *credibility* of our forces for deterrence is dependent on their flexibility to provide a spectrum of deterrent options, and their resilience to adjust in a timely way to changes in the threat environment. The U.S. need for flexible and resilient strategic forces to deter enemies and assure allies credibly has been recognized for decades, and is the reason that Democratic and Republican administrations since the 1960s rejected the old "assured destruction" standard popularized by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in his day.

McNamara's horrific yet rigid and finite threat of nuclear "assured destruction" was discarded specifically because it alone was deemed to be an *incredible* deterrent threat vis-à-vis many of the severe threats we and our allies faced, including limited nuclear threats. The basic U.S. and allied concern was that a U.S. "assured destruction" deterrent would leave the United States and allies vulnerable to attack because opponents would not actually believe that the United States would employ an "assured destruction" deterrent in response to any but the most severe nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Thus U.S. and allied governments agreed on the need for greater flexibility through multiple more limited deterrent options to help provide credible U.S. deterrence strategies to a spectrum of possible attacks.

Virtually all major nuclear policy documents made public since the 1960s have emphasized this need for flexibility and multiple strategic force options.[1]

Dr. Keith B. Payne, President and Chairman of the National Institute for Public Policy and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, is Professor and Head of Missouri State University's graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, located in Fairfax, Virginia. This article is adapted from his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 27, 2010.

Strategic force flexibility is particularly important today for credible deterrence because the contemporary threat environment can shift rapidly and in surprising ways. In one crisis we may need one set of strategic capabilities to deter credibly, while in another, a different set of strategic capabilities may be necessary; assuring allies credibly may necessitate still different types of strategic forces; and when an attack cannot be deterred, an altogether different set of forces may be necessary to defend against it.

The material question is whether the treaty is compatible with the continued force flexibility and resilience essential to the credibility of U.S. deterrence strategies over the long term.

If we want a credible deterrent to a spectrum of severe attacks, including for example, nuclear and biological attacks on our allies, our deterrence forces must have the quantity and diversity necessary to be flexible and resilient. The 2009 report by the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, entitled *America's Strategic Posture*, emphasizes this contemporary U.S. requirement given the current, fluid threat environment.[2]

Understanding this requirement is the necessary starting point for any review of New START, the arms reduction agreement recently finalized by the White House and Kremlin. Indeed, at New START's lower force levels, the need for flexibility and resilience in our remaining forces becomes increasingly important. The material question is whether the treaty is compatible with the continued force flexibility and resilience essential to the credibility of U.S. deterrence strategies over the long term. Under New START, would the combination of U.S. reductions and possible Russian force deployments (with or without Russian cheating) threaten the necessary flexibility and resilience of our forces? After all, we cannot allow our enthusiasm for quantitative nuclear reductions to undermine our ability to credibly deter war and assure American allies. As the late Herman Kahn often observed, "The objective of nuclear-weapons policy should not be solely to decrease the number of weapons in the world, but to make the world safer—which is not necessarily the same thing."[3]

Drawing down American capabilities

New START raises some concerns in this regard. For example, a recent Administration report on verification emphasizes that "any" Russian cheating "would have little effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces..."[4] This claim is ominous because it suggests that the Obama administration has resurrected "assured destruction"-type capabilities as the standard of adequacy for U.S. strategic forces, and on that limited basis has determined that "any" Russian cheating could have no serious effect on our ability to deter or assure.[5] This flies in the face of every Republican and Democratic administration since the 1960s and their proper conclusion that U.S. "assured destruction" capabilities alone are inadequate because they require little or none of the flexibility and resilience so important for *credible* deterrence and assurance. Assured destruction is a conveniently finite, undemanding force standard; it imposes few requirements on U.S. offensive capa-

bilities and none on U.S. defenses, but it also undermines U.S. deterrence and assurance missions. The Administration's celebratory claims about New START verification that appear tied to some version of this old Cold War-type of measure are far more troubling than reassuring.

In addition, the treaty would limit U.S. strategic force flexibility and resilience because it requires sizeable reductions in the number of U.S. strategic nuclear launchers, and would limit some types of strategic *conventional* forces for prompt global strike (PGS). Administration officials have said, "The treaty does not constrain our ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities."[6] But in fact, New START *would* restrict deployment of any U.S. conventional PGS options based on existing ICBMs or sea-launched ballistic missiles. These would be limited under New START's ceiling of 700 deployed launchers.[7] And, we would have to reduce our strategic nuclear force launchers further below 700 on a 1:1 basis for each of these conventional PGS systems deployed. Such a substitution in general, it should be noted, has understandably been rejected for deterrence purposes by senior U.S. military leaders.[8]

Administration officials, though, have said that limiting these conventional PGS options in this fashion is acceptable based on the assumption that only *a small number of such systems will be needed*.[9] Unfortunately, there can be no certainty behind that assumption given the many different and now-unknown threats that will arise in New START's 10-15 year time frame. Perhaps the option of deploying *many* such conventional PGS systems will be critical for deterrence, assurance or defense. Yet, under New START, we would be mightily constrained from doing so because of the treaty's limits and its required 1:1 trade-off with our nuclear forces.

Stretched to the limit

In addition, New START's force limits do not allow "more [capability] than is needed" for deterrence under current planning.[10] Leaving little or no such margin may be risky when force flexibility and diversity is necessary to deter and assure credibly across a range of threats.

Senior U.S. military leaders have noted in open testimony that New START *would indeed allow sufficient U.S. strategic force flexibility*.[11] However, the analysis behind this important conclusion reportedly was predicated on three key assumptions: 1) U.S. planning guidance for strategic forces would remain the same; 2) there would be no requests for an increase in forces; and 3) Russia would be compliant with New START.[12]

But would the treaty allow sufficient U.S. flexibility and resilience *if one or all of those optimistic starting assumptions do not hold, as is plausible*? For example, what if Russia again decides to violate its treaty commitments? What if relations with China and Russia return to a crisis pitch, and they express more severe nuclear threats to our allies or to us? What if Iranian deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles throws the entire Middle East into an unprecedented security crisis? What if the apparent nuclear nexus of Burma, Iran, North Korea and Syria poses unprecedented threats to our allies or our forces abroad?[13] U.S. planning and force requirements might have to change with any and all of these unwanted developments that could arise during New START's tenure. What new

quantitative or qualitative strategic force requirements might arise as a result for credible deterrence, assurance or defense, and would New START preserve the necessary U.S. force flexibility and resilience to meet those requirements? These are fundamental questions regarding the treaty and international security.

New START neither requires real Russian reductions nor does it provide hard limits on a renewed buildup of Russian strategic nuclear forces.

More simply, will the U.S., at least, develop and deploy the diverse strategic force structure that remains possible *under the treaty* and could help preserve U.S. force flexibility and resilience at lower levels? The traditional U.S. triad of bombers, ICBMs, and sea-based missiles—now buttressed by missile defenses and the potential for new non-nuclear PGS capabilities—can be extremely valuable in this regard because the diversity of offensive and defensive options helps provide the necessary basis for adjusting to a multitude of different threats and circumstances.

The Obama administration has expressed its intention to support the triad, missile defense deployment, and conventional PGS, but at this point it has made no apparent commitment to advanced conventional PGS deployment or to modernizing the aging ICBM and bomber legs of the triad, including the air-launched cruise missile. This fosters concern that the Administration's enthusiasm for force reductions may now come at the expense of the long-standing requirements for force diversity, flexibility, and resilience, and take refuge in a return to old "assured destruction"-type thinking. If our strategic forces are to be reduced further, we also must take care to ensure that they also are modernized with the specific goal of maximizing their flexibility and resilience at lower numbers—whether through traditional means or as a result of innovations. Past administrations have so balanced reductions with necessary modernization programs, but this is a tall order to which the Obama administration has not yet committed.

For example, bombers have great inherent flexibility and resilience, and the weapons counting rules for bombers under New START are extremely permissive. Yet, while Russia has decided to build a new strategic bomber and apparently has a new long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missile near deployment,[14] the Obama administration plans to cut U.S. nuclear-capable bombers by more than one-third under New START and has made no commitment to replace the venerable B-52 or to build a new air-launched cruise missile.[15] Similarly, the Administration has announced that it will deMIRV U.S. ICBMs and reduce the number of U.S. ICBM launchers by at least 30 under New START,[16] while Russia is deploying new MIRVed mobile ICBMs, and has decided to move ahead with a new heavy MIRVed ICBM as is now permitted under New START.

Over time, this New START-inspired combination of U.S. ICBM reductions and permitted Russian MIRVed heavy ICBMs could again challenge the survivability of U.S. ICBMs, bombers, and missile-carrying submarines not on patrol—a situation long recognized as highly "destabilizing." And if the survivability of these U.S. forces is at risk, so

too will be much of the triad's flexibility and the corresponding credibility of U.S. forces to deter and assure.

The Administration will need to make some hard commitments to U.S. force modernization if we are to move forward with flexible and resilient offensive and defensive capabilities at lower force levels. How much confidence can we have that the Administration will take the necessary strategic modernization steps given its highest nuclear priority of nonproliferation and movement toward a nuclear-free world, its commitment to further negotiations with Moscow, and its presumption against any new nuclear warheads?[17] A solid U.S. commitment to bomber and cruise missile modernization, Minuteman ICBM life extension and ultimate replacement, and missile defenses of all ranges likewise could help provide this confidence. Indeed, credible assurances and the necessary strategic modernization budgets should be the corresponding *sine qua non* of any acceptance of New START.

Disproportionate burden

Concern about New START's impact on U.S. force flexibility and resilience—however modest or significant—might be eased if the treaty's ceilings on Russian forces actually would reduce the threats we might face. But, according to numerous Russian open source accounts, New START's ceilings are of little real consequence for Russia because Russia's aged Cold War strategic launchers already have been reduced below New START's ceilings, and will decline further with or without the treaty—while Russia's comprehensive post-Cold War nuclear modernization programs are moving forward slowly. Alexei Arbatov, the former Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, notes that "[t]he new treaty is an agreement on reducing the American and not the Russian [strategic nuclear forces]. In fact, the latter will be reduced in any case because of the mass removal from the order of battle of obsolete arms and the one-at-a-time introduction of new systems."[18] Prior to the New START negotiations, Russian open sources already projected that by 2012 Russian strategic nuclear forces could have as few as 406 launchers and fewer than 1,500 accountable warheads—well below New START ceilings using its counting rules.[19] The point was made most succinctly by Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA and Canada Institute in Moscow: "We will not have to reduce anything prematurely. In effect, the ceilings established by the new START Treaty do not force us to reduce currently available strategic offensive forces… Only the United States will have to conduct reductions…"[20] Russian defense expert Mikhail Barabanov again makes the same point: "The truth is, Russia's nuclear arsenal is already at or even below the new ceilings. At the time of the signing of the treaty, Russia had a total of just 640 strategic delivery vehicles—only 571 of them deployed... It therefore becomes evident that Russia needs no actual reductions to comply. If anything, it may need to bring some of its numbers up to the new limits, not down."[21]

In other words, New START's common ceilings essentially appear to require *unilateral* reductions by the United States. Russian officials and analysts have long celebrated this situation, while some U.S. officials and treaty proponents have acknowledged it only recently.[22] In this context, it is difficult to take seri-

ously the notion that the treaty's supposed reductions for Russia justify its prospective limitations on U.S. flexibility and resilience.

Nor does the treaty provide solid barriers against the re-emergence of Russian strategic forces. New START neither requires real Russian reductions nor does it provide hard limits on a renewed buildup of Russian strategic nuclear forces. That is because New START contains sufficient loopholes and permissive counting rules to allow Russia to deploy far beyond the treaty's 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads ceiling *within the terms of the treaty* if Russia finds the financial resources to do so. In fact, according to a report by RIA Novosti, the official news agency of the Russian Federation, Russia could deploy 2,100 strategic actual nuclear weapons under the treaty—well above the putative 1,550 warhead ceiling.[23] There are avenues that would allow Russia to deploy many more than even that number and remain within the confines of the treaty.

This may be significant over time because Russia's highest defense procurement priority is the comprehensive modernization of its strategic nuclear forces.[24] According to Russian open sources, Russia has a new strategic air-launched nuclear cruise missile near deployment, is MIRVing its new mobile ICBMs (the RS-24), and has committed to deploy at least one new strategic bomber, a new 5,000 km-range submarine-launched cruise missile, and a new heavy ICBM. There also has been interest expressed in the Russian press in a new rail-mobile ICBM and a new air-launched ICBM—neither of which, according to some Russian public commentary, would necessarily have to be counted under the treaty's force ceilings.

At the moment, aging forces and Russia's production and financial problems are causing reductions in Russia's force numbers precipitously—with or without New START. But, Russia has committed to the comprehensive modernization of its strategic forces; if and when it has the necessary financial and production capacity to realize this goal, New START will not prevent Russia from deploying new forces well beyond the treaty's specified ceilings within the terms of the treaty.

New START and missile defense

Senior administration officials have said about missile defense that "[t]here are no constraints of any kind in the New START Treaty,"[25] and that "[t]he treaty does nothing to constrain missile defenses... there is no limit or constraint on what the United States can do with its missile defense systems."[26] But such statements are simply false; New START contains both explicit and implicit limitations on U.S. missile defense options. Judgments may differ regarding their significance, but there should be no further denials that New START includes them.

For example, Article 5, paragraph 3, of the treaty prohibits the United States from converting ICBM or sea-based missile launchers for missile defense purposes. The Administration has said that this is not a significant limit on U.S. defenses because the United States has no plans for such conversions.[27] Yet, missile agency directors examined such options in the past and have said publicly they found them technically credible and of interest. New START—a treaty that is supposed to have no restrictions on missile defense—would now preclude this option from the possible plans of future administrations.

U.S. missile defense options may need to be protected, particularly given Russia's long-standing goal to veto American missile defenses, and the Administration's apparent commitment to further negotiations with the Kremlin. Here, Congress can play a key role; the Senate could direct the President to make more clear to Russia that the United States recognizes no treaty limits on missile defense beyond those in Article 5, paragraph 3, and that the U.S. will not agree to any further negotiated limits of any kind on its missile defense options.

In addition, New START establishes the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) and gives it broad authority to "agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty."[28] Missile defense is part of the subject matter of the treaty and its protocol, and the BCC is authorized specifically to discuss the unique distinguishing features of missile defense launchers and interceptors and make "viability and effectiveness" changes in the treaty. These could be done in secret and without Senate advice and consent.[29] Such institutions are not supposed to make substantive changes in the terms of treaties. But, START I's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) served with a more limited scope, and appears to have made significant changes in START's terms without Senate consultation. This past precedent is not comforting.

The Senate might find it particularly valuable to insist on continuous and complete visibility into the ongoing workings of the BCC. This could be particularly helpful to ensure that no new limits on missile defense emerge, without Senate advice and consent, from the BCC's potentially secret proceedings.

In sum, strategic force flexibility and resilience are key contributors to the credibility of our deterrence strategies and assurance commitments to allies. This was true in the past and is even more so today. New START warrants our concern and close scrutiny because its reductions and limitations will constrain flexibility and resilience, even to include limitations on U.S. conventional PGS and missile defense options. The most important question regarding New START is whether U.S. forces in the future will retain sufficient flexibility and resilience to be credible for deterrence and assurance in conditions that are less optimistic than those assumed by the Administration in its New START analyses. Three key considerations in this regard are: 1) the treaty's ceilings appear not to require real Russian nuclear force reductions in the near term, and its loopholes and extreme permissiveness would not prevent the resurgence of Russian strategic capabilities over time—the beginning of which already is visible; 2) enthusiasm for further reductions should not be permitted to inspire a retreat to old "assured destruction"-type planning measures that were inadequate during the Cold War and are more so today; and, 3) the Obama administration has not committed to the modernization of U.S. strategic forces necessary to ensure their continued viability, flexibility, and resilience at lower force levels. Such a commitment is critical with or without New START, but in its absence moving forward with New START could further undermine U.S. and allied security.

1. See Richard Nixon, *National Security Decision Memorandum-242: Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons*, January 17, 1974 (Top Secret, declassified February 20, 1998). See also, Jimmy Carter, *Presidential Directive/NSC-59*, July 25, 1980 (Top Secret, partially declassified August 20, 1996); *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 40.
2. *America's Strategic Posture: Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 23, 24-26.
3. "Herman Kahn Quotes," BrainyQuote.com, n.d., http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/h/hermankahn224157.html.
4. Unclassified potions of the report quoted by Chairman Carl Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee, *Hearing on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Implementation*, July 20, 2010, CQ Congressional Transcript.
5. "Assured devastating second strike capability" is the descriptor used by Dr. James Miller in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 20, 2010.
6. Ibid.; see also Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, *Fact Sheet*, April 8, 2010, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/139899.htm.
7. Under New START, the number of deployed U.S. strategic launchers will have to be reduced from today's reported level of 880 launchers to a ceiling of 700 deployed launchers. Amy Woolf, *The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 18, 2010), 19.
8. Gen. Kevin Chilton, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 22, 2010.
9. Woolf, *The New START Treaty*, 17-18; James Miller, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 22, 2010.
10. Gen. Kevin Chilton, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2010.
11. Chilton, Senate testimony, April 22, 2010.
12. Ibid.
13. For more, see the discussion in "Article Sees Serious Implications for India from Burma's Purported Nuclear Plans," *The Tribune Online* (Chandigarh), July 17, 2010.
14. See "Moscow Upgrades Strategic Bomber Fleet," *Air & Cosmos* (Paris), January 8, 2010, 34-35; "Russian Military Pundits Consider Recent Missile Launches, Prospects," *Mayak Radio* (Moscow), August 8, 2001.
15. White House, "Fact Sheet on the 1251 Report," May 13, 2010, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/New%20START%20section%201251%20fact%20sheet.pdf.
16. Ibid.
17. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, April 2010, vi; Miller, House Armed Services Committee testimony, April 15, 2010.
18. "Russia: Arbatov Critique of Khramchikhin Article on Poor State of RF Air Defense," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, March 5, 2010.
19. See "Russia: Strategic Missile Troops Chief, Aide Cited on 25 December RS-24 Test Launch," NEWSru.com, December 25, 2007.
20. Sergei Rogov, "Attempt Number 6: the Balance of Achievements and Concessions. Only the United States Will Have to Reduce Its Strategic Forces," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, April 9, 2010, http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-09/1_snv.html.
21. Mikhail Barabanov, "The Arms Non-Reduction Treaty," *Moscow Defense Brief* no. 2 (2010), 2-3.
22. See for example, Woolf, *The New START Treaty*, 20.
23. Ilya Kramnuk, "New START Treaty Based on Mutual Russian-U.S. Concessions," RIA Novosti, April 22, 2010, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100409/158499862.html.
24. First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin, as cited in Pavel Felgenhauer, "Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty on the US by Developing BMD," RIA Novosti, July 16, 2010.
25. Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, April 15, 2010, 19.
26. Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Press Briefing, "New START Treaty and the Obama Administration's Nonproliferation Agenda," March 29, 2010, www.state.gov/t/us/139205.htm.
27. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 17, 2010.
28. New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 6, Sec. 1, paragraph b.
29. New START Treaty, Article XV, paragraph 2; New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 6, Sec. 5.

Provocatively Weak

Peter Vincent Pry

In 2008, Congress established a bipartisan expert commission to help it understand the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. strategic posture amid the growing thaw in relations between Moscow and Washington. Chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, colloquially known as the Strategic Posture Commission, delivered its report the following year, providing analysis and consensus recommendations on a wide range of issues vital to the future U.S. strategic posture, among them missile defense, the scientific-industrial nuclear weapons infrastructure, and defense against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.[1]

On one issue, however, the Commission remained conspicuously silent. The Commission had been specifically tasked by the Congress to include "force-on-force exchange modeling" as part of its analysis, in order to "calculate the effectiveness" of the U.S. deterrent "under various scenarios." Yet, its final report contains no such analysis. No consensus could be reached among the Commissioners about the necessity or relevance of this classic means of evaluating the strategic nuclear balance, now that the Cold War is over.[2]

Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is President of EMPact America, Director of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy Forum, and served on the staffs of the Strategic Posture Commission, the EMP Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA.

This article is based on analysis performed for the Strategic Posture Commission, in fulfillment of that congressional requirement. While it did not achieve the consensus support necessary among the commissioners for publication in their final report, the key findings of this analysis are offered here in the hope that members of the Congress and the general public may find the information useful in evaluating the U.S. strategic posture today—and the risks of America's new arms control treaty with Russia.

Potential nuclear adversaries

The Cold War is over, and Russia is no longer considered a threat to the West officially—though many experts are skeptical of this view. Nor are China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and India officially regarded by the United States as nuclear threats. Nonetheless, this judgment is at its core one based on political factors that could change rapidly. Moreover, while the United States no longer presently regards its relations with any state as so strained they could spark nuclear confrontation or war, others do; Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and Iranian political and military leaders regularly and publicly advocate preparedness for conflict with the United States.[3]

Nor is it hard to imagine circumstances under which Pakistan or India's nuclear weapons could imperil the United States. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could, as a result of a *jihadist* coup or Taliban takeover, virtually overnight become a threat. For the moment, Pakistan's regional rival, India, seems impossibly removed from ever becoming a threat to the United States, but its behavior in a supreme national crisis, such as a nuclear war with U.S. ally Pakistan, would be unpredictable, and could even conceivably pit New Delhi against Washington.

A well-rounded analysis should include the present and future nuclear capabilities to threaten U.S. forces and population posed by these countries and actors—as well as by Russia, with whom America is now attempting to forge a new strategic understanding. Such an analysis would show that a disproportionately large amount of damage could be inflicted on U.S. military forces, population, and industry by a very small number of nuclear weapons—even by a single weapon. Perhaps because rigorous analysis of potential adversary nuclear attack options has been out of vogue since the end of the Cold War, most U.S. political leaders and the general public at large are unaware that profound changes in U.S. strategic posture have greatly increased U.S. vulnerabilities. Awareness of this reality may partially account for the great enthusiasm in Russia and China for modernizing their nuclear arsenals and, in North Korea and Iran, for acquiring nuclear weapons.

The Cold War "window of vulnerability"

In order to better understand how the present U.S. strategic posture has become markedly more vulnerable since the Cold War, it may be useful to revisit U.S. strategic vulnerabilities that were of great concern during the Cold War. Moreover, recounting these Cold War vulnerabilities may be instructive, since many policymakers are unaware of these nuclear threats faced by the United States.

Estimates of some possible Soviet nuclear threats—or attack options—against U.S. strategic nuclear forces

were provided to Congress on September 11, 1974, by then-Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. The briefing was classified "Secret" but later sanitized and declassified.[4]

At that time, Defense Secretary Schlesinger testified to Congress that Moscow then had a range of limited nuclear Counterforce options that it could threaten or execute against the United States. Any and all of these Counterforce options, according to Defense Secretary Schlesinger, were more credible and more likely than an all-out nuclear attack on the United States, which would guarantee an all-out nuclear response from the U.S. in return. Limiting collateral damage to the U.S. population made these Counterforce nuclear attacks credible. The more limited the collateral damage, and the more effective the Counterforce attack, the less risky and more credible the attack option.

Defense Secretary Schlesinger described to the Senate some limited nuclear war scenarios that Moscow could pursue that would destroy vitally important elements of the U.S. strategic deterrent, while limiting U.S. civilian casualties to a very small percentage of the total U.S. population. The Defense Secretary presented a number of tables and graphs to support Department of Defense calculations.

[Supplied by Department of Defense]

COMPARISON OF FULL SCALE AND LIMITED NUCLEAR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES



According to Defense Department calculations circa 1974, Moscow could make a limited nuclear attack on U.S. ballistic missile submarine bases that would destroy U.S. submarines in port (about one-third of the American fleet). The attack would limit collateral fatalities from all nuclear effects, including fallout, to about 100,000 Americans, or less than 0.0005 of the total national population at the time (212,600,000 people in 1975).

According to then-current Defense Department calculations, Moscow could make a nuclear attack limited to all 45 U.S. strategic bomber bases, thereby destroying the unalerted bomber force, composing 75 percent of all U.S. strategic bombers. Such an attack would kill 300,000 people and produce total casualties, killed and injured, of about 700,000. This was less than 0.004 of the total U.S. population.

Likewise, according to Defense Department calculations in 1974, Moscow could destroy one-third of U.S. submarines and three-quarters of U.S. strategic bombers—which carried collectively more than two-thirds of all U.S. strategic nuclear weapons—while inflicting just 400,000 deaths on U.S. civilians, less than 0.002 of the U.S. total population.

[Supplied by Department of Defense]

COLLATERAL IMPACT ON U.S. POPULATION OF A SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. ICBM FIELDS



Moscow was also estimated to be able to make a nuclear attack limited to U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with the warheads airburst to minimize fallout, at a cost of 800,000 American dead. Total casualties, dead and injured, were estimated at 1.5 million, about 0.007 of the total national population. If the warheads were groundburst against U.S. ICBMs to produce fallout "it would drive the number of fatalities or casualties to a significantly higher level, something on the order of 3 million," according to Secretary Schlesinger.

The 1974 Schlesinger briefing demonstrated that a Soviet Counterforce attack on all three legs of the U.S. Triad—submarines in port, bombers, and ICBMs—could be accomplished while limiting U.S. civilian fatalities to about 1 to 3 million, about one percent of the total national population.

[Supplied by Department of Defense]

COLLATERAL IMPACT ON U.S. POPULATION RESULTING FROM A SOVIET ATTACK ON OTHER SELECTED U.S. MILITARY TARGETS



Today's "window of vulnerability"

Today, Russia would be much more effective than it could have been in 1974, both at destroying U.S. strategic forces and in limiting collateral damage to the U.S. civilian population. This is because of the increased effectiveness of Russian strategic forces, and because of America's much smaller and more vulnerable strategic posture. To wit:

Today, one-third of U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)—those normally in port while the others are at sea—could be destroyed by attacking just two submarine bases (King's Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington).[5] But today, as compared to 1974, the capability to threaten or destroy

one-third of U.S. SSBNs would have a much more crippling effect on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, because a larger proportion of U.S. nuclear weapons and Counterforce capabilities are now invested in submarines. China could easily carry out such a limited disarming strike against U.S. SSBNs today. North Korea, Iran, and India are developing ICBMs that could perform such an attack as well. And today, North Korea, Iran or terrorists are capable of attacking U.S. SSBNs in port by launching conventional anti-ship missiles off a freighter. Unclassified overhead imagery is now available on the Internet showing the exact location of Ohio-class SSBNs at their berths—information that could support geo-location for their precise targeting by ballistic or non-nuclear cruise missiles.

Perhaps because rigorous analysis of potential adversary nuclear attack options has been out of vogue since the end of the Cold War, most U.S. political leaders and the general public at large are unaware that profound changes in U.S. strategic posture have greatly increased U.S. vulnerabilities.

In 1974, the Defense Department postulated that Moscow would attack 45 strategic bomber bases. Today, the number of U.S. strategic bomber bases has been reduced to three (Minot, Barksdale, Whiteman AFBs).[6] Defense Department calculations in 1974 showed that Moscow could attack three U.S. strategic bomber bases and limit collateral civilian casualties to about 10,000 persons, using high-yield "dirty" bombs. China could easily manage this limited nuclear option against U.S. strategic bombers today. North Korea, Iran, and India are developing ICBMs that could perform such an attack, which requires only three warheads.

