

GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA: MEASURES, METHODS AND RESULTS

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Governance is performance—the delivery of high quality political goods to citizens by governments of all kinds. In Africa, as everywhere else, those political goods are security and safety, rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development. The Ibrahim Index of African Governance, created at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, evaluates forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries according to fifty-seven variables. The results of this massive measurement exercise produce overall rankings of governance attainment, plus rankings for each of the five categories of political goods and each of the fifty-seven variables. Yet, the purpose of this Index is not to rate, but to diagnose. The Index is a diagnostic tool for civil society, donors and governments so that performance can be enhanced and the lives and outcomes of Africans can be strengthened. Improving African governance is the goal.

A THEORY OF GOVERNANCE

Governance is the delivery of political goods to citizens. The better the quality of that delivery and the greater the quantity of the political goods being delivered, the higher the level of governance—everywhere and at every jurisdictional level, not just in Africa.¹ Delivery and performance are synonymous in this context. If governments patch roads or fix broken street lights, they deliver valuable political goods that are hard for citizens to obtain privately. These homely examples illustrate an underappreciated truism: Governments and nation-states exist primarily to provide for their taxpayers and inhabitants. Governments exist to perform for their citizens in areas and in ways that are more easily—and more usually—managed and organized by the overarching state than by private enterprises or collective civic collaborations. The provision of physical safety and national security are prime examples.

Modern nation-states deliver political goods to persons within their designated

borders. Having inherited, assumed and replaced the suzerains of earlier centuries, nation-states now buffer external forces and influences, champion the local concerns of their adherents and mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena as well as the dynamism of their own internal economic, political and social realities.

It is according to their performance in the governance realm that states succeed or fail. Stronger states are distinguished from weak states according to the levels of their effective delivery of political goods. Such goods are those intangible and hard to assess claims that citizens make on national and local governments. Political goods encapsulate citizen expectations and bundles of obligation, as well as inform the local political culture and give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of state and citizenry interactions.²

A HIERARCHY OF POLITICAL GOODS

There is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as important as the supply of security, especially human security. Individuals alone can sometimes arrange their own security. Groups of individuals can band together to purchase goods and services that provide more or less substantial quantities of security. Traditionally, however, individuals and groups of individuals have not effectively substituted privately obtained measures of security for publicly provided security.

States are obliged by definition to provide national security—to prevent cross-border invasions and losses of territory. They are obligated to deter domestic threats or attacks upon the national order and social structure. Nation-states are also charged with preventing crime and related assaults on human security. They pledge to help their citizens resolve differences with the state and with their fellow citizens without resorting to arms or other forms of physical coercion. When states fail to deliver these fundamental political goods, they lose the Weberian monopoly of violence and encourage the rise of non-state actors, insurgents and anarchy.

When, and only when, reasonable provisions for security exist within a country, especially within a fragile or newly reconstructed nation-state, can its government deliver other essential political goods. After security and safety, rule of law is critical. This is the political good of predictable, recognizable, systematized methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating both the norms and the prevailing mores of a host society. The essentials of this political good are embodied in codes and procedures that together comprise an enforceable body of law, security of property and contract, an independent judicial system and rules that derive from internally and externally validated norms.

A third key political good is participation—the political good that enables citizens to participate freely, openly and fully in politics and the political process.

This good encompasses four essential components: the right to compete for office; respect and support for political institutions; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental civil liberties and human rights.

A fourth political good that governments owe their citizens is sustainable economic opportunity. This includes an effective macro-economy—a money and banking system with a central bank and a national currency; a beneficial fiscal and institutional context in which citizens can maximize their personal entrepreneurial endeavors and potentially prosper; and strong arteries of commerce—roads, rails, airports, harbors, modern communication systems and so on.

Governments are also responsible for nurturing human development by providing schools and universities, quality medical care, freedom from disease, access to water and sufficient food to alleviate hunger. The achievement of this fifth political good is only partially responsive to immediate governmental initiatives. Governments cannot improve educational outcomes instantly or eradicate diseases on their own. However, citizens in the developing world do look to their governments for educational and medical services, and cannot, for example, procure clean water very easily without official expenditures and interventions.

