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### About the Author

**Anne-Marie D'Aoust** is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. Aside from her work on the sociology of the discipline of IR, she examines the governmentality of marriage migration in Europe and the United States, focusing on technologies of love and risk management.

## Beyond geography and social structure: disciplinary sociologies of power in international relations

Kevin McMillan

School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier Avenue East, Desmarais Building,  
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada.

E-mail: [Kevin.McMillan@uottawa.ca](mailto:Kevin.McMillan@uottawa.ca)

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Throughout their relatively brief history, studies examining the academic International Relations (IR) discipline have manifested an abiding concern with power and its uneven 'distribution'. In this, of course, they mirror the object of their analysis. The same might also be said of the approach they



typically use to study disciplinary power: as within IR theory itself, studies of the IR discipline have primarily identified and assessed power in geographical and territorial terms. There are two principal (and often overlapping) variants of this approach: the first, and most familiar, is national (state-centric); the second, increasingly popular, is imperial (world-systemic).

Since the seminal work of Stanley Hoffmann (1977), for example, it has been a truism of IR disciplinary studies that their object is a distinctly 'American social science'. Though this brisk caption might be understood in various ways, it has been generally held to imply that the global discipline is dominated by theoretical concepts, themes, debates, approaches and methods originating — however this is interpreted — in the US. This judgement has been endorsed, with minor variations, by successive independent studies (e.g., Holsti 1985; Puchala 1997; Aydinli and Mathews 2000; Smith 2000, 2002). It has also given rise to an equally geographic 'counter-hegemonic' effort to examine national and regional communities of IR scholars outside of the US, with the aim of more accurately depicting the global discipline, of demonstrating the diversity of really existing 'ways of doing IR', and of suggesting ways in which IR as practised in the US might benefit from greater attention to themes, approaches and methods common elsewhere in the world.

It was perhaps natural to link this national hegemony to the image of a series of hierarchical relationships with other regional intellectual communities, radiating outward from the American hub. That hub could be expanded to include other 'imperial' powers. Already in 1985, Kalevi Holsti was drawing on Raúl Prebisch's famous 'centre-periphery' distinction to push the national assessment of power in, as it were, a world-systemic and post-colonial direction. Thus within the joint Anglo-American 'intellectual condominium', Holsti distinguished between the US 'core' and the declining British 'semi-periphery'; the rest of the world represented various dependent 'peripheries'. Asymmetric, one-way relations of communication, production and knowledge-flow prevailed: (widely-recognised) knowledge production was heavily concentrated, overwhelmingly generated by the few in the centre, while the peripheral multitude imported and consumed. Those in the autarkic centre, and sometimes in an increasingly self-sufficient and nationally parochial semi-periphery, remained blissfully ignorant of peripheral developments, as did peripherals of the goings-on in other peripheries (Friedrichs 2004: 3–5). Later uses of the analogy broadened core membership to varying degrees.

As aspects of this description might already suggest, one can only push the analogy to centre-periphery models of the global economy so far. One might also harbour certain qualms about the use of specific IR theories to frame the second-order study of the discipline that contains them. Still, the appeal of such geographic approaches to an assessment of disciplinary power is not only understandable but in many ways justified. Whatever qualifications one might



want to pin on it, treated as a broad-brush generalisation, the claim that the community of US scholars enjoys and exercises a hegemonic position within the global IR discipline is on balance accurate, significant and informative.

### **Geography and social structure in sociologies of IR**

One may nevertheless ask whether these geographical characterisations are the only ways to conceptualise disciplinary hegemony (DH),<sup>1</sup> or even the most useful. I argue here that they are neither. National/regional borders and communities are a convenient but ultimately imprecise and overly narrow means of demarcating global DH.<sup>2</sup> Though national policies may provide a degree of commonality along certain institutional dimensions — which ones no doubt varying from case to case — there is no particular reason to suppose that national or regional borders will correspond rigorously to the boundaries between specific constellations of institutional structure, intellectual culture, epistemic history or theoretical debate, should such exist. Nor, for that matter, to the structure and exercise of disciplinary power worldwide.