In 1974, about 25 percent of U.S. strategic bombers were maintained on strip alert, armed and ready to take off on short notice. Today, however, the U.S. is especially reliant on strategic bombers like the B-2 to conduct selective, surgical strikes that are politically necessary in order to prosecute conventional conflicts or "police actions." Yet today U.S. strategic bombers are not on alert, or even armed, and would therefore be totally destroyed in a surprise attack.

Similarly, because strategic bombers in 1974 were on strip alert, they complicated an adversary's first strike, making it difficult to attack bombers and ICBMs simultaneously. Today, because bombers are no longer maintained on alert, bombers, ICBMs and SSBNs in port can be attacked simultaneously.

In 1974, the Defense Department postulated that Moscow would attack 1,054 U.S. ICBM silos. Today, the number of U.S. ICBM silos has been reduced to 450. China may be tempted to acquire Counterforce capabilities against this much-diminished target set—one that, under New START, is likely to diminish still further.

In 1974, U.S. strategic command and control was much more robust than it is today. Airborne Launch Control Centers (ALCCs) provided redundant launch means for ICBMs. TACAMO ("Take Charge And Move Out," the acronym commonly used for the E-6B strategic communications platform) aircraft were widely dispersed and on strip alert to communicate an Emergency Action Message

(EAM) from the President to submarines at sea. SSBNs cannot launch without an EAM. An Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) buried antenna supplemented TACAMO communications with submarines. Today, ALCCs and ELF no longer exist, all replaced by TACAMO aircraft. Today, TACAMO are almost entirely dealerted and concentrated on a single base (Tinker AFB), where they could be mostly destroyed by a single warhead. A single ICBM, in other words, would place the potential for a decapitating strike against U.S. strategic forces within the grasp of not only Russia or China, but of North Korea, Iran, India, or Pakistan as well.

Today, as compared to 1974, a Russian or other hostile nuclear planner has some unprecedented targeting "bargains," which are worth repeating for emphasis: Two warheads on SSBN ports could destroy one-third of the strongest Triad leg. Three warheads could wipe out the bomber leg of the strategic Triad. One warhead could buy most of the TACAMO aircraft, now a vital C3 link for both ICBMs and SSBNs. Today virtually all ICBMs can be destroyed using less than one-quarter the number of warheads required in 1974.

In other words, a hypothetical Russian Counterforce attack against any Triad leg, or against all U.S. strategic nuclear forces, would be much more effective now, and result in far fewer collateral civilian casualties than projected in 1974. Today, estimating conservatively, Russia could probably attack all three legs of the U.S. Triad at a cost of less than 300,000 casualties, less than 0.001 (or less than 0.1 percent) of the U.S. total population.[7] This represents, compared to 1974, a tenfold improvement in Russia's ability to limit collateral casualties. Approximately 500 Russian nuclear warheads could be used to destroy virtually all U.S. strategic bombers, ICBMs, SSBNs in port, and critical command and control nodes necessary to execute SSBNs at sea, achieving an exchange ratio and operational outcome highly favorable to Russia.

Under New START, for the first time in the history of the U.S.-Russian nuclear competition, U.S. retaliatory capabilities following a Russian first strike will no longer be able to achieve Assured Destruction against Russia, or offer robust Counterforce capabilities.

Achieving such a Counterforce capability, requiring 500 warheads, is not out of the question for China. China would have to develop only 50 ICBMs like Russia's SS-18 for the 500 warheads needed to pose a disarming Counterforce threat against the United States.

Finally, the development of new generation nuclear weapons, that have no counterparts in the U.S. nuclear deterrent, could decisively tilt the strategic nuclear balance against the United States, rendering existing U.S. nuclear arms obsolete. Russia, according to their open source writings, has achieved a revolutionary technological advantage over the United States in "third generation" nuclear weapons. These include "clean" neutron tactical nuclear warheads and "Super-EMP" weapons. The latter, according to Russian claims, can generate a super-energetic electromagnetic pulse over the entire continental United States that would destroy the electronics of

all strategic forces and communications, and so win a nuclear war against the U.S. with a single weapon.[8]

China, according to their open source writings, also claims to have "Super-EMP" weapons. If North Korea also has or develops "Super-EMP" weapons, as alleged by some credible sources, Iran—the world's leading sponsor of international terrorism—may not be far behind.[9]

The dangers of New START

Under New START, for the first time in the history of the U.S.-Russian nuclear competition, U.S. retaliatory capabilities following a Russian first strike will no longer be able to achieve Assured Destruction against Russia, or offer robust Counterforce capabilities. U.S. Assured Destruction against Russia is equated with a retaliatory capability, following a Russian disarming attack, capable of destroying 25 percent of Russia's population and 75 percent of its industry. Cold War era calculations indicated that U.S. Assured Destruction was achievable against Russia with a surviving retaliatory force of 400 equivalent megatons (EMTs).[10] Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, 400 EMTs remains a valid Assured Destruction criterion against Russia, because its population and industry is dispersed over a much larger area than that of the United States. In contrast, about 50 percent of the total U.S. population and over 75 percent of U.S. industry is concentrated in just 50 urban-industrial areas, targetable by fewer than 100 Russian EMTs.

This asymmetry in urban-industrial vulnerability, already highly favorable to Russia, is made even more marked by Russia's still extensive civil defense programs to protect the general population, which have no equivalent in the United States. Nor does the U.S. have Russia's thousands of hardened command posts, including hundreds of deep underground shelters, many virtually invulnerable to nuclear attack, that would allow hundreds of thousands of Russia's political-military elite to survive and enable their nation to recover from a nuclear war. During the Cold War, some U.S. military planners were so concerned that a Russian first strike and strategic defense could so dangerously diminish U.S. retaliatory capabilities that the notion of "synergistic deterrence" was introduced, where each Triad leg was supposed to be independently capable of Assured Destruction. Today's U.S. nuclear Triad is no longer sufficiently powerful to support "synergistic deterrence"; nor will it be able to support Assured Destruction under the limitations imposed by New START.

Something like Assured Destruction, though "politically incorrect" and not much publicly discussed today, is still part of U.S. strategic thinking and military operational planning. The 2009 U.S. Air Force Doctrine Document *Nuclear Operations* still expects U.S. strategic nuclear forces to have a survivable retaliatory reserve for intra-war deterrence and successful war termination: "The goal behind using nuclear weapons is to achieve U.S. political objectives and resolve a conflict on terms favorable to the U.S.... Finally, the U.S. must maintain forces in reserve which will continue to protect against coercion following a nuclear strike, convincing the adversary that further hostilities on its part will be met by a swift response."[11]

During the Cold War, and today, the idea of Assured Destruction was not actually to employ this capabil-

ity to destroy the adversary's population and industry. Rather, Assured Destruction was intended to deter nuclear war in the first place. Failing that, an Assured Destruction capability held in reserve, it was hoped, might contain a nuclear exchange to Counterforce by deterring the adversary from escalating to nuclear attacks on cities.

In fact, New START so diminishes the numbers of U.S. strategic weapons that, after a Russian disarming attack, all three legs of the U.S. Triad—ICBMs, bombers, and submarines—will not collectively have enough surviving forces to muster 400 EMTs to threaten Assured Destruction against the aggressor, who may then contemplate a second wave of attacks against U.S. cities to compel Washington to surrender. Current thinking about New START seeks to preserve the U.S. Triad, but this is not compatible with Assured Destruction, as ICBMs and bombers are so vulnerable. Nor will abandoning the Triad for a more survivable Dyad of bombers and submarines, sharing equally the 1,550 warheads allowed under New START, salvage Assured Destruction. A surprise attack that wipes out the bombers and submarines in port will still leave the U.S. with fewer than 400 EMTs. Even a Monad comprising only submarines, the most survivable platform, even if all submarines survive a surprise attack, will still fall short of the 400 EMTs for Assured Destruction if all are armed with the W76 100-kiloton warhead. Only a Monad of submarines, all armed with the W88 475-kiloton warhead, could suffer the loss of submarines at port, and still offer a strategic reserve of 400 EMTs for Assured Destruction and intra-war deterrence. However, this submarine Monad, above and beyond the reserve for Assured Destruction, would offer only about 375 warheads for Counterforce attacks—wholly inadequate against the thousands of military targets in Russia or China. 375 U.S. weapons would be vastly overmatched for a nuclear exchange with Russia, which after a first strike under New START would still have over 1,000 strategic warheads and thousands of tactical nuclear weapons for additional attacks.

The Congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack has warned that any nuclear weapon could be used to make an EMP attack against the United States—with catastrophic consequences for U.S. critical infrastructure that supports the economy and survival of the national population.

Yet all these calculations about Assured Destruction are rendered obsolete by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states, which can achieve an Assured Destruction capability against the United States by means of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.

The Congressionally mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack has warned that any nuclear weapon could be used to make an EMP attack against the United States—with catastrophic consequences for U.S. critical infrastructure that supports the economy and survival of the national population.[12] Electronic systems are indis-

pensable and increasingly vital to the operation of the national critical infrastructure—electric power, communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water—that sustains modern civilization and the lives of the American people. An EMP attack could destroy the critical infrastructure that is indispensable to the existence of the United States, perhaps beyond recovery. During the Cold War, the United States estimated that an adversary threat of Assured Destruction against the U.S. population and industry would require large numbers of warheads. *Today, any nation or group armed with a single nuclear missile can threaten or carry out an EMP attack against the United States that is essentially equivalent to Assured Destruction of U.S. population and industry, with all the diplomatic and strategic leverage that capability implies.*

Why worry about nuclear war?

Why would Russia or any state attack the United States? Miscalculation may be the most likely cause. Moscow's political and military elites still often think in Cold War terms, perceive the United States as a threat, and may overreact catastrophically to some U.S. or allied action, even a perfectly innocent one. For example, the Russian nuclear alert on January 25, 1995, in mistaken response to Norway's launch of a meteorological rocket, is probably the closest Moscow has ever come, closer even than the Cuban missile crisis, to launching a nuclear strike.[13] Elites in China, North Korea, and Iran, for different reasons and from different perspectives, share Russia's suspicious view of the United States. All states are capable of miscalculation.

Russian aggression on its periphery, like its recent war with Georgia, may in the future be aimed at bigger game, and go so badly that Moscow may resort to tactical nuclear strikes to extricate itself, rapidly escalating to the strategic level. So a local or regional conflict could inadvertently lead to a confrontation between Russia and the United States, in a nuclear replay of World War I. China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and India all have local potential nuclear flashpoints—for example, in Taiwan, South Korea, Iraq, and Kashmir—that could escalate in unpredictable ways.

In a nuclear replay of World War II, Moscow might gamble on a cosmic roll of the dice to reverse the verdict of the Cold War, by launching a surprise nuclear attack to crush the United States, and thereby dominate the world. China, North Korea, or Iran could be similarly motivated for lesser goals, such as regional dominance, that might satisfy their highest aspirations. Nor should vengeance by collapsing states, such as North Korea or Iran should their own policies lead to self-destruction, be underestimated as a motive for war, even nuclear war, if the means and opportunity present themselves.

Hopefully, these scenarios and the nuclear arithmetic that could make them possible will never matter. But no one can foresee the future. These scenarios and the nuclear balance could matter very much to Congress and the President someday, and perhaps soon.

What is to be done?

None of this is to argue against ratification of New START under any circumstances. New START can become a boon to U.S. national security if hearings on the Treaty in Congress can begin rebuilding a

bipartisan strategic consensus and become a launching pad for initiatives, supplemental to New START, to correct the vulnerabilities in the U.S. strategic posture described here.

If the bipartisan strategic consensus that prevailed in the Cold War were still functioning today, solutions to the problems described here would include the following: 1) Building up U.S. nuclear forces to cancel Russia's overall advantage in numbers of nuclear weapons, in order to negotiate a ban or equal reductions in tactical nuclear weapons; 2) U.S. development and deployment of new-generation nuclear weapons, in order to negotiate a ban or equal reductions in such weapons; and 3) Increasing the survivability of U.S. strategic forces, so they can fulfill Assured Destruction and robust Counterforce missions, by returning strategic bombers to strip alert and dispersed basing, and protecting strategic forces with missile defenses.

But that strategic consensus no longer exists, even within the Republican Party. Most of the vulnerabilities in the U.S. strategic posture began and worsened when Republicans controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress.

Yet strategic consensus within the United States may be achievable on at least one crucial point—protecting U.S. military forces and critical civilian infrastructure against nuclear EMP attack. EMP is the single most worrisome nuclear challenge facing the United States today. Terrorists or rogue states armed with a single nuclear missile could inflict an EMP catastrophe on the United States that, given our current state of unpreparedness, would kill two-thirds of the U.S. population within the year through starvation, disease, and societal breakdown. Given current U.S. unpreparedness, the United States might never recover from an EMP attack.

To its credit, the Department of Defense is beginning to take some steps to protect U.S. military forces from EMP by reintroducing EMP hardening requirements for some select communications links and forces. But few EMP experts agree that DOD is doing enough, or moving fast enough to counter the emerging EMP threats. In Congress, meanwhile, liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans have made common cause to protect the critical civilian infrastructure from EMP, including through HR 5026, "The Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act," which passed the House unanimously, but is now stalled in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.

HR 5026, the GRID Act, is perhaps emblematic of these strange and dangerous times, made more dangerous by the obsolete strategic thinking represented by New START. The little known GRID Act is far more important to U.S. national security than New START. To a very large extent, national security against EMP attack rests, not in the hands of the august Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services but, oddly, in the lesser known Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, whose staff rarely thinks about nuclear strategy.

The most dangerous times and the most dangerous threats are those that demand for security a radical paradigm shift in thinking strategically and in acting institutionally, as is the case with EMP. Let us hope that Congress—and the U.S. government at large—is up to the challenge.

1. *America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).
2. Ibid. 115; see also: *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*, Public Law 110-181, Sec. 1062, paragraph (e), (3).
3. See for example, Nikolay Poroskov, "NATO's Eastward Expansion Prompting Review of Russian Nuclear Strategy," *Vremya Novostey* (Moscow), July 7, 2004; Mark Schneider, *The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation* (Fairfax, Va. United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, National Institute Press, 2006); Department of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005); Mark Schneider, *The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the People's Republic of China* (Fairfax, Va. United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, National Institute Press, November 2007); Cynthia E. Ayers, "Ahmadinejad's Dangerous Worldview: A Nightmare Scenario," *Proteus Futures Digest* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. National Intelligence University and U.S. Army War College, 2007); *A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infidels* (Fairfax, Va. United States Nuclear Strategy Forum, National Institute Press, September 2008).
4. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, September 11, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), sanitized and declassified January 10, 1975.
5. Normally on a daily basis, when U.S. ballistic missile submarines are not generated, a surprise attack would find about one-third of the submarines at port while two-thirds are at sea (one third in transit and one third on station).
6. A useful source for the current numbers and status of U.S. strategic forces is Amy E. Woolf, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 20, 2010).
7. 300,000 casualties, killed and injured—200,000 from attacking 450 ICBMs and C^3, 90,000 from attacking three SSBN bases, and 10,000 from attacking three bomber bases.
8. See Aleksey Vaschenko, "Russia: Nuclear Response to America Possible Using Super-EMP Factor," *Zavtra* (Moscow), November 1, 2006. For some other examples of Russian commentary on advanced nuclear weapons, see Vladimir Belous, "Characteristics and Missions of Modern Neutron Weapons," *Yadernyy Kontrol* (Moscow) no. 3 (May-June 1999); Viktor Mikhaylov, "Russia's Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century," *Vek* (Moscow), February 20-26, 1998; Schneider, *The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian Federation*.
9. Kim Min-seok and Yoo Jee-ho, "Military Source Warns of North's EMP Bomb," *Joong-Ang Daily* (Seoul), September 2, 2009. For more on interest in nuclear EMP attack and work on "Super-EMP" weapons in Russia, China, and North Korea, see the author's testimony and statement for the record on behalf of the EMP Commission submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, March 9, 2005.
10. An "equivalent megaton" (EMT) is a measure of the area that a nuclear weapon can destroy by subjecting all targets in the area to at least 5 psi of blast overpressure, which will severely damage or destroy most buildings and people. One EMT will cover an area of about 58 square miles with 5 psi overpressure. See Peter Vincent Pry, *The Strategic Nuclear Balance: And Why It Matters* (New York and London: Crane Russak, 1990), 187-189.
11. U.S. Air Force, *Nuclear Operations: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-12* (May 7, 2009—UNCLASSIFIED), 9.
12. *Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack*, Volume 1: Executive Report (Washington, D.C.: 2004); *Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National Infrastructure* (Washington, D.C.: April 2008). Reports by the Strategic Posture Commission (2009) and the Department of Energy (2010) independently confirm the EMP Commission's warning that rogue states and terrorists could make a catastrophic EMP attack on the United States. See *America's Strategic Posture*, 90-91; U.S. Department of Energy and North American Electric Reliability Corporation, *High-Impact Low-Frequency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power System* (Washington, D.C.: DOE and NERC, June 2010), 77-89.
13. Peter Vincent Pry, *War Scare: Russia and America on the Nuclear Brink* (London: Praeger, 1999), Part V. For another example of nuclear miscalculation by Moscow, see Ben B. Fisher, *A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare*, CSI 97-10002 (Langley, Va. CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, September 1997).

The Last Line of Defense

Henry Cooper & Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

For years, conventional wisdom had it that missile defense and counter-proliferation were at odds with one another. According to this flawed logic, the deployment of missile defenses would lead to the development and deployment of greater numbers of increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles designed to penetrate them, resulting in an ever-escalating arms race. Conversely, the more flimsy the defense, the lower the offense.

But the conventional wisdom was dubious at best. If anything, the Cold War experience proved the converse was true in the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms competition. If offensive strategic arms had been sharply limited in the initial U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, and improving defensive strategic arms became the basis of the U.S.-Soviet competition, a more stable defense domi-

Dr. Henry F. Cooper served as Chief U.S. Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks with the Soviet Union (1985-1989) and subsequently as the first civilian director of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1990. Ambassador Cooper is Chairman of High Frontier, a non-profit organization studying issues of missile defense and space, and Chairman Emeritus of Applied Research Associates. He is a member of the Independent Working Group on Post-ABM Treaty Missile Defense and the Space Relationship.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., is President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University's Fletcher School. He has lectured widely at government, industry, and academic forums in the United States and overseas. He is the author or co-author of many publications on national security, foreign policy, and international relations. He has served on the State Department's International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), and is co-chairman of the Independent Working Group on Post-ABM Treaty Missile Defense and the Space Relationship.

nant relationship might have evolved. And today, that condition might more easily be extended to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

None of that happened, however, and the lesson is instructive. As the Obama administration embarks upon its vaunted "reset" of U.S. relations with Russia, achieving a defense dominant strategic relationship should be the goal of our bilateral relationship. So should fostering a multilateral environment that can help restrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. And missile defense can help on both counts.

Beginning in the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan's strategic modernization program, his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), for the first time, focused on *actually reducing* offensive arms while building effective defenses.

Flawed assumptions

To understand this, consider the troubled history of America's missile defense programs.

ABM Treaty advocates argued that if the United States and the Soviet Union deployed little or no missile defense, then neither would have any compelling incentive to build more offensive nuclear forces than then existed—stabilizing the so-called arms race. At a limited offensive force level, each side would be deterred from striking the other in fear of a devastating retaliatory strike—a condition referred to as "strategic stability." Under this deterrence theory, commonly called Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, neither side would need more strategic forces to assure such a devastating retaliatory strike. Achieving those low levels was the hope of the ABM Treaty, even though the associated Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I Agreement did not actually limit the numbers of nuclear weapons to the 1972 levels.

In any case, the United States had already capped its deployment of strategic offensive forces and subsequently abandoned building ballistic missile defenses to protect the American people and U.S. and allied troops. Instead, it chose to rely entirely on this MAD doctrine for its security and that of its allies. The single U.S. site permitted by the ABM Treaty ended after just one month's operation in 1974, and no U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems were developed until the *Patriot* air defense system was modified—over the objections of the arms control community—during the late 1980s, just in time to play a role during the 1991 Gulf War.

In contrast, the Soviets continued improving their missile defenses—against both strategic and theater ballistic missiles—to and beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty. In conjunction with a massive civil defense program, they maintained and continuously upgraded an operational defense of Moscow against long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). They also deployed air defense systems with more TMD capability than our 1991 *Patriot*; many believed they were also capable against ICBMs, in violation of the ABM Treaty. And concurrently, the Soviets proceeded with the largest buildup of strategic offensive forces during the Cold War,

contradicting the underlying premise that the ABM Treaty would stabilize the arms race—at least as seen by the Soviets.

When the SALT I Agreement and ABM Treaty were signed in 1972, the third-generation Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs should have been sufficiently capable to meet Soviet deterrent requirements (as U.S. strategic analysts calculated them). However, the Soviets showed no inclination to reduce their massive development of strategic offensive forces—by then focused on their fourth-generation ICBMs and SLBMs, thereby undercutting the aforementioned logic behind the SALT I Agreement and ABM Treaty, even as they were signing them (and, it turns out, already violating their terms). And development of the fourth-generation systems continued unabated throughout the 1970s in spite of U.S. attempts in the SALT II negotiations to the contrary. In fact, the failure of SALT II, which legitimized even greater numbers of strategic arms, was so apparent that it was never ratified by the Senate.

Thus—notwithstanding the ABM Treaty and continuing arms control negotiations—the evidence is clear that, even though it limited its strategic offensive forces and abstained from serious development of missile defenses, the United States did not in fact dissuade the Soviet Union from deploying a large offensive nuclear force. If anything, these actions increased the incentives for the Soviets to build more such capabilities. By the late 1970s, their huge SS-18 missile with its 10 high-yield nuclear warheads, together with several other ICBMs and improved strategic submarines and associated SLBMs, posed a threat to the survivability of U.S. strategic offensive forces, particularly our land-based ICBMs and strategic bombers, a condition widely regarded as destabilizing in the U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship.

Furthermore, the Soviets began deploying a variant of the Soviet single RV mobile ICBM, the SS-16, as the 3-RV SS-20, to threaten our West European allies—leading the U.S. to counter by developing the *Pershing II* ballistic missile and Ground Launched Cruise Missile, beginning in the Carter administration, and deploying them, during the Reagan administration, in five West European NATO partner nations. But well before the end of the 1970s it had become clear that the Soviet Union was bent upon deploying as large and modern a nuclear force as possible. In short, Moscow's behavior was exactly the opposite of what proponents of the ABM Treaty had predicted would be the case. In fact, with the ABM Treaty the Soviet Union behaved as many of the Treaty's supporters had suggested Moscow would have acted in its absence.

Our ability to protect foreign countries from nuclear attack depends on the credibility of our commitment to their defense. If that guarantee is eroded, the incentive on the part of such countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons rises.

Flipping the script

What happened next strongly suggests the converse is so—at least for a time. Beginning in the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan's strategic modernization program, his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and the Strategic Arms Reduc-

tion Talks (START), for the first time, focused on *actually reducing* offensive arms while building effective defenses. President Reagan's approach quite deliberately turned the above theories on their head.

To underwrite a constructive counterproliferation role in the years ahead, the United States must be prepared to deploy missile defenses that discourage nuclear weapons acquisition and deter nuclear weapons use.

At the outset of the SDI program, the myth that defenses accelerate the deployment of nuclear forces continued to hold sway among the cognoscenti. This was clear from the widespread outcry following President Reagan's March 23, 1983, announcement initiating the SDI program. Soviet General Secretary Andropov, echoed by MAD advocates throughout the West, asserted that SDI would lead to an unbridled arms race—particularly in space. And the doubters argued that these conditions made impossible meeting Reagan's goal of actually reducing nuclear weapons under START (rather than legitimizing their growth, as had been the case under the ever-increasing SALT limits). This prognosis turned out to be as false as the original underpinnings of the MAD and arms race stability doctrines of the 1960s and 1970s.

In turning the MAD logic on its head, Reagan in effect contended that effective missile defenses would reduce the demand for offensive ballistic missiles—that is, they would constitute a necessary counterproliferation tool. He believed effective missile defenses, particularly space-based defenses, were needed to drive down nuclear forces, and proposed a transition strategy, developed cooperatively with the Soviets, to move from the past offense-dominant mix of strategic forces to a defense-dominant one. The SDI program was to conduct the research and development to enable the building of effective defenses to underwrite that strategy.

The key adjective, "effective," came to be associated with the so-called "Nitze Criteria," which called for defenses that were: (1) survivable against direct attack and (2) cost-effective at the margin (meaning that the cost of a given defensive interceptor was less than the cost of an additional attacking offensive nuclear weapon). The SDI program eventually met these challenging conditions, primarily via space-based defenses—most notably by the *Brilliant Pebbles* space-based interceptor system. The Soviets surely understood the value of such space-based defenses from the outset and argued in all settings against the U.S. building them, no doubt to preserve their advantage in strategic offensive forces.

The U.S. delegation at the Nuclear and Space Talks insisted that as the United States and the Soviet Union relied increasingly on such an effective missile defense, they could reduce the large numbers of nuclear weapons targeted against each other. To help establish his firm interest in achieving such a regime, Reagan expressed willingness to actually share missile defense technologies with the Soviet Union as part of a transition from a strategy of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction to one founded on mutually assured survival. Reagan also refused to sacrifice the most effective missile defense at the Reykjavik Summit with

Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in October 1986. Since Reagan saw the deployment of increasingly robust missile defense as the indispensable basis for reducing reliance on ballistic missiles, he refused Gorbachev's demand to restrict testing of space-based defenses to the laboratory in exchange for eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces and deep reductions in strategic offensive forces. And as is often said, the rest is history.

Reagan's buildup of our nuclear forces while emphasizing his belief that it was preferable to base a deterrence strategy on defense or survival at lower levels of nuclear forces rather than on the idea of retaliation or avenging a nuclear attack was rewarded with the first arms control agreement ever to eliminate an entire class of nuclear forces, the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and subsequently to achieve deep reductions in strategic offensive forces in the 1991 START I Treaty. No additional concurrent arms control constraints were placed on the SDI program, which, by 1991 when START I was signed, was developing a global protection against limited strikes, or GPALS, system—one which prominently featured a space-based interceptor component. Discussions of this concept were included in the continuing Nuclear and Space Talks and briefed to the Russian leadership in the Kremlin by a representative of our Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In January 1992, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed at the United Nations that the SDI program be redirected to take advantage of Russian technology and that together the United States and Russia build a Joint Global Defense to protect the world community. Regrettably, the George H. W. Bush administration did not take advantage of Russia's acceptance of Reagan's vision to conclude what would have been a historic agreement with the Kremlin. Subsequently, the Clinton administration, when it took office, regressed to the traditional arms control framework of strengthening the ABM Treaty; adopting again the failed MAD model for strategic stability; and drastically reducing the funding for ballistic missile defenses—cancelling the most cost-effective system concept developed by the SDI program, the *Brilliant Pebbles* space-based interceptor; gutting the ground-based programs; and sharply scaling back the Theater Missile Defense programs.

If a full complement of ground-based, sea-based and space-based defenses is deployed, the utility of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles will be significantly degraded—and that would be a major counterproliferation achievement.

