

AFRICAN SOLUTIONS TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN AFRICA

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In February 1994, Robert Kaplan published a highly controversial article in the influential *Atlantic Monthly* titled, “The Coming Anarchy.” Kaplan prophesized that a combination of “scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism and disease” would swiftly undermine the social fabric of the world we know.¹ Africa, and especially West Africa, was depicted as one of the key ground zero sites. Kaplan’s article has been widely read and debated by both academics and policymakers.

One and a half decades later, Kaplan’s doomsday predictions are yet to be realized. States and citizens, in Africa and elsewhere, remain challenged by the problems identified in “The Coming Anarchy,” but the prospect of a continent-wide social meltdown seems an unlikely short- to medium-term scenario. In Africa, some of the conditions of human security have arguably improved. In particular, there has been a quantifiable decrease in the occurrence of major armed conflict. Between 1998 and 2002, Africa was the region with the highest number of major armed conflicts compared to the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East.² Africa experienced on average eight distinct major armed conflicts each year during this five-year period. However, between 2003 and 2006 the number of major armed conflicts decreased to three per annum; in 2007, only one major armed conflict was observed in Africa.³

Despite this decrease in the number of major armed conflicts, Africa currently remains affected by a series of intense minor armed conflicts.⁴ These conflicts brew in the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Darfur region of Sudan and Somalia; they all have the potential to significantly destabilize much of central and eastern Africa. The existence of armed non-state groups in the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, as well as the high levels of firearms crime and violence in urban centers in Kenya and South Africa remains a critical human security concern. Small arms and light weapons are among the key tools used to foment violence in Africa. The proliferation of such

weapons and related ammunition has intensified and prolonged violent conflicts.

In response to the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in Africa, African governments, with the support of donor governments and agencies, have initiated inter-state arms control processes. Since 2000, African governments have successfully negotiated continental and regional arms control agreements and established inter-governmental implementation agencies. A number of countries have initiated bilateral arms collection and destruction operations, and certain governments have updated or are in the process of reforming their arms control policy and legislation. These developments contribute to greater confidence building and continental integration.

The illegal arms trade is characterized by members of the security forces selling their arms and ammunition in violation of national law.

They have the potential to enhance the safety and security of Africa's population, thereby forestalling Kaplan's prophecy of impending chaos.

This article explores both the legal and illegal dynamics of the international conventional arms trade as well as weapons transfers and proliferation in Africa—all of which are intertwined. Specific reference is

made to current conflict hotspots in Africa, where the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is most severe. This article also critically considers the mechanisms and instruments that have been established to control these arms transfers. In addition, it examines the link between arms transfers and peace and continental integration in Africa.

OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE IN RELATION TO AFRICA⁵

The arms trade in relation to Africa, as in other regions, can be divided into legal and illegal components. No international instrument currently regulates the international arms trade. Therefore, the legality of arms transfers is determined by relevant national legislation of the export, transit and recipient states, as well as international arms embargoes. The legal trade typically entails government-to-government transfers where the required import and export documentation is provided and neither the importer nor the exporter is subject to an arms embargo. The illicit trade generally involves arms transactions where one or more of the parties has an arms embargo imposed against it or operates in violation of arms control legislation. These parties can include non-state actors such as rebel groups, militias and criminal gangs. The illegal arms trade is also characterized by members of the security forces and licensed civilian firearm holders selling their personal arms and

Table 1: Regional distribution of the top 100 arms producing companies (sales in US\$ billions)

Region/Country	2006 Arms Sales	Companies	Region/Country	2006 Arms Sales	Companies
North America			Eastern Europe		
USA	200.2	41	Russia	6.1	8
Canada	0.5	1			
Western Europe			Other OECD		
United Kingdom	37.3	11	Japan	5.2	4
France	19.5	6	South Korea	1.8	3
Trans-European	12.6	1	Australia	0.5	1
Italy	11.0	5	Other Non-OECD		
Germany	6.1	5	Israel	4.6	4
Sweden	2.3	1	India	3.5	3
Spain	1.9	2	Singapore	0.9	1
Switzerland	0.6	1			
Finland	0.5	1			
Norway	0.5	1			

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

ammunition in violation of national law. The unauthorized informal production of firearms by gunsmiths is a significant source of illicit firearms in some areas in Africa, particularly in West Africa.

