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— The U.S. Military Faces the Future —

New Strategic Challenges

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From the Publisher

As of this writing, the Obama Administration has been in office for less than a month, but no grass has grown under its feet. It has introduced a massive economic stimulus package which, depending on one's political orientation, has been called a misdirected expenditure of money or a meaningful response to the current global financial crisis.

President Obama named former Senator George Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East. Depending on who you are, this could be seen as the same old approach with the same old guy or a welcome renewal of American engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

President Obama has reached out to the Muslim world, which could be seen as an affirmation of pre-election concerns about his commitment to Israel, or as a wise move that will allow him to broker a real and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Every action taken by the Obama Administration in its short history has evoked strong reactions from practically every point on the political spectrum. By the time this appears in print, a clearer picture of who President Obama is and what he stands for may emerge. At the moment, however, we have only perceptions.

What is clear is that President Obama has taken all the lessons of the last eight years and thrown them out the window. He has reinstated some old discredited policies and beliefs. Among them is the belief that the hostility coming from the Muslim world is the result of American behavior. In other words, if only we reach out to them they will embrace us in return.

That's not going to happen. But then President Obama is going to have to learn that himself, the same way he will have to learn that you can't negotiate Iran out of developing a nuclear bomb.

President Obama also has decided that he is going to shift the focus of the war from Iraq to Afghanistan. A big mistake. Afghanistan will be a greater quagmire than Iraq ever was. History tells us this. No foreign power has ever been successful in Afghanistan.

Why is he doing this? Because it separates how he conducts the war from the way President Bush conducted the war.

There is a Talmudic saying, "We stand on the shoulders of those who came before us." It is clear that the new crowd at the White House has disdain for its predecessors and that the differences between them are profound. But let's not throw the baby out with the bath water. The concept that President Bush did everything wrong made for great campaign rhetoric but it is no prescription for progress in the Middle East.

I applaud President Obama's idealism. But to achieve success, idealism must be tempered with reality.

Somehow, we must come together as a country and discard the absolutism of our judgments. Philosophical and policy differences can be a good thing. Openly expressed and debated differences are the substance of democracy. They represent a collective search for answers to difficult challenges.

Neither adulation for President Obama nor contempt for President Bush will further the discussion. Nor will lines in the sand that so many have already drawn.

Tom Neumann
Publisher

Editor's Corner

By now, it's become widely accepted that the United States has found itself in a new kind of conflict, fundamentally different from those that confronted it in the past. The question of how to respond to this different type of war, however, is far less settled. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote recently in *Foreign Affairs*, in the future the U.S. will need to strike a balance "between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done."

The nature of that adaptation is the central theme of our current issue. We kick off our discussion with best selling author Ralph Peters, who offers up a scathing indictment of our lack of seriousness in addressing the religious and ideological dimensions of the current struggle. Admiral Eric Olson, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, outlines how the vision of "balanced" warfare outlined above is being implemented by America's special operations forces. Rear Admiral (ret.) John Sigler of the National Defense University follows with his projections of what U.S. military commitments in the Middle East are likely to be in the years ahead. The George C. Marshall Institute's Jeff Kueter then explores the growing worldwide threat of ballistic missiles—and how the United States has begun erecting a strategic response to it. From there, two military experts, Stephen Sloan and Sebastian Gorka, provide a bit of historical perspective on counterinsurgency strategy, and the lessons that previous conflicts can teach us about waging what has come to be known as the "Long War." Center for International Private Enterprise president John Sullivan and two of his colleagues, Aleksandr Shkolnikov and Anna Nadgrodkiewicz, then examine "the day after" military conflict - and the political, economic and social prerequisites for lasting stability in countries emerging from war. We close with counterterrorism specialist Patrick Poole's sobering survey of the shortcomings of modern military education when it comes to understanding our current adversaries.

But that's not all. From there, we move on to examine some of the most pressing challenges now confronting America's warfighters and policymakers. Strategists Bradley Thayer and Thomas Skypek paint a grim picture of America's slow decline from nuclear supremacy, and what it portends for the future of U.S. stature and alliances abroad. Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy explains the dangers inherent in the new push for nuclear disarmament now visible in Washington and elsewhere. Military cyberwarfare expert Brian Mazanec posits how China could use cyberspace in the event of a conflict with the United States, and suggests what needs to be done in response. Former congressional staffer Mario Loyola lays out a new approach to tackling the Iranian nuclear crisis—one that leverages America's comparative advantage in

military escalation as a way of deterring and containing the Islamic Republic. Last but not least, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies explores the roots of radicalism in Pakistan's feared Inter-Services Intelligence, the agency that lies at the heart of our current problems with our "strategic partner" in South Asia.

This time, Ambassador Max Kampelman, one of the intellectual founders of the "Global Zero" movement, is our featured "Perspective" interviewee. Our regular "Dispatch" feature returns with three articles, covering Lebanon's changing political scene, Pakistan's internal contradictions, and how Montenegro is coming of geopolitical age. In closing, we offer reviews of four important books, Keith Payne's *The Great American Gamble*, *The Truth About Syria* by Barry Rubin, Bill Gertz's *The Failure Factory*, and *China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security* by Bruce MacDonald.

In his recent *Foreign Affairs* article, Secretary Gates outlined the importance of looking at a range of factors—"psychological, cultural, political, and human"—in formulating a comprehensive new approach to warfare. We hope that this issue of *The Journal* provides readers and policymakers alike with ideas about how to begin doing so.

Ilan Berman
Editor

Wishful Thinking and Indecisive Wars

Ralph Peters

The most troubling aspect of international security for the United States is not the killing power of our immediate enemies, which remains modest in historical terms, but our increasingly effete view of warfare. The greatest advantage our opponents enjoy is an uncompromising strength of will, their readiness to "pay any price and bear any burden" to hurt and humble us. As our enemies' view of what is permissible in war expands apocalyptically, our self-limiting definitions of allowable targets and acceptable casualties—hostile, civilian and our own—continue to narrow fatefully. Our enemies cannot defeat us in direct confrontations, but we appear determined to defeat ourselves.

Much has been made over the past two decades of the emergence of "asymmetric warfare," in which the ill-equipped confront the superbly armed by changing the rules of the battlefield. Yet, such irregular warfare is not new—it is warfare's oldest form, the stone against the bronze-tipped spear—and the crucial asymmetry does not lie in weaponry, but in moral courage. While our most resolute current enemies—Islamist extremists—may violate our conceptions of morality and ethics, they also are willing to sacrifice more, suffer more and kill more (even among their own kind) than we are. We become mired in the details of minor missteps, while fanatical holy warriors consecrate their lives to their ultimate vision. They live their cause, but we do not live ours. We have forgotten

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what warfare means and what it takes to win.

> The problem is religion. Our Islamist enemies are inspired by it, while we are terrified even to talk about it. We are in the unique position of denying that our enemies know what they themselves are up to.

There are multiple reasons for this American amnesia about the cost of victory. First, we, the people, have lived in unprecedented safety for so long (despite the now-faded shock of September 11, 2001) that we simply do not feel endangered; rather, we sense that what nastiness there may be in the world will always occur elsewhere and need not disturb our lifestyles. We like the *frisson* of feeling a little guilt, but resent all calls to action that require sacrifice.

Second, collective memory has effectively erased the European-sponsored horrors of the last century; yesteryear's "unthinkable" events have become, well, unthinkable. As someone born only seven years after the ovens of Auschwitz stopped smoking, I am stunned by the common notion, which prevails despite ample evidence to the contrary, that such horrors are impossible today.

Third, ending the draft resulted in a superb military, but an unknowing, detached population. The higher you go in our social caste system, the less grasp you find of the military's complexity and the greater the expectation that, when employed, our armed forces should be able to fix things promptly and politely.

Fourth, an unholy alliance between the defense industry and aca-demic theorists seduced decisionmakers with a false-messiah catechism of bloodless war. In pursuit of billions in profits, defense contractors made promises impossible to fulfill, while think tank scholars sought acclaim by designing warfare models that excited political leaders anxious to get off cheaply, but which left out factors such as the enemy, human psychology, and 5,000 years of precedents.

Fifth, we have become largely a white-collar, suburban society in which a child's bloody nose is no longer a routine part of growing up, but grounds for a lawsuit; the privileged among us have lost the sense of grit in daily life. We grow up believing that safety from harm is a right that others are bound to respect as we do. Our rising generation of political leaders assumes that, if anyone wishes to do us harm, it must be the result of a misunderstanding that can be resolved by that lethal narcotic of the chattering classes, dialogue.

Last, but not least, history is no longer taught as a serious subject in America's schools. As a result, politicians lack perspective; journalists lack meaningful touchstones; and the average person's sense of warfare has been redefined by media entertainments in which misery, if introduced, is brief.

By 1965, we had already forgotten what it took to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and the degeneration of our historical sense has continued to accelerate since then. More Americans died in one afternoon at Cold Harbor during our Civil War than died in six years in Iraq. Three times as many American troops fell during the morning of June 6, 1944, as have been lost in combat in over seven years in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, prize-hunting reporters insist that our losses in Iraq have been cata-

strophic, while those in Afghanistan are unreasonably high.

We have cheapened the idea of war. We have had wars on poverty, wars on drugs, wars on crime, economic warfare, ratings wars, campaign war chests, bride wars, and price wars in the retail sector. The problem, of course, is that none of these "wars" has anything to do with warfare as soldiers know it. Careless of language and anxious to dramatize our lives and careers, we have elevated policy initiatives, commercial spats and social rivalries to the level of humanity's most complex, decisive and vital endeavor.

One of the many disheartening results of our willful ignorance has been well-intentioned, inane claims to the effect that "war doesn't change anything" and that "war isn't the answer," that we all need to "give peace a chance." Who among us would not love to live in such a splendid world? Unfortunately, the world in which we do live remains one in which war is the primary means of resolving humanity's grandest disagreements, as well as supplying the answer to plenty of questions. As for giving peace a chance, the sentiment is nice, but it does not work when your self-appointed enemy wants to kill you. Gandhi's campaign of non-violence (often quite violent in its reality) only worked because his opponent was willing to play along. Gandhi would not have survived very long in Nazi Germany, Stalin's Russia, Mao's (or today's) China, Pol Pot's Cambodia, or Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Effective non-violence is contractual. Where the contract does not exist, Gandhi dies.

Furthermore, our expectations of war's results have become absurd. Even the best wars do not yield perfect aftermaths. World War II changed the planet for the better, yet left the eastern half of Europe under Stalin's yoke and opened the door for the Maoist takeover in China. Should we then declare it a failure and not worth fighting? Our Civil War preserved the Union and abolished slavery—worthy results, surely. Still, it took over a century for equality of opportunity for minorities to gain a firm footing. Should Lincoln have let the Confederacy go with slavery untouched, rather than choosing to fight? Expecting Iraq, Afghanistan or the conflict of tomorrow to end quickly, cleanly and neatly belongs to the realm of childhood fantasy, not human reality. Even the most successful war yields imperfect results. An insistence on prompt, ideal outcomes as the measure of victory guarantees the perception of defeat.

Consider the current bemoaning of a perceived "lack of progress" and "setbacks" in Afghanistan. A largely pre-medieval, ferociously xenophobic country that never enjoyed good government or a central power able to control all of its territory had become the hostage of a monstrous regime and a haven for terrorists. Today, Afghanistan has an elected government, feeble though it may be; for the first time in the region's history, some of the local people welcome, and most tolerate, the presence of foreign troops; women are no longer stoned to death in sports stadiums for the edification of the masses; and the most inventive terrorists of our time have been driven into remote compounds and caves. We agonize (at least in the media) over the persistence of the Taliban, unwilling to recognize that the Taliban or a similar organization will always find a constituency in remote tribal valleys and among fanatics. If we set ourselves the goal of wiping out the Taliban, we will fail.

Given a realistic mission of thrusting the Islamists to the extreme margins of society over decades, however, we can effect meaningful change (much as the Ku Klux Klan, whose following once numbered in the millions across our nation, has been reduced to a tiny club of grumps). Even now, we have already won in terms of the crucial question: Is Afghanistan a better place today for most Afghans, for the world and for us than it was on September 10, 2001? Why must we talk ourselves into defeat?

We have the power to win any war. Victory remains possible in every conflict we face today or that looms on the horizon. But, for now, we are unwilling to accept that war not only is, but must be, hell. Sadly, our enemies do not share our scruples.

The present foe

The willful ignorance within the American intelligentsia and in Washington, D.C., does not stop with the mechanics and costs of warfare, but extends to a denial of the essential qualities of our most-determined enemies. While narco-guerrillas, tribal rebels or pirates may vex us, Islamist terrorists are opponents of a far more frightening quality. These fanatics do not yet pose an existential threat to the United States, but we must recognize the profound difference between secular groups fighting for power or wealth and men whose galvanizing dream is to destroy the West. When forced to assess the latter, we take the easy way out and focus on their current capabilities, although the key to understanding them is to study their ultimate goals—no matter how absurd and unrealistic their ambitions may seem to us.

The problem is religion. Our Islamist enemies are inspired by it, while we are terrified even to talk about it. We are in the unique position of denying that our enemies know what they themselves are up to. They insist, publicly, that their goal is our destruction (or, in their mildest moods, our conversion) in their god's name. We contort ourselves to insist that their religious rhetoric is all a sham, that they are merely cynics exploiting the superstitions of the masses. Setting aside the point that a devout believer can behave cynically in his mundane actions, our phony, one-dimensional analysis of al-Qaeda and its ilk has precious little to do with the nature of our enemies—which we are desperate to deny—and everything to do with us.

We have so oversold ourselves on the notion of respect for all religions (except, of course, Christianity and Judaism) that we insist that faith cannot be a cause of atrocious violence. The notion of killing to please a deity and further his perceived agenda is so unpleasant to us that we simply pretend it away. U.S. intelligence agencies and government departments go to absurd lengths, even in classified analyses, to avoid such basic terms as "Islamist terrorist." Well, if your enemy is a terrorist and he professes to be an Islamist, it may be wise to take him at his word.

A paralyzing problem "inside the Beltway" is that our ruling class has been educated out of religious fervor. Even officials and bureaucrats who attend a church or synagogue each week no longer comprehend the life-shaking power of revelation, the transformative ecstasy of glimpsing the divine, or the exonerating communalism of living faith. Emotional displays of belief make the functional agnostic or social atheist nervous; he or she reacts with elitist disdain. Thus we insist, for our own comfort, that our enemies do not really mean

what they profess, that they are as devoid of a transcendental sense of the universe as we are.

History parades no end of killers-for-god in front of us. The procession has lasted at least five thousand years. At various times, each major faith—especially our inherently violent monotheist faiths—has engaged in religious warfare and religious terrorism. When a struggling faith finds itself under the assault of a more powerful foreign belief system, it fights: Jews against Romans, Christians against Muslims, Muslims against Christians and Jews. When faiths feel threatened, externally or internally, they fight as long as they retain critical mass. Today the Judeo-Christian/post-belief world occupies the dominant strategic position, as it has, increasingly, for the last five centuries, its rise coinciding with Islam's long descent into cultural darkness and civilizational impotence. Behind all its entertaining bravado, Islam is fighting for its life, for validation.

Islam, in other words, is on the ropes, despite no end of nonsense heralding "Eurabia" or other Muslim demographic conquests. If demography were all there was to it, China and India long since would have divided the world between them. Islam today is composed of over a billion essentially powerless human beings, many of them humiliated and furiously jealous. So Islam fights and will fight, within its meager-but-pesky capabilities. Operationally, it matters little that the failures of the Middle Eastern Islamic world are self-wrought, the disastrous results of the deterioration of a once-triumphant faith into a web of static cultures obsessed with behavior at the expense of achievement. The core world of Islam, stretching from Casablanca to the Hindu Kush, is not competitive in a single significant sphere of human endeavor (not even terrorism since, at present, we are terrorizing the terrorists). We are confronted with a historical anomaly, the public collapse of a once-great, still-proud civilization that, in the age of super-computers, cannot build a reliable automobile: enormous wealth has been squandered; human capital goes wasted; economies are dysfunctional; and the quality of life is barbaric. Those who once cowered at Islam's greatness now rule the world. The roughly one-fifth of humanity that makes up the Muslim world lacks a single world-class university of its own. The resultant rage is immeasurable; jealousy may be the greatest unacknowledged strategic factor in the world today.

When the United States is forced to go to war—or decides to go to war—it must intend to win. That means that rather than setting civilian apparatchiks to calculate minimum force levels, we need to bring every possible resource to bear from the outset—an approach that saves blood and treasure in the long run.

Embattled cultures dependably experience religious revivals: What does not work in this life will work in the next. All the deity in question asks is submission, sacrifice—and action to validate faith. Unlike the terrorists of yesteryear, who sought to change the world and hoped to live to see it changed, today's terrorists focus on god's kingdom and regard death as a promotion. We struggle to explain suicide bombers in sociological terms, deciding that they are malleable and

unhappy young people, psychologically vulnerable. But plenty of individuals in our own society are malleable, unhappy and unstable. Where are the Western atheist suicide bombers?

To make enduring progress against Islamist terrorists, we must begin by accepting that the terrorists are Islamists. And the use of the term "Islamist," rather than "Islamic," is vital—not for reasons of political correctness, but because it connotes a severe deviation from what remains, for now, mainstream Islam. We face enemies who celebrate death and who revel in bloodshed. Islamist terrorists have a closer kinship with the blood cults of the pre-Islamic Middle East—or even with the Aztecs—than they do with the *ghazis* who exploded out of the Arabian desert, ablaze with a new faith. At a time when we should be asking painful questions about why the belief persists that gods want human blood, we insist on downplaying religion's power and insisting that our new enemies are much the same as the old ones. It is as if we sought to analyze Hitler's Germany without mentioning Nazis.

We will not even accept that the struggle between Islam and the West never ceased. Even after Islam's superpower status collapsed, the European imperial era was bloodied by countless Muslim insurrections, and even the Cold War was punctuated with Islamist revivals and calls for *jihad*. The difference down the centuries was that, until recently, the West understood that this was a survival struggle and did what had to be done (the myth that insurgents of any kind usually win has no historical basis). Unfortunately for our delicate sensibilities, the age-old lesson of religion-fueled rebellions is that they must be put down with unsparing bloodshed—the fanatic's god is not interested in compromise solutions. The leading rebels or terrorists must be killed. We, on the contrary, want to make them our friends.

The paradox is that our humane approach to warfare results in unnecessary bloodshed. Had we been ruthless in the use of our overwhelming power in the early days of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the ultimate human toll—on all sides—would have been far lower. In warfare of every kind, there is an immutable law: If you are unwilling to pay the butcher's bill up front, you will pay it with compound interest in the end. Iraq was not hard; we made it so. Likewise, had we not tried to do Afghanistan on the cheap, Osama bin Laden would be dead and al-Qaeda even weaker than it is today.

When the United States is forced to go to war—or decides to go to war—it must intend to win. That means that rather than setting civilian apparatchiks to calculate minimum force levels, we need to bring every possible resource to bear from the outset—an approach that saves blood and treasure in the long run. And we must stop obsessing about our minor sins. Warfare will never be clean, soldiers will always make mistakes, and rounds will always go astray, despite our conscientious safeguards and best intentions. Instead of agonizing over a fatal mistake made by a young Marine at a roadblock, we must return to the fundamental recognition that the greatest "war crime" the United States can commit is to lose.

Other threats, new dimensions

Within the defense community, another danger looms: the risk of preparing to re-fight the last war, or, in other words, assuming that our

present struggles are the prototypes of our future ones. As someone who spent much of the 1990s arguing that the U.S. armed forces needed to prepare for irregular warfare and urban combat, I now find myself required to remind my former peers in the military that we must remain reasonably prepared for traditional threats from states.

Yet another counter-historical assumption is that states have matured beyond fighting wars with each other, that everyone would have too much to lose, that the inter-connected nature of trade makes full-scale conventional wars impossible. That is precisely the view that educated Europeans held in the first decade of the twentieth century. Even the youngish Winston Churchill, a veteran of multiple colonial conflicts, believed that general war between civilized states had become unthinkable. It had not.

Bearing in mind that, while neither party desires war, we could find ourselves tumbling, *à la* 1914, into a conflict with China, we need to remember that the apparent threat of the moment is not necessarily the deadly menace of tomorrow. It may not be China that challenges us, after all, but the unexpected rise of a dormant power. The precedent is there: in 1929, Germany had a playground military limited to 100,000 men. Ten years later, a re-armed Germany had embarked on the most destructive campaign of aggression in history, its killing power and savagery exceeding that of the Mongols. Without militarizing our economy (or indulging our unscrupulous defense industry), we must carry out rational modernization efforts within our conventional forces—even as we march through a series of special-operations-intensive fights for which there is no end in sight. We do not need to bankrupt

ourselves to do so, but must accept an era of hard choices, asking ourselves not which weapons we would like to have, but which are truly necessary.

Still, even should we make perfect acquisition decisions (an unlikely prospect, given the power of lobbyists and public relations firms serving the defense industry), that would not guarantee us victory or even a solid initial performance in a future conventional war. As with the struggle to drive terrorists into remote corners, we are limited less by our military capabilities than by our determination to pretend that war can be made innocently.

Whether faced with conventional or unconventional threats, the same deadly impulse is at work in our government and among the think tank astrologers who serve as its courtiers: An insistence on constantly narrowing the parameters of what is permissible in warfare. We are attempting to impose ever sterner restrictions on the conduct of war even as our enemies, immediate and potential, are exploring every possible means of expanding their conduct of conflicts into new realms of total war.

What is stunning about the United States is the fragility of our system. To strategically immobilize our military, you have only to successfully attack one link in the chain, our satellites. Our homeland's complex infrastructure offers ever-increasing opportunities for disruption to enemies well aware that they cannot defeat our military head-on, but who hope to wage total war asymmetrically, leapfrogging over our ships and armored divisions to make daily life so miserable for Americans that we would quit the fight. No matter that even the gravest attacks upon our homeland might, instead, re-arouse the killer spirit among Americans—

our enemies view the home front as our weak flank.

From what we know of emerging Chinese and Russian warfighting doctrine, both from their writings and their actions against third parties, their concept of the future battlefield is all-inclusive, even as we, for our part, long to isolate combatants in a post-modern version of a medieval joust. As just a few minor examples, consider Russia's and China's use of cyber-attacks to punish and even paralyze other states. We are afraid to post dummy websites for information-warfare purposes, since we have talked ourselves into warfare-by-lawyers. Meanwhile, the Chinese routinely seek to infiltrate or attack Pentagon computer networks, while Russia paralyzed Estonia through a massive cyber-blitzkrieg just a couple of years ago. Our potential enemies believe that anything that might lead to victory is permissible. We are afraid that we might get sued.

Yet, even the Chinese and Russians do not have an apocalyptic vision of warfare. They want to survive and they would be willing to let us survive, if only on their terms. But religion-driven terrorists care not for this world and its glories. If the right Islamist terrorists acquired a usable nuclear weapon, they would not hesitate to employ it (the most bewildering security analysts are those who minimize the danger should Iran acquire nuclear weapons). The most impassioned extremists among our enemies not only have no qualms about the mass extermination of unbelievers, but would be delighted to offer their god rivers of the blood of less-devout Muslims. Our fiercest enemies are in love with death.

For our part, we truly think that our enemies are kidding, that we can negotiate with them, after all, if only we could figure out which toys they really want. They pray to their god for help in cutting our throats, and we want to chat.

The killers without guns

While the essence of warfare never changes—it will always be about killing the enemy until he acquiesces in our desires or is exterminated—its topical manifestations evolve and its dimensions expand. Today, the United States and its allies will never face a lone enemy on the battlefield. There will always be a hostile third party in the fight, but one which we not only refrain from attacking but are hesitant to annoy: the media.

While this brief essay cannot undertake to analyze the psychological dysfunctions that lead many among the most privileged Westerners to attack their own civilization and those who defend it, we can acknowledge the overwhelming evidence that, to most media practitioners, our troops are always guilty (even if proven innocent), while our barbaric enemies are innocent (even if proven guilty). The phenomenon of Western and world journalists championing the "rights" and causes of blood-drenched butchers who, given the opportunity, would torture and slaughter them, disproves the notion—were any additional proof required—that human beings are rational creatures. Indeed, the passionate belief of so much of the intelligentsia that our civilization is evil and only the savage is noble looks rather like an anemic version of the self-delusions of the terrorists themselves. And, of course, there is a penalty for the intellectual's dismissal of religion: humans need to believe in something greater than themselves, even if they have a degree from Harvard. Rejecting the god of their

fathers, the neo-pagans who dominate the media serve as lackeys at the terrorists' bloody altar.

Of course, the media have shaped the outcome of conflicts for centuries, from the European wars of religion through Vietnam. More recently, though, the media have *determined* the outcomes of conflicts. While journalists and editors ultimately failed to defeat the U.S. government in Iraq, video cameras and biased reporting guaranteed that Hezbollah would survive the 2006 war with Israel and, as of this writing, they appear to have saved Hamas from destruction in Gaza.

Pretending to be impartial, the self-segregating personalities drawn to media careers overwhelmingly take a side, and that side is rarely ours. Although it seems unthinkable now, future wars may require censorship, news blackouts and, ultimately, military attacks on the partisan media. Perceiving themselves as superior beings, journalists have positioned themselves as protected-species combatants. But freedom of the press stops when its abuse kills our soldiers and strengthens our enemies. Such a view arouses disdain today, but a media establishment that has forgotten any sense of sober patriotism may find that it has become tomorrow's conventional wisdom.

The point of all this is simple: *Win*. In warfare, nothing else matters. If you cannot win clean, win dirty. But *win*. Our victories are ultimately in humanity's interests, while our failures nourish monsters.

In closing, we must dispose of one last mantra that has been too broadly and uncritically accepted: the nonsense that, if we win by fighting as fiercely as our enemies, we will "become just like them." To convince Imperial Japan of its defeat, we not only had to fire-bomb Japanese cities, but drop two atomic bombs. Did we then become like the Japanese of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Did we subsequently invade other lands with the goal of permanent conquest, enslaving their populations? Did our destruction of German cities—also necessary for victory—turn us into Nazis? Of course, you can find a few campus leftists who think so, but they have yet to reveal the location of our death camps.

We may wish reality to be otherwise, but we must deal with it as we find it. And the reality of warfare is that it is the organized endeavor at which human beings excel. Only our ability to develop and maintain cities approaches warfare in its complexity. There is simply nothing that human collectives do better (or with more enthusiasm) than fight each other. Whether we seek explanations for human bloodlust in Darwin, in our religious texts (do start with the Book of Joshua), or among the sociologists who have done irreparable damage to the poor, we finally must accept empirical reality: at least a small minority of humanity longs to harm others. The violent, like the poor, will always be with us, and we must be willing to kill those who would kill others. At present, the American view of warfare has degenerated from science to a superstition in which we try to propitiate the gods with chants and dances. We need to regain a sense of the world's reality.

Of all the enemies we face today and may face tomorrow, the most dangerous is our own wishful thinking.

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A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare

Admiral Eric T. Olson

To successfully deter and confront the global insurgency threatening the world and our nation today, the U.S. military must be able to employ a balanced approach to warfare, carefully blending the full spectrum of military, para-military and civil action to achieve success. It is an approach I refer to as "balanced warfare." It is the manner in which our nation's Special Operations Forces are combating terrorism today, and it is the guiding principle behind the Department of Defense's campaign plan to combat global terrorism.

The environment

Today, we find ourselves living in a "new normal." The world is not going to go back to the way it was before 9/11. Our national security is threatened not only by terrorists and terrorist organizations, but also by fragile states either unwilling or unable to provide for the most basic needs of their people. Further, sovereignty is not what it used to be; advances in communications, transportation and global networking continue to make borders more transparent, economies more interconnected, and information available on an unprecedented scale. The effects of this globalization create stresses on underdeveloped and developing nations and societies, which in turn create regional instability and unrest.

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As a result of our current environment, war is not what it used to be. Traditionally defined forms of warfare such as counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare and guerrilla warfare are now lumped under the umbrella term of "irregular warfare." We have commonly referred to the current conflict as the Global War on Terrorism, but this term means something else when translated into most other languages. Our current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, identified it best when he wrote recently, "What is dubbed the war on terrorism, in grim reality, is a prolonged, worldwide, irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation."[1] Regardless of how the term is defined, one thing remains constant: The type of warfare we fight on the ground is not determined by what forces we have on the ground; it is determined by our adversaries.

We need to be responsive enough to adjust rapidly to what the enemy throws at us, and we need to have the agility to transcend the spectrum of conflict. In many cases, we fight at various levels of conflict simultaneously. The ability to do this successfully requires a holistic approach to warfare, aimed at both eliminating our most determined adversaries and eroding the conditions which led to their behavior.

The strategy

The Department of Defense campaign strategy against terrorism is contained in Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 7500. Crafted at the United States Special Operations Command and approved by the Secretary of Defense—first Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and subsequently Secretary Gates—it serves as both the guiding plan within the Department of Defense and a supporting plan in the interagency environment for combating terrorism. It is supported by regional Global War on Terrorism plans crafted by each of the geographic combatant commanders around the world.

The United States Special Operations Command is uniquely suited to develop a campaign plan for what is essentially a global insurgency. Formed primarily out of U.S. Army Special Forces and Naval Special Warfare units created to combat the guerrilla and insurgent threats facing the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, the Command can draw upon the resident knowledge and institutional expertise required for counterinsurgency planning. Since the Army officially established its Special Warfare Center in 1956 for the purpose of training its servicemembers in counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare and psychological operations, the officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to these specialty areas are drawing on five decades of experience in developing the doctrine for, and conducting, insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare.

The approaches

CONPLAN 7500 provides the framework for two approaches for influencing the behavior of our adversaries: direct and indirect. While the direct approach focuses on isolating and defeating the threat, mostly through violent, kinetic actions, the indirect approach focuses on shaping and influencing the environment itself.

The direct approach consists of those efforts that disrupt violent extremist organizations—the polite way of saying capturing, killing, and

interdicting terrorists and terrorist networks to prevent them from harming us in the near term. It also denies access to and use of weapons of mass destruction by violent extremist organizations, many of which have declared their specific intent to acquire and use such weapons to kill great numbers of people in the U.S. and elsewhere. These operations are conducted largely by the military. The direct approach is urgent, necessary, chaotic and kinetic, and the effects are mostly short term.