Although SDI did not result in actual missile defense deployments during this era, it cast a long political shadow. It indisputably led to the fundamental framework of the 1985 Nuclear and Space Talks and the subsequent major reductions in offensive nuclear arms and contributed strongly to the demise of the Soviet Union—a clear and significant counterproliferation achievement. It provided the technical basis for building truly effective future missile defenses—as had been Reagan's objective in his March 23, 1983, speech. And it set the stage for a continuing political debate that led eventually to the 1998 Missile Defense Act that made building an effective ballistic missile

defense system the law of the land, the end of the ABM Treaty in 2002, and a currently growing complement of missile defense systems to protect the American people and our troops, friends and allies.

Still salient

Today of course, the world is dramatically different. In place of the Soviet Union, we still have Russia with large, but reduced, numbers of nuclear weapon systems which they continue to modernize, together with China with its growing nuclear arsenal. We also have substantial numbers of nuclear aspirants and emerging nuclear possessors. Many other states have differing levels of nuclear latency, and could move quickly to nuclear weapons status if they chose to do so, given the widespread availability of knowledge and information about nuclear matters. Our need for defense against nuclear weapons therefore is growing year by year.

In the absence of effective missile defenses, nuclear-armed missiles are relatively cheap, compared to the overall cost of equivalent conventional capabilities. Nuclear weapons offer countries like North Korea and Iran a capability that would be next to impossible to create with conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons also are believed to confer political prestige on their possessors. They can threaten neighboring states (Japan and Israel come immediately to mind in the case, respectively, of North Korea and Iran). Because missile defense degrades the prospects for successful nuclear use, the acquisition of a nuclear force becomes a less attractive option. To the extent that missile defense reduces the likelihood that ballistic missiles will reach their intended target, it serves an indispensable counterproliferation role.

Missile defense can play other counterproliferation roles as well. U.S. security guarantees have been given to more than thirty countries, including but extending beyond NATO members and Japan. Extended U.S. security guarantees are likely to become more difficult, and yet more necessary, in the years ahead if we become more vulnerable to nuclear attack, making extended guarantees less credible. Our ability to protect such countries from nuclear attack depends on the credibility of our commitment to their defense. If that guarantee is eroded, the incentive on the part of such countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons rises.

The U.S. collaborative missile defense development program with Japan began in earnest following North Korea's 1998 ballistic missile test, and today Japan has operations in the Sea of Japan. And we have worked closely with Israel to develop their missile defenses since the SDI era. These and other bilateral and multilateral (e.g., in NATO) cooperative missile defense programs reinforce U.S. security guarantees, offering a more credible alternative to a threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons in order to deter an attack or to engage in escalation control.

To underwrite a constructive counterproliferation role in the years ahead, the United States must be prepared to deploy missile defenses that discourage nuclear weapons acquisition and deter nuclear weapons use. And because the future world will contain different kinds of nuclear possessors, our missile defense must have increasingly robust capabilities. Given the quickening pace of global ballistic missile proliferation, assuring that missile defenses remain ahead of the quantitative and qualitative improvements being deployed

by hostile states will be a significant challenge, particularly when the United States and its allies face situations in which more than one nuclear weapons state pose a political/military threat.

Taken together, these considerations strengthen the case for a U.S. missile defense that: (1) affords multiple opportunities to intercept missiles and warheads in all phases of flight; (2) can be quickly positioned in or near crisis points; and (3) is undergoing improvements that keep the defenses as far in front of emerging threats as possible. A missile defense with these important characteristics, taken together, would maximize its counterproliferation role.

Back to the future

These conditions are, in fact, the same as those contemplated by the SDI program in 1990 under the GPALS concept. The defense must be a global defense, able to protect against missiles that might be launched from uncertain origins almost anywhere in the world toward uncertain targets in the United States and among our overseas troops, friends and allies. It likewise must have a high probability of intercepting attacking ballistic missiles, in order to assure protection.

Most system concepts included in GPALS have progressed and today are being deployed and improved. Ground based defenses play an important role, but for political and economic reasons cannot be deployed to provide global coverage. Still, such ground-based defenses can be part of our alliance relationships—for example, in NATO, to strengthen a global defense architecture. Sea-based defenses can provide global protection—about 40 U.S. missile defense capable ships will be at sea around the world by 2015. Allies, including Japan, are joining the United States in building a global sea-based defense that will continue to improve and grow in numbers.

Perhaps most important will be to develop a future global capability to shoot down attacking ballistic missiles in their boost phase, before they can release multiple warheads and decoys. The most cost-effective boost-phase defense would be based in space. Furthermore, space-based interceptors would have multiple opportunities to intercept attacking ballistic missiles in all their phases of flight—in the boost phase, throughout the midcourse phase and into the reentry phase. Such a concept was a centerpiece of the SDI from the outset, and by the end of the SDI era in 1993, the key technology was on the verge of being demonstrated—and the most cost-effective missile defense system concept was within sight.

Thus, we strongly urge the revival of a well-funded technology development effort to build space-based defense interceptors. If a full complement of ground-based, sea-based and space-based defenses is deployed, the utility of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles will be significantly degraded—and that would be a major counterproliferation achievement. It would also be consistent with the defense dominant strategic capability at the core of Ronald Reagan's vision for reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. Reagan's proven approach of building defenses and reducing threatening nuclear forces is preferred to the apparent strategy behind the New Start Treaty, which legitimizes increased numbers and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces while threatening to limit our own efforts to improve missile defenses. After all, we've seen this play before.

Adrift in Arabia

Efraim Karsh

Transforming America's relations with the Islamic world has been perhaps the foremost foreign policy issue through which President Obama has sought to set himself apart from his immediate predecessor. Having long downplayed his Muslim roots—going so far as to disguise not only his middle name, Hussein, but also to substitute for Barack the less conspicuous Barry early on in his career[1]—Obama has embraced them since taking office. As he explained in his much-ballyhooed June 2009 address to the Muslim World in Cairo:

> I'm a Christian, but my father came from a Kenyan family that includes generations of Muslims. As a boy, I spent several years in Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan at the break of dawn and at the fall of dusk. As a young man, I worked in Chicago communities where many found dignity and peace in their Muslim faith... So I have known Islam on three continents before coming to the region where it was first revealed. That experience guides my conviction that partnership between America and Islam must be based on what Islam is, not what it isn't.[2]

Reverting to standard "post-colonial" rhetoric, the president squarely blamed the West for "the great tension between the United States and Muslims around the world." "The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars," he claimed,

Efraim Karsh, editor of the *Middle East Quarterly*, is Professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King's College London.

> More recently, tension has been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations... Violent extremists have exploited these tensions in a small but potent minority of Muslims… [culminating in] the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the continued efforts of these extremists to engage in violence against civilians."[3]

While there is no denying the widespread appeal of this argument, there is also no way around the fact that, in almost every particular, it is demonstratively, even invidiously, wrong. The depiction of Muslims as hapless victims of the aggressive encroachments of others is patronizing in the worst tradition of the "white man's burden," which has dismissed regional players as half-witted creatures, too dim to be accountable for their own fate. Moreover, Islamic history has been anything but reactive. From the Prophet Muhammad to the Ottomans, the story of Islam has been the story of the rise and fall of an often-astonishing imperial aggressiveness and, no less important, of never quiescent imperial dreams and repeated fantasies of revenge and restoration. These fantasies gained rapid momentum during the last phases of the Ottoman Empire, culminating in its disastrous decision to enter World War I on the losing side, as well as in the creation of an imperialist dream that would survive the Ottoman era to haunt Islamic and Middle Eastern politics into the 21st century.

To this very day, for example, many Muslims unabashedly pine for the restoration of Spain, and look upon the expulsion of the Moors from that country in 1492 as a grave historical injustice. Osama bin Laden highlighted "the tragedy of Andalusia" in the wake of the 9/11 attacks,[4] while the perpetrators of the subsequent March 2004 Madrid bombings, in which hundreds of people were murdered, mentioned revenge for the loss of Spain as one of the atrocity's "root causes."[5]

Indeed, even countries that have never been under Islamic imperial rule have become legitimate targets of radical Islamic fervor. Since the late 1980s, various Islamist movements have looked upon the growing number of French Muslims as a sign that France, too, has become a potential part of the House of Islam.[6] In Germany, which extended a warm welcome to the scores of Islamists fleeing persecution in their home countries, the radical Muslim Brotherhood has successfully established itself, with ample Saudi financing, as the effective voice of the three-million-strong Muslim community.[7] Their British counterparts have followed suit; "We will remodel this country in an Islamic image," London-based preacher Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad told an attentive audience less than two months after 9/11. "We will replace the Bible with the Qur'an."[8]

This goal need not necessarily be pursued by the sword; it can be achieved through demographic growth and steady conversion to Islam. But should peaceful means prove insufficient, physical force can readily be brought to bear.

Nor is this vision confined to a tiny extremist fringe, as President Obama apparently believes. That much is clear from the overwhelming support the 9/11 attacks garnered throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, the admiring evocations of bin Laden's murderous acts during

the 2006 crisis over the Danish cartoons, and polls indicating significant reservoirs of sympathy among Muslims in Britain for the "feelings and motives" of the suicide bombers who attacked London in July 2005.[9]

In the historical imagination of many Muslims, bin Laden represents nothing short of the new incarnation of Saladin, defeater of the Crusaders and conqueror of Jerusalem. In this sense, the House of Islam's war for world mastery is a traditional, indeed venerable, quest that is far from over. If, today, America is reviled in the Muslim world, it is not because of its specific policies but because, as the preeminent world power, it blocks the final realization of this same age-old dream of a universal Islamic community, or *umma*.

It is the failure to recognize this state of affairs that accounts for the resounding lack of success of Obama's policies toward the Middle East and the Muslim World. For all his hyped outreach to Arabs and Muslims—from the pledged "new way forward" in his inaugural speech to his first major presidential interview, given to the *al-Arabiya* television network, to his submissive bow to Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, to his instruction to NASA to reach out to the Muslim world—Obama has failed to win the quiescence, let alone the respect and admiration of these societies. On the contrary, in line with Osama bin Laden's handy quip in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks that "when people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse,"[10] his prestige has been on a downward spiral since the first days of his presidency. In the recent words of a Saudi academic, who had been formerly smitten with the first black U.S. president: "He talks too much."[11]

Misreading Iran

Take Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, the foremost threat to Middle Eastern stability, if not to world peace, in the foreseeable future. In a sharp break from the previous administration's attempts to coerce Tehran to abandon its nuclear program, Obama initially chose the road of "engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect."[12]

In his *al-Arabiya* interview, a mere week after his inauguration, Obama already promised that if Iran agreed "to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us." Two months later, in a videotaped greeting on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, he reassured the clerics in Tehran of his absolute commitment "to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us," claiming that this "new beginning" would win Iran substantial economic and political gains, most notably worldwide acceptance of the legitimacy of the Islamic regime derided by the Bush administration as a central part of the "Axis of Evil." This, however, could only be achieved "through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create."[13]

In his Cairo address, Obama amplified this suggestion. While warning Iran that its nuclear ambitions might lead to "a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead this region and the world down a hugely dangerous path," he made no allusion to the possibility of coercion, going out of his way to show empathy with Iran's supposed sensitivities. "I understand those who protest that some countries have weapons that others do not," he said.

> No single nation should pick and choose which nation holds nuclear weapons. And that's why I strongly reaffirmed America's commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons. And any nation—including Iran—should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That commitment is at the core of the treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully abide by it. And I'm hopeful that all countries in the region can share in this goal.[14]

If, today, America is reviled in the Muslim world, it is not because of its specific policies but because, as the preeminent world power, it blocks the final realization of this same age-old dream of a universal Islamic community, or *umma*.

However appealing as intellectual sophistry (though China and Russia, among others, have remained conspicuously unimpressed), the framing of Iran's nuclear buildup within the context of the NPT is totally misconceived, for the simple reason that the matter at hand is one of international security rather than international legality. Even if Iran were not a signatory to the NPT, and hence legally free to develop nuclear weapons, it would still be imperative for the international community to prevent this eventuality, since the existence of the deadliest weapons at the hands of a militant regime driven by messianic zeal and committed to the worldwide export of its radical brand of Islam would be a recipe for disaster.

Nor is Obama's professed commitment to a nuclear-free world likely to impress the clerics in Tehran. Quite the opposite, in fact. Since their nuclear ambitions emanate from imperialist rather than defensive considerations, the disarmament of other nuclear powers (notably Israel) could only whet their appetite by increasing the relative edge of these weapons for the Islamic Republic's quest for regional hegemony, if not the world mastery envisaged by its founding father, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As Khomeini put it in his day: "The Iranian revolution is not exclusively that of Iran, because Islam does not belong to any particular people… We will export our revolution throughout the world because it is an Islamic revolution. The struggle will continue until the calls 'there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah' are echoed all over the world."[15]

Moreover, Obama's eagerness to demonstrate his even-handedness and goodwill to a regime that views the world in zero-sum terms has only served to cast him as weak and indecisive, an image that was further reinforced by the administration's knee-jerk response to the Islamic regime's brutal suppression of popular protest over the rigging of the June 2009 presidential elections. That the U.S. president, who had made a point in his inaugural address to warn "those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent" that they were "on the wrong side of history," and who lectured Muslim regimes throughout the world that "you must maintain your power through consent, not coercion,"[16] remained conspicuously silent in the face of the flagrant violation of these very principles did not pass unnoticed by the Iranian regime. Iran's leaders responded accordingly; President Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad not only demanded that the United States apologize to the Iranian people, but also that it withdraw its troops from conflict zones around the world and "stop supporting the Zionists, outlaws, and criminals."[17]

He reiterated the demand for an American apology five months later, this time for its supposed meddling in the June 2009 Iranian elections, while the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ridiculed Obama for privately courting Iran while censuring it in public. "The U.S. President said that we were waiting for the day when people would take to the streets," he stated in a Friday sermon. "At the same time they write letters saying that they want to have ties and that they respect the Islamic Republic. Which are we to believe?"[18]

Iran's leaders backed their defiant rhetoric with actions. In a February 2010 visit to Damascus, for example, Ahmadinejad signed a string of agreements with his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, and the two held warm meetings with the leaders of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas Islamist terror groups aimed at underscoring the indivisibility of their alliance. Coming a day after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Syria "to begin to move away from the relationship with Iran" and to stop supporting Hezbollah, the summit was a clear slap in the face of the administration—and proof of the abject collapse of Obama's "engagement" policy.

Losing Turkey

So was the Turkish Republic's sudden and dramatic disengagement from the founding principles underpinning its creation in the wake of World War I. This latter setback was particularly galling to the White House, in part because the president had made that country a major cornerstone of his engagement strategy. "This is my first trip overseas as President of the United States," he told the Turkish parliament on April 6, 2009:

> I've been to the G20 summit in London, and the NATO summit in Strasbourg, and the European Union summit in Prague. Some people have asked me if I chose to continue my travels to Ankara and Istanbul to send a message to the world. And my answer is simple: Evet—yes. Turkey is a critical ally... And Turkey and the United States must stand together—and work together—to overcome the challenges of our time.[19]

Having praised Turkey's "strong, vibrant, secular democracy," Obama voiced unequivocal support for the country's incorporation into the European Union—a highly contentious issue among the organization's members. In his opinion, Turkey was "an important part of Europe," which had to be "truly united, peaceful and free" in order to be able to meet the challenges of the 21st century. "Let me be clear," he said:

> The United States strongly supports Turkey's bid to become a member of the European Union. We speak not as members of the EU, but as close friends of both Turkey and Europe. Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in transatlantic and European institutions. Turkey is bound to Europe by more than the bridges over the Bosporus. Centuries of shared history, culture, and commerce bring you together. Europe gains by the diversity of ethnicity, tradition and faith—it is not diminished by it. And Turkish membership would broaden and strengthen Europe's foundation once more.[20]

"I know there are those who like to debate Turkey's future," he continued.

> They see your country at the crossroads of continents, and touched by the currents of history.... They wonder whether you will be pulled in one direction or another.
>
> But I believe here is what they don't understand: Turkey's greatness lies in your ability to be at the center of things. This is not where East and West divide—this is where they come together.[21]

As with his Cairo speech, Obama's reading of the historic Turkish-Western interaction (and its attendant implications) was disastrously flawed. Far from being a bridge between East and West, the Ottoman Empire was an implacable foe that had steadily encroached on Europe and its way of life. It is true that the 19th century saw numerous instances of Ottoman-European collaboration; but this was merely pragmatic maneuvering aimed at arresting imperial decline and holding on to colonial possessions.

Rather than reward America's longest and most loyal ally in the Middle East, the Obama administration has ruthlessly exploited the Jewish state's growing international isolation for the sake of winning over enemies and critics.

This failed, and from the end of the Napoleonic wars (1815) to the outbreak of World War I, Turkey was the most violent part of the European continent, as the Ottoman Empire's attempt to keep its reluctant European subjects under its domination unleashed a prolonged orgy of bloodletting and mayhem, from the Greek civil war of the 1820s to the Crimean War to the Balkan crisis of the 1870s to the Balkan wars of 1912-13.

Obama's exercise in appeasement was wholly unnecessary. By the time he was addressing the Turkish parliament, the country's "strong and secular democracy," lauded by Obama as Atatürk's foremost and most enduring legacy, was well and truly under siege. In the eight eventful years since it won the November 2002 general elections, the Islamist Justice and Reconciliation Party (AKP) has transformed Turkey's legal system, suppressed the independent media, and sterilized the political and military systems, even as hundreds of opponents and critics have found themselves indicted on dubious charges of a grand conspiracy to overthrow the Turkish government.[22]

This process was not confined to the domestic scene. Turkey's growing Islamization has been accompanied by a mixture of anti-Western sentiments and reasserted aspirations for regional hegemony, aptly described by a growing number of Turkish and foreign commentators as "Neo-Ottomanism."[23] Hence Turkey's growing alignment with Iran, exemplified most notably in the attempt to avert the imposition of international sanctions on Tehran by signing (with Brazil) a nuclear fuel swap deal in May 2010, which would have provided for the dispatch of low-enriched Iranian uranium to Turkey in return for fuel for one Iranian nuclear reactor. Similarly evocative has been Turkey's eagerness to wrest the mediator's role between Syria and Israel from the West, despite the AKP's overt hostility to Israel and to Jews more generally. Then there is Turkey's embrace of the Palestinian branch of

the Muslim Brothers, better known by its Arabic acronym, Hamas, which reached its peak in May 2010 with the sponsorship of a flotilla aimed at breaking the Israeli blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.

Exacerbating the Arab-Israeli conflict

Instead of backing the Israeli effort to contain a murderous Islamist group, implacably opposed to Western values and ideals and committed to the establishment of "a great Islamic state, be it pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic," on Israel's ruins,[24] the Obama administration viewed the international outcry attending the flotilla incident as a golden opportunity to tighten the noose around Israel—the main, indeed only, defined component of its policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.

To be sure, in his Cairo address Obama made a point of emphasizing the permanence of "America's strong bonds with Israel." But then, by predicating Israel's right to exist on the Holocaust (which he diluted by putting on a par with Palestinian suffering), rather than on the historic Jewish attachment to Palestine, he effectively adopted the Palestinian narrative. Under that telling, the Palestinians are the real victims of the Holocaust, forced to foot the bill for the West's presumed desire to atone for its genocidal tendencies and indifference through the establishment of a Jewish state. Never mind that there was no collective sense of guilt among Europeans, many of whom viewed themselves as fellow victims of Nazi aggression. Anti-Semitic sentiments remained as pronounced as ever, especially in Eastern Europe, which witnessed a few vicious pogroms shortly after the end of WWII.

A year after announcing "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world," Obama's grandiose outreach lies in tatters.

Nor did Obama succeed in advancing his avowed commitment to the two-state solution of Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the contrary, by putting excessive pressure on Israel and none whatsoever on the Arabs, and by casting the issue of West Bank settlements as the foremost obstacle to peace while turning a blind eye to continued Palestinian and Arab rejection of Israel's right to exist, he managed to alienate the Israeli public and to harden the position of the Palestinian leadership, which watched the recurrent crises in U.S.-Israeli relations with undisguised satisfaction in anticipation of substantial (and unreciprocated) Israeli concessions. Thus, for example, when on June 14, 2009, in an abrupt departure from Likud's foremost ideological precept, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state provided the Palestinian leadership responded in kind and recognized Israel's Jewish nature, the Obama administration did nothing to disabuse Arab regimes of their adamant rejection of Jewish statehood and instead pressured the Israeli government for a complete freeze of building activities in the settlements and East Jerusalem.

This behavior is not difficult to understand. Appeasement of one's enemies at the expense of friends, whose loyalty can be taken for granted, is a common—if unsavory—human trait. Rather than reward America's longest and most loyal

ally in the Middle East, the Obama administration ruthlessly exploited the Jewish state's growing international isolation for the sake of winning over enemies and critics. It was also a telling affirmation that the Obama administration subscribes to the common fallacy that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict constitutes the root of all evil, and that its resolution will lead to regional peace.

In order to have even the slightest chance of success, Obama's "new beginning" must be promptly ended, with appeasement replaced by containment and counterattack.

Such a view is wildly inaccurate. For one thing, violence was an integral part of Middle Eastern political culture long before the advent of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and physical force remains today the main if not the sole instrument of regional political discourse. For another, the Arab states have never had any real stake in the "liberation of Palestine." Though anti-Zionism has been the core principle of pan-Arab solidarity since the 1930s, it has almost always served as an instrument for achieving the self-interested ends of those who proclaim it.

Consider, for example, the pan-Arab invasion of the newly proclaimed state of Israel in May 1948. On its face, it was a shining demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs. But the invasion had far less to do with winning independence for the indigenous population than with the desire of the Arab regimes for territorial aggrandizement. Transjordan's King Abdullah wanted to incorporate substantial parts of mandatory Palestine, if not the entire country, into the greater Syrian empire he coveted; Egypt wanted to prevent that eventuality by laying its hands on southern Palestine; Syria and Lebanon sought to annex the Galilee; Iraq viewed the 1948 war as a stepping-stone in its long-standing ambition to bring the entire Fertile Crescent under its rule. Had the Jewish state lost the war, its territory would not have fallen to the Palestinians but would have been divided among the invading Arab forces.

During the decades that followed, the Arab states manipulated the Palestinian national cause for their own ends. Neither Egypt nor Jordan allowed Palestinian self-determination in the parts of Palestine they had occupied during the 1948 war (respectively, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Palestinian refugees were kept in squalid camps for decades as a means of derogating Israel and stirring pan-Arab sentiments. "The Palestinians are useful to the Arab states as they are," Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser candidly responded to an inquiring Western reporter in 1956. "We will always see that they do not become too powerful."[25] As late as 1974, Syria's Hafez al-Assad referred to Palestine as being "not only a part of the Arab homeland but a basic part of southern Syria."[26]

If the Arab states have shown little empathy for the plight of ordinary Palestinians, the Islamic connection to the Palestinian problem is even more tenuous. It is not out of concern for a Palestinian right to national self-determination but as part of a holy war to prevent the loss of a part of the "House of Islam" that Islamists inveigh against the Jewish state of Israel. In the words of the

Hamas covenant: "The land of Palestine has been an Islamic trust (*waqf*) throughout the generations and until the day of resurrection... When our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims."[27] That current American policy ignores this reality not only serves to weaken Israel and embolden its enemies, but also to make the prospects of Arab-Israeli peace ever more remote.

A new beginning?

A year after announcing "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world," Obama's grandiose outreach lies in tatters. The clerics in Tehran continue their dogged quest for the "bomb" and have intensified arms supplies to their Lebanese terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, with Syria's connivance and support. Turkey persists in its Islamist odyssey, and Hamas continues its military buildup and occasional terror attacks, while at the same time promoting its removal from the EU's list of terror organizations. Nor for that matter has the cold-shouldering of Israel enhanced Obama's popularity in the Arab world, as evidenced, *inter alia*, by recent surveys showing a steady decline in his standing and making him only marginally more popular in comparison with his much maligned predecessor, George W. Bush.[28]

Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama has failed to chart a course that is different in any meaningful way from that of the previous administration. On the contrary, while credit for the relative calm in Iraq is undoubtedly due to the Bush-era "surge," which Senator Obama had bitterly opposed at the time,[29] the military situation in Afghanistan—which he has made the edifice of his struggle against violent extremism—has seriously deteriorated, owing to his indecisive and poorly conceived strategy. Particularly damaging was the announced intention to withdraw from the country in the summer of 2011, which has left the Taliban in the enviable position of lying low and biding its time until the departure of American forces, or wearing them down in a sustained guerrilla and terror campaign, so as to portray the withdrawal as an ignominious retreat.

The truth of the matter is that in order to have even the slightest chance of success, Obama's "new beginning" must be promptly ended, with appeasement replaced by containment and counterattack. As a first step, the president and his advisers must recognize the Manichean and irreconcilable nature of the challenge posed by their adversaries. There is no peaceful way to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, stemming as they do from its imperialist brand of Islamism; a military strike must remain a serious option. Turkey's Islamist drift is bound to make it an enemy of the West, rather than the ally it was over the past half-a-century. Hamas and Hezbollah will never reconcile themselves to the existence of a Jewish state on any part of the perceived House of Islam, however tiny. And there is no way for the U.S. to resolve the century-old war between Arabs and Jews unless the Palestinian and Arab leaders eschew their genocidal hopes for Israel's destruction and accept the Jewish right to statehood. Failure to grasp these realities is an assured recipe for disaster.

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The Yemeni Vortex

Ian Illych Martinez

On Christmas Day 2009, Yemen was thrust into the international spotlight by the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 by Nigerian-born militant Abdel Farouk Abumuttalab. In the months since, legions of pundits have rushed to describe how and why Yemen—where Abumuttalab trained and received religious instruction—has become the new epicenter of global terrorism.

Overwhelmingly, the commentary has focused on one element of the contemporary problem posed by Yemen: the emergence of the bin Laden network's Persian Gulf franchise, known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), within its borders. Yemen's problems, however, go far beyond AQAP, and include two other intractable conflicts: the Huthi rebellion in the country's north and a renewed armed secessionist movement in its south. Indeed, until Abumuttalab's botched December bombing, it was these two conflicts, and not the fight against AQAP, that were the main focus of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Today, they continue to pose the most immediate challenges to his rule. Throw in falling oil returns—Yemen may run out by 2017—and severe water shortages, and you have all of the necessary ingredients for a new failed state in the Persian Gulf.

A tribal quarrel turns global

The most pressing concern for the Saleh regime is the persistent rebellion among the Huthi ethnic clan in Yemen's Saada province. The Huthis are Zaydis,

Ian Illych Martinez is a former CIA Intelligence Officer who covered Africa and the Near East. He is currently an attorney in private practice in Miami, Florida.

Shi'ite Muslims of a sect unique to Yemen. The Zaydi had their own Imamate from the ninth century until the country's 1962 officers' coup. Today, they are attempting to bring about its reestablishment, and push back against the Sunni elite in Sana'a.

A collapse of the Yemeni state would most directly threaten the security of Sana'a's immediate neighbors in the southern Gulf. It could also, however, serve to destabilize regional shipping, with local *jihadists* seeking to link to their brethren on the Horn of Africa—something which has long been a stated goal of AQAP.