Both aspects of the arms trade can include transport agents, middlemen or brokers, transporting the arms by land, water or air. Those who facilitate illegal transactions often attempt to disguise them as legitimate trade by means of forged documentation or to conceal arms in consignments of innocuous goods. On some occasions, arms are disassembled, and the different components are transported separately to the final destination.⁶

The arms trade, both legal and illegal, lacks transparency, which makes it impossible to analyze the exact nature and dynamics of this global enterprise. Some countries produce arms export and import reports and provide information that is publicly accessible via the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms database.⁷ However, very few African countries publish such information. Due to the clandestine nature of the illegal arms trade, very limited reliable information is available.

Only a small number of African countries have the capability to manufacture arms and ammunition; South Africa and Egypt have the largest arms industries in

Africa. However, in global terms, African arms industries are economically insignificant; African defense companies do not feature in the top one-hundred arms companies in terms of sales. Table 1 provides a regional breakdown and indicates that companies in North America and Western Europe produce the vast majority of arms in the global market. The Chinese arms industry is also a key player in the international arms trade, yet, there is no reliable data publicly available in this regard. Therefore, Chinese companies are not included in Table 1.

ROLE OF ARMS BROKERS IN AFRICA

Arms brokering is the arrangement and facilitation of transfers of weapons, ammunition, parts and components by persons or companies who are not direct parties to the transactions, and the broker, therefore, may not come into direct contact with or possession of the actual items. While brokers may have a legitimate role to play in the legal arms trade, illicit brokering often plays a part in the diversion of small arms and light weapons into illicit markets, violations of arms embargoes or in facilitating access to arms by transnational organized crime syndicates.⁸

International attention focused on arms brokering activities in Africa in the mid-1990s, when arms brokers were supplying arms to genocide forces in Rwanda, rebel groups in Angola and Sierra Leone and the repressive regime of Charles Taylor in Liberia—all of which were subject to United Nations (UN) Security Council arms embargoes at the time. In recent years, arms brokers have been implicated in the violation of Security Council arms embargoes against Somalia and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as rebel groups and militias in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Darfur region of Sudan.⁹

The numerous international and regional multilateral agreements that have been established are aimed at eradicating the uncontrolled proliferation of arms and include recommendations and commitments to regulate and control arms brokering activities. However, effective control over arms brokers can only be achieved through creating and implementing national legislation.¹⁰ In Africa, very few states have promulgated legislation to regulate arms brokering activities.

CONFLICT HOTSPOT FOCUS¹¹

This section provides an overview of the three most intense armed conflicts in Africa, namely those in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and the Darfur region in Sudan. This section will specifically focus on their sources of arms, ammunition and military equipment, and the manner in which they were transported to the conflict zones.

Much of the evidence is drawn from the reports of UN panels of experts and groups of experts that have been established on an ad hoc basis by the UN Security

Council to monitor the enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions and arms embargoes. These detailed reports typically represent the most reliable sources of publicly available information on arms trafficking in relation to embargoed regimes. All three areas discussed below are currently subject to arms embargoes.

Democratic Republic of Congo

In 1997, a Rwandan-supported rebellion led by Laurent Kabila overthrew the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. The Rwandan government backed the rebellion as it sought to neutralize Rwandan rebel forces that were operating from the eastern parts of DRC territory and were receiving military and material support from the Mobutu government. However, the new government of the DRC failed to take effective action against these rebel groups, and in 1998, an assortment of rebel groups supported by Rwanda and Uganda launched a military campaign to oust the government of Laurent Kabila. The new DRC government was only able to retain control of the state machinery due to military assistance from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe.

