

Honored by the Glory of Islam: Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe

By *Marc David Baer*

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 332 pp., ISBN 9780195331752.

Drawing on contemporary archival and manuscript sources, Marc Baer unfolds the most fascinating story of Sultan Mehmed IV. Although his reign was remarkably long (1648-87), he has almost been forgotten or depicted dismissively as weak and foolish. Aiming to retrieve that lost history, the book's central theme is conversion – of Muslims to “proper” Islamic practices, of Christians and Jews to Islam, and of space. Thus, the reader encounters the Kadızadeli movement that first rose to prominence in the 1650s. The movement advocated a revivalist pietism, in the sense that it called for the effective prohibition of unlawful innovations.

The structure of the book follows the sultan's reign. The narrative begins with the circumstances of the enthronement of the seven-year old Mehmed IV in 1648, including a strikingly vivid depiction of Istanbul at the time. Then the discussion moves to the “decade of crisis” that followed. In the face of external and internal challenges, central government proved to be ineffective – as between 1648 and 1656 there was a total of twelve grand viziers. The crisis raised the question of legitimacy; in particular, the position of power held by the *valide sultan* came to be seen as the source of all the empire's problems.

Beginning with chapter 3, Baer discusses factors contributing to an improvement in the situation. The Kadızadeli movement is introduced, whose growing influence on the elite suffered a set-back

when Köprülü Mehmed Pasha became grand vizier in 1656. During his term of office, the grand vizier managed to suppress internal rebellion and conquer again territory that had been lost. After reestablishing Ottoman rule the mosques that had been converted into churches, were turned back again into mosques (“conversions of sacred space abroad” – pp. 77/8). According to Baer, the grand vizier's success came at the expense of the sultan and the Ottoman household. Thus in the 1660s, Mehmed IV and the *valide sultan* worked hand in hand to strengthen the dynasty and the sultanate, drawing on notions of piety.

Baer explains that the destruction caused by the great fire in Istanbul in 1660 provided an opportunity to Islamize the city. At the time, nearly half of the city's inhabitants were non-Muslims (p. 104). He argues that “in a period of crisis, Islamization of areas inhabited by Christians and Jews in Istanbul served as a visible sign of the authority of the dynasty and religion that Hatice Turhan represented” (p. 101). The religious reorientation was not limited to the elite, “in the 1660s a new wave of Kadızadeli-inspired piety rolled over the city” (p. 104).

In 1663, Mehmed IV moved to Edirne, “the old warrior capital” (p. 105), while his mother stayed in Istanbul. At that time, Mehmed IV also appointed an official chronicler and developed a close relationship with the Kadızadeli preacher Vani Meh-

med Efendi, who became the confidant of the sultan, and also of Hatice Turhan and the grand vizier. At first, the religious reforms targeted Sufis, “especially Bektashis, Halvetis, and Mevlevi, the three orders that historically had had close ties with the military and the dynasty” (p. 112); and – with much less success – the consumption and sale of alcohol.

Baer gives an account of two conversion projects in the second half of the 1660s: Mehmed IV brought about the conversion of Rabbi Shabbatai Tzevi, the leader of the Jewish messianic movement, in 1665; and Hatice Turhan converted Jewish palace physicians by conditioning their employment on the conversion to Islam.

Chapter 7 “analyses how Ottoman historians writing after a mature Mehmed IV moved to Edirne depict him as [...] a pious, strong, manly, warrior (ghazi) sultan, who reclaimed power taken by royal women and, with his preacher at his side, converted people and places in Ottoman Europe” (p. 138). The discussion focuses on the conquest of Candia (Crete) in 1669, and the process of the conversion of space that followed.

Chapter 8 discusses the military campaigns in Europe in the 1670s that were led by the sultan in person. Baer explains that “These victories enabled Mehmed IV to expand the empire to its greatest limits, leaving in his wake bell towers converted into minarets and Christians circumcised as Muslims, which in turn increased the morale of Muslims in the imperial capital” (p. 140).

Chapter 9 explores the interrelation between hunting and conversion. Mehmed IV’s frequent hunting expeditions were said to have “demonstrated his bravery and courage, hence manliness, and trained

him for warfare” (p. 179). It also provided him with an opportunity to come in contact with his subjects, especially during a “drive,” the sultan’s favorite hunting technique, in which numerous local villagers were compelled to participate. For hundreds of peasants, their encounter with the sultan resulted in their conversion to Islam. Baer points out that historians have overlooked that the “sultan’s mobile court served as a traveling conversion maker” (p. 185).

Under the heading, “The Failed Final Jihad,” Baer recounts the siege of Vienna (1683) as the culminating point of the aspirations stemming from the ghazi-sultan conception. He stresses that despite negative omens, and despite the option of diverting it without loss of face, the campaign went ahead and ended in the devastating defeat. The discussion of the aftermath focuses on changing interpretations. Already a generation after his death (1693), “Mehmed IV had been remade into a sedentary sovereign” (p. 243); he was no longer referred to as *ghazi*. “Along with his active role in promoting military conquest of infidel lands, Mehmed IV’s conversion of Christian and Jewish souls and space also disappeared from the historical record after his reign. [...] his reign lent itself to erasure, in particular because it is remembered mainly for” the territorial losses following the unsuccessful siege of Vienna (p. 244).

The book concludes with general observations on “Islamic rulers and the process of conversion” and provides an overview on how some of the other major actors in the story are remembered.

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The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1788

By *Stefan Winter*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 204 pp., ISBN 9780521765848.

Stefan Winter's recent study is a truly revisionist reading of the history of Lebanese communities under the Ottoman Empire. It is the product of a problem-oriented and well-organized research; an earlier version had been submitted as a doctoral dissertation to Chicago University in 2002. It is based on a rich bibliography comprising archival documents and secondary sources in many languages. Here, the author strikes a balance between local and official administrative sources. The reader feels that the Ottoman center is well represented by the regulations and orders dispatched to the Lebanese region. The author, however, narrates his story from a viewpoint within the cities of Lebanon.