There have been several uprisings of the Huthi to date. The current one began on June 18, 2004, when government forces were sent to arrest the then-clan leader, Hussein al-Huthi.[1] Al-Huthi had been a vocal opponent of President Saleh, terming him "a tyrant… who wants to please America and Israel, by sacrificing the blood of his own people."[2] Three months later, al-Huthi was killed by government forces.

The revolt did not die with him, however. Al-Huthi's death prompted the breakdown of a tenuous ceasefire that had been arranged by Qatar in 2008, and the resumption of Huthi fighting against the Saleh government. In response, Saleh sent his closest advisor, Ali Mohsen, to deal with the uprising. Mohsen, a veteran of the anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan, adopted a scorched earth policy to end the rebellion, complete with widespread government bombing of targets throughout Saada and the use of *jihadists* against the Huthis.[3] These tactics, however, have had the opposite of their intended effect, serving as a beacon for other groups aggrieved at the government's tactics.

The struggle against the Huthi did not remain localized for long. In the late fall, Saudi Arabia, which had been providing material and financial support to the Yemeni government, entered the war in earnest after one of its border posts was attacked by the Huthis. On November 4, 2009, Saudi Arabian jets entered Yemeni airspace, bombing Huthi positions inside Yemen. Seven days later, Saudi Arabia imposed a naval blockade upon the coast. Then, in January, Saudi Arabia pushed out Huthi rebels who had captured a border village. The fighting has been intense, claiming the lives of more than a hundred Saudi soldiers.[4]

The government's tactics—and the entry of Saudi Arabia into the fray—have led to accusations that Sana'a is recruiting *jihadists* to quell the Huthis.[5] A second cease-fire was announced on February 12, 2010, but it too quickly collapsed.

By most informed estimates, the Huthi rebellion is not strong enough to topple the central government.[6] But its power and appeal should not be underestimated. Government repression has had the unintended consequence of lending public sympathy and support to the Huthis, while returning *jihadists* from Afghanistan and newer recruits may have contributed to the rebellion's rise.

The revolt, moreover, has the potential to grow to become regional war, with Riyadh and Tehran acting through their proxies. In September 2009, Saleh accused Tehran of meddling in the conflict, using its proxy, Hezbollah, to provide support to the Huthis in neighboring Eritrea.[7] Yemen has also issued statements

that it has found caches of Iranian weapons inside Yemen and has claimed to have seized an Iranian-flagged vessel with weapons intended for insurgents in its waters.[8] The seizure was the first concrete proof that Iran may have been helping the rebellion, confirming Sana'a's continued assertions of Iranian intervention in response to increased Saudi attacks against a Shi'a group.

The scourge of southern secessionism

Yemen, the legendary home of the Queen of Sheba, has had a natural divide since antiquity. Its North is mountainous and temperate, with a hot and humid strip of coastland adjacent to the Red Sea. Its South, by contrast, is barren and arid. The South was historically ruled by a variety of dynasties and caliphs until a British Royal Navy ship ran aground and was looted in 1837. In 1839, the Royal Navy took its revenge by steaming into Aden and acquiring the first possession of Queen Victoria's reign. The British subsequently physically divided the country into North and South Yemen. South Yemen—called the Aden Protectorate—was anchored by Aden in the west and ran along the coast eastward. North Yemen was centered around Sana'a, the current capital, and not subject to British rule (although its Imam claimed dominion over South Yemen as well).

The death of the Imam of North Yemen in September 1962 touched off a coup attempt by republican elements in the military. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, a natural ally of these republican officers and a persistent thorn in the side of the British, immediately flew in troops and recognized the new state.[9]

North Yemen was now in a state of civil war. Egypt backed the republicans, who governed the towns. The British in Aden and Saudi Arabia to the north backed the royalists and the Zaydi Imam, who controlled the countryside. This bloody status quo persisted until 1967, when Egypt, as a result of the Six-Day War, opted to end its expedition and withdraw its troops from North Yemen. A month later, the British did likewise from Aden. The day after, the Aden Protectorate became the Southern Yemen People's Republic.

In the North, meanwhile, turmoil persisted. Egypt's puppet government was overthrown, and within a month after its departure, North Yemen was plunged into civil war. Saudi Arabia intervened and coached both sides to a cease-fire and a power-sharing arrangement. South Yemen became a staunch Communist state—the only one with a state religion, Islam—where the state ruled Aden and the tribes roamed at will in the countryside. Its major source of income was foreign remittances by Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia.[10] Nonetheless, the Communist government maintained the rule of law inherited from the British, outlawed weddings of minors, and increased literacy and female rights.

North and South Yemen fought a major border war in 1979, and again in 1980.[11] Both countries tried various unity governments, all of which were unsuccessful until the May 1990 unification of the North and South to become modern Yemen. The move was prompted by two events in South Yemen: a nasty civil war and the end of Soviet subsidies in 1989. Oil had been found in between both countries, and unity seemed a better outcome than fighting over the oil deposits;

although roughly seventy percent of the oil lies in South Yemen.[12]

Yemen's joy at reunification was short-lived. Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and Yemen took Saddam's side, voting later that year against a United Nations resolution which sought the ouster of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Yemen's decision led to the expulsion by Saudi Arabia of all Yemeni guest workers, causing the immediate collapse of Yemen's economy, which relied heavily on foreign remittances.[13] The U.S. stopped nearly $70 million in aid. Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden—whose father was Yemeni—was proposing the mountains of Yemen as a training base for his army to oust the Iraqis.[14] (The Saudis rejected his proposal and instead turned to the United States.)

In 1994, all-out rebellion broke out in the South, and Saleh used former *jihadists* from the Afghan campaign against the secessionists.[15] These fighters looted everything of value in Aden. Massive street protests broke out in 2007, instigated by former soldiers and Marxists claiming that their pensions had not been paid and that major opportunities and jobs went to northerners.[16] A group calling itself the Southern Movement was born, with a platform advocating for independence. In the summer of 2008, street riots erupted throughout the South.[17] In May 2009, the protests turned deadly when over 16 people were killed and the Southern newspaper's offices were raided and closed. Shortly thereafter, Ali Salem al-Bidh, Southern Yemen's Marxist pre-unification president, was made leader of the Southern Movement.

For now, the Southern Movement is peaceful. However, rumors of it stockpiling weapons have circulated for over a year.[18] More than 100 people have been killed since 2007. Southerners have now raised the former Marxist flag of South Yemen and wax nostalgic for British rule.

President Saleh, in other words, is facing a secessionist movement of his own creation, fostered by dismissing those involved in the 1994 uprising, by limiting their opportunities, and by neglecting the South's economy while at the same time draining its oil. Without significant reforms, the Southern secession could find common cause with AQAP, transforming a local political struggle into a regional religious one.

Al-Qaeda attacks in Yemen

December 29, 1992: Bombing of hotel in Aden aimed at U.S. troops transiting through to Somalia. No casualties. This is al-Qaeda's first official attack.
January 9, 2000: attempted attack against the *USS The Sullivans* fails when the boat carrying the explosives sinks.
October 12, 2000: The *USS Cole* is attacked in Aden Harbor, killing 17 and wounding 39.
June 1, 2001: Attempted bombing of U.S. Embassy.
October 6, 2002: In a similar attack to the *Cole*, the French oil tanker *Limburg* was attacked, killing one French sailor.
March 2008: Attempted mortar attack against the U.S. Embassy.
September 2008: Car bombing of U.S. Embassy leaves sixteen dead, including one American.
April 2008: Mortar attacks against the Italian Embassy.
April 2010: Attempted suicide bombing attack against the British Ambassador.

Al-Qaeda comes home

Around 1990, Osama bin Laden, convinced the U.S. had made a secret alliance with Sana'a, began financing *jihadi* operations in Yemen from his home in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[19] Bin Laden began to travel to Yemen, advocating a revolt against the government there. His actions, along with his financing, eventually brought President Saleh to Riyadh in protest.

Bin Laden's subsequent move to the Sudan, following a brief spell in Afghanistan, did nothing to temper his activism toward Yemen. In 1992, al-Qaeda declared that the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia and Yemen should be targeted. It began arming Somali factions, which subsequently battled U.S. forces in Somalia in October 1993.[20] In November 1995, al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. military advisory facility in Riyadh, and in June 1996 the Khobar Towers were targeted. From 2003-2007, Saudi Arabia was engulfed in a series of terrorist attacks. In response, Saudi security forces ruthlessly hunted down al-Qaeda operatives, successfully pushing them largely out of the Kingdom and into Yemen.[21]

There, al-Qaeda launched one of its most spectacular attacks. In October 2000, the *USS Cole* docked in Aden Harbor pursuant to the 1998 U.S.-Yemeni treaty, which allowed U.S. warships to refuel there. Targeting a vessel in Yemen had been a goal of al-Qaeda since 1998, and the attack on the *USS Cole* was financed and planned by bin Laden himself.[22] The resulting suicide attack killed 17 and wounded 40, and was hailed as a "great victory" for bin Laden. Al-Qaeda waited for the U.S. to retaliate, but it never did.

Nearly a year after 9/11, Abu Ali al-Harithi, the mastermind of the *USS Cole* bombing and the head of al-Qaeda in Yemen, was killed in a U.S. Predator drone strike. Subsequently, in September 2004, a judge sentenced to death four of the *USS Cole* planners. That same year, the leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia—a Yemeni—was ambushed and killed by Saudi forces. With the court ruling and further government action, the movement was driven underground and its operations severely restricted.

The onslaught prompted a change of tactics. In March 2008, al-Qaeda websites began instructing their members to go to Yemen, leading to an upsurge in attacks against Western targets there.[23] Less than a year later, in January 2009, al-Qaeda's franchises in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged, announcing the union in a webcast made by former Guantánamo Bay detainees and graduates of a Saudi rehabilitation program.[24] The founder of the new hybrid group appeared to be none other than Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a former assistant to bin Laden and one of the 23 suspects who broke out of a Yemeni prison in 2006. Al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, himself confirmed al-Wuhayshi as "emir" of AQAP and endorsed the merger.[25]

The developments raised worries in Washington. "Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for Al Qaeda [sic] to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives," Dennis Blair, then the Director of National Intelligence, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2009.[26] Subsequently, that May, Deputy CIA Director Stephen Kappes visited Yemen in an effort to convince President Saleh to take the offensive in targeting AQAP.[27] Since then, Washington has matched its political atten-

tion with financial backing. While the Obama administration has stopped repatriating detained Yemenis held at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo—hoping in some measure to "drain the swamp" in the southern Gulf—it has also earmarked $150 million in military assistance for Sana'a this year, more than double the $67 million in aid the Yemeni government received in 2009.[28]

Preventing state failure

President Saleh, who cannot run for political office after 2013 unless he amends the country's constitution, is facing his toughest tests since assuming power in 1978. Riven by conflicts in the north and south, and beset by an increasingly aggressive, adventurist AQAP, Yemen is descending into chaos.

The implications for Washington and its allies are grave. A collapse of the Yemeni state would most directly threaten the security of Sana'a's immediate neighbors in the southern Gulf. It could also, however, serve to destabilize regional shipping, with local *jihadists* seeking to link to their brethren on the Horn of Africa—something which has long been a stated goal of AQAP.[29]

But an infusion of Western special forces—an option currently being discussed in Washington—is not the answer, since the presence of significant numbers of U.S. troops would surely serve as a magnet for *jihadists* throughout the Peninsula. Nor should Riyadh overeact to any Huthi provocations, or Iran's alleged complicity in the conflict.

Rather, the solution lies in soft power. After years of mismanagement and neglect under the Saleh regime, Yemen is suffering from desperate economic and societal malaise. Outside the cities access to water is spotty; half the population is illiterate, unemployment for those 15 to 24 stands at nearly fifty percent, and half the population lives on less than $2 a day.[30] Western and Arab donors need to step in to prevent a complete socio-economic collapse. Regional neighbors should loosen restrictions on the employment of Yemenis in the region, even as the government in Sana'a is prodded to enact systemic reforms. Secessionists in the South require a bigger voice in the government, and must be made to understand that separation will not necessarily equate to a rise in living standards. The role of Iman—a nod to the Huthi—similarly could be created as a ceremonial post.

Whatever happens, neither Washington nor Riyadh should succumb to the temptation to get sucked further into Yemen's troubles. Nor should they simply be content to preserve the current status quo, providing a virtual blank check for the Saleh government. Yemen's problems are deeper, and more diverse, than are commonly understood. The solution to them should be as well.

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Defeating Decentralized Terrorism

David Grange

The global security environment is changing dramatically. The complexity of current and future national security realities highlights the necessity of bringing together all elements of national power in unprecedented fashion. Since the attacks of 9/11, U.S. government entities including the intelligence community and the Departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security have made significant strides in synchronizing efforts at both the strategic (i.e., regional planning) and tactical (i.e., counterterrorism) levels. But the most powerful tools of U.S. national power—our economic and informational engines in the public and private sectors—have yet to be effectively harnessed by the U.S. government.

This is a critical error. For, if properly synchronized, America's economic and private sectors hold the power to proactively create "positional advantage" for the United States government and its allies against terrorist adversaries that employ irregular methods to exploit increasingly non- or under-governed spaces, such as Somalia and Yemen. Furthermore, the same initiative can leverage non-governmental organizations and other private sector entities to improve the success rate of America's public/private international development projects. So, where in this article terrorist leadership is cited as the target the reader may understand that the utilization of network co-option can be employed, for example, to maximize development assistance in areas where criminal gangs, for instance, prevent access and/or intimidate the local populace.

Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, USA (ret.), was an Army Aviator, Ranger, Special Forces (Green Beret), and Special Operating Units officer. He commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. He is currently CEO of PPD, Inc. For nine years, he provided CNN with on-camera commentary. He is now a military analyst for CBS.

Today, the understanding of this potential is becoming increasingly commonplace. Yet implementation has lagged behind, at least at the official level. Here, the U.S. government can learn from successful private sector businesses, which have effectively employed networks in global commercial activities, and from philanthropies and not-for-profit organizations, which have done the same across a wide range of humanitarian fields. Harnessing these actors can help Washington across a variety of complex contemporary security challenges, from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to Russian dominance over the Republic of Georgia to the looming threat of Iranian nuclear weapons.

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It takes a network to defeat a network

The enormous challenges presented by the decentralized nature of modern terrorist organizations has served as an impetus for significant advances in collaboration and interagency coordination on the part of the U.S. government. The complex and often compartmentalized networks within which these terrorist groups operate include increasingly complex sub-networks in areas such as financing, logistics, training, media, and propaganda to gain positional advantage to support operations. These amorphous, seemingly invisible adversary networks coalesce around a shared, central cause such as international jihad (global Islamic revolution) and use all the tools at their disposal to collaborate and execute decentralized operations.

To counter this vast, multifaceted "network of networks," American networks must be thoroughly restructured. Accordingly, an ongoing attempt is under way to foster friendly networks that work in concert to disrupt enemy activity. To do so, the inward-looking tendencies of U.S. government bureaucracies must be dramatically reduced if not eliminated. Such deficiencies stymie information sharing and collaboration. Still in its infancy, this friendly network model has begun to chart successes and offers possibilities for expansion across the range of those areas that make up a country's ability to influence other states, known as the DIME spectrum: diplomacy, intelligence, military and economic.

Previously untapped and uncoordinated private and corporate resources can be integrated into a larger public/private sector strategy to form another front in the larger American approach to irregular conflict. Such a system, however, involves more than sophisticated collaboration technology and strategic partnerships. To operate efficiently, the system would require stimulating networks around specific problem sets and areas, and organizing and managing Communities of Interest (COIs).

Communities of Interest

Communities of Interest (COI) describes activity that often appears randomly around shared causes and is manifested on the Internet through social websites, chat rooms

and blogs. Frequently spontaneous, this phenomenon is accelerated through information-age technology that makes possible an improved situational awareness as disparate individuals and groups post information, pictures and videos.

In certain cases, these spontaneous COIs change from simply a group with a shared awareness to collective action. Armed with instantaneous information, improved access, and connected by a common cause, elements of the network emerge to drive activities that the individuals that compose it would otherwise be incapable of accomplishing on their own.

Intentionally creating such a network, or COI structure, to counter those of the terrorist organization requires both an understanding and employment of the organizing principles that "spontaneously" cause a random COI to form. These principles can be summarized by several common traits:

- Group focus around a common and/or shared problem
- A specific event or new information that draws them to this problem
- Shared situational awareness made possible by the Internet
- A combined willingness to contribute to the solution and work for the greater good of the community
- The employment of individual and group efforts to solve mutual problems

Community of Interest structure

The COI network is, in essence, a framework composed of the common challenges, problems, and collective goals that attract the Communities of Interest in the first place. At the core of this intentional self-organization is a Coordination and Collaboration node that acts as the catalyst for mobilization. Examining the evolution of terrorist networks, counterterrorism theory refers to these Coordination and Collaboration nodes as "identity entrepreneurs," "operational leaders," and "spiritual sanctioners."

The 2007 New York Police Department report "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat" provides this description:

> Although there are many groups or clusters of individuals that are on the path of radicalization, each group needs certain archetypes to evolve from just being a "bunch of guys" to an operational terrorist cell. All eleven case studies had:
>
> - A "spiritual sanctioner" who provides the justification for jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist. In come cases, the sanctioner was the nucleus around which the cluster formed.
>
> - An "operational leader" who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act—organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.[1]

Therefore, it is essential that friendly, intentionally formed Communities of Interest have a similar mobilizing and operational leadership element.

COIs can be created

While unintentional Communities of Interest may spontaneously form, a COI structure can actually be created around a specific problem.

By intentionally attracting known and emerging players to a high-priority common problem, the network of Communities of Interest can be quickly organized and led. These organizations and resources are often disparate, untapped, and may already be acting individually for their own benefit. Focused together, they can act as a unit of employment (UE), which is essentially a highly modifiable unit that integrates and synchronizes groups so it can take on larger and more complex issues. The UE, when combined with essential ingredients from other elements in the system, can create, in a sense, a comprehensive "private/public sector combined arms team" whose sum is greater than its parts.

Such a UE would be best applied toward problem solving rather than simply rallying around a cause. Furthermore, led by loosely integrated leadership nodes (described below), this network of Communities of Interest will inherently find other stakeholders, discover other critical elements of information, and spur multiple approaches against the common problem set.

Employing intentional Communities of Interest

After a common cause, problem set, or "influence zone" is designated, the Coordination and Collaboration node is responsible for its daily and weekly management and maintenance. The community's members interact primarily through information technology such as video teleconferencing and e-mail. Nevertheless, it is the human dimension—the people, relationships, collaborative spirit, and focus—that serves as the glue binding the organizational structure of the network together. Trusted agents or known experts, often introduced through liaisons, are charter members of the COI. Over time, members will introduce other members who add value to the network.

Direction and focus are critical. The Coordination and Collaboration nodes are essentially responsible for managing the disparate interests, fostering entrepreneurial initiatives, and maintaining operational priorities within the COI. These designated representatives must intuitively and selflessly think about collaboration, and always be looking to share/link information to other efforts. They must tie in vertically to the leadership—usually a stakeholder to the Coordination and Collaboration node—outward to COI stakeholders, and horizontally to their fellow COI Coordination and Collaboration nodes.

Communities of Interest are expected to adapt, flex, and evolve over time. The key to successful leadership and management is flexibility and focus. To be relevant to the network, Communities of Interest must integrate into the common cause, encourage collaboration, solve associated challenges, and channel effort into shared credit.

As with enemy networks, friendly COI networks often require multiple Communities of Interest acting independently. Geographically, they can be located forward, in or around the "influence zone," or in safe rear areas including the United States. Ideally, a combination of the two provides optimized placement. In all cases, it is imperative that Coordination and Collaboration nodes and the Communities of Interest communicate and work together.

Boosting international economic development

Private sector Communities of Interest could be developed using similar steps at the investor, corporate headquarters, and local overseas levels, albeit with several unique caveats. Ideally, investors would be motivated by a compelling national problem that coincides with a personal interest or opportunity for financial gain. Mobilized by a third party private sector venture capital node, they would invest resources so that others (or they themselves) can improve the situation or solve a critical problem.

This venture capital node would need to be aligned with the strategic intent of U.S. government entities to ensure that corporate stakeholder Communities of Interest receive the necessary assistance, access and/or placement to thrive in the affected regions. It would be naïve to think the private sector would embark on a risky proposition in an emerging market or ungoverned state without reasonable assurances of enhanced security or competitive advantage.

Thus, a private sector COI node should mobilize and establish a forward presence to assess security risks, conduct advanced economic scouting, and form local area private sector networks. Depending on the operating zone, this can be done independently or to augment existing U.S. government efforts. This advance force/risk mitigation team of specialized private sector personnel would be prepared to enter the region as a sort of "economic special operations force" to train, advise, and assist the local population. Self-sustaining, they would establish local networks and build security and economic capacity at the local level while interfacing with the host nation to ensure that the operating environment is compatible with future development programs and initiatives. They would also scout for indigenous and allied investor networks that may have mutual interests in establishing capital growth.

For instance, in a friendly "influence zone," private sector COIs may be financially self-sustaining, relying on outside synchronization for more strategic priorities and for coordination once operations in the local environment commence. Outside investors from a private sector COI may be able to pool resources, confident in the ability of specialized security teams to provide backup for mitigating risks associated with economic development. Consequently, while the private sector Coordination and Collaboration node would synchronize priorities with the Department of Defense and U.S. government-designated influence zones, external partnerships would more inherently involve U.S. embassies, local commercial entities, international industry, and NGOs.

To manage resources more efficiently, private sector businesses would be the vanguard for friendly influence zones and expend more resources on the front end while the U.S. government would benefit from a more receptive local populace.

In a hostile "influence zone," however, it is anticipated that the private sector may require more complex interaction with the Department of Defense and other elements of the U.S. government on all levels—from strategic to tactical—including planning and execution, rear sector resources, and forward deployed support. This is necessary for a variety of reasons, including security deconfliction, augmentation of existing Department of Defense/U.S. government contracts, as well as collabora-

tion across the aforementioned DIME spectrum. For areas under some form of international administration, the effort would be more of a hand-in-hand approach, while areas actively contested by enemy forces would be left mostly for U.S. government forces initially, most likely harnessing existing private sector contracts and deliverables, followed by independently operating private sector/business COIs once conditions have been set.

Therefore, in a hostile zone, while the crisis may attract private sector interest quickly, it is expected that once a COI emerges to assist ongoing efforts, financially there will be some level of sub-contracting and mutual support brokered to augment prime contractors. Through shared situational awareness, private sector COIs can pool resources and expand to other COIs with similar interests to execute privately what the U.S. government or the Department of Defense would be incapable of doing. An example of this may be the formation of a private COI composed of industry experts from untapped areas that get involved analytically at first, then are "tapped" to support ongoing efforts through sub-contracts to existing prime contractors if their solutions are beneficial to existing efforts or can fill gaps and seams otherwise left uncovered.

Toward a "Whole of Nation" approach

The incorporation and synchronization of America's economic and private sectors into government efforts, referred to as a "Whole of Nation" approach, is necessary for the U.S. and allied efforts to actively engage and defeat the global terrorist threat. The U.S. government, while powerful, can solve only a finite number of problems. To effectively confront an irregular adversary who has enjoyed relative freedom of movement in the shadows, in the schools, in the boardrooms, on the Internet, and has created instability and uncertainty, and thwarted development and progress.

This model is a conceptual starting point for a serious dialogue of how to make private sector mobilization successful on a scale not yet seen in the Global War on Terror. Drawing from lessons learned in academia, social networking, and Department of Defense/Information Architecture fusion centers, the central tenets expressed in this brief article provide an outline for coalescing economic and private sector strengths with traditional Department of Defense and U.S. government efforts.

"Defeating Decentralized Terrorism" is adapted from "Whole of Nation Approach to Irregular Conflict/Warfare" by Brig. Gen. David L. Grange, USA (ret.), keynote address, IW Symposium, MacDill AFB, September 2, 2009.

1. Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: New York City Police Department, n.d.), http://hoekstra.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

Radicalism South of the Border

Jon B. Perdue

The point at which the United States' southern border changes from a political issue to a security issue has been reached. While it has been utilized primarily as a political tool in recent years, new revelations of actual terror cells in Mexico have made border security a far more serious issue.

When General Douglas Fraser, Commander of U.S. Southern Command, mentioned the increased presence in Venezuela of the Quds Force, the section of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps responsible for foreign operations, in a hearing in March, it put Islamist infiltration on the radar amongst policy circles in Washington, though the issue received little attention in the media.

But the issue received greater scrutiny after June 23rd of this year, when Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC) wrote a letter to Director of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano requesting a task force be set up and a report to Congress issued on the cooperation between Islamic terrorist groups and Mexican drug cartels. Myrick's letter quoted former Chief of Operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Michael Braun, who reported: "Hezbollah relies on the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartel… They work together; they rely on the same shadow facilitators. One way or another they are all connected."[1]

The issue was given further import with the July 22 presentation to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) by Colombia's

Jon B. Perdue is the Director of Latin America Programs at The Fund for American Studies in Washington, D.C. This article is excerpted from his forthcoming book on Iran and Venezuela, *The War of All the People* (Potomac Books).

OAS representative Ambassador Luis Alfonso Hoyos, revealing that Venezuela was allowing the region's most lethal terrorist group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a safe haven within its territory. Hoyos' two-hour presentation included intelligence reports, satellite photos and witness testimonies that laid out the case with embarrassingly irrefutable evidence to an OAS that had grown accustomed to little more than supportive silence about the region's rogue regimes.[2]

The history of Middle Eastern and Latin American terrorist cooperation is long and varied, and belies the notion that regimes that use radicalized religion to gain and hold power are incompatible with those that use radicalized political ideology.

The religious of the Middle East and the secular of Latin America

The nexus of Middle Eastern Islamist terrorist groups with Marxist and Maoist terrorists in Latin America is often treated as a novel and unusual partnership between strange bedfellows that share no cultural or ideological ties. This "burqa-bikini paradox," so to speak, is too often mistaken as a new, and likely ephemeral, relationship of convenience.

In truth, the history of Middle Eastern and Latin American terrorist cooperation is long and varied, and belies the notion that regimes that use radicalized religion to gain and hold power are incompatible with those that use radicalized political ideology, despite their ostensible cultural differences. Since the end of the Cold War, Soviet influence in Latin America has been supplanted by the far more radicalized and menacing threat of Islamic terrorism. To gauge the problem, it is important for policy makers to understand the differences between long-term migration and strategic infiltration in the Western hemisphere.

The first Muslim to arrive in the Americas, Estavanico, or "Stephen the Moor," traveled to Cuba and Hispaniola (present day Dominican Republic and Haiti) in 1527 with Pánfilo de Narváez's futile expedition to colonize Florida. In the nearly 500 years since, only Suriname, where Muslims make up 21 percent of the country's small population of some 510,000 people, boasts a Muslim population greater than 10 percent of the total.

Just 30 years ago, Roman Catholicism claimed almost 90 percent of the total population in Latin America. Today, only 55 to 65 percent of Latin Americans count themselves as Catholic. While there has been a large increase in *"evangelicos,"* or non-Catholic Christians, there has also been an effective recruiting effort by various Muslim groups.