But they are not decisive. Enduring results come from the *indirect* approaches—those in which we enable partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through training, equipment, transfer of technology, wargaming, and so forth. It consists of efforts to deter tacit and active support for violent extremist organizations where the government is either unwilling or unable to remove terrorist sanctuaries. It is the efforts to shape and stabilize the environment that impact the enemy in the longterm. This is truly "draining the swamp," rather than simply attempting to capture or kill all of the "alligators."

In a global campaign against terrorism, these two approaches are rarely mutually exclusive of one another. While the direct approach is mostly decisive in its impact, it also buys the time for the indirect approach to have its desired effect. Capturing and killing adversaries will always be necessary, but we will not kill or capture our way to victory. Nor will we talk our way to victory. The key to long-term success in a global campaign against terrorism lies in changing behavior.

From theory to practice

Although these two approaches are easily defined in theory, they are often difficult to distinguish in practice. People, units and capabilities cannot be categorized as direct or indirect in nature; only *activities* can be, and only at the time they are occurring. Oftentimes, they are intertwined and occurring simultaneously.

A great example is what most Special Operations Forces are doing on most days in Iraq—eating, living, planning, preparing, and fighting with the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. When these forces fight, they look like us, they move like us, they shoot like us; they take all of the actions at the objective that we would. Through night-vision video, it is difficult to tell them apart from us. And that, after all, is the point. The ultimate effect is the enabling of our partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves, so that eventually we can turn the operations over to them—and they will be able to control their own destiny. That intertwining happens several times a night, in several places across Iraq, and it consumes most of our force there on any given day. Disrupting violent extremist organizations has had a powerful impact in Iraq, and we are seeing a dramatic reduction of al-Qaeda's capability there.

Another example of the direct and indirect approaches to warfare can be seen in the counterinsurgency efforts being conducted by our Special Forces detachments in Afghanistan. During a recent seven-month deployment, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan, consisting of about 2,400 total personnel, conducted nearly three thousand operations where the operation was expected to be non-kinetic (with no antici-

pation of an exchange of gunfire). Additionally, its soldiers conducted over two thousand operations where they anticipated, or experienced, an exchange of gunfire, resulting in several thousand enemies killed or captured. More importantly, they also treated 50,000 local nationals in medical, dental and various other kinds of clinics. Among their various humanitarian operations, they dropped nearly a million pounds of supplies in places that would not have otherwise received aid. They established 19 local radio stations and distributed almost 8,000 radios to ensure the broadcasts could be heard. They completed a large number of construction and engineering projects, often in partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In turn, these projects, consisting of the construction of culverts, bridges, irrigation systems and schoolhouses, have had a tremendous impact on the local population.

Throughout the same period, the same task force—along with representatives from other branches of the U.S. military, various U.S. government agencies, and local Afghan security forces—employed 1,347 Afghans, and engaged heavily with the local population. In the event of a *shura* (an organized meeting of local leaders), a Special Forces A-Team Commander attended and negotiated any number of issues: "How can we help? How can we engage? What do you know that we might want to know?" During their seven-month deployment, these detachments went to such meetings more than 300 times. They also conducted less formal meetings, where, while on routine patrol, they would stop in a village and talk to the village elder. There were 950 of these meetings during the same period. A total of 1,200 engagements with local

leaders took place during the course of that deployment, and these *intertwining actions* had a powerful effect on the battlefield.

The application of the balanced approach is not limited to areas where we are engaged in armed conflict, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Our nation's Special Operations Forces are also at work applying the indirect approach to combating terrorism in several other parts of the world as well. On a typical day, the operational forces of the U.S. Special Operations Command can be found in 60 to 70 countries, primarily conducting foreign internal defense (FID) and civil affairs operations.

In the case of FID, the effort is focused on enhancing the internal security of other nations, primarily through unit-to-unit engagement and training events. These operations either involve an Army Special Forces A-team, a Navy SEAL platoon, Air Force combat aviation advisors, or a Marine special operations team working in a remote place with a handful of counterparts. For many of the partner nation units, this is the most prestigious training they will get all year, and the participants are handpicked. Very important relationship building occurs during these FID events.

Civil affairs operations, some of which occur in conjunction with FID, nation building, and humanitarian assistance missions, are different. Under the umbrella of civil affairs operations, we do not paint schools and dig wells, but we help determine which schools need to be painted and where the wells should be dug. We normally contract with local organizations to do the work so everybody benefits. This also helps empower local leaders in their efforts to provide improved governance and services.

Persistent presence

The key to success in applying the indirect approach is persistence. Building partnerships requires the development of meaningful military-to-military relationships. That effort is long-term, and the effects are enduring. This approach not only builds partner nation capacity and regional stability, but it also deters the tacit and active support of sanctuaries that foster and develop future terrorists. Again, the effect is to drain the proverbial swamps—the perceived social injustice, and the persecution and intimidation—that can feed the germs of terrorist activity.

The decisive effects of such persistent engagement can be seen in places like the Philippines, where for over five years Special Operations Forces have been advising and assisting that nation's armed forces in their successful campaign against Islamic insurgents. Even more pronounced are the effects of our nation's persistent partnership with, and military engagement in, Colombia. For over 10 years, U.S. Special Operations Forces have been advising and assisting the armed forces of Colombia in the fight against the leftist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). In recent years, the Colombian armed forces have dealt serious blows to that organization, culminating with the recent dramatic and brilliant rescue of U.S. and Colombian hostages in 2008 in an operation that was completely planned, led and conducted by Colombian forces.

Staying the course

The concepts behind balancing these direct and indirect approaches in what amounts to a global counterinsurgency effort are not new to irregular warfare. They are the product of the doctrine developed over decades by our Special Operations Forces. In a 1962 address to the U.S. Army Special Forces on the topic of what was then referred to as "special warfare," President John F. Kennedy stated:

> Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, paramilitary, and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.[2]

Regardless of the name we use—*special warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, irregular warfare*—one thing is for certain: it characterizes the nature of warfare we are experiencing, and will experience, for the foreseeable future. We must recognize that "pure military skill" will not be enough. While the ability to conduct high-end, direct action activities will always remain urgent and necessary, it is the indirect approaches, working through and with others in building a global network of partners, that will have the most decisive and enduring effects.

1. Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009.
2. John F. Kennedy, Speech to the United States Army, April 11, 1962, as reprinted in *Special Warfare: An Army Specialty* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

FUTURE FORCE PLANNING FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Rear Admiral John F. Sigler

With the Obama administration now in place, campaign promises are being kept and security strategies developed. The result over the next two years will be a significant realignment of U.S. military force posture in the Middle East. Forces will withdraw from Iraq according to a discrete timeline, and forces will be added to Afghanistan as part of a revised strategy to reverse recent Taliban gains in that nation. One strategic question, beyond the eventual outcomes in both places, is what the longer-term picture for U.S. forces will be. How many troops will be forward deployed in the region, where will they be, and for what purpose?

The posture of U.S. forces in the Middle East for the next ten to twenty years will be determined by what are essentially three considerations. The first is the enduring and evolving interests of the United States in the region, and possible challenges to them. The second is how military transformation (including issues of affordability) will affect U.S. troop basing and deployment. The third will be regional views of the United States, including the perceived contribution and impact of U.S. force presence.

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The evolution of America's Mideast presence

With the exception of the early nineteenth century Barbary Wars against North African pirates, U.S. military interests in the Middle East and particularly in the Arabian Gulf first emerged in the 1940s, just after President Franklin D. Roosevelt established a close relationship with King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud in February 1945. The end of World War II saw the United States turn from relative isolation to the acceptance of global leadership and commitments, including the rebuilding of the shattered nations and institutions of Europe and the Far East. In between lay the oil-rich lands of the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. The United States' foremost post-war peer competitor, the Soviet Union, resided just to the north of the Gulf and saw the Gulf and the North Arabian Sea as potential strategic warm water points of access. And in 1948, the State of Israel was created on a narrow strip of land along the Levant. Cumulatively, these developments defined America's interlocking post-war interests: preserving regional relationships, establishing a forward presence against Soviet encroachment, securing regional energy resources, and enforcing its commitment to the security of the fledgling state of Israel.

Representing those interests were U.S. diplomatic posts throughout the region, American corporate enterprises, especially in the energy sector, and a modest U.S. military presence, primarily naval in nature. In 1948, a number of U.S. naval task forces visited the Gulf to oversee the large number of Navy oilers and chartered tankers loading out and transporting Gulf oil. As the war-ships entered the Gulf, they became Task Force 126. By June 1949, the Task Force had become a continuous presence and was renamed the Persian Gulf Force. In August of that year the title was changed to the Middle East Force. The Middle East Force was a permanent command structure with a continuous presence of four to five ships, including a flagship and navy rear admiral in command. The admiral and his staff were the primary face of the U.S. military presence in the region, while the ambassadors and their embassies were the diplomatic face. Along with the defense attachés, Marine guards and security assistance officers[1] assigned to the embassies, the U.S. military presence on a given day, over the next three decades, would vary from approximately 1,000 to 2,000 people.

Interestingly, these numbers did not vary appreciably during periods of regional instability such as the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948-9, 1956, 1967 and 1973-4. But the fall of the Shah of Iran in the late 1970s, and the ensuing 444-day hostage crisis, ushered in a new era, with U.S. military planners recognizing the need for a contingency force able to go quickly to any hot spot anywhere in the world. In response, the Carter administration established the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The RDF, however, was an ad hoc force, as well as primarily an Army command, and by 1980 two elements became clear to the Pentagon: the RDF needed to become a joint task force comprising units from all of the services, and its focus was increasingly becoming the Middle East. In 1980, the RDF became the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and by 1982 it was recognized that the RDJTF had become a *de facto* unified command.

At midnight on January 1, 1983, the United States Central Command was formally established, with contingency response and engagement responsibility for the Horn of Africa, the Middle East (excluding Israel, Syria and Lebanon, which remained in the European Command), Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Command has expanded somewhat over the years, to include Lebanon, Syria and the five Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.

Central Command's structure departed from that of the other combatant commands in two important ways: the headquarters was not in its assigned region, but rather resided at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, and it had no permanently assigned forces. Its forces in case of contingency flowed from the United States as well as from other theaters. Central Command has been extremely busy; in its twenty-six years, it has had to respond to twenty-four significant contingencies, including two wars today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, it continuously engages with regional governments and forces in a wide range of activities termed "theater security cooperation."

Post-Cold War engagements

The effect on U.S. force presence in the Middle East since the establishment of Central Command and its nearly continuous response to contingencies has been dramatic. From the 1,000-2,000 personnel "in theater" on any given day the numbers rose to 5,000 during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and concurrent 1978-1989 Soviet war against the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. These additional forces included an increased naval presence to help protect commercial shipping threatened by the Iran-Iraq war as well as some ground units to provide additional assurance to friendly regimes in the region.

Of course, the largest U.S. commitment to the region occurred in 1990, when Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait. Thus began Operation Desert Shield, the pre-combat phase designed to prepare for ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, while simultaneously protecting Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states from attack. The build-up of forces during Desert Shield resulted in 543,000 troops present in theater to fight the ensuing war, Desert Storm. An important element of Desert Shield/Storm (and that will likely be a factor in all future major contingencies) was the incorporation of a coalition force of 34 nations into the U.S. war plan. Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, with a massive air campaign followed by a devastating 100-hour ground campaign that ended the war and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait of February 27, 1991.

Following victory over Saddam Hussein's regime, the United States and its coalition partners quickly and sharply reduced their force levels. In the case of the United States, however, the numbers did not return to pre-war levels, primarily due a continuing threat of additional adventurism by Saddam and a U.S. policy called "Dual Containment," designed to keep both Iraq and Iran in check. A major element of dual containment was the enforcement, primarily by military forces, of a number of United Nations sanctions that had been imposed by the international community against both countries over the years.

The post-war U.S force levels settled down to 17,000-24,000 troops in the region on any given day. Of the

four significant activities account-ing for the bulk of these forces, three were dedicated to UN Secu-rity Council sanction enforcement: Operations Northern and Southern Watch (ONW/OSW) and Maritime Interception Operations (MIO). Northern and Southern Watch con-sisted of around-the-clock air patrols by land-based air forces of the U.S. and the UK as well as by carrier-based naval aircraft. Their primary mission was to enforce no-fly zones established by Security Council res-olutions to prevent Iraqi government attacks on its Kurdish populations to the north and Shi'a populations to the south. They additionally pro-vided real-time monitoring of troop movements and other activities of the Ba'athist regime. Coalition naval forces also closely monitored Gulf shipping and intercepted/inspected those vessels suspected of smug-gling oil and goods from and to Iraq by the sanctions regime. The fourth major activity was an ongoing exer-cise with the armed forces of Kuwait, called Desert Spring, a brigade-sized operation of about 3,000 standing troops augmented by 2,000-3,000 rotationally deployed personnel. The dual purpose was to ensure high combat readiness by the Kuwaitis and to have a deterrent force in place against a possible repeat offensive by Saddam.

In addition to the above forces, America's daily presence in the region included about 75 bilateral and multi-lateral exercises per year, enhanced security assistance activities, mili-tary-to-military personnel exchanges and the establishment of additional bilateral and multilateral security mechanisms such as demining and disaster response. One last feature of this period, which continues to this day and will be part of the future

equation, was the pre-positioning afloat and at land-based sites of large stocks of military equipment and con-sumables. These stocks allow for far more rapid contingency response, as large numbers of troops can be quickly airlifted in to marry up with their equipment, the bulk of which would otherwise have to be shipped to theater over several weeks.

The 17,000-24,000 force level lasted through the 1990s with a slight bump upwards about once a year as Saddam would move troops in a threatening way or make a verbal threat that would cause coalition forces to increase their alert levels. Dual containment essentially ended as a policy in late 1998, when the U.S. declared that it would no longer put up with these provocations. The response, Operation Desert Fox, was a combined U.S.–UK operation against the Iraqi regime and weapons of mass destruction targets waged over a three-day period in December 1998, utilizing in-place forces.

The next major change in force levels came in 2001, following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. Since those attacks had, in part, been engineered by al-Qaeda leadership operating out of Taliban-governed Afghanistan, the United States first tried to negotiate al-Qaeda's expulsion. When the Tal-iban refused to cooperate, and given the extraordinarily repressive nature of their regime, the decision was made to carry out Operation Enduring Free-dom to root out terrorists and replace the regime there. A coalition force of about 20,000, including approximately 18,000 Americans, was involved in this effort. Additionally, 47,000 troops from 40 nations, including 17,000 more Americans, are now involved in stabil-ity operations under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

U.S. Forces in the Middle East & Central Asia		
		Troop Levels
1940s–1970s	Protection of U.S. interests	1,000-2,000
1980s	Iran-Iraq war, Soviets in Afghanistan	5,000
1990-1991	Desert Shield/Storm	500,000
1990s	Dual Containment	17,000-24,000
2001-2008	Afghanistan/Iraq	300,000

The war in Afghanistan brought U.S. Middle East force levels up to about 55,000 troops. Soon thereafter, in March 2003, the United States and the UK, along with small contingents from several other nations, conducted Operation Iraqi Liberation [later renamed Operation Iraqi Freedom], designed primarily to overthrow the Ba'athist regime as a means of ending Saddam's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, including (it was thought) a major nuclear weapons program. Approximately 248,000 American soldiers and Marines, along with about 49,000 Coalition partners, were deployed to the Middle East to execute the operation. The actual invasion force was about 12,000 less, due to a Turkish decision not to let U.S. forces invade along a northern front via their territory. These two operations continue with total presence in the neighborhood of 300,000 since 2003. The so-called "surge" added about 30,000 in 2008; these forces, however, are in the process of being withdrawn.

In the near term, we can expect a steady withdrawal from Iraq of all U.S. and Coalition combat forces, to be completed within 16 to 22 months. About one-third to one-half of the current 140,000 troops will leave, with the remainder reassigned to training and support missions for an undetermined time into the future. Concurrently, there will be a build-up of combat forces in Afghanistan from the cur-

rent level of approximately 35,000 to as many as 60,000. President Obama's decisions concerning both the Iraq withdrawals and Afghanistan additions are reportedly pending.

Planning ahead

The question, then, is what happens next? What numbers are we likely to put in the last column when the bulk of troops and all but stabilization forces are withdrawn?

If instabilities do not rise to a level requiring a major U.S. or international response, we could assume that the United States will be able to return to a posture in the region similar to the one that characterized the 1940s through the 1970s. The unfortunate reality, however, is that the greater Middle East in recent decades has seen at least one (often several) major destabilizing event every decade, from the fall of the Shah of Iran to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Possible future contingencies that would result in an upward excursion from the baseline are—also unfortunately—numerous. Indeed, policymakers in the region and the United States should worry about at least seven potential scenarios:

- The overthrow of one or more moderate regimes;

- Major state failure in or adjacent to the region;

- The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction;

- A regional environmental and/or humanitarian disaster;

- A major terrorist attack in the region, or outside it but emanating from the Middle East;

- Conflict arising from failure to establish a durable Middle East peace; and

- Major-power conflict over energy resources.

While the probability of any one of these events (and others not listed) will occur is variable, history suggests the potential for at least one to take place in the next ten to twenty years is high. A recognition of this state of affairs plays a large part in how the U.S. structures its security capabilities in, and strategy toward, the region.

The United States' Cold War military capabilities were characterized and shaped by peer competition with the Soviet Union. The ability to deter major global war and, should deterrence fail, prevail against a formidable but reasonably quantifiable adversary dictated U.S. force structure and posture for five decades. Although, thankfully, that war never occurred, U.S. forces fought in a number of lesser contingencies with the forces designed and postured for the global scenario. Following the demise of the Cold War, a predicted "peace dividend" evaporated as regional contingencies, perhaps no longer held in check by the superpower competition, became the order of the day. Central Command's response in the last years of the Cold War and after, noted earlier, provides ample example of the emergent secu-

rity environment. Force structure and posture also became a more complex equation, as forces were designed to deter and prevail against less quantifiable enemies.

Toward the end of the twentieth century, two major complications arose: state-sponsored transnational terrorism and non-state actors capable of significant conventional and unconventional warfare. The new reality became painfully evident when al-Qaeda operatives attacked the U.S. homeland in 2001. As a result, the challenge has become how to deal with a wide range of potential adversaries. What kind of capabilities are required now and beyond?

The United States used to postulate the advantage of asymmetric warfare as the ability of a large well-equipped, trained and connected force to prevail no matter what was thrown at it. In a tactical sense, that is usually still the case, but an element of the new environment is asymmetric strategy. The very cornerstone of U.S. military strategy—"deter, and should deterrence fail, prevail"—is being challenged. Prevail has always implied winning the nation's wars. Now, and for some future period (likely to include twenty years or more) at least some of the adversaries the U.S. and its allies and friends may face do not need to win in combat to achieve their strategic objectives.

An additional challenge for defense policy has been the affordability of new weapons systems required to keep the asymmetric edge in a potential conflict. A good example is the unit cost of new naval vessels. In the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy came within two ships of a "six-hundred ship" fleet at less cost than that required to build a force of less than half that size today. And while the newer ships are far more capable

than those they replaced, it is still true that a ship can only be in one place at one time—something that is particularly problematic in a diffuse security environment. In the same vein, the costs of equipment, personnel and operations have risen steeply for all of the services.

In response to these increased costs, as well as to the prevalence of a less identifiable enemy, the U.S. government has embarked upon a process of "military transformation." All of the institutions of the Department of Defense—from business practices to force structure and employment—have come under scrutiny, as the United States attempts to build an affordable force that can protect the nation's interests and can fight not only the next war, but those that will follow in an unpredictable future. Transformation can be characterized by an artful combination of both evolutionary and revolutionary approaches to the entire spectrum of Department of Defense operations in peace and war. Although it was closely associated with the Bush administration, in large part because of its public visibility during the tenure of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, military transformation is in truth an ongoing fact of life for the U.S. armed forces. The six goals currently enumerated for "transformation" are:

- To protect the U.S. homeland and American bases overseas;

- To project and sustain power in distant theaters;

- To deny enemies sanctuary;

- To protect U.S. information networks from attack;

- To use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so they can fight jointly; and

- To maintain unhindered access to space.[2]

In fulfillment of these objectives, forces are to be capable of projecting force over long distance, rapidly deployable, capable of fully integrated joint operations and capable of reaching distant theaters rapidly. At the same time, they are to be bolstered by improved intelligence, long-range precision strike capabilities, and sea-based platforms.[3] A recurring theme in this view of transformation is that there will be far less forward basing in the future, and that U.S.-based forces will be given the tools to operate quickly anywhere in the world.

The requirements for transformation are also evolving. The June 2008 *National Defense Strategy* adds two key elements to the existing mission set of the U.S. armed forces. The first is the requirement for U.S. military capabilities to be seamlessly coordinated with the other agencies and elements of U.S. national power. The second is the recognition that the U.S. will need to coordinate its capabilities and activities with the international community of nations with intersecting interests.[4]

The bottom line

The central questions preoccupying U.S. military force planners are how these transformed forces will be postured in the Middle East ten to twenty years hence, what will their likely numbers be, where will they be located and what will they be doing?

The best answer is that, under the given assumptions, the period in

question will look most like the years between Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Liberation. The enduring interests of that period—unfettered global access to energy resources and regional stability, including the security of Israel—will continue. A potential source of instability will be still young and relatively fragile democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Replacing the ongoing threat posed by Saddam Hussein will be that of sub-state actors like al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Hezbollah. Iran could continue on a slow pace of reform but, absent other externalities, will continue to compete for regional hegemony. Both China and India will be more actively engaged in the region as their growing economies demand greater energy resources. And although Pakistan is outside of the area, events in that nation will continue to influence the region.

During the 1990s, the four pillars of U.S. strategy were *assuring* our partners and friends of our support; *dissuading* friends and adversaries alike from behavior counter to stability; *deterring* enemies from attacking U.S. and friendly interests; and, should deterrence fail, *prevailing* in combat. While they may have somewhat different titles in the future, America's goals are likely to be the same. The strategy will, however, be overlaid by transformation, which means that more of the troops dedicated to the pillars will be home-based in the United States, ready to deploy quickly. The so-called Long War against transnational terrorists and their support systems will continue.[5] Forces similar in numbers to those dedicated to Operations Northern and Southern Watch, Exercise Desert Spring and Maritime Intercept Operations will be dedicated both to the long war and the important adjunct of that war: supporting the democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Strengthening the capabilities of potential coalition partners and the ability of U.S. forces to operate with them on short notice will require continuation of robust theater security cooperation programs. These will include a significant number of bilateral and multilateral exercises, security assistance in weapons systems and training, and military-to-military exchanges at all levels to ensure better understanding and interoperability. Collective security arrangements will be strengthened where possible (for example, in the form of shared early warning regimes and integrated missile defense systems).

Finally, although transformed U.S. forces will be able to strike and be rapidly deployable from long distances, ground forces will need to be able to have places to go and from which to operate beyond sea-basing. Further, heavy ground forces will need to have significant amounts of equipment and material prepositioned either afloat or ashore. Based on the experience with Turkey during Operation Iraqi Liberation, access agreements will need to be diversified. A key approach to the access and basing challenge will be the negotiation for the establishment of significant numbers of "warm bases" throughout the region and in neighboring countries. These will be bases that will not have U.S. troops permanently assigned, beyond a small number of liaison officers, but which will be kept at, or are capable of being rapidly brought up to, U.S. standards for operations. Beyond contingency response, these warm bases should prove valuable for the host nation for their own forces, for exercise use and as a way to minimize the cultural impact of the stationing of foreign troops in their territory.

When all of the ongoing (e.g., stabilization forces) and rotational operational forces (for example, routine naval deployments), security assistance personnel, prepositioning and warm-basing liaison personnel and a standing force joint headquarters are added up, the notional numbers of troops on a given day is approximately 12,000, dispersed throughout the Middle East.[6] But such a number is simply an estimated baseline. If Middle Eastern history is any indication, wild card events will cause potentially major expansions in U.S. troop levels in the years ahead.

1. Security Assistance Officers are the Department of Defense's representatives in each nation for coordination of a wide range of support to the nation's military, from arms sales to military training.
2. Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks before the National Defense University, Washington, DC, January 31, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183.
3. Ibid.
4. *National Defense Strategy*, U.S. Department of Defense, June 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf.
5. Ibid.
6. The numbers represent an average of 5,000 personnel afloat, 500 security assistance and embassy personnel, forward headquarters (including the Navy in Bahrain and a standing joint force) of approximately 500, about 200 liaison officers for warm and prepositioning bases, and approximately 6,000-7,000 operational personnel conducting Long War and stabilization operations.

how

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THE MISSILE DEFENSE MISSION

Jeff Kueter

Today, the United States has unquestioned dominance on the modern battlefield. The integration of real-time communications, navigation, and overhead surveillance in support of tactical operations, the expanded use of precision-guided, stand-off munitions, the superiority of airpower, and many other capabilities all provide the U.S. with warfighting advantages not possessed by any other nation—namely, the ability to direct overwhelming force to precise points quickly and with high probability of survival of the attacking force. These same capabilities, however, have caused adversaries of the United States to shift their strategies and their choice of weapons. A key trend in this regard is the pursuit of weapons that place U.S. assets at risk and increase the costs of confrontation to unacceptable levels—ballistic missiles chief among them.

The technology is certainly not new. The first ballistic missiles were used by the Germans during World War II. Carrying conventional munitions, the German missiles attempted to compensate for the loss of their airpower and incite terror in the minds of the British population. The marriage of missiles with nuclear warheads by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, however, greatly expanded their lethality and strategic importance. Now capable of delivering nuclear munitions to points throughout the globe with virtually no warning, no chance of return, and no defense, the nuclear-

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armed ballistic missile fundamentally restructured the geopolitical security environment. Concepts of deterrence emerged as leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union struggled to preserve their own security amidst the prospect of global annihilation. As the Cold War ended, new security challenges replaced strategic nuclear competition, and the proliferation of missile technology complicated those challenges.

As more nations acquire ballistic missile capabilities, the role of defenses against missile attacks is also changing. Throughout the Cold War, discussions over the feasibility of defenses invariably became debates over the effectiveness of deterrence.[1] Critics claimed defenses would destabilize the prevailing condition of mutual insecurity. If one superpower came to believe that the other could protect itself from attack, then the other was vulnerable and more prone to take offensive risks. In the post-Cold War era, these concepts may no longer apply. Whether U.S. nuclear forces can deter nations such as Iran or North Korea remains a hotly contested question in contemporary security debates. And as more nations acquire ballistic missile capability, the potential for their accidental or intentional use grows.

Ballistic missiles in modern warfare

Writing in 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, better known as the Rumsfeld Commission, offered a compelling summary of the utility of ballistic missiles in modern warfare. It noted that:

> Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical environment and the roles of ballistic missiles and weap-

ons of mass destruction have both evolved. Ballistic missiles provide a cost-effective delivery system that can be used for both conventional and non-conventional weapons. For those seeking to thwart the projection of U.S. power, the capability to combine ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction provides a strategic counter to U.S. conventional and information-based military superiority. With such weapons, these nations can pose a serious threat to the United States, to its forward-based forces and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies.

> Whether short or long range, a successfully launched ballistic missile has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target compared to other means of delivery. Emerging powers therefore see ballistic missiles as highly effective deterrent weapons and as an effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the United States.[2]

Strategic competitors of the United States are still investing heavily in these technologies. Russia maintains an impressive and technically sophisticated arsenal of missiles and nuclear capabilities and, recognizing the significance of the nuclear arsenal to its geopolitical influence, Russian President Medvedev recently announced an aggressive plan to completely overhaul Russian nuclear forces by 2020.[3] China's nuclear arsenal is smaller than that of Russia, but growing in both size and capability. To that end, estimates suggest China's forces may soon grow into "a smaller version of the former Soviet threat."[4]

In large measure, these capabilities are oriented against the United States. The superiority of U.S. conventional forces on the battlefield has

accelerated the embrace of missile technologies by peer competitors. The relative immaturity of current defensive capabilities, coupled with the superior firepower of the missile platform, makes them an appealing weapon system. Thus, China is investing in new missile technologies to check U.S. involvement in a future conflict over Taiwan. In particular, Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles have raised alarms among U.S. policymakers because of their apparent purpose to destroy American aircraft carriers. According to the Pentagon's 2008 report on Chinese military power:

> China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile as a component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is a key component of China's anti-access strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances.[5]

Reports suggest these capabilities will become operational in 2009.[6] Carrier-killing missiles would greatly complicate U.S. actions to defend Taiwan or other areas, where the projection of carrier-borne airpower is often among the first military responses to a region of crisis.

Other adversaries are pursuing missiles for similar ends. Following a recent test launch of a long-range missile, Gen. Hossein Salami, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard ground forces, was reported as saying, "We want to tell the world that those who conduct their foreign policy by using the language of threat against Iran have to know that our finger is always on the trigger and we have hundreds even thousands of missiles ready to be fired against predetermined targets."[7] Similar statements emanate from North Korea. Both, like Iraq before them, are using their missile arsenals to deter and retaliate against regional foes and U.S. forces in the region. Commenting on the same test, the Islamic Republic News Agency said the Iranian missiles "were tested to demonstrate Iran's capability in hitting its enemies accurately at the early stages of their probable attacks …."[8]

In the years ahead, ballistic missiles will remain instruments of coercive power. They deter potential adversaries and enable retaliation or preemptive strikes without the need to develop an air force or gaining air superiority. They allow the attacker to strike targets of varying ranges with a high degree of accuracy and enormous lethality, whether nuclear or conventionally armed. Not surprisingly, then, more and more nations seek to acquire them.

A growing worldwide threat

The drawdown in missile arsenals by the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia may have reduced the total of ballistic missiles worldwide since the end of the Cold War, but the number of countries fielding some type of ballistic missile capability has increased substantially. Today, some 28 countries are estimated to be capable of fielding ballistic missiles of various varieties.[9] Part of this increase is attributable to the Soviet Union's fragmentation into many independent states, some of which (e.g., Belarus and Kazakhstan) maintained the arsenals stationed on their territories during Soviet times.

Yet, many countries, particularly in the Middle East, are also acquiring longer-range and more powerful missiles through indigenous development or purchase from China, Russia, and North Korea.