A feature of studies of disciplinary power in IR has been, if anything, more widespread and significant than the geographical construal of hegemony. Beginning already with Hoffmann, a wide range of stereotypically ‘sociological’, structural features of the discipline’s power dynamics has been identified, often in combination with the national-community approach.<sup>3</sup> Like sociologies of IR more generally, studies of asymmetrical power relations in the discipline have strongly tended to privilege ‘social-structural’ factors in their descriptions and explanations of IR’s main features. That is, they have focused on conditions internal and external to the discipline deemed to be ‘material’, concrete and enduring — hence easily identified, observed and measured. Internal structural conditions refer to what are thought to be intrinsic, constant<sup>4</sup> and systemic features of the (sub-)discipline as a whole, or of academic knowledge production more generally — for example, journal submission patterns or networks/alliances among researchers. External structural conditions are conditions considered to be part of the discipline’s wider ‘environment’ — for example, patterns of government research funding or academe-policy connections. Although there are still few specific, detailed studies, scholars reflecting on the discipline have pointed at least nominally to the importance of examining research funding patterns, social networks, organisational structures and institutions, national academic cultures, connections with policy communities and think-tanks, leading journals, editorial-board membership, direction/composition of research teams, media links, hiring/promotion practices and patterns of publication and citation. Thus sociologies of IR have so far directed the bulk of their attention to



institutional, procedural and organisational factors to describe and explain the character of the power relations that structure the discipline.

This lopsided emphasis is problematic. As with geographical conceptions of hegemony, sociologies of disciplinary power — and sociologies of IR more generally — need to broaden their focus beyond ‘social-structural’ accounts of its nature and persistence. Certainly, patterns of disciplinary power are both shaped by and manifest in these elements of the discipline’s ‘social organisation’, and their systematic investigation not only holds great promise, but has already yielded important findings.<sup>5</sup> However, this sort of ‘structural’ approach to the study of power in the IR discipline — an approach mirroring prevailing inclinations in IR and political science more broadly — is insufficient at best. This is not because the significance of the social, structural and material dimensions of the discipline’s power relations has been exaggerated, but because of the narrow underlying conception of what counts as ‘sociological’, ‘social’, ‘structural’ and ‘material’ in the first place.

What this ‘social-structural’ approach largely cannot do — at least as currently practised — is to grapple effectively and systematically with the discipline’s character (and that of its prevailing hegemony) as first and foremost an *intellectual* enterprise and phenomenon. To point this out is not to argue for a return to the bad old days when scientific knowledge was studied in supposedly pristine isolation, as an unmoored and ethereal realm of ideas, propositions and truth-claims. Recent sociologies of the discipline have correctly noted that any academic discipline by its very nature consists of a complex of social relationships, relationships not ancillary to or separable from the knowledge which it contains and produces, but rather constitutively intertwined with — *and embedded in* — that knowledge. However, sociologies of IR tend to interpret this insight narrowly, as an injunction to investigate the social conditions of intellectual production. Disciplinary knowledge is produced and explained by the organisation of its (internal/external) social setting and infrastructure. The result can be a certain social-structural determinism that effectively treats academic knowledge as epiphenomenal, relegated to the role of the perennial ‘dependent variable’, always produced and never producing, to be explained by presumably ‘deeper’ social-structural factors. This tendency is particularly evident in the ‘national/regional-communities’ literature: most recent work surveying local IR theory in national or regional contexts describes features of the scholarship typical of academic IR in that area, then proceeds to cite various structural, institutional and environmental features of the discipline/state/region held to explain those features.<sup>6</sup>