Whereas the influence of Islam in the past in Latin America was mostly based on smaller immigrant Muslim enclaves, there has been some recent success in proselytizing indigenous tribes and remote populations by both Shi'a and Sunni preachers and activists. Muslim populations significant in numbers if not total percentages exist today in Argentina, Panama, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Brazil, which contains the largest Muslim community in South America with estimates of its size ranging from 250,000 to nearly one million. The most successful Islamic proselytizing movement in Latin America is believed to be Spain's al-Murabitun.

The al-Murabitun, an Islamist revival movement founded by a Scottish convert to Islam who goes by the name Shaykh Dr. Abdalqadir as-Sufi, draws inspiration from the Almoravids, a Berber dynasty of the western Sahara who ruled North Africa and Spain in the 11th and 12th century and included a significant population of converts to Islam from Spain and other European countries.

The al-Murabitun advocate a "collective reversion to Islam and a return to the region's true heritage," as opposed to what most Muslims would consider a true conversion to Islam. The al-Murabitun preach a form of Islam that is not imbued with "imperialism," but instead claims to serve as a "remedy for the oppression and destruction brought by Spanish conquest."[3]

It has been reported that the al-Murabitun made an attempt, though unsuccessful, to form an alliance with Mexico's Subcomandante Marcos, the head of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) of Mexico, after his unsuccessful 1994 uprising in Chiapas. Although Marcos refused the offer, many of the Zapatista insurgents that belong to the Tzotzils, a Yucatan tribe, did convert to Islam, a fact that alarmed Mexican President Vicente Fox enough to accuse them of having links to al-Qaeda.[4]

Since the 1980s, the terrorist group Hezbollah has been recruiting and raising money from Lebanese and Syrian immigrants living mostly in three specific areas—the Tri-Border (TBA) Area at the intersection of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, Venezuela's Margarita Island, and the Caribbean coastline of Colombia, concentrated in the towns of Maicao and San Andres.

In March 2009, the then-commander of U.S. Southern Command, Admiral James G. Stavridis, told the House Armed Services Committee that the connection between illicit drug trafficking and Islamic radical terrorism was a growing threat to the United States, and stated that the previous August, "U.S. Southern Command supported a Drug Enforcement Administration operation, in coordination with host countries, which targeted a Hezbollah-connected drug trafficking organization in the Tri-Border Area."

Stavridis also mentioned that an interagency operation the previous October led to the arrest of dozens of Colombians associated with a Hezbollah-connected narco-trafficking and money-laundering ring that funded Hezbollah terrorism worldwide.[5]

Recently, numerous cases have been reported of Hezbollah operating on the border with Mexico. In 2008, Salim Boughader Mucharrafille, a Mexican of Lebanese descent, was sentenced to 60 years in prison on charges of organized crime and immigrant smuggling. Mucharrafille had been arrested six years earlier for smuggling immigrants into the United States, some of whom were connected to Hezbollah. A year before, in 2001, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani illegally crossed the Mexican border and traveled to Dearborn, Michigan, where he was later charged and convicted for "material support and resources ... to Hezbollah," according to the indictment.[6]

In July 2008, it was reported in the Mexican newspaper *El Universal* that a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) document suggested that since 2005 two Mexican drug cartels had been sending operatives to train in Iran with the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Reportedly, the train-

ing included instruction in sniper tactics and use of rocket launchers.[7] Though the DEA would not confirm the report, it clearly indicated that there was now a link between Latin American narco-traffickers and Middle Eastern terrorists.

In a speech in Mexico in 2007, Robert Grenier, the former head of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, warned that the U.S. was concerned that Hezbollah or Hamas would try to set up operations in Mexico in order to infiltrate America's southern border and carry out terrorist attacks.[8] His warning proved prescient when, as recently as July of this year, a Hezbollah cell was busted by Mexican police in Tijuana, where Mexicans of Lebanese origin had been recruited to set up a cell to train for attacks against Israel and the West. The head of the operation, Jameel Nasr, had been under Mexican police surveillance as he traveled frequently back and forth to Lebanon, and also spent two months in Venezuela in the summer of 2008.[9]

Nasr's 2008 stay in Venezuela has become more troubling since the 2010 publication of the book *El Palestino*, by Antonio Salas. Salas, a Spanish journalist known for his earlier book, *Diario de un Skin*, in which he infiltrated a skinhead group, repeated the exploit by going undercover as a Muslim terrorist-in-training. Salas was able to travel worldwide amongst terrorist operatives, and shot undercover video of several supposed terrorist training camps inside Venezuela.

Spain, whose socialist president José Luis Zapatero would normally maintain a close relationship with fellow traveler Venezuela President Hugo Chávez, demanded that Venezuela explain its assistance to Basque ETA terrorists plotting attacks on Spanish soil. In March of 2010, Spanish High Court Judge Eloy Velasco issued warrants for 13 ETA and FARC terrorists, one of whom was a Venezuelan government employee who was born in Spain. The Spanish High Court declared that the Venezuelan government had served as a go-between for ETA and FARC, and that, after the contact, the FARC had sought logistical assistance from ETA if it chose to assassinate Colombian officials visiting Spain. Colombia's President Alvaro Uribe, the court said, was one of the targets.

According to the magistrate, several ETA terrorists had traveled to Venezuela to train members of the FARC to use cell phones as detonators for bombs containing the explosive C4, and members of Venezuela's armed forces had accompanied them on at least one occasion. Several ETA terrorists had also traveled to FARC camps in Colombia, via Venezuela, to receive guerrilla training. The same day that the magistrate's report was released, Spanish police released the names of three ETA terrorists that were captured the day before. One of those terrorists, José Ayestaran, was wanted by Spainish authorities in connection with 10 killings. Ayestaran had lived in Venezuela for many years.[10]

The Chávez problem

As Hugo Chávez has consolidated power in Venezuela and used his country's oil wealth to spread his influence into other countries in the region, his relationship with Iran has emerged as a growing threat to both the United States and his neighbors. And while many have blithely dismissed Chávez as more of a sideshow than a threat, his ability to function as a sanctions buster for Iran makes him a much bigger problem. But the threat does not stop there.

Within the Chávez regime, there are a large number of apparatchiks and bureaucrats with ties to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups in positions that allow them to aid not only Iran, but other terrorists in the region as well.

The *Miami Herald* reported on Tarek El Aissami as far back as 2003—a young Chávez confidante who serves as both Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice. El Aissami, age 34, was previously a radical student leader at the Universidad de los Andes, where, during his tenure as student body president, "supporters are alleged to have consolidated their control of the Domingo Salazar student dormitories and turned them into a haven for armed political and criminal groups."[11]

The *Miami Herald* article about El Aissami noted that a report done by Oswaldo Alcala, the vice-rector of academic affairs at the university, stated that "of 1,122 people living in the eight residences, only 387 are active students and more than 600 have no university connections." In other words, radical groups with strong connections to both Marxist terrorists as well as Hezbollah and the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'ath Parties had taken over the university's dormitories.

The vice-rector also mentioned to the *Miami Herald* that, in the residences where this group of radical students lived with other students, "There's always weapons there. This is something you see in the movies." Before he was named minister of interior and justice, El Aissami served as deputy director in the ministry that issues *cedulas* (national identity cards) and passports.

Roger Noriega, former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, reported a cadre of other Chávez acolytes with connections to Hezbollah, Iraq's Ba'ath Party, and other terrorist and radical groups:

> Tarek William Saab Halabi, governor of the province of Anzoategui; George Kabboul Abdelnour, who heads Bariven, the purchasing arm of state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela, SA (PDVSA); Imaad Saab, Venezuela's ambassador to Syria; Radwan Sabbagh, president of a mining company operating in the province of Orinoco; Aref Richany Jimenez, a brigadier general in the Venezuelan army who heads the military's industrial company and is a director of PDVSA; Fadi Kabboul Abdelnour, PDVSA's director of planning; the minister of interior's sister, Amin Obayda El Aissami Maddah, an executive in PDVSA's technology arm; Kamal Naim Naim, president of the Bolívar provincial assembly.[12]

As he has purged many of his former closest friends and military colleagues that have denounced his descent into dictatorship, Chávez's cabinet has become both younger and more radical.

The Venezuela-Iran axis

The modern relationship between Venezuela and Iran began in the 1960s, when both countries became founding members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Despite the success of OPEC in keeping petroleum prices high and the coffers of its members, including several terrorism-sponsoring states, filled, the most current threat to the hemisphere didn't arrive until Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela.

Almost immediately after he took office in 1999, Chávez made his first

overtures to Mohammed Khatami, then the Iranian president. Chávez partnered with Khatami to persuade the cartel to cut back oil supplies, which tripled the price per barrel on the world market from $12 to $36 a barrel by the year 2000.[13] In return, Khatami lobbied for Caracas to host OPEC's Second Summit in September 2000. The last time that Venezuela had hosted an OPEC meeting had been in 1975, when OPEC declared an oil embargo against the West for its support of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[14]

As Hugo Chávez has consolidated power in Venezuela and used his country's oil wealth to spread his influence into other countries in the region, his relationship with Iran has emerged as a growing threat to both the United States and his neighbors.

Chávez's 2000 OPEC meeting was considered a great success, as he rolled out the red carpet and put the power of the state and his supporters to work making sure that the visitors were treated like royalty. At the meeting, Chávez was able to secure an agreement by the cartel to restrict production in order to keep the price of oil high.

The fact that Chávez secured the OPEC summit made him a major player within the organization. To consolidate his status, Chávez toured ten OPEC countries, including Iraq, where he became the first head of state of any nation to meet with Saddam Hussein since the first Gulf War. Saddam Hussein used the visit to polish his image in the international community after being isolated for the previous decade.

Chávez would continue helping Iran by running interference and buying influence in the United Nations and other international bodies. Venezuela, Syria, and Cuba were the only countries on the 35-member board of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to vote against reporting Iran's nuclear activity to the Security Council.[15] Khatami would visit Chávez two more times before he left office, once to boost the oil price at an OPEC meeting, and once to sign bilateral cooperation agreements to solidify the Venezuela-Iran partnership. But the Venezuela-Iran relationship wouldn't reach its zenith until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president of Iran on August 3, 2005.

In July 2006, Chávez made a special trip to Tehran to try to thwart international criticism of Iran for its nuclear intransigence and for aiding Hezbollah terrorists. He would visit again in November 2007, and after a two-hour closed-door meeting with Ahmadinejad, Chávez stated, "Here are two brother countries, united like a single fist… God willing, with the fall of the dollar, the deviant U.S. imperialism will fall as soon as possible, too."[16]

Chávez was later given Iran's highest honor, the Higher Medal of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for "supporting Tehran in its nuclear standoff with the international community." Upon receiving the medal, Chávez took the occasion to condemn Israel for the "terrorism" and "madness" of its 2006 attacks in Lebanon, and also stated, "Let's save the human race, let's finish off the U.S. empire."[17]

After handing Chávez the medal, Ahmadinejad said, "Mr. Chávez is a kindred spirit, and my brother. He is a friend of the Iranian nation and the people seeking freedom around the

world. He works perpetually against the dominant system. He is a worker of God and a servant of the people."

Many of those in the foreign policy establishment didn't take Hugo Chávez seriously until New York County District Attorney Robert Morgenthau decided to hold a public press conference in September 2009, where he reported the following:

> In April 2008, Venezuela and Iran entered into a Memorandum of Understanding pledging full military support and cooperation. It has been reported that since 2006 Iranian military advisors have been embedded with Venezuelan troops. Asymmetric warfare, taught to members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah and Hamas, has replaced U.S. Army field manuals as the standard Venezuelan military doctrine.[18]

Morgenthau laid out a very good case for taking the Iran-Venezuela partnership seriously, even more so with the world watching Iran's escalating belligerence and its nuclear intransigence. As the IAEA tries to monitor Iran's nuclear program, and the United States tries to implement sanctions designed to stop the rogue nation's ability to develop a deployable nuclear warhead, the veteran DA's statement sounded even more ominous: "based on information developed by my office, the Iranians with the help of Venezuela are now engaged in… economic and proliferation sanctions-busting schemes."

Though the active policy throughout the Bush and Obama administrations has been to ignore Hugo Chávez's histrionics, the ability of oil-rich Venezuela to undermine the sanctions regime designed to deter Iranian nuclear ambitions has given this cross-cultural relationship new gravitas. Chávez promised to sell 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day to Iran, a sanctions-busting maneuver designed to help the regime, which, though awash in oil, lacks sufficient refining capacity for its domestic needs. He has also been implicated by various security agencies in providing the uranium necessary to effectuate an Iranian nuclear warhead.[19]

Last year, *Ha'aretz* reported on a secret three-page memo that Israel prepared before Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon's visit to an Organization of American States conference in Honduras. Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales strenuously denied the report's finding that Venezuela and Bolivia were providing Iran with uranium.[20]

But it was recently announced by the Iranian minister of industry and mines, Ali Akhbar Mehravian, that Iran is providing $250 million in funding for mining operations in Bolivia that include geological prospecting for uranium and lithium. "President Mahm[o]ud Ahmadinejad has ordered us, in keeping with whatever priorities and projects are suggested, to begin assisting and transferring technology to Bolivia through Iranian and Libyan experts," the Iranian minister said at a joint press conference in La Paz with President Evo Morales.

The method within the madness

It is hard not to dismiss Hugo Chávez as a madman or buffoon. He has a weekly television show, *Alo Presidente!* (Hello President!), in which he pontificates for Castro-length episodes on everything from novel ideas on statecraft that pop into his head to the length of time that Venezuelans should spend in the shower (in order to save water during state-induced

water shortages). He has changed the name of the country to match his ersatz socialist governing program, and on a whim changed Venezuelan standard time by 30 minutes.

It would be foolhardy to dismiss Chávez's machinations as the ravings of a lunatic *caudillo*, however. He has been part of a fifth column group within the Venezuelan military since at least 1980, where he and others have planned coups as well as how they would govern once their coup succeeded. And it should be noted that the main reason that the coup to remove Chávez in 2002 failed is because the opposition had no plan in place to make a constitutional transition in the event of a coup. Yet the Chávez plan has continued apace. And whether coordinated or coincidental, Venezuela and Iran have followed similar military paths since Chávez became president.

Since the Iran-Iraq War, although Iran has built up all branches of its military forces, it has not budgeted for a war-ready conventional army. Instead, Iran has focused on missile technology to harass its neighbors and naval capacity to be able to cause problems in the Persian Gulf. But more importantly, Iran has fortified its networks for international subversion with groups like Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, that specialize in asymmetrical warfare.

Similarly, Chávez began training his military in this method in 2004, at the "1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War," where he encouraged his soldiers to change their tactical thinking from a conventional style to a "people's war" paradigm.[21]

Chávez then had a special edition of *La Guerra Periferica y Islam Revolucionaria* (Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetric Warfare), by Jorge Verstrynge, a Spanish socialist, distributed to the Venezuelan Army as its new training manual.

The manual calls Islamic terrorism "the ultimate and preferred method of asymmetric warfare because it involves fighters willing to sacrifice their lives to kill the enemy."[22] The manual also includes instructions for building and exploding a nuclear "dirty bomb." Verstrynge has since become a consultant to the Venezuelan Army, whose members have also been forced by Chávez to recite the Cuban-style pledge "Fatherland, Socialism or Death."[23]

The "peripheral" portion of Verstrynge's title defines the strategy used by Iran of gradually increasing its military capacity through surrogates along the borders of its adversaries. Iran used Hezbollah and Hamas on Israel's northern and southern borders to prepare specialized missile crews. These Hezbollah terrorists would be the ones responsible for starting the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War by firing Katyusha rockets into Israeli civilian areas.[24]

Even before the United States government decided to remove Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran had been utilizing this peripheral warfare tactic by financing, supplying and training several Shiite groups within Iraq. Iran continued this strategy by building up a presence in Sudan, just south of Egypt, in order to support terrorist operations against President Hosni Mubarak's government, and supported or infiltrated anti-government groups into Yemen to enable them to threaten Saudi Arabia's oil infrastructure.[25]

The Hezbollah influence on Chávez

Hugo Chávez also utilizes "peripheral warfare" methods modeled after Hezbollah's war with Israel. He recently sent an invitation to several mayors in the Amazon region of Peru whose municipalities lie near the area where the borders of Peru, Colombia and Brazil meet. Although some mayors refused the invitation, others stated that they knew of some that had accepted. One of the mayors explained, "Chávez is searching for friends on the border with Colombia, probably because he considers Colombia an enemy and a threat."[26]

In this region of Peru, FARC members have also forced farmers to grow coca leaves to supply its cocaine operations that have been displaced by the Colombian government's aggressive anti-drug and counter-terror policies. Chavez's entreaties to mayors in the region, it is also speculated, are to buy their acquiescence in the cross-border gambit of both drug smuggling and coca cultivation, as well as providing a FARC refuge within Peru.

Peripheral warfare conducted by Hugo Chávez also includes the use of "ALBA houses," ostensible medical offices for the poor that serve as recruitment centers for insurgents in neighboring countries. These are modeled after Cuba's "Barrio Adentro" program that has been utilized for years to infiltrate spies and agitators into neighboring countries under the guise of doctors, coaches and advisors to help the poor.

The concept of asymmetric or fourth generation warfare was first defined in a 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," as a return to a decentralized form of warfare in which at least one of the combatants is not a state but a violent non-state entity. It has since been elaborated upon by military and security experts, but it has yet to be internalized within the state security bureaucracy in Washington, although military commanders and the Department of Defense have shown a much greater comprehension and acceptance of the concept.

More recently, as cooperation has increased between Iran and Venezuela against the U.S., the necessity of effectively countering the threat has become a higher priority among policy circles.

Iranian involvement south of the border not unnoticed

On January 27, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified about the threat of Iran in Latin America:

> I'm concerned about the level of, frankly, subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America, particularly in South America and Central America.
>
> They're opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts, behind which they interfere in what is going on in some of these countries. To be honest, I'm more concerned about Iranian meddling in the region than I am the Russians.[27]

Still, there has been a tendency among regional security analysts to downplay this threat in America's backyard. Chris Zambelis, a Middle East analyst with the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, has stated that, although Latin American islands like San Andres and Isla Margarita do have large numbers of Muslims, "there's no evidence at all"

to suggest that local Arab merchants are financing Hezbollah.

Zambelis' reasoning is worth considering, as there is an incentive to cast any suspect activity within a host government's territory as terror-related. According to Zambelis, "Colombian and regional governments have played on U.S. concerns by moving to curry favor with the United States to further their own domestic agendas and international standing. In doing so, they often highlight the alleged threat of al Qaeda or other brands of radical Islamist terrorism within their own borders."[28]

The Tri-Border Area

Still, this tendency to understate the potential threat sounds oddly similar to the treatment given al Qaeda following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and more importantly, it ignores previous attacks such as the 1994 bombing of the main Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in which 85 people died. The bombing was traced back to Hezbollah members that planned the operation from within the Tri-Border Area where the borders of Argentina, Paragay and Brazil come together.[29]

The U.S. Southern Command, which oversees coordination operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, said the following concerning security in Latin America:

> We have detected a number of Islamic Radical Group facilitators that continue to participate in fundraising and logistical support activities such as money laundering, document forgery, and illicit trafficking. Proceeds from these activities are supporting worldwide terrorist activities. Not only do these activities serve to support Islamic terrorist groups in the Middle East, these same activities performed by other groups make up the greater criminal network so prominent in the AOR [Area of Responsibility]. Illicit activities, facilitated by the AOR's permissive environment, are the backbone for criminal entities like urban gangs, narco-terrorists, Islamic terrorists, and worldwide organized crime.[30]

The Treasury Department issued memos in 2002 and 2006 that stated that there were "clear examples" of Islamic groups in the region that "finance terrorist activities" through ventures in the Tri-Border Area. The groups mentioned in the memos included al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Egypt's al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, and Islamic Jihad, among others.[31]

In this Tri-Border Area, there exists a sophisticated operation of counterfeiting in everything from luxury goods to health and beauty products, alongside a growing population of Hezbollah converts that are suspected of terrorist fundraising. While many of the converts may be far from radical, the ability of the enclave to harbor terrorist elements, even unwittingly, makes its presence a concern.

The New Yorker's Jeffrey Goldberg described the Tri-Border Area as follows:

> The sidewalks are dense with stands selling sunglasses and perfume, and with tables of pornographic videos. Marijuana is sold openly; so are pirated CDs. The music of Eminem came from one shop; from another, there were sounds familiar to me from South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley—martial Hezbollah music. I bought a cassette recording of the speeches of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader.[32]

As non-state actors utilize peripheral warfare tactics around border areas, the affected states will be forced to decide to use asymmetric tactics in retaliation, or to watch their borders be used against them. When Ecuador, under Chávez acolyte Rafael Correa, let the FARC cross its borders while the Colombian Army was denied the same right in order to pursue them, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe decided to invoke Colombia's right to attack on either side of the border.

Uribe's predecessor, President Andres Pastrana, had ceded a Switzerland-sized swath of Colombian territory to the FARC while they worked on a peace treaty – a strategy that illustrated a lack of understanding of asymmetric warfare. And while Pastrana's administration subsequently crumbled for its failure to understand the conflict, the FARC consolidated its power and utilized the "peace zone" as a rest and staging area for increased terrorist operations. When Uribe won the presidency after campaigning on using the *"mano dura"* (iron hand) against terrorism, the FARC had grown such that it was able to fire mortars within striking distance of the reviewing stand at Uribe's inauguration.

Advent of fourth generation war

President Uribe, more than any other president in the hemisphere, demonstrated an understanding of the need to break from conventional techniques to fight a fourth generation war. On a visit to Colombia in March 2009, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congratulated Colombian leaders "for the great successes you have achieved" against narco-terrorists, and stated, "We in the United States, as we have done [for] a long time, continue to strongly support your approach, your execution, and obviously your results."[33] The chairman's remarks were a vindication for Uribe, who had been criticized for the very tactics that would turn the tide against a terrorist insurgency that killed and kidnapped civilians as a policy.

For the previous five years, most American military leaders and politicians had treated Uribe as radioactive, since he had made a speech in September 2003 in which he called human rights groups "spokesmen for terrorism" and "politickers of terrorism," challenging them to "take off their masks... and drop this cowardice of hiding their ideas behind human rights."

Uribe was referring to the panoply of *soi disant* "human rights" groups that seemed to find abuses and atrocities everywhere that could be blamed on state police or military, but hardly commented on the atrocities of the FARC and other terrorist groups that killed and kidnapped civilians as a matter of policy. Moreover, these groups had been successful in bringing prosecutions against members of the military while defending the FARC as beleaguered freedom fighters. Although Uribe was attacked ferociously for his comments, he would be later vindicated when some of his critics' names showed up in FARC documents as allies or abettors of the terrorists.[34]

Fighting and winning a fourth generation war

In a fourth generation war, for every tactic that terrorist groups utilize to gain an advantage over the state security apparatus, they expose themselves to having those

tactics turned against them. But this can only occur once the state actually makes the decision to take the threat seriously. The primary armament in a fourth generation war is psychological or political warfare, or better stated, the will to use one's armaments carries as much impact as the amount of killing power that they contain.

The decision by President Bush to do the "surge" in Iraq was as much a psychological warfare tactic as it was a conventional tactic. Although the increase in troops would be used to secure and hold territory, it was the decision itself, to send in more troops despite worldwide condemnation, that let Iraq's people and politicians know that the U.S. was serious and in for the long haul. The "message" was as important as the number of troops.

The enemies of modernity understand this too, though policymakers may not yet. In a 1982 article in *The New York Times*, Salvadoran guerrilla Hector Oqueli summed up fourth generation warfare succinctly, stating, "We have to win the war inside the United States."[35] This sentiment was reinforced two years later by the Sandinista leader Tomas Borge in a *Newsweek* interview, when he stated, "The battle for Nicaragua is not being waged in Nicaragua. It is being fought in the United States."[36] This type of political warfare, as these men understood, is much closer to think tank warfare than tank warfare, and its combatants understand that winning the hearts and minds of some policymakers in Washington is a far more attainable objective than winning over their own populations to their threadbare ideologies.

The two bombings in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, already believed to be the work of Hezbollah terrorists trained in Latin America, make the issue of Islamist infiltration in the region a security priority. Since then, there has been constant cooperation between Latin American and Middle Eastern terrorist groups. As Mexico battles its own escalating war against narco-terrorists, the U.S. border will become an increasingly precarious security issue as Hezbollah and other operatives take advantage of the chaos to infiltrate the United States. And as Iran's nuclear brinksmanship brings the world closer to confrontation, its proxies in Latin America will become an increasingly perilous threat much closer to home.

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

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The Tabligh Challenge

Timothy R. Furnish

Tablighi Jama`at is almost certainly the world's largest Islamic missionary group. Having originated in the Indian subcontinent early in the 20th century, Tablighi Jamaat, or TJ, is now active in some 165 nations, and its annual gathering in Tongi, Bangladesh, is exceeded in size only by the *hajj* to Mecca.[1]

Because of its blend of Islamic ideology and missionary methodology, TJ poses a unique challenge to American analysts and policymakers. It does not fit neatly into the categories of "radical/extremist" and "moderate" so beloved of the Obama and Bush administrations. Nor is it amenable to the usual range of foreign policy, security and defense approaches. Herewith, a primer on what is perhaps the least appreciated challenge posed by ideological Islam.

Origins and development

TJ is a product of the Deobandi strain of Islam that originated in the north of India in the mid-19th century as a reaction to British rule of India and the subsequent Christian and Hindu missionary activity there. The Deoband movement combined Sufism (Islamic mysticism) with rigorous study of *hadiths* (Islamic traditions) and adherence to Islamic law.[2] TJ's founder, Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1944), graduated from the central Deoband *madrassa* in 1910 but eventually developed the idea that a Deobandi-style education, while necessary, was insufficient to revitalize Islam. In his view, "only through physical move-

Dr. Timothy R. Furnish works as an analyst and author specializing in Islamic eschatology, Mahdism and sects. He blogs on these topics at the History News Network (as Occidental Jihadist) and his own site, www.mahdiwatch.org. His new book, *The Caliphate: Threat or Opportunity?,* is due out in 2011.

ment away from one's place could one leave behind one's esteem for life and its comforts for the cause of God."[3]

TJ is now, according to the few experts on the group, the most-followed Islamic program on the planet; indeed, it may well be the most influential transnational Islamic organization, bar none.

Ilyas combined this concept with that of *tabligh*, an idea he borrowed from another Islamic sect in India, the Barelvis. The result was the novel idea, enshrined in TJ ideology at the group's official inception in 1934, that dissemination of Islam should be the duty of each and every Muslim, rather than the exclusive province of the spiritual elites.[4] And while TJ shared the Deobandi-derived hatred of other faiths' inroads into the Muslim community, there was an even stronger concern about the deleterious effects of Westernization and secularization.

The resulting belief system mandated for members of TJ is standard issue in most regards. It advocates a Sunni dogma that includes adherence to doctrinal staples (Muhammad's prophethood, the authority of the Qur'an, Islamic eschatology), observance of veiling for women, an emphasis on daily prayers, and the teaching of Islam in the home to children. But TJ adds several additional wrinkles to this orthodoxy, promoting *`ilm*, "[book] knowledge," and *dhikr*, "remembrance," a Sufi practice of prayer recitation supposed to lead to a mystical state of union with Allah. It also stresses respect for other Muslims, regardless of sect, firmly rejects other religions, and espouses an obsessive observance of Islamic rites and rituals.[5]

Most important of all, however, are TJ mission trips. Members of the organization must spend at least three days each month, and 40 days per year, on these self-financed *tabligh* treks, where they enter a town or city, stay at a sympathetic mosque or home, and go door-to-door summoning Muslims to Quran study, prayer and classes on Islamic doctrine—to, in effect, re-inject piety into their lives.