China is one of five nations with intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities (ranges over 5,500 kilometers), but short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) constitute the majority of Beijing's force. The operational SRBM arsenal includes the CSS-6, 7, and 8 missiles. The CSS-6 and CSS-7 are solid-fueled, road-mobile missiles, carrying payloads of up to 500 kilograms while traveling 600 and 300 km, respectively.[10] China's medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) forces are primarily focused on deterring Russian interference in the Pacific Rim and exerting regional influence. These missiles are capable of striking Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea.[11]

China's ICBMs can strike the United States, but it is developing new capabilities as well. Approximately twenty CSS-4 liquid-fueled missiles are estimated to reside in silos throughout China. This missile has a 13,000-km range and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.[12] Additionally, Beijing is working on three ICBM development projects: the CSS-9, *Julang-2* SLBM, and CSS-X-10. The CSS-9 will add a road-mobile component to the current silo-based force, which will eventually match the CSS-4's range. Current estimates suggest the *Julang-2* will be deployed on Type 094 submarines before 2011; its range of 8,000 kilometers will allow Beijing to target the United States from sea-based platforms near the Chinese mainland for the first time.[13] The solid-fueled CSS-X-10's fully operational deployment is also expected this decade, at which time it will become the centerpiece of Beijing's nuclear strike force.[14]

The Russian Federation inherited the Soviet Union's ballistic missile program, including a wide array of SRBM and ICBM capabilities. Russia recently completed testing on the *Iskander* SRBM with a 300-kilometer range and payload capacity of 480 kilograms. When the *Iskander* becomes operational, Russia plans to export it to Belarus, Iran, and Syria as well as use it to upgrade its own SRBM forces.[15]

Russia's advanced ICBM program has solid- and liquid-fueled missiles including some with submarine launch capabilities. The SS-27 *Topol-M* is Russia's principal long-range missile development program, and is quickly replacing the SS-18 *Satan* as Russia's top ICBM. Though it lacks the *Satan's* payload capacity (1,200 kilograms), the *Topol-M* can be outfitted with MIRV technology.[16] Deployment of the *Topol-M* began in 2008.[17]

SLBM capabilities are provided by the SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 *Sineva*. The Russian military is developing a SLBM-version of the *Topol-M* called the SS-N-27 *Bulava*. Once fully operational, the *Bulava* will extend Russia's SLBM range to 10,000 km while carrying ten or more MIRV warheads.[18]

North Korea not only poses a threat to U.S. interests and allies in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, but to the continental U.S. itself. Its role as a key cog in the international marketplace for missile technology lends it additional importance. On July 4, 2006, North Korea tested the *Taepo Dong 2*, with the capability of hitting the west coast of the U.S. (3,500-5,500-kilometer range).[19] Despite the missile's failure

40 seconds after launch, U.S. officials say, "North Korea's engineers probably learned enough to make modifications, not only to its long-range ballistic missiles, but also to its shorter-range systems."[20] As of this writing, North Korea reportedly is preparing for another round of missile tests.

North Korea possesses an increasingly capable arsenal of SRBMs and MRBMs in addition to its *Taepo Dong 2* program. Its short-range ballistic missiles are variants on the basic SCUD design. It purchased approximately 100 *Hwasong 5* (300-kilometer range) road-mobile SCUD-B missiles and indigenously produced around 100 *Hwasong 6* and *7* (500- and 700-kilometer ranges, respectively) missiles.[21] The *Hwasong 6* and *7*s give Pyongyang the ability to "bombard all targets in South Korea critical to a Communist invasion."[22]

North Korea's operational medium-range *No Dong* (1,300-kilometer range) missiles are single-stage, liquid-fueled missiles derived from SCUD technology. *No Dong* research and development in the 1980s produced the *Taepo Dong* programs. The *Taepo Dong 1* is a medium-range missile (1,500-2,000-kilometer range) carrying a 1,000-1,500-kilogram warhead to target. Pyongyang tested the *Taepo Dong 1* over the Sea of Japan on August 31, 1998, generating a political firestorm in Japan and the U.S.[23] In total, North Korea is estimated to have deployed at least 750 ballistic missiles, including between 600-800 SCUDs, 150-2,000 *No Dongs*, and 10-20 *Taepo Dong 1s*.[24]

Iran has the largest force of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, comprising several hundred SRBMs and MRBMs.[25] Its short-range capabilities were developed indigenously and with assistance from China, Russia, and, especially, North Korea.[26] The short-range arsenal includes the *Shahab-1* (SCUD-B variant), *Shahab-2* (SCUD-C variant), M-9 and M-11, and the *Fatah* A-1000 (*Zelzal* variant). The *Shahab-1* and *Shahab-2* are the most advanced of the group, with range capabilities of 300 and 700 kilometers and maximum payloads of 1,000 and 700 kilograms, respectively.[27]

Iran has made considerable progress with its *Shahab-3* MRBM program, a derivative of the North Korean *No Dong-1*. It was first deployed in June 2003, but by May 2005, Iran had successfully tested a solid-fuel *Shahab-3* and expanded its range to 2,000 kilometers, providing Iran with the capability to strike Israel, Turkey, and American forces stationed in the Middle East.[28]

More importantly, the U.S. intelligence community estimates that Iran might acquire ICBM capabilities by 2015, conditional on access to foreign technology from North Korea and/or Russia.[29] The ICBM work is closely related to Iran's space program, which successfully placed a satellite into orbit in February 2009.[30]

Pakistan and Syria are the other most commonly cited missile proliferators that might pose a threat to the United States. With a focus on their regions, their missile arsenals are filled with SRBM and MRBM missiles largely derived from the SCUD. Outside of the NATO countries, India and Israel also have active missile development programs.

Toward twenty-first century defense

In December 2002, President Bush set the United States on course to defend against these threats. In doing so, his administration laid out plans for a "modest" defense against

the rogue state ballistic missile threat (North Korea and Iran), available for limited defensive missions, beginning in 2004.[31] These efforts were clearly considered just a starting point for the development and eventual deployment of improved and expanded capabilities in the years ahead. The Bush administration's program, while free from the constraints of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) from which he withdrew the U.S. in 2002, pushed forward the missile defenses which were most mature at the time the political decision to move ahead was made.

The resulting layered defense was made up of individual interception systems linked by a communications and sensor network. There is no single missile defense system, but instead a "system of systems" designed to be interoperable and geared toward one or more of the three phases of ballistic missile flight.

Currently, the U.S. is nearing the goal of 30 ground-based midcourse interceptors (GMD) in missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Eighteen *Aegis* ships are equipped with the long-range surveillance and tracking capabilities needed to perform ballistic missile defense missions and are armed with 60 Standard Missile Three (SM-3) midcourse and SM-2 terminal phase interceptors. The *Patriot* PAC-3 terminal defensive system is complete. The Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom, the Cobra Dane radar, the Sea-Based X-Band radar, and the forward-based transportable X-Band radar are in service, and communications and battle management systems and software linking the whole system are under development. Together, these technologies offer a rudimentary but incomplete defense capable of attempting interceptions in the midcourse and terminal phases of flight.

As these systems move from their research and development phases to operational deployment, the warfighter is more engaged in planning for use of missile defenses in combat. Tests of the *Aegis* and GMD systems are run by active-duty sailors and soldiers, as was the February 2008 destruction of a de-orbiting intelligence satellite with *Aegis* BMD assets. Operational use of the *Patriot* and PAC-3 systems during the Iraqi conflicts offered insights into how missile defenses operate during wartime environments. Together these experiences, combined with analytical work on concepts of operation, offer illustrations for how missile defenses will be used.

Yet these capabilities are still relatively modest. The defense deployed by President Bush during his tenure is designed overwhelmingly to address the threats posed by North Korea and Iran; nations with relatively small missile arsenals of presently limited, but growing, sophistication. Current budgeting will certainly help to improve the quantitative capabilities of the current missile defense architecture; the U.S. will purchase more GMD, THAAD, or SM-3 interceptors, outfit more *Aegis* vessels with BMD capabilities, and expand the number of sensors or radars. But for those seeking a truly global defense against missile threats of growing number and sophistication, it is clear that a new approach is needed.

The reasons are clear. The ballistic missile will remain an instrument of power for the foreseeable future. Designing effective defenses to protect the American people, our friends and allies abroad and our deployed military forces is important, not only for the lives such defenses can save,

but also because their mere existence discourages others from using their offensive weaponry. If defenses are not seen as credible, if they fail to keep pace with the size and capability of the threat, they will provide little more than a false sense of protection. Missile arsenals are increasing in size and sophistication. New challengers will emerge, and old challengers may return. U.S. policy, programs, and budgets must recognize these facts, and embrace the need for quantitative and qualitative improvements to missile defense.

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CONTEXTUALIZING COUNTERINSURGENCY

——— Stephen Sloan & Sebastian L. v. Gorka ———

Afew days before Christmas in 2007, on the day the Pentagon bade farewell to Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense launched its new field manual on counterinsurgency (COIN). Incredibly, the field manual had been written in just thirteen months, often with the input of officers who were actually in theater fighting at the time. In the first month after its release, FM 3-24: *Counterinsurgency*, was downloaded more than 1.5 million times from Army and Marine Corps websites, reviewed on extremist Salafi websites and later even found in Taliban camps in Pakistan. This unclassified document has since then become one of the key tools in what, since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, was rechristened "The Long War."

In the months before and since, there has been an upsurge in specialist articles by strategists and historians, as well as commentary on weblogs from those actually fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, all debating the merits of FM 3-24 and the various extant counterinsurgency theories and case studies. The U.S. government even established a dedicated website (http://www.usgcoin.org/index.

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cfm) to document and discuss the question of counterinsurgency.

The rediscovery and widespread acceptance of what had for decades been the doctrinal "black sheep" led several strategists and authors to not only embrace counterinsurgency's rebirth in the Central Asian and Middle Eastern contexts, but to see in it the answer to our challenge of defeating al-Qaeda globally. Today, despite a healthy debate over how well the new, revised doctrine will serve U.S. national security interests in the post-9/11 strategic environment and how it should inform a global doctrine, certain fundamental questions remain—questions which go beyond the merits of any individual doctrinal document.

How does insurgency and counterinsurgency relate to the higher strategic activity of waging global war? Is the "Long War" truly just another iteration of counterinsurgency, but in this case applied globally? Just how applicable is "classical" COIN theory to the struggle with globally dispersed terrorism that is religiously informed? Can other, less examined/forgotten conflicts illuminate the nature of the current confrontation?

The nature of the threat

The first problem is one of definition. Although some seven-and-a-half years have elapsed since the events of September 11th, there still exists considerable disagreement over who, or what, we are fighting. Writing the day after the attacks on Washington and New York, the influential columnist Charles Krauthammer defined the threat as an "existential" one:

> We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era. It will henceforth be known as

the age of terrorism. Organized terror has shown what it can do: execute the single greatest massacre in American history, shut down the greatest power on the globe and send its leaders into underground shelters. All this, without even resorting to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction.[1]

Yet, in its official response, the White House did not declare war just on al-Qaeda but on terrorism itself. President Bush was unequivocal. "Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there," he told a joint session of Congress just nine days after the attacks. "It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."[2] This is how we arrived at the term Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

However, during its tenure, even the Bush administration was not consistent in its use of this term. All too often, President Bush also referred to the enemy as being *militant jihadism and Islamofascism*, not just al-Qaeda or terrorism itself.[3] And, with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the consequent eruption of sectarian violence there, administration thinking undertook another evolution: toward the idea of al-Qaeda as an insurgency.

America's military response to this development, in the form of counterinsurgency, has lagged far behind. As one study of the subject by the prestigious RAND Corporation noted in 2007:

> The U.S. response to this pattern of insurgency has stressed (1) new bureaucratic layers, e.g., the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, that seem to have improved neither

analysis nor decisionmaking; (2) increased investment in military platforms, which are of marginal utility against a diffuse and elusive insurgency; and (3) the use of force, which may validate the jihadist argument, producing more *jihadis* and inspiring new martyrs. What has been missing is a systematic attempt to identify and meet critical analytical, planning, and operational decisionmaking needs for global COIN, exploiting revolutionary progress in information networking. *Consequently, U.S. COIN has been as clumsy as the new insurgency has been cunning.*[4] (emphasis added)

Intellectual blinders

The rediscovery of counterinsurgency theory[5] following the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq led scholars and officials to revisit case studies and doctrinal texts on the subject long overlooked by politics and fashion. Speaking on the day of FM 3-24's official release, one of its contributing editors, Col. John Nagl, made it clear that it was the negative political backlash to Vietnam that made the U.S. Army willingly forget and distance itself from all that it had learned in Indo-China about unconventional warfare during the 1960s and 1970s.[6] Since then, however, we have seen the wholesale return of serving officers and strategists to the study of classic texts on previous insurgencies, foremost among them Callwell on 'small wars,' Frank E. Kitson on Northern Ireland, Roger Trinquier and David Galula on the French experience in Algeria, as well as Robert Taber's original *War of the Flea* and of course the works of T. E. Lawrence (of Arabia), in an effort to relearn that which we once knew.

Drawing on these classic texts and today's fresh interpretations of them, it is relatively easy to compile a set of classic COIN do's and don'ts. (see Table 1). Nevertheless, two surprising facts remain. Firstly,

Table 1

Classic Tenets of Counterinsurgency
Unity of effort—integrated employment of political, military, economic, social and psychological countermeasures
Win the "hearts and minds" of the population (W.H.A.M.)
Gain greater credibility than the insurgent—legitimacy is the main objective
Deny insurgents' sanctuary
Police primacy
Focus on intelligence
Selective and discriminate use of force
Avoid overreaction to insurgent violence
Separate insurgents from support base
Use "clear and hold" and "oil spot" tactics to gradually sanitize areas of insurgents
Secure (host-)nation borders
Protect key infrastructure

Sources: *FM 3-24 and the classic works of Lawrence, Kitson, etc.*

for some opaque reason, the list of conflicts the military and academic worlds examine under the category of "insurgencies" is incredibly restrictive and ignores many cases of irregular warfare that could be included without undue justification. In most cases, those conflicts have for some reason been labeled "civil wars" or "revolutions" and not insurgencies. Secondly, despite all the canonical texts and individual and comparative case studies, no one has attempted a categorization of previous COIN cases that differentiates between the original conditions at the start of a conflict, the given government's aims and the eventual strategic end-state that it wished to achieve.

Together, these two factors—the restriction of COIN analysis to just a handful of famous 20th-century cases and the mistake of examining each without first separating them based upon the strategic government aims and the political, economic and military point of departure—have greatly distorted what can be learned from existing examples of irregular warfare and what in fact the lessons for today may be.

If the data set of COIN analysis is enlarged, the results are striking. Modern COIN theory is built on just a handful of books written by practitioners, based upon their experiences in just a handful of 20th-century conflicts. The most famous of these authors have been mentioned above: Lawrence, Callwell, Kitson, Trinquier, Galula, and so forth. Country studies by less famous writers are similarly restricted in scope to a small number of countries or regions, including: Vietnam (and French Indochina), Algeria, Northern Ireland, the Philippines and Malaya. A few of the more adventurous writers will go on to discuss Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola,

El Salvador, Aden, Oman or Afghanistan under the Soviets. Only the most adventurous brave traveling as far at Kashmir or Cyprus to look at what can be learned there. Subsequently, the modern study of counterinsurgency is limited to just over a dozen conflicts in a century that witnessed scores of wars and lesser conflicts, domestic and inter-state (see Table 2).

Just as detrimental to the formation of a comprehensive modern COIN doctrine is the fact that almost all of the better-known examples of counterinsurgency are limited to cases where a colonial or post-imperial government was fighting on the territory of its dependent (ex-)colonies. In the vast majority of these cases, the insurgent was interested in self-determination or similar politically— as opposed to religiously—motivated goals. Limiting our understanding of insurgency to such historically particular anti-colonial and areligious cases seems very hard to justify in today's decidedly post-colonial and post-Cold War era. Most importantly, none of the insurgents discussed within the canon of classic COIN studies was religiously motivated with the aim of initiating a global revolution, as is al-Qaeda. As a result, any translation of classic COIN doctrine to the threat posed by a religiously informed and globally ambitious al-Qaeda would seem forced, to say the least—and misguided at best.

Broadening the scope

But what if we were to truly broaden the scope of COIN analysis to include all examples of irregular warfare that occurred in the 20th century? Such a list, if it is to be intellectually rigorous, must include those instances—internal or international—where unconventional warfare was used by one or both sides,

Table 2

Classic COIN Case Studies	
Core, Most Common	*Additional, Less-Studied Cases*
Algeria	Rhodesia
Malaya	Cyprus
Northern Ireland	Mozambique
Vietnam	Aden
The Philippines	Angola
	Oman
	Colombia
	El Salvador
	Afghanistan (Soviet occupation)
	Jammu and Kashmir
	Sri Lanka
TOTAL: 16 cases	

to include civil wars and revolutions. Such a list would include conflicts that the COIN strategists, both pre- and post-9/11, rarely discuss, such as the Boer War, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, partisan and resistance efforts in Europe during World War II and even the Chechen-Russian conflict of the 1990s. The tally adds up to almost fifty conflicts and enormously expands the field of data that can be examined by the counterinsurgency strategist and theoretician.

This expanded set of case-studies lends itself to at least a preliminary classification (see Table 3). Those that are italicized denote conflicts that are rarely, if ever, examined as instances of insurgency or counterinsurgency. Conflicts marked with an asterisk constitute an additional category or sub-set: COIN events substantially informed or influenced by religion, (as well as politics) and which therefore have greater relevance to today's threat environment.

There is no scientific reason why the study of these other conflicts has been all but ignored by those wishing to find doctrinal answers as to how to defeat today's irregular foe. This is especially true once we realize that by enlarging the pool of conflicts to be studied we automatically include cases that are far closer to the current challenges we face. First, we include more cases where the enemy was religiously as well as politically motivated, as are bin Laden and his Salafi allies. Second, we now include examples of conflicts which are similar to Iraq and Afghanistan insofar as the goal of the counterinsurgent was not a return to the *status quo ante*, a return to normalcy, but instead a drastic alteration of the political reality, the forcible engineering of a nation, turning a dictatorship into democracy.

It would therefore seem obvious that there is no unitary counterinsurgency doctrine, and that there can be

Table 3

New COIN-Relevant Categories of Conflict	
Colonial Anti-Separatist	**Domestic Regime Change/Rev.**
Algeria	*Russian Revoluion*
Boer War	*Cuba Revolution*
	Hungarian Revolution
Anti-Separatist	*Iranian Revolution**
Northern Ireland*	
Chechnya*	**International Regime Change**
	Afghanistan 1979*
Domestic Resistance	Afghanistan 2001*
WWII—Yugoslav partisan	Iraq 2003*
—Finland	
—Norway	
—Estonia	
Internationally Assisted/Coordinated Resistance	
WWII—France, etc. (SOE)	

no universal set of best practices that has evolved over time. After all, how can the same guidelines be used to reestablish order by a strong central government that has been challenged by a minority (such as was the case in Northern Ireland or even Malaya) and also to guide the use of force in creating a completely new economic, political and military system in a country that was formerly a fundamentalist religious regime (Afghanistan) or a secular dictatorship (Iraq)? By comparison, would we ever have insisted on using a doctrine based on lessons learned in mass-maneuver warfare in a conventional campaign in Europe (e.g., WWII) for a campaign consisting of unconventional raiding missions in Central Asia (e.g., America's support to the anti-Soviet *mujahideen* in the 1980s)? At the very least, we need to have a doctrine in each case shaped by two fundamental variables: the starting point for the intervention, and the ultimate (political) goal.[6]

When one discusses the former, it is useful to ask whether the initial situation is one of unrest and low-level violence amongst people that are tied to us historically, culturally and linguistically (the colonial scenario), or the use of force in a nation-state which suffered under a dictatorship for decades (Iraq), or that has a failed central government of its own (Afghanistan). In the latter two instances, we need to think about whether our objective is simply the suppression of relatively low levels of violence, or to radically alter the political and economic reality of another country.

On top of the need to recognize the differences in the strategy one

would adopt based on these under-examined factors, there is also the question of religion. If counterinsurgency is, in the final analysis, about which side has the greatest legitimacy, then we cannot simply measure that legitimacy as a function of political recognition by the majority of the population (representation, as opposed to "democracy"). It should be obvious that if our forces are not only from a different ethnic, linguistic and cultural group from those communities in which they are operating, but also not of the same faith, then this will drastically affect the legitimacy of our intervention and the chances for success. At the very least, it will affect our credibility in the eyes of a different faith-community. Put another way, if after World War II, U.S. troops had had to occupy Saudi Arabia or Turkey for a number of decades, would they have used the same rules and doctrines and been as successful as they were in their occupation of (West) Germany?[8]

Toward 21st-century COIN

What are the doctrinal consequences of recognizing that a great variety of irregular conflicts should be examined under the heading of counterinsurgency and that these can be categorized into very different types of campaigns based upon starting points and end-states desired? One significant conclusion is that we must stop thinking in terms of "Vietnamization," or as we now say: "Afghanization" and "Iraqization." The idea that externally effected regime-change must follow the pattern of COIN activities in Vietnam, a Cold War conflict uninformed by religion, seems wrong-headed. Similarly, the idea that the foreign force comes in,

effects massive change and then measures its success by how many of its units' responsibilities are gradually handed over to indigenously created and controlled forces seems at the very least to be outdated, if not wholly irrelevant to current (and especially future) scenarios.

If today the yardstick of success is how soon native forces and the new representative government can take responsibility for the security of their own citizens, we may be better served by emphasizing them to begin with. And since it is clear that the final end-state envisions zero (or nominal) troop presence by U.S. forces, we should immediately dismiss all COIN cases where this was not the end-state envisaged, and where—whatever happened—it was always going to be "our" national forces patrolling national territory (such as in Northern Ireland or Colombia).

Consequently we may need to radically redefine counterinsurgency, or instead re-label what we are doing as "international regime change." As we look to the expanded list of COIN-relevant conflicts of the 20th century, our guiding principles for interventions where we wish to encourage radical change in another state would better be derived from those case studies where the outside actor assisted and facilitated a change-of-regime or at least armed resistance to a regime that was illegitimate (for example, the cases from WWII of external assistance to indigenous resistance groups, or the covert assistance provided by the U.S. to the *mujahideen* in Communist Afghanistan). Our forces may be best served therefore by the formulation of a new doctrine specifically for international regime-change based upon previous cases where the need to catalyze change

and resistance was very much in our national interest but where we could not or did not want deploy our own forces enmasse.[9]

Marginalization doctrine

In formulating a strategic policy or doctrine that can have application from Mosul to Manchester and from Herat to Heidelberg, we should focus less on universal concepts of our own legitimacy and instead build a strategy to delegitimize and thus marginalize the enemy.[10] Al-Qaeda, and all the associated movements and organizations which espouse a fundamentalist and totalitarian vision of the future to be achieved through the use of violence against the unarmed in the name of God, must be attacked with ideological tools which focus upon how these people represent no-one except themselves and how through their actions they do more to harm their nominal co-religionists than anyone else. Military force, law enforcement tools, intelligence and public diplomacy must all be employed in such a way as to lay bare the message and the methods of al-Qaeda for what they are: the views of an unanointed bloody minority.

1. Charles Krauthammer, "An Act of War Demands a Military Response," *Independent* (London), September 14, 2001, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/charles-krauthammer--an-act-of-war-demands-a-military-response-669224.html.
2. As cited in *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004), 337.
3. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy," October 6, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html.
4. D. C. Gompert: "Heads we Win—the cognitive side of counterinsurgency," RAND *Counterinsurgency Study Paper* 1 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007.)
5. Here the word "rediscovery" applies to what is usually referred to as "Big Army." Counterinsurgency was a subject that certain elements of the U.S. armed forces—especially the Marine Corps—never forgot. It was the mainstream Army that had disowned the doctrine in the years after Vietnam. I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. Thomas Marks, head of the Irregular Warfare Department, College of International Security Studies, National Defense University, for encouraging this differentiation.
6. "Army Unveils Counter-Insurgency Manual," interview with Col. Nagl, National Public Radio, December 15th, 2006. Audio file at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6630779.
7. On the latter point, if some readers hear echoes of von Clausewitz, that is no accident. While it has become passé, if not clichéd, to stress today that a counterinsurgency campaign (run by a democracy) cannot be won by use of force alone, the subtler point is that we must first define the political goal of the COIN campaign. Von Clausewitz would agree.
8. While one could here mention the case of post-WWII Japan as an example of the occupier and the population not sharing the same ethnicity, culture or language, the use and monopoly of atomic weapons by the U.S. clearly makes that case sui generis.
9. Such a doctrine may be used by a new cadre of unconventional or special forces trained specifically to facilitate such indigenous resistance and domestic regime-change. Such a force would be the same as or similar to the concept of a "Corps of Advisers." For details see John Nagl, "A Battalion's Worth of Good Ideas," *New York Times*, April 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/opinion/02nagl.html.
10. The idea for a doctrine or policy of marginalization was born of a discussion between author Sebastian Gorka and Dr. Dominick Donald of AEGIS Defence Services Ltd. at the World Trade Group symposium on Terrorism and Insurgency, Stockholm, March 11, 2008.

A Post-Conflict Primer

───   J. Sullivan, A. Shkolnikov & A. Nadgrodkiewicz

In November 2007, Iraqis took a major step toward bringing their country closer together and laying the foundation of a democratic market economy. The event was not a new election or an infrastructure project expected to generate thousands of jobs. It was not a headline-capturing new security strategy or a trade deal that would allow commerce to flourish. Nonetheless, it was a significant accomplishment by the Iraqi business community, civil society, and local government officials.

That month, a coalition of 26 Kurdish business associations, chambers of commerce, and economic think tanks presented the Kurdistan Business Agenda (KBA) to the Kurdistan Regional Government. KBA was the culmination of a year's worth of intense work by hundreds of Iraqi business people, in partnership with the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), who focused on developing a plan for the economic rebuilding of the region.[1]

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The uniqueness of this economic plan for the country's reconstruction was that it was developed from the ground up by Iraqis for Iraqis, not copied from elsewhere.

In the difficult environment of Iraq, the act of the business community's coming together to formulate a plan for the reconstruction—and then working with the government to implement the major points—was groundbreaking. It showed that the private sector has a stake in building a more secure and predictable investment climate. The manner in which the KBA was developed and then advocated before the government—open, inclusive, and transparent—was as much indicative of progress in Iraq's democratic development as the early elections following the toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime. It was a real, substantive, and robust answer to the often-heard calls for giving Iraqis input into rebuilding the country. Even more crucially, it demonstrated how the private sector can play a key role in post-conflict reconstruction.

Experience shows that physical reconstruction alone is not sufficient for the sustained, long-term political and socio-economic development of societies emerging from conflict. Instead, equal attention must be paid to the reconstruction—and in many cases building from scratch—of the institutions that underlie functioning economic and political systems.

The imperative of institutional reform

The term "reconstruction," as applied to post-conflict countries, can be somewhat misleading. It tends to be narrowly understood to mean the restoration of physical infrastructure: rebuilding houses, roads, bridges, factories, and so forth. Such projects are often showcased in public coverage of reconstruction efforts, because they are easy to grasp and visualize.

But, while this is important, experience shows that physical reconstruction alone is not sufficient for the sustained, long-term political and socio-economic development of societies emerging from conflict. The fact that 40 percent of post-conflict countries return to violence within a decade[2] suggests that a traditional approach focusing mostly on physical rebuilding fails nearly half the time to accomplish what is needed for sustained peaceful growth and development. Instead, equal attention must be paid to the reconstruction—and in many cases building from scratch—of the institutions that underlie functioning economic and political systems. By institutions, we mean social, economic, and political structures that guide human behavior. In many countries, as experience indicates, one of the greatest challenges lies in formalizing informal institutions.

Local ownership

Institutional development cannot begin without a viable state structure, which provides a framework for security, rule of law, economic development, and political stability. State-building in countries emerging from conflicts is a daunting task. And recent experience, particularly in Bosnia and Kosovo but also in

Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that although international participation is required, outsiders cannot simply impose governance structures—local groups must be involved in the process to ensure legitimacy and sustainability. Where incentives become distorted, particularly when local governance institutions become accountable to foreign donors rather than local people, the potential for effective state-building is undermined even further. Therefore, the participation of local stakeholders in enacting institutional reforms is crucial.

The international community's experiences in Bosnia over the last decade illustrate that assistance delivered as part of post-conflict reconstruction must develop the capacity of local civil society groups to design and implement reforms. If these groups do not already exist, they must be created from scratch and led to sustainability—however difficult the process may seem. As Hoover Institution expert Larry Diamond has noted, reconstruction efforts must "proceed with some humility and a decent respect for the opinions of the people" who are ultimately on the receiving end of that reconstruction.[3] This is what helps to build legitimate institutions that are grounded in local realities, needs, and concerns. Political theorist Francis Fukuyama brings up a similar point. When talking about reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, he notes that "the secret is to give [countries] enough governance to get things going again, but to figure out a way to have it be Iraqis or Afghans that are doing this."[4] Although ensuring local ownership may prolong the reform process, taking these steps early is essential if countries are to achieve consensus on reform and become sustainable democracies.

What to rebuild?

Beyond meeting the basic nutrition, sanitation, and health needs of the local population, long-term social well-being depends greatly on laying the economic foundation and creating opportunities for employment and upward social mobility. In one form or another, economic issues are regularly identified as major concerns of citizens in post-conflict countries. When surveyed by the Asia Foundation in 2006, for example, more than a fifth of respondents in Afghanistan cited a poor economy, lack of reconstruction progress, weak governance, and unemployment as the main reasons why they thought their country was moving in the wrong direction.[5] This number is in all probability higher today.

In addition to being one of the top concerns in the reconstruction process, unemployment and poor economic conditions often perpetuate conflict. Studies that link conflicts and poor economic prospects often conclude that countries with higher per capita income have a lower risk of civil war.[6] Even more striking is the fact that negative economic growth of just 5 percent can on average increase the risk of a civil war by as much as 50 percent.[7]

A functioning democratic system involves more than the rise of new leadership, even when that goal is achieved through free and fair elections. At the core of a working democracy is how a government makes decisions on a day-to-day basis. Local input from diverse stakeholders is necessary.

In this sense, the goals of post-conflict reconstruction may not seem very different from those of general development strategies. They encompass generating economic opportunities; creating jobs; eradicating corruption; and establishing grass-roots-oriented, transparent institutions of democratic governance that provide citizens with a sense of ownership and participation. The difference is that they are pursued in a much more challenging political, social, and security environment, where even minor shortcomings in meeting the expectations of weary local populations can push countries and societies back onto the path of conflict.

Rule of law and an independent judiciary

Restoring the rule of law and an independent, fair judiciary system in post-conflict societies is among the most pressing tasks, because it ensures the physical safety of the population and promotes a secure and predictable environment in public life. A sound law enforcement system is also a necessary part of the market economy. Without secure property rights, enforceable contracts, and an effective way to adjudicate disputes, assets such as land or housing cannot serve as loan collateral or investment capital; trade is difficult and transactions inefficient; and much-needed economic growth is difficult to achieve.