The book begins with a critical and communicative evaluation of the relevant historiography. In the first chapter, Winter contextualizes the past of the Shiites in the Ottoman Empire, giving a short summary concerning the Shiite holy places in Iraq and discussing the Shiites of Jabal 'Amil. Briefly he also examines the historical experiences of unorthodox religious movements that in varying degrees were connected to Shiism, such as the Bektaşis and Kızılbaş. He also attempts to explore mental reflections of Shiism in mainstream "Ottoman thought." In the second chapter, he explains the foundation of Ottoman rule in Syria and Lebanon in the sixteenth century and describes the relationships between imperial and local power holders, such as the Shiite Harfush, but also the Druze emirates including that of Fahreddin Ma'n. In the third chapter, Winter delves into the past of the

Hamada emirate, the cooperation of these emirs with the Ottoman center, and their rule over Mount Lebanon between 1641 and 1685. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the author explores the transitions between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: in response to financial and political challenges, the Ottoman center moved from a more decentralized and tolerant structure to a more centralized and inflexible one. In these chapters, the author explains the ways in which Ottoman governments forced the local power holders to obey their authority. In the sixth and final chapter, he explains "the decline of Shiite rule in Tripoli and the Bekaa" in the eighteenth century: the Shihabi emirate took the place of the Harfush and Hamada.

Winter challenges the long established Maronite-centered historiography. He complains that most authors to date have uncritically relied on local chronicles and western consular reports. Recommending a diversification of source material, he particularly suggests a more intensive use of Ottoman source material. In taking this approach, Winter readily admits his debt to the works of Ahmad Beydoun and Kamal Salibi, who almost a quarter century ago, have questioned and criticized Lebanese national historiography for its 'confessionalist' premises. Sadly although Kamal Salibi ranks as the 'grand old man' of Lebanese historiography, his and Beydoun's ideas have not gained wide acceptance, and thus Stefan Winter's approach continues to be innovative.

The author is well aware of the prob-

lems involved in ascribing a strictly defined ideology to the Ottoman elites. In his work, state and ideology appear as things that rulers, bureaucrats and countless other functionaries make and remake almost in every generation. From this recurrent process there result certain behavioral patterns, which show continuities with respect to earlier policies. With these processes constantly in mind, Stefan Winter examines the long-term history of the ethno-religious communities inhabiting the area that now encompasses Lebanon, demonstrating the complexities of changing state-society relations between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.

Stefan Winter dates the beginning of contemporary Lebanon two centuries earlier than customary: for him the key event is the Ottoman conquest of 1516. Since then the Shiite communities of Lebanon have played a role that is much more ambiguous than has been conventionally accepted. Certainly, the Ottoman elite often came down heavily on people that its members had defined as heretics. But at the same time there was a good deal of 'unofficial tolerance' and certain Shiite families were integrated into the provincial governing body as tax collectors. As Stefan Winter puts the case, conventional historiography has legitimized and magnified the status of Druze feudal lords. As a result other groups, particularly the Shiites, have been 'edited out' of the picture. Therefore, this book primarily comes out as a critique of romantic and nationalist Lebanese historical writing and asserts the Shiite roots of Lebanese history. Winter shows that Shiite influence did not decline until the late eighteenth century. In other words, the author asserts that the national history of Lebanon begins not only with the exten-

sion of the Druze and Maronite communities' influence in the region but also with the breaking of Shiite power.

Winter also criticizes Marxist-inspired idealizing descriptions of class-based political confrontations between the inhabitants of Lebanon and the Ottoman central administration, rejecting as "historicized mythologies" the notions of relentless Ottoman oppression and romanticized Lebanese liberation. According to this author, such simplifications obscure the inter-confessional diversity of the region and more seriously obfuscate the domestic conflicts that occurred even in the middle of the struggle against what was supposedly the 'common enemy,' namely the power-holders at the Ottoman center. He dwells on the example of the Shiite Hamadas who in the middle of the seventeenth century were involved in intra-Maronite disputes and ruled over a Maronite district. At the same time, Christians played certain roles in the internal conflicts of the Shiite Hamadas. Similarly, the author argues that the Shiites of Mount of 'Amil were not living in an isolated world as supposed by the Lebanese historiography. On the whole, the author as a historian appears to defend Ottoman rule, traditionally accused as the *bête noire* of the modern nationalist historical writing that developed in the countries formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire.

Ottoman political pragmatism had favored the Shiite Harfush Emirs in the sixteenth century when they were of practical use to the central authorities. However, when their service was no longer needed, the authorities did not hesitate to damage their reputation. Stefan Winter highlights certain cases in which being a Shiite in Lebanon actually might make it easier for a local power-holder to obtain the recom-

mendations needed for obtaining lucrative tax-farms, however in other cases, such a lord might find it more expedient to claim that he was a Sunni, normally of the Shafi'i persuasion. Throughout, Stefan Winter tries to convince the reader that religious concerns played less decisive roles than a modern reader might think. The most important characteristics of Lebanese political history under sixteenth and eighteenth century Ottoman rule were 'mutual dependency' and 'complex ties of power relationships' between local subjects, intermediaries and imperial authorities. As fiscal concerns were dominant, the distribution of tax farms had nothing to do with sectarian identity; what counted was maximization of revenues and enhanced government control. With regard to religion Stefan Winter emphasizes the importance of the tribal life-style and "folk Islam," instead of a religiosity shaped according to Islamic law. In this sense, Winter shares the views of Hanna Batatu as well as Marion Farouq and Peter Sluglett concerning the history of nineteenth-century Iraq.