Between 1947 (the date of Indian independence and partition) and the end of the Cold War, under the leadership of Ilyas' son, Mawlana Yusuf, TJ expanded its geographical area of operations out of South Asia (India and Pakistan) to most of the rest of the world, and also expanded its methodology to include attempting to convert non-Muslims to Islam.[6] TJ emissaries spread mainly to majority-Muslim countries in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Two secondary TJ hubs, in Mecca and Medina and in London, were also established. After the USSR's collapse in 1991, the organization moved into former Soviet Central Asia. In countries with a majority, or substantial, Muslim population, TJ's target list starts with the *ulama*, then moves to the intellectuals and professionals, followed by influential merchants and, finally, *hoi polloi*. This approach obviously has worked, since TJ is now, according to the few experts on the group,[7] the most-followed Islamic program on the planet; indeed, it may well be the most influential transnational Islamic organization, bar none.

TJ in Africa

Responding to TJ is quickly emerging as one of the most significant—and unexpected—challenges confronting the newest U.S. Combatant Command, AFRICOM, which is responsible for the entire African

continent save Egypt. TJ is known to be active in at least 35 of Africa's 54 countries, but its activities are well documented in only a handful.

Gambia is a tiny country in West Africa, surrounded on all sides by its larger neighbor Senegal. However, Gambia's 1.5 million people are 90 percent Muslim, and despite its small size and population it may very well be the hub of TJ activity in West Africa.[8] TJ has had a presence in Gambia since as early as the 1960s, but did not make much headway there until the 1990s. The reasons were primarily twofold: 1) its missionaries there preached in En-glish, the *lingua franca* of the country (as a former British colony), and 2) the global Islamic resurgence made many Gambians receptive to different interpretations of Islam. What is most striking about TJ in Gambia is its appeal to the indigenous Muslims, particularly youth. This state of affairs contrasts greatly with the situation in South and East Africa, where TJ's greatest concentrations are among Africans of South Asian descent (on which more below).

The latest data indicates that only about 1 percent of Gambia's Muslim population—perhaps 13,000 people—are involved with TJ. However, the group is punching far above its weight, promoting strict Islamic ritual observation there with considerable success. In fact, an unnamed member of Gambia's Supreme Islamic Council fears that within a decade [from 2006] TJ will dominate, and even destroy, the country.[9] TJ's appeal to youth contains an element of rebellion against their parents' typically African Muslim attachment to Sufism, and counterintuitively it is the youth who assume modest dress and demeanor, over against the perceived un-Islamic libertinism of the older generation.

Morocco's 31 million people are 99 percent Muslim, almost entirely Sunni, and while the country shares Islam as the majority religion with Gambia it is in many ways a world apart, being Arab and Berber in culture. TJ was introduced into Morocco as *Jamaat al-Tabligh wa-al-Dawah* (JTD) in 1960, and officially recognized by the government in 1975.[10] JTD has focused on the need for individual Muslims to reform their lives and avoid the corruption of the world—in this they are rather analogous to an evangelical/fundamentalist Christian denomination. One seemingly novel practice of JTD members is to not only visit Muslim homes in the vicinity of mosques, but also make calls upon hospitalized Muslims. The group's greatest focus is on ritualized conduct, controlled in detail so as to accord with the presumed practice of Muhammad—to include eating, drinking, preparing for bed, sleeping, visiting a graveyard or the market, and bathing. Such activities help foster a sense of synchronized religious community, which—while not overtly associated with any *jihadist* groups—may mean that TJ in Morocco is functioning as "a kind of crossroads for future Islamists."[11]

TJ is known to be active in at least 35 of Africa's 54 countries, but its activities are well documented in only a handful.

TJ likewise is active in the West African Saharan countries of Mali, Mauritania and Niger—particularly in Mali,[12] which has 12 million people, 90 percent of them Muslim. (Mau-

ritania's three million people are officially 100 percent Muslim, while Niger's 11 million are 80 percent Muslim, but with significant minorities of Christians and adherents of traditional African religions.) TJ members, like Salafis, are far ahead of U.S. forces in that, being Muslim, they more easily fit into the regional Islamic context. Thus, TJ has become one of the three most important outside players in the Saharan region stretching across Mauritania, Mali and Niger, the others being the U.S. military and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The region is poor, smuggling is an integral part of the economy and everyone has "illegal" weapons—all of which makes this an extremely volatile area. Yet TJ actually lost popularity in the region after 9/11 because the African Saharan peoples realized that TJ's South Asian Muslim origins made them possible American targets. In fact, the Malian government extradited 25 members of TJ not long after 9/11.[13] Since then, TJ connections among some of the Touareg leaders in Mali have surfaced, although the group's leaders have repeatedly said that TJ's activities in the region are totally unconnected to the global *jihad*.

The evidence from TJ activities in Africa—Gambia, Morocco, Mali, South Africa, and Tanzania—strongly supports the contention that the organization reinforces Sunni group solidarity and increases adherence to conservative Islamic norms. However, evidence of TJ serving as a gateway to *jihad* is more limited.

South Africa would seem a strange venue for TJ activity: the country's 49 million citizens are 80 percent Christian. But thanks to centuries of British rule, there is a substantial minority—some 2 million people—of South Asian descent in Africa's most advanced and economically powerful nation, of whom perhaps half are Muslim, providing a ready-made audience for TJ missionaries.

The organization's popularity in that country stems from three factors: 1) its "Sufi-lite" orientation, which appeals to South Asian Muslims; 2) its Deoband origins, since South African Islam has a heavy Deobandi tint; 3) the two Deoband Islamic seminaries in the country that promote TJ as positive for Muslims. The disconnect between TJ and the larger Sunni community in South Africa is evident in the separate mosques built in many South African Muslim communities. However, many Muslims have become disenchanted with majority black rule because of its tolerance for abortion, prostitution, pornography and other immoral activities. Almost undoubtedly, TJ has had a role in this increased social conservatism among Muslims, as it has fostered increased piety and an larger numbers of South Africa's Muslims sending their children to Islamic schools, more and more women wearing head and body coverings, increased patronage of Islamic banks, and so forth. TJ clearly has had a large hand in polarizing South Africa's Islamic community.

But TJ is perhaps most active in the eastern environs of Africa, particularly in Tanzania and Uganda.[14] Tanzania's 44 million population is at least one-third Muslim, while Uganda's 32 million populace is 84 percent Christian and some 12 percent Muslim. Uganda's Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Muslim separatist group, is

alleged to have recruited from TJ. But it is in Tanzania that the TJ-terrorist nexus truly developed. Islamic identification runs high particularly on the island of Zanzibar, which in the 18th and 19th century was the capital of the Omani Sultanate, ruling over much of East Africa, as well as on the twin island to the north, Pemba. It's not surprising, therefore, that not only TJ but Wahhabi/Salafi preachers have found fertile soil there. In fact, in Tanzania, there seems to be a conflation of Wahhabi fundamentalism and TJ-style reformism, at least in the popular mind. An example of a Wahhabized, militant TJ member is Zahor Issa Omar, who travels from Pemba to mainland Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda on regular preaching missions, allegedly supported by Saudi money; it is also alleged that Saudi clerics send these itinerant preachers preferred *khutbah* ("sermon") advice.[15] More traditionalist Zanzibari Muslim leaders consider the TJ missionaries intruders, even a threat; one such cleric is Maalim Mohammed Idriss, who has stated that TJ and Wahhabism both pervert Islam and pose a threat to the ancient Sufi traditions of East Africa.[16]

Indeed, two of the indicted terrorists involved in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi—Khalfan Khamis Mohammed and Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani—were Zanzibaris who had been initially involved with TJ before "graduating" to the al-Qaeda network.[17] It would seem that in Tanzania—or at least in Zanzibar and Pemba—TJ *is* fulfilling the alarmist prophecy of providing at least some of *jihad's* willing legionnaires, if not quite legions, as some have posited.[18] But elsewhere in East Africa, Salafi/Wahhabi Muslims are not so well-disposed toward TJ. In August 2009, the Somali group al-Shabaab attacked a mosque and killed at least five TJ members[19] in the central Somali town of Galkacyo. So rumors of automatic TJ-*jihadist* cooperation in Africa remain (pending more data) at least somewhat, if not greatly, exaggerated.

Viewed through a *realpolitik* lens, the very characteristics that make TJ a potential security concern could also make it a fulcrum for an American policy that aims to exploit sectarian cleavages within the Islamic world, particularly in Africa.

TJ in comparative perspective

Just what kind of Islamic group is Tablighi Jamaat? The answer depends to some extent on the analytical paradigm that is brought to bear. In the last two centuries, Islamic societies have three broad responses to the perceived encroachment of Western ideas and culture: 1) emulation; 2) fusion of Western concepts with Islamic institutions; 3) total rejection of Western ideas and things in favor of Muslim ones.[20]

The first mode was practiced by Ottoman-era reformers like Muhammad Ali of Egypt and the Ottoman Turks with their Tanzimat reforms. These were mainly attempts in the military and educational realms. The ultimate example of this category was Kemal Atatürk's wholesale jettisoning of Islamic traditions and practice (among them the Ottoman Arabic script and the idea of the caliphate) in favor of Western ones, such as a European alphabet and a separation between mosque and state.

The second pattern was predicated on the idea that there was no inherent contradiction or conflict between the ideas and things of the West and of Islam. Thinkers such as the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh argued that Islam was perfectly compatible with Western science and even democracy—a belief which motivated the short-lived attempt to turn the Ottoman empire into a constitutional, democratic monarchy in the 1870s.[21]

TJ clearly does support al-Qaeda and similar groups, albeit indirectly and passively (and, it might even be argued, unintentionally).

The third response, rejectionism, was exemplified in the past by the Wahhabis, whose founder, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, repudiated not only anything Western but beliefs and practices of other Muslims, such as the Sufis and Shi'a, deemed insufficiently devoted to the absolute, transcendent unity of Allah. Tablighi Jamaat would seem to fit into this third category, its teachings rejecting Western concepts and modernity as a danger to Islam, and focusing on a return to Islamic roots.

But despite its official pacifist stance, is TJ nevertheless a "gateway" or "crossroads" to violent *jihad*? Some analysts certainly think so. Alex Alexiev even goes so far as to argue that TJ constitutes "jihad's stealthy legions." He maintains that "all Tablighis preach a creed that is hardly distinguishable from the radical Wahhabi-Salafi jihadist ideology" and that, more concretely, TJ involvement has not only been instrumental in the backgrounds of prominent Islamists such as Richard Reid, John Walker Lindh, the Lackawanna Six and Jose Padilla, but that terrorist group recruiters scout TJ's Raiwind, Pakistan, training complex looking for prospects.[22] Much the same indictment of TJ is shared by Fred Burton and Scott Stewart of STRATFOR.[23] By contrast others, mainly academics, argue that TJ not only ostracizes any members who join *jihadist* groups[24] but also that its (alleged) privatization of faith makes it compatible with modernity.[25] Analysts such as these also point out that TJ preaches *jihad* as "personal purification," not holy war; many Islamist groups openly criticize TJ for its apolitical and non-violent teachings; and Wahhabi online fatwas include TJ in a list of heretical groups, in the same category as Shi`is.

The evidence from TJ activities in Africa—Gambia, Morocco, Mali, South Africa, and Tanzania—strongly supports the contention that the organization reinforces Sunni group solidarity and increases adherence to conservative Islamic norms. However, evidence of TJ serving as a gateway to *jihad* is more limited, and only clearly seen in Tanzania, with the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi bombers.

The more pressing issue, then, is that of TJ's alleged role in grooming future *jihadists*. While it may be hyperbole to say that TJ preaches the same creed as Wahhabis and Salafis, it does promulgate a literalist reading of the Qur'an and strict emulation of Islam's founder, Muhammad—both of which are problematic. Not only are the "sword," or *jihad*, verses of the Qur'an numerous—numbering some 164 by one count[26]—but under the doctrine of *naskh*, "abrogation," they supersede all of the Qur'an's apparently peaceful verses. In addition, TJ members are taught

to emulate Islam's prophet unswervingly. Thus, when some learn about Muhammad leading armies in battle or ordering the execution of theological and political opponents, they may decide that the *jihadist* groups are more faithful followers of their prophet than TJ itself—and so make the transition. Thus, the key issue is not whether TJ is actively inculcating *jihadist* thought, per se. What is more important, and disquieting, is that the organization is instilling Qur'anic literalism and Muhammadan emulation, both of which are also staples of violent *jihadist* groups.

And there's no arguing with TJ's success. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist organizations may castigate the organization for its disengagement from politics and for its lack of popular welfare and education programs, but one could argue that Tabligh is better than its detractors at keeping its eye on the real prize: renewing piety among Muslims and indoctrinating them with a strong sense of Islamic community that is global in scope.

Dividing and conquering

Viewed through a *realpolitik* lens, the very characteristics that make TJ a potential security concern could also make it a fulcrum for an American policy that aims to exploit sectarian cleavages within the Islamic world, particularly in Africa. For example, TJ is deemed too Sufi by strict Wahhabis/Salafis and not nearly Sufi enough for Barelvis and many African Muslims. Strategic communications programs could play up theses cleavages, should TJ come to be considered a threat in certain countries or regions of Africa. TJ's anti-Shi`ite beliefs could, alternatively, be accentuated in order to help confound Iranian Shi`i inroads into Africa; while TJ's comparatively mild communal religious programs could be used to provide an alternative to the Saudi-funded Wahhabi groups active in Africa.

As the Army Counterinsurgency Manual made famous by General David Petraeus points out:

> A feature of today's operational environment deserving mention is the effort by Islamic extremists, including those that advocate violence, to spread their influence through the funding and use of entities that share their views or facilitate them to varying degrees. **These entities may or may not be threats themselves; however, they can provide passive or active support to local or distant insurgencies.**[27] (Emphasis added.)

TJ clearly does support al-Qaeda and similar groups, albeit indirectly and passively (and, it might even be argued, unintentionally). As a transnational, yet non-violent organization, Tablighi Jamaat presents a *sui generis* challenge to American foreign, defense and counterterrorism policy—one not amenable to Predator strikes or other kinetic solutions. Yet opposing TJ could be seen as tantamount to opposing the spread of Islam itself—a prospect that may give many pause. The key to a constructive approach, then, lies in understanding what makes TJ tick—and thereafter harnessing it as a tool to promote American interests.

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The Caucasian Cauldron

Sergey Markedonov

Today, as the Republic of Kyrgyzstan plunges into crisis and the threat of a new failed state in Central Asia looms larger, the turmoil in the neighboring Caucasus has receded from the front pages. The worst-case scenarios predicted by analysts and politicians at the height of regional unrest in August 2008 have not materialized. Russia did not attempt to topple the government of Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia, or apply the same approach to Ukraine, as many in the West fully expected. Nor has the West attempted to goad Georgia into a rematch with Moscow, as Russian policymakers believed it would.

Nevertheless, the Caucasus remains one of the most vulnerable, and volatile, parts of Eurasia. It is the place where the breakup of the former USSR began, and now the site where a newly-assertive Russia is demonstrating its willingness to play the role of a revisionist state for the first time since 1991. Russia defines the "Greater Caucasus" as an indispensable part of its sphere of vital interests, and consequently seeks to be a key stakeholder for the region.

But the costs of this engagement are steep. Russia may style itself as the guarantor of security and stability in the Caucasus, but it now has serious challenges within its own borders in those areas that abut the region. President Dmitry Medvedev said as much in his 2009 address to the Federal Assembly, Russia's upper house of parliament, when he characterized the situation in the region as his administration's most important domestic policy issue.[1]

Dr. Sergey Markedonov is a visiting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

From ethnic nationalism to Islamic revival

In truth, the problem detailed by Medvedev is not new. Ethnic separatism in the Russian Caucasus has been a persistent problem for Moscow since the Soviet collapse. Over the past two decades, this struggle has been punctuated most publicly by two military campaigns in Chechnya (1994-96 and 1999-2000), and by the 1992 Ossetian–Ingush conflict, which—nearly two decades on—still has not been fully settled.

Russia may style itself as the guarantor of security and stability in the Caucasus, but it now has serious challenges within its own borders in those areas that abut the region.

But these conflicts were only part of a much larger picture. In the early- to mid-1990s, other ethnonationalist movements in the North Caucasus were also brandishing the idea of self-determination. During the same period, separatists in the Caucasus formulated plans for secession—not only from Russia, but also from the constituent republics of the former USSR. Other irredentist projects abounded as well; in Dagestan, the largest North Caucasian republic, the anti-establishment Party of Independence and Revival was active during the early 1990s, while in Karachay-Circassia, five separate political entities proclaimed independence in 1991 alone.

The popularity of ethnic nationalism reached its peak in the first half of the 1990s. Its rise during this period was fueled not only by the "weakness of the state," but also by objective circumstances. The trend was predictable; the disintegration of any imperial or quasi-imperial state is inevitably accompanied by a quest for "roots" and a new identity among its constituent parts, and Russia was no exception. Notably, this drift had a strong religious component as well. Russia's Caucasian republics had been part of the Soviet state for more than seven decades, saddled with a policy of official atheism actively enforced by Moscow. Religiosity was prohibited, while ethnicity was cultivated. As a result, upon the breakup of the USSR, a movement of Islamic radicals naturally emerged in the North Caucasus, seeking to combine religious rhetoric with ethnic nationalism. And it found a receptive audience among those searching for a new, post-Soviet identity.

The rise of Islamic radicalism across the North Caucasus, in other words, was much more than just a manifestation of Chechnya's struggle against the Russian federal center. Moreover, it was only indirectly connected with Chechnya. It also was much more pervasive. Next door in the Russian Republic of Dagestan, the first clashes between Sufi Muslims and Salafists took place in 1994-1995. By 1997, Dagestan's Sufis had moved to bar Salafist activity, and that December the Republic's People's Assembly passed legal restrictions on the public activities of Salafi Muslims.[2] The following year, Islamic radicals attempted to carry out a coup in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, and three settlements within the Republic were unilaterally proclaimed by the "Special Islamic area." It's not by accident that Chechen *jihadists* like Shamil Basayev and Ibn ul-Khattab chose Dagestan as the weakest link in Russia's republics—and as the target for their infamous Fall 1999 raids.

Dagestan's troubles were part of a larger transformation taking shape in the Caucasus. Over time, the popularity of ethnic nationalism and ethnic separatism began to decline, as public disillusion and corruption among ethnic elites served to blunt the appeal of those ideologies. At the same time, a radical Islamist environment was emerging in the North Caucasus. This project gained popularity not because of the illiteracy of the local population or their alleged native "provincialism." Rather, it was due to the appeal of the ideology espoused by radical Islamists, who advocated a world religion and religious values that extended beyond ethnic groups and clan politics. The ideologues of this so-called "pure Islam" also skillfully targeted the disenfranchised segments of the region's youth, who had been deprived of opportunities for employment and education. As a result, radical Islam began to spread not only across the eastern part of the Russian Caucasus (i.e., Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia), but also across its west, where the religiosity of the population had traditionally been less pronounced.

The tragic events that took place in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, on October 13, 2005, were a product of this trend. In that attack, a large group of militants targeted a number of buildings associated with the Russian security forces. More than 100 people, including at least 14 civilians, were reported to have been killed during the ensuing shooting, which continued into the following day. Many others were wounded. Caucasian warlord Shamil Basayev subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack, which was depicted as a *jihad* by Islamic *mujahideen* against the *kafirs* (unbelievers, i.e., Russians) and *munafiqs* (traitors, i.e., local authorities).[3]

Indeed, the current instability plaguing Ingushetia, Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria or Dagestan has little to do with ethnic nationalism and separatism, and everything to do with religion. Ever since the Beslan tragedy of September 2004, the main driver of anti-Russian sentiment in the North Caucasus has not been slogans of ethno-political self-determination but the green flag of radical Islam. And this challenge is evolving.

The rise of Islamic radicalism across the North Caucasus was much more than just a manifestation of Chechnya's struggle against the Russian federal center.

Foreign elements in the Caucasus jihad

The rise of Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus has created a qualitatively different set of problems than those confronted by Russian authorities in the past. But what are the contours of the problem? To accurately evaluate the external influences on Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus, it is necessary to understand its characteristics.

First, Arab nations have never had a common policy toward the Russian Caucasus. Nor is such a stance even possible, given the lack of political and confessional unity in the Arab world. Secondly, many Arab states (Syria, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority among them) have been, and continue to be, interested in expanding Russia's role in the Middle East peace process. As a result, an internal weakening of Russia cannot be one of their objectives.

Thirdly, it is necessary to clearly separate the official positions

of Arab states and those of Caucasian diaspora communities resident in the Middle East. Chechnya, for example, boasts a large expatriate community in Jordan, and many of its representatives openly expressed their sympathy for the unacknowledged Chechen Republic of Ichkeria created during the mid-1990s. By contrast, Jordanian diplomats explicitly stated that the Hashemite Kingdom opposes terrorism and under no circumstances interferes with the internal affairs of other states. In Egypt also, official policy was pro-Moscow during the last decade's conflicts in the Caucasus, even while Islamists in the region embraced the work of Egyptian militant Sayyid Qutb as their manual.[4]

The growing popularity of radical Islam in today's Caucasus is explained, first and foremost, not by foreign intrigues, but by the region's endemic problems—and the lack of obvious solutions to them.

In the end, not one Arab country acknowledged the independence of Chechnya or of the "Special Islamic territory" (the Kadar zone) in Dagestan, although Chechen delegations were officially received in the United Arab Emirates and in Qatar. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the second president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, actually found his final refuge in Qatar, where he was granted refugee status in 2000 but barred from carrying out political activity of any kind. (Yanderbiyev was killed in Doha in 2004). Today, with the disappearance of the de-facto independent Chechen state and the lack of any authority outside of Russian control, Arab support for Caucasian Islamists is even more problematic, and ephemeral.

By contrast, much greater support has come from Islamists in East and Central Asia. This interest was showcased in the recognition of Chechnya as an independent Muslim state in the late 1990s not by Iraq or Syria, but by the so-called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban.[5] The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamist grassroots movement Hizb ut-Tahrir likewise have attempted repeatedly to penetrate the region, albeit with far less success than they have experienced in Central Asia.[6]

Al-Qaeda's role in Islamist activity in the Caucasus deserves special attention. On the one hand, Russian law enforcement agencies have been unable to prove any direct links between the Bin Laden network and terrorist attacks or operations in the region. Al-Qaeda's leaders didn't proclaim the Caucasus to be the "new battlefield of jihad" after Afghanistan and Iraq. However, operating through proxies, al-Qaeda is known to have organized financial and ideological aid, and coordinated operations, in both Dagestan and Chechnya.[7]

Yet the growing popularity of radical Islam in today's Caucasus is explained, first and foremost, not by foreign intrigues, but by the region's endemic problems—and the lack of obvious solutions to them. Russian political analyst (and former Minister of the separatist Chechnya) Shamil' Beno correctly evaluated the situation when he said that "[f]undamentalism cannot appear in a place where there are no serious problems in the society. Only an atmosphere of complete spiritual vacuum can force a young man to give up worldly temptations."[8] In this sense, any penetration from the outside, including

that of Arab or Central Asian co-religionists, can be effective only if the path has already been paved for it. All of which begs the question: is confrontation between Russia and the West warranted, when radical forces consider us to the same extent their main enemy?

Common ground

Today, after nearly two decades of neglect and Islamist growth, there is no shortage of alarmist prognoses and predictions about the state of stability in the Caucasus. But a narrow window of opportunity still exists. It is useful to remember that every religion adapts itself to local conditions, and Islam is no different. In the 19th century, the famous Imam Shamil spread the "Tarikat" variant of Islam by force in what is now Dagestan and Chechnya. Over time, however, this brand of Islam has come to be considered "traditional" in the eastern part of the Caucasus. And while it undoubtedly possesses its own radicals, this form of Islam is generally pro-Russian and loyal to the state.

The example is instructive. With the passing of time, today's Wahhabi Islam in the Caucasus is likely to undergo a complex transformation, becoming more "traditional" and less radical. But helping this process along will require significant work, not only on the part of the authorities of the North Caucasian republics, but also on the part of Russia as a whole. Russian authorities, experts and citizens must differentiate between terrorists and those who would be ready to pledge political loyalty to the state.

Likewise, it is incorrect to label the entire opposition movement in the North Caucasus as Islamist. A strong secular opposition still exists in Ingushetia and Dagestan, and it opposes both Islamist ideas and federal authority. Though weaker in power and influence than in past years, these groups remain active—and viable.

The main challenge to the security of the Russian state is no longer posed by ethnic separatism, but by radical Islamism.

Today, therefore, the situation in the North Caucasus is no worse than it was in the early 1990s. But it is considerably different. The main challenge to the security of the Russian state is no longer posed by ethnic separatism, but by radical Islamism. One should keep in mind that this political movement is fueled by the shortcomings of both the central and regional Russian authorities. Nepotism, incompetence, political exclusion and a lack of transparency have conspired to provide fertile soil for radical Islam. Correcting these deficiencies is therefore more than simply an issue of good governance for Moscow. It is an issue of national security.

To this end, Russia needs to develop an anti-terrorist strategy commensurate with its overall objectives. Following the two Chechen wars, some Russian officials and terrorism experts embraced Israeli methods of fighting terrorism, with significant "hard power" successes. But Russia needs an approach that melds ideological warfare and social integration with security operations—something which Israel, for all of its strengths in the counterterrorism arena, has not made a priority in its dealings with the Palestinians. Moscow, by contrast, needs to focus on the divide between Islamic "moderates" and "radicals," even as it carries out surgical strikes against

terrorist groups which pose a clear and present danger to its security. It likewise needs to differentiate between terrorism and criminality, combating the former through the promotion of tolerant variants of the Muslim religion while rooting out the latter by anti-corruption measures, greater accountability and a fresh cadre of public service officials not beholden to the existing regional *status quo*.

And the West can help. Washington's recent decision to include Doku Umarov, the head of the Islamist resistance in the North Caucasus, on its official foreign terrorist list is an encouraging, if early, sign of the "reset" now under way in U.S.-Russian relations.[9] The United States arguably has not made a substantive step of this sort in Russia's direction since September 2001. Official Washington's decision is all the more valuable in that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev considers the North Caucasus to be his country's "main domestic political problem." Of course, the State Department's decision will not solve all the problems of violence in the North Caucasus. Many of them are of a systemic domestic nature, and depend on the will and effort of Russia itself to overcome them.

Nor can Washington's latest step be seen as a manifestation of geopolitical altruism. It is, however, an acknowledgment of a shared interest with Russia in combating the scourge of radical Islam. It is also a hopeful sign that, at least when it comes to the issue of Islamic extremism, U.S.-Russian relations don't necessarily need to be zero-sum.

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Taking Stock In Iraq

P.J. Dermer

The U.S. military withdrew the last of its major combat forces on August 31 as bilaterally agreed upon with the government of Iraq. The remaining forces, totaling approximately 50,000, will have a mandated operational mission of training, advising and partnering—with their Iraqi counterparts clearly in the lead. By December 2011, the majority of U.S. forces are scheduled to be out of the country, leaving behind an as-yet undecided advisory and assistance effort along the lines of other legacy defense missions in the Middle East.