OBJECTIVE MEASURES

In order to evaluate the different ways in which governments satisfy their citizens by delivering essential political goods—by performing creditably—we need to find a way to measure performance. It is possible to do so, as many indices do, by asking experts to assess how well countries are doing. Experts can fill out questionnaires and thus rate performance. But those ratings are by definition subjective. It is also possible to poll citizens to ask them how satisfied they are. If the questions are constructed carefully, useful information can be obtained, but the information is still based on opinion and, ultimately, is merely an array of perceptions.

Another way to measure performance and governmental effectiveness depends on finding objective criteria that are proxies for security, rule of law, participation, economic opportunity and human development. To do so, it is essential to specify the outcomes that citizens demand under the rubrics of each of these political goods. For example, for human security, lower crime rates (fewer homicides, assaults and rapes) would presumably testify to improved conditions. Under human development, higher school persistence rates would indicate better outcomes for citizens. High GDP per capita levels and growth rates would indicate that a nation is helping its citizens prosper. Each of these results can be matched against such results from a cohort of peers; results and indices are thus relative and never absolute.

Objective criteria tied to outcome data are easier to defend than subjective

ones—and objective data are much easier to quantify. Subjective data, after all, are by definition prey to classical forms of selection bias. Moreover, without numbers derived from attempts to measure outcomes (not inputs) in a particular area of governance, a score derived from those numbers and the summation of the scores of the number of indicators (fifty-seven in the Index of African Governance’s last iteration), it is almost impossible to devise a ranking method that is credible and acceptable. Without such scores derived from a variety of measures, ranking systems that list more than the perceived best and worst of countries are suspect. Admittedly, the indicators that measure the five political goods need to be selected carefully as true components or representations of the political good under examination.

The Index of African Governance strives for transparency and simplicity in selecting indicators of governance. Unlike many other indices, it is not focused on perceptions or expert judgments. Insofar as possible, the Index uses the hard numbers available in each country. Where those numbers do not exist or are unavailable, the Index seeks “objectively measured” data—systematically derived scores that can be replicated by other researchers following the same approach. It asks: What has a government achieved? How well has it performed? It does not measure good intentions or official budgetary promises—inputs that may or may not result in high performance. The Index prefers to know what results have flowed from governmental actions and expenditures. Have citizens benefited? If so, how and by how much? Have, for example, their health outcomes improved or has their educational attainment increased?

The makers of the Index fully realize that factors beyond governmental action in a specific year may affect the outcomes measured in that year or across multiple years. That is why the Index provides more than single-indicator assessments of the performance of African countries. That is also why the Index is updated annually—to track changes over time. Conceivably, natural resource factor endowments and baseline GDP compilations could be used to disaggregate the forty-eight African national cases in the Index for purposes of ranking, in addition to the overall ranking method that was adopted in the 2007 and 2008 Indexes of African Governance.³ However, it would still be necessary to compare the attainments of all countries in sub-Saharan Africa against their peers, irrespective of wealth or size, or of other factors like landlocked-ness or tropicality that might arguably affect the performance of governments.

GOVERNANCE CATEGORIES AND INDICATORS

The Index of African Governance employs fifty-seven indicators (sub-sub-categories) to measure governance across the five categories of political goods. The main categories are also sub-divided for analytical purposes into fourteen sub-

categories. The first political good in the Index is Safety and Security. It includes a National Security sub-category that, in turn, includes six sub-sub-categories: government involvement in armed conflicts; number of battle-deaths in armed conflicts; number of civilian deaths due to one-sided violence; refugees and asylum seekers originating from each country; internally displaced persons; and ease of access to small arms and light weapons. The Index equates security with these six features (or measures). Each provides a number, which, when compared to numbers in the countries of the remainder of sub-Saharan Africa, provides a peer comparative score. Thus all of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (or the world) can be rated according to these effective measures of national security.⁴