A subtle issue here is how disciplinary scholarship and knowledge tend to be conceived in such an approach. Two connected images are relevant here. One is knowledge as an inert aggregate mass, an accumulation of individual facts,



propositions or bits of information. The second is knowledge as an array of theories, often organised into ‘paradigms’ or broader theoretical approaches. Both images feed into the picture of disciplinary knowledge as a *product/output/outcome* of other processes and practices (research, learning, data-collection, observation, inference, teaching), which are in their turn the result of wider social and structural conditions that drive and shape them. We do not typically conceive of knowledge itself as an inherently sociological phenomenon, as an ensemble of activities and practices. If we do think of practices in connection with knowledge, it is the generic kinds of practices that go into *creating* or *producing* knowledge (writing, reading, revising, running journal clubs, reviewing journal submissions, giving and listening to academic talks, debating ideas with others, submitting papers to peers for feedback, etc.), not the practices *embedded in* or constituting knowledge *itself*, not knowledge itself *as* a set of practices.

Yet in its discursive form, knowledge is a ‘social’, ‘sociological’, ‘structural’ and ‘material’ phenomenon, and manifestly so. Far better, then, for us to conceive of disciplinary knowledge — of theory, theorising and scholarship — as composed, quite literally, of active reasoning, inference, persuasion, criticism, exclusion, positioning and argumentation rather than just a mass of ‘information’ or a collection of theories and paradigms. We should examine *what scholars do in* making arguments, debating, advancing scientific theses and theorising. And to conceive of disciplinary knowledge in this fashion would begin to undermine the implicit assumption of significant ontological difference between knowledge, the activities of knowledge-production and the social conditions of knowledge-production. I will argue that all three of these broad categories of phenomena should in fact be understood as structured concatenations of social practices. Among other things, this suggests that *explanation* of disciplinary phenomena is far less unidirectional, and far more complex, than hitherto assumed.

## Identifying and explaining DH

The usual social–structural elements cited in disciplinary studies face two broad kinds of problems. On the side of *identification* and *description*, these elements alone are unable to identify the core features of DH as a — partially, but necessarily — socio-epistemic phenomenon. Like the academic discipline that hosts it, DH is of course far from a purely epistemic or intellectual phenomenon, but this does not mean that we can ignore or downplay its epistemic dimensions. DH in IR frequently tends to be conceptualised, identified and studied in terms of uneven global patterns of intellectual/theoretical production and consumption — with the presumption that



‘whoever creates the theories, controls the agenda’ (Aydinli and Mathews 2008). However, identifying these patterns of production and consumption crucially depends on detailed knowledge of the ‘product’ itself — on the ability to discern with some precision the various specific forms, styles and features of scholarship being produced in the global discipline. In the absence of such, we are simply unable to identify DH and its characteristics with any precision — what its contours are, ‘where’ it is ‘located’, which scholars, institutions and work are included and excluded, what features specifically differentiate it from its rivals, dependents and alternatives, and so forth. We need a substantive account that can specify features that hegemonic scholarship broadly shares in common at a socio-epistemic level.

Less obvious is the fact that when it comes to *explanation*, these social-structural elements simply cannot do the job on their own — they cannot adequately account for the origins, extent and perpetuation of hegemony in the discipline. For one thing, they cannot because they represent only some of the many factors involved. Many of the main forces are primarily discursive and socio-epistemic in character.<sup>7</sup> We betray a denuded conception of what contributes to the emergence and preservation of power if we limit ourselves to (allegedly!) ‘material’ factors alone — or, rather, to IR’s typically shrunken understanding of what counts as ‘material’ in the first place — particularly when studying forms of power in an intellectual enterprise such as the production of academic knowledge about IR. An adequate understanding of the mechanisms by which DH is sustained will require, for example, knowledge of its ‘boundary maintenance’ practices. These are the discursive (and eminently ‘material’) practices whereby those within hegemony seek to preserve distinctions and boundaries separating their work from that of others; to define and restrict the field of legitimate inquiry; and to label, characterise, situate and evaluate heterodox work in juxtaposition to their own. Analysis need not stop there; a nuanced conception of power calls attention to the ways in which DH is also constituted by the practices of those who are not its ‘members’, including those beyond the academic sphere and even, crucially, those targeted by hegemonic boundary practices themselves.