Democratic governance

A functioning democratic system involves more than the rise of new leadership, even when that goal is achieved through free and fair elections. At the core of a working democracy is how a government makes decisions on a day-to-day basis. Local input from diverse stakeholders is necessary in the decision-making process. Only broad-based participation can ensure the lasting legitimacy of the government, monitor its performance, and provide the population with a sense of ownership of the enacted reforms.

Independent media also play an indispensable role. They have a dual function of providing information about current political developments and the state of the economy, and serving as a watchdog of those in power. This function makes free media important in anti-corruption efforts, helping the public reach informed choices in a transparent business climate.

Legal and regulatory frameworks

Equally important is the creation of mechanisms that allow for the modification and improvement of existing laws in a democratic manner, including rules that create a legal framework for a functioning market economy. After all, laws on the books during the old regime may be outdated, unjust, unenforceable or otherwise unsuitable for new post-conflict realities. Reconstruction provides unique momentum for such flawed, entrenched laws to be replaced by a more effective framework.

From a long-term development perspective, it is crucial that a revised legal and regulatory environment be conducive to entrepreneurship and business, so that economic benefits accrue to all on an equal footing. In order to accomplish that, government must strive to become a transparent, arm's-length regulator, rather than an active player in the economy. Its objective must be to monitor and correct, rather than choose winners and losers and arbitrarily dispense economic privileges.

Economic stabilization

Armed conflicts disrupt not only a country's social and political fabric, but also the basic ability of an economy to function. Conflicts create incalculable losses, not only in a real physical sense but also in terms of lost economic growth and development. It is no coincidence that states emerging from violence are among the poorest in the world. In fact, 15 of the world's 20 poorest countries have suffered periods of conflict since the 1980s.[8] Consequently, the key objective of post-conflict reconstruction efforts should be to restore the domestic capacity for a productive and dynamic market economy, thereby establishing the basis for a prosperous society.

Here, the private sector can play a vital role. Business agendas, such as the Kurdistan Business Agenda (KBA) referred to at the beginning of this article, can provide reformers with a list of *what* needs to be addressed on the day-to-day policymaking level to spur economic growth and, as a result, to provide economic and job opportunities for regular citizens. The true significance of the Iraqi experience with the KBA was that it showed how the business community can cooperate and speak with a unified voice on the issues crucial to post-conflict rebuilding and development. Business people representing various segments of the Iraqi private sector spent a whole year working together to create an economic plan for the country: identifying constraints to doing business, prioritizing problems, determining the opportunities for reform, recommending specific solutions, and building trust.

This bottom-up effort clearly demonstrated that the private sector is more likely to commit to reforms if entrepreneurs themselves are the ones participating in drafting them than if they are just handed a list written up by someone else. Likewise, governments are more likely to listen to the voices of their own constituents rather than those of outsiders. The importance of the local buy-in achieved in this manner cannot be overestimated.

Significantly, a business agenda is not just a litany of problems; it is also a compilation of actionable solutions that are actively promoted and presented before the local government. By virtue of generating this public-private dialogue on key reconstruction and development issues, the agenda enhances democratic process, giving the business community a platform for providing input into policymaking in an open and transparent way.

> Armed conflicts disrupt not only a country's social and political fabric, but also the basic ability of an economy to function. Consequently, the key objective of post-conflict reconstruction efforts should be to restore the domestic capacity for a productive and dynamic market economy, thereby establishing the basis for a prosperous society.

The way forward

In order to make a difference, those involved in a country's post-conflict recovery must identify an effective way to utilize the expertise and commitment of local groups to achieve lasting peace and prosperity. When integrating local groups into the reconstruction effort, those involved in the recovery work must

also have enough tolerance for "learning by doing." In many cases, local organizations may lack certain skills, and their inability to complete a certain project with due quality should not serve as a deterrent. Rather, their capacity to improve must be developed. This also means that local reformers should not be overwhelmed with an overambitious scope of activities or too many financial resources they cannot fully absorb.

Douglass North, who won a Nobel Prize for his pioneering work on institutions, captures best the importance of local focus on institutional reforms. He argues that institutions cannot be transferred wholesale; something that functions well in one country will not necessarily work well in another.[9] He also warns that local culture should not be ignored, and most importantly, that incentives play a fundamental role in the reconstruction process. If no incentives exist for citizens and the government to improve governance, commit to fair play, engage in competitive market activities, and support the rule of law, then institutions are unlikely to take root.

Putting reconstruction in the hands of local groups is an ambitious task, but it is required if countries are to assume ownership of and responsibility for institutional reforms and humanitarian relief. Where local capacity to implement reforms and to lead humanitarian relief is weak, efforts should focus on building it up, rather than replacing it with external leadership. In each case, there has to be just the right amount of assistance to jump-start the reform process, yet not so much as to distort incentives, undermine legitimacy, and thwart long-term development at the expense of short-term needs.

The example of formulating and implementing business agendas in Kurdistan and other post-conflict areas shows that the private sector has an important role to play in this process. Only when the local economy is strong and local civil society groups are engaged in the policy dialogue can reconstruction successfully take place. Given the right tools to become a voice for needed reforms, the business community can become the engine that drives both reconstruction efforts and market-oriented democratic development in post-conflict countries.

1. To learn more about CIPE and the Kurdistan Business Agenda, visit http://www.cipe.org/regional/mena/iraq/kba.php.
2. United States Agency for International Development, "A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries," October 4, 2007.
3. Larry Diamond, "Lessons from Iraq," *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005).
4. Francis Fukuyama, "State-Building: Capturing Lessons Learned," Center for International Private Enterprise *Economic Reform Feature Service*, April 25, 2005.
5. "Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People," The Asia Foundation, 2006, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/AGsurvey06.pdf.
6. For example, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50 (1998), 563-73.
7. House of Commons, International Development Committee, *Conflict and Development: Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,* vol. I, October 16, 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmintdev/923/923i.pdf.
8. Caroline Bahnson and Jozefina Cutura, "The Post Conflict Fund: Addressing Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs," The World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 2004, http://bakti.easternindonesia.org/gsdl/collect/pdf/index/assoc/HASHbf58.dir/doc.pdf.
9. Douglass C. North, "Local Knowledge and Institutional Reform," Center for International Private Enterprise *Economic Reform Feature Service*, August 26, 2004.

HIGHER MISEDUCATION

Patrick Poole

"If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." This famous maxim by the ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu is familiar to every student of military science and strategy. His counsel is simple: understand your enemy, understand yourself. Some seven-and-a-half years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, important segments of our military infrastructure dedicated to training and educating the next generation of military leaders give every indication of having failed to heed Sun Tzu's advice.

Strategic collapse at the Army War College

A recent post by *Washington Post* military correspondent Tom Ricks on his *Foreign Policy* blog provides evidence of this strategic collapse at one of the country's top military education institutions.[1] In it, Ricks reported on a new publication by Sherifa Zuhur, a research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute. Zuhur's study, *HAMAS and Israel: Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics*,[2] published just a few days before the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and HAMAS in Gaza, informs readers that HAMAS has been misunderstood due to misreporting by "Israeli and Western sources that villainize the group," and urges the U.S. government to embrace it through negotiations, despite ongoing acts of terror.

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In fact, Zuhur squarely places the blame of failure for peace between Israel and the Palestinians on Israel, namely its refusal to recognize HAMAS as the legitimate government in Gaza. "Israel's stance towards the democratically-elected Palestinian government headed by HAMAS in 2006, and towards Palestinian national coherence—legal, territorial, political, and economic—has been a major obstacle to substantive peacemaking," she writes.[3] Conveniently unmentioned are the nearly 6,000 rockets and mortars the terrorist group has fired indiscriminately into southern Israel since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005.[4]

She also blames U.S. policies for the terrorist group's hostility towards America, but takes pains to assure readers that, unlike al-Qaeda, Gaza's radicals have no plans to take their *jihad* global. "As a result of U.S. hostility to HAMAS, the organization increasingly regards the U.S. administration, although not the American people, as an enemy," writes Zuhur. "However, HAMAS is not interested in a global jihad like al-Qa'ida [sic], and maintains that its only foe is Israel, hoping that better communications with the United States will emerge, and recognizing that its officials' inability to travel and speak with Americans has damaged its image."[5]

This, of course, ignores the long string of threats against the U.S. and other Western nations by HAMAS leadership going back more than a decade.[6] Nor does it account for the organization's overt solidarity with al-Qaeda's war against America. Less than a month after the 9/11 attacks, the *New York Times* reported that HAMAS organized a student rally at the Islamic University of Gaza, where speakers led the crowd in anti-American slogans while students carried pictures of Osama bin Laden and others bearing the statement "HAMAS hails Bin Laden." And in November 2001, a column ran in the HAMAS weekly newspaper, *Al-Risala*, recommending that anthrax be placed in the American water supply.[7]

Rather, according to Zuhur, what really clouds the judgment of Israeli and U.S. thinking is that both countries have fallen prey to their own propaganda, which pays undue attention to the rabidly anti-Jewish elements of the 1988 HAMAS Covenant and its calls for the total destruction of Israel, while failing to recognize that HAMAS has developed into an enlightened, progressive organization.[8] Calls for the violent destruction of the state of Israel notwithstanding, Zuhur recommends that both Jerusalem and Washington "abandon their policies of non-negotiation and non-communication with HAMAS," even as HAMAS rockets continue to rain down on southern Israel.

To do so, Zuhur proposes that America attempt to create a division between the social and political apparatus of HAMAS and its terrorist wings, in order to render the organization more acceptable.[9] Never mind that this approach has been mocked by no less an authority than HAMAS leader Mahmoud Al-Zahar himself, who has made clear that:

> HAMAS responds to all questions related to the life of the citizens not only in the case of confrontation but also in the political, economic, social, health, and internal relations field. This movement has proved that it is one organic unit. Mistaken is the one who thinks that the military wing acts outside the framework of HAMAS or behaves recklessly.[10]

Of course, the short- and long-term policy implications of following Zuhur's recommendations could very well be catastrophic. Embracing HAMAS as the legitimate government of Gaza would effectively reward it for its violent takeover of the territory in June 2007, and the terror haven it has created there since. The relationship between HAMAS and Iran is also a factor, since—given the growing military support given to HAMAS by the Iranian regime in recent years—an American embrace would encourage the entrenchment of an Iranian proxy to Israel's south, to complement the Hezbollah threat from the north. Finally, U.S. engagement with HAMAS—a designated terrorist organization under federal law—would send a dangerous signal to American allies such as India, the Philippines and Afghanistan, each of which is waging its own campaign against Islamist terrorism, that Washington has abandoned its principles in favor of accommodation with its enemies. Yet such is the state of affairs and the strategic vision amongst some segments of the military academic community.

A larger strategic problem

As troubling as Zuhur's approach is, it is only representative of a larger rot in the U.S. military's halls of higher learning: a failure to adequately and truthfully engage the ideas of Islamic terrorists. As defense expert and author Mark Perry tells Ricks:

> It's worse than you think. They have curtailed the curriculum so that their students are not exposed to radical Islam. Akin to denying students access to Marx during the Cold War.[11]

This is hardly the first complaint that the military has failed to investigate and assess the strategic writings related to radical Islam and Islamic war doctrine to adequately assess the enemy threat. William Gawthrop, the former head of the Joint Terrorism Task Force of the Defense Department's Counterintelligence Field Activity, lamented in a military intelligence journal article not long ago that:

> As late as early 2006, the senior service colleges of the Department of Defense had not incorporated into their curriculum a systematic study of Muhammad as a military or political leader. As a consequence, we still do not have an in-depth understanding of the war-fighting doctrine laid down by Muhammad, how it might be applied today by an increasing number of Islamic groups, or how it might be countered.[12]

Another vocal critic of our military's strategic studies is Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Myers, who has argued that understanding the Islamic doctrine of war is a basic necessity for our military leadership. "To understand war, one has to study its philosophy; the grammar and logic of your opponent. Only then are you approaching strategic comprehension," Myers writes. "To understand the war against Islamist terrorism one must begin to understand the Islamic way of war, its philosophy and doctrine, the meanings of jihad in Islam—and one needs to understand that those meanings are highly varied and utilitarian depending on the source.[13] Not doing so leaves our own military strategy aimless and increases our long-term vulnerability to further terrorist attacks."[14]

One cause for this deficiency can be found in the strategic documents of the U.S. government itself, namely the 2006 *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, which states that the U.S. government and its agencies "will not automatically adopt a common assessment of the threat or a common understanding of the nature of the war; nor will U.S. coalition partners."[15] This amounts to a stunning admission. Simply put, our fighting forces have made a deliberate decision to forgo Sun Tzu's advice to know our enemy.

At least some experts have attempted to inject some strategic clarity in our discussions of our enemies. But more often than not, they have paid dearly for it. That was the case with former Joint Chiefs of Staff J-2 analyst Stephen Coughlin, whose master's thesis at the National Defense Intelligence University examined texts from multiple schools of Islamic jurisprudence to evaluate the respective traditions on jihad and their contemporary use by Islamic terrorists. Coughlin's conclusion? That failing to investigate these sources has left our military "disarmed in the war of ideas."[16] Coughlin's thesis had barely seen the light of day before he was promptly sacked from his position with the Joint Chiefs, having running afoul of another Pentagon official, Hesham Islam, a top-ranked Muslim advisor to Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, who took issue with Coughlin's academic analysis.[17]

Culling the herd of one's critics, as seen in the Coughlin affair, may forge a consensus within the military community, but it does not make our forces any more prepared to fight the "long war" against global Islamic terrorism. In fact, quite the opposite.

Linguistic sleight-of-hand

Another manner in which this strategic blindness has crept into our federal government is the self-styled "Truespeak" movement, led primarily by Jim Guirard of the Truespeak Institute. Truespeak advocates an end to the use of standard Islamic terms used to identify terrorists, such as "jihadist" and "mujahideen." Instead, its proponents argue that other Arabic terms, such as "hiraba" and "mufsidoon," which have connotations of banditry and criminal activity, are better used to attempt to deny Islamic terrorists religious legitimacy. It is also driven by ideological concerns to free institutional Islam from the taint of Islamic terrorism.

The earliest proponent of this new lexicon appears to be University of Michigan professor Sherman Jackson, whose article "Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition"[18] advocates this new terminology. The article is based on a series of lectures Jackson delivered prior to the 9/11 attacks, so his argument is not colored by those events. Many articles on this topic published since 9/11 defending this shift refer back to Jackson's 2001 treatment of the subject, and Guirard specifically cites Jackson in support of his "Truespeak lexicon."

However, one problem immediately appears when someone tries to use Jackson's analysis: he admits that the language is confined to "domestic terrorism"—a point never mentioned by those appealing to this analysis for blanket application of this terminology. In his first endnote, Jackon explains the difficulty from the viewpoint of Islamic law to apply the lexicon to international terrorism:

> I limit my discussion in this paper to domestic terrorism because a discussion of international ter-

rorism would take us into the complicated issue of extraterritoriality and the question of the applicability of Islamic law outside the lands of Islam, an issue on which the jurists differed widely.[19]

Thus, while Jackson's new lexicon might apply to "sudden jihad syndrome" of Muslims living in the West committing spontaneous, limited and "leaderless" acts of terror, applying the label of *hiraba* to international terrorist activities becomes problematic from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, which he admits has a wide range of opinion.

Second, while Jackson states that *hiraba* fits nicely with the FBI's definition of terrorism, he then issues three qualifications that severely negate its use with reference to al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations. Thus, "to the extent that a group declares itself or is deemed by the government to be acting in pursuit of political objectives… their activity is actually less likely to fall under the law of hirabah," while "the greater the number of individuals involved in a prima facie act of terrorism, the less likely to fall under the laws of hirabah" and the fact that "hirabah, at least in its fully developed form, appears to be potentially a much broader category than terrorism proper, covering as it does a spectrum of crimes ranging from breaking and entering to 'hate crimes' to rape…."[20]

Experts have taken note of the inherent contradictions in this approach. As Walid Phares of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies points out, "In Arab Muslim history, a *Hiraba* (unauthorized warring) was when a group of warriors launched itself against the enemy without orders from the real commander. Obviously, this implies that a 'genuine' war against a real enemy does exist

and that these hotheaded soldiers have simply acted without orders. Hence this cunning explanation puts 'spin' on *jihad* but leaves the core idea of *jihadism* completely intact."[21]

Such textual problems and criticism, however, have not prevented the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the State Department, various commands of the U.S. military, and other federal agencies from adopting the Truespeak lexicon as *de facto* government policy. The first such measure was a January 2008 memorandum published by the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, which suggested that a "negative climate" was being created by the use of "jihadist" and other such phrases connecting terrorism with Islam, resulting in attacks and discrimination against American Muslims.[22] This claim, however, flies in the face of hate crime statistics recently released by the FBI which show that anti-Muslim incidents have dropped precipitously since the 9/11 attacks, and declined by 26.3 percent between 2006 and 2007 (the most recent period for which complete information is available).[23]

Another difficulty with the DHS recommendations concerns the authorities relied upon to support both the need for a new lexicon and development of alternative terms to be used. The memorandum references a May 8, 2007, meeting between then-Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and a group of "influential Muslim Americans," during which the discussion turned to the terminology used to describe the terrorists. But a closer look at the four Muslim leaders who were part of that meeting with Chertoff and who recommended the adoption of new terminology to describe Islamic terrorism raises serious questions. A

June 2007 *San Francisco Chronicle* article identified the four individuals as Akbar Ahmed, former High Commissioner from Pakistan to Great Britain and chair of Islamic Studies at American University; M.J. Khan, a Houston city councilman; Shahed Amanullah, a Muslim blogger and editor of AltMuslim.com; and Reza Aslan, an author and creative writing professor at the University of California-Irvine.[24]

While all of these individuals may be accomplished in their respective fields, none has any qualifications whatsoever to speak authoritatively on these finely detailed nuances of Islamic law. Even Professor Ahmed's authority could be questioned by those in the Muslim world, as his entire education has been conducted in Britain and he has no specific training from the authoritative centers of Islamic jurisprudence, such as Al-Azhar or the Islamic University of Medina. As for the supposed intent of these guidelines to help influence the Muslim world, all of the "experts" in question live and work in the United States, and relying on their opinions to speak on attitudes and opinions of the entire Muslim world smacks of precisely the Western-centric attitudes that this new terminology claims to counteract.

Another recent attempt to institute the Truespeak lexicon as official government policy came in the form of a State Department report prepared by the National Counterterrorism Center,[25] which proscribes the use of "jihadist" or "mujahedin" with reference to terrorists and claims that "calling our enemies 'jihadis' and their movement a global 'jihad' unintentionally legitimizes their actions."[26]

This movement has impacted discussions in the military community as well. Leading the charge has been Douglas Streusand of the National Defense University, who co-authored a short paper in 2006 recommending the adoption of the Truespeak lexicon.[27] A more recent defense of these efforts appeared in the Autumn 2008 edition of the Army War College Journal, *Parameters*, authored by Daniel Roper, Director of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center.[28] Roper's article invokes the authority of the DHS memorandum and the work of Jim Guirard of the Truespeak Institute in support of this shift in terminology.

In response, analysts and contractors attached to the U.S. Central Command's "Red Team" prepared a report that criticized these efforts:

> There are a growing number of USG documents that suggest that we stand in danger of (if we have not already) demonizing Islam and/or associating all Muslims with violence simply by invoking the Islamic identity, or Islamic goals, of a particular extremist group. While there is concern that we not label all Muslims as Islamist terrorists, it is proper to address certain aspects of violence as uniquely Islamic…The fact is our enemies cite the sources of Islam as the foundation of their global jihad. We are left with the responsibility of portraying our enemies in an honest and accurate fashion.[29]

The Red Team report goes on to observe that much of the terminology that Truespeak advocates want to see banned is in fact common usage in the Muslim world, and the recommended usage of the lexicon is entirely foreign to the audience they are attempting to influence. For instance, most of the Muslim world already refers to Islamic terrorists as "jihadists." The Red Team analysis concludes that a great many of these efforts to change the lexicon

are driven by emotional and political responses, not by exegetical debate or examination of Islamic sources.

Addressing our strategic blindness

The strategic blindness seen at the U.S. Army War College and throughout the federal government is entirely self-imposed. Efforts to impose the Truespeak lexicon are little more than wishful thinking and a very poor foundation on which to establish national policy in a time of war.

In the case of Sherifa Zuhur's recent *apologia* for HAMAS, the issue is not one of academic freedom as much as an abandonment of our most basic principles. A slackening of our will to preserve long-held moral values, such as our refusal to negotiate with terrorist organizations, apparently runs through all levels of our military senior service schools and the federal government, and has occurred without any discussion or debate whatsoever. There is no way to determine how far this rot extends, but it is important to note that this condition has not yet been acknowledged, let alone addressed.

It is only compounded by our failure to understand the Islamic sources to which our enemy constantly appeals. By automatically discounting terrorist references to Islamic texts and traditions, important insights into their strategy and methodology are missed. The end result is that we limit—rather than expand—our understanding of our enemy. The intellectual and strategic groundwork for the "long war" against Islamic terrorism will never be accomplished as long as our senior service schools and military academies continue to neglect this vital area of strategic study.

One reason for the reluctance to study Islamic war doctrine is no doubt rooted in our American tradition of secularism. Attempting to assess and judge religious views is unfamiliar territory, and fraught with peril. But that does not mean that it should be avoided. If we are to win the battle against Islamic terrorism, we must come to understand it by familiarizing ourselves with its ideas and sources, not trying to rationalize our institutional neglect or define away our intellectual discomfort. Regardless of what one might think about the relationship between Islamic theology and *jihadist* justifications for terror, it is a fact that *our adversaries believe* they are operating in accordance with Islamic tradition. Islamic war doctrine ought to be studied on that basis alone.

Returning to Sun Tzu's maxim, perhaps the root of our military's current strategic schizophrenia is not so much about our refusal to understand our enemies as much as it is a failure to understand ourselves. As a nation, we no longer have a sense of who we are, what we believe, or even why we fight. The present war has exposed those fault lines. Our most basic values are at stake, not just from external threats, but also from within. Consider this: at the height of World War II, would research professors at the Army War College have even considered attempting to defend Nazi fascism or Japanese imperialism, as Sherifa Zuhur has now done with HAMAS? Would our military institutions have ever shied away from investigating Communist ideology and Soviet military doctrine for fear of offending the Russian people?

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The Perilous Future of U.S. Strategic Forces

Bradley A. Thayer & Thomas M. Skypek

Today, the United States finds itself in a curious position in international politics. While its conventional military power remains unparalleled, its once-formidable strategic deterrent—encapsulated in its nuclear forces and infrastructure—is atrophying.

It is painfully clear that Washington's interest in its strategic forces has waned greatly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States has not produced a new nuclear warhead in almost two decades, and its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force and nuclear infrastructure are stretched to the point of exhaustion with their current missions. Problems that would have been unthinkable during the Cold War now seem to be commonplace. Such a decline is unprecedented, and will have grand strategic consequences for American power in the years ahead.

Understanding this state of affairs is important for several reasons. First, conventional wisdom has it that the strategic forces and infrastructure of the United States are strong and will remain so into the future. In fact, however, quite the opposite is true. America's nuclear capabilities are sufficient at present, but are decaying in every aspect—from the nuclear warheads themselves to the missiles that deliver them to the specialized scientists and engineers who build them. There are serious weaknesses in the nuclear arsenal that will manifest themselves in the years ahead, and cause U.S. strategic forces to fail to meet future mission requirements.

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Second, if this problem is not addressed, the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent will be doubted by both allies and adversaries. A weak extended deterrent capability will make aggression more likely, and further hinder Washington's ability to advance U.S. interests against foes who—for the first time in history—may be better-armed with nuclear weapons than the United States.

Third, if the credibility of America's strategic deterrent is in question, the United States will have created an incentive to proliferate. Under those conditions, it is reasonable to expect that many states now covered by U.S. extended deterrent commitments, such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, would themselves be driven to acquire nuclear forces.

Conventional wisdom has it that the strategic forces and infrastructure of the United States are strong and will remain so into the future. In fact, quite the opposite is true.

The bear is back

While the United States faces substantial problems in its strategic force posture, and is, indeed, the only nuclear country that cannot manufacture a new nuclear weapon, other nuclear states—China, France, Great Britain, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia—have not taken a similar "nuclear holiday." As we noted not long ago in *The National Interest*, the strategic nuclear balance has changed appreciably in recent years, and not in Washington's favor.[1]

While Chinese nuclear modernization is important, and will become ever more so, it is salient for our dis-

cussion to acknowledge what Moscow is accomplishing. This is because, first, Chinese strategic modernization continues slowly and steadily but is still modest. China's *Xia* SSBN, for example, has never conducted a deterrent patrol; second, and more important, is the inescapable conclusion that the strategic torch has been passed from Washington to Moscow.

Quite simply, Russia is building a twenty-first-century nuclear arsenal, while the United States is not. If the United States does not change course and take the necessary steps to modernize its arsenal, Russia will secure strategic dominance, with the accompanying political benefits accruing to Moscow.

This is not to argue that the Russian nuclear enterprise is flawless. It is not. Moscow's nuclear command and control suffers from serious deficiencies, particularly in the realm of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. In time, however these deficiencies will be resolved. Indeed, the Russians are moving to solve them already, through improvements to both their strategic and conventional forces.

Since 1999, the Russians have conducted annual strategic exercises, the scale of which matches what was typical during the Cold War, and far beyond what the United States has undertaken. Russian exercises also involve the highest echelons of their government. In August 2005, during a major exercise, President Vladimir Putin himself flew in a Blackjack bomber that launched four Kh-555 land attack cruise missiles. The commitment of the Russian leadership to building and maintaining a modernized nuclear arsenal is unquestionable. The most convincing evidence is the depth and breadth of their modernization efforts.

Major Russian Strategic Weapons Modernization Programs *(Potential in italics)*
Strategic System
1. Development of RS-24 MIRVed ICBM
2. Deployment of SS-27 Silo-Based ICBM
3. Deployment of Mobile SS-27 ICBM
4. Development of a MIRVed ICBM based upon Bulava
5. Launch of Fourth-Generation SSBN
6. Deployment of Bulava SLBM
7. Deployment of Long-Range Cruise Missile
8. Continued Production of Tu-160s
9. *Modernization of EMP Weapons*

Russian strategic modernization began in earnest this decade. Unlike the United States, Russia is modernizing each leg of its triad, has significantly reformed its nuclear doctrine, and continues to build new nuclear weapons. The Russian strategic hiatus of the 1990s, in other words, ended with the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency roughly a decade ago. It continues today under the leadership of Putin's handpicked protégé, Dmitry Medvedev.

While it has never been the cornerstone of the Russian triad, Moscow's modernization of its strategic bomber fleet nevertheless continues steadily. Two strategic bombers will be commissioned into the Russian Air Force every three years, according to General Vladimir Mikhailov, the commander of the Russian Air Force.[2] Russia has three types of bombers in its fleet, the Tu-160 "Blackjack," Tu-22 "Blinder," and Tu-95 "Bear." The new bombers will be Tu-160s.

Like bombers, submarines have always played second fiddle to the Russian ICBM force. Still, there is significant modernization under way to this leg as well. This modernization began by eliminating the vestiges of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet. By the start of 2007, Russia had decommissioned 148 out of 197 Soviet-era submarines. Russia dismantles eighteen nuclear submarines annually, and Moscow expects to have decommissioned all Soviet-era submarines by 2010.[3]

Russia is also making progress on its sea-launched ballistic missile capabilities. In June 2007, it successfully tested its new *Bulava* SLBM, following a series of failed tests throughout 2006. Russia's leadership remains committed to the system, despite the failure of the *Bulava's* most recent (December 2008) test. Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the Russian General Staff, announced in January 2009 that tests of the *Bulava* will continue.[4] Once operational, the *Bulava*—a slightly modified version of the new *Topol-M* ICBM—will equip Russia's three new *Borei*-class nuclear submarines. It carries a single 500 kiloton nuclear weapon, plus decoys, and has a maneuvering capability of unknown effectiveness intended to defeat U.S. missile defenses.

As was the case with the Soviet Union in its day, the backbone of

Russia's strategic nuclear forces lies with its ICBMs. The SS-18 will stay in service until 2016. In addition, Russia has developed the silo-based SS-27, of which it has 40 now, and will add 34 more. A road mobile derivative is also under development, and Russia is expected to have 50 by 2015.[5] Additionally, in May and December 2007, Russia tested a new MIRVed ICBM, the RS-24. This missile, which has not yet been given a NATO designation, will replace the old SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs by 2050.

There are also reports that Russia is working on a new liquid-fueled ICBM which will carry ten warheads with a throw-weight of four tons.[6] This would far outclass its closest U.S. counterparts, the *Minuteman* and *Trident II*. Also in the realm of potential weapons, the Russians have discussed the development of a hypersonic glide vehicle that would reach distant continents quickly and would be able to penetrate U.S. missile defenses.[7]

The Russians are also modernizing their low-yield nuclear warheads, which may be used for tactical or strategic purposes. Moscow is developing a precision, low-yield nuclear weapon, on the order of several tens of tons to 100 tons of TNT, and a "clean" nuclear earth penetrator, even as Congress has canceled new low-yield programs such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).[8]

Moscow is also interested in EMP weapons, and is believed to possess a robust capability that could give it the capacity to target the U.S.' dependency on insufficiently hardened electronics for its military and key civilian sectors. Such a scenario may sound far-fetched, but it is plausible—and potentially catastrophic. As Brian Kennedy of the Claremont Institute recently outlined in the *Wall Street Journal*:

Gamma rays from the explosion, through the Compton Effect, generate three classes of disruptive electromagnetic pulses, which permanently destroy consumer electronics, the electronics in some automobiles and, most importantly, the hundreds of large transformers that distribute power throughout the U.S. All of our lights, refrigerators, water-pumping stations, TVs and radios stop running. We have no communication and no ability to provide food and water to 300 million Americans.[9]

Russia has the world's largest nuclear weapons production complex, with two plants for nuclear weapons assembly and one plant for plutonium and uranium pit production. Russia has the stated capacity to disassemble 2,000 warheads a year, which equals the technical capability to produce about the same number of warheads. The United States, meanwhile, is not developing or producing any new warheads, and has not since 1989. In an emergency, the U.S. might be able to produce about 40 warheads a year at the TA-55 facility at Los Alamos. Not until 2023, under present plans, will the U.S. have large scale pit production capability. Russia's nuclear testing facilities require minimal lead time in order to conduct a nuclear test, and Russia has admitted to conducting a robust program of hydrodynamic experiments, or "sub-critical" tests, that produce a very small yield, the equivalent of 0.1 gram of TNT.

