

# Aid allocation of the emerging Central and Eastern European donors

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This paper examines the main characteristics of the (re-)emerging foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), concentrating on the allocation of their aid resources. I adopt an econometric approach, similar to the ones used in the literature, for analysing the aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors. Using this approach, I examine the various factors that influence aid allocation of the Visegrád countries, using data for the years between 2001 and 2008. The most important conclusion is that the amount of aid a partner country gets from the four emerging donors is not influenced by the level of poverty or the previous performance of the recipients (measured by the level of economic growth or the quality of institutions). The main determining factor seems to be geographic proximity, as countries in the Western Balkans and the Post-Soviet region receive much more aid from the Visegrád countries than other recipients. Historical ties (pre-1989 development relations) and international obligations in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq are also found to be significant explanatory factors. This allocation is in line with the foreign political and economic interests of these new donors. Although there are clear similarities between the four donors, this paper also identifies some individual country characteristics. *Journal of International Relations and Development* (2012) **15**, 65–89.

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## Introduction

In the past decade, a number of Central and Eastern European countries have emerged as new donors of foreign aid. Although these countries already had certain forms of development-related cooperation with Third World countries during the Cold War, the pre-1989 experiences are difficult to compare with their current, (re-)emerging aid policies. There is a clear pressure, related mostly to membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU), for these new donors to align themselves with the norms and principles of the international development aid regime. Many special characteristics are observable, however, in the



Central and Eastern European donors, which predict that they will behave differently than the members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the 'club' of advanced donor countries. In part, this may be related to the fact that their foreign aid policies are still in their infancy, but it is also undeniable that their motivations for giving aid are somewhat different than those of the Western donors. It is logical to assume that the consequences of these different motivations are identifiable in the quality and allocation of aid provided by the emerging donors.

In this paper, I examine the determining factors behind the aid allocation of the Central and Eastern European donors, using simple regression methods. My goal is to show that, when making decisions on how to allocate their aid resources, these donors take different factors into consideration than what the general trend is among the OECD DAC countries. More specifically, my hypothesis is that the Central and Eastern European donors do not take into account the recipients' need for aid (measured by their per capita income levels), nor their previous performance (measured by their growth performance or institutional quality). There is a growing body of literature that argues that these factors related to recipient countries' needs and merits are increasingly important in explaining the aid allocation of the OECD DAC countries, although it cannot be denied that this group of countries is highly heterogeneous. I argue, however, that, due to the emergent character of their aid policies and their different motivations for giving aid, Central and Eastern European countries will take other factors into consideration when making their aid allocation decisions. The results indicate that geographic proximity and earlier relations (dating back to the Communist era) are important factors among others in determining the amount of aid a recipient country receives from the Central and Eastern European donors. I find no evidence of need- and merit-based aid allocation among these countries. In other words, these countries do not base their aid allocation decisions on the level of income or the quality of policies and institutions in recipient countries, as is increasingly common among OECD DAC members.

I concentrate on aid allocation and do not analyse the quality of aid provided by the Central and Eastern European donors, as the lack of data would seriously hinder any such attempts. Out of all Central and Eastern European donors, I examine the four members of the Visegrád Group (V4), namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, as they have the most advanced and significant foreign aid policies in the region. As I will show, there are considerable similarities between these countries in terms of foreign aid motivations, but also some important differences that have not been identified by earlier research. There is also a practical reason for the selection of these four countries: they are the only countries among the Central and Eastern European donors for which the OECD provides comparable time



series data on aid allocation, which is a *sine qua non* for my quantitative analysis.

To my knowledge, the aid allocation decisions of the V4 countries have so far not been scrutinised in a quantitative manner in the literature. This paper contributes to the existing literature by applying the methods used for analysing aid allocation decisions and the underlying motivations of the OECD DAC members to the V4 countries, leading to a better understanding of the way these countries make decisions concerning aid allocation and how this is different from the better-established donor countries. The results confirm the earlier case study evidence, but also raise some interesting questions related to the differences between the aid practices of these countries.

The paper is structured as follows: the first section reviews the literature on the aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors, with a special focus on the methodology of the various studies and their results. The next section lists the main common characteristics of the aid policies of the four Visegrád countries. The subsequent section introduces a few stylised facts concerning the aid allocation of these emerging donors, and the penultimate section contains the description and estimation of my regression models. The final section concludes the paper. Throughout this paper, the terms aid, foreign aid and development assistance are used as synonyms, and they always refer to the OECD's statistical category of ODA (official development assistance).

## **Aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors**

There are no single and unambiguous conclusions in the literature examining the determinants of aid allocation. One of the main reasons for this is that each donor country may have several motivations for giving foreign aid and it can be difficult to pinpoint any single driving force. But even if one could identify the main determining factors in the case of a single donor country, the diversity among donors would still make any generalisation exceedingly difficult. A second reason for the mixed results in the literature is related to the question of what time period the various authors analyse. It is quite clear that the aid allocation decisions of donors were influenced by different factors during the Cold War than those that are relevant at present.

The main models for explaining aid allocation in the literature are the 'recipient need' and the 'donor interest' models (McKinley and Little 1979; Gounder 1994; McGillivray 2003). According to the former, aid allocation should be driven by the needs of the recipients; therefore countries with lower incomes, higher levels of poverty or lower levels of human development should receive more aid. The donor interest model, on the other hand, states that foreign aid serves donor interests, and thus those countries that have some kind



of political, economic or other relations with the given donors will receive more resources. Although this distinction is to some extent flawed, as donors may have interests in giving aid to poor countries to reduce poverty (i.e., poverty reduction can reflect both recipient need and donor interest), it has become a frequent point of reference in the literature.