However, the problem goes deeper. For the most part, such structural elements cannot properly be tagged as causes or conditions *at all*, absent an adequate understanding of their discursive counterparts or of key features of the DH complex in question. Otherwise they do not reliably *attach*, so to speak, to their explanandum. Explanation is illusory if we do not have a very good idea of *what it is* that we are trying to explain. If we are uncertain as to the precise nature of hegemony, and what exactly counts as hegemonic work, then we cannot know which potential social mechanisms of reproduction, for instance, are relevant, or in what specific ways they actually support or affect hegemonic dominance.



For explanation to succeed, we need to grasp the correct contours and basic nature of the phenomenon we seek to explain. For instance, in order to understand whether and how specific hiring patterns might entrench DH, we need to know what *kind* of people are being hired and why, and whether this matches up with that hegemony's basic character and operating principles. One suspects people are generally not hired for their nationality *per se*; if a department seeks an American, for instance, one assumes it is for whatever associations people typically attach to the attribute of being an American scholar — particularly associations involving, directly or indirectly, the kind and content of scholarship engaged in. It is in fact rather hard to imagine what hegemony in an academic discipline might possibly consist of without extensive reference to the kind, content and style of scholarship it produces and prefers. And if most sociologies of IR must indeed fundamentally depend at some level on characterisations of disciplinary knowledge, then the success of such accounts ultimately hinges in no small part on the accuracy and value of those characterisations.

If we need to understand IR's DH first and foremost in socio-epistemic terms, this suggests the need to reconceive what such hegemony is and where it extends. If we need a snappy label, then I propose that DH in IR be characterised as 'mainstream'<sup>8</sup> rather than 'American'. It should now be clear why such hegemony is so imprecisely captured by geographic accounts of power and its distribution within the discipline. Without question, American IR, however conceived, is overwhelmingly 'mainstream' in its orientation, but there are certainly American IR scholars, teaching in and outside of the US, who do not 'do' mainstream IR. By contrast, there are thousands of IR scholars around the world — scholars who are neither US nationals, nor trained in the US, nor employed by US universities — who do. It is arbitrary and problematic to characterise these latter scholars as somehow 'outside' IR's hegemony, simply because they are 'offshore' — as peripherals merely 'importing' pre-fabricated American IR, rather than themselves hegemonic scholars actually producing, contributing to and advancing hegemonic IR scholarship. Many of its most important figures, nodes, vehicles and mechanisms of power may well reside in the US, but DH in IR is clearly produced and *practised* all over the world.

### **An alternative focus: hegemonic practices**

I want to suggest that the most important and precise distinctions within IR scholarship are to be made among different regimes of socio-epistemic 'practices' in the discipline. Though my main aim here is to urge the analysis of hegemony's intellectual practices, this claim applies equally to the study of those 'social-structural' factors typically cited in the literature. For of course



funding, hiring, citation, publication and so on are themselves practices — even though we tend to treat them as brute, free-standing objects whose existence and attributes are readily isolated, measured and quantified, and whose significance is seen to lie primarily in the relative magnitude/frequency of their sub-types. However, so too are those disciplinary phenomena that might appear to be more legitimately construed as ‘objects’: for example, institutions, organisational structures, policy communities and social networks. For whatever else these ‘things’ may be composed of — for example, people and materiel — they always involve specific configurations of multiple, diverse practices. Indeed, it is largely their component practices that *make* these phenomena regular, structural, ‘material’, stable and so forth *in the first place*.