From the above survey, it is abundantly clear that the Russian leadership has made the modernization of its strategic nuclear weapons a priority. While other states may not, Russia recognizes that nuclear weapons remain a major source of strategic power, and for that reason it will continue to produce the most

advanced nuclear forces in the world. Their nuclear infrastructure is also the most advanced and capable in the world. Given these capabilities, and its conventional weakness, it is no surprise that Russia has the lowest declared threshold for nuclear use of any of the major nuclear powers. In January 2008, Yury Baluyevsky, then the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, detailed publicly exactly how low that threshold actually is:

> We do not intend to attack anyone, but we consider it necessary for all our partners in the world community to understand clearly... that to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons.[10]

Baluyevsky's remarks about the preventive use of nuclear weapons underscore the value Russia places on its nuclear capabilities. Nuclear weapons and strategic strike capabilities will remain the highest force maintenance and procurement priority of the Russian Federation for decades to come.

An agenda for renewal

In Washington, by contrast, nuclear weapons have become an afterthought for policymakers and military leadership alike. If U.S. nuclear forces were a stock, its price would have collapsed in the 1990s, and its value would remain near an all-time low. Yet nuclear modernization is a non-negotiable imperative if the United States wishes to achieve its grand strategic goals into the future, including credible extended deterrence commitments to allies like Japan and South Korea. Given the time required to develop these complicated systems, and the period needed

to integrate them into the force, modernization must begin immediately.

Using 2009 as a baseline, the ages of the current systems of the nuclear triad are 39 years for the *Minuteman III*, 19 years for the *Trident II D-5* SLBM, 48 years for the *B-52H*, 12 years for the B-2, and 28 years for the *Ohio* Class SSBNs. The startling age of these strategic systems and the increasing costs to deploy and maintain them accounts in large part for the rapid reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States that have taken place since 2001—including an 18 percent reduction in ICBMs, a 63 percent decline in the number of bombers in service, and a constriction of nearly a quarter in the size of the SSBN fleet.[11]

The first step toward reversing this decline is to modernize the U.S. ICBM force. Today, ICBMs serve as the anchor of the United States' strategic deterrent, for good reason. ICBMs possess a robust payload capacity and are survivable against would-be first strikes initiated by any current likely adversaries. In addition, ICBMs have the power to hold a spectrum of targets at prompt risk, whether using nuclear or conventional warheads.

However, drastic reductions in the size of the ICBM force—due to *Minuteman II*, *Minuteman III*, and *Peacekeeper* retirements, and the lack of a replacement ICBM for the *Minuteman III*—will raise doubts about the capabilities of the United States in the years ahead. America's ICBM force may be robust now, but it will not be in the future.

A second area of focus must be the development of robust defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles. The global proliferation of ballistic and cruise missile technologies has left the U.S. homeland vulnerable. Ballistic missiles are capable of deliv-

ering WMD as well as large conventional payloads, and the technologies needed to build them are widely available, often indigenously or on the global market. At present, there are 25 states armed with ballistic missiles. Many, like Iran and North Korea, not only produce ballistic missiles but export them as well, and share critical missile technologies with other states. For example, Pakistan's *Ghauri* medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) is based on the North Korean *No Dong*, and was produced with North Korean assistance. Iran's *Shahab-3* MRBM is a version of the *No Dong* that has been improved with Russian assistance. Even ICBMs are no longer a monopoly of the superpowers. In the next eight to ten years, North Korea and Iran are expected to develop an ICBM capability, which would allow them to target the United States, as well as its allies.

While the United States faces substantial problems in its strategic force posture, and is, indeed, the only nuclear country that cannot manufacture a new nuclear weapon, other nuclear states—China, France, Great Britain, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia—have not taken a similar "nuclear holiday."

To combat the growing threat of ballistic missiles, the Bush administration deployed a limited defense during its time in office. Key components of this system are the ground-based interceptors based at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. A third interceptor site, which would give the United States and NATO the capability for limited defense against the Iranian *Shahab* family of missiles, is currently planned for Poland and the Czech Republic.

It is unclear, as of yet, how the Obama administration plans to approach the issue of missile defense. Early signs, however, are not encouraging. In November 2008, the Obama transition team released the following statement after a telephone call with Polish President Lech Kaczynski: "President-elect Obama made no commitment on it [placing interceptors in Poland]. His position is as it was throughout the campaign—that he supports deploying a missile defense system when the technology is proved to be workable."[12] This ambiguity is troubling, since a robust missile defense capability not only strengthens Washington's deterrence posture but also hedges against a failure of deterrence.

The technologies in question, moreover, are mature. The Pentagon's successful shoot-down of a damaged U.S. satellite with a Standard Missile-3 in February 2008 demonstrated the versatility of hit-to-kill technology. The operation also highlighted why further investments are warranted. It is important that the leadership in Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran knows that U.S. missile defense technologies work.

But significant work remains. Cruise missiles, for example, present as serious a danger to the United States as ballistic missiles, and yet this threat currently receives almost no attention from policymakers or the popular media. Cruise missiles may be launched from any location: the ground, on or under the sea, or in the air. They are very difficult to detect because they fly at low altitudes, at relatively high speeds, and

have a low radar cross section with a modest infrared signature.

Cruise missiles are ideal platforms for countries like China, Iran, or North Korea to attack the United States because they are proven weapons systems, easily affordable, easier to maintain and deploy, hard to defeat, and can be delivered by several different weapons platforms. The United States is deeply vulnerable; seventy-five percent of the U.S. population and 80 percent of the wealth of the U.S. lie within 200 miles of the coast. Cruise missiles are even more widely distributed than ballistic missiles, moreover. About 75 countries are estimated to possess cruise missiles, and by 2015, at least 24 states are expected to pose a serious cruise missile threat to the United States due to the proliferation of sophisticated systems. With effective missile defenses, the United States could not only defend itself against ballistic or cruise missile attack, but also assure allies that they will be protected as well.

Another, seldom analyzed, problem for the strategic forces of the United States is an aging workforce— one created by our long national procurement holiday for strategic systems. No other nuclear country faces this problem, since all others are modernizing their strategic forces. And this "critical skills" gap is only widening. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Skills convened in 2006 evaluated the critical skills of the United States in six categories: development capabilities and skills; production capabilities and skills; sustainment capabilities and skills; material availability; critical suppliers; and special facilities, such as for nuclear testing. The DSB report is shocking in its assessments. It found that the United States faces

great dangers in the reliability of the guidance, re-entry systems, and propulsion of the ICBM force.[13] The state of the U.S. SLBM and SSBN force is better, at least for the moment. But, as the DSB study made clear, current demographics do not favor the maintenance of critical skills over the next ten years.[14]

> In Washington, nuclear weapons have become an afterthought for policymakers and military leadership alike. If U.S. nuclear forces were a stock, its price would have collapsed in the 1990s, and its value would remain near an all-time low.

With respect to nuclear command and control issues, there are two areas of concern. The first is access to space, upon which many U.S. military capabilities rely. The shrinking launch schedules due to commercial satellite providers, decreasing military and NASA missile launches, and an aging workforce mean that fewer individuals have participated in a successful launch and know the difficulties that may be encountered and how to solve them. Second, the aging workforce also hinders the government's ability to gauge nuclear weapons effects on systems. As the DSB recognizes:

> Today, the number of individuals working on the various C4ISR [Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] programs who have worried about system or subsystem vulnerabilities to EMP [Electromagnetic Pulse]—including black-out,

red-out, or other nuclear weapon-induced effects—continues to decline, and the people with these skill sets are not being replaced.[15]

These vulnerabilities, moreover, will almost certainly increase if they are not addressed immediately, because many of the people who addressed EMP vulnerability during the Cold War are retiring.

When it comes to strategic forces—including warheads and delivery systems—the United States is faring even worse, for three major reasons. First, spending on nuclear weapons systems has declined significantly in the post-Cold War period, and is now the smallest share of the defense budget since the 1940s. The decline has been greatest in nuclear offensive strike systems. For these systems, funding has fallen to 4 percent of DoD's total current budget. In 1991, the United States funded the last SSBN and the last *Peacekeeper* ICBM; and, in 1993, it bought the last B-2 of its fleet. So, funding has declined, while each component of the triad has aged.

The second major problem is the nuclear warheads themselves. At the present time, the key challenge for the United States is ensuring the reliability of its strategic arsenal. The Bush administration opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but did not break our country's nearly twenty-year moratorium on nuclear testing. As a result, the nuclear weapons labs are confronted with the momentous challenge of ensuring reliability without the scientific evidence that only testing can provide.

Congress, meanwhile, has consistently reduced and/or eliminated funding for nuclear modernization programs, including the Reliable Replace-

ment Warhead (RRW) program. In September 2008, Congress refused once again to fund RRW. Opposition on Capitol Hill has been bipartisan. Only a handful of members, such as Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL), and Representative Terry Everett (R-AL), have consistently voted to fund critical modernization efforts such as RRW. Fortunately, the Obama administration shows signs that it could spur greater attention to this issue. Writing in the January/February 2009 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates indicated as much when he challenged congressional inaction on the RRW, stating that "Congress needs to do its part by funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program—for safety, for security, and for a more reliable deterrent."[16]

Toward a nuclear renaissance

In the post-Cold War world, the United States will continue to depend on its strategic nuclear forces to accomplish its grand strategic goals. That will become increasingly difficult if it does not act—and act now—to redress the key vulnerabilities in its arsenal. While these vulnerabilities may not receive significant attention in the press, they are noticed by the allies and foes of the United States. Nuclear weapons remain a tremendous source of power in the international system. Quite simply, states with nuclear weapons are treated differently than those without them.

America currently shows few signs of understanding this reality. There are no new ICBMs or SLBMs under development, and the U.S. targets no states with its missiles. B-2 production has halted, and no U.S. bombers are on alert. Many strategic and tactical nuclear weapons

programs have been canceled. U.S. Army, Marines, and Navy surface and air components are out of the nuclear weapons business. There has been a reduction of over 85 percent in the number of NATO sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe as their delivery systems have dropped from eleven to one.

The upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—both of which will be gearing up in the coming months—present a major opportunity for the Obama administration to ameliorate America's deteriorating nuclear weapons enterprise. Modernization of the entire nuclear enterprise should be the chief priority of these strategic policy documents.

The stakes could not be higher. The overwhelming military superiority of the United States is not guaranteed into perpetuity. Eventually, as its nuclear capabilities and skills atrophy, the United States will lose the great advantages it now possesses, because other nuclear states will continue to modernize their arsenals and maintain robust nuclear infrastructure. And, once lost, recapturing a credible extended deterrent capability will be increasingly difficult for America to accomplish.

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NOT SAVED BY "ZERO"

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

Barack Obama ran for the presidency in 2008 on a platform of change and hope. Now that he occupies the White House, President Obama has unveiled his intention to effect the most sweeping change in the U.S. security posture since the end of World War II. Namely, he proposes to rid the world of nuclear weapons—including, of course, those of the United States.

Within hours of Mr. Obama's inauguration, a posting on the White House web site declared: "[President] Obama and [Vice President Joe] Biden will set a goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and pursue it... [They will] show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons."[1]

This goal is now the object not only of Team Obama, but of a well-funded international initiative dubbed the "Global Zero Campaign." It is all about hope. Hope that every nuclear nation and wannabe will agree to embrace denuclearization. Hope that an agreement can be fashioned that will be verifiable, as well as universal. And, not least, hope that the world will be a safer place, rather than a more dangerous one.

But in fact, under present and foreseeable circumstances, the idea of global nuclear disarmament brings to mind Samuel Johnson's characterization of second marriages, which he called "the triumph of hope over experience." Analysis rooted in hard experience leaves little basis for such hopes—and abundant grounds for fearing that American security and that of many others

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who rely upon our nuclear deterrent for *their* security will be gravely and adversely affected by such a denuclearization campaign.

Unfortunately, there is a dirty little secret about the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Even in the absence of a Global Zero outcome, the United States is on a glide slope towards the inexorable denuclearization of the American arsenal.

As a practical matter we have, over the past seventeen years, unilaterally observed what amounts to the sort of "nuclear freeze" promoted by anti-nuclear activists in the early 1980s and adamantly rejected at the time by President Ronald Reagan. And just as the former intended, and the latter warned, this de facto freeze has had a devastating impact on our nuclear posture and the deterrent it is supposed to constitute.

Erosion by design

To be sure, it is difficult to point to any single action taken by President Obama's three immediate predecessors, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton or George W. Bush—certainly any *public* one—that officially, formally declared it to be the policy of the United States to go out of the nuclear weapons business.

To the contrary, there have been numerous documents issued by administrations of both parties—notably, President George W. Bush's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and a White Paper jointly released by the Defense and Energy Departments late in his second term—that insist we will need effective nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. Needless to say, we also still have thousands of these weapons in our stockpile.

Yet, there is no getting around a portentous fact. Since we stopped testing nuclear weapons in 1992, we have systematically, if incrementally, pursued a path the late Rep. Floyd Spence, then-chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, once called "erosion by design."[2]

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During this period, we have: undertaken no underground nuclear testing; allowed the steady obsolescence without replacement of the stockpile; and looked the other way as our capability to engage in new weapons production atrophied, the industrial complex deteriorated and virtually everyone in that enterprise who once had *direct* experience with the design, testing and production of nuclear weapons either died or retired. The cumulative effect has been indisputable: Today, whether we acknowledge it or not, we have put ourselves as a nation squarely on the path to unilateral denuclearization. All other things being equal, it is just a matter of time until we are effectively finished as a nuclear power.

Many have been responsible for this state of affairs, including successive administrations and Congresses under both political parties. Particu-

larly insidious, however, has been the role played by the past and present chairmen of the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, Reps. David Hobson and Peter Visclosky, respectively. These legislators have used their positions on Capitol Hill to block—mostly out of public view—such modest measures as were sought by the George W. Bush team to help keep our nuclear arsenal a going concern, notably: the development of a "Reliable Replacement Warhead"; the construction of a new manufacturing facility for the "pits" at the core of thermonuclear weapons; and the implementation of steps needed to improve our nation's readiness for resumed underground nuclear testing.

The cumulative effect of these congressional actions, and the failure of the Bush administration to reverse them while in office, has been, as a practical matter, to preclude modernization of the U.S. nuclear stockpile—and to render the scientific and engineering personnel critical to the industrial complex upon which it depends under-employed, demoralized and with good reason to seek more engaging work elsewhere. Taken together, the end result is as ominous as it is predictable: The hollowing out and irreversible obsolescence of our nuclear arsenal.

Such actions are extraordinarily reckless, given their negative impact upon the country's ability to continue to field a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent. The fact that they have largely been taken without public scrutiny or appreciable debate only compounds the damage they will inflict upon the national interest.

Matters are made still worse by the geostrategic context in which these trends are being allowed to continue and accelerate: We live in a world in which, far from seeing widespread movement towards global nuclear disarmament, *every other declared nuclear weapons state is modernizing its nuclear forces*. Of particular concern is the fact that the Russian and Chinese strategic force modernization initiatives are being accompanied by more assertive foreign policies.

Meanwhile, various nuclear wannabes—including the planet's most dangerous rogue states—are acquiring the means to produce such arms. And the likelihood is growing by the day that terrorists will get their hands on "dirty" radioactive bombs and perhaps crude atomic weapons.

The mirage of "global zero"

The obvious danger posed by such proliferation has prompted some, including a number of former senior U.S. government officials who should know better (such as former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz) to insist that—rather than take corrective action—we should formally embrace the course of denuclearization upon which we have unofficially embarked. By so doing, they insist, we can persuade others to follow our example.

This sentiment is animating, and such eminences are providing political cover for, the Global Zero Campaign as a means of achieving this outcome via an international treaty. At a conference convened in Paris in December 2008, a gaggle of former officials and retired military officers from around the world endorsed the idea of negotiating a treaty we are assured will be verifiable and result in the elimination of all nuclear weapons by a date certain. Press reports from the meeting suggest that that date may be 20-25 years hence.

How such an agreement would be achieved remains unclear at this writing, as do virtually all of the details. Clearly, the Global Zeroists anticipate having all the world's nations sit down and negotiate an accord replete with timetables for dismantling arsenals and intrusive verification arrangements for ensuring that it is done universally and, presumably, irreversibly.

The problems inherent in such an undertaking are legion. Just to mention two: the improbability of all nations' agreeing to give up their nuclear arms or ambitions and the inherent difficulty in verifying compliance. With respect to the first, even a Global Zero enthusiast like former U.S. arms control negotiator Richard Burt felt constrained to acknowledge during a press conference after the Campaign's conclave in Paris in December: "It's a real showstopper" for this initiative if Iran gets a nuclear weapon.[3]

The obvious danger posed by proliferation has prompted some to insist that—rather than take corrective action—we should formally embrace the course of denuclearization upon which we have unofficially embarked. By so doing, they insist, we can persuade others to follow our example.

Regarding the second, the chances of negotiating the sort of on-site inspections that would be essential if there were to be any hope of truly monitoring a global ban on nuclear weapons are slim, to say the least. It is instructive that, last year, North Korea refused to entertain far less intrusive verification arrangements as part of the so-called "Six-Party"

disarmament talks. Given the stakes involved—there would be an enormous premium on cheating, as any nation that retained nuclear weapons after all the others had given theirs up would be uniquely powerful—anything less than perfect assurance of compliance would have to be seen as a "showstopper," too.

It seems likely that even a Democrat-controlled Senate would have difficulty getting a treaty ratified that, by definition, amounted to a program for unilateral U.S. nuclear disarmament, since one that is truly universal and verifiable cannot be negotiated. After all, just 34 Senators are needed to reject a treaty. Even with their depleted ranks following the 2008 elections, the Republican caucus should be able to muster sufficient GOP votes—and perhaps even a few from across the aisle—to defeat a manifestly defective Global Zero treaty.

Plan B

The Global Zeroists may opt, therefore, for an alternative approach known as the "Ottawa" model, after the location of its first application: the 1997 conclave that produced the so-called "global ban" on anti-personnel land mines.

At Ottawa and in a number of subsequent gambits, activist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) joined forces with official delegations from various nations for the purpose of formally establishing "international norms." These norms purport to place beyond the pale whatever weapons the sponsors find morally repugnant or otherwise objectionable.

The Ottawa process works like this: A global conference is convened for the purpose of adopting an accord "ridding the world" of the weapons in question. Participants—whether official or unofficial—typically have

nothing to lose from such an agreement. The non-governmental participants, of course, do not have such weapons and can give full expression to their sanctimonious morality in denouncing them. Participants representing governments typically fall into two categories: 1) Those whose nations do not have such weapons either and, therefore, feel free to demand that others *who do* give them up or 2) those whose arsenals include those arms, but have no intention of eliminating their stockpiles in a verifiable way.

For the latter, typically including the Russians and Chinese, these conclaves are exercises in pure cynicism. Secure in the knowledge that they can block any measure that might actually interfere with their weapons programs and lethal capabilities, these nations exploit such initiatives as opportunities to weaken potential adversaries—most especially, the United States.

Once the parties hammer out what amounts to a hortatory condemnation and wholly unverifiable ban of the particular class of weapons—for example, "eliminating" anti-personnel land mines or, more recently, cluster munitions—they pronounce that all nations should adhere to the accord or risk being deemed uncivilized. The NGOs and their allies in subscribing governments then try to compel holdouts to conform via negative publicity.

For its part, the Obama administration is unlikely to require much pressure to go along with Global Zero, even if the form it takes is an Ottawa-style "norm." After all, Team Obama is on record as favoring the denuclearization agenda. That being the case, the new President and his subordinates—far from being reluctant adherents—might be inclined to

play a leading role in negotiating such an international accord, if only as a stopgap for and catalyst to the negotiation of an actual treaty. At the very least, such a norm would help justify the steps towards denuclearization that Messrs. Obama and Biden have already espoused.

The chances of negotiating the sort of on-site inspections that would be essential if there were to be any hope of truly monitoring a global ban on nuclear weapons are slim, to say the least. Given the stakes involved, there would be an enormous premium on cheating, as any nation that retained nuclear weapons after eall the others had given theirs up would be uniquely powerful.

Now, it must be noted that the Obama White House web site insists that "Obama and Biden will always maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist."[4] Yet, the site also declares that the Obama-Biden team will take actions that belie, or at least are wholly inconsistent with, that commitment.

For example, it declares that the President and Vice President "will take several steps down the long road toward eliminating nuclear weapons. They will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair trigger alert; seek dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material; and set a goal to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global."[5]

These pledges are hardy perennials of the anti-nuclear Left. They have long been championed by that community as a means of catalyzing the process of disarming the United States' nuclear arsenal. Were they to be adopted, the problems associated with the seventeen-year-old unilateral U.S. "nuclear freeze" would be greatly, and probably irreversibly, compounded.

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Sanity check

The Obama administration's promises and proposals for denuclearization give rise to several important questions with which the American people and their elected representatives must swiftly come to grips.

Since the U.S. is disarming anyway, what incentive is there for *any*—let alone *all*—of the other declared nuclear powers actually to agree to denuclearize? Even if they all do, will we have confidence that they are living up to their agreements? What about the rogue state nuclear wannabes: Will they verifiably give up their ambitions and programs? Until such time as *all* nuclear weapons are eliminated, will the continuing attrition of the U.S. nuclear deterrent make an attack on us or our allies less—or *more*—likely? Assuming we could somehow achieve the

sort of denuclearization Mr. Obama seeks and eliminate not only our arsenal but that of all other nations, would we simply make the world safe for *conventional* war?

The answers to such questions share a common denominator: U.S. security will not be served by perpetuating, let alone formalizing, the denuclearization explicitly espoused by President Barack Obama and his administration. As we have already discussed, there is no chance that a real, effective, global and verifiable ban on nuclear weapons can be negotiated. The Ottawa alternative would be a fraud, a placebo that simply lowers our guard while doing nothing to enhance our security.

Those allied nations and peoples around the world who rely upon our extended deterrent umbrella are rightly anxious that further erosion in our nuclear arsenal will pose a danger to them, as well as to us. Some have signaled that they would feel constrained under the circumstances to develop their own nuclear arsenals in the hope of offsetting our weakness. Such proliferation is the very antithesis of the Global Zeroists' objective, yet it is a predictable response to their agenda.

Even if we could somehow achieve the global and verified elimination of nuclear weapons, the best that could be hoped for is not terribly appetizing: A world in which nations can once again contemplate with impunity launching cataclysmic wars in which non-nuclear weapons are employed with devastating effects.

Needed: a sound alternative

These conclusions suggest that a wholesale course-correction is needed with regard to our nuclear

posture. Several commissions have been empanelled in recent months by the Defense Department and Congress to evaluate the adequacy of U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy, programs and policies. A new Nuclear Posture Review will be performed within the next year by the Obama administration.

In support of these efforts, a distinguished team of policy and technical experts have joined forces under the sponsorship of the Center for Security Policy in what has been dubbed the New Deterrent Working Group. Last year, the Group submitted to members of these commissions and congressional leaders a White Paper entitled "Towards a New Deterrent."[6] It made the following recommendations for changes designed to promote peace by restoring and maintaining the strength of the U.S. deterrent and its supporting human and industrial infrastructure:

- The President should make forthwith a public statement pronouncing the need for the foreseeable future to maintain a nuclear deterrent that is safe, reliable and effective—and our government's intention and determination to do so.

- The design and production of the Reliable Replacement Warhead should be approved at once.

- A national debate should be undertaken immediately aimed at engendering consensus regarding: the nature of deterrence; its abiding importance in U.S. foreign and national security strategy; the role of nuclear weapons in that strategy; and the characteristics and quantities of weapons needed today and tomorrow.

- Work should be initiated on advanced nuclear weapons technology, including so-called "fourth-generation" weapons optimized for present and emerging deterrence missions.

- The Defense Department must once again regard the nuclear deterrent mission as a priority, and resource and staff it accordingly. Statements to that effect last year by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force are welcome, as is the recently released White Paper issued jointly by the Defense and Energy Departments entitled "National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century."

- A commitment must be made to design, develop and introduce follow-on delivery systems so as to ensure the continued viability of all three legs of the strategic Triad.

- We need a sustained effort by the Pentagon, in conjunction with the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration, to assure that we have the capacity on a continuing basis to design, test and produce new nuclear weapons, as well as to assure over time the viability of our deterrent. That includes a hot production line capable of supporting multiple warhead designs and a new pit facility. It also requires that we reestablish a cadre of nuclear specialists, both civilian and military, with the requisite skill sets to maintain an effective deterrent and the properly funded, modern industrial complex needed to support it.

Instead of what amounts to a preoccupation with dismantling our nuclear forces—which does nothing to discourage the spread of nuclear forces elsewhere, America, as one of the Non-Proliferation Treaty-designated nuclear weapons states, must act to *enforce* the NPT, doing so unilaterally if other declared states will not. The present approach will lead inexorably to the end of our extended deterrence, a development that will have the effect of *promoting* proliferation, not curbing it.

- Nuclear weapons effects tests are needed, including underground nuclear testing, especially to understand our vulnerabilities to electromagnetic pulse attacks. Under no circumstances should we deny ourselves the right and the ability to conduct nuclear tests— whether in exchange for research and development funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead or on some other pretext.

- We need as well a course-correction regarding proliferation: Instead of what amounts to a preoccupation with dismantling our nuclear forces—which does nothing to discourage the spread of nuclear forces elsewhere, America, as one of the Non-Proliferation Treaty-designated nuclear weapons states, must act to *enforce* the NPT, doing so unilaterally if other declared states will not. The present approach will lead inexorably to the end

of our extended deterrence, a development that will have the effect of *promoting* proliferation, not curbing it.

Peace in the 21st century will require abiding American nuclear strength rooted in the foregoing measures. We can only hope that President Obama will be open to changes along these lines as he becomes more familiar with present and prospective international realities.

To be clear, such strength is a necessary condition, although not assuredly a *sufficient* one. On the other hand, unilateral disarmament— whether via continuing, stealthy denuclearization or a Global Zero accord or something in between—is a formula for a world with more and more dangerous nuclear stockpiles elsewhere, and the growing likelihood that such weapons will be used against us and our friends.

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THE ART OF (CYBER) WAR

Brian M. Mazanec

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly developing and fielding advanced capabilities in cyberspace. These capabilities are focused not only on collecting sensitive information, but also on achieving military effects capable of causing economic harm, damaging critical infrastructure, and influencing the outcome of conventional armed conflicts.

China, in other words, is interested in cyberwarfare as a tool of national power, and is greatly improving its capabilities to conduct military operations in cyberspace. In its most recent report to Congress on China's military power, the Pentagon noted that "China's strategic strike capabilities… are expanding from the land, air, and sea dimensions of the traditional battlefield into the… cyber-space domains."[1] Understanding China's cyberwarfare strategy will provide valuable insight into its future ambitions, principally in light of the U.S.'s heavy reliance on the cyberspace domain from both a military and economic standpoint.

The roots of Chinese cyberwarfare

In many ways, China's contemporary focus on cyberwarfare is an extension of traditional Chinese stratagems, namely Sun Tzu's "overcoming the superior with the inferior" (i.e., asymmetric warfare) and Chairman Mao Zedong's con-

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cept of "People's War." It is intimately connected to the country's broader geopolitical strategic interests: regime survival; dominance in the Asia/Pacific region; growing influence on a global level; and prevention of Taiwan's independence, coupled with its ultimate assimilation into the PRC.[2]

Cyberwarfare has been a pillar of Chinese military strategy since the early 1990s, when the Gulf War provided China's leaders with a painfully clear example of the importance of technological superiority and the advantage "informationalized" forces possess over their less advanced opponents. PRC strategists quickly came to embrace the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and believed the future of warfare would increasingly rely on denying or degrading an enemy's information flow, rather than simple kinetic firepower. This is particularly true when one considers a theoretical Sino-U.S. conflict, in which U.S. military power would be difficult if not impossible to defeat head-on. Thus, in their infamous 1999 manifesto, *Unrestricted Warfare*, People's Liberation Army (PLA) Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui proposed a form of warfare that "transcends all boundaries and limits," and exploits the central role that cyberspace plays in future conflict.[3]

A decade on, the results are striking. In recent years, the PRC has steadily leveraged its rapidly growing economy to advance its capabilities to act in cyberspace. As Richard Lawless, then Deputy Undersecretary for Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, noted back in 2007: "Chinese capabilities in this area have evolved from defending networks from attack to offensive operations against adversary networks… [They are] leveraging information technology expertise available in China's booming economy to make significant strides in cyberwarfare."[4]

Beijing's notorious lack of transparency regarding its armed forces

Summary of nation-state cyberwarfare capabilities

	China	India	Iran	N. Korea	Pakistan	Russia
Official cyberwarfare doctrine	X	X			*Probable*	X
Cyberwarfare training	X	X	X		X	
Cyberwarfare exercises/simulations	X	X				
Collaberation with IT industry and/or technical universities	X	X	X		X	X
IT road map	*likely*	X				
Information warfare units	X	X		X		
Record of hacking other nations	X					X

Adapted from Charles Billo and Welton Chang, "Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States," Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, December 2004.

has made the scope of China's cyber-warfare capabilities difficult to determine. What is clear, however, is that the PRC is heavily investing in cyber-warfare relative to other nations. Equally evident is that their investments are paying major dividends. According to a 2008 study by Dartmouth College's Institute for Security Technology Studies, China alone among other potential U.S. competitors has developed the full spectrum of capabilities and practices for cyber-space dominance and cyberwarfare.[5]

China's leaders did not develop this capability overnight. Their interest in cyberwarfare led to a sustained investment in asymmetric disruptive capabilities. As early as 2003, the PLA had already organized its first cyberwarfare units.[6] Since then, these cadres have leveraged China's economy to force IT companies, most significantly Microsoft, to reveal sensitive and proprietary information regarding their software and applications.[7] This information allows the PLA to utilize "zero-day" security flaws in Microsoft Office applications that exploit unknown or un-patched software vulnerabilities before the vendor patch is available.[8] It also greatly enhances the PRC's ability to plant malicious software designed to collect sensitive information or potentially damage networks and infrastructure.

Perhaps the best example of China's burgeoning cyberwarfare capabilities is known as Titan Rain. The Titan Rain cyber attacks occurred from 2003 to 2005, and involved systematic intrusions into hundreds of U.S. government computers and the computer networks of America's Western European allies. The U.S. media reported that the intrusions originated from three routers in the PRC's Guangdong province, and unofficial statements from senior U.S. officials leave little doubt that this was a highly sophisticated state-sanctioned Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) attack from the PRC intended to exfiltrate huge amounts of sensitive data.[9] While these CNE attacks are damaging and pose serious risks for U.S. national security, they are less troubling when compared to the looming threat of Chinese Computer Network Attacks (CNA), which seek to move beyond cyber-espionage in order to achieve real-world military effects in a true cyberwar.