Winter's book rejects the notion of an unchanging ideology of Ottoman 'revulsion' against its Shiite subjects, an assumption mainly based on fatwas produced in the sixteenth century. Showing examples of non-Sunni communities, which preferred to cooperate with the Ottoman governments instead of protesting against them, Stefan Winter argues that the Ottoman Empire did not embrace an enduring policy of 'humiliation' and 'marginalization' against its non-Sunni inhabitants. Hence, although the established ad-hoc consensus might have been highly fragile, being Shiite in Lebanon did not prevent the Shiite Hamada and Harfush tribes from integrating into Ottoman imperial rule. Adopting

the thesis of Robert Ian Moore, concerning the formation of a persecuting society in the European middle ages, Winter argues that the "anti-Shiite impulse" emerged among bureaucratic circles whenever a political necessity appeared and mostly during long-term shifts and structural instabilities. In this regard, the persecution of Kızılbaş in the sixteenth century is represented as a temporal event rather than an articulation of a universal Ottoman antagonism against Shiites. According to Winter, the same thing applied to the Lebanese experience. As the priorities of the provincial government changed, fiscal and political adjustments contributed to the reformulation and adaptation of an offensive discourse against Shiism in the last decades of the seventeenth century. The main reasons behind the Ottoman campaign against the Shiite Hamada tribe, which had held onto power in Tripoli during most of the seventeenth century, were its unruly behavior and the trouble it had caused recently settled tribes. Only after the marginalization of Shiites did central Ottoman authorities co-operate with the Shihabis in destroying Shiite rule in Mount Lebanon. Stefan Winter argues that for the Ottomans, the Shiite Hamadas were primarily brigands before they were members of any sect. However, Winter also points out that after the Shiite emirs proved unable to deliver further services to the Ottoman government, the memory of their previous utility quickly disappeared.

In his argument, the author adopts some concepts developed by the French Annales School and tries to identify structural transformations that the Ottoman Empire went through. As a direct consequence, historical agency is given to structures rather than to people. Thus,

for example, the personal cruelty of Cezzar Ahmad Pasha represents a return to “the normal mode of the Ayan rule” in the eighteenth century; such statements can fairly be criticized for undermining the role of human agency in history. On the other hand, despite noting some long-term changes, Winter’s book basically focuses on a chain of political events. This choice does not exactly further the literary quality of a familiar shortcoming among historians who use extensive archival material. Minute anecdotal detail not only becomes tiresome but also occasionally seems not to lead anywhere. Sometimes the reader awaits the concluding paragraphs with impatience. Even a local Lebanese reader well versed in Lebanese geography, may be lost in the plethora of personal and place names. In addition, un-translated quotations in French, especially in the fifth and sixth chapters, might not be very helpful to the non-francophone reader. However, the major difficulty with the book is that although it is called “The Shiites of Lebanon under Ottoman rule,” I have not found

a single reference to the social lives of these people. Thus, the narrative concentrates mainly on fiscal and political events, which undoubtedly have their importance but need to be connected with the social reality familiar to these politically ambitious, occasionally rebellious, and occasionally cooperative Lebanese Shiites lived.

Stefan Winter is well aware of the political potential inherent in his study. Without ever indulging in teleological speculations, he points out that the problems of present-day Lebanon cannot be understood without taking account of the Shiites, who were a constitutive component of the population that in time was to become the Lebanese people. In reinserting the Shiite emirates into Lebanese history and revising the current Maronite cum-Druze-centered historiography, the author has made a brilliant contribution to Shiite, Lebanese, Ottoman and more generally, Middle Eastern studies.

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From Hellenism to Islam, Cultural and Linguistic Change in the Roman Near East

Edited by *Hannah M. Cotton, Robert G. Hoyland, Jonathan J. Price*
and *David L. Wasserstein*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 481 pp., ISBN 9780521875813, £65.00.

This is an important addition to the mounting literature on the cultural and especially the linguistic mix in the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire in the period before the Arab conquests. It arose from a conference and a related research theme on epigraphy and cultural and lin-

guistic change in the Near East “from Hellenism to Islam,” organised by the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the year 2002-3. This background, as well as the connection of three members of the research group with the international project, which aims

to publish all inscriptions from Israel and Palestine surviving from the fourth to seventh centuries, explains the emphasis of some of the contributions on the evidence of inscriptions. On the whole, the volume deals with the period before rather than after the coming of Islam. The exceptions are two contributions on Egypt by Tonio Sebastian Richter and Arietta Papaconstantinou, both of which deal with the complex interplay in Greek, Coptic, and Arabic, and a third by Leah Di Segni's paper that provides a welcome survey of Greek inscriptions in the region from the sixth century and into the late Umayyad period. Robert Hoyland's penetrating paper "Arab kings, Arab tribes and the beginnings of historical memory in late Roman epigraphy," also discusses the portrayal of pre-Islamic Arab leaders and groups in later Arabic sources.

With the exception of the two papers on Egypt just mentioned, the only contributions which deal with Anatolia as distinct from the Near East are the fascinating paper by Angelos Chaniotis on "Ritual performance of divine justice: the epigraphy of confession, atonement, and exaltation in Roman Asia Minor" and Walter Ameling's discussion of inscriptions relating to diaspora Jews in Asia Minor and Syria. It is a pity that there are no maps, both in view of the large number of place names in the text. In addition, obviously modern national borders are irrelevant to this period, and one of the areas most productive of written material in the period before Islam is now partly or mainly in Eastern Turkey (see Sebastian Brock, "Edessene Syriac inscriptions in late antique Syria"). Also somewhat distant from the main theme of the volume is Marijana Rici's contribution on the legal and social status of *threptoi* (children reared by persons other

than their natural parents) in narrative and documentary sources.