A cease-fire agreement by all major conflicting parties was reached in July 1999. However, it was only in 2003, following the signing of an agreement by the major conflicting parties in South Africa in 2002 that some semblance of peace in the DRC was secured, with the exception of some of the eastern provinces. A UN mission was deployed in November 1999 to facilitate and support disarmament, peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in the DRC.

Despite the UN deployment, armed violence in most of the eastern provinces continued after the signing of the peace agreement and was exacerbated by the extensive availability of arms and arms smuggling. Consequently, in July 2003, the UN Security Council, in terms of UN Resolution 1493, imposed an arms embargo against all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. The resolution, however, excluded the armed forces of the DRC government.¹²

In its July 2004 report, a DRC Group of Experts, which was established to monitor the enforcement of the UN Security Council sanctions and arms embargo, claimed that both Uganda and Rwanda had either directly or indirectly violated the embargo.¹³ Subsequent groups' of experts reports have further implicated Rwanda and Uganda in sanctions-busting activities, which the two countries have vehemently denied.¹⁴

From late August 2008, large-scale armed conflict returned to areas around the city of Goma in North Kivu following the initiation of a rebellion of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) against the DRC government and its allied forces. Until his arrest in January 2009, General Laurent Nkunda led

this rebellion, allegedly with Rwandan backing.¹⁵ Experts estimate that the recent hostilities have resulted in the displacement of approximately 250,000 people in the affected regions.¹⁶

The report issued on 21 November 2008 by the UN Group of Experts about the DRC has suggested that the CNDP acquires most of its weapons and ammunition during offensives against the government armed forces. For example, in October 2008, the CNDP briefly seized the Rumangabo military camp and in the process took possession of a significant number of government weapons and ammunition. There have also been allegations that the CNDP has secured arms and ammunition from Rwanda and Uganda by means of smuggling networks. These allegations have yet to be corroborated, but Rwandan authorities have nonetheless been accused of multiple infractions: complicity with regards to recruitment of Rwandan citizens into the CNDP, arrangement of military equipment transfers to the CNDP and the provision of technical military support to the CNDP.¹⁷

Somalia

In 1992, as a result of civil war, the collapse of the fragile Somali state and the associated humanitarian disaster, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo against the territory of Somalia by means of UN Resolution 733. In 1993 the UN deployed a peace enforcement mission, which during its two years of existence, proved to be largely ineffective. A series of peace initiatives have been pursued, but none has succeeded to date. In January 2007, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia and overthrew the Council of Islamic Courts, a non-state actor that had seized control of Mogadishu and other strategic areas from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Sporadic violent conflict has erupted between non-state actors and the TFG and its allies, and states and non-state actors have violated the arms embargo since the Ethiopian intervention.

At the time of writing this article, Ethiopian forces have withdrawn from Somalia following military setbacks and the high cost of maintaining a military presence. Armed opposition groups have also expanded the areas under their control and influence. By November 2008, most major southern Somali towns were under the control of opposition forces. Transitional Federal Government forces only remained in control of parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa.¹⁸

Reports by the monitoring group established by the UN Security Council to observe the enforcement of the arms embargo in Somalia have consistently indicated violations of the embargo. Significant quantities of weapons and military-related equipment have been transferred to the Somali factions. Neighboring states such as Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen, Eastern European states and individual arms brokers have been accused of ignoring the embargo.¹⁹

Non-state actors acquire the funds for their weapons from a variety of sources, including the government of Eritrea, private donors, particularly in the Arab and Islamic world and fund-raising activities among the Somali diaspora. Some non-state actors have engaged in piracy and kidnapping to procure arms, ammunition and equipment. Initially, piracy in Somali waters was amateurish and relatively infrequent. However, since early 2008 it has changed. According to the UN:

[It is] a sophisticated and well-organized industry whose dramatic expansion poses a growing threat to international shipping. The extraordinarily lucrative nature of piracy has transformed rag-tag, ocean-going militias into well-resourced, efficient and heavily armed syndicates employing hundreds of people in north-eastern and central Somalia.²⁰

Foreign military and security support to TFG forces has been another principal source of arms, ammunition and military material to Somalia. The objective of this support is purportedly to enhance the stabilization of Somalia. The UN Monitoring Group estimates that as much as 80 percent of such support has been diverted to the private sector and non-governmental opposition groups.²¹ According to the International Crisis Group, morale within the TFG army is low and deserters often sell their arms and ammunition to Somali arms markets. Insurgent groups then have access to arms through these markets.²²

The Darfur Region in Sudan

Sudan was in a state of civil war between 1983 and 2004. The key parties to the conflict were the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Additionally, numerous other rebel movements and non-state actors employed violence against the government and each other. In January 2005, a national peace accord, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, was signed by the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, which provided for a Government of National Unity (GNU) established in August 2005. However, the GNU appears to be an uneasy compromise. Sudan's system of governance remains divided and is marred by nepotism and mistrust.²³

In 2003, following a series of military triumphs against the Sudanese government in Darfur by two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudanese government responded by arming ethnic militias, popularly referred to as the Janjaweed. This resulted in an outbreak of mass violence and an acute humanitarian crisis within the Darfur region.

In April 2004, the N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement, a peace

deal between the warring factions in Darfur, was negotiated. This was followed by the deployment of an African Union (AU) observer mission in this region. However, to date all parties to the agreement have breached the cease-fire on numerous occasions. There have been some attempts to broker a more sustainable peace deal, but success has been limited.

As a consequence of these cease-fire violations and the humanitarian crisis, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental and rebel groups operating in Darfur by means of Security Council Resolution 1556 in July 2004. In March 2005, Resolution 1591 was passed in an attempt to augment the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. This resolution made provision for targeted travel and financial sanctions and established a Panel of Experts to monitor the implementation of the UN Security Council arms embargo and to report on human rights violations in the Darfur region.²⁴

The Panel of Experts report published in December 2005 indicated that the SLM/A and JEM had received arms, ammunition and equipment from Chad, Eritrea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and non-governmental groups in violation of the arms embargo. The report also suggested that the government of Eritrea was providing military training and logistical support to JEM and SLM/A. In addition, the panel found that the arms embargo had been indirectly violated by the Sudanese government through its incorporation of elements of the *Janjaweed* militia into the state security bodies, such as the Popular Defence Force (PDF), the border intelligence guard, the central reserve police, the popular police and the nomadic police. The SPLM/A was also implicated in embargo-busting activities.²⁵

Subsequent reports from the Panel of Experts have reinforced their assertions of military support by the government of Sudan and the government of Chad to non-state actors operating in the embargoed areas of Darfur. The Panel of Experts has also indicated that rebel groups from Chad have been incorporated into Sudanese military operations in Darfur.²⁶ In December 2008, the Sudanese government was still in the process of implementing military operations in the embargoed areas of Darfur and often in collaboration with pro-government militias. The Panel of Experts has reported that the Sudanese government has made use of commercial air transport and cargo businesses to transport equipment and troops into Darfur, in clear violation of the embargo.²⁷

ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES

The development of an Africa-wide small arms and light weapons (SALW) control agreement predates the premier international SALW control framework, titled the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which was negoti-

ated by UN members in 2001. The year before the UN Programme was adopted, member states of the Organization of African Unity met in Bamako, Mali and compiled a common African position on the illicit trafficking and proliferation of SALW: the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. A key aspect of this document is the recommendation that signatory states establish National Focal Points that synchronize the government bodies responsible for devising a national arms control action plan, facilitating small arms control research, monitoring arms control activities and formulating policy and legislation.²⁸ Many African states have created such positions, though some of these entities are more effective than others.