However, what does it mean to study ‘practices’? Scholars in IR’s burgeoning ‘practice turn’ have tended to stress the habitual, tacit, non-calculative, non-representational and ‘everyday’ dimensions of human action (e.g., Adler 2008: 202–4; Leander 2008: 14–9; Pouliot 2008, 2010; Hellmann 2009; Hopf 2010). For these scholars, practice is the domain of human action that is ‘second nature’ and quasi-automatic, performed without deliberate reflection; it is the product of inarticulate skills, tacit knowledge and know-how, of a ‘practical sense’, a ‘feel for the game’. In my view there are analytical problems with this approach, though I find its concerns important. I will not elaborate on either here. Instead, I will briefly propose a somewhat different conception of practices, one that I see as particularly fruitful for studies of DH.

This approach would treat practices not as tacit knowledge or behavioural dispositions underlying activity, but as the activity itself. Practices are concrete and ‘on the surface’, not something hidden or invisible that operates ‘beneath’ or ‘behind’ action. Nor would practices be limited to only certain kinds of action — that is, the habitual or non-reflexive. Instead, practices are simply generalised types of actions, identified in all their specificity. To identify socio-epistemic practices in IR, we look for the various types of intellectual or discursive action in which IR scholars regularly engage in the course of self-consciously attempting to contribute to disciplinary scholarship. ‘Regularly’ does not mean all, always or everywhere; not every mainstream scholar has actually used the widespread rhetoric of ‘middle-range theory’, for instance, yet that discursive practice is about as mainstream IR as it gets.<sup>9</sup> Nor will all of mainstream IR’s epistemic practices necessarily be unique to the discipline — the discourse of ‘middle-range theory’, for instance, having originated in sociology — nor even to mainstream scholars within the discipline. What will be peculiar to mainstream IR theory will be its specific overall configuration of practices, as well as the network of constitutive relations among those practices. Moreover, this configuration and some of its component practices will, of course, change over time; hegemony in IR is not a static thing.





An analytical difficulty arises in identifying hegemonic scholarship. Once one leaves behind (seemingly) determinate geographical criteria, refuses to specify in advance necessary and sufficient conditions for hegemony, and aims to characterise hegemonic (i.e., mainstream) scholarship primarily in terms of its discursive practices, one appears to be left without any non-circular identification strategies. A more satisfactory strategy might be to embrace the potential virtues of circularity: to begin with texts that are very widely cited and taught, to inductively identify salient practices featured there, and then to form a preliminary conceptualisation of hegemonic mainstream scholarship, later refining it in recursive fashion through ongoing calibration between analytical category and empirical instances. No doubt there are other plausible strategies.

One example of a practice of mainstream IR theorising might be the very widespread practice of developing scientific concepts and characterising/comparing empirical phenomena along (quasi-)typological lines. Concepts or phenomena of interest are individuated, depicted and related to one another by focusing attention on two or three among their innumerable features; these features are then characterised in abstract, universal form and presented as shared polar 'dimensions' along which the phenomena are held to differ from one another (or vary). Empirical 'cases' can then be slotted into the relevant cells of the resulting property-space. This practice is typically accompanied by explicit claims or implicit assumptions of mutual exclusion and especially joint exhaustion within the constrained set of logico-empirical possibilities that it yields.<sup>10</sup>

Understood as generalised action-types, 'practices' might initially seem to be little different from the conventional concepts of 'political behaviour' or 'behavioural regularities', commonly studied by mainstream IR theory and political science. Nevertheless, profound differences from those concepts/approaches should be noted. Practices must be studied in a holistic fashion; they cannot be effectively understood or explained in isolation. The nature, orientation and principal features of a given practice cannot be grasped apart from the web of neighbouring, contemporaneous practices in which it is embedded. We do not fully understand typological practices of concept-formation without a sense of the ways in which they tie into, reflect, support and are sustained by certain other socio-epistemic practices of mainstream IR. One such is the practice of formulating highly abstract, often amorphous, universal functional concepts. In philosophical jargon, these concepts are hyper-'multiply realisable': they can be applied, often by loose analogy and as-if reasoning, to an incredibly diverse range of actual empirical objects, events, actors, features and phenomena: for instance, 'incentives', 'side-payments', 'signalling', 'compliance', 'social capital', 'relative gains (considerations)', 'credible commitment', 'norm entrepreneurs' or 'soft balancing'.



