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The crisis in Ukraine triggered a feeling that drastic changes are happening in the system of international relations that is still weakly articulated academically. Policy commentators mostly intuitively claim that after the events in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine the structure of East-West relations underwent drastic alterations, which permanently altered the status quo. There are strong voices claiming that in this new reality, we should primarily focus on the often underestimated issues of physical force, military strength and energy resources. A new wave of Realpolitik epistemology seems to be underway.
Unlike these voices, I deem that ideational issues still matter for unpacking the intricacies of new trends. How identities are articulated, how norms are implemented and how new ideas are infused in the debate are all of utmost salience for studying international relations in times of crisis. Ukraine is an ideational and normative challenge to the Kremlin, which by and large overshadows rational calculus. Paradoxically, while both countries build their international identities on the post-colonial assumption of "rising from the knees," the way the two do so are strikingly dissimilar.
It is from this perspective that the question of Russia's instruments in areas of vital interest can be most effectively studied. What does Russia want in its policies toward the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries - Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan? Are these policies rational or emotional, offensive or defensive? What toolkits would Russia be able to apply against neighboring countries with strong pro-European ambitions, and how effective would Russian pressure be in the long run? It is this set of questions that inspired me in this analysis.
In this paper I argue, first, that Russia has launched its own normative policy toward the EaP countries that incorporates a set of conceptual arguments, such as portraying Ukraine and Russia as allegedly bound by civilizational ties, referring to the core conservative tenets of international politics - the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention - or reactivating the Soviet mythology. Second, Russia is not only unilaterally imposing its power, but also exploiting the opportunities embedded in the structure of its relations with post-Soviet states. Against this backdrop, Russia sees its policies as mostly reactive and defensive rather than offensive, which is overwhelmingly denied in the West. Third, Russia's policies are largely inconclusive and inconsistent, which is conducive to the dispersal of hegemonic discourse and its potential fragmentation.