The majority of authors analysing the period of the Cold War clearly subscribe to the donor interest model. They conclude that aid allocation decisions were primarily driven by strategic and geopolitical considerations, and thus donors usually gave more aid to countries that were important to them due to some strategic reason. Aid was used as a tool of influence in this context. Alesina and Dollar (2000), for example, showed that during the Cold War donors gave more aid to those recipients with which they had longer colonial ties or that belonged to the same alliance system as they did. The United States is well known to have used aid to achieve geopolitical goals ever since the birth of foreign aid (Morgenthau 1962), as it gave more resources to those countries that were especially important in the containment of regional Soviet influence. Israel and Egypt, especially after the 1979 Camp David agreement, also received huge amounts of US assistance. McKinley and Little (1979: 243) came to the conclusion that there are 'no grounds for asserting that humanitarian criteria have any significant direct influence' on US aid allocation.

However, during the Cold War, economic and trade considerations were also an important motivation for donors. In an influential early study, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) argued that among other motivations, donors give more aid to countries with which they have higher volumes of trade. There is a relatively well-established consensus in the literature that during the Cold War the previous performance of the recipients, the quality of their political leadership, the level of poverty (Maizels and Nissanke 1984), the respect for human rights (Neumayer 2003) or the level of corruption (Alesina and Weder 2002) were not decisive factors in determining the amount of aid they received from the donors. Cases like the relationship between the United States and Zaire (today's Democratic Republic of Congo) illustrate well that recipient merit was not an important factor (Weissman 1997).

Although the literature examining the post-Cold War era also has mixed conclusions, there seems to be some degree of consensus concerning the fact that changes have occurred in donor behaviour and also in aid allocation. It is a well-documented fact that aid levels decreased during the 1990s, but a resurgence of aid can be observed after the turn of the millennium. The content of foreign aid has also changed in the past two decades. According to Burnell (2005: 4), the end of the Cold War 'provided an enabling environment for new political objectives and aid rationales, namely democracy, "good governance" and human rights, to be sought directly via projects or programmes and also through adding political conditionalities'. Many new issues



have also arisen, such as the integration of gender and civil society into foreign aid (Lister and Carbone 2006), post-conflict rehabilitation (Collier *et al.* 2003) or, more recently, climate change (World Bank 2009a).

The shifts in the content and scope of foreign aid make it reasonable to assume that aid allocation may also have changed. Dollar and Levin (2006), for example, came to the conclusion that, since the second half of the 1990s, an increasing number of donors have taken the previous performance (measured by the quality of institutions and policies using the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index) and levels of income of the recipients into consideration when deciding on how to allocate their aid. Their findings are supported by the conclusions of Isopi and Mavrotas (2006). Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006), also examining the post-1989 period, found that aid and per capita income have been negatively related, whereas aid has been positively related to infant mortality, human rights and government effectiveness.

The reason behind this perceived shift from donor interests to recipient needs may be related to increased ethical considerations of the donors, but probably security-related aspects are the most important. Perhaps it does not even mean a shift towards recipient needs but rather a shift within donor interests.<sup>1</sup> According to Burnell (2005), the two main reasons behind the resurgence of aid and the changes in aid policies (and thus allocation) are globalisation and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The latter has dramatically shown that due to globalisation, the indirect effects of global poverty, state weakness and frustrations over failed modernisation in developing countries can increasingly affect rich countries as well. However, terrorism is not the only security threat that is (directly or indirectly) related to poverty. Mass migration and trafficking in human beings, the emergence and spread of new diseases, organised crime and violent conflict are all issues that require the attention of donors.

Many donor countries may have recognised that foreign aid can serve as a tool for battling such global threats by promoting economic growth, decreasing poverty and fostering democratisation (Rotberg 2002; Brainad 2003). For aid actually to achieve these goals, it must be more effective and better allocated. As shown by Collier and Dollar (2002), there is a close link between the allocation of aid and its overall effectiveness. According to their results, the number of people pulled out of poverty can be maximised if those countries receive the most aid where per capita incomes are low but policies and institutions are of good quality. McGillivray *et al.* (2006) argued in a review on the empirical literature that aid effectiveness has been increasing since the 1990s, which may in part be due to a more effective allocation of aid.

Most of the works mentioned above seek to make generalisations on the level of the entire foreign aid regime. Such an approach, however, may be misleading, as it masks the potential heterogeneity between donors. Although one



can agree that there seems to be a general trend among the countries in the OECD DAC to move towards an aid allocation model based on need and merit, this is hardly true for all individual donor countries. Therefore, many authors concentrate only on a single donor, or a group of donors, and try to establish the factors that affect their aid allocation decisions. This approach allows for more clear-cut conclusions, as it does not seek to generalise results for the heterogeneous group of all aid-giving countries (Gounder 1994; Schraeder *et al.* 1998; Berthélemy 2006). According to these studies, the well-known although simplistic cleavage between ‘altruistic’ and ‘egoistic’ OECD DAC donors is clearly identifiable. Although many donors (such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom) do take into consideration the needs and merits of the recipients when determining the allocation of their aid, others such as the United States, Japan, Italy or Greece seem more interested in furthering their own shorter-term interests, and they try to reap the immediate economic benefits from foreign aid. Still, it is possible to identify some shift even in US foreign aid policy in the past decade, such as the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account in 2004 (Radelet 2003).

Most of the works cited above use regression methods to identify the main factors that influence the allocation of foreign aid. The dependent variable in such regressions is the amount of aid a recipient receives (either from one donor, or all donors). The independent variables represent such factors, which may influence this amount, but of course taking all such factors into account is not possible. In fact, quantifying some of the determinants of aid allocation into variables in a regression model raises many questions. The main works in the literature usually use the following independent variables (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Younas 2008):

- variables indicating recipient need, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, levels of poverty or some measure of human development;
- variables indicating the merits or previous performance of the recipient, which try to capture how much aid the recipient ‘deserves’ and how effectively it can use these resources. This can be measured by previous levels of economic growth, the quality of economic and political institutions, the quality of economic policies or the level of corruption;
- variables indicating donor interests, measuring the intensity of relations between the recipient and the donor(s), such as those indicating former colonial ties, the volume of bilateral trade, the stock of bilateral investments, the participation in a common military alliance or even voting together in the UN General Assembly; and
- other variables, such as the size of the population in the recipient country.