Also connected with typological practices is the use — not just in quantitative but in qualitative and even explicitly anti-correlational research (e.g., Checkel 2001: 565) — of the broad explanatory model and vocabulary associated with statistical inference. One example of this connection is the practice of formulating the dimensions of qualitative typologies as ordinal categorical variables along which ‘values’ ‘vary’ in more-*vs*-less terms. Mainstream IR theory also exhibits a marked predilection for structural explanatory models. Such models purport to explain a phenomenon’s effects, or an actor(-type)’s behaviour, by isolating it abstractly and then proposing a small number of ways in which features of its ‘external environment’ might systematically vary, thereby generating different ‘outcomes’. Significantly, the set of dimensions along which the structural environment is held to vary, their range of possible values, and the set of resulting outcomes are each treated as exhaustive. Here there are clear similarities in the form and functioning of typological practices and practices of structural explanation. Such isomorphisms are just one of the ways in which neighbouring practices can relate to, interact with and sustain one another.

There is great value in learning how practices function in relation to one another and ‘hang together’; it helps us, *inter alia*, to explain them, and to learn some key sources of their collective resilience. Moreover, by identifying typological practices, hypothetico-deductive techniques, the formulation of structural models and so on, plus the relations among them, we begin to isolate and reconstruct a level of analysis that has its own dynamics and interrelations, irreducible to the particular motives, for example, of the particular actors that perform the individual actions instantiating those practices. This implies that practices of interest should be isolated and examined *at the specific level of the practices themselves*.

This principle suggests a methodological corollary. As practices are most effectively identified, characterised and explained by considering their relations to contemporaneous practices — and as truly universal (transhistorical/transcultural) practices are therefore fairly rare — an open-ended, inductive approach to the empirical identification and investigation of hegemonic epistemic practices would seem appropriate. Furthermore, rather than classify actors’ practices in terms of familiar action-categories, one might seek inductively to develop new categories designed to capture and emphasise key features of these practices as identified and grasped in all their substantive specificity.

### **To what end?**

Studies of the dominant intellectual practices of mainstream IR theory could yield a wide range of benefits. For one thing, they might shake us out of the



common, complacent assumption that power is power is power. We sometimes behave as if the mere fact of a striking concentration/inequality of power — plus perhaps its causes or mechanisms of persistence — are all we really need to know. A detailed understanding of mainstream disciplinary practices would give us a far more precise idea of what exactly hegemonic IR is, who practises it, where and *how*. By examining these practices as a distinct level of analysis unto themselves, and by assessing the relations among them, we could also understand the inner architecture of mutual support (or tension) among hegemony's various epistemic elements — assumptions, ontological or epistemological commitments, styles of reasoning, modes of inference, perceived purposes and objectives, narratives of self and others.

Together with the analysis of intellectual practices of 'border maintenance' and similar activities, moreover, it can give us a better idea of how power is actually exercised and actually operates at the socio-epistemic level. It can help us understand DH's 'defence mechanisms', and how it routinely portrays and deals with challenges, doubts and divergence. It can teach us the sources of hegemony's self-confidence, its cohesiveness and its internal and external persuasiveness, attractiveness and force. The study of hegemonic practices can help us to understand the inertia and resilience (or otherwise) of existing power relations and dynamics in the discipline. It might explore the ways in which hegemony's epistemic and non-epistemic practices interconnect, overlap and diverge. It might also expand its focus to include the practices of both hegemonic and non-hegemonic IR theory, and the interactions among them; we can analyse how these interactions have developed their own patterns, regular effects and sources of stability or instability.