Why China wages cyberwar

China's interest in achieving military effects via cyberwarfare begins with deterrence. The goal is not to deter other nations from conducting cyberwarfare against the PRC; rather, it is to use the threat of cyberwarfare to deter an actor from behaving in a manner that is in opposition to Chinese strategic interests.

In the near term, the PRC's primary focus is the question of an independent Taiwan. Chinese planners seek to use cyberwarfare to deter U.S. military involvement in a hostile reunification scenario with Taiwan.[10] One advantage of threatening strategic cyberwarfare for a deterrence impact is that it is a more realistic threat when compared to the threat of other strategic weapons such as nuclear weapons. It is highly implausible that the PRC would use its limited *force de frappe* to keep the U.S. out of the Formosa Strait, especially in light of its no-first-use policy.[11] But a strategic cyberwarfare attack, with less international stigma and a likely more restrained retaliatory response, is more credible. Furthermore, the challenge of attribution in cyberspace provides China with plausible deni-

ability and makes cyberwarfare all the more attractive. "Independent" patriotic hackers, cultivated and loosely controlled as a 21st-century version of Mao's "People's War," provide the perfect mechanism to give the PRC cyber threat credibility.

Deterrence theory has been largely associated with nuclear policy, but its application extends to cyberwarfare. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union adopted a survivable nuclear force to present a credible deterrent that maintained the "uncertainty" inherent in a strategic balance as understood through the accepted theories of Herman Kahn and, later, Thomas Schelling. This arguably prevented a world war through the threat of massive nuclear retaliation—a formula commonly known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Deterrence can be both offensive (such as MAD) or defensive (deterrence by denial) and based on neutralizing or mitigating the adversary's undesired action/threat so as to credibly remove the perception that benefits would result from the action.

When one assesses PRC cyberwarfare deterrence, the focus is on the offensive side of the spectrum. For deterrence to function, the target of deterrence must be a rational actor, which certainly is the case with the U.S. In fact, the transparency inherent in U.S. society and government decision-making ensure that its calculus in a conflict such as one associated with Taiwan would be relatively easy to discern. This only increases the appeal of using cyberwarfare to achieve successful deterrence. Targets held at risk to achieve deterrence are divided into counterforce and countervalue, the former holding a military target at risk and the latter targeting civilian infrastructure and population or anything else the adversary values.

China believes strategic cyberwarfare is capable of targeting both of these segments to achieve significant deterrence effects.

The PRC cyber-threat is not limited to the mere threat of counterforce/countervalue cyberwarfare to deter an adversary such as the U.S., however. For the deterrent effects discussed above to be legitimate and credible, China must actually be prepared to follow through with the threatened punishment or action even if deterrence fails. It is likely to do so in response to one of three principal conflict scenarios.

War over Taiwan

The most likely scenario relates to Taiwan. In the event of an outbreak of hostilities with the island nation, the PLA can be expected to seek a quick knockout blow of Taiwan's defenses while simultaneously delaying U.S. armed forces' entry into the Formosa Strait and then degrading their ability to fight if/once they have arrived. James Mulvenon, an expert on Chinese cyberwarfare, has outlined the probable situation as follows:

> For the PLA, using [information warfare] against U.S. information systems to degrade or even delay a deployment of forces to Taiwan offers an attractive asymmetric strategy. American forces are highly information-dependent and rely heavily on precisely coordinated logistics networks… If PLA information operators… were able to hack or crash these systems, thereby delaying the arrival of a U.S. carrier battle group to the theater, while simultaneously carrying out a coordinated campaign of short-range ballistic missile attacks, "fifth column" and [information warfare] attacks against Taiwanese critical infrastructure, then Taipei might be quickly brought to its knees and forced to capitulate to Beijing.[12]

Limited PRC cyberwarfare would likely target U.S. logistics as the opening salvo of the conflict. The PRC believes both that U.S. logistical processes are the most vulnerable aspect of military activity, and that U.S. operational vulnerabilities are greatest during the early deployment phase of war. This preemptive approach can be described as part of the Chinese strategy of "gaining mastery before the enemy has struck" (*xianfa zhiren*).[13] In this scenario, Chinese cyberwarfare would seek to slow down the deployment of additional U.S. forces required to engage the PLA with overwhelming force in the defense of Taiwan (via misdirection of U.S. matériel stores or delay of re-supply efforts). And because of the U.S. aversion to casualties and continued belief in the so-called "Powell Doctrine" of only engaging an adversary with overwhelming maximal force required for quick success, the U.S. would not likely engage on a large scale until additional forces were forward deployed and re-supply processes established. This could ultimately buy the PRC an additional week or longer before U.S. military forces were brought to bear, creating a decisive window of opportunity to seize Taiwan and dramatically increase the cost of U.S. involvement.

Assuming such a preemptive scenario is unsuccessful, the PRC could seek to use cyberwarfare more overtly to attack U.S. military technologies directly. Such an attack would be focused on the accuracy, timeliness and reliability of information upon which U.S. forces depend (i.e., C4ISR systems). This approach was described by PRC scholars in their 2000 Science of Campaigns report:

> The goal of information warfare is, at the critical time and region related to overall campaign operations, to cut off the enemy's ability to obtain, control, and use information, to influence, reduce, and even destroy the enemy's capabilities of observing, decision-making, and commanding and controlling troops, while we maintain our own ability to command and control in order to seize information superiority, and to produce the strategic and campaign superiority, creating conditions for winning the decisive battle.[14]

This tactical application of PRC cyberwarfare is a highly evolved form of Chairman Mao Zedong's dictum that China must "seal up the enemies' eyes and ears, and make them become blind and deaf, and we must as far as possible confuse the minds of their commanders and turn them into madmen, using this to achieve our own victory."[15] It would effectively increase Clausewitz's "fog of war" for the U.S., while reducing it for the PLA.

Regional conflicts in Asia

PRC cyberwarfare capabilities are not exclusively valuable to a conflict with the U.S. The PRC could find itself in limited wars with a nation other than the U.S., where its current U.S.-focused cyberwarfare capabilities could also prove advantageous.

India is the most likely adversary in such a regional scenario. Relations between China and India have been marked by political tensions ever since the two countries went to war in 1962 over a still disputed region of the Himalayan border in Arunachal Pradesh. The PLA was largely successful in defeating the Indian military in that conflict, but skirmishes continued into the late 1980s and the issue remains unsettled today. In the mid-1990s, the PRC and India signed the Sino-

Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords promoting stability along the "Line of Actual Control" in the border conflict.[16] Despite this progress, the PLA maintains a growing presence in the region and many anticipate future conflicts between the two economically rising giants.

India is an increasingly high-tech nation reliant on cyberspace. It has over 60 million Internet users, with its use growth rate exceeding that of China.[17] Much of India's impressive economic growth is due to globalization and the ability to reliably connect to the rest of the world via cyberspace and IT systems. If the PRC could credibly threaten cyberwarfare against Indian civilian targets in cyberspace, it has the potential to succeed in deterring India from opposing its interests. If deterrence failed, the PRC would have an effective tool to strike at the heart of India's growth and thus severely erode its will to fight.

Militarily, New Delhi is also vulnerable. While the Indian military is nowhere near as advanced as that of the U.S., it is a relatively modern fighting force—with all of the vulnerabilities that that entails. The PLA could use its cyberwarfare capabilities to leverage those shortfalls as part of a limited regional war. Beyond the Arunachal Pradesh border dispute, the PRC could covertly or overtly leverage its cyberwarfare capabilities in support of Pakistan during a potential Pakistani-Indian conflict.

Conflict between China and India will be increasingly likely as both rise in terms of relative power over the coming decades. As India develops into an armed power with global aspirations and an increasing reliance on cyberspace, the PRC will benefit from being able to hold Indian targets at risk via the threat of cyberwarfare. Such capabilities will not only provide a strategic advantage in conflicts with the U.S. and India, but also with any other modern power with which the PRC comes into conflict.

Total war

The most severe application of PRC cyberwarfare would, for obvious reasons, occur in the context of an unlimited total war with the U.S. Such a conflict would witness the full display of all PLA capabilities, both conventional and asymmetric, and potentially even nuclear.

It should be noted, however, that such a scenario is exceedingly unlikely. According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, PRC leaders believe future wars "will be limited in geographical scope, duration, and political objectives, and will be highly dependent on command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems."[18] Yet the catastrophic effects of such a confrontation suggest that, however remote, the scenario warrants examination.

PRC cyberwarfare during total war with the U.S. would include a massive strategic cyberwarfare campaign aimed at the U.S. homeland. In 2001, senior analysts at the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) and NATO published an article highlighting the broad and unrestricted nature of such a strategic cyberwarfare attack:

> An unrestricted cyber campaign would almost certainly be directed primarily against the target country's critical national infrastructure: energy, transportation, finance, water, communications, emergency services and the information infrastructure itself. It would likely cross boundaries between government and private sectors, and, if sophisticated and coordinated, would

have both immediate impact and delayed consequences. Ultimately, an unrestricted cyber attack would likely result in significant loss of life, as well as economic and social degradation.[19]

What would such a campaign look like? Back in 2002, Professionals for Cyber Defense (PCD), a private cybersecurity group, assembled a planning team to model a realistic strategic cyberwarfare attack on the U.S. Their scenario, called Dark Angel, assumed an attacker would have modest funding ($500 million) and would be focused on destabilizing the U.S. in order to reduce the U.S. ability to project military power and deplete the will to fight.[20] The validated Dark Angel attack targeted rail transportation, oil and gas pipelines, difficult-to-replace power infrastructure, financial service systems, emergency service systems such as 911, and disabled general Internet service.

Chinese cyberwarfare would likely resemble this scenario, without suffering from many of the constraints associated with it. In a total war with the U.S., the PRC would have no need to cloak its actions and would use the full extent of its capability (well beyond those postulated in Dark Angel). Eliminating these financial and political limitations would allow the PRC to destroy as much cyber-based infrastructure as possible in an attempt to throw the U.S. economy into chaos, which would simultaneously degrade the U.S.'s ability and will to wage a protracted total war. Such an attack would likely be modeled after the reinvigorated concept of "People's War" mentioned earlier. Estimates indicate China has 50,000 Internet police and 50,000 military hackers in place or being trained, who will populate over 250 cyber units.[21] Additionally, China has more

than a quarter-billion Internet users, many of whom could be employed as patriotic hackers or whose computers could be utilized by the government as part of a Distributed Denial of Service attack.[22] All of these individuals could be used in a strategic cyberwarfare first strike meant to cripple the U.S., just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sought to do decades earlier. The PRC could also augment these efforts with electronic warfare-based cyberwarfare, potentially using non-nuclear or even nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons delivered by covert means to key infrastructure nodes in North America. Furthermore, because computer networks and IT systems are extremely interconnected, such an attack would have global consequences.

Strategic cyberwarfare attacks during a total war with the U.S. would destroy critical infrastructure and wreak economic havoc, but their most critical impact may be on the will of the U.S. population. By creating a chronic loss of services such as power, emergency response, television and telephony across the U.S., citizens would suffer a loss of confidence in the U.S. government. Individuals would question the status and security of their personal finances in savings and retirement accounts, and uncertainty could lead to rioting and hoarding that would act as a force multiplier, further stressing an already damaged infrastructure. The PRC would be in a position to fuel this chaos further by conducting psychological operations within the U.S. through covert means.

Forging a U.S. response

As the discussion above shows, China's interest goes well beyond simply utilizing cyberspace as a tool for espionage. The PRC is seriously

pursuing cyberwarfare capabilities in order to achieve military effects in deterrence, limited war, and total war scenarios. These scenarios—and PRC cyberwarfare capabilities in general—merit serious consideration by U.S. defense planners and senior leaders.

The U.S.'s response should start with an allied effort to defend cyberspace. Such a step is logical; since cyberwarfare is global in reach, so must be the response. In order to be truly preventive and effective, operations will need to be coordinated among many allied states on many different levels. This recommendation was embraced by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which stressed in its 2007 report that Congress should "urge the Administration to engage in consultations with its allies on an alliance-based approach to China's cyber attacks."[23]

The good news is that multilateral defensive measures should prove popular with U.S. allies as they would not necessarily require a costly financial investment as do many traditional military capabilities. Instead, simply granting access and authorities or modifying Information Assurance (IA) tactics, techniques and procedures can have a significant impact. This is welcome news to many NATO members, whose budgets are already spread thin due to changing demographics and costly social safety nets.

Such movement, moreover, is already visible. Following the 2007 cyberwarfare attack on Estonia, NATO began to invest in the defense of cyberspace, and Allied nations have more publicly acknowledged the need to secure networks, particularly in light of PRC cyber intrusions. These early steps should be augmented by additional ones intended to identify, defend against and defeat future cyber threats on a multilat-

eral level. After all, given the unique global nature of cyberspace, isolation in confronting cyberwarfare is likely to be even more dangerous than isolation in the face of traditional threats.

Simultaneously, the U.S. needs to demonstrate a strengthened commitment to defend Taiwan. The current U.S. pledge to defend Taiwan's right to self-determination and independence is ambiguous at best. The Taiwan Relations Act fails to provide a clear security commitment to the island nation, and simply states that any existential threat to Taiwan would be a "grave concern" to the U.S.[24] Some have argued that this vague commitment is helpful because it provides Washington with the "strategic ambiguity" necessary to deter any action while providing for a flexible U.S. response. This ambiguity, however, is likely to be interpreted by the PRC as an indication that Taiwan is at the very least less of an essential national priority than was the defense of Europe during the Cold War. Reestablishing an agreement similar to the 1955 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty would send a strong signal to the PRC that the U.S. will defend Taiwan, regardless of the PLA's capabilities to inflict harm, in cyberspace or otherwise.

In addition to reducing the possibility of miscalculation regarding the status of Taiwan, the U.S. should undertake an effort to develop a declaratory policy which would ensure clarity of the costs associated with conducting cyberwarfare against the U.S. and its interests. Such a policy should not only promise retaliation in kind—cyberwarfare in response to cyberwarfare—but also include the full spectrum of military options in response. This would signal to the world that the U.S. is serious about cyberwarfare and truly does consider it on par with traditional WMD

usage given the scope of the threat to U.S. critical infrastructure. Strategic ambiguity may be useful in formulating nuclear posture, due in part to the stigma associated with nuclear weapons and their utility in mitigating the conventional Soviet advantage during the Cold War, but the nature of the cyberwarfare threat requires more explicit guarantees of U.S. military action in response. This policy should also include a provision making it clear that harboring "independent" cyberwarfare attackers is tantamount to the state's launching the attack itself.

The U.S. should also engage in direct talks with the PRC in order to ensure total clarity on how the U.S. would respond to cyberwarfare. This bilateral dialogue should include discussions on important topics such as threat reduction mechanisms, the laws of warfare, and, specifically, how the laws of warfare apply to cyberspace and any red lines that may exist.

Perhaps the most obvious recommendation to address the threat posed by Chinese cyberwarfare is to develop and strengthen U.S. capabilities in cyberspace, both of a defensive and offensive nature. Within the United States military, the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is the global synchronizer for cyberspace operations and is reportedly already pursuing greater offensive capabilities under its Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO).[25] Currently, military units from Air Force Space Command (to which the cyber mission was recently reassigned), the developing Navy Cyber Forces Command, and the provisional Army Network Warfare Battalion are working with other U.S. cyberwarfare professionals to establish a durable interagency structure for coordination on cyber threats.[26] Since in cyberspace, even more so than in other domains, the best defense is a good offense, these units, working under USSTRATCOM and the JTF-GNO, must continue to develop the tools that could be used to disable the PRC's own cyberwarfare capabilities in the early stages of a conflict.

Finally, the U.S. military must continue to foster flexibility that will prepare men and women in uniform to adapt and respond if IT processes fail or become unreliable due to a cyberwarfare attack. This effort can be considered a hardening of the target of sorts, in this case the actual personnel who use the systems dependent on cyberspace. Old fashioned skills utilizing pre-printed field manuals, phones, paper and pencils should remain viable, albeit less efficient, avenues to compensate for systems brought down in a cyberwarfare attack. These "Plan B" tactics, moreover, should be regularly exercised. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently cautioned, the U.S. should be modest about what technology can accomplish: "…the advances in precision, sensor, information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do… But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political and human dimensions of warfare, which are inevitably tragic, inefficient and uncertain."[27] Gates' advice, although not focused specifically on cyberwarfare, should be taken to heart by those planning to avert or mitigate a catastrophic electronic attack on the United States.

Taking Chinese cyberwarfare seriously

The threat of cyberwarfare from the PRC is real and growing. The U.S. cannot afford to ignore the looming asymmetric threat from its rising peer competitor in Asia.

There is strong evidence that suggests the PRC cyberwarfare threat will increase in sophistication and severity as technology and the offensive advantage outpace cyber defense measures. China's interest in cyberwarfare extends beyond intelligence collection into attacks geared towards both the strategic and tactical disruption of U.S. power in order to gain an asymmetric advantage, and Beijing's investments in these capabilities is unlikely to diminish. All of which makes continued investments by the United States in both offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace essential to preserving both U.S. national security and U.S. freedom of action within this new domain.

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Finding Equilibrium on Iran

Mario Loyola

Last summer, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told then-Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama that Iran might be able to assemble a nuclear device by the end of 2009.[1] The controversial National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program, released by the U.S. intelligence community in November 2007, puts Iran closer to four years away from a nuclear weapon capability.[2] Either way, Iran looks set to achieve nuclear threshold capability—the point at which it has overcome all material and technical hurdles and can decide to weaponize in a matter of months—in the near future unless the West can bring significantly greater leverage to bear in the diplomacy of the Iran nuclear crisis.

One factor that has begun to compress the time horizon for Iran's attainment of threshold capability is Iran's growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU). According to its own declarations, Iran will have a sufficient quantity of LEU by the end of 2009 for a single warhead, if further enriched to weapons grade, and enough for several by the end of 2010. This stockpile will be mobile, easy to disperse, and difficult to detect. Therefore, as early as 2010, Iran's nuclear breakout could become virtually unstoppable.

Many commentators and policymakers—including Vice President Joseph Biden—have dismissed fears that Iran may use nuclear weapons, arguing that a strategy of deterrence is enough to keep the Iranian threat contained. This may be true in the case of an Iranian missile launch, but Iran could also man-

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ufacture a device and deliver it in an unconventional "terrorist" attack, directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, without leaving "fingerprints." Some commentators seem to assume that "nuclear forensics technology" would permit us to identify the source of a nuclear explosion.[3] But according to Michael May, former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which has helped pioneer such technology, forensic identification would be much more useful in ruling out a possible origin than in identifying it, and the science cannot provide a 100 percent positive ID.[4] For these and other reasons, Cold War strategies of containment and deterrence will not be as reliable in an age of nuclear terrorism as they were against Soviet ICBMs.

The dimension of the Iranian nuclear threat that deserves perhaps the most immediate consideration, however, is the broader strategic effect of a known or possible nuclear weapons capability. As the North Korean nuclear crisis shows, even the implied threat of such a capability has an enormous "counter-deterrent" effect. In 1994, when the threat of North Korea's conventional forces convinced the Clinton administration not to bomb the reactor at Yongbyon, we were virtually certain that the DPRK had no nuclear weapons. We would not know for sure that it had produced nuclear warheads until the summer of 2006, when it carried out a controlled explosion of a nuclear device. But in the intervening twelve years, the estimates of how close North Korea was to getting nukes slowly became irrelevant, as the U.S. national security establishment shifted incrementally to accommodate the increasingly inevitable North Korean nuclear breakout. In late 2004, one hawkish administration official privately admitted that the use of force to destroy North Korea's nuclear program had effectively disappeared as an option, given even the marginal possibility that North Korea might already have nukes and might retaliate by "incinerating Tokyo."[5]

The implied threat of nuclear weapons will allow Iran to assume an even more aggressive posture in the region. The Islamic Republic calls for the downfall of many Arab governments, and lays claim to Bahrain and other Persian Gulf territories outright; it has infiltrated into Iraq and (to a lesser extent) Afghanistan, with deadly results; through Hezbollah, Hamas, and its own Revolutionary Guard, it is pursuing a strategy of regional political hegemony and aggressive confrontation; and it is arguably responsible both for the 2006 Lebanon War and the more recent violence in Gaza. Iran clearly sees itself as a great power deserving of a greater strategic position, and is willing to achieve it aggressively and without negotiating in good faith. With a nuclear weapons capability in hand, the regime will feel much more "safe" in pursuing its aggressive strategy for regional hegemony, with effects that could dramatically destabilize an already unstable region.

Perhaps the most pernicious effect of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability will be to provide strength and survivability to the Islamic Revolution—the greatest force for extremism and instability in the Middle East. A regime that is increasingly unpopular at home, and that might otherwise soon see little choice but to moderate its policies, will seem much more lasting and entrenched once it has nuclear weapons. That would be a grievous blow to moderate forces in the region.

Enough carrots and sticks

Most commentators who endeavor to develop a response to Iran's nuclear ambitions tend towards a piecemeal analysis of "policy options." But the best diplomatic strategy is one that leverages a combination of such options towards the attainment of a favorable balance of power—a necessary precondition for a mutually favorable settlement. In his 1960 book *The Strategy of Conflict*, Thomas Schelling noted that situations of pure conflict are very rare. Normally, opposing sides in a conflict will have enough interests in common to make some mutually attractive settlement possible. But with the situation tilting rapidly in Iran's favor, a satisfactory settlement is unlikely in the near term unless sufficient leverage is brought to bear to bring the correlation of forces back to a favorable balance.

The question of sufficient leverage depends in turn on what our most essential objective should be. The single-minded insistence that Iran stop enriching uranium has several disadvantages for the West, not the least of which is to distract attention from what we really need in the end, which is transparency in Iran's nuclear activities.

Alexander George wrote in *Forceful Persuasion*:

> According to the logic of… coercive diplomacy, it is more likely to be successful if the objective selected—and the demand made—by the coercing power reflects only the most important of its interests. Such a choice is more likely to create an asymmetry of interests, and therefore an asymmetry of motivations, in its favor. Conversely, if the coercing power pursues ambitious objectives that do not reflect its vital or very important interests or makes demands that infringe on vital or very important interests of the adversary, the asymmetry of interests and the balance of motivations is likely to operate in favor of the adversary.[6]

Focusing on Iran's uranium enrichment centers the dispute on an issue that is both psychologically and strategically vital for Iran but only peripheral for the West.

The issue of uranium enrichment is peripheral for the U.S. because the vital threat lies not in the enrichment activity, but in its context: the nature of the regime itself, its energetic use and sponsorship of terrorism, the uncertainty as to the scope and purpose of its nuclear activities, and the lack of any convincing economic rationale for a full nuclear fuel cycle. This is not to minimize the issue of enrichment, but rather to draw attention to the even more grave issues which surround it. Tellingly, even if Iran agrees tomorrow to suspend all enrichment activity at its declared Natanz facility, it would hardly signal the end of the nuclear crisis.

On the other hand, Iranians have come to see a full indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment, as a national endeavor. According to some polling, as much as 80 percent of the Iranian public favors the development of civilian nuclear energy.[7] Nuclear technology has come to symbolize national greatness for many Iranians. The regime may be unpopular, but its stance on that issue is not.

Meanwhile, the vital issue for the West is verification of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Here, the regime in Tehran is on far weaker footing. According to a poll conducted in July 2007 by Terror

Free Tomorrow, 80 percent of Iranians support full IAEA inspections and a guarantee not to develop nuclear weapons in exchange for normalized relations with the West and western aid. Only 29 percent of those polled expressed a strong desire to acquire nuclear weapons.[8] Indeed, even among conservatives within the regime, there are those who do not think nuclear weapons worth the economic and diplomatic ostracism that they are engendering. And popular majorities in many countries, from the U.S. to France to Japan, support the use of force to keep Iran from attaining nuclear *weapons*. Politically speaking, transparency and compliance with international law are the regime's weak points.

If our diplomacy should pit our vital interests against the regime's weak points, transparency (a word even Iran's mullahs use approvingly) should be our principal negotiating objective. But transparency is a moving target; the greater the scope of Iran's nuclear activities, the greater the degree of transparency it would have to provide. And the longer the crisis drags out, the greater the uncertainty as to its possible undeclared activities, so the passage of time without a satisfactory settlement would also increase the level of transparency Iran would ultimately have to provide in order to allay the West's security concerns. The West should begin to focus on the issue of transparency, because if Iran agrees in coming months to suspend uranium enrichment, it will try to create the impression the crisis is over, and it will succeed unless the West remains unified and focused on what is really at stake.

Applying these principles, a deal satisfactory to the West which leaves the way open for Iran to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle would have to allay all of our fears about the regime itself. Such a deal would have to include 1) a verifiable end to Iran's support for terrorism; 2) the normalization of relations with its adversaries, including Israel and the U.S., on terms acceptable to all parties; 3) the placement of all nuclear-related activities under the supervision of an independent civilian atomic energy agency;[9] 4) full compliance with the maximum IAEA safeguards; and 5) agreement to such supplementary disclosures and verifications as may be necessary to close out all outstanding questions. Such concessions, however, will almost certainly have to await the demise of the current regime in Tehran.

The next best framework would be one akin to what Iran is implicitly being offered now: a lifting of sanctions and assistance in constructing a proliferation-safe nuclear infrastructure in which enrichment of nuclear fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel would be done abroad by members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In exchange, Iran would have to 1) suspend and dismantle its extraneous fuel-cycle facilities, including uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing; and 2) provide for sufficient disclosures and inspections to permit the IAEA's verification of the peaceful nature of its program for both declared and possible undeclared facilities. Alas, the current regime in Tehran has rejected essentially this "offer" insistently and repeatedly, and at great material cost to itself.

The bare minimum the West could settle for, then, would be a temporary agreement that increases transparency and extends the time horizon for Iran's attainment of threshold capability. The U.S. should

consider offering Iran a diminution of sanctions in exchange for a long-term freeze in further expansion of Iran's nuclear capability and sufficient transparency through disclosures and inspections to be able to verify the freeze, with respect both to declared facilities and to possible undeclared activities—even if it means accepting continued uranium enrichment.

But even such a minimalist framework is likely to be rejected by the Iranian leadership absent significantly increased pressure. To be successful, dialogue will therefore need to be grounded in a strategy of sufficient leverage to convince Iran that a negotiated settlement is more attractive than the alternative.

The logical starting point for such a strategy is containment. The late Peter Rodman, who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Bush administration, proposed a containment strategy that includes: 1) stabilizing the situation in Iraq; 2) building up the military forces of Iran's neighbors; and 3) a declaratory policy of extending the U.S. nuclear and conventional force security umbrella to those neighbors.[10] Such a policy reflects George Kennan's Cold War definition of containment as a strategy that might constrain the expansion of a revolutionary power until the internal contradictions in its system begin to weaken it.

But given the short time left before Iran's attainment of threshold capability, it seems clear that coercive levers beyond containment will be needed. The measures most likely to win international and domestic political support are economic. Existing sanctions by the United Nations, the European Union, and individual countries from the U.S. to Japan have already significantly crimped Iran's

economy. They have increased Iran's cost of capital some 30 percent, and are cutting off Iran's sources of foreign investment. Given the regime's internal economic mismanagement, which has produced an inflationary spiral and shortages of basic goods, including gasoline, additional sanctions could create excruciating pressures on the Iranian regime.

Alas, there may not be much more that we can expect by way of economic sanctions from the UN Security Council. Future economic pressure may come not from the UN but from the European Union and Iran's other bilateral trading partners. Sanctions could also make use of financial measures that leverage second- and third-order market effects to make it increasingly difficult for Iran to conduct business with the outside world. Finally, such measures could target the key inputs into Iran's economy, most vulnerable of which is likely to be the gasoline imports, on which Iran depends for some 40 percent of its total refined petroleum consumption.

The current strategy banks on political and economic tools in the hopes that the penalty of isolation will be sufficient to dissuade Iran from its nuclear advance, without reaching the need to choose between military conflict and a nuclear-armed Iran. But, as Rodman noted, "to 'exhaust' these tools means to use them, not to exhaust ourselves in debating them for two years, doling them out in small increments, and then wondering why the Iranians have not been intimidated."[11]

Deterrence and dynamic equilibrium

Reflecting the increasing international apprehension over Iran's

aggressive nuclear advance, President Obama has declared that the development of nuclear weapons by the current regime in Iran is an unacceptable "game-changer," and has intimated that the use of military force would be appropriate to prevent it. But what circumstance might trigger consideration of what military action? The failure to answer this question has resulted in a diplomatic strategy that is incomplete and perhaps fatally weak.

Alexander George has identified four basic variants of coercive diplomacy: "the classic ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the 'gradual turning of the screw,' and the 'try-and-see' approach."[12] The strongest of these strategies, the classic ultimatum, combines 1) a demand upon the opponent with 2) a time limit (or sense of urgency) for compliance and 3) a threat of punishment for non-compliance. The weakest, the "try-and-see" approach, presents a demand with neither a time limit for compliance nor a threat of punishment for non-compliance. Though the U.S. posture towards Iran often sounds like a classic ultimatum, it is in reality little more than a failing "try-and-see" approach. The same ambiguity that makes "all options remain on the table" valuable for a purely passive deterrent makes for much weaker diplomacy when one actively seeks a negotiated settlement.

Much discussion has been devoted to the "military option," but most of it has been artificially slanted. Commentators almost always start by asking what military strikes would be needed to destroy Iran's nuclear program. Having framed the question in that way, they naturally conclude that such strikes would involve hundreds of sorties conducted over a period of weeks; that they would not have a high probability of fully destroying the relevant facilities; and that Iran would simply reconstitute its program and proceed in secrecy, its thirst for nuclear weapons and its domestic political support significantly strengthened. This answer is, of course, "cooked" by the flawed initial question, which is founded on the false premise that military options are only useful if diplomacy fails.

The purpose of military power is not in the first instance to destroy Iran's nuclear capability, but rather to convince the Iranians to abandon it. As former Clinton administration official Ashton Carter recently noted, limited military force can be integral to a diplomatic strategy.[13] In a paradigm of coercive diplomacy, where the possibility of war may hang in the balance, the spectrum of possible effects one might seek through the use of force runs the gamut of military capabilities, from small-scale non-violent tactical demonstrations to applications of strategically decisive force.