The models in the literature are usually estimated using panel data in order to increase the number of observations in the regression and to control for



recipient and donor fixed effects, following the methods suggested by Trumbull and Wall (1994). It must be noted, however, that the results of such regression-based studies must always be treated with a degree of scepticism. Due to the inherent uncertainties of the method, conclusions and policy recommendations based on regression analysis should only be accepted if they are also triangulated by other methods. However, regressions are still the most common method used for analysing aid allocation decisions, and they can be extremely useful for testing broad hypothesis generated by case studies — exactly what is needed in the case of the V4 donors. So far, according to my knowledge, only descriptive case studies have been published to analyse the foreign aid policies of these countries. Regression analysis can also help to identify common patterns for these emerging donors, which may be different than those observable in the case of the OECD DAC donors.

Before introducing my regression approach, I feel it is important to draw up the main characteristics of the foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries, as well as the factors that determine these.

### **The main characteristics of the Visegrád donors**

After the turn of the millennium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia all started to create or recreate their international development policies. All four countries possessed some degree of prior international development experience, since before 1989 they all had development relations with Third World countries in one form or another. During the Cold War the countries of the Eastern Bloc did not have sovereign foreign policies, and thus their international development efforts were also subordinated to the political, military and other interests of the Soviet Union. This influence could be pinpointed in the allocation of their aid: the recipients were mostly developing countries with socialist or strongly leftist governments, not to mention the formal allies of the Soviet Bloc (Carbone 2004: 244). It is difficult to compare these pre-1989 foreign aid policies of the Visegrád countries with the classic project- and programme-oriented approach of the OECD DAC member states, as they mainly consisted of the delivery of in-kind goods, technical cooperation, scholarships and tied aid credits (Szentes 1994; Baginski 2002).<sup>2</sup>

With the end of the Cold War and the initiation of the transition process, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland all suspended their foreign aid policies, which was an understandable decision given the severe recession caused by the economic transformation process. With the European Community's 'Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies' program, these countries became recipients of foreign aid. Throughout the 1990s, foreign aid



was basically restricted to giving a limited number of scholarships to developing country students, as well as membership fees and other *ad hoc* contributions to international organisations (such as the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization or the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)). In the case of Hungary, an important form of aid were the resources granted to ethnic Hungarians living in the Ukraine, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. Altogether, though, the 1990s were characterised by the steep decline of foreign aid policies.

By the end of the decade an increasing, although rather implicit, international pressure built on the four countries to take a larger share in aiding poorer countries. At first, this pressure stemmed from membership in the OECD,<sup>3</sup> and later the EU also played an important role in pushing these countries to create new foreign aid policies.<sup>4</sup> Still, the issue of international development cooperation was neglected during the accession negotiations, which reflected the low political priority that both sides attached to it (Harmer and Cotterrell 2005: 11; Lightfoot 2008). Besides international pressure, other factors might have also contributed to the creation of these policies after the millennium. Drozd (2007: 6), for example, remarks that in the case of Poland an important factor was demonstrating the country's successful transition to a full-fledged market economy. All four countries laid down the legal, institutional and financial foundations of their new international development policies between 2001 and 2003, a process helped in part by a joint capacity-building project carried out by the Canadian International Development Agency and the UNDP. It is therefore clear that the international development policies of the Western countries served as role models for the re-emerging foreign aid policies of the four Visegrád countries.

Taking this historical background into consideration, it is difficult to compare the current emerging foreign aid policies of the four countries with those of the OECD DAC donors, who have many decades of experience in providing foreign aid. These differing characteristics lead to different goals and motivations for the Visegrád countries than those observable in the case of many Western donors. The main characteristics are the following:

- The Visegrád countries are relatively small (or in the case of Poland, medium-sized) states and none of them were colonial powers, which leads to the conclusion that their former political relations with developing countries were sporadic at best. As they did not have sovereign foreign policies before the transition, they did not have the possibility to form relationships with developing countries according to their own national interests (Baginski 2002; Carbone 2004).
- As a partial consequence of the above, the Visegrád countries have only limited economic ties at present with developing countries as well.





- When compared with Western European countries or the United States, many people in the Visegrád countries seem to see themselves as less affected by the security threats caused by global poverty and state weakness (Tálas 2007). Although this may or may not be the case, one can argue that these perceptions may also have an effect on the international development policies of these countries.
- The questions of international development are usually not part of the public discourse in the four countries, and thus public awareness about these issues is also much lower than in the Western donor countries. Bucar and Mrak (2007: 11) argue that there is no significant constituency for development cooperation in these countries. This is well reflected by the various Eurobarometer surveys, which also show at the same time that the citizens of the Visegrád countries are not indifferent towards the situation in the developing countries from a moral standpoint (e.g., Eurobarometer 2007).
- The four countries are facing severe development challenges of their own and thus it may be difficult for governments to justify spending large amounts on foreign aid towards the taxpayers. The desire to join the euro zone and the straightjacket of the Maastricht-criteria also limit any possibilities these countries may have for a rapid increase in funds spent on foreign aid, not to mention the current economic crisis.

It is clear that the few characteristics listed above will definitely have an effect on the quantity, quality and allocation of the foreign aid disbursed by the four Central and Eastern European countries. I will only make a few remarks concerning quantity and quality, as my research is mainly confined to examining the allocation of their resources.

The amount of aid disbursed by the Visegrád countries is quite low compared with the OECD DAC average, both compared to the GNIs of the respective donors and especially in absolute terms. Table 1 shows the evolution in the past years of the ODA/GNI figures of the four countries and compares it with the DAC average. Although an increasing trend is visible to some extent, 2007 and 2008 showed stagnation, and in the case of Hungary there was a rather spectacular decline compared with previous years. With the exception of Hungary, where the decline of the ODA/GNI ratio also meant the decline of the absolute amount spent on foreign aid, stagnating ratios hide increasing absolute amounts (OECD 2007a: 33, 2008: 33) for the rest of the V4 countries.