Given the still-unsettled nature of Iraq's post-Saddam environment, the question on the minds of U.S. officials and pundits alike is obvious: can the drawdown proceed as planned, regardless of continuing public announcements that it will? This remains a hot topic for Iraqis as well—one on par with, or even more pressing than, talk about the national political election stalemate. Iraqis, quite simply, are asking whether their national army is strong enough to protect them after American forces withdraw, and what will happen to them when they do?[1] Iraqi Chief of General Staff General Babakir Zebari added to the fray in mid-August by publicly stating that Iraq will not be able to defend itself adequately after a U.S. withdrawal and therefore U.S. forces should stay until at least 2020.[2]

So, just how far have the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) come since 2003? What are their relative strengths and shortcomings? And what are the threats the

Colonel (Ret.) P.J. Dermer is a former U.S. Army infantry soldier, aviator and Middle East Foreign Area Officer. His experience includes conventional and special operations venues. Over twenty years in the Middle East, he served two tours in Iraq, where he was a key player in the foundation of Iraq's new security institutions.

Iraqi military will face after America's departure? Answering these questions is essential to determining whether the U.S. military can indeed withdraw from Iraq, and what it will leave in its wake if and when it does.

Force strength, by the numbers

It is hard to find anyone in Iraq who knows authoritatively the actual number of forces on the Iraqi security payroll. The figures cited tend to vary greatly. Nevertheless, knowledgeable Iraqis currently estimate a working figure of approximately 680,000 by combining Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) security personnel strengths. As a point of reference, U.S. Operation Iraqi Freedom planners believed that 400,000 to 600,000 armed personnel were available to Saddam Hussein at the onset of the war. U.S. planners considered that number formidable, and were convinced that Iraq's new security forces would never need to be that robust again. But they are.

The approximate breakdown of the combined figure above is the following:

- the Iraqi Army, with approximately 197,000 men in arms;
- Federal Police, with approximately 100,000;
- Blue Civil Police, with approximately 300,000;
- Oil Police, with approximately 29,000;
- Fixed Protection Service (exact numbers unknown);
- Special Forces units, with approximately 4,120;
- The Iraqi Air Force, with approximately 4,000;
- Iraq's Navy, with approximately 2,900; and
- Border Directorate, with approximately 42,300.

The primary security arm, the Army, consists of 16 divisions—albeit with two under Kurdistan Regional Government control. (Iraqis south of the Green Line consider these two to be non-operational, since they do not answer to Baghdad.) Operationally, security forces are organized into seven commands modeled on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), the first of its kind to be stood up in 2007. The BOC's primary charter was to coordinate and partner Iraqi security forces' efforts with Coalition forces to implement the now infamous "surge" strategy. On the surface, the commands work as a coordinating headquarters between the Army, Federal Police, Local Police, Border Forces and Navy Forces (where applicable). These commands were also envisioned to perform as regional "Corps" level headquarters in the western sense, but because their commanders do not exercise real command and control over all their subordinate forces such as the Police, the concept has not been fully realized.

But these numbers don't shed much light onto the actual state of Iraqi security, or the ability of Iraqi forces to fill the inevitable vacuum that would be left by a U.S. withdrawal. Though often touted by Administration officials as a benchmark of real progress, the figures are not relevant in assessing either Iraqi professional capabilities or their qualitative development to date. The

devil, as always, lies in the details and the behind-the-scenes nuances. Iraqi security forces are clearly operating in the public view and their capabilities constantly evolving. They are able to impose a sense of security in most locations, but violence continues to simmer in several key urban and some rural locations. The influences affecting Iraq's security development are legion, and include political and cultural dynamics, as well as systemic hangovers from the previous regime.

Political and cultural influences

Senior Iraqi leaders tell foreign interlocutors that, unlike under the previous regime, their new security forces are clean, politically independent, and free from militia influences. Honest critics, however, diverge from that assessment to varying degrees. Political influence is rampant throughout, as exemplified by the fact that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is widely known to personally approve the activities of his major operational commands and divisions, lest he be caught by surprise. Indeed, Maliki often holds court (usually late in the evenings) with unit commanders without regard for their chain of command, and retains promotion authority for those who make clear their loyalty to Maliki and his party—regardless of sect. This has bred no shortage of discontent among military peers, and painted an image of a cronyistic regime strikingly similar to its predecessor. It has also served to undermine the governmental chain of command, since neither the MOD nor the MOI can be said to be strategically leading their forces.

Maliki, moreover, has created extralegal security and intelligence organizations which report directly to him. Of particular note is the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs, focusing on intelligence collection against those deemed a threat to the regime, and the Office of the Arm of the General Secretary (OCINC), a civilian office with a military style title with amorphous responsibilities close to the office of the Prime Minister. Likewise, in 2008, Maliki ordered the formation of the Baghdad Infantry Brigade and its cantonment permanently stationed inside the Green Zone. Its orders ostensibly come from his office, not the Ministry of Defense or Joint Staff. Last, Iraq's only armored division is commanded by one of Maliki's cousins. Its tanks now guard the entrances to the Green Zone.

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Political factionalism also abounds. Maliki's surprise crackdown on Shi'a forces in Basra and Baghdad in 2008 was just as much an effort to rid himself of a political competitor and nuisance—Muqtada al-Sadr—as they were intended to free Iraq's southern economic lifeline from harmful militia elements. But the threat from Sadr is hardly over; the political stalemate in the wake of the country's March elections has left some security commanders hesitant to alienate Sadr's Jaysh Al Mahdi militia (JAM), which gained 40 seats

in the new parliament. Indeed, a recent assessment by the RAND Corporation notes that it is unlikely that the Iraqi Army will effectively engage JAM if it chooses to attack the remaining U.S. forces during the drawdown. Rather, it argues that huge numbers of JAM operatives work in the army as soldiers and are expected to step aside if JAM chooses to attack again.[3]

The Kurds have their strategic political influences in the security services as well. The current Chief of Staff is a seasoned KDP Peshmerga (Kurdish militia) officer with little conventional military experience. He assumed his key military position by virtue of the political assassination of his predecessor, a Sunni Arab officer, several years ago. It must be noted that while more than 90 percent of Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslim they are not Arabs. Coalition Provisional Authority planners originally mandated the Chief of Staff position be filled by a Sunni Arab, and the general has made it known he has been more than ready to retire for some time now. Iraq's Sunni Arab security elite, meanwhile, does not hide the fact it wants the position back. But Kurdish political leaders are loath to give up this key position unless they are likely to gain another key security position in return.

Systemic dilemmas

Systemic shortcomings likewise continue to hamper Iraq's new security services on a number of fronts.

The first is leadership. Iraq's senior security leadership, simply put, is a mixed bag. U.S. and Coalition trainers and partners have spent an extraordinary amount of effort to foster initiative, critical thinking and mental flexibility in their Iraqi counterparts. But lowering cultural barriers has not happened on the scale or at a pace sought by the Coalition. Organizations remain centralized at the top; only a handful of key actors make all the decisions; and conservatism and concomitant fear of independent decision remain clearly embedded throughout the military hierarchy. There are exceptions, of course, particularly among the younger generation of military leaders. But even they tend to micromanage their staffs and keep a close hold on any information. Last, sectarianism, though hard to see on the surface, remains a deeply-rooted problem.

Operations are hampered by growth and development problems. Iraqi security services on the whole are not yet adept at synchronized combined arms operations or planning without the help of their U.S. counterparts. They are not maneuver-oriented and cannot deploy or control battlespace outside of their traditional areas of operation for long periods of time. Apart from the Iraqi Special Forces units, the current *modus operandi* is very much that of the past; static checkpoint and fixed base operations with short patrolling "outside the wire." Integrated staff planning, when it does occur, is initiated and driven by the commander from the top down. Engineering assets, a critical component for mobility and sustained combined arms operations, remain deficient. Rules of engagement are loose, particularly the rule of proportionality in the use of force. Individual initiative and acumen at lower ranks is also lacking. Lastly, despite intense efforts at fostering intra-service cooperation by U.S. advisors, mistrust between Iraq's various forces remains palpable.

Force modernization is uneven, uncoordinated and all over the geo-

graphical map. Claims of insider influence, outright corruption and biased competition tenders are constantly heard in the late evening hours when drinking strong Iraqi tea. Culturally predisposed to freestyle wheeling and dealing, Iraqi security officials dislike the bureaucratically cumbersome U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) system. Moreover, due to the fighting over the last few years, force modernization has focused on ground infantry and police units—to the detriment of other branches of Iraq's military. The result is a lopsided fighting force suitable for some combat missions under some conditions, rather than the fully flexible warfighting machine envisioned by Coalition planners.

Intelligence capabilities are lacking. Always a sensitive occupation and subject in the Middle East, Iraqi security services today do not yet conduct proper or synchronized intelligence activities in support of their myriad operational services. Iraqis note that most reports continue to be politically motivated and hence are of no real operational value. Analysis, particularly that of long-term trends and developments, is non-existent, as is counterintelligence and operational military security (OPSEC). As such, operations planning, personnel information and other sensitive information are often breached.

Corruption, a tough concept to define in a western sense, has unquestionably taken its toll on force development. At a personal level, citizens are being denied a job in a security service based on their sect (notably Sunni). On a larger level, Iraqi security services remain stymied in their efforts to address serious security threats (for example, that of Improvised Explosive Devices) because of their insistence on natural pricing "inflation" for their systems, which has hampered the purchase of reliable, modern, state-of-the-art equipment—to include systems in use by U.S. forces.

Although they are a constant focus of U.S. officials and international agencies, human rights remain a work in progress. Old ways die hard, even after years of close partnership. Modern equipment and training do not develop or adjust principles and values. Particularly telling in this regard is the recent discovery of another secret prison for holding Sunni Arabs at Baghdad's old Muthanna military airfield.[4]

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A multilayered threat picture

The situation in Iraq today is far better when compared against metrics of the very violent years of 2005-2007. Better is relative, however, depending on where one lives in Iraq. The threat of increased violence hovers constantly due to the political stalemate and unresolved vendettas from previous fighting that continue to fester. It is not just al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that presents a clear and present danger; Shi'a and other party-affiliated militias, battered in 2008, still exist outside traditional security structures. And then there are the Kurds.

AQI, it should be noted, is not the foreign monolith it once was. The Bin Laden network's regional fran-

chise lost most of its power bases and strongholds when local Iraqis turned against it in 2007 in a phenomenon that came to be known as "the Awakening" or "Sons of Iraq." Currently dominated by Iraqis, AQI is still a threat, as demonstrated by the steady stream of incidents, especially in mixed Sunni-Shi'a population centers, that imperil local stability. While the organization has suffered recent leadership setbacks, it still maintains local bases and will remain a threat until the political situation in Iraq becomes more inclusive (i.e., there are substantially more Sunnis in key positions of power than currently).

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At present, many members of AQI are either in a dormant state or have joined other organizations to mask their activities. Others have been absorbed into the remnants of the Awakening/Sons of Iraq, and are believed to be willing to renounce AQI if given a chance. But this will not happen so long as Sunni Arabs believe they are still politically disenfranchised by a government deemed to be closer to Iran than to the country's own body politic. Adding fuel to the fire are promises made by Prime Minister Maliki's Shi'a government that have failed to materialize, as well as his continuing purge of the Awakening's ranks. These developments highlight a critical problem: without political inclusion and a concomitant period of relative stability, Sunni Arab leaders will not be able to justify a full abdication of violence, or a complete disavowal of AQI. Moreover, Iraqi Sunnis simply cannot be seen to be in league with Maliki's Shi'a government in its effort to disarm their own community, leaving it defenseless. Prime Minister-elect Iyad Allawi's inability to form a government has only added to the sense of dislocation among Iraq's Sunnis.

As a result, there are some who believe that AQI will go on the offensive again, especially if political conditions remain unsettled. But the organization's ranks have thinned considerably, and—having learned the lesson of the Awakening—its interests cannot not be in conflict with those of the greater Iraqi Sunni Arab community. Therefore, containing and managing AQI is likely to be more of a political venture than a security challenge in the months ahead. Nevertheless, deep divisions within the Sunni Arab community persist with scores still to be settled, as presently witnessed. For the foreseeable future, AQI will remain an uncertain and dangerous player.

But the residual violence in Iraq is about more than just AQI. Iraq's Shi'a political parties and their militias are not down and out. Some are still licking their wounds from the beating administered by the Maliki government in 2008. Others are hedging their bets and cautiously observing political developments. Therefore, the violence at present in Iraq's Shi'a strongholds is mostly politically and criminally motivated. Regardless, the militias remain well armed and recruit constantly. Moreover, the Shi'a militias are still being aided and abetted by Iran, whose current focus is as much economic as it is political.[5] Still, within both the MOI headquarters and other security units, efforts are under way to purge

the most radical of these elements from the rank and file. These efforts are halting and difficult, but they are unequivocally a good sign.

Finally, the threat from the Kurdish Peshmerga (as well as the two divisions controlled by Kurdish commanders in the North) is simply that they are not under the direct control of Baghdad. As such, they remain available to protect Kurdish interests, to the concern of their Iraqi counterparts. They are well trained, and have benefited from a windfall of heavy weaponry and matériel acquired during the fall of Saddam. Despite their perceived capabilities, however, they are proving to be less than capable against their indigenous PKK problem.

The logic of withdrawal

The preceding analysis leaves room for cautious optimism that the withdrawal from Iraq can continue along the current timeline. Predictions about the future in Iraq are guesswork at best, and the angst visible regarding the U.S. departure is understandable. Yet, when assessed comprehensively, the picture in the longer term is positive if the Iraqi political stalemate resolves itself and the security services can get their collective act together.

There are signs that this is possible. Although Mosul and Baghdad remain particularly problematic (albeit for different reasons), other areas of the country are relatively peaceful. Nor is the overall picture of the Iraqi security services as bleak as it appears at first blush. Yes, there are inadequacies, disconnects and challenges, but at the end of the day the Iraqi security forces more or less believe they are evolving, and succeeding. Iraqi Special Forces units are both very good and very busy, while regional commanders appear committed to ridding their country of the malign elements that were never tolerated in the past. Lastly, the Iraqi Army is staying out of the political fray, at least for the time being.

The real focus of the Iraqi Army today is on regaining the country's "honor" and primacy as a regional military power—not simply being the nation's new policeman. Their preferred center of attention is against time-honored conventional regional threats: Iran and Syria.

As the country's premier security arm, the real focus of the Iraqi Army today is on regaining the country's "honor" and primacy as a regional military power—not simply being the nation's new policeman. Their preferred center of attention is against time-honored conventional regional threats: Iran and Syria. In order to focus externally, however, Iraqi security commanders understand they must first put their domestic house in order.

And while there are those who clearly wish the United States to stay, there are those who clearly want us to leave. Regardless of their own inadequacies, at least some senior-level Iraqis feel the U.S. presence is more problematic then helpful. They note that the withdrawal will strengthen the confidence and self-esteem of Iraqi troops, while at the same time stripping politicians of the convenient "occupation" card used to justify opposition to the legitimacy of the central government in Baghdad.

Then there is the issue of our own resources. Perhaps John Nagl, president of the Washington-based

Center for a New American Security and himself a former Army officer, put the problem best when he noted that:

> Leaving Iraq is not only a public relations issue, but a recovery-of-force issue. The Army has not recovered from its surge into Iraq, and now it is surging in Afghanistan, which hasn't turned the corner at all. There are many connections between the two wars, and the fact we only have one Army is one of them. We just don't have enough Army to do everything we want it to do right now.[6]

That said, withdrawal does not mean we are throwing in the "strategic" towel. At 50,000, the remaining contingent of military trainers, mentors and capacity builders is not a small force. And, in coordination with Iraqi counterparts, this group is likely to evolve into a robust train and equip mission along the lines of those developed by Iraq's neighbors. This presence will support Iraq's continued development, and provide a level of conventional deterrence against external threats, something Iraq needs to allow it space and time to find its own way internally.

Iraqis know how to take care of their problems if they really want to. Our withdrawal is an unmistakable signal that it is time for them to begin in earnest to do so on their own.

1. Author's conversation, Baghdad, Iraq, April 2010.
2. Matthew Weaver, "Iraqi Army Not Ready to Take Over until 2020, Says Country's Top General," *Guardian* (London), August 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/12/iraqi-army-not-ready-general.
3. See Walter L. Perry et al., *Withdrawing from Iraq, Alternative Schedules, Associated Risks, and Mitigating Strategies* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009).
4. Ned Barker, "Secret Prison Revealed in Baghdad," *Los Angeles Times*, April 19, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/19/world/la-fg-iraq-prison19-2010apr19.
5. See, for example, "Iran Supports Three Insurgent Groups in Iraq: US General," Agence France-Presse, July 21, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jCA6iGhsEI3i-z4hAG-8Z2Cu4kV3Q.
6. As cited in Scott Wilson, "U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq Will Be on Time, Vice President Biden Says," *Washington Post*, May 27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605349.html.

PERSPECTIVE

Dubious Disarmament

An Interview with The Honorable Robert G. Joseph

Ambassador Robert G. Joseph currently holds the position of Senior Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. Previously (2005-2007), he was Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, serving as the State Department's principal officer for non- and counterproliferation matters, arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations, and security assistance. Before that, Dr. Joseph served in the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense. In that capacity, he was responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. policies and strategies for preventing, deterring and defending against threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction.

In July 2010, Amb. Joseph spoke with *Journal* editor Ilan Berman about the state of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, the Obama administration's "reset" of relations with Russia, and the new shape of U.S. missile defense.

You were one of the principal architects of what was perhaps the Bush administration's most far-reaching counterproliferation effort, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Yet the PSI remains poorly understood, even within national security circles in the United States. What were the rationale and organizing principles of the PSI?

The Proliferation Security Initiative was announced by President Bush in May 2003. The purpose then, as now, was to create a cooperative multilateral mechanism for disrupting the trade in illicit WMD and missile-related materials and technologies.

As for organizing principles, the approach was rather unconventional. Initially, we gathered a small number of states that shared our commitment to stopping proliferation and were in a position to contribute to this common goal. In this early phase, the focus was on developing the "Statement of Interdiction Principles," which remains in effect today. The objective was twofold: first, to motivate states to be proactive in enforcing their legal rights to act against the proliferation trade, and second, to create an enabling framework to build national and international capacities to interdict proliferation trafficking.

Consistent with these goals, there was significant progress in the first years of the Initiative. The number of PSI partners increased to well over 90 states, making PSI participation a standard of good nonproliferation behavior. And cooperation grew to include law enforcement and customs communities. Dozens of major exercises in almost every region of the world were held to improve coordination and capacities to act effectively. The results, in actual interdictions, were impressive.

In its heyday, the PSI was the world's most successful security partnership, more than double the size of NATO. Recently, however, it has fallen into disrepair. What is its status today?

Soon after coming into office, the Obama administration stated its intention to strengthen the PSI, as well as other initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. I found this welcome and encouraging. However, progress has been slow and incremental. As a practical matter, PSI-type activities seem to have a much lower priority for this White House than traditional arms control negotiations with Russia, or agreement on a consensus document at the NPT Review Conference—a document that calls out Israel and fails to mention Iran.

Since taking office, President Obama has made nuclear disarmament one of the key elements of its foreign policy. How is his administration pursuing this objective, in practical terms?

There is no doubt that the Obama administration has placed disarmament at the top of its national security agenda. The President's April 2009 Prague speech set the tone and direction his Administration would follow toward a "world free of nuclear weapons." The underlying worldview appears to be: lead by example and others will follow.

And lead the Administration has. The abrupt cancellation of the planned third missile defense site in Europe to pave the way for "New START"; the concessions made to Russia in those negotiations; the unilateral, U.S.-only, commitment in the Nuclear Posture Review not to pursue any new nuclear design or capabilities are only several of many examples.

But to what end? In the first instance, we have not seen the results that President Obama, Secretary Clinton and others promised. While the Security Council recently passed yet another sanctions resolution against Iran, its fourth, the

measures outlined in it are far from "crippling," and Iran defiantly continues to enrich uranium on the path to a nuclear weapon. Nor is there any progress with North Korea, with Pyongyang declaring it will expand its nuclear and missile programs. As for bringing along the international community, leading by example has produced even fewer results; Iran's president was able to hijack the NPT Review Conference on its very first day.

Nevertheless, the Administration appears determined to stay the course—seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the initiation of arms control negotiations in areas that would undermine U.S. security, including on missile defenses and space.

The Obama administration's recent "reset" of relations with Russia has yielded a new strategic arms limitation agreement, known as "New START." What are the benefits of this agreement for the United States? What are the drawbacks?

The Obama administration has stated that "New START" will contribute to a "reset" of the U.S.-Russia relationship. What exactly that means is unclear.

Not surprisingly, Russia's leaders appear quite pleased with the negotiated outcomes, almost to the point of dancing in the end zone. Clearly, Russia got what it wanted: limits on strategic launchers that constrain the United States but not Russia; elimination of monitoring provisions that provided transparency on Russian modernization; no limits on so-called "non-strategic" nuclear forces that give Russia a major advantage in overall force levels; and—all Administration protestations to the contrary—direct constraints on both U.S. missile defenses and on future conventional global strike capabilities. Short of re-establishing the ABM Treaty, it is hard not to conclude that Russia got pretty much everything it wanted. For our part, we got a new arms control agreement.

Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that the treaty may contribute not to a more normal relationship with Moscow, but to the return to a competitive, and perhaps adversarial, relationship with the United States. The signing ceremonies and summit photo ops are reminiscent of the Cold War days. For some in Moscow, this symbolism is welcomed as a reflection of restored superpower status—a status that continues to be defined in opposition to the United States. And for those Russian leaders who see the United States as the enemy, the treaty holds value because it restores nuclear weapons as the principal currency of the bilateral relationship. This is perhaps the only category of arms in which Russia can compete.

Instead of pursuing old-style arms control of the type practiced during the Cold War, we should be seeking new avenues of cooperation with Russia in areas where our interests intersect—such as furthering our cooperation against nuclear terrorism and managing the expansion of nuclear energy in a way that reduces the prospects for proliferation. It is much more likely that we can build trust and confidence on this basis in the future than by relying on the approaches of the past.

American missile defense has undergone several transformations over the past decade. Currently, the Obama administration's plan emphasizes short- and medium-range defenses, deployed abroad, over long-range defense of the U.S. homeland. Do these priorities track with the current proliferation challenges facing the United States?

The United States does not have the luxury of choosing which missile threats it will defend against. We must act to develop and deploy effective defenses simultaneously against short, medium, and long-range threats. We must protect our forces abroad, our friends and allies, and our homeland from missile attack.

Iran and other countries are actively seeking the capability to hold U.S. cities hostage, perhaps to deter us from fulfilling our security commitments and assisting our friends in vital regions of interest, including the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. We need to stay ahead of this threat by investing in real capabilities that can be deployed when and where they are needed.

DISPATCHES

The Promise of a United Maghreb

Mbarka Bouaida

CASABLANCA—The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) can claim some successes since its inception on February 17, 1989. Yet much still remains to be done to integrate the countries of the Maghreb. True regional unity, and the prosperity that flows from it, will require an examination of future challenges facing the North African region: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.

That task has never been more crucial. The current international environment and the proliferation of multiple crises—financial, economic, food, energy-related or other—makes the removal of impediments to effective development more important than ever. The Kingdom of Morocco has blazed a trail in this regard, spearheading the drive for a strong, united, and mutually beneficial Maghreb. It has done so not only due to shared history, language (Arabic and Amazigh), and religion, but also because it is a necessity dictated by our shared destinies and aspirations. Quite simply, North African integration is a duty that we cannot ignore in the face of globalization.

More than ever before, the well-being of the citizens of the Maghreb hinges on the free circulation of people, services, goods, merchandise, and capital in a North African common market—one that will eventually lead to a monetary and economic union that contributes to robust, revitalized trade among the countries of the region.

Such a dream is achievable. Increasing national growth rates by just two points, admittedly an ambitious goal in these difficult economic times, would make regional states powerful, complementary, and competitive—and make North Africa a hub for domestic and international investment. With growing competencies across a range of business capabilities, the opportunities

MS. MBARKA BOUAIDA is a member of the Moroccan Parliament, and chair of its Committee of Foreign Affairs, National Defense and Religious Affairs. She also represents Morocco in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.

inherent in African markets will contribute to international attention, and regional development.

And with greater coordinated responses to cross-border opportunities, we could begin thinking bigger. North African states would be able take advantage of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation via the Mediterranean Union, and expand contacts with other parts of Africa and the Middle East to more effectively deal with transnational threats, be they financial, economic, food, energy-related or environmental.

Indeed, North African integration can serve as a model for joint action and effective cooperation across the Arab and Islamic worlds, both on the African continent and beyond it. It would offer to Arab, Islamic, and African countries a unique cultural model that underscores common values like the respect for diversity, and serve as a source of inspiration to neighboring nations.

The first step along this path is a return to the region's rich shared cultural heritage. Revisiting our history, our language, and religion is key to recalling that what joins us together is more important than what separates us.

But our march toward a modern Maghreb should not stop with these memories. Rather, we should focus on the potential complementarities emerging in our region. By keeping close watch on various strategies to develop North African agriculture, tourism, the deployment of networks (oil and gas pipelines, electrical cables, telecommunications, transportation, etc.), and the opening of free trade to other Maghreb countries, we will successfully embrace the challenge of the Maghreb integration.

By making our countries more business friendly, via the harmonization of legal, administrative, and financial measures that create a favorable climate for inter-Maghreb transactions and investment, and by lifting impediments to trade, in particular the logic-defying closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border, the road to a Greater Maghreb could be paved. At the same time, by opening up a common regional market of more than 80 million consumers, large enough to attain economies of scale, North African corporate entities could boost their competitiveness in a globalized environment, and improve the living conditions of local populations.

But a strategy for regional integration will only succeed if local leaders make intelligent use of the many opportunities that are afforded to them. It is far more effective for the North African counties to speak and negotiate with their global partners with one voice. In turn, dealing with a single regional policy and purpose is more attractive to international partners interested in investing in the Maghreb. To put a modern twist on an old adage, the countries of the Maghreb today have a clear choice: they can prosper together, or they can stagnate separately.

The Tunisian Model

Roger Bismuth

TUNIS—Every year, far from the media spotlight, a great Jewish pilgrimage occurs where few would expect it. That place is Tunisia, a moderate Muslim country that takes pride in its religious tolerance and equal rights for women.

The pilgrimage culminating at the historic Ghriba Synagogue on the island of Djerba would be extraordinary in any other part of the Arab world. But it is not in Tunisia, where modernity is embraced and openness to other cultures and religions is a way of life. You probably don't read about this, for most reports out of the Arab World depict a monolithic bloc of nations aligned against the West. This is far from the truth—and far from the case in Tunisia.

The extent to which Tunisia stands up for religious tolerance is not well known abroad. Opposition radicals at home and bigots abroad seize on the Ghriba pilgrimage to try to vilify the Tunisian government. Fundamentalist-inspired Middle Eastern television stations have tried in the past to "embarrass" Tunis by criticizing the presence of Jewish and Israeli pilgrims on Tunisian soil. Curiously, this bigotry has received no attention and provoked no real criticism in the West.