The second sub-category, Public Safety, is measured by one indicator: level of violent crime. Our proxy is the annual number of homicides, but we are also seeking a good method to count assaults and rapes. Years ago, Interpol provided violent crime numbers for all countries, but that is no longer done. The Index instead attempts to obtain relevant numbers directly from official national sources, using local researchers working for the Index, or by employing internationally supplied estimates based on expert opinions. The first method of obtaining such data is preferable, but in some African countries local researchers are unable to secure official numbers that appear reliable.

The second political good, Rule of Law, Transparency and Corruption, encompasses eight sub-sub-categories. The first is ratification of core international human rights conventions, a straightforward binomial case of ratification or not. The use of such an undifferentiated indicator is supported by recent work by Beth Simmons.⁵ The second accounts for the existence of official United Nations international sanctions imposed on one or more of Africa's forty-eight countries. The third assesses property rights using a Property Rights Index developed as part of the Index of Economic Freedom produced by the Heritage Foundation and the *Wall Street Journal*. The fourth sub-sub-category measures judicial independence according to a rule of law score developed by Freedom House. The fifth sub-sub-category concerns the efficiency of a country's court system. As a proxy, it examines the speed with which pre-trial detainees are brought to trial; results are based on a compilation prepared by the International Centre for Prison Studies, King's College, London. The seventh indicator focuses on the efficiency of national institutions regarding contract enforcement based on the World Bank's examination of the number of days it takes a contract dispute to be settled in the national courts. The final sub-sub-category, public sector corruption, reflects the findings of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the industry standard.

Participation and Human Rights is the third political good. Among the five sub-sub-categories, the first—free, fair and competitive elections—is self-explan-

Table 1: 2006 Ibrahim Index of African Governance

Rank	Country	Score
1	Mauritius	85.1
2	Seychelles	79.8
3	Cape Verde	74.7
4	Botswana	74.1
5	South Africa	71.5
6	Namibia	70.9
7	Ghana	70.1
8	Gabon	69.4
9	São Tomé and Príncipe	68.3
10	Senegal	66.1
11	Malawi	63.9
12	Lesotho	63.3
13	Benin	62.5
14	Comoros	61.9
15	Tanzania	61.6
16	Madagascar	60.4
17	Kenya	59.1
18	Rwanda	59.1
19	Uganda	58.3
20	Burkina Faso	58.3
21	Zambia	58.3
22	Mozambique	57.1
23	Mali	55.9
24	Niger	55.5
25	Cameroon	55.4
26	Djibouti	55.2
27	Gambia	55.2
28	Congo	53.3
29	Togo	53.0
30	Guinea-Bissau	51.9
31	Ethiopia	50.9
32	Mauritania	50.8
33	Zimbabwe	50.4
34	Swaziland	50.2
35	Burundi	50.0
36	Equatorial Guinea	49.2
37	Sierra Leone	49.1

Rank	Country	Score
38	Liberia	48.7
39	Nigeria	48.5
40	Guinea	47.8
41	Eritrea	46.5
42	Côte d'Ivoire	45.6
43	Central African Republic	43.6
44	Angola	43.3
45	Sudan	34.2
46	Chad	33.9
47	Congo, Democratic Republic	29.8
48	Somalia	18.9

Source: The Ibrahim Index of African Governance is a project of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. This publication was created and prepared under the auspices of the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government's Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution under the direction of Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist. Copyright © 2008 the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

atory. The Index team codes the fairness of national elections, and also assesses opposition participation in elections at the executive and legislative levels. Another sub-sub-category examines press freedom. Three more deal with overall physical integrity rights, respect for civil rights and the absence of gender discrimination—as measured by women's economic, political and social rights.