It is difficult to draw any clear conclusions concerning the quality of aid channelled by the four countries. Even though some descriptive and even normative studies have been published in the past years (e.g., Bucar and Mrak 2007; Drozd 2007; Kiss 2007; OECD 2007b; Szent-Iványi and Tétényi 2008; Lightfoot 2010), the scarcity of comparable data renders any such attempt almost impossible. These few existing studies do permit a fair amount of



**Table 1** ODA/GNI ratios in the Visegrád countries between 2002 and 2008 (per cent)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Czech Republic	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12
Hungary	—	0.03	0.06	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.08
Poland	—	0.01	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.08
Slovakia	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.10
OECD DAC average	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.33	0.31	0.28	0.31

Source: OECD (2007a: 33; 2008: 33; 2009: 33).

critical remarks concerning aid quality, but it must be kept in mind that we are dealing with emerging foreign aid policies, still in the phase of learning. Still, the most important generalisable conclusions from these studies are the following:

- The institutional settings for aid delivery in the four countries are highly fragmented. Too many organisations and ministries are involved, and there is a lack of strategic focus: the proliferation of partners and sectors and thus resources is clearly present (Kiss 2007: 8–9, 11; OECD 2007b: 14; World Bank 2007: 3; Zagranica Group 2007: 15).
- Their foreign aid policies are highly donor-driven, and the recipients have little influence on planning and programming resources. Recipient ‘ownership’, which refers to whether the countries receiving aid are in charge of (or at least have a substantial role in) planning and implementing the development projects financed by aid, is difficult to identify in practice (OECD 2007b: 20; Zagranica 2007: 19).
- The evaluation of projects is not given ample emphasis, and feedback and organisational learning are neglected (OECD 2007b: 21).

It is clear that more research is required in order to gain broader insights into the qualitative aspects of foreign aid channelled by the Visegrád countries. From my perspective, however, the quality of aid is secondary, the main question is to whom the countries give aid and why. Taking the historical background and other characteristics of the four countries described in this section into account, it is possible to gain better insights into these aid allocation decisions.

### **A few stylised facts on the aid allocation of the Visegrád countries**

Perhaps one of the most striking features of the aid allocation of the Visegrád countries is that they seem to concentrate most of their resources on partners in



their neighbourhood, mainly the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet region. Although the stability of these two regions is important for all European countries, it is of paramount interest for Central and Eastern Europe (Dangerfield 2009), as they would be hit hardest by potential instability in the forms of increased migration, decreasing international trade and foreign investments and increasing levels of organised crime. Avoiding further conflict in the former Yugoslavia and promoting political stability and economic growth in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is one of the most important foreign policy interests of the Visegrád countries. Some numbers relating to their aid allocation illustrate well how important these two regions are for the four emerging donors.

According to data from the OECD's StatExtracts online database, Hungary channelled more than 61 per cent of its bilateral ODA in 2008 to relatively poor European countries, with Serbia and the Ukraine among the top three partners. The same figure for Poland is 47 per cent, and Belarus and the Ukraine were by far the two most important recipients. European countries are also important in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, although the figures for 2008 are distorted due to large-scale Czech aid to Afghanistan and Slovakian debt relief to Liberia. Besides Afghanistan, Serbia and Bosnia were the second- and third-largest recipients of Czech ODA in 2008.

Taking a broader view, the partner countries of the four emerging Visegrád donors may be divided into the following three groups (with some exceptions):

- Countries belonging to the immediate neighbourhood, or in other words the Western Balkans and the CIS region: Although there are major annual fluctuations in the amount of V4 aid given to these partner countries, the relative importance of these two regions has not changed since 2001.
- Iraq and Afghanistan: Giving aid to them is a result of international obligations as NATO members and their close ties to the United States.<sup>5</sup>
- Partner countries 'inherited' from the Communist period: These are the countries with which development partnerships already existed before the transition, such as Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique or Laos. Formerly (or in some cases even at present), these countries all had socialist-oriented political systems, or for other reasons hoped to gain (development or military) assistance from the Soviet bloc.

The question arises: why do the Visegrád countries choose far-flung developing recipients today? Why do not they concentrate all their aid resources on their neighbouring countries (and perhaps on any international obligations)? Their security-related motivations for giving aid clearly dictate giving aid to potentially unstable countries in their proximity. Being present in far-away developing countries also entails costs that may be prohibitively high for such emerging donors. Also, they have much more limited economic



and political ties with these countries, as elaborated in the section ‘The main characteristics of the Visegrád donors’. The reason for supporting such countries, I argue, is international pressure: both the EU and the OECD expect (although perhaps they do not explicitly state it) the emerging Central and Eastern European donors to support less-developed countries as well (Michaux 2002; Drozd 2007: 10). If they have to select such partner countries, it seems logical for them to select ones with which they had relations before the transition and thus may have some experience.

## **Regression approach, data and results**

### **Model and data**

The few facts mentioned above and the grouping of partner countries still does not prove that the four emerging donors systematically allocate their foreign aid based on different criteria than those used by most OECD DAC donors. In order to pinpoint the factors that influence the aid allocation decisions of the Visegrád countries, I employ a simple regression approach, in some aspects similar to the ones used for analysing the aid allocation decisions of the DAC members in the literature (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Schraeder *et al.* 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 2006; Dollar and Levin 2006; Younas 2008). The models used of course must be adapted to the characteristics of the Visegrád countries and limits posed by the availability of data.

The dependent variable of my regression is the amount of aid a recipient country gets from the Visegrád donors (i.e., the gross bilateral ODA received by the various recipients from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia combined). Data on this variable are from the StratExtracts Online database of the OECD for the years between 2001 and 2008. The literature on aid allocation prefers to use 4- or 5-year averages for such data in order to eliminate potential biases caused by large annual fluctuations in aid to any single countries (which are relatively common). Therefore, I decided to split my data into two 4-year episodes, thus each recipient country will constitute two observations, one for the period between 2001 and 2004 and a second for the years between 2005 and 2008. I estimate this model using a simple pooled-ordinary least squares (OLS) method. I also tried using a country-year approach and estimated it with the fixed effects method as suggested by Trumbull and Wall (1994) as a robustness check for the pooled-OLS method. Although the data on bilateral ODA published by the OECD is not perfect, as it includes money that does not actually leave the donor country such as debt relief or the costs of housing refugees, it is not possible to clean the data from these distorting factors. I discuss the potential biases and limitations that this may cause in the section ‘Limitations’.