Of these, ironically enough, the most impractical is the only one that commentators ever seem to consider: a campaign of air strikes sufficiently powerful to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure (mostly) but not sufficiently powerful to affect its capacity to retaliate or its willingness to reconstitute the program. Besides the fact that this would hurt Iran grievously without weakening it, such a campaign—as an initial use of force—might be seen to lack a compelling political justification, given Iran's strategy of proceeding always in small, incremental steps. If so, it could unify Iranians behind the regime, and fracture public opinion in the West.

The elements of a smart diplomatic strategy (including military

options) will seek to match Iran's clever strategy of small steps with small steps of our own. At the "small" end of the "coercive diplomacy" spectrum there are the naval demonstrations and covert operations that are happening already. Between these activities and the "big" end of the spectrum, many military options could serve to enhance the crucial negotiating leverage in our diplomatic strategy.

In a strategy of coercive diplomacy, the outcome of a limited military confrontation often turns on which side feels (and communicates to the other side) that it can better afford the risks of escalation. Given the wide disparity in conventional capabilities between the U.S. and Iran, it is hard to imagine that Iran could find escalation attractive in any situation. But if Iran is more committed to its objective than the U.S. and its partners are to theirs, that alone could nullify the latent "escalation dominance" implied in our comparative military advantage.

By the same token, if military force is applied in a limited and incremental way at the outset, it could increase the chances that hesitation will win out in Tehran and cooler heads will prevail. From Tehran's point of view, the risks of escalation will be greater the more it still has to lose *after* any use of force by its adversaries. Conversely, the more force its adversaries use at the outset, the less it will have to lose, the more humiliated it will feel, and the more it will be tempted to retaliate with the assets still at its disposal.

For this reason, the more significant applications of force would need to account for the increased chance of Iranian retaliation, and critical elements of the regime's capacity to retaliate would then become parts of the target lists. If Iran is willing to absorb the risks of escalation, it could retaliate through missile attacks against U.S. forces and allies in the region, and by launching a campaign of terrorist attacks against Western targets by regime elements and proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

Iran could also interrupt oil exports from the Persian Gulf, especially through the Strait of Hormuz. But, according to Ashton Carter, the U.S. Navy is confident that it can quickly reestablish freedom of navigation. And there is an oil weapon on our side, too. The West could shut off Iran's imports of gasoline, on which it depends for 40 percent of its consumption. And it could also shut off *Iran's* oil exports, on which the regime depends for 85 percent of its revenue; according to Carter, such a move "would immediately bring the country to its knees."[14]

Added to the dangers of retaliation and escalation is the danger of ruining the hard-fought unity among Western capitals and partner countries that is so vital in confronting both the Iranian menace and the larger movement of Islamist extremism. The diplomatic, economic, and even cultural isolation of Iran is now reaching visibly painful levels, with more to come. Any military action, however small, could jeopardize the international unity forged on these fronts over the past several years, whether it is undertaken unilaterally by the U.S. or even with a small coalition.[15]

It is vital that U.S. diplomacy continue to strengthen the resolve of the powers now arrayed against Iran in the nuclear crisis. Just as vital is ensuring that differences on long-range policy issues not be deferred in the interests of current unity (as so disastrously happened with the pas-

sage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 in November 2002) but addressed and resolved now, while there is still time for deliberation. As allies and partners, our governments should try to plan for the worst-case scenario that looms largest in the near term: namely that Iran finally forces us to choose between military action and a nuclear-armed Iran.

Public opinion would also loom large in any consideration of military options. Will Western public opinion back limited military options beyond the ones currently in use? Assuming Iran retaliates in a way that further escalates the conflict, will Western public opinion support an increased military response? Finally, if any such conflict should escalate, will public support for military exertion wither with early reverses, military and civilian casualties, or the spectacle of captured soldiers paraded on *Al Jazeera*?

Against these risks should be weighed the risks of the current Iranian regime's attaining the nuclear threshold. A nuclear weapons capability could immeasurably empower the mullahs and encourage their worst ambitions. It could turn the Middle East upside down, and create such fear in Israel as to call into question the viability of the state itself. We could face the harrowing prospect of a nonproliferation regime in full collapse, and the eventual risk of losing urban centers to nuclear terrorism without necessarily being able to identify those responsible.

With a threat of this magnitude, with such vital U.S. interests at stake, and while we still enjoy a position of such comparatively overwhelming military power, it would not be unreasonable for Western leaders to conclude that we can afford the risks of escalation better than Iran. Western

leaders have called a nuclear-armed Iran—with the current regime in power—unacceptable. If they are willing to use even the most limited military measures, they must be prepared to accept a calculated risk of escalation. And if they do accept that risk, then it is vital to marshal public support for a firm stance and communicate that commitment of purpose to Iran.

There is at the root of the current standoff a search for a favorable balance of power. By incrementally increasing the pressure on Iran, the West is hoping that it will discover Iran's "breaking point" before Iran reaches a nuclear weapons capability. For its part, Tehran is hoping that it will discover the West's "breaking point" before it is forced to abandon its uranium enrichment activity. The countervailing pressures from the West and from Tehran are not yet at equilibrium; the balance continues to tilt in Tehran's direction, which is why Tehran continues to behave as if time is on its side.

As Iran brings us nearer to a final choice between military conflict and a nuclear-armed Iran, Western leaders may deem it prudent to strengthen our diplomacy with a more convincing threat of military action. While the manifold risks of escalation point to more limited and incremental measures than most commentators have in mind when they discuss "the military option," it is crucial not to dismiss the value of military levers in the diplomacy of this crisis. Military options may remain on the table when diplomacy fails, but they are most valuable when they help diplomacy succeed.

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FIXING OUR PAKISTAN PROBLEM

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

A deadly suicide bombing hit India's embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008. After the U.S. learned that the attack may have implicated rogue elements of Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), American strategic planners decided that the U.S. needed to deliver a stern warning to Pakistan. Late that month, CIA deputy director Stephen R. Kappes secretly traveled to Islamabad to present Pakistani officials with information about the ISI's ties to extremists in the country's tribal areas. The *New York Times* opined that this was "the bluntest American warning to Pakistan since shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks about the ties between the spy service and Islamic militants."[1]

Pakistan is one of the critical countries in America's "war on terror."[2] After the October 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan toppled the Taliban, most of al-Qaeda's senior leadership relocated to Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas, the mountainous region that borders Afghanistan. Once there, the terrorist leaders set about finding allies within tribal society. Though Pakistan's military mounted a campaign to flush out al-Qaeda after the group was connected to multiple assassination attempts against then-president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf, the military suffered so many losses that Musharraf eventually concluded he had no option but to negotiate with his would-be killers. In March and September 2006 he consummated both halves of the Waziristan accords, peace agreements that essentially ceded Waziristan to Islamic militants. Those

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accords, and other agreements that Pakistan's government has entered since, have helped al-Qaeda establish a new safe haven in Pakistan.

Just as Pakistan is critical to the war on terror, American analysts increasingly believe that support for religious militancy within the country's ISI and military is one of the key obstacles to formulating a sound Pakistan policy. It is important that policymakers and scholars understand how support for religious militancy has gained a foothold in Pakistan's ISI and military, and the problems that it now poses.

Pakistan is one of the critical countries in America's "war on terror." But support for religious militancy within the country's ISI and military is one of the key obstacles to formulating a sound Pakistan policy.

Practical in form, Islamist in function

At their founding, Pakistan's military and intelligence services were shaped by the country's colonial experience. The ISI was formed by a British army officer, Major General R. Cawthome, in 1948. Originally the agency was charged with coordinating the intelligence functions of Pakistan's army, navy, and air force, and "confined itself to playing its specified role."[3]

Shuja Nawaz notes that Pakistan's army had an elitist orientation at the outset. "The senior echelons were still British officers who had opted to stay on," he writes, "and they were in turn succeeded by their native clones, men who saw the army as a unique institution, separate and

apart from the rest of civil society and authority."[4] Despite this, Husain Haqqani, who is currently Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S., has written that the later Islamization of Pakistan's military was "not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments," such as that of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Rather, since Pakistan's formation, its leaders "have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan's identity," and tried to "manage" Islamic militancy "so that it serves its nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics." Thus, later Islamization policies were, in Haqqani's view, "the extension of a consistent state ideology, not an aberration."[5] One example is the early fighting between Pakistan and India over the disputed Kashmir valley, where in 1947-1948 Pakistani army officers "used the Islamic notion of jihad to mobilize the tribesmen they had recruited as raiders for the seizure of Kashmir." Thus, Haqqani concludes that despite the Pakistani army's birth out of the British Indian army, "within the first few months of independence it was also moving in the direction of adopting an Islamic ideological coloring."[6]

The military, however, did not have a smooth and seamless relationship with Pakistan's Islamic parties. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military ruler, displayed hostility toward the religious parties, writing in his diary in 1967 that "[t]he mullah regards the educated Muslims as his deadliest enemy and the rival for power," and that "we have got to take on all those [mullahs] who are political mischief-makers."[7]

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became prime minister in 1973, broadened the ISI by creating an internal wing. He was concerned with bolstering his

own political power, and his personal leadership had a paranoid strain. Thus, he wanted the ISI to conduct surveillance on friend and foe alike, and the agency kept dossiers on a range of figures. Ironically, the internal wing that Bhutto helped create would play a role in the military coup that toppled him from power in July 1977. The coup brought to power General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who would consciously push Pakistani society in a more religious direction, and would concentrate his efforts on the military in particular.

Stephen P. Cohen, a Pakistan expert at the Brookings Institution, points out that though Pakistan's military shifted in an explicitly Islamic direction under Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the army began Islamizing under Bhutto. "Zulfikar himself ordered alcohol removed from the mess," Cohen says, "and one of the reasons that he picked Zia as the army's chief of staff may have been that Zia was seen as a pious general."[8] Bhutto was not motivated by personal conviction in doing so: he was secular in outlook, but the Islamists were ascendant politically. This gesture was designed to placate them.

After executing a coup against Bhutto, Zia served as prime minister for around ten years, the longest tenure of any Pakistani executive. Zia was involved from an early age with the Tablighi Jamaat, a socially conservative grassroots religious movement. He had served in the Royal Indian Army prior to Pakistan's creation, and his religiosity was apparent during his military service: he once explained that while other officers' free time was occupied by drinking, gambling, and dancing, he spent his in prayer.[9]

Zia's background and religious zeal translated into the adoption of overtly Muslim public policy posi-

tions, as well as the government's imposition of Islamic norms and customs. These changes began immediately after the coup. One observer noted in early 1979 that a "general Islamic tone pervades everything." He continued:

> A state enterprise advertises for a manager "who should be a God fearing and practicing Muslim." Floggings are common. Television has been greatly changed—to the accompaniment of public protest in the letters-to-the-editors column of the newspapers. Total closure of eating and drinking places between sunup and sunset marked Ramzan, the holy month of fasting, and no tea was served in business establishments or offices, private or public…. On December 2 [of 1978] (the first of Musharram, the beginning of the Hijri year 1399) came the long promised announcement of the first steps toward Islamization of the laws. Islamic laws on theft, drinking, adultery, and the protection of freedom of belief are to be enforced from [February 1979].[10]

Zia's government created *sharia* courts to determine the religious legitimacy of all laws, and invalidate those that they deemed improper. The government simultaneously tried to create an "Islamic economy" that was free of interest.

Zia devoted particular attention to changing the culture of Pakistan's military. His reforms went beyond Bhutto's nascent changes in three major ways. First, the military's training came to include Islamic teachings. For example, officers were required to read S. K. Malik's *The Quranic Concept of War*, and a Directorate of Religious Instruction was created to oversee the Islamic education of the officer corps. Second, religious cri-

teria were incorporated into the promotion requirements for officers, and into their promotion exams. Many skilled officers with secular outlooks were passed over for promotion, while many officers with conservative religious outlooks reached top levels of command. Third, Zia reinforced these policies by mandating formal obedience to Islamic rules within the military. He required not only that soldiers attend Friday congregational prayers at regimental mosques, but also that units bring mullahs with them to the front lines of combat.

At the same time that Zia was implementing these policies, the demographics of the officer corps were naturally shifting. The first generation of officers came from the country's social elites, frequently educated in English-language schools, while the rank-and-file of the new junior officers came from Pakistan's poorer northern districts. Journalist Zahid Hussain notes that "[t]he spirit of liberalism, common in the 'old' army, was practically unknown to them. They were products of a social class that, by its very nature, was conservative and easily influenced by Islamic fundamentalism."[11]

Zia's policies, coupled with the demographic shift in the junior officer corps, moved the military in a more religious, and more fundamentalist, direction. This new direction was also aided by external circumstances. Soon after Zia came to power, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on behalf of a pro-Soviet regime that was threatened by Islamic rebels. This invasion would prove fateful. In addition to imposing great costs on the Soviet Union that would contribute to its collapse, the invasion spurred the U.S. and Pakistan to support anti-Soviet *mujahideen*. Thus, some of the changes to the organiza-

tional culture of Pakistan's military pushed by Zia were put into practice on the battlefield. The ISI would grow exponentially during this period, and important relationships between Pakistani officials and Islamic militants would develop.

The Afghan crucible, and after

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Though the Soviets hoped to quickly secure the country for their proxy government, they became embroiled in a draining conflict.

The ISI was critical to anti-Soviet efforts. It funneled money to the *mujahideen*, and trained them. In doing so, the ISI benefited from significant foreign support, a large amount coming from the CIA. The CIA's funding of the anti-Soviet resistance rose "from about $30 million in fiscal 1981 to about $200 million in fiscal 1984,"[12] and reached about $500 million per year at its height. The money given to the ISI was effectively doubled by Saudi Arabia, which matched U.S. funding dollar for dollar during the Afghan-Soviet war.

The relationship between the CIA and ISI developed on the ISI's terms, with Zia minimizing contact between the Americans and the Afghan *mujahideen*. This arrangement was mutually advantageous. It gave the Americans plausible deniability, gave the Pakistanis access to a large amount of American money, and allowed Pakistani officials to forge their own relationships with the *mujahideen*.

Though there were a range of *mujahideen* factions, the ISI preferred to fund extremist Islamic groups and ethnic separatists. There were two major reasons for this. One was strategic: the ISI perceived Islamists as fearless fighters, and believed they

could more easily be transformed into a Pakistan proxy. A second reason was ideological: as Zia's reforms promoting religion within Pakistan's military took root, more officers came to sympathize with, or even adopt, a hard-line religious outlook.

As funding for the *mujahideen* grew, so did the ISI. Though it had a staff of around 2,000 prior to the Afghan-Soviet war, "the ISI grew to 20,000 employees during the height of the fight to remove the Soviets."[13] American funding for the war ended in 1989, when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in defeat. Nonetheless, the ISI retained about 40,000 employees, and had a budget of around $1 billion "for maintaining influence among the now-victorious *mujahideen* groups."[14]

After the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan, little united the disparate *mujahideen* factions other than their common fight against the Soviet-backed regime of Mohammad Najibullah. It is thus unsurprising that the country fell into civil war in 1992, after the *mujahideen* captured the capital of Kabul. Award-winning journalist Ahmed Rashid considers it significant that Kabul fell not to the Pashtun *mujahideen* factions, but rather to the better organized Tajik forces. "It was a devastating psychological blow because for the first time in 300 years the Pashtuns had lost control of the capital," he writes in his definitive book about the Taliban. "An internal civil war began almost immediately."[15] Various warlords and former *mujahideen* vied for power in the capital and other strategic areas. The ISI remained involved during this period, and eventually became a major sponsor of the Taliban.

During the Afghan-Soviet war, a network of *madrasas* funded by Saudi Arabia sprang up near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. These schools served a strategic purpose: students were indoctrinated with a militant religious ideology designed to make them more fervent in the fight against the Soviets. This network of schools would ultimately give birth to the Taliban.

> Today, support for jihadist groups occurs at three levels within Pakistan's ISI and military. First, there is an institutional policy of support for actors such as the Haqqani network, Mullah Omar's Taliban, and perhaps other jihadist groups that have ties to al-Qaeda at top levels. Second, rogue elements of Pakistan's ISI and military have provided support for jihadist groups against the policies of their institutions. Third, retired ISI and military officers with connections to Islamic militancy often remain influential following their retirement.

The Taliban emerged from Afghanistan's chaos in 1994. There are a number of accounts of how the group formed, but Rashid finds one story to be the most credible. In this telling, two neighbors approached Mullah Mohammed Omar to inform him that a warlord "had abducted two teenage girls, their heads had been shaved and they had been taken to a military camp and repeatedly raped." In response, Omar and thirty *talibs* "attacked the base, freeing the girls and hanging the commander from the barrel of a tank."[16]

The Taliban's power rapidly grew in Afghanistan because they were effective fighters, and they promised an alternative, albeit a ruthless one, to the prevailing lawlessness. Within two years of the group's founding, it captured both Kandahar and Kabul. In doing so, the Taliban was aided by the ISI's sponsorship. "The ISI helped the Taliban take the key cities of Jalalabad and the capital, Kabul," the *Christian Science Monitor* reported, "and continued to back them as they secured about 95 percent of Afghanistan."[17] *U.S. News and World Report* further explained the close working relationship between the ISI and the Taliban: "ISI operatives permeated the regime, helping uneducated Taliban leaders with everything from fighting the opposition Northern Alliance to more mundane tasks like translating international documents."[18]

As the Taliban expanded, it brought a harsh version of Islamic law. In his seminal 2001 book *Holy War, Inc.*, journalist Peter Bergen referred to the Taliban's voluminous restrictions as "Tali-bans." He noted:

> Soccer, kite-flying, music, television, and the presence of females in schools and offices were all banned. Some of the decrees had a Monty Python-esque quality, like the rule banning the use of paper bags on the remote chance the paper might include recycled pages of the Koran. Behavior the Taliban deemed deviant was met with inventive punishments. Taliban religious scholars labored over the vital question of how to deal with homosexuals: "Some say we should take these sinners to a high roof and throw them down, while others say we should dig a big hole beside a wall, bury them, then push the wall on top of them."[19]

The Taliban offered Osama bin Laden and his followers safe haven in Afghanistan after they were forced to flee Sudan. Al-Qaeda established a network of training camps in Afghanistan; the 9/11 attacks were just one product of these camps. Significantly, while al-Qaeda found safe haven in Afghanistan, ISI agents formed relationships with the terrorist group. The *New York Times* has reported on the concerns of American officials that the ISI "even used Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan to train covert operatives for use in a war of terror against India."[20] The *Times* noted that the ISI's use of al-Qaeda camps to train fighters destined for Kashmir may have been revealed in August 1998, when the U.S. struck camps near Khost, Afghanistan, in retaliation for the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. "The casualties included several members of a Kashmiri militant group supported by Pakistan who were believed to be training in the Qaeda camps," the *Times* reported.[21]

The ISI supported the Taliban largely because the government in Kabul had historically been hostile to Pakistan, and Pakistan wanted its northern neighbor to be an ally. The Taliban's fundamentalist religious ideology was a primary factor that convinced Pakistani planners that it could serve as their proxy, thus providing Pakistan with "strategic depth." But the ideological reasons behind the ISI's support for the Taliban were also growing: militant Islamic ideology within Pakistan's military and ISI has increased over time.

Resistant to reform

Shortly after 9/11, U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage gave Pakistan the ultimatum that, in Musharraf's words, "we had to decide

whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age."[22] The first major battlefield in the war on terror was Afghanistan, and Pakistan's geographic proximity and historical support for the Taliban made it strategically important. Armitage's threat (along with several carrots) prompted Musharraf to announce a dramatic about-face, and closely align with the U.S. Musharraf declared on January 12, 2002, that "no Pakistan-based organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion."[23] He banned five *jihadist* groups that day, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

The ISI had already developed a distinctive strategic and ideological outlook prior to 9/11 that favored support for stateless Islamist fighters. Hence, along with his changed policies, Musharraf sacked pro-Taliban commanders at the top levels of the ISI and military. Altogether, he "forced the reassignment or resignation of Pakistan's intelligence chief, two top generals and a number of other military commanders—most of whom were regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist."[24]

In addition to the firings, Musharraf made other changes aimed at purging officers with extremist sympathies from the military and ISI. In February 2002, for example, Pakistan began "to disband two major units of its powerful intelligence service that had close links to Islamic militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir."[25] But this was not enough to transform the strategic and ideological outlook of either institution. Many military and ISI officers remained tied to the Taliban militants and *mujahideen* with whom they had built relations over

the course of two decades. Moreover, the Frankenstein monster of Pakistan-created *jihadist* groups was now out of control: Pakistan created many such groups, and supported them for over a decade. It couldn't simply cut them all off at once.

Today, support for *jihadist* groups occurs at three levels within Pakistan's ISI and military. First, there is an institutional policy of support within the ISI for actors such as the Haqqani network, Mullah Omar's Taliban, and perhaps other *jihadist* groups that have ties to al-Qaeda at top levels.

Second, beyond the ISI's explicit policies, rogue elements of Pakistan's ISI and military have provided support for *jihadist* groups against the policies of their institutions. These elements have been implicated in several recent terrorist incidents, and peripheral evidence suggests that these may only be the tip of the iceberg. Major incidents where rogue elements within Pakistan's ISI or military may have been involved include the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, the July 2008 bombing of India's embassy in Kabul, the September 2008 Islamabad Marriott bombing, and assassination attempts directed at Pervez Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. However, few—if any—Western analysts have a good sense of what percentage of people within the ISI support *jihadist* groups against the policies of Pakistan's government. There is also an open question as to whether these rogue elements are acting individually, or if they constitute factions within the ISI and the military.

Third, retired ISI and military officers with connections to Islamic militancy often remain influential following their retirement. One example is former ISI head Hamid Gul, who in 2003 declared that "God will

destroy the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and wherever it will try to go from there." In late 2008, the U.S. sent a secret document to Pakistan's government linking Gul to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and India has demanded his arrest in connection with the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.[26]

There is frequently overlap between these three levels. For example, retired ISI officers frequently work for the organization as contractors, and a number of analysts believe that contractors are the strongest link insofar as support for *jihadist* groups against the ISI's policies is concerned. It is clear that all three levels of support create problems for U.S. interests in the region, while strengthening *jihadist* groups.

Solutions

Few options for addressing support for religious militancy in Pakistan's military and ISI are easy or certain to work. Because of the importance of the problem, and the uncertainty of the solutions, the U.S. should be willing to try several options simultaneously. Though not all of them will bear fruit, tackling the problem in multiple ways will allow the U.S. to build on its successes.

The overarching goal of U.S. diplomacy with Pakistan should be to persuade Pakistan's government to cease support for *jihadist* groups where there is an institutional policy of doing so, and to conduct operations on its own soil against these groups. Any U.S. policy in this regard should include both carrots and sticks. The diplomacy should not be loud and blustering; it needs to be direct yet behind the scenes. One reason that Musharraf's party was trounced in the February 2008 parliamentary elections is that he was popularly

seen as an American puppet. Diplomatic pressure that is too overt may put Pakistani politicians in a position where they jeopardize their political future by doing the right thing.

One interesting diplomatic route for the U.S. is entering into a dialogue with Pakistan about how to ameliorate its security concerns. Pakistani planners have always cited strategic depth as a reason that they support stateless Islamic militants, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The U.S. has not engaged in dialogue with Pakistan about its security concerns before.

Some sticks that the U.S. can use in its diplomacy with Pakistan are obvious, such as the threat of lessening economic assistance. Seth Jones, a Pakistan expert with the RAND Corporation, says that U.S. assistance should be tied to the arrest or killing of key al-Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. "The threat then would be that if we can't get clear progress in a measurable timeframe, this would leave the United States in the unfortunate position of having to significantly decrease its assistance to Pakistan and move in the direction of India." Jones thinks this pressure should be aimed at getting Pakistan's military and intelligence services to undertake a "clear and hold strategy" against al-Qaeda safe havens—not as a military offensive, but as a police and intelligence operation.[27]

One interesting fact is that conducting military operations on Pakistani soil can function as a stick, given the frequently apoplectic reaction to such operations by Pakistani leadership. The threat of such operations can have a coercive effect.

The U.S. can also take steps, albeit relatively modest ones, to bolster actors within Pakistan's military and ISI that are opposed to religious

militancy. For example, the U.S. could enhance the prestige of commanders and units within Pakistan's military who willingly cooperate in counterinsurgency operations by earmarking military aid for specific regiments or commanders. Similarly, high-level U.S. military training could focus on units and commanders who have demonstrated their willingness to undertake military or policing efforts against extremist groups.

Zahid Hussain observed that when Musharraf allied with the United States after 9/11, the president was "taking Pakistan to war with itself."[28] While a complex set of policies, conflicts, and geopolitical circumstances pushed Pakistan's military and ISI toward support of stateless religious militants, later efforts to reverse these policies have not been as vigorous. And for that, both Pakistan and the U.S. are now paying a price. Whatever road we take in Pakistan will involve a substantial time commitment, and progress is likely to be slow. But it is vital to develop a coherent Pakistan policy.

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PERSPECTIVE

"The Power of the Ought": An Interview with Ambassador Max Kampelman

I n 1980, Max Kampelman was appointed by President Jimmy Carter to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a post he would hold until 1983. Subsequently, he headed the U.S. delegation to the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Nuclear and Space Arms Control in Geneva (1985-1989), and served as Counselor to the Department of State (1987-1989). He is currently of counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson in Washington, DC.

On January 26th, Amb. Kampelman sat down with *Journal* editor Ilan Berman to discuss nuclear disarmament and the future of U.S. democracy promotion.

You are one of the principal architects of the nuclear disarmament concept that is known today as Global Zero. What are the origins of this effort?

My interest in this dates back to 1985, when President Ronald Reagan and Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev decided to revive negotiations over nuclear weapons between our two countries. Following his initial meeting with Gorbachev, Reagan called a White House meeting of his staff, during which he mentioned that he had suggested to Gorbachev the desirability of "going to zero" on all of our nuclear weapons.

I was at that session, and I remember virtually unanimous consternation among Reagan's advisors at the proposal. Practically everyone there believed it was not in our interest to destroy our nuclear weapons. Reagan listened attentively to them, but he moved ahead with a major effort to draw down the U.S. and Soviet arsenals.

President Reagan asked me to head the delegation to those negotiations. In three years, we succeeded in producing two treaties—one which totally abolished our intermediate-range nuclear weapons and another that reduced the number of our longer-range strategic nuclear weapons by half. They started us down a path toward a nuclear-free world.

A great number of senior statesmen agree with you. Former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Senator Sam Nunn, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and many other notables have embraced the idea of "going to zero" that you have championed. But how realistic do you think such an effort is?

I think many people believe this ought to be done, but few think it can be. As for me, I believe in the power of the "ought." Sixty years ago, when the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal published his study of the Negro in America, the idea of equality was far from universal. Today, we have a black president. That political movement, of the "is" to the "ought," of what is to what could and should be, is what has made America and its form of democracy so revered. Today, our role in the world must be to help establish a civilized "ought" for the human race—the abolition of weapons of mass destruction.

I am under no illusion that this will be easy. But the alternative is unimaginable.

One of the chief complaints aired by critics of the Global Zero movement is the difficulty of truly verifiable nuclear disarmament. After all, a durable framework for verification is difficult enough when one discusses state actors. But what about non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, which are hell-bent on acquiring the same sort of capabilities without any of the institutional constraints that states have?

In my judgment, neutralizing them is largely a by-product of state compliance. We ought to have a worldwide pledge that governments cannot allow this sort of "leakage" to happen, which would be backed up by total political, economic and cultural isolation for violators. By prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons among states, we must also establish a procedure against cheating by making it impossible for sub-state groups to acquire them as well.

Given your earliest government service, as America's point man at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, you understand the importance of democracy promotion. The Bush administration's years in office saw a number of democratic transformations in places like Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Lebanon. Currently, however, it is not at all clear that those gains will be sustained over time. How do you see the Bush administration's legacy on this front?

Within every single country in the world, there are now groups fighting for the advancement of democracy. There are also inevitably dictatorial types who resist these efforts. It is a continual struggle, certainly, but it is also one that is moving slowly but surely in favor of democratic processes. There is no longer a question about whether democracy *ought* to be. This does not mean that the drive for unilateral power by some will not continue. But we are an infinitely more civilized

world today than we were a thousand years ago, and this movement is inexorable. President Reagan helped to establish that commitment and goal.

The country where all the trends we discussed come together, most immediately, is Iran. The Obama administration has already made clear that they plan to depart from the policies of their predecessor and engage with the Islamic Republic. When they do, what should they be asking for, and what should they be requesting in return?

First and foremost, our goal should be to get Iran to give up its nuclear program. We also should be strengthening democracy trends where they exist, including in Iran.

Those two themes are not incompatible. In my opinion, we will have no influence on the current Iranian regime, as it presently stands. The regime there is an irresponsible international actor, and there is every indication it is proceeding with its nuclear program. Strengthening democratic trends is therefore the best way to foster change—and thereby to neutralize the threat posed by the current regime, including the nuclear one.

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DISPATCHES

Out of Gas

Nicholas Noe

BEIRUT—It has become something of a maxim that elections in the Middle East, when they are free and fair, generally tend to disfavor U.S. designs for them. In Lebanon, at least, this appeared not to be the case since the election in 2005 of a pro-U.S. majority, known as the March 14 alliance. That particular contest, however, was built on a wave of enthusiasm and deft diplomacy following what the State Department dubbed the "Cedar Revolution," i.e., Syria's forced withdrawal from its tiny neighbor following the Valentine's Day assassination of the Sunni ex-Premier, Rafik Hariri. It was also built, perhaps even more importantly, on the backs of some of Washington's supposedly worst enemies: primarily the militant Shi'ite party Hezbollah, which delivered enough votes to March 14 to allow it to form a government and hold a slim majority in the country's 128-member Parliament.

Four years and two wars on, however, a great deal has changed. March 14 is now ostensibly on life support, desperately trying to come to terms with a changing international scene that seeks engagement with Syria and Iran, a U.S. government that still refuses to deliver on March 14's key electoral promises, and the most surprising aspect of all: the enduring political alliance between the single most popular and best organized Christian party in the country, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by General Michel Aoun, and Hezbollah.

Although electioneering has only recently begun, the minority coalition—which includes Armenians, the other main Shiite party, AMAL, as well as small Sunni, Druze and Christian factions—appears well positioned to gain what will likely be a majority of only a few seats in the next four-year Parliament. Key

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to the minority's early advantage in the relatively small number of Christian battleground districts is its greater coherency as a unified political actor and its superior ability to mobilize constituencies, especially as voter turnout along sectarian lines is expected to be decisive in most of the contested districts.