The measurement of the fourth political good of Sustainable Economic Development is built upon a foundation of twelve sub-sub-categories: national GDP per capita, national GDP growth per capita, inflation percentages, deficits and surpluses as percentages of GDP, reliability of financial institutions (using contract intensive money as the proxy), the number of days it takes to begin a business (using World Bank data), road networks (using data the Index team compiles annually), electricity capacity, number of telephone subscribers, computer usage figures, Internet usage numbers and the Yale Environmental Performance Index (which provides at least one environmentally sensitive data point).

The final political good, Human Development, encompasses the sub-categories of poverty, health and sanitation, and educational opportunity. The first sub-category is composed of aggregate poverty data and Gini index inequality numbers.⁶ The second—health—is measured by carefully calculated estimates of life expectancy at birth, child mortality, maternal mortality, undernourishment, immunization levels, HIV prevalence data, tuberculosis incidence rates, numbers of physicians and nurses per 100,000 people and access to potable water. Educational quality is based on adult literacy rates, primary education completion numbers, progression to secondary school, pupil-to-teacher and girl-to-boy ratios in school.

OTHER INDEXING METHODS

Measuring what governments do is not new. Benchmarking and preparing report cards on various kinds of performance is well-established. Indeed, with regard to national governments, indices and ranking systems of all kinds have proliferated. There are indices of happiness, global peace, global integrity, economic freedom, political freedom, press freedom, economic competition, corruption, accountability, child welfare and many others. There is even a “dirty war” index.⁷ There are many kinds of national, regional and international attitudinal surveys—some extremely ambitious. What makes the 2008 and 2007 Indexes of African Governance unique are their attempts to be comprehensive across a broad range of data for all forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries—nations where data compilation methods and official statistical practices are not yet fully formed.

Among projects that seek to measure governance broadly, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators has the most complete coverage of countries. There are other efforts with similarly complete country coverage such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report. However, these efforts are designed to measure only components of governance: corruption, human development and political rights and civil liberties, respectively. Among analogous projects on governance, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s African Governance Report, for example, provided data on twenty-six sub-Saharan countries in its first report in 2005 and thirty-three in 2008.⁸ The well-regarded Afrobarometer opinion surveys in 2008 covered only twenty of those same countries.⁹ The World Governance Assessment conducted by the Overseas Development Institute from 2005 to 2007 covered only six sub-Saharan African countries.¹⁰ The general pattern noted among indices is that coverage of sub-Saharan African countries is sparse except in those special cases, such as the World Bank, Freedom House and Transparency International, where subjective measures are employed. African data are difficult to gather and certify.

GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: 2008 RESULTS

African governance is improving. That was the major, surprising finding of the second annual Index of African Governance.

Given continued conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where about 5.4 million civilians have been killed in brutal civil wars since 1990; intensified mayhem in the Sudan, where more than 300,000 Arabs and Africans have been slaughtered in Darfur and elsewhere since 2003; continued tension between the north and south in Côte d’Ivoire; battles in the Niger Delta, where

oil wealth exists amid extreme deprivation; a war in northern Uganda, waged by the cultish Lord's Resistance Army against the governments of the DRC and Uganda; and piracy at sea and bitter struggles on land in Somalia, no governance, or prolonged bad governance, might seem more the sub-Saharan African trend than good governance.

The 2008 Index, however, showed that thirty-four of forty-eight governments have begun delivering improved results. Because of data lags, each year's Index reports results from two years before. Thus, the 2008 Index reports results from 2006. These most recent results show improvements over findings for 2005, and from 2000 to 2004. Multiparty systems are now more normal in Africa and most countries demand that their leaders step down after constitutionally mandated term limits. Most economies are open, and old-fashioned Afro-socialist ideas are now largely junked—only Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe calls himself the chief “comrade.” Millions of Africans are on the Internet and use their cell phones to pay bills and connect to the world.