For independent variables of the model, I include the factors that may determine how much aid a recipient country got from the V4 donors between 2001 and 2008. The variables used are the following:

- The size of the recipient country's population, measured as an average of the 2001–2004 and the 2005–2008 periods, respectively. *Ceteris paribus*, larger countries should receive more aid from the Visegrád countries than smaller ones. Data are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
- GDP per capita of the recipient countries in purchasing power parity (PPP). Poorer countries should get higher amounts of foreign aid, but I hypothesise that this relationship does not exist in the case of the Visegrád donors. It is widely discussed in the aid literature that there is an endogenous relationship between aid and income levels (Roodman 2007 for an accessible discussion on the topic). This endogeneity comes from the potential two-way causality between aid and income levels: income may determine how much aid donors give to a country, but aid also increases income levels. In order to control for this potential bias, I measure GDP per capita in the year before the beginning of each of the two periods, that is, in 2000 and 2004, instead of using averages for the entire period. The logic behind this approach is that GDP per capita in the previous years may influence how much aid a country gets, but is definitely not influenced by the average annual amount of aid channelled in the following 4 years. Data on PPP GDP per capita are from the IMF.
- GDP growth in the recipient country, which may signal both need for aid and performance and 'merit'. Countries with low levels of economic growth may need more aid to accelerate growth, but, on the other hand, donors may be more willing to reward 'good performers' with larger amounts of aid. In the case of the Visegrád countries, I hypothesise that the growth rate of the recipient's GDP will not have any effect on how much aid it receives. As with GDP per capita, the problem of endogeneity arises here as well, so I use a similar approach as above and lag the growth variables. Data on growth are also from the IMF.
- Institutional quality of the recipient country. As outlined in the section 'Aid allocation of the OECD DAC donors', some donors increasingly concentrate their aid in countries with 'good institutions'. I use two measures of institutional quality: the well-known Freedom House index measuring political institutions and civil liberties,<sup>6</sup> and the 'rule of law' index published by the World Bank in its World Governance Indicators initiative.<sup>7</sup> I hypothesise that neither indicator will have any explanatory power in the case of the aid allocation by the Visegrád countries.
- I decided to include dummy variables in the model for the various groups of recipient countries, that is, the Western Balkans, the CIS region, Iraq and



Afghanistan, as well as the pre-1989 recipients. I hypothesise that these dummies will have significant explanatory power.

- Due to the nature of the pooled-OLS approach, there is also a dummy included for the second (2005–2008) period. This allows me to test whether there has been a general scaling up of bilateral aid by the V4 donors in the period between 2005 and 2008 as a result, for example, of their accession to the EU.

ODA and GDP data are measured in constant 2008 prices and exchange rates. Unfortunately, there is no appropriate variable for measuring economic relations between the Visegrád donors and their aid-receiving partners. In the literature on the OECD DAC donors, usually the volume of bilateral trade (Younas 2008) or the stock of foreign direct investment is used, but these data are not readily available for the Visegrád donors. I hope, however, that this will not weaken the explanatory power of my model, as the trade and economic interests of the Visegrád donors would mainly predict larger aid flows to the Balkans and the CIS regions, thus these interests may be captured sufficiently by the dummy variables relating to these two regions.

Depending on model specification, I have 201–207 data points for the pooled-OLS estimation, and 723 data points for the fixed effects estimation. The number of data points basically represents the entire population, although I do have a few missing observations where data on income levels and economic growth is not available: Cuba, North Korea, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Somalia. Except for the PA, none of these countries receive large amounts of aid from the V4 countries, so I do not think that dropping these observations will bias the results. The number of data points should be enough for a meaningful regression analysis, as most regression textbooks agree that there should be at least ten times as many observations as variables, a condition that is more than met in my case.

### **Estimation results and robustness checks**

Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of my model outlined above, as well as some simple sensitivity tests. In model (1), I use the pooled-OLS method. The conclusions from this first model are quite straightforward: the four Visegrád countries do not take into account the level of poverty or the performance of their recipients when determining their aid allocation. Of GDP per capita (*gdp\_cap*, included in logarithm form), level of GDP growth (*gdp\_gr*), and quality of institutions (measured with the index from Freedom House, variable *FH*), none are statistically significant. It seems that these emerging donors make their aid allocation decisions based exclusively on the population level of the recipient (*pop*, also included in logarithm form), geographic