The volume well illustrates the intensity of current scholarly discussion about the Roman Near East in the period preceding the impact of Islam. Fergus' Millar highlights much of this theme in his introduction. On one level, this is part of a wider debate about prosperity and decline, with many writers pointing to the 'fall' of the Roman empire and rise to prominence of barbarian peoples in the west as a fifth-century phenomenon, while the provinces of the eastern Mediterranean continued to flourish economically and culturally at least until the Persian invasion and occupation of the early seventh century (and in the view of many until well after the Arab conquests). An economic boom fed by population growth in this period is highlighted, for example, by Robert Hoyland (p. 388). It is striking that the centre of imperial government in Constantinople seems far away, to judge from the emphasis in these papers. Among the themes that emerge in many of the contributions perhaps, the most prominent are those of cultural identity and the reliability of other markers, such as language and religious practices. A major topic is the use of Greek in relation to indigenous languages (connected with the 'Hellenism' of the book's title), but two papers (Eck and Isaac) also deal with the use of Latin. The contribution by Richter stands out for its application of sociolinguistic theory and comparative material from other periods against a too-ready resort by many ancient historians to notions of bilingualism. Languages and scripts also need to be distinguished. A language could be and often was written down in a different script than the spoken word, as in the case of Arabic, written in northern Arabia

and southern Syria in Nabataean Aramaic script which gradually developed into Arabic script or in Egypt in Coptic signs. Christian division, a prominent theme in other publications on the Near East in this period, and rightly re-emphasised by Papaconstantinou in relation to Egypt, generally gives way here to these complex linguistic questions, which together present a far more localised and nuanced impression of change than is usually provided. The Talmud, “a complete Greek book written in Aramaic letters,” (p. 284) also emerges as being affected by the cultures surrounding its production. We can agree with Hoyland (374) that this period, which also saw the emergence of a Samaritan script in the fourth century (Dan Barag, “Samaritan writing and writings”), represented an “efflorescence of a whole range of languages and scripts across the Roman empire,” and nowhere more vividly exemplified than at Dura-Europos (see Ted Kaizer, “Religion and language in Dura-Europos”), or Palmyra, where eight churches are now known from late antiquity, at least one of them from the Umayyad period. With this phenomenon of linguistic change also went the experience of “language death,” “language shift” or “language loss.” (Richter)

Some of these highly complex developments indicate the formation of new groups, but Papaconstantinou is right (449,

n. 8) to caution that “identity and allegiance in this period is complex, and involves much more than the usually cited religious and ethnic factors.” Thus, the reasons for the “westward spread” of Syriac inscriptions and writing in the fifth and especially the sixth centuries (Brock, p. 291) or for the rise of Arabic script and disappearance of ENA (Epigraphic South Arabian; see Hoyland, p. 391) are equally complex and multiple. The main reasons were new clientage relationships with the Roman power that brought corresponding changes to the Arab groups already settled in imperial territory and that no group in these Near Eastern provinces during this period could remain unaffected by the degree of change that was taking place on all sides.

Many of the contributions address the basic methodological problems inherent in drawing conclusions from inscriptional evidence, or from naming practices. But the overall impression left by this volume is of a period characterised by multiple linguistic and cultural shifts, and of highly complex and changing allegiances. Above all, the consolidation of Islam did not take place in a context of cultural or political decline but against an existing background of energetic experimentation and cultural change.

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Economic Liberalization and Turkey

By *Sübüdey Togan*

London: Routledge, 2010, 322 pp., ISBN 9780415495950.

“Economic Liberalization and Turkey” provides comprehensive information related to liberalization of trade in agricultural

and industrial goods, the liberalization of services, and the role of regulatory intuitions in trade liberalization. The book is

divided into three parts. Part I consist of two chapters. The first two chapters provide readers with an informed background about the liberalization of the Turkish economy. It also looks at the liberalization of trade in goods. Part II of this book consists of six chapters. The 6 chapters describe liberalization of Turkey's service sector, including telecommunication, electricity, natural gas, banking, maritime freight, and the road freight transport sector. The Part III is devoted to quantifying the impact of economic liberalization and consists of only one chapter.

Part I consists of two chapters, which are focused on Turkey's trade regime and trade liberalization.. According to this first chapter, entitled "The Foreign Trade Regime and Trade Liberalization in Turkey," co-authored by Bartłomej Kaminski, the Turkish economy is stable because macroeconomic conditions are stable and domestic market competition has given way to greater domestic consumption satisfaction since 2001. Because of the Customs Union Decision (CUD) and Turkey's accession process to the EU, the liberalization process of Turkey's economy allowed for an increased competition in Turkey's domestic market and a more efficient service sector. The CUD contributed to Turkey's domestic market competition by providing predictability, transparency, and stability. Even though, there is a free movement of products between Turkey and the EU, certain protectionist measures remain in place on both sides of the alley.

In the "Standards, Conformity Assessment and Technical Barriers to Trade," co-authored by Saadettin Doğan, exports are the main focus of this chapter. For the Turkish economy, exports have become the primary source foreign currency and

economic growth. For this reason, Turkey tries to eliminate barriers by improving trade standards and adapting the EU's technical legislation into Turkish legislation for Turkish exporters. Unfortunately, technical barriers to trade between the EU and Turkey have not yet been eliminated. It is argued that Turkey still needs to adopt the model EU technical legislation, establish institutions required for the efficient functioning of quality infrastructure, train a substantial number of qualified staff, and build a modern technical infrastructure. Moreover, the adjustment costs required to eliminate the technical barriers to trade will be significant for the Turkish public sector.

Part II of the book is focused on the liberalization of sectors, such as telecommunication, electricity, natural gas, the banking service, maritime freight transport, and road freight transport sector. The first chapter is entitled "Liberalization of Telecommunications Services," co-authored by Erkan Akdemir and Erdem Başçı, and it relates to the history of Turkish telecommunication services. Before 1994, one national company held the monopoly over this sector, the "PTT." Afterwards, the telecommunication sector was liberalized. Although there have been efforts to enhance the competitiveness of the telecommunication's sector, much is still left on the drawing board.

The chapter entitled, "Electricity Sector Policy Reform," co-authored by Osman Sevaioğlu, evaluates the comparison between the EU countries and Turkey. Sevaioğlu argues that at the time the EU put into place the electricity sector policy reform, Turkey's electricity reform was not yet introduced because of its deteriorating fiscal situation. Today, Turkey has yet

to reach full efficiency and security in its Electricity's sector supply although its fiscal problems have been solved.