Liberia, the most improved country in sub-Saharan Africa from 2005 to 2006, moved up in rank from 44th to 38th largely due to the leadership efforts of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa's first female head of state, and to her post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Countries like Eritrea, with an appalling human rights record and suppression of press freedom, moved down strikingly—from 39th to 41st. In both cases, and in so many other cases revealed by the Index, political leadership quality helped to determine performance and national achievements.¹¹

The top governance performers in the Index each year were the countries, many small, that have been conspicuously well managed since their achievement of independence from colonial rule. Mauritius, Seychelles, Cape Verde, Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Ghana, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Senegal lead the list. In each of these countries citizens are comparatively wealthy, mostly literate, safe (except for South Africa), free of internal conflict and accustomed to solid rule of law performances with moderate levels of corruption. Gabon is the outlier in this group of well-governed sub-Saharan African countries with low scores in the Index for participatory fairness, but high scores for sustainable economic opportunity and security in a tightly run state.

Just below the top ten is another cohort of countries led surprisingly by Malawi, a poor country helped by good security and safety, and a solid rule of law. Other countries in this group include Lesotho, which is small, surrounded and well-led; Benin, with several free elections behind it; the Comoros; Tanzania, above its neighbors, but lower than Malawi because of corruption and limited prosperity; Madagascar, which is led by a charismatic reformer; Kenya (its scores do not account for the 2008 carnage); Rwanda, which is tightly run and vigorously

modernizing; Uganda, despite the tight-fisted rule of its third-term president; and Burkina Faso. Zambia, much improved after earlier suffering, massive corruption and disinvestment, did not make the top twenty. Nevertheless, it placed 21st in the 2008 ranking.

The least well-governed places in sub-Saharan Africa—the bottom ten—are those countries perpetually at war with themselves. From top (39th) to bottom (48th), they are Nigeria, Guinea, Eritrea, Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Angola, Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. Each of these low-ranking countries deprives its citizens of security and safety, and delivers almost no other political goods of quality. Each has poorly maintained roads (for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo has thousands of kilometers fewer paved roads than at independence), very low GDPs per capita, desperate health attainments and virtually no educational opportunities, questionable human rights records, massive corruption and unfree elections. In other words, each of these countries is or has been badly governed.

Because of the unfortunate two-year statistical lag, Index results are not as up-to-date as the compilers of the Index would prefer. This means that the 2008 Index could not fully capture the tragic deterioration in governance quality in Zimbabwe, ranked 33rd, which was 25th in 2000 and has fallen steadily across all of the fifty-seven indicators that comprise the Index. In 2008, Zimbabwean schools were closed for want of teachers and human security, hospitals were shut for want of medicines and power, GDP per capita levels fell from \$850 in 2000 to about \$150, unemployment levels reached 90 percent, food supplies were short and corruption was rife.¹² There is a wholesale absence of good governance. Mugabe is a despot, who for a decade has thumbed his nose at opposition attempts to unseat him. In late 2008, he resisted all calls by world leaders to step down, and declared: “Zimbabwe is mine.”¹³ In early 2009, Mugabe even took a one-month vacation while his citizens suffered from an epidemic of corruption, continued violence and no government.¹⁴ In the 2009 and 2010 Indexes, these factors will guarantee Zimbabwe a spot in the bottom ten.

Equatorial Guinea, another African country with limited human rights and a prevailing tyrant—Teodoro Obiang Nguema—ranked as high as 36th in the 2008 list largely because its known deficiencies were obscured by soaring GDP levels from oil and gas revenues and tight security, better known as repression. The categories of analysis in the Index that focused on corruption, rule of law, participation and the like showed Equatorial Guinea in its true light, but they could not compensate for its security and wealth achievements. Equatorial Guinea is also using its wealth to build roads and other infrastructure projects.¹⁵

The Index was designed to bring the importance of governance to light. It has

begun to achieve this goal. In the 1960s, West African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria had higher GDPs per capita than countries in Asia like Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and South Korea—who would later become the Asian Tigers. What made the difference, Africans now realize, was good governance. As Asian societies prospered, they did so only where reasonable levels of good governance—the supply of qualities and quantities of political goods to citizens—were achieved. At the same time, in the 1970s and 1980s, Africans fell backwards under the rule of single-party, single-man experiments, military juntas and cruel tyrants like Mobutu Sese Seko and Idi Amin.