Fortunately, Tunisia remains undaunted. In my position as a member of the Tunisian Senate, I am a constant and proud witness to my country's principled commitment to religious tolerance. Holding the pilgrimage requires a lot of effort and planning. But we in Tunisia have always believed that the potent symbolism of the event was the most important consideration.

The Ghriba pilgrimage is a microcosm of Tunisia's uniqueness. An heir to ancient Carthage, Tunisia has a long history of contributions to global causes that belies its relatively small size. The country has also managed to achieve stability and prosperity for more than two decades with limited natural resources. When it comes to religious faith and practice, it is no exaggeration to say that there is no country in the region that is fighting fanaticism in all its forms better than Tunisia. We have done so even when our friends and allies in the West were not yet particularly aware of the threat.

In Tunisia we ensure that children of all races, religion and gender have access to education and healthcare. Our schooling and vaccination rates often exceed those of developed countries. More than 80 percent of Tunisians now own their own homes.

Simply put, there is no other country in the region which can boast similar progress, and especially in terms of gender equality. Women hold 27 percent of seats in Tunisia's Chamber of Deputies, and more than 15 percent in our Senate—outpacing many developed nations. And Tunisia is primed for the future: more than 60 percent of university students in Tunisia are women.

Roger Bismuth is the president of the Tunisian Jewish community, as well as a member of the Tunisian Senate and the executive committee of the country's business federation.

Fighting the religious fanaticism threatening to turn back the clock for women and others in Tunisia continues to be a top priority for the government of President Zine Abidine Ben Ali. Some international organizations, which seem more interested in "the rights" of Salafist *jihadis* than those whom they have violently targeted, should remember that the danger these radicals pose to the whole region is both clear and present.

Tunisia has successfully thwarted terrorism at home since the late 1980s. But we are not naïve; the threat is now both regional and global. This is why Tunisia has adopted a multi-dimensional approach, introducing broad educational reforms, fighting poverty and launching job-creation programs—and thereby depriving violent extremists of fertile ground. Still, we remain vigilant, even while upholding the legal and human rights of all suspects in terrorism cases.

Perhaps Tunisia's "problem," in the eyes of some critics, is simply that we refuse to submit to the will of those who believe a fundamentalist future might not be a very bad thing after all, even if it means religious intolerance and discrimination would be the rule rather than the exception. Advancing democracy and tolerance is not easy, particularly when there are so many extremists working against that objective.

Distant observers must shed their illusions; democracy cannot bloom instantly in all environments. It must be protected and nourished over time in order to take firm root. In Tunisia, it is—and it has.

Kreisky's Corrosive Legacy

Simone Dinah Hartmann & Florian Markl

VIENNA—On June 24th 2010, Israeli President Shimon Peres welcomed Austria's Social Democratic Chancellor, Werner Faymann, for a working meeting during the latter's official state visit to Israel. On that occasion, Peres urged European leaders to "return to the doctrine of former Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky" and support the Middle East peace process. Like Kreisky allegedly did with Yasser Arafat in the 1970s, Europeans nowadays should "turn to Hamas, which controls Gaza, and pressure its leaders into supporting negotiations toward peace, recognizing Israel, and stopping the weapons smuggling and acts of terrorism."

Peres' statement was odd in various respects. Its underlying assumption, that Hamas could be turned from an enemy into a supporter of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, is highly questionable. Even more problematic, Arafat is held up here as a historic example of the metamorphosis of a terrorist leader into a partner for peace—even though the reality was quite different. Not least, following in the footsteps of Bruno Kreisky could hardly be good for Israel, since his Middle East policy consisted of pressuring the Jewish state while appeasing and supporting its worst enemies.

Kreisky, a staunchly secular socialist and lifetime opponent of Zionism, was born into a Viennese Jewish family, and spent the years of National Socialism in exile in Sweden. After his return to Austria, he embarked upon a career in the foreign ministry. In 1970, Kreisky became Austria's first socialist Chancellor, despite an anti-Semitic campaign waged against him by his conservative opponents. He burst onto the Middle East policy scene in September 1973, when two Palestinian terrorists kidnapped Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union on their way through Austria. Kreisky negotiated their release, but at a price—the closure of the transit-camp at Schonau castle run by the Jewish Agency. Although the transit of Jews from the Soviet Union through Austria continued, Kreisky's decision to close the camp at Shonau was highly symbolic, widely seen as the first case of a government capitulating to the demands of Palestinian terrorists.

In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, the Socialist International, until then staunchly pro-Israel, changed course. Under Kreisky's leadership, European socialists began to reach out to "socialist" parties throughout the Arab world. It was during the first of those so-called "fact finding missions" that Kreisky met Yasser Arafat for the first time. While not impressed on a personal level, Kreisky quickly became the PLO leader's most ardent supporter, despite Arafat's status—just two years after the 1972 massacre at the Munich Olympic Games and following years of Palestinian terrorist attacks throughout the world—as *persona non grata* on the world stage.

Contrary to all available evidence, Chancellor Kreisky claimed to have never seen proof of the PLO's declared goal of the destruction of Israel. He spent much

Simone Dinah Hartmann is director of STOP THE BOMB Austria and co-editor of *Iran in the World System* (Studienverlag, 2010). Florian Markl, a former historian for the General Settlement Fund for Victims of National Socialism in Vienna, is currently completing his doctorate on Palestinian terrorism in Austria.

of the 1970s trying to enhance the status of Arafat and the PLO in the international arena, which did not prevent Palestinian terrorists from perpetrating attacks in Austria, including the spectacular hostage-taking of OPEC ministers in Vienna in 1975, and two bloody attacks on Vienna's main synagogue in 1979 and 1981, respectively. In 1979, Kreisky provoked yet another international outcry by hosting Arafat in Vienna. In 1980, Austria became the first western country to officially recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Even as Palestinian terrorists cut a bloody swath through Austria, Kreisky's relations with Israel went from bad to worse. Once the right-wing Likud party came to power in Jerusalem in 1977, Kreisky's already frosty attitude turned overtly hostile. His decision in 1982 to welcome Muammar al-Gaddafi, another rogue Arab politician deeply involved in anti-western and anti-Israeli terrorism, only further exacerbated Austria's mounting tensions with Israel.

The Kreisky "doctrine" bore strange fruit elsewhere in the Middle East as well. During the Iran-Iraq-war, the state-owned VOEST steel concern—in flagrant violation of Austria's weapons-export regulations—sold hundreds of artillery pieces first to Iraq, and later on to Iran as well. While the Iraqi war effort was supported by other western countries as well, the Islamic Republic of Iran was not—until, that is, Austrian politicians with their odd predilection for rogue regimes stepped in.

In 1984, Austrian Social Democrat Erwin Lanc became the first Western foreign minister to visit Iran following the Islamic Revolution. In 1987, Ali Akbar Velayati came to Vienna in the first state visit to a western country by an Iranian foreign minister since 1979. When an Iranian hit team murdered Iranian-Kurdish leader Abdel Rahman Quassemlou in Vienna in 1989, Austrian officials not only did not reconsider their relations to the Iranian regime, they actively helped the murderers to flee the country. Kurt Waldheim, the Austrian president whose term in office was clouded by revelations about his Nazi past, became the first Western head of state to pay the regime in Tehran a courtesy visit in 1991, even going so far as to place a wreath atop Ayatollah Khomeini's sarcophagus. His trip to Tehran paved the way for further visits by high-ranking politicians from other Western European countries—especially from Germany.

Austrian trade relations with Iran have since flourished, nearly doubling in the last decade. Despite international attempts to pressure Iran into abandoning its nuclear program, Austria has positioned itself as a valuable economic partner for the Islamic Republic. The head of the Iranian Chamber of Commerce has described Austria as Iran's "gateway to the European Union." And even though Austria, currently a member of the UN Security Council, supported the latest round of sanctions over Iran's nuclear program, regime representatives still receive a warm welcome in Vienna: this past May, Iranian foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki, the opening speaker at the infamous Holocaust denial conference in Tehran, was hosted by conservative Austrian foreign minister Michael Spindelegger.

Most recently, Vienna's city council demonstrated its adherence to the Kreisky "doctrine" by unanimously passing a one-sided resolution condemning Israel's military action against the Gaza flotilla, just hours after the incident in the Mediterranean. It should come as no surprise that the resolution was initiated by the Social Democrats; the party once led by Kreisky can still be found at the forefront of anti-Israel activism in Europe.

In short, not much has changed since Kreisky left office in 1983. While occasionally paying lip service to Israel's security concerns, Austria's politicians continue to pursue policies that are deeply detrimental to its interests.

Book Reviews

Course Correction

Shawn Macomber

Newt Gingrich, *To Save America: Stopping Obama's Secular-Socialist Machine* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2010), 356 pp. $29.95.

"Democracy," H.L. Mencken once famously quipped, "is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard." In Newt Gingrich's sprawling new jeremiad and call-to-arms, *To Save America*, the former House speaker appears to endorse a modified version of that maxim:

> [T]he secular-socialist machine gained power through dishonesty, deceit, and deception. But the American people have not been entirely innocent in this process. For years we avoided hard choices by retreating into a fantasy world where difficult problems didn't exist. We thought our country could have wealth without working for it and security without defending it. The inescapable truth is that we have not been honest with ourselves. We are emerging from a pattern of self-deception that transcends partisan and ideological lines. Repeatedly refusing to face the facts, we have been surprised by obvious events that we only missed due to our determination to deceive ourselves.

Whether some apparatchik somewhere within the "machine" hatched a plan to sell American voters on that fantasy world is an open question. That Team Obama messaging gurus David Axelrod and David Plouffe explicitly advertised the same cannot be disputed. Married to the rampant anti-Bushism of the moment, a free lunch at the expense of whatever industry or tax bracket

Shawn Macomber is a contributing editor to *The American Spectator.*

the promised imperial presidency chose to demagogue and strong arm, proved a persuasive electoral argument. Lest any pundit be confused about voters' "honest" intent, they proceeded to load Congress to the gills with blustering, activist liberals.

Alas, the reality of activist government which can be evaded during a theoretical campaign cannot be so easily shaken during the practice of governance. Transitioning from promising the stars and a cynical, Pollyanna-ish mantra of "change" to bureaucratic coercion and a chaotic fiscal policy is a tough trick. Today, the prognosis is dire. Our enemies—the "irreconcilable wing of Islam," as Gingrich calls it, along with the authoritarian nation-state power jockeys and nettlesome tin-pot dictators—are as intractable as ever, the war-on-business-plus-massive-stimulus method of combating joblessness has failed utterly, and Obama's "Not only can we afford to do this, we can't afford *not* to do this" theory of budgeting has produced endemic deficits dwarfing those of the shameful Bush era. The consequences of evading reality have, in other words, taken on the characteristics of compound interest, without Americans seriously grappling with the tab coming due.

A great deal of *To Save America* necessarily deals with domestic policy. That is, after all, the arena in which Obama and the Democratic Congress have mostly chosen to do battle. But the approach of the current administration does not bode well for the prospects of addressing the five major national security threats Gingrich outlines: Terrorists with nuclear weapons, an electromagnetic pulse attack, cyberwarfare, biological warfare, and the growing gap between Chinese and American capabilities.

On the last concern, Gingrich is not terribly persuasive. A confluence of history and demography have now coalesced into a Chinese moment, but neither element is static, and China will soon face internal schisms as the short-sighted One Child policy and the foundational tensions of mashing authoritarian rule atop an increasingly dynamic, quasi-free enterprise economy come home to roost. And if Gingrich's bleak outlook on the post-Obamanomics American economy has merit—which it does—then so much the worse for a China holding our debt and desperate for spendthrift export markets.

On the remaining four threats, however, Gingrich's descriptions are sobering—if not outright terrifying. And a regulatory state sanctioned by an Alfred E. Neuman "What, me worry?" government and administered by elite, unelected bureaucratic rulemaking cliques, Gingrich fears, will not engender, especially when combined with an anemic economy, the type of vision necessary to keep these nightmares from invading the waking world:

> Imagine going back in time a hundred years and talking to Henry Ford about a hybrid electric engine… Or explain to the Wright brothers the U.S. military's stealth bombers. Or talk to Edison about three dimensional full color Imax movies. None of these inventions could have been built even if they could have been imagined that long ago. More important, none of them were developed based on taxing and regulating other industries into extinction. They were the product of American ingenuity, not government mandates.

The problem is, even as the Obama-Pelosi-Reid overreach launches Republicans into office, it

is not at all clear that even those who generally share Gingrich's worldview are prepared to expound the awful truth to the masses. Let's say establishment Republicans do begin talking straight about what it will take to defend ourselves, while simultaneously crawling out of our fiscal black hole. The same electorate that recently rewarded the gauziest, most substance-free campaign in recent memory with the highest percentage of the vote in two decades isn't likely to become overnight devotees of emphatic, unvarnished, apocalyptic truths.

Thus, *To Save America* is a very good bill of particulars against the current ruling philosophy of government, a chilling look at what the restitution for these years could look like in blood and treasure, and a fount of guarded optimism. Gingrich proves himself a forward-looking "ideas man" once again. But when he asks, "We have the power, but do we have the will?" the answer isn't immediately clear. And when it is not, unfortunately, a "No" is implied.

At one point in *To Save America*, Gingrich recalls walking to the Atlanta Public Library in October of 1962, wondering en route if the entire city, along with every other American metropolis, would soon be a mass grave covered in radioactive ash. It's an anecdote that showcases a willingness to confront the abyss quite a bit more unique than Gingrich supposes. What else can we do but hope that he, once again, proves the skeptics and doubters wrong?

Prodigal Son

Asaf Romirowsky

MOSAB HASSAN YOUSEF with RON BRACKIN, *Son of Hamas: A Gripping Account of Terror, Betrayal, Political Intrigue, and Unthinkable Choices* (SaltRiver, 2010), 288 pp. $26.99.

They called him the "Green Prince," because of his royal Hamas pedigree and in deference to the signature color used by Islamists. But Mosab Hassan Yousef was also Israel's most valuable spy inside Hamas—and certainly the most successful one. Over more than a decade, he prevented dozens of suicide bombings and assassination attempts by the Palestinian Islamist group, saving hundreds of lives in the process.

Yousef's remarkable memoir, *Son of Hamas*, begins with his childhood in Ramallah—a youth marked by close family ties amid the Israeli "occupation." Yousef's father, an imam educated in Jordan, rose to notoriety in their hometown. In 1986, he—along with six other men, including wheelchair-bound Gaza cleric Sheikh Ahmed Yassin—formed Hamas at a secret meeting in Hebron. The first intifada broke out the following year, and Yousef did his share, throwing rocks at Israeli civilians and military vehicles. His personal transformation took place after his first arrest in 1996, when he was approached by Israel's General Security Service, the Shin Bet. His subsequent discovery of Christianity only served to solidify his new calling.

The stories of Yousef's subsequent exploits would make for a great work of fiction, were they not fully corroborated by the Shin Bet. The *Ha'aretz* newspaper's Arab affairs correspondent, Avi Issacharoff, quotes Yousef's Shin Bet handler expressing genuine admiration for his most valuable asset: "So many people owe him their life and don't even know it. People who did a lot less were awarded the Israel Security Prize. He certainly deserves it. The amazing thing is that none of his actions were done for money. He did things he believed in. He wanted to save lives."

Infiltrating the upper echelons of Hamas came relatively easily to Yousef, because of his father's stature. He used the access in good stead; during the second intifada, Yousef supplied crucial intelligence that led to the arrests of several key Palestinian leaders—among them, Ibrahim Hamid, a Hamas commander in the West Bank, and Marwan Barghouti, accused of orchestrating numerous attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers, including the deadly Passover Massacre at the Park Hotel in Netanya on March 27, 2002. Moreover, since he accompanied his father to meet with Yasser Arafat prior to the start of the so called "al-Aqsa" intifada, Yousef can corroborate the premeditated nature of the uprising, which was the product of a deal brokered by Arafat and Yousef *père*, rather than a spontaneous response to

ASAF ROMIROWSKY is a senior fellow at EMET and an associate fellow at the Middle East Forum.

then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount.

Yousef's tale illustrates the importance of HUMINT, human intelligence gathered by agents in the field working their sources, on which Israel's security forces have relied so extensively since the state's founding. If anything, the need today is even more pressing; with the Gaza disengagement in 2005, Israel lost much of its nascent human capital in the Palestinian Territories. In this intelligence vacuum, individuals like Yousef have become supremely important in the Israeli government's tireless quest to protect innocent lives.

The one person whom Yousef would not help capture was his father. Upon learning about his son's activities, Sheikh Hassan Yousef released a statement from his prison cell saying that, although it might have been possible for the Israelis to recruit his son, Mosab had no access to the movement's secrets, and must have been "blackmailed" into cooperating by Israeli security forces. More recently, the Sheikh wrote a letter from jail saying that he and his whole family "inclusively and exhaustively denounce our eldest son."

Yousef himself retired from the spy business and fled the West Bank in 2007. He now lives in California, a devout Christian. But no good deed goes unpunished; despite his extensive contributions to counterterrorism, in 2009 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) opposed Yousef's request for political asylum, and initiated proceedings to deport him on terrorist charges. It was only after his Shin Bet handler came forward to testify on his behalf, and after his cause was taken up directly by a number of champions in Congress, that the government dropped its objections to Yousef's requests for political asylum. As of this writing, the "Green Prince" has been granted "tentative" refuge in the U.S.

Happy ending notwithstanding, Yousef's tale is a cautionary one. Over the years, the U.S. government time and again has welcomed Islamist radicals with open arms, even as it has turned against the very heroes that have tried to keep it safe. Yousef's book is a remarkable story of courage and conviction in the face of radicalism. His subsequent experience at the hands of U.S. authorities is a timely reminder that—when it comes to the struggle against radical Islam—America still has a great deal to learn about who its friends really are.

Through the Monitor, Darkly

Eric R. Sterner

RICHARD A. CLARKE and ROBERT K. KNAKE, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do about It* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010), 290 pp. $25.99.

Science fiction author William Gibson coined the term "cyberspace" way back in 1984. The concept has since gained in popularity as the information revolution gathered speed. Unfortunately, Gibson's fictional description does not offer a useful policymaking framework. For that, one must turn to the Pentagon, which defines cyberspace as "a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers."

Predictably, this new domain has emerged as a key challenge for U.S. national security. The information revolution has prompted a corresponding revolution in military affairs—a fundamental change in the nature of warfare at the operational level. Enthusiasts saw this shift as an opportunity to deepen and extend America's military advantage. Others, however, have viewed it with more foreboding, as an entirely new domain of vulnerability.

Former National Security Council staffer Richard Clarke falls into the latter camp. Clarke is best known for having made Osama bin Laden his personal policy crusade prior to 9/11, but his portfolio while in government also included U.S. critical infrastructure, including cyberspace. In that capacity, beginning in the Clinton administration, he pioneered national policymaking related to cyber security. His latest book, *Cyber War*, represents a culmination of that experience.

Part memoir, part policy essay, part threat assessment, and part call-to-arms, Clarke and his co-author, Robert Knake, have penned a useful primer on cyberspace and national security. It begins with a chapter relating the story of several different cyber battles, including the use of cyber weapons against Iraq in 2003, the Russo-Estonian cyber war of 2007, the Russo-Georgian cyber war of 2008, and the summer 2009 conflicts between North Korea and South Korea and North Korea and the United States. From the historical record, Clarke and Knake take away five big conclusions. First, that cyber war is real. Second, that it happens at the speed of light. Third, that cyber war is global in nature. Fourth, that it skips the traditional battlefield altogether. And fifth, that cyber war as a geopolitical phenomenon has already begun.

ERIC R. STERNER is a Senior Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute.

The authors follow quickly with a review of interagency battles over roles and missions, an overview of suspected foreign capabilities, and an accessible assessment of how cyberspace works and its known flaws. These portions of *Cyber War* offer a useful starting point for anyone seeking an introduction to the issues and the players.

Having laid out the problems that cyberspace presents for U.S. national security and a useful background for considering policy propositions, Clarke and Knake spend the last third of the book discussing the dynamics of cyber conflict, and recommending future courses of action. Their assessment is damning; U.S. vulnerability to a coordinated cyber attack has been a concern for over two decades, they point out. But despite multiple high-level studies, policies, strategies, and funding initiatives, three successive presidents have failed to effectively address it. Instead, the U.S. government long has accepted a "network, defend thyself" approach, eschewing regulations the authors believe are needed for real change.

The prescriptions Clarke and Knake propose are sweeping. They would prefer to inspect all Internet traffic before it enters the cyberspace "backbone," to separate critical infrastructure controls (particularly those associated with the electricity grid) from cyberspace, and to aggressively pursue defense information technology upgrades in what they call a "defensive triad." In theory, they posit, such steps would deter some attacks by foiling their goals, and mitigate others that manage to penetrate critical U.S. networks.

Having discussed defense, *Cyber War* moves on to offense. While vague about how they interpret the dynamics of using cyber weapons first, the authors seem to recommend a "no first use of cyberweapons in a non-kinetic environment" posture, lest the United States provoke an adversary to strike at our critical vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, Clarke and Knake offer no compelling reason why adversaries would withhold use of their cyberweapons just because the United States has not used them first. Indeed, given the inherent uncertainties surrounding cyber conflict, it may be impossible for the United States to convince any adversary that it has not used cyberweapons, even when it in fact hasn't.

But here, policy ends and personality begins. Bluntly, *Cyber War* is excessively egocentric—a reflection of Clarke's perception of himself as a national security trailblazer. It is written in the first person singular; Knake's voice is silent. Nor are there footnotes or a bibliography, leaving the reader with no choice but to take Clarke's word when it comes to the motivations and actions of key players in a shifting, amorphous emerging battlefield.

To the vast majority of them, *Cyber War* is unforgiving. Clarke generally attributes small-minded, narrow, and self-interested motives to any and all who disagree with him. On occasion, these prejudices stray into the realm of conspiracy theory; for example, Clarke depicts the current Administration's continued opposition to the regulation he desires to President Obama's chief domestic policy advisor's marriage to a former Microsoft lobbyist, and the fact that Microsoft spends a fair amount on political action committees. All this leads Clarke to assert that "the Obama Administration was, quite literally, in bed with Microsoft."

Its tone, shallowness, and breeziness make *Cyber War* a good read, and Clarke a talking head valued by the media. But these same features undermine the credibility of the book's arguments, and serve to diminish its policy impact as decision-makers continue to wrestle with the real and difficult questions Clarke and Knake successfully identify and investigate. Nevertheless, if taken with a heavy grain of salt, *Cyber War* is a welcome contribution to the contemporary analysis of cyberspace and national security. Sadly, with a bit less vitriol and more impartiality, it could be so much more.



Counterinsurgency 2.0

Martin Sieff

ROY GODSON and RICHARD SHULTZ, *Adapting America's Security Paradigm and Security Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 2010).

One of the greatest institutional weaknesses of the U.S. armed forces, especially the U.S. Army, has been an inability to retain the hard-won lessons of conflicts fought over the past half century, especially in the area of counterinsurgency and the strategic problems of waging it on behalf of weak and ineffectual partner governments. It took more than three-and-a-half years of continued deterioration in Iraq to finally initiate an effective counterinsurgency strategy at the beginning of 2007. Since then, counterinsurgency has become the new fashionable specialty for the Army, and this is in general a most welcome development. However, the curse of assuming that solutions learned the hard way can be adapted wholesale without regard for greatly changed local conditions has continued to afflict U.S. policymakers.

The conflict in Afghanistan, for example, has not proved amenable to the same tactics as did the conflict in Iraq. Gen. Stanley McChrystal served with outstanding success in Iraq. But for all his intelligence, commitment and applied energy, he was unable to significantly reverse the dynamics of conflict in Afghanistan in America's favor during his tenure there. This, in large part, was the reason why President Barack Obama was forced to relieve McChrystal of command and reassess U.S strategy and tactics in that mountainous, recalcitrant little nation.

As such, *Adapting America's Security Paradigm* by Roy Godson and Richard Schultz appears at an opportune time. A sustained study of, and debate over, the very different and often confusingly protean nature of guerrilla warfare and low intensity conflicts must become an ongoing and central focus of the U.S. military and of the academic institutions and think tanks which serve it. And Godson and Shultz deliver, making important and sometimes radical recommendations that start us along that path.

Perhaps the most important of these, and the one most likely to raise hackles at West Point and around the Pentagon, is that the security problems increasingly generated by the global environment of the 21st century can no longer be solved by simply mandating bigger fixes of financial investment and support or of newer and better technologies. At a time when the Obama administration has quadrupled the already serious budget deficit that it inherited from the George W. Bush administration

MARTIN SIEFF is Chief Political Analyst for *The Globalist*, a former senior foreign correspondent for the *Washington Times* and former Managing Editor, International Affairs, for *United Press International*.

(from $1.7 trillion to $6.8 trillion), this is a timely and sobering point to make, as well as being an unconventional and important insight. The Pentagon's quiet ditching of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's budget-busting fantasies of netcentric war also serves notice that Godson and Shultz's welcome return to the analytic basics of war comes at an appropriate time.

Godson and Shultz likewise have been assiduous in learning key lessons from the operational level in Iraq. They took to heart the complaints of senior Army officers that the Central Intelligence Agency was far too slow in providing intelligence of operational use in the field, and far too diffuse in its focus and assessment of the intelligence that the Army needed. They are also entirely correct to advocate the restructuring of military units that take point duty in the field in counterinsurgency operations. The lessons of Iraq confirm the importance of establishing intelligence dominance, as well as of intelligence collection down to the local unit. This proved crucially important to the success of Army units operating in Iraq under Gen. David Petraeus during the Bush administration's "surge" of forces there.

Likewise essential, according to Godson and Schultz, is creating—and then maintaining—small corps of experts that integrate civilian expertise with professional army officers and serving soldiers. Unit cohesion and practical cooperation of such hybrid units is notoriously difficult to achieve and maintain, but the potential results and force-multiplying increase in experience and applied expertise is well worth the effort. Godson and Shultz also correctly identify the crucial importance of mastering the smallest and most complicated local environments—a lesson repeatedly lost and relearned by generals and armies over many centuries.

Several caveats to these conclusions are necessary, however. First, the sensible, complex, integrated polices that Godson and Shultz advocate do not usually produce immediate or often even rapid results, although improvements from them can quickly be seen. Patience is crucial in overseeing the strategic direction of these conflicts, and in educating home populations whose understanding is essential to maintain support for them. Also, while this study should be applauded as a seminal contribution to advancing the necessary debate on developing effective counterinsurgency strategies, it should be seen as an early step in this process, not as a definitive summary of it.

Nor is *Adapting America's Security Paradigm* comprehensive in nature. Not all of the security challenges that the U.S. Army will face in the 21st century will be counterinsurgency problems along the lines of Iraq and Afghanistan. Focusing solely or overwhelmingly on the threat of counterinsurgency, weak states and armed groups is like having doctors specialize only in dealing with cancer or AIDS, while stripping them of the medical education and medical and surgical tools needed to deal with other forms of illness. Conventional war is not going away, as the Israelis and the Georgians in particular well understand.

Nevertheless, Godson and Shultz have done well to shine their spotlight on this important, continuing and widely misunderstood dimension of contemporary warfare. Because it isn't going to go away either.

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