Both of these aspects were on display recently with March 14's thinly veiled encouragement of "neutral" or "independent" candidates. Given the continued strength of Aoun, as well as the demonstrated ability of his allies to turn out supporters, March 14 clearly now believes that its best chance of winning battleground seats is to tap into the popularity of the independent Maronite president, Michel Suleiman, rather than rely on its own "brand."

But that strategy is vulnerable on at least two fronts. First, Suleiman himself has made it clear that he has no interest in electioneering on behalf of others. And without the president's expenditure of his political capital, it remains entirely unclear whether any purported neutral candidate could beat the FPM list or stymie efforts already under way to paint such figures as a kind of "March 14 lite."

Second, although March 14 is in the process of designing its list and ironing out thorny internal conflicts over seats, it may prove difficult to avoid three-way races where a March 14 candidate undercuts the full import of a neutral candidate, to the benefit of the FPM.

Even if the strategy of relying on neutrals progresses under ideal circumstances, March 14 faces two deeper problems: its continuing lack of organizational depth and competency and a further degradation of its appeal, as its core ideology slowly atrophies.

At the most basic level, as the August 2007 by-election in the Christian battleground of Metn demonstrated (the seat was won by a relatively unknown FPM candidate over a leading March 14 figure, Amine Gemayel), the decades-old machinery of voter turnout employed by key parties within the majority is woefully inadequate when up against the modern campaign methods of the FPM and some of its allies. But in the almost two years since that seminal loss, March 14 has apparently not learned this lesson. According to U.S. and European election experts, it is still intent on activating its supporters through traditional means. This should prove especially problematic in June since, unlike past elections held over several weeks, the contest this time will be held on only one day, with agility, communication and voter enthusiasm more critical than ever.

More significantly, March 14's ideological approach increasingly appears anachronistic when measured against domestic and international trends. Foremost in this regard is its continued rhetorical focus on Hezbollah's arms and the hard line it promotes on all things related to Syria. Given the raft of cordial and arguably productive visits to Damascus by key Lebanese figures, including the President, the head of the Army and Interior ministry and more recently the March 14-allied Defense Minister, Elias Murr, this stance seems more focused on appealing to its base than attracting the swing voters, especially Christians, who will be of prime importance come June.

In this, of course, international events are also working against March 14, as the United States and the international community move towards direct engagement and, in some cases, rapprochement, with the Assad regime. Apparently unable to adapt to this new reality, the March 14 alliance continues to fight

the clear-cut battles of 2005 rather than the more nuanced and tactically challenging post-Bush praxis.

The "new" March 14 emphasis on setting up the election as a kind of binding referendum on Hezbollah's arms can also be viewed through this prism. With an Obama administration warming up to both Iran and Syria, it is less likely in the minds of swing voters that Washington would lend the kind of military support that would be necessary at a minimum to forcefully disarm the party.

Indeed, Aoun is already touting Hezbollah's lack of military involvement in the recent Gaza conflict as a vindication of his 2006 Memorandum of Understanding with the group. That conflict, and the accompanying perception that Israel "went crazy" in Gaza, has also strengthened the minority alliance's emphasis on maintaining Hezbollah's arms as part of a strong national deterrent, at the expense of March 14's preferred strategy of not provoking Israel.

All of this could change significantly, of course, should Hezbollah drag Lebanon irrationally or selfishly into another devastating conflict with Israel, either of its own accord or at the request of its allies in Syria and/or Iran. Both the FPM and Hezbollah clearly recognize the danger, however, and have apparently gone to great lengths, perhaps over the opposition of more hard-line Hezbollah cadres and leaders, to avoid the potentially devastating electoral blow that would likely come with such an ill-conceived step.

In the meantime, the minority alliance as a whole stands to reap further gains, in the absence of direct conflict or concrete actions by the Obama administration to aid March 14, from an Israeli leadership that appears to most Lebanese to be more unpredictable and dangerous than ever before.

Pakistan's Enemy Within

M. D. Nalapat

NEW DELHI—Pakistan is facing a societal meltdown, and the reason is not the failure of its army to wrest the two-thirds of Kashmir which has remained in Indian control since 1949. Nor is it the operations of NATO forces in Afghanistan, or the periodic Predator raids into its territory carried out by the United States. The media and "experts" notwithstanding, the spread of *jihadist* violence in that country does not have its roots in Kashmir, or the Iraq or Afghanistan wars, many though Indian, U.S. and NATO mistakes in these conflicts have been. Rather, *jihad* in Pakistan is nourished by two factors, both of which are internal to the country.

The first is the continuation of feudalism, with the traditional landlords still dominant throughout most of the country, so that many youths from less privileged social backgrounds turn to radicalism as a means of escape. The other slow-acting cancer is Pakistan's education system, especially at the grade school level. This affliction finds its roots in the 1970s, when the "graduates" of religious schools and seminaries—more than 80 percent of which are Wahhabi—were given equality of status with those from "modern" educational platforms. These religious schools, or *madrasas*, focus exclusively on rote learning within a severely circumscribed curriculum, and as a result turn out "graduates" who are incapable of integrating into a modern economy.

It is convenient for Pakistan's politicians, most of the top echelons of whom are themselves from a feudal—or (usually covert) Wahhabist—background, to pin the blame for the failure of civil society in Pakistan on external factors. Unless significant internal reform takes place within Pakistan, however, the *jihad* industry will not get extinguished, even in the face of concessions to Wahhabi demands from moderate states and peoples. Until slaveholder control of the feudal elite is removed from rural society in Pakistan, and land is redistributed among the rest of the population, the way it has happened in most parts of India, and unless school education in Pakistan is rescued from the clutches of both the religious institutions as well as from "modern" curricula that emphasize Wahhabi gobbledygook rather than a scientific worldview, Pakistan will continue to deliver greater and greater numbers of recruits to the *jihadist* cause.

Poring through school textbooks or forcing into irrelevance the very feudal elite who host visitors from the United States and the EU so magnificently in their fiefs is hardly glamorous. It is certainly far less so than televised meetings with VIPs and zigzagging between capitals, moving from one five-star hotel to the next to cajole the natives into signing declarations and agreements that usually have about as much value as the paper they are printed on. But they are much more necessary. Unless fundamental internal changes are effected within Pakistan, the country will continue its descent into "Talibanization."

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That process is already well under way. Eight years after it was declared by President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to be a stalwart U.S. ally in the War on Terror, the followers of Mullah Omar are present in every Pakistani city, and have formed a dense network of "overground" agencies that nourish the militia in Afghanistan and the growing portion of Pakistan that is effectively under their control.

The new administration in Washington has an opportunity to make a real difference. The Internet and cable television have blown huge holes through the system of Wahhabist-Khomeinist educational indoctrination practiced in many majority-Muslim states (including those misleadingly labeled as moderate), and has generated within the youthful populations there a thirst for modernity and for acquiring the skills needed in a globalized world that local schools and colleges are unable—indeed, unwilling—to provide. (The educational infrastructure in the Muslim world is pitiful, with only 500 universities in the 57 OIC countries, as compared with more than 8,400 in India alone.)

This undercurrent of dissatisfaction with local educational and lifestyle models has created an opportunity for President Obama to move beyond a Clintonesque fixation on South Asia's external conflicts into the area of internal reform. To be sure, each country in South Asia is in significant need of such change. Sri Lanka's Sinhalese majority needs to avoid a repeat of the Tamil-phobic policies of the 1950s and the 1960s that spawned the LTTE. Bangladesh needs to begin the task of rolling back the numerous *jihadist* nests that have been set up under the patronage of an army that has become an accomplice of the Pakistani military. Nepal needs to ensure that Maoists do not gain so much power that they succeed in setting up a single-party state. India needs to give up its fascination with the softest of soft responses to international *jihad*. And Afghanistan needs to move away from its hot-cold policy towards the Taliban and take the help of all available elements within its society to eliminate this menace to the civilized world.

Stability in the region will remain elusive, however, unless Pakistan gets the attention it deserves. And with regard to Pakistan, the primary roots of instability are internal. U.S. policymakers need to remember that, and engage the growing (and moderate) civil society that for too long has been ignored by the international community.

The Case for Montenegro

Borut Grgic

BRUSSELS—During the 1990s, Balkan issues dominated the foreign policy debate in Washington. This is hardly the case today, which is probably a good thing. It suggests that considerable progress has been made in the region. Back then, America's involvement was instrumental in securing peace, and it remains relevant today, at least on the political level, for ensuring that security and stability prevail. But all in all, democratic and economic reforms, not war, are now at the center of the region's political focus.

Montenegro has been a principal beneficiary of these trends. Despite a politically turbulent year throughout the region, the country managed to chart impressive GDP growth of almost eight percent in 2008. All its major economic indicators are positive, and Podgorica has put together a convincing development strategy based on tourism, ecology and energy. The government of Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic is making steady and visible progress in reforming institutions and adopting modern legislation in the hope of speeding up the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. Last December, as part of this process, Montenegro handed in its application for EU membership.

Montenegro's move reflects an emerging regional reality. Membership in the European Union and NATO are two political priorities of the day in the Balkans. These institutions are understood to be the staples of long-term stability and economic renaissance. There is no alternative for the region, which probably explains why there is enthusiasm and support for NATO membership even in Serbia, where political progress is still subject to nationalist sentiments.

The development is a positive one for the Atlantic Alliance as well. More Balkans in NATO, and therefore less NATO in the Balkans, means more hardware to deal with global hot spots like Afghanistan. As NATO continues to transform into an organization that focuses on out-of-area operations, a scaling-down of its military presence in the Balkan theater must continue. Which is where Montenegro comes in.

Montenegro will be the next regional state to apply for membership in the Alliance, and the case for its inclusion is a compelling one. It is the last Adriatic coastal state in line for NATO membership. With Montenegro in the club, the NATO security perimeter around the Adriatic Sea will be complete. This, in turn, will boost the Alliance's ability to do reconnaissance missions and interdictions in the Adriatic, and protect the Balkans from organized crime, smuggling, piracy and terrorism.

The 1990s was a lost decade for the Balkan region, with local institutions, economy and society deeply influenced and undermined by war. Periods of lawlessness, sanctions and disputes over territories turned parts of countries—and in some cases entire nations—into no-man's-land. This naturally attracted organized crime and smugglers, elements which now use the Balkans as a major

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corridor for drugs, contraband, prostitutes, and even to facilitate the entry of terrorists into Europe. Full NATO membership can help strengthen and nurture those institutions necessary to fight and withstand the pressure from organized crime.

In addition, some key energy and transportation infrastructure is already traversing the region, connecting central Europe with the Caspian and Central Asia. The security of this trade and energy corridor depends on the nature of relations between Montenegro and NATO.

The recent conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia has had a chilling effect on Alliance politics. Already, there are some in Washington and abroad who have advocated a slowdown—if not an outright freeze—on NATO enlargement. Such a decision is fraught with danger, and threatens to jeopardize the fragile gains that have been made in the Balkans over the past decade.

In light of this trend, Montenegro's candidacy matters a great deal. Qualifying Montenegro for NATO membership would suggest to the Montenegrins, and to everyone else, that expansion of the Atlantic Alliance is still on track. It would also ensure that other NATO aspirants remain on track with their domestic political and military reforms. And that, more than anything else, can help ensure that the region does not experience another lost decade.

BOOK REVIEWS

Gambling with Theory

Baker Spring

KEITH B. PAYNE, *The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2008), 471 pp. $19.00.

Delineating the connections between theory and practice in matters of nuclear deterrence and warfighting is a daunting task. But, armed with solid academic credentials and years of practical experience, Keith Payne has undertaken just such an effort. And his meticulous research and penetrating analysis have produced what is almost certain to become the definitive analytical work on the subject for the period covering the 1960s through the years immediately following the end of the Cold War.

The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century reveals what an extraordinary gamble America's intellectual and political leaders took in formulating and applying the theory behind the "balance of terror" that governed the possession and use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. That theory bet the survival of the country on the premise that exposing its population and economic structure to the most devastating weapon man ever invented is the surest path to security. Most disturbingly, Payne explains, both academic and political leaders today continue to be drawn to this theory as the basis for policy, despite the fact that the world is a fundamentally different place from what it was during the Cold War.

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Payne's analysis reveals how the balance-of-terror theory behind nuclear deterrence was developed and sustained in a one-sided fashion. In virtually all other theories of warfare, the application of purely theoretical principles is balanced against insights derived from actual events, which in turn are used to refine and shape the theory. Our nuclear deterrence theory, however, has been all but completely deductive.

In a sense, this is unequivocally good news. The lack of direct nuclear-armed conflicts since the last days of World War II has prevented the broader use of inductive logic regarding nuclear warfare. The danger, however, is the temptation to see the absence of such a conflict as irrefutable proof that the theory works under virtually any circumstance. Payne's greatest service is explaining why such an assumption is both dangerous and wrong. Drawing definitive conclusions about the validity of a theory from non-events and a lack of experience is, to put it mildly, a risky proposition.

Payne is careful, however, to point out that he is not asserting that broader deterrence theory makes no contribution to the formulation of wise and effective policies governing nuclear weapons and nuclear warfare, including lessening the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used. Rather, he states prudently, applications of the theory must vary in accordance with differing circumstances and conditions.

The Great American Gamble reserves its most forceful criticisms for those who have concluded that there is a condition of "existential deterrence" as long as the prospect of nuclear retaliation for any attack exists. It also rejects the derivative proposition, that an effective nuclear deterrence pos-

ture is severable from "warfighting" considerations and combat missions. Such a proposition, it points out, is both wrong and dangerous; it obviates the need to build a strategic posture that will meet the standards of military effectiveness that rest at the core of well-designed defense and national security strategies.

As Hamas rockets rain down on Israel, Payne's observations serve to remind democratic leaders everywhere that their people, more than anything, want a military both willing and able to fully defend them. Gambling with their lives through unthinking adherence to a theory of deterrence that is almost certainly no longer applicable is simply irresponsible.

Much to his credit, Payne also recognizes the moral costs to the United States of applying the balance-of-terror theory of nuclear deterrence. It has long been a central tenet of Western philosophy that a just war will not involve purposeful attacks on innocent civilians. The balance-of-terror theory turned this principle on its head. At its height in the early 1960s, the theory assumed explicitly that U.S. retaliatory nuclear forces should be used to destroy 30 percent of the Soviet population. As is often the case, moral and practical judgments go hand in hand. In today's world, continuation of a balance-of-terror policy raises the question of how it will benefit the United States to respond to an attack on its territory or the territory of a friend or ally with a weapon of mass destruction by incinerating the poor half-starved subjects of some distant tyranny.

If it could benefit from anything, Payne's work might have spent more time at the outset explaining how the circumstances that encouraged the embrace of the balance-of-terror

theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s were the result of the discredited effort to achieve nuclear disarmament in the 1940s. Represented most prominently by the Baruch Plan, the disarmament movement unrealistically assumed worldwide support for disarmament when the Soviet Union opposed it. The lesson—and one that policymakers in Washington should heed today—is that naïve attempts at nuclear disarmament can result in the pursuit of questionable alternatives when the attempts fail. To his credit, Payne does address the question of nuclear disarmament under today's circumstances later in his book, and he makes a convincing case that there are serious problems with the vision being articulated by its proponents. A short treatment of the history behind the earlier effort, however, would have bolstered his call for caution.

Effective national security policies are the result of a careful balancing of theory and practice. Whether theory dominates practice or vice versa, the resulting imbalance will incur excessive policy risk. Payne's book serves to remind policymakers that the balance-of-terror nuclear deterrence policies embraced by the U.S. in the 1960s were unbalanced in favor of theory over practice. His message is a well-timed warning that the fortuitous results of the Cold War also involved an extraordinary risk. In his words, it constituted a gamble. His careful analysis has provided sufficient warning that the odds against this gamble are only growing longer.

An Inconvenient Truth

Matthew R. J. Brodsky

BARRY RUBIN, *The Truth About Syria* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 304 pp. $14.95.

Forty years ago, in assessing the foreign policy direction of the regime of Hafez Assad in Damascus, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency concluded that "[t]he question in regard to Syria's future… is not whether it will be moderate or radical, but what will be the kind and intensity of its radicalism." Four decades later, the new U.S. administration finds itself struggling with the same question as it works to craft a new policy toward Syria.

These days, most politicians seem to favor engagement, ever looking inward to find the American solution to Syria's behavioral problems. The thinking is that if the United States would only offer this carrot or that incentive, Syria would reorient itself away from Iran and terrorists, dump its designs to establish a Greater Syria, stop subverting its neighbors, and become a constructive player in the Middle East—perhaps even a U.S. ally. Some have even posited the idea that the problem with Syria actually lies with us, and our failure to explain to Damascus how changing its behavior would actually benefit the regime there.

Along comes *The Truth About Syria*, Barry Rubin's detailed survey of Syrian actions and foreign policy

(mis)adventures since its emergence as an independent state in 1946, throwing cold water on America's passionate climb toward Syrian engagement. Unlike other recent books on the subject—among them Flynt Leverett's *Inheriting Syria* and Eyal Zisser's *Commanding Syria*—Rubin's work stands out both for its passion and its critical perspective. His essential point is that Syria is not radical as a result of mistreatment by the West or Israel, but because the regime needs radicalism to endure. Therefore, engagement is not only bound to fail, but will encourage more militant behavior from Damascus.

But can a regime that has systematically abused its own people, fomented instability abroad, and offered no positive vision for the future survive simply on a mixture of luck, brute force, and the West's inability to stand firm? According to Rubin, the answer is a resounding "yes." He provides ample proof that on nearly every conceivable issue in the Middle East, the U.S. and Syria are diametrically opposed to one another. It is not in Syria's interest to have a peace agreement with Israel that would inevitably increase American influence in the region, just as it is not in its interest for a separate Palestinian-Israeli peace to emerge that would forever rob the regime of its most valuable card: the Palestinian issue. Syria's importance in the

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region rests on its ability to cause mischief. Absent a compelling grievance, Syria would be reduced to a fourth-rate power, void of natural resources, and with little influence in the Arab world.

America, however, has so far failed to grasp this fact. Indeed, more often than not, Rubin points out, the Assad regime is treated as "a privileged dictatorship, a most favored terrorism-sponsoring nation, and a forgiven massive violator of human rights." And the worse Syria behaves, up to a point, the better it fares diplomatically.

Yet even as they struggle to find the right combination of incentives to induce a change in the regime's behavior, U.S. policymakers have ignored the only case where lasting change was successfully effected. In 1998, Turkey threatened to invade Syria over the latter's support for the radical, anti-Turkish Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK). Syria backed down. Turkey remains the only country on Syria's border that threatened to respond to violence with violence. Today, it is the only country on Syria's border not terrorized by the Assad regime. The lesson is clear: Damascus fears the credible use of military force that could undermine the stability of the regime.

Rubin's policy prescriptions are simple. Syria must not be engaged. Rather, it should be pressured and deterred. This requires credibility, patience, and a demonstration by the West that it will not falter. Syria must be denied assets, isolated, and its endeavors frustrated using all tools in the Western foreign policy arsenal—from trade to counter-alliances, diplomatic "naming and shaming," and covert operations. The policy should be neither appeasement nor regime change, but "tough diplomacy

backed up by strength and staying power." But, given the fecklessness of Western policy in the region so far, he holds out little hope that this will happen: "Possibly the need for many more years of suffering is inescapable… Another opportunity for real progress can be built only on the basis of new defeats and failures." Likewise, for Rubin, the idea of a "grand bargain" with Syria is absurd. Simply put, the U.S. cannot offer Assad what he wants without further destabilizing the region.

The Truth About Syria is certainly not without its blemishes. A less passionate rebuke of Syrian behavior, and a toning down of the hyperbole, would have greatly strengthened Rubin's case. So would have extending a small benefit of the doubt to any of Assad's actions. But Rubin's gloomy conclusions are grounded in an accurate understanding of Syrian motivations. The inconvenient truth is that the Assad regime will continue to strive to control its neighbors for the foreseeable future, because that is its nature. And, despite the fervent wishes of policymakers in Washington, nothing so far gives any indication that the tiger in Damascus is about to change his stripes.

Death by Bureaucracy

Shawn Macomber

Bill Gertz, *The Failure Factory: How Unelected Bureaucrats, Liberal Democrats, and Big Government Republicans Are Undermining America's Security and Leading Us to War* (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 304 pp. $26.95.

Thomas Jefferson, seeking a way to more fully universalize the philosophical arguments contained within the New Testament, famously fashioned his own version of the book, snipping out the supernatural and miraculous bits as he strung together the corporeal-yet-profound lessons he believed were "as easily distinguished as diamonds in a dunghill." Jefferson understood there are instances when it is wise to leave aside narrower, contentious aspects of an argument in pursuit of a larger consensus. He likely also realized how deep attachment to orthodoxy runs—Jefferson never revealed these revised scriptures to anyone outside of his close circle of friends and family.

Few fair-minded critics would hold anyone to the Apostle of Democracy standard. Scribbling along the lines of the Declaration of Independence, after all, is something of a tough act to follow. Bill Gertz, the rightly celebrated *Washington Times* investigative reporter, however, may have benefited from adhering to the judiciousness of Jefferson's Bible in crafting his latest book.

The Failure Factory promises to unveil the "vast network of unelected officials whose authority has grown wildly out of control," as well as "their enablers in the political class." It is a worthy pursuit. This fundamental shift in governance is a critical underreported story, and one that carries with it harrowing implications for our representative democratic republic that the average citizen has not yet even begun to fathom. Gene Healy explained the process well last year in *The Cult of the Presidency*: "Congress passes a statute endorsing a high-minded goal—accommodation of the handicapped, safe drinking water, protection of wildlife—and leaves it to the relevant executive branch agency to issue and enforce the regulations governing individual behavior. That process results in some 75,000 new pages added to the Federal Register every year."

The "relevant executive branch" agencies are, of course, brimming with human beings frequently referred to as *bureaucrats*, who enjoy not only the thrill of proximity to power that infects nearly everyone in Washington, DC, but who have also been bequeathed an ever-increasing power to act upon whim with minimal oversight and career life spans which frequently exceed those of the politicians who installed them.

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While Healy explored this tyranny-lite in an overarching macro sense, Gertz focuses on how this delegation of authority, along with a simultaneous shirking of Constitutional responsibility by the legislative branch, affects national security. And he uncovers much to be disturbed by: petty bureaucratic stonewalling retarding the fast-tracking process designed to quickly deliver mine-resistant vehicles to Iraq; appointees of past presidential administrations in the State and Defense Departments openly and aggressively working to subvert the policies of later administrations whose political philosophies they happen to oppose; decaying standards that allowed the *very same* Hezbollah spy to infiltrate both the CIA and FBI employing little more than a pretty smile and a conscientious playing up to establishment prejudices.

The case against such devolution of democracy, then, appears fairly simple to distill. This delegation of rule-making authority is codifying a tyranny of the majority well after the majority has dissipated, leaving it able, as John Stuart Mill warned in *On Liberty*, to "fetter the development and, if possible, prevent the formation of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own." This is why, as Gertz notes, John Bolton, serving at the pleasure of the president of the United States, was forced to hire "a lawyer from outside the department in order to force [his own employees] to implement sanctions laws" and how Foreign Service officers, shielded by odious federal employment rules, could simply refuse to serve in Iraq when called—even as American servicemen and women selflessly fought and died there.

Since both major political parties in the United States experience times of waning influence and popularity, such a system benefits neither Democrats nor Republicans. One of the main functions of the federal apparatus, indeed, as envisioned by James Madison in *Federalist* No. 10, should be to "break and control the violence of faction" and blunt manias of "an interested and overbearing majority," not perpetuate them indefinitely. What passes for the democratic process today is, in other words, diametrically opposed to our founders' vision of a free people able to *throw the bums out*. If ever there was a post-partisan issue, this should be it.

Unfortunately, *The Failure Factory* far too often leaves readers with the impression that Gertz doesn't necessarily believe out-of-control unelected bureaucrats are the problem. Rather, his issue seems to be with the fact the leviathan is being tended by out-of-control unelected bureaucrats with the *wrong* political outlook. Hence, his disparaging remarks for those who don't share his support for the Iraq war, don't approach China with the same degree of suspicion and animosity, and so forth. Obama partisans and enablers will no doubt issue the same complaints in reverse. Around and around we go.

Which is a shame. Introducing arguments over the nature of Islam and political correctness virtually guarantees that one is preaching to the choir. And that, in turn, undermines the broad base of support necessary to rectify the situation Gertz so deplores. The issue isn't that Gertz's grievances are meritless or that he shouldn't defend what he believes. It's that in the context of the overarching problem he elucidates and presumably seeks to

resolve with *The Failure Factory*, a significant amount of his more biting analysis has a wrong time, wrong place vibe.

The concluding chapter of recommendations nevertheless contains some very good ideas, such as removing intelligence agencies from the reform-stunting Civil Service system, a ban on the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of executive branch employees' holding simultaneous legislative branch jobs, and clarifying the "code of conduct for former government and military officials." Others are less persuasive, however. Gertz suggests, for example, the problem of a politicized national security apparatus and biased National Intelligence Estimates can at least be partially ameliorated by having "all National Intelligence officers... nominated by the president and confirmed by a majority of the Senate." Right, because Senate confirmation hearings have always been a partisanship- and politicization-free zone? Gertz further urges the creation of "a central institution that can provide training for presidential appointees who could be called to government service—or perhaps two institutions, with one run by each political party." Why? To create a career incentive and more effective breed of partisan bureaucrat than the one we're already cursed with?

Every cause, political or otherwise, eventually faces the question of whether it wants to be a mainstream movement or a club. *The Failure Factory* contains a wealth of intriguing and sobering reportage, for which Gertz should be praised. This book will at times likely shock even close observers of the news and grizzled Big Government skeptics. The author nonetheless ultimately chooses, at least in tone, to write for the clubhouse. That's a boon for future journalists seeking a continuously simmering problem to write about. Alas, it provides precious little intellectual ammunition for people who might actually like to just solve it.

A Middle Way on Space

Eric Sayers

Bruce W. MacDonald, *China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2008), 60 pp.

While the epic struggle between the United States and Soviet Union turned space into a political and military arena for confrontation for more than three decades, the years following the end of the Cold War saw America's unchallenged primacy blanket the cosmos. Since China's testing of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007 and the subsequent U.S. intercept of a failed satellite in February 2008, however new attention is being paid to an issue that once seemed all but settled.

The implications of China's successful ASAT test left U.S. politicians and military planners asking questions about China's intentions and the maturity of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) space program. Is the United States prepared to contend with another state power able to target its space assets? What will such a capability mean for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the Taiwan Strait? Is the weaponization of space inevitable?

Predictably, the D.C. think tank circuit responded, churning out a slew of journal articles and publications on space security. Bruce W. MacDonald's *China, Space Weapons,* *and U.S. Security* represents the latest contribution to this evolving debate.

Unlike traditional geographic domains, space is a medium that is severely lacking in strategic theory (there is, at least as of yet, no Clausewitz or Mahan for space). MacDonald's work makes no attempt to tackle such a grand task, but is nevertheless a worthwhile contribution and valuable overview of the topic. It includes a reprint of the 2006 U.S. *National Space Policy* (NSP), takes time to explain what is frequently assumed to be a trivial difference between space "weaponization" and space "militarization," and explains in brief the different types of offensive and defensive space systems.

MacDonald gets the big picture right, identifying America's constellations of satellites as the hub of its military power. First demonstrated during the Gulf War in 1991, the ability of the joint military to communicate information, gather and disseminate intelligence, navigate, and even guide missiles to their targets is all highly dependent upon space. Inevitably, as MacDonald explains, this dependence has become a vulnerability in the eyes of near-term peer competitors like China, which seek innovative asymmetric means to neutralize the ability of the United States to project power, specifically in a crisis scenario involving Taiwan.

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Regardless of what China may say in public regarding space issues, MacDonald asserts, "The PLA envisions conflict in space and is preparing for it… leaving the United States with no choice but to hedge prudently against this uncertainty."

But while his recognition of the vulnerability, the threat, and the need to take serious action to protect space assets is sound and consistent with the findings of the 2006 U.S. *National Space Policy*, MacDonald finds himself at odds with two of its major principles. First, the 2006 *Space Policy* declares, "The United States considers space capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—vital to its national interests," and will "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests." MacDonald, however, seems to think we should do otherwise. While he recognizes U.S. space assets are indeed "vital," he notes that because "U.S. attacks on the space capabilities of others run a high risk of sparking counterattacks and the costs of hardening U.S. systems against similar attacks are so high," retaining the right to use offensive action will only place America's vital space assets at more risk.

Second, MacDonald believes the rejection of new legal regimes for space by the 2006 NSP is counterproductive. While he accepts that legal mechanisms cannot solve space security problems and that a broad-based ban on ASAT weapons is unattainable, he is supportive of a ban on testing or demonstrating "hit-to-kill" direct ascent ASAT weapons that produce destructive space debris and have irreversible effects that he fears may lead to escalation. We are thus left with what MacDonald calls a policy of deterrence-based superiority, combining temporary and less provocative offensive measures (electronic jamming or laser blinding, for instance), with a ban on "hit-to-kill" ASATs, defensive systems, continued dialogue, and confidence-building measures. The result is a strategy that is concerned more with the debris created by "hit-to-kill" ASATs and their escalatory nature than with constructing a robust regime to prevent such attacks and ensure America's unhindered access to space.

Additionally, MacDonald assumes that space dominance, similar to the way the United States dominates the air or seas, is generally unattainable due to the low barriers to entering the offensive space realm and the high costs of attempting to defend space assets. While he is correct to an extent, dominance is not as unattainable as MacDonald professes. An affordable and attainable means to ensure access, while not accepting China's long-term pursuit of space parity, lies with deploying and maintaining numerous reserve microsatellites that are cheap, responsive, and nimble.

MacDonald's work is likely only one of a slew of publications on the topic that we can expect to see in the immediate future, as the debate over space security, and America's place in it, takes center stage. President Obama has already outlined his stark differences with the Bush administration on the subject. MacDonald's approach—which dismisses space dominance and "hit-to-kill" ASATs, but also emphasizes the need for a balance of offensive and defensive tools in space—charts what may best be described as a middle way in the debate, one that could serve as a starting point for the new administration.

Erratum

Caroline Glick's article, "Ending the Stalemate," incorrectly identified Salaam Fayyad as a "former Hamas finance minister." Fayyad actually served as finance minister from 2002 to 2005 as part of the Fatah government in the Palestinian Authority.

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