Fortunately, those days are seemingly gone. Everywhere in Africa today there is a recognition that governance matters—that governments are responsible for uplifting, not oppressing their peoples. Few Africans want more Mugabes or Mobutus. Most Africans want what Botswana and Mauritius, and now Ghana and Senegal, have achieved through better governance. The road to prosperity and social improvement, Africans now understand, is through strengthened governance. The ingredients of positive change are there, despite HIV/AIDS, continued internal warfare and poverty. Africans are demanding more from their governments, with civil society in many countries at the vanguard of these movements for change.

In 2009, in recognition of the importance of governance, a handful of African regimes invited the makers of the Index to explain their national results to gatherings of presidents, prime ministers and cabinet officials. This process should become more common as the utility of the Index as a diagnostic tool becomes better known, especially in those countries whose leaders are serious about moving up from the middle ranks into the ranks of the most improving, or even into the top ten. Just as a physician can develop a profile of a patient and outline the path to a better outcome and a healthier future, so the Index can show how each country compares to its peers and neighbors and how that nation might strive to gain in score and rank, and thereby deliver higher levels of performance and outcomes to its citizens. Africa's most enlightened leaders take that responsibility seriously and are employing the data in the Index to that end. More leaders will follow.

IBRAHIM PRIZE FOR AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

The Index was originally linked tightly to the first prizes awarded by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation for accomplished African leadership. At first, leaders eligible for the prize had to come from countries with reasonably high ranking on the Index and where they had provided security, rule of law, relatively little corruption and good economic and political outcomes during their terms of office. The Index was a necessary, but not a sufficient, bar over which the leaders were expected to

hurdle. By 2008, however, it was clear that the number of eligible leaders for each year's prize were so few and likely to be so few in the future, that the qualitative deliberations of the prize committee, chaired by Kofi Annan, were sufficient. The committee could easily decide among the few candidates. It also contemplated the possibility in some future year that no fit candidate for the prize could be found among those former heads of state and heads of government who were eligible.

In its first year, the Foundation awarded its \$5 million prize to Joaquim Chissano, recent president of Mozambique. He was an estimable laureate who led his country from Marxism to democracy, civil war to peace and massive poverty to modest but increasing economic development. Moreover, he was a leader with integrity and modesty whose vision for Mozambique, and for Africa, made him an appealing and appropriate prize winner.


In year two, the choice was even easier: Festus Mogae, who served as Botswana's president from 1998 to 2008, led the African mainland's most democratic and, by the Index, best governed country. Botswana had always adhered to democratic values and open economic systems. It was known for its unswervingly participatory politics and its careful management of mineral wealth.¹⁶ It had never flirted with "Dutch disease."¹⁷ Mogae was a worthy successor to the founding presidents of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama and Sir Ketumile Masire. He, too, was clear sighted and modest, and a worthy prize winner for Africa.

Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese cell phone entrepreneur and pioneer with great foresight, created his foundation's prize because he believed that Africa lacked good leadership. He felt that leadership mattered more than almost anything else and that he could do more for Africa by strengthening its leadership qualities than through any other means. He felt equally strong about governance and hence funded the preparation of the Ibrahim Index in its first two years.

Whether the generous leadership prize will prove enough of an incentive to transform poorly performing African leaders into good leaders and avoid future Mugabes is not yet known. It will probably take a decade for analysts and Ibrahim to discover whether the availability of the prize has motivated the contemporary generation of sub-Saharan African leaders—the Sirleafs, Jakaya Kikwetes, Ian Khamas, John Atta Millses or Umaru Yar'Aduas—to act more responsibly than they otherwise might have. An older generation of leaders—Yoweri Museveni, Mwai Kibaki, Abdoulaye Wade, Omar Bongo and so on—already have track records which pre-date the prize. Thus, even roughly and impressionistically, it will be impossible to demonstrate the value of the prize in terms of improving leadership quality until the current generation of new leaders leave office. Will they have strengthened their countries and led responsibly? The Index will be able to tell, with that two-year lag, and so will the prize committee as it scrutinizes the few

candidates in any year.