**Table 2** Estimates for the aid allocation of the Visegrád donors between 2001 and 2008

<i>Dependent variable: log(V4ODA)</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Pooled OLS</i>	<i>Pooled OLS</i>	<i>Pooled OLS</i>	<i>Pooled OLS</i>	<i>Fixed effects</i>
log(gdp_cap)	0.093 (0.742)	0.105 (0.775)	0.032 (0.175)	—	0.202 (0.888)
log(pop)	0.605* [0.448; 0.763] (10.001)	0.603* [0.440; 0.765] (9.65)	0.594* [0.423; 0.765] (9.055)	0.599* [0.443; 0.755] (9.964)	0.319* [0.037; 0.603] (2.915)
gdp_gr	-0.002 (-0.086)	-0.002 (-0.085)	0.0002 (0.006)	—	0.006 (0.425)
FH	-0.0001 (-0.002)	—	-0.005 (-0.065)	—	-0.037 (-0.435)
RoL	—	-0.04 (-0.185)	—	—	—
Balkan	3.848* [2.724; 4.972] (8.91)	3.833* [2.688; 4.978] (8.71)	3.809* [2.667; 4.952] (8.676)	3.932* [2.856; 5.008] (9.503)	2.456* [1.195; 3.722] (5.028)
CIS	2.662* [1.733; 3.592] (7.455)	2.642* [1.690; 3.595] (7.219)	2.579* [1.578; 3.580] (6.703)	2.656* [1.762; 3.550] (7.727)	2.419* [1.080; 3.762] (4.664)
Pre-1989	2.526* [1.406; 3.646] (5.868)	2.519* [1.416; 3.629] (5.940)	2.473* [1.312; 3.635] (5.541)	2.455* [1.387; 3.525] (5.974)	1.235* [0.163; 2.307] (2.977)
Afg_Iraq	4.809* [4.059; 5.558] (16.689)	4.768* [3.783; 5.753] (12.592)	4.637* [3.520; 5.755] (10.797)	4.689* [4.023; 5.355] (18.313)	3.440* [2.321; 4.568] (7.907)
Period2	0.432*** [0.063; 0.800] (1.936)	0.423*** [0.062; 0.795] (1.935)	0.437* [0.068; 0.805] (0.052)	0.437** [0.036; 0.839] (2.147)	—
Africa	—	—	-0.186 (-0.535)	—	—
Constant	-4.767* [-7.636; -1.705] (-4.097)	-4.776* [-7.727; -1.824] (-4.210)	-4.070** [-7.517; -0.623] (-2.329)	-3.930* [-4.504; -3.355] (-17.792)	—
R <sup>2</sup>	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.55	0.76
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.71
Number of observations ( <i>n</i> )	201	201	201	207	723

\*Significant at the 1 per cent level; \*\*significant at the 5 per cent level; \*\*\*significant at the 10 per cent level.

Notes: *t*-statistics in parenthesis. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (using White's method). Model (5) also contains year dummies, which are jointly significant at the 1 per cent level. Confidence intervals are included in square brackets at the appropriate significance level for significant coefficients.

proximity (variables Balkan and CIS), former relations (pre-1989) and international obligations in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq (Afg\_Iraq), as all these variables are statistically significant. A further interesting observation is that the dummy variable relating to the second period (2005–2008, variable

period2) is also marginally significant, which can imply that there has been a general scaling up of bilateral V4 aid to all recipients after the EU accession of these donors.

The explanatory power of model (1) is reasonably high for such regressions (the size of the coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) is 0.52); therefore, one can assume that the model has sufficient explanatory power. The results of estimating the first model therefore support all the hypotheses outlined in section 'Model and data', as well as the main arguments of this paper.

In model (2) of Table 2, I used the 'rule of law' index published by the World Bank to measure institutional quality instead of Freedom House's index. This measure of institutional quality is also not significant, and adding it to the model does not meaningfully change anything. In model (3), I add a dummy for African countries, but it is also not significant, showing that the V4 donors do not give more aid to the African countries that would be most in need of it. Once again, adding this dummy does not change my previous results. Model (4) only contains the significant variables. By dropping the insignificant variables, the number of observations has been increased, and thus the overall explanatory power of the model also increases slightly. According to model (4) in Table 2, countries in the Western Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia) *ceteris paribus* receive almost five times (393 per cent) more aid from the Visegrád donors than do any other of the V4 partners. The CIS countries (and Georgia), as well as the pre-1989 partners, also receive more aid; in both cases, the amounts are approximately 270 per cent higher. Iraq and Afghanistan receive 469 per cent more aid than other recipients with comparable characteristics.

In model (5), I try a different method to check the robustness of my estimations above. Instead of using two 4-year period averages of the aid recipient countries, I include all recipients on a country-year basis, greatly increasing the number of observations. I estimate this panel with a fixed effects method, with which I can account for unobserved recipient heterogeneity. Both this different method and the pooled-OLS method give us similar results. Although coefficients of the variables do change, the same variables turn out to be significant, as in models (1) through (4). The  $R^2$  has greatly increased, but this is probably due to the larger number of observations, and should not make us to jump to any conclusions on which model is better.

The results therefore seem to be relatively robust: when determining the allocation of their bilateral aid, the Visegrád donors do not take into consideration the income levels of the recipients, their economic performance, nor the quality of their political or economic institutions. Besides the size of the population in the recipient countries, the only significant explanatory factors are related to geographic proximity, pre-1989 relations and, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, the existence of international commitments. All models





examined have an  $R^2$  between 0.52 and 0.76, which can be regarded as reasonably high. Of course, it is not possible to obtain too high an explanatory power, as the foreign aid allocation of a donor country is always affected by unforeseen events (such as natural catastrophes which require urgent humanitarian assistance) or *ad hoc* political considerations which would be difficult to model.

So far, I have assumed that all four Visegrád countries behave in a similar manner when determining their aid allocation. The analysis above has confirmed that there are broad similarities. However, bundling together the aid given by these four countries may mask some important individual characteristics. Therefore, I also estimate regression (1) from Table 2 using individual aid allocation data. The results of these estimates are shown in Table 3.

Although the individual country estimates in Table 3 do confirm the broad trends discussed earlier, they also point to some interesting individual characteristics. In contrast to the general trends observed above, it seems that the Czech Republic, for example, does prefer to give more aid to countries that are more democratic. This result is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful: a country that improves its Freedom House score by 1 point gets 15 per cent more aid from the Czech Republic. We can also observe a similar behaviour in the case of Poland. Hungary also seems to be an interesting case, as the recipient country's level of population is not statistically significant. This would imply that Hungary does not give more aid to recipients with larger population levels, a finding that is quite surprising. Slovakia, however, seems to be the country which differs most from the other three. The per capita income levels of the recipients are significant — although only marginally — which means that the country may actually have a poverty focus, in contrast with the other three. Also, being a former Soviet country or a pre-1989 partner does not explain the amount of aid a country gets from Slovakia. However, the  $R^2$  of these individual models is the lowest in the case of Slovakia, which may imply that some important determining factors of aid allocation may be missing from the model. It is also worth noting that the number of data points in the case of Hungary and Slovakia are relatively low (78 and 79), as they seem to have fewer partner countries than the Czech Republic and Poland. This may put into question the validity of these two regressions. In order to address this problem, I decreased the number of variables by dropping the insignificant ones and reran the regression. The results did not change. These individual country characteristics would definitely warrant further study.