Subsequently, regional arms control agreements have been negotiated within the structures of regional economic communities. These agreements have sought to achieve multiple objectives: make the illicit production and possession of small arms and light weapons a criminal offense, promote the destruction of stocks of surplus weapons and introduce tighter control measures over weapon stockpiles and arms transfers. Three prominent regional agreements have been negotiated on the continent covering the majority of sub-Saharan Africa:

- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2006)
- Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001)
- Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (2004)

WEST AFRICA

The ECOWAS Convention evolved from the politically binding 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons. In terms of this Convention, member states must ban the transfer of small arms and light weapons into and out of their national territory. A member state can request exemptions to meet legitimate national defense and security needs or to participate in operations to support peace. In this regard, member states are compelled to establish and maintain arms transfer control systems. The Convention also requires member states to discourage civilian possession of small arms and light weapons, carefully regulate where such possession exists, safely store and maintain their national small arms and light weapons stocks, collect and destroy

surplus and illicit arms, mark all state and civilian held small arms and light weapons with a unique number and closely regulate arms brokering activities.²⁹

To facilitate the implementation of the Convention, a small arms unit was established within the ECOWAS Department of Political Affairs and Defence to coordinate activities in relation to the implementation of the Convention. In addition, the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) was set up in Bamako on 8 June 2006 to assist member states to build small arms control capacity at the national level. In particular, ECOSAP was tasked with collaborating with national SALW commissions to enhance their ability to counter the proliferation and misuse of these weapons.³⁰

Member states have engaged in considerable consultation and research with regards to the strictures of the Convention, but measurable implementation of this agreement has yet to be realized. In addition, as of the end of 2008, the Convention has not yet entered into force. Only six ECOWAS member states have ratified the resolution: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo. In order for the Convention to become legally binding, nine member states are required to ratify it.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

The SADC Firearms Protocol was the first African regional small arms agreement to become legally binding. The protocol aims to promote cooperation among states in order to curb and prevent the excessive manufacturing, accumulation, trafficking, possession and use of illicit firearms, ammunition and other related materials. States in the region have successfully collaborated to coordinate several arms control initiatives, particularly in the area of arms collection and destruction. For example, between 2001 and 2006, joint policing operations between the South African and Mozambican police, commonly referred to as Operations Rachel, resulted in the collection and destruction of 46,902 small arms and light weapons and 24,493,565 rounds of ammunition on Mozambican soil.³¹

The Southern African Regional Police Chief's Cooperation Organization (SARPCCO), which has a secretariat based in Harare, Zimbabwe, coordinates the implementation of the SADC Firearms Protocol. SARPCCO has a dedicated firearms desk officer responsible for assisting states with the implementation of the protocol. Member states have tended to prioritize cross-border small arms and light weapons collection and destruction operations, particularly in Mozambique and Angola. However, SARPCCO has recently developed standard operating procedures for national implementation of the protocol, which will expand the pursuance of practical arms control measures beyond arms collection and destruction operations.³² A key concern is that SARPCCO has been reliant on the support of

non-governmental organizations and donor governments to fund much of its arms control and destruction projects.

GREAT LAKES REGION AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa is a legally binding agreement that entered into force in May 2006.³³ From an arms control perspective, the Nairobi Protocol is arguably more progressive than the SADC Protocol because it is more specific in prescribing actions to be undertaken by signatory states. A regional organization has been established, the Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the protocol. Best practice guidelines have been developed which outline detailed policy and practice recommendations for the protocol's national implementation. In addition, these guidelines stipulate extensive criteria for inter-state arms transfers. For example, transfer license applications should be considered on a case-by-case basis, not violate UN Security Council arms embargoes and conform to international humanitarian law.³⁴

RECSA has administered numerous training and capacity building workshops throughout the region. These workshops provided assistance to states to strengthen arms control policy and helped senior officials bring their countries in line with the requirements of the Nairobi Protocol. In 2008, some signatory states were issued electronic SALW-marking equipment by RECSA with the assistance of foreign donors. By December 2008, many of these states had initiated the process of marking state and civilian SALW with unique numbers, which are stored on an electronic database. This will help facilitate locating future lost and stolen weapons.