African critics of the prize suggest that the \$5 million prize money could be better spent on direct poverty relief or on educational or medical improvements. Others have derided the prize for its naïve belief that corrupt African leaders could be deterred by such a small amount when the wages of corruption and leadership sin are potentially so much greater. Others have said that leaders should not be rewarded for simply doing their job—for behaving well and working for their citizens.

However worthy the critiques of the prize, its very existence, along with the Index, draw attention, almost for the first time, to the importance of leadership and governance in Africa's future. By analyzing Africa's situation in that manner, by suggesting that Africa, not colonial rule or the paucity of foreign assistance, is largely responsible for its own destiny—the Ibrahim initiative and the Index project may in time help to transform Africa beneficially. If leadership can be reformed by focusing on governance and underlining its critical importance, and if governance can truly become central to the thinking of leaders and administrations, then Africa's inhabitants may join the citizens of the rest of the globe in their economic, social and political advances and accomplishments. 

NOTES

¹ Robert I. Rotberg, "Improving Governance in the Developing World: Creating a Measuring and Ranking System," in *The Good Governance Problem: Doing Something About It*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Deborah West (Cambridge, MA: 2004), 5-6.

² For political goods, see J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics* XVIII (1966), 420-426. See also Mancur Olsen, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, MA: 1965), 15.

³ There are detailed discussions of the methodology in Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist, *Strengthening African Governance: Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Results and Rankings* (Cambridge, MA: 2007 and 2008). From 2009 the Index will be called the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Index of African Governance.

⁴ Detailed explanations of each sub-sub-category can be found in Rotberg and Gisselquist, *Strengthening African Governance*.

⁵ Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2009).

⁶ The Gini index is a standard measure of inequality that compares the cumulative distribution of incomes across a population with a hypothetical, perfectly equal society. The greater the deviation, the more inequality and, therefore, the greater the index.

⁷ Madelyn Hicks and M. Spagat, "The Dirty War Index: A public health and human rights tool for examining and monitoring armed conflict outcomes," *PLoS Medicine*, V e243, (2008), <http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0050243>.

⁸ "African Governance Report 2005" (report, Economic Commission for Africa, United Nations, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2005).

⁹ See www.afrobarometer.org.

¹⁰ See www.odi.org.uk/projects/00-07-world-governance-assessment/index.html.

¹¹ For discussions of leadership, see Robert I. Rotberg, "Strengthening African Leadership: There is Another Way," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004), 14-18; and Rotberg, "The Roots of Africa's Leadership Deficit," *Compass* no.1 (2003), 28-32.

¹² Celia W. Dugger, "Violence in Zimbabwe Disrupts Schools and Aid," *New York Times*, 8 May 2008; Chris McGreal, "A Month Ago The Hospitals Were Overflowing. Now They Lie Empty," *The Guardian*, 6 December 2008.

¹³ Angus Shaw, "Mugabe Vows Not to Step Down," *Boston Globe*, 20 December 2008.

¹⁴ "Crisis Heightens as Mugabe Tries to Prolong His Tenure," *Southern Africa Report* XXVI (12 December 2008), 4.

¹⁵ See John R. Heilbrunn, "Equatorial Guinea and Togo: What Price Repression?" in *Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 223-249.

¹⁶ Other authors have explored the limitations of Botswanan political openness. One example is Kenneth Good and Ian Taylor, "Botswana: A Minimalist Democracy," *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (August 2008).

¹⁷ In other words, Botswana never suffered from an overemphasis on its natural resources, such as diamonds, at the expense of its other goods, particularly manufactured goods. Similarly, because there was not a disproportionate emphasis on its natural resources, the value of Botswana's currency never inflated to the point that its exchange rate was negatively impacted.