Finally, as the foregoing might suggest, careful examination of some of the dominant intellectual practices of mainstream IR can assist appreciably in the pursuit of critique and change. It is hardly a coincidence that most who engage in disciplinary studies — whether of the sociological or historiographical variety — write from a non-mainstream perspective. Most scholars, for instance, who study relations of power within the discipline do so with the aim of criticising and perhaps helping to transform those relations. The quest to understand mainstream IR's assumptions, defence mechanisms, bordering practices, sources of resilience and points of internal tension does not originate in sheer curiosity. In the social world, the path from understanding and explanation to intervention is rarely straightforward, but the former are conditions usually necessary — if hardly sufficient — to the latter's success. To this end, a sophisticated understanding of hegemonic practices in the discipline can play a powerful role. Such understanding might, for example, help deflate the self-evidence of mainstream IR theory by allowing scholars to articulate with precision what the social world would have to be like in order for mainstream IR's explicit claims and implicit commitments —



ontological, epistemological and methodological — actually to have any force. It might also help critics rebut claims that mainstream IR's theoretical and methodological diversity furnishes a decisive refutation of charges of parochialism, epistemological intolerance/closure and hostility to difference (e.g., Moravcsik 2003: 135–6; cf. Jordan *et al.* 2009: 8–11).

These are vague promises, and the pudding's proof, of course, will be in the eating. However, the stakes are large, as any scholar who has been summarily informed that they are not 'doing IR' knows very well. The prospects for meaningful change may hinge to a considerable extent on the precision, power, rigour, clarity, accuracy and plausibility of our own critical and transformatively oriented discursive practices. And that, perhaps, is reason enough for those analysing the IR discipline to continue to probe and refine their accounts and critiques of the entrenched hegemony that dominates it.

## Notes

- 1 I follow conventional practice in IR disciplinary studies in using the term 'hegemony', in both its realist and (probably more appropriate) neo-Gramscian senses. Personally, I find this concept vague and problematic — problematic partly because of its construal of power, in pseudo-quantitative comparative terms, as something homogeneous in nature that is 'possessed' in greater or lesser amounts — but it has the merits of familiarity and brevity.
- 2 A few geographical approaches resist making any *ex ante* commitment to a particular privileged spatial scale, whether national, regional, etc.: for example, Agnew (2007).
- 3 See, for example, the classification of explanatory factors suggested by Tickner and Wæver (2009: 19–21) in the introduction to their edited volume.
- 4 Though of varying magnitude, frequency, distribution or features; this variation is often treated as explanatory.
- 5 An exemplar in the 'structural' genre of disciplinary studies is Waever (2007a, cf. 2007b). Within the national-communities literature, see the original and insightful (if appropriately tentative) summary conclusions of Tickner and Wæver (2009: Ch. 18).
- 6 See, for example, the various chapters in Jørgensen and Knudsen (2006) and Tickner and Waever (2009).
- 7 For example, Friedrichs' claim (2004: 10–6, 20) that standard accounts of disciplinary history in terms of American DH help sustain that very hegemony. Of course, these forces are every bit as 'sociological' — and *political* — as the factors more usually cited — a central point of this reflection.
- 8 I choose this label for sore lack of better. The obvious alternatives — 'conventional', 'standard', 'traditional', 'orthodox', 'canonical', 'established' and so on — seem equally problematic or worse.
- 9 Though such practices should probably not be peripheral or rare, and should be widely recognised in the relevant circles as constituting or contributing to serious — if possibly wrongheaded — scholarship.
- 10 See Abbott and Snidal (2000) for a clear example.

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### **About the Author**

**Kevin McMillan** is an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, Canada, where he also coordinates the International Studies and Modern Languages programme. His research interests include European international history, the emergence and evolution of modern international governance, and the philosophy of the social sciences. He recently completed a monograph on *Constitutive Theory and the Study of Practices*, and is working on a second entitled *The Emergence of International Governance: Practices of European Politics, 1700-1848*.