The most noticeable arms control activities in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa have been arms and ammunition collection and destruction. Some states have destroyed significant quantities of small arms, light weapons and ammunition that were surplus, obsolete or confiscated by security forces. Between 2003 and 2007, RECSA supported the destruction of 100,600 firearms. Destruction processes took place in Burundi, the DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.³⁵ Signatory states have also made progress in the development of national action plans and have established National Focal Points.

Despite these destruction successes, SALW-related legislation and policy in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa has been measured. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, no state had formally adopted amended SALW control legislation since the Nairobi Protocol came into force. However, states such as Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC have made steps toward ratification by presenting

bills to their respective parliaments.³⁶ Additionally, signatory states have encountered a number of obstacles toward fulfilling many of their key obligations to this protocol due to ongoing conflicts, which continue to stimulate a demand for weapons. For example, all three conflict hotspots previously assessed, the DRC, Somalia and Darfur, exist within the borders of signatories of the Nairobi Protocol. Furthermore, a number of governments have been unable to make any significant impact on curbing illegal arms transfers as they lack the capacity to effectively police their borders and are unable to effectively secure state weapons stockpiles.

As with ECOWAS and SADC, RECSA and the signatory states to the Nairobi Protocol have been highly reliant on external support to help develop their arms control and disarmament initiatives. Such reliance on external funding limits the sustainability of arms control and disarmament processes initiated by African intergovernmental organizations, as they are unlikely to be effectively pursued when the external support is discontinued. Nonetheless, signatory states have reportedly made small financial contributions to RECSA's annual budget, hence reducing RECSA's dependence on foreign donor assistance.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION


The proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons throughout Africa undermines sustainable peace and continental integration in Africa as these arms can contribute to the exacerbation and increased lethality of violent conflict. However, African states, with the support of donor governments and agencies, have not been complacent in initiating efforts to counteract this proliferation. As indicated above, inter-state initiatives have been launched to proactively respond to the small arms and light weapons problem.

In some cases, neighboring states that do not maintain cordial relations with each other have willingly joined common arms control forums. This is particularly the case in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa where a number of governments (or factions within said governments) stand accused of supplying arms to non-state actors in other states and violating arms embargoes. For example, these types of accusations have proliferated between the DRC and Rwanda, the DRC and Uganda and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Yet joint participation in arms control fora have helped states move past recrimination to solutions that can contribute to sustainable peace in these impacted regions.

CONCLUSION

Despite the noticeable reduction in major armed conflicts in Africa, long-term peace remains elusive in many areas across the most marginalized continent. A key component of this dynamic is the availability and misuse of small arms and light

weapons. Non-state actors, such as rebel groups and militias, as well as repressive governments, are still able to source small arms and light weapons domestically or through regional and international smuggling networks. Securing such weapons is nonetheless more complicated than it was in the 1990s, as international and regional arms control and disarmament initiatives have constrained access to the more conventional sources of small arms and light weapons.

Further constructive action aimed at deepening the effectiveness of these arms control and disarmament process, both internationally and in Africa, is crucial. This process requires the targeting of donor assistance to allow for measurable and sustainable capacity building of the national and inter-state arms control and disarmament agencies and strategic operational projects. In turn, as early evidence suggests, such measures will further promote continental integration and peace-building. 

NOTES

¹ Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” *Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (February 1994), 44-76.

² “The main criterion for classifying an armed conflict as major remains: that fighting between two parties, one or both of which is a state, has resulted in 1000 battle-related deaths during at least one calendar year of the conflict.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73.