The chapter, entitled "Policy Reform in the Natural Gas Sector," co-authored by Cenk Pala, focuses on the natural gas sector. It discusses the existing conditions of Turkey's natural gas sector. The authors claim that only the United States and the United Kingdom can put in place the necessary conditions for a fully efficient natural gas market, such as full production competition, wholesaling, retailing, and establishing the proper conduits for transmission and distribution. There are tensions between Turkey and Russia regarding the location and control of these natural gas pipelines. Much of which are under Russian control. Therefore, Turkey needs to find alternative natural gas sources in order to achieve greater efficiency.

"Liberalization of the Banking Services," co-authored by Hakan Berument and Hasan Ersel, is another chapter of this book. They claim that the lack of regulation in Turkey's banking sector is its quintessential problem. Each country has its own regulations concerning its banking sector. This leads to a belief that their own system is more reliable than the ones in other countries. When Turkey did not adopt the Basel Core Principles, its banking sector subsequently faced a crisis in 2001. The 2008 crisis called into question the ability of supervisory authorities and the adequacy of the existing regulations domestically and internationally.

The chapter, entitled "Maritime Freight Transport Sector Policy Reform," argues that the EU's regulations on maritime transport are expensive now. Owing to the nature of the maritime freight transport, countries need to harmonize their own

rules and regulations with international rules and regulations. These are related to commercial operations and practices, rights and obligations of states, and safety and environmental regulations. The authors claim that Turkey should prioritize to achieve immediate convergence with the EU's maritime freight transport sector rules and regulations would be extremely costly for Turkey.

"Policy Reform in the Road Freight Transport Sector," co-authored by Sare Arıcanlı, is the last chapter in Part II. The authors argue that as a result of transportation rate increases - road infrastructure is a significant indicator for economic growth. Turkey's geographical conditions make road transportation essential for Turkey's economy, so that it needs to put into place relevant regulatory rules.. At this point, Turkey is in the process of setting up an institutional framework, as well as passing legislations and regulations in line with the EU's road freight transport sector. By accepting these regulations, Turkey will enhance competition in the road freight transport sector.

Finally, the last part of this book, entitled "Impact of Economic Liberalization," co-authored by Hakan Berument and Jan Michalek, indicates that although economic liberalization is beneficial for countries, it also has high costs. The cost will be high in the case of the elimination of technical barriers to trade and adjusting to the EU's banking, maritime freight and road freight transportation. This edited book also provides an in-depth analysis of Turkey's economic liberalization which is worth reading to understand the trajectory of Turkish economy in recent decades.

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The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus

By *Harry Anastasiou*

Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008, *Vol. I: The Impasse of Ethnonationalism*, 2008, 254 pp., ISBN, 0815631960 & *Vol. II: Nationalism Versus Europeanization*, 2008, 313 pp., ISBN 0815631979.

The Broken Olive Branch is a two volume book wherein the author analyses the Cyprus question through the prisms of ethno nationalism. In the first volume, through his interpretation, the author evaluates the historical origins of the Cyprus issue. According to the author, the uncritical adoption of ethnocentric nationalism is an fundamental factor in evaluating this conflict. The author points to the importance of the physical separation of the two communities on the island since 1964. The author argued that the Greek Cypriot nationalist aspiration of establishing a union with Greece (Enosis) and the Turkish Cypriot aspiration for the ethnic partition of Cyprus created the outcome of a divided island. Greek Cypriots wanted to establish a Hellenic state in which the Greeks of Cyprus would secure state power for themselves alone. Turkish Cypriots also aimed to have a territorially separate Turkish state in which they would have monopolized state power. (vol 1, p.44-45) While explaining the historical reasons of the division of Cyprus, the author underestimated the suffering of the Turks of Cyprus from 1963 to 1974 during which Turks were attacked, killed, and forced to leave their homes. In fact the alienation of Turkish Cypriots goes back to 1955 when the EOKA started its armed struggle for union with Greece (Enosis). However, even before that date problems existed between the two com-

munities. The author argued that it was not until the 1990s that Turkish and Greek Cypriots began to overcome nationalist rationals with direct citizen based contacts. Through these initiatives members of both communities shared their experiences and this helped to overcome prejudices. The author acknowledged the difficulties of direct dialogue, since there are issues that led to a breakdown of communication. Both communities' perception of certain events is quite different. For example, the author indicated that the Turkish side considered the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus a historically justified, legitimate independent state, while the Greek side considered it as an illegitimate breakaway state. While Greek Cypriots claimed the right of refugees to return to their homes, Turkish Cypriots considered it as an attempt to retake the northern territory, leaving the Turks without shelter. (vol.1, p.155-56) These differences of opinion on key issues were reflected in the endless negotiation process, which the book explains in detail. For example, the author states that the Greek Cypriots approach to the political settlement is based on the foundations set up by the Republic of Cyprus of 1960. The Greek side wants to maintain a strict legal continuity of the current state to any future settlement. (vol. 1, p. 186) However, for the Turkish side this approach to the negotiations is opposed to a bicomunal

and bizonal federation, which it supports. The Turkish side's arguments are based on the principle that no federation can be attained without first recognizing the existence of two state entities of equal legal status. (vol. 1, p.188) The first volume of the book concluded with the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. The author argued that the summit's decision to grant Turkey the status of an EU candidate opened the door to a new political environment on the issue of Cyprus. Since Turkey's candidacy to the EU, the terms of references by which Turkish and Greek Cypriots negotiated have changed.

In the second volume of the book, the author explains global trends and the impact of the EU as a catalyst for political and civil changes in Turkey and Greece. The negotiation process through the Annan Plan and political realities of the post referendum era were discussed in the book.

The impact of globalizing trends began to function as a vital catalyst of socio-political change, reducing the impact of nationalistic politics of unilateralism and isolationism. While stressing that global trends encourage integration, the author neglected to discuss that global trends of fragmentation and ethno-nationalism are also very real today. This latter group of global trends may have had a great impact on the Cyprus question, particularly, after the failure of the Annan Plan. As he correctly pointed out the failure to resolve the Cyprus problem (with the Annan plan) was perhaps the greatest political setback in the history of the island. (vol. 2, p. 140) The Annan plan failed at a time when even nationalist Greek Cypriots like Marios Matsakis talked about a two-state solution. (vol. 2, p. 189) Turkish Cypriots were very disappointed by the failure of the Annan Plan to be approved

by their Greek counterparts. And they may have interpreted this failure as meaning that the Greek Cypriots do not want to live in a bicomunal and bizonal state. Turkish Cypriots were also disappointed by the process after the referendum of the Annan Plan, since despite the Greek side's 'no vote' for the plan, Greek Cypriots became a member of the EU and the comprehensive embargo against the Turkish Cypriots still continues. It should be added here that the Greek Cypriots were rewarded by the EU, while the Turkish Cypriots continue to be punished.

In the two volumes of the book, the author's objective is to find and evaluate the ways and options in which the two communities can live together in the same state. However, in the first volume of the book, the description of the history of Cyprus and particularly the increase of tensions and conflicts since the 1950's would lead the reader to question whether the two communities of Cyprus can run a common state as envisaged in the Annan Plan and other previous UN plans. As the author indicated, in 1963 the Greek Cypriots pushed forward constitutional amendments aiming to abrogate the 1959-1960 agreements in order to open the way for 'Enosis.' It should be noted that besides the Greek Cypriots' goal of establishing 'Enosis,' the Greek Cypriots felt that the 1959-1960 agreements were imposed by the international community and they wanted an out at the first occasion. Realistically, we should acknowledge that any international agreement on the Cyprus question would have to be imposed by the international community. And even if the both sides accept a plan for a solution, there would still be a danger that history would repeat itself. Meaning, that the only reason either party

or both would accept a plan would be because of the pressure from major international powers. Always leaving the possibility open that the unsatisfied side would try and change and/or reverse any potential future agreement.

In the two volumes of the book, the author gave an insightful and comprehensive analysis and he showed goodwill in his intention and recommendations for the solution on the questions of Cyprus. If the author had explained and analyzed the impact of international developments on the Cyprus question after the post Annan era, the work would have been more thorough

and relevant. Because the question of Cyprus can be compared to the continuing global trend towards separation of certain nations today, like the independence of Kosovo. Despite his lack of emphasis on the terror faced by Turkish Cypriots, particularly in the period between 1963-1974, and the extreme hardships the embargo continues to impose on Turkish Cypriots, the author did try to objectively understand and evaluate the arguments and positions of Turkish Cypriots.

Kamer Kasım

Abant İzzet Baysal University

Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership

By *Burak Akçapar*

AltaMira: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2007, 211 pp., ISBN 9780742554016, \$77.00.

The European Commission, once asserted that “even before Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union, Turkey and Croatia, had begun joining the EU. Negotiations with Croatia may be concluded within a few years, while those with Turkey are expected to take considerably longer.”¹ Yet the crux of the matter is that Turkey’s full membership negotiation in the EU was not fruitful over the previous four decades. Debates over Turkey’s full membership in the European Union (EU) have been gaining salience not only as a matter of scholarly interest in Europe but also as a major issue in Turkey. Akçapar’s book sets out to examine the optimal future of the EU membership process for Turkey. The book seeks

to address the wide dimensions of the relationships between Turkey, Europe, and the United States (US). The major hypothesis that gives substance to the book is to engender the policies for Turkey, Europe, the US, and the neighbours of Europe.

Akçapar’s book aims to fill the gap between the EU and Turkey’s full membership perceptions. His purpose is to study and analyze from various perspectives the benefits of Turkey’s membership in the EU. In terms of Turkey’s full membership in the EU, however, Akçapar seeks to elucidate a pivotal argument convincingly perceiving his book as an account of a case study for Turkey joining the EU as a full member. Indeed, as Akçapar claims in the first chapter,

while Turkey has maintained its focus on full membership in the EU, the successive EU decision makers barred tangible progress to that effect. Similarly, it is argued that a breakthrough was achieved in December 1999, when the Helsinki Summit officially recognized Turkey without any precondition as an accession candidate on an equal footing with the other candidate states. (p. 35) Proceeding from the European future of Turkey the author points out to numerous reports in the second chapter that may have influenced the EU's thinking on Turkey's membership in the EU. The reports represent that Turkey's membership aspirations are widely seen as a threat to the EU's integration. However, Turkey is an astonishing opportunity for the EU. In the central chapters, Akçapar turns to the EU integration, and the asymmetrical policies between the EU and the US on international issues, such as the 2003 Iraqi invasion.

The main innovative contribution of the book in Chapter Five is its attempt to understand the question of whether Turkey should be more or less engaged in its neighborhood (Lebanon, Iraq and Syria), which has yet to be fully resolved. Probably one of the reasons for the tendency to explain the regional role of Turkey is that the Europeanization of the foreign and security policy of Turkey can no longer be dissociated from the imperative to engage in the surrounding region. (p. 112) In order to substantiate the nature of the US-Turkey relationship, the author argues that the US and Turkey have been longstanding allies and partners. One interesting point, which emerges from this analysis, is the importance that Turkey holds for the US and equally for the EU is not contested. However, the debate about Turkey's eventual membership in the EU is far from over (p. 163) and the negotia-

tions involve an intricate process. The chief conclusions emerge that first, by opening the accession negotiation of the EU with Turkey, a dreaded EU "Superstate" does not emerge. Second, Turkish membership becomes meaningful wherein the EU had been seeking a more integrated foreign and security policy.

Akçapar is to be commended for embarking on a complicated and extensive subject. However, his study has several shortcomings. First, from an international relations theoretical point of view, the approach of the book is not sufficiently comprehensive. Moreover, theorizing European integration could be realized by applying the English School of international relations theory.² In addressing European integration, the English School views that primary institutions could bind the internal and external integration of Europe together. Therefore, primary institutions are the key to understanding the practices within Europe such as bilateral and multilateral relations with other players. Among the master primary institutions, diplomacy is pertinent in that context as the author accentuates the role of negotiation between Turkey and the EU. Second, a further weakness is the lack of a clear methodology. Due to the key role that language plays in negotiation, narrative analysis could probably be adopted to study policy formation. Third, regarding the data collection in this book, the majority of data has been chosen from the existing literature while the current data on the European Commission could be a valuable source. Fourth, while Turkey's membership in the EU is examined and that is expected to find new practices for the issue, Akçapar turns to the US-Turkish relationship as a comparison, but it could be argued that this is not within

the parameters of this study. Fifth, Akcapar exaggerates the praise Turkey is receiving by regional public opinion due to Turkey's increased activism in the region. (p.78)

Although other solutions rather than the ones now adopted could have been part of the book, the book highlights the EU's approach to the world outside its borders and the current developments of the European Neighborhood policy. In the particular case of Turkey, this book provides insightful information on what is going on both from the perspective of the EU and Turkey. Researchers examining Turkey's current policies as well as those concerned

with European studies, in general, should closely read this book.

Fatemeh Shayan

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Endnotes

1. European Commission (2010), "Uniting a continent: enlargement", Retrieved from http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm, accessed 21 October 2010.

2. T. Diez and R. Whitman R. (2002), "Analyzing European integration: Reflecting on the English School- Scenarios for an encounter," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 43-67.

The Unmaking of the Middle East, A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands

By *Jeremy Salt*

California: University of California Press, 2009, 480 pp., ISBN 9780520261709, \$18.95.

The term "global war on terror" is no longer fashionable. Lip service is now paid to the idea that diplomacy and development are essential components of the effort to counter Islamic extremism, and the realization is growing that making armed force the "default option" for dealing with terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam is probably strengthening the hand of the terrorists. Meanwhile, on the other side of Samuel Huntington's "civilizational divide" there is an appreciation that, however brutal and mindless the U.S.-led war on terror and attendant nation-building efforts have been, and however incompetent, corrupt and repressive governments in much of the Muslim world have become, the replacement of such regimes by the leaders of those who now slaughter Westerners

and Muslims in the name of Islam would make matters worse than they are at present. A serious effort on both sides to act on these realizations and to find common ground across the divide would seem to be in order.

"The Unmaking of the Middle East," Jeremy Salt's extensively and generally well documented, solidly analytical and deeply outraged account of Western domination of the region from Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 to the middle of the present decade, details many, if not all, the problems that make it unlikely a serious search for common ground will be undertaken, let alone succeed. Professor Salt teaches in the political science department at Bilkent University, Ankara and has been involved with the Middle East since arriving in Bei-

rut as a young journalist in 1965. Halfway through the book's introduction, he refers to "the similarities across the centuries" of the ways in which Western intervention in the Middle East has been justified as well as the existence of "a certain pathology" involving who "we" and "they" are, what "we" are entitled to do, and how "they" must respond if they are to avoid punishment." This "cultural substructure" is the bedrock on which the four parts of Professor Salt's book rest.

Professor Salt uses the two chapters that make up the first part of the book to "set the scene" for his denunciation in the remaining three parts of the Western policies that in his well-founded view have unmade the Middle East. He takes Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, who first spoke of a clash between Western and Muslim civilizations, to task for making plain their view that the responsibility for the creation of what Huntington called Islam's "bloody borders" rests with the Muslim world. He goes on to point out that, for a century and a half at least, most of the blood shed in the Middle East was Muslim and was shed by Westerners. Descriptions of the brutality of the French occupation of Algeria begun in 1830, the devastating British naval bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, and the slaughter of the Sudanese Khalifa's army at Omdurman in 1898 drive home this point. Salt notes that the terms "West" and "Middle East" are of recent vintage and agrees with the great British scholar H.A.R. Gibb that the two so-called "worlds" have been closely related both before and after the rise of Islam. The transformation wrought by the Renaissance, Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution in Europe were translated by European governments into imperial policies that benefited those gov-

ernments at great political, economic and above all human cost to the people of the Middle East.

The five chapters of the book's second part cover the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing domination of the Middle East by Britain and France through the "civil war along the Potomac" that preceded the U.S. decision to recognize the State of Israel. Salt describes the dismemberment of the Empire, both directly by various members of the Concert of Europe and via the secession of Ottoman provinces in the Balkans and beyond with encouragement and material support from European governments. Events such as the massacre of 18,000 Armenians in Adana in 1909 are briefly mentioned, but Salt is intent on telling the other story – that of the great suffering of Muslims in the Great War, which lasted for the Turks from 1912 to 1923. A chapter describes the unsuccessful British project in Iraq, first as the League of Nation's Mandatory power and then as supporter of the unpopular Hashemite monarchy and its most prominent politician, Nuri al Said.

Professor Salt devotes nearly half his book to Palestine and Israel, and his critique of British and later American policy there is withering. Sir Arthur Balfour described British commitments in Palestine as "incompatible with facts," and a major "incompatibility" is his 1917 Declaration, as Foreign Secretary, that "His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people" but that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities" there. The British allowed enough Jewish immigration into Palestine to reduce substantially the initially overwhelming majority of the

“existing non-Jewish communities,” dealt harshly with those communities when they began armed resistance to “double colonization” by the British and the Zionists, and then beat a retreat as their Jewish protégés turned against them.

Most of the rest of the book traces the development of American policy in various Middle Eastern “hotspots,” primarily in Israel and Palestine but also in Lebanon, Iraq and the Iran-Iraq war. Israel’s rise from its dramatic beginnings in 1948 to its present position of regional military supremacy and economic power and its status as the United States’ closest ally in the region and leading recipient of American aid are chronicled, as are the ruthlessness of its attacks on its neighbors and periodic duplicity in its dealings with the U.S. government. United States policy in the region, from failure to restrain Israel from attacking Egypt in June 1967 to its own invasion

and occupation of Iraq 26 years later are condemned in bitter and generally well-documented detail.

At the end of the book, Professor Salt asks the reader to judge whether 9/11 will one day be seen “as the tocsin that sounded the end of the new American century” and whether this would be “good for all of us.” In presenting its case, the book is not objective; unlike those of the Israel and the West and its friends in the region, which are discussed (and occasionally distorted) in detail, the atrocities, depredations and duplicities of Arab governments and groups receive little or no attention. That said, Salt’s questions are legitimate. His book should be pondered by those in a position to act in a way that may someday make the answers to his questions something other than “yes.”

Charles Dunbar, *Boston University*

Egypt, The Moment of Change

Edited by *Rabab al-Mahdi* and *Philip Marfleet*

London: Zed Books, 2009, 186 pp., ISBN 9781848130210.

Egypt plays an undeniably crucial role in Middle Eastern politics and culture. Its strategic importance and inextricably close relationship to the United States warrant scrutiny not only of the current political and economic situation but also of possibilities for revolutionary change. The eight contributors to *Egypt: The Moment of Change* provide a clear and concise depiction of how events and decisions from the era of Nasser through the present day have led to the untenable situation ordinary Egyptians face. Geared towards the lay reader while

retaining academic rigor, this collection of essays documents the horrific consequences of US involvement in Egypt, particularly how neoliberal economic policies were applied in the context of a blatantly authoritarian regime. This volume focuses not on “the economy or political system as such” but rather highlights the ways in which Egyptian “social movements” coalesce within a limited and repressive political framework. The contributors themselves range from well established professors such as Joel Beinin and Ray Bush to

Ahmed El-Sayed El-Naggar, an economic analyst and Aida Seif El-Dawla, a professor of Psychiatry and founder of the El-Nadim Center for Psychological Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence. All of the contributors, however, are defined as “activists engaged with the phenomena they discuss” or strongly linked to their subject matter “through extensive personal observation and ties with the people they write about.” (p.13)

Despite an avowed unity of purpose, the eight chapters which comprise this work range widely in terms of their level of detail, readability, and the degree of importance they ascribe to different social movements. The first chapter “State and Society” by Philip Marfleet provides a strong, historical overview of the Egyptian state apparatus from the free officers to the present day. Marfleet focuses on the repressive tactics of Egyptian nominal or rather “low intensity democracy” as well as the possible avenues of rebellion open to the Egyptian people. In contrast, the second chapter “Economic policy: from state control to decay and corruption” by Ahmad El-Sayed El-Naggar seems too detailed in its account of the economic shifts in the past several decades of Egypt’s history. El-Naggar discusses how Nasser’s state capitalism gave way to Sadat’s Intifah and Mubarak’s “free-market principles without concern for social welfare.”(p.36) El-Naggar then highlights problems of unemployment, corruption, inflation, and general economic malaise. While this subject matter is clearly instrumental to the book’s argument that change is both necessary and inevitable, its varied statistics could prove overwhelming to the lay reader. The third chapter, “The land and the people” by Ray Bush continues the discussion of Egypt’s

economic situation by examining the consequences of government policy towards land and land ownership since Nasser’s reforms. As Bush demonstrates, Nasser’s incompletely implemented policies of land ownership that were designed to benefit the fellahin or peasant class at the expense of the elite class of landholders, which had amassed their estates in the colonial era. Nasser’s land reform eventually gave way to Mubarak’s neoliberal economic tactics, which often target landholding peasant farmers, leading to increased food prices, a stagnant economy, and a “guarantee of continued communal struggles.” (p.67)

Joel Beinin’s chapter, “Workers’ struggles under ‘socialism’ and neoliberalism,” Rabab El-Mahdi’s “The democracy movement: cycles of protest” and Sameh Naguib’s “Islamism(s) old and new” describe three types of social movements, their protests against Mubarak’s regime, and their potential to eventually bring about that regime’s dissolution. Beinin focuses on the strikes undertaken by tens of thousands of Egyptian workers, particularly blue-collar employees, during the past decade. Beinin notes that although these workers often win fiscal concessions, political gains, such as democratic reforms or requests for a representative government are few in number, receiving little support or success. Similarly, Naguib discusses the power of the Muslim brotherhood to unite disparate classes of society, including but not limited to the “lumpen intelligentsia.” Since the 1970s, according to Naguib, Islam has become a catchall solution for the myriad problems everyday Egyptians face. Despite documented populist appeal of the Muslim brotherhood, and its ability to mobilize the Egyptian population, Naguib concludes pessimistically that the movement itself

will not survive “conditions of extreme repression” or “political and social crises.” (p.119) Beinin and Naguib’s analyses contrast radically to Rabab El-Mahdi’s optimistic chapter on Kifaya, the democracy movement in Egypt. El-Mahdi even attributes the workers’ struggles (which Beinin links to financial constraints) to Kifaya’s influence. (p.101) El-Mahdi highlights the few successes of the Kifaya movement; however, her emphasis on the power of this democratic movement to possibly affect fundamental change in Egypt’s government may be a nod towards the sympathies of an American audience.

The final two chapters are the most compelling of the work. Aida Seif El-Dawla depicts the “culture of abuse” (p. 121) perpetrated by Egypt’s police and security services. The state of emergency which has existed in Egypt since 1981 provides the legal justification for this abuse, trying civilians in military courts without possibility of appeal, harassment and mutilation of women, and the systematic torture of political dissidents, the powerless and the poor. Moreover, Mubarak’s willingness to

comply with the American policy of extraordinary rendition perpetuates and intensifies the torture of Egyptians as well as prisoners in US custody. Anne Alexander’s chapter similarly focuses on the fraught relationship between Mubarak’s regime, the United States, the Palestinians, the Arab states, and the Egyptian people. The billions of dollars poured into Egypt by the United States have contributed to economic, not political liberalization. As a client state, Egypt has proved an unwieldy ally, particularly as its people protest Egypt’s ties to Israel and the US.

As this volume clearly illustrates, the conditions in Egypt do seem untenable: no freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, accountability to the law. Yet, this work raises more questions about the possibility for change than it answers. Egypt’s “moment of change,” so clearly desired by the contributors to this informative book, will remain out of reach until truly radical shifts occur not only in Egypt but in the world at large.

Hilary Falb, *UC Berkeley*

Lebanon, Liberation, Conflict and Crisis

Edited by *Barry Rubin*

New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009, 244 pp., ISBN 9780230605879, £60.

This reviewer wonders why