### Limitations

The analysis has confirmed that there are broad similarities among the aid allocation decisions of the V4 emerging donors, which may differ from those



**Table 3** Pooled OLS estimates for the aid allocation of individual Visegrád donors between 2001 and 2008

<i>Dependent variable: log of ODA provided by individual donors</i>				
	(1) <i>Czech Republic</i>	(2) <i>Hungary</i>	(3) <i>Poland</i>	(4) <i>Slovakia</i>
log(gdp_cap)	0.088 (0.844)	-0.123 (-0.329)	0.129 (1.213)	-0.519*** [-0.955; -0.083] (2.248)
log(pop)	0.409* [0.247; 0.571] (6.565)	0.189 (1.408)	0.426* [0.206; 0.646] (5.052)	0.185 (1.400)
gdp_gr	-0.018 (-0.838)	0.003 (0.036)	-0.015 (-0.509)	0.278 (0.436)
FH	-0.15** [-0.307; -0.005] (-2.045)	-0.067 (-0.537)	0.166** [0.006; 0.325] (2.048)	-0.039 (-0.314)
Balkan	2.683* [1.632; 3.733] (6.647)	3.331* [1.532; 5.129] (4.908)	2.838* [1.170; 4.507] (4.439)	1.987* [0.504; 3.471] (3.549)
CIS	1.785* [0.899; 2.672] (5.246)	1.723* [0.090; 3.370] (2.795)	2.431* [1.358; 3.503] (5.916)	0.660 (1.327)
Pre-1989	1.577* [0.398; 2.756] (3.482)	2.366* [0.152; 4.580] (2.833)	1.621* [0.031; 3.212] (2.661)	-0.255 (-0.410)
Afg_Iraq	5.097* [4.564; 5.630] (24.913)	4.715* [1.988; 7.442] (4.582)	2.893* [2.238; 3.548] (11.528)	1.728** [0.110; 3.346] (2.131)
Period2	0.149 (0.721)	-0.320 (-0.767)	0.654* [0.017; 1.291] (2.681)	0.959** [0.108; 1.809] (2.248)
Constant	-3.439* [-5.910; -0.969] (-3.625)	-2.729 (-0.756)	-6.227* [-9.021; -3.434] (-5.820)	0.977 (0.402)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.42	0.38	0.32
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.23
Number of observations ( <i>n</i> )	188	78	154	79

\*Significant at the 1 per cent level; \*\*significant at the 5 per cent level; \*\*\*significant at the 10 per cent level.

*Notes:* *t*-statistics in parenthesis. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (using White's method). Confidence intervals are included in square brackets at the appropriate significance level for significant coefficients.

observable in the case of the OECD DAC members. I have also shown some individual country characteristics as well. However, this approach does have some limitations, and although this article's results do confirm earlier, mainly case-study-based evidence (such as Bucar and Mrak 2007; Drozd 2007; Kiss



2007), we must examine how these limitations may distort the results. One of the main sources of such limitations is the structure of bilateral aid provided by the V4 countries, and how this structure is not reflected in the data on aid provided by the OECD. As mentioned earlier, a large portion of V4 aid never leaves the donor country. According to the OECD's methodology for calculating ODA, debt forgiveness, refugee costs and scholarships to students from developing countries are also considered as foreign aid. Using the data provided by the OECD, it is not possible to purge bilateral aid data from these 'inflating' factors. According to estimates of CONCORD (2009: 39), the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development, such inflated items made up 14 per cent of the total aid provided by the Czech Republic in 2008. Estimates are not available for the other three countries. Still, it is possible at least to speculate on what kind of bias these problems with aid data add to the regression results, although a thorough analysis is definitely out of the scope of this paper.

It is quite clear that the debt forgiveness and refugee costs are not driven by the same motivations as true bilateral aid, and the motivations behind allocating scholarships may also differ. Forgiven debt included as ODA is likely to introduce an upward bias for the coefficients of the pre-1989 partner countries, as well as that of Iraq and Afghanistan. This is mainly due to the fact that the debts forgiven in the past decade by the V4 countries were in most cases related to concessional and commercial loans (export credits) provided to developing countries, mainly to ones which oriented themselves towards the Eastern Bloc (Stojanos 2006). In the past years, Poland gave large-scale debt relief to Angola, as did Slovakia to Afghanistan and Hungary to Ethiopia and Iraq (Manning 2007: 100–2; CONCORD 2009). Some countries that were granted debt relief, such as Nicaragua in the case of the Czech Republic or Sudan in the case of Slovakia, were not considered as pre-1989 partner countries. As both of them are very poor countries, debt relief to them should bias the coefficient of GDP per capita downwards, which is not significant even with this bias.

The bias coming from refugee costs may be more difficult to determine. Although I have no data on the magnitude of refugee costs included by V4 donors in their ODA statistics, I do have data on the number and countries of origin of persons applying for asylum in these countries, which can be a reasonable proxy, although far from perfect. Table 4 shows the countries of origin for persons applying for asylum status in the four countries between 2001 and 2008. Among the top source countries, we can see countries belonging to the CIS region (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus), the Western Balkans and pre-1989 partners (Mongolia, Vietnam), as well as other developing countries such as Somalia, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Nigeria. Afghanistan and Iraq also figure prominently. Due to this heterogeneity, it is likely that the costs of refugees may put a bias in all the coefficients, but the exact size of it cannot be determined.



**Table 4** Number of people seeking asylum status in the Visegrád countries by country of origin (2001–2008)

Russia	58,422	Serbia	4,071
Afghanistan	16,506	Pakistan	4,065
India	12,845	Slovakia	3,292
Ukraine	10,583	Romania	2,638
Iraq	8,287	Belarus	2,504
China	7,640	Turkey	1,897
Viet Nam	7,114	Mongolia	1,639
Moldova	7,081	Somalia	1,597
Georgia	5,453	Nigeria	1,453
Bangladesh	5,358	Iran	1,128
Armenia	4,163		

Only countries with more than 1,000 applicants between 2001 and 2008 are listed.

Source: UNHCR (2010).

Scholarships to developing country students perhaps distort the results the least, as they are not significant amounts in the case of the V4 countries. In the case of the Czech Republic, student costs made up 5.6 per cent of bilateral aid in 2008, and once again there is no data on the other countries (OECD 2010). Also, we do not know much on the regional composition of the incoming students, so speculating on the bias these costs may introduce would definitely require further research and data collection.

Problems with the data on aid can therefore impose some limitations on the results. I am also aware of the fact that the regression analysis may require further tests and perhaps methods more sophisticated than OLS or fixed effects estimation in order to be truly robust. However, as my conclusions are in line with the stylised facts and the limited case study evidence, I feel that the model identifies the factors that influence aid allocation in the four emerging donors well, and the biases from data problems do not invalidate my results.

## Conclusions

In this paper, I analysed the foreign aid policies of the four emerging Visegrád donors with a special emphasis on the factors that determine the allocation of their aid resources. The conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis clearly support the main hypothesis of the paper: the level of poverty (measured by per capita GDP) and the previous performance of the recipients (measured by the rate of economic growth or the quality of institutions) are not significant factors in explaining the aid allocation decisions of the four donor countries.

According to these results, the Visegrád donors seem to behave in a similar fashion to the donors that the literature has labelled ‘egoistic’, at least when it



comes to their aid allocation. The four countries mainly support recipients in which they have political, security and economic interests, as countries in the Western Balkans and the CIS region are the most important recipients. The reduction of global poverty is clearly not a consideration. Although this observed aid allocation is in line with the political and economic interests of the four donor countries, the question arises as to how much it is due to strategic decisions. It is plausible, for example, that the Visegrád countries only choose recipients from their 'neighbourhood' for reasons of convenience. Providing large-scale foreign aid to extremely poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa or other distant developing regions would be much more costly, and the experience of the four emerging donors in those areas is also much less. A further explanation may be that the four donors have some kind of perceived or actual comparative advantage compared with other donors in the Western Balkan and CIS regions. Therefore, more than one explanation may be possible for the observed 'egoistic' aid allocation, but determining which one is relevant is beyond the scope of this current paper.

Besides confirming these general trends, this paper has also contributed to the literature by identifying some donor specific characteristics. The Czech Republic and Poland do seem to put some emphasis on selecting countries that are more democratic. Hungary does not seem to take the size of the recipients into consideration, as larger countries do not get more aid from it. Slovakia seems to have the clearest break with its Communist past, as countries that were partners of Czechoslovakia before 1989 do not receive more aid from Slovakia at present. Analysing these individual country characteristics, as well as their reasons and consequences, is an interesting area of future case study-based research.

## Notes

- 1 Danielson and Wohlgemuth (2005) argue that donors such as Sweden are not driven by altruism, but rather a kind of 'enlightened egoism'. This refers to the fact that such countries have recognised that instead of seeking short-term economic and foreign policy benefits, it is in their long-term national security interest to decrease global poverty.
- 2 A detailed scientific analysis of these pre-1989 development policies is missing from the literature. One must not, however, underestimate the importance of these policies. For example, in the 1970s, Hungary spent an average of 0.7 per cent of its national income on various forms of foreign aid, which is an extremely high level (although the methodologies for calculating both national incomes and aid levels in the Eastern Bloc at the time do not permit comparisons with Western donors and current aid levels) (HUN-IDA 2004; Szent-Iványi and Tétényi 2008). Michaux (2002: 19) is therefore clearly mistaken in stating that Central and Eastern European countries have no development traditions.
- 3 The Czech Republic became a member of the OECD in 1995, followed by Hungary and Poland in 1996 and Slovakia in 2000. This, however, did not mean automatic membership in the OECD DAC, where the four countries have only observer status to this day.



- 4 In the case of the EU, this pressure mainly comes from softer *acquis*, such as Council statements and declarations. In 2002, the European Council reaffirmed that the ODA/GNI target of 0.7 per cent must be reached by 2015, with an intermediate goal of 0.39 per cent by 2006 (European Council 2002: 6). In 2005, a new intermediate goal was established for 2010 of 0.56 per cent, and a separate goal was set for the new member states of 0.17 per cent (Bucar and Mrak 2007: 7). In addition, in 2005, a joint statement by the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, entitled the 'European Consensus on Development', created a new framework for the EU's common development policy and established many requirements for the individual member states (European Consensus 2006).
- 5 Hungary and the Czech Republic even manage two provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan.
- 6 Freedom House publishes two indices in their annual report 'Freedom in the World', one measuring political rights, the other measuring civil liberties. Both are rated on a scale of 1–7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. I have taken the two indicators and averaged them across countries to get a single indicator measuring the quality of political institutions.
- 7 In its World Governance Indicators initiative, the World Bank publishes six indices: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. The rule of law index measures 'the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence' (World Bank 2009b: 1). These factors are one of the main determinants of whether it is worth making long-term investments in an economy. Thus, the rule of law index is a reasonably good measure of the economic institutions, which affect long-term growth and the effectiveness of aid. 'Rule of law' is measured on scale of –2.5 to 2.5, where lower scores mean lower-quality institutions.

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## Appendix

**Table A1** Data sources

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Data source</i>
Per capita GDP (gdp_cap)	IMF World Economic Outlook Database Online
Population data (pop)	IMF World Economic Outlook Database Online
GDP growth rate (gdp_gr)	IMF World Economic Outlook Database Online
ODA data (V4ODA)	OECD StatExtracts Online
Freedom House index (FH)	Freedom House: Freedom in the World Online
'Rule of Law' index (RoL)	World Bank Governance Matters 2009 Worldwide Governance Indicators

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