³ *Ibid.*, 75-78.

⁴ A minor armed conflict is characterized by *Columbia: Essays on Conflict, Peace, and Development* as “... causing no more than 1,000 battlefield deaths during the entire conflict.” Andres Solimano, *Columbia: Essays on Conflict, Peace, and Development* (World Bank Publications, 2000), 161.

⁵ Portions of the section were previously published in Guy Lamb, “Stoking the Fires: The International Arms Trade in Africa,” *ISS Today* (6 February 2009).

⁶ Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, *The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents* (Oslo: PRIO/ NISAT/ BASIC, 1999), 1-3.

⁷ The UN Register of Conventional Weapons, <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html>

⁸ Wood and Peleman, 1-3.

⁹ Brian Wood, “The Prevention of Illicit Brokering of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Framing the Issue,” in *Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons—Scope and Implications*, ed. UNIDIR, Small Arms Survey and United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2006), 3; Guy Lamb and Nicholas Marsh, “Introduction,” in *Dangerous Dealings: Arms Brokering and Regulations in Southern Africa (Preliminary Results)*, ed. Guy Lamb and Nicholas Marsh, (Pretoria: ISS and PRIO, 2008), 1-4.

¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons, A/62/163 (New York: United Nations, 2007), 8.

¹¹ Portions of this section were previously published in Guy Lamb, “Beyond ‘Shadow-Boxing’ and ‘Lip Service’: The Enforcement of Arms Embargoes in Africa,” (occasional paper 135, ISS, April 2007).

¹² United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1493 (2003), (New York: United Nations, 2003).

¹³ United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 15 July 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2004/551 (New York: United Nations, 2004), 13-23.

¹⁴ United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 4 January 2005 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004), S/2005/30 (New York: United Nations, 2005), 9; United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1698 (2006), S/2007/423 (New York: United Nations, 2006), 25; “Uganda, Rwanda Deny Violating DRC Arms Embargo, Slam UN Report,” *Agence France-Presse*, 1 February 2005; United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 23 January 2008, S/2008/43 (New York: United Nations, 2008), 13.

¹⁵ On 22 January 2009, Nkunda was arrested by Rwanda authorities on charges of war crimes. “Rwanda arrest Congo rebel leader,” *BBC World News America*, 23 January 2009.

¹⁶ International Crisis Group, “Crisis Group Submission to UN Security Council on the Situation in DR Congo,” 25 November 2008.

¹⁷ United Nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 21 November 2008, S/2008/773 (New York: United Nations, 2008), 6-18.

¹⁸ International Crisis Group, “Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State,” Africa Report No. 147, 23 December 2008, i.

¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1425 (2002), 24 February 2003, S/2003/223 (New York: United Nations, 2003), 16-31; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1519 (2003), 22 July 2004, S/2004/604 (New York: United Nations, 2004), 29-39; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1630 (2005), 5 April 2006, S/2006/229 (New York: United Nations, 2006), 10-15; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1766 (2007), 2 April 2008, S/2008/274 (New York: United Nations, 2008), 13-24.

²⁰ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1811 (2008), 20 November 2008, S/2008/769 (New York: United Nations, 2008), 24-33; 43-48.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 40.

²² International Crisis Group, “Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State,” Africa Report No. 147, 23 December 2008, 8.

²³ International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead,” Africa Report No. 106, 31 March 2006, 10.

²⁴ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1591 (2005) (New York: United Nations, 2005).

²⁵ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan, 9 December 2005, S/2006/65 (New York: United Nations, 2005), 25-37.

²⁶ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Prepared in Accordance with Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1665 (2006), 31 August 2006, S/2006/795 (New York: United Nations, 2006), 23-28; United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005) Concerning the Sudan Prepared in Accordance with Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1713 (2006), 10 September 2007, S/2007/584 (New York: United Nations, 2007), 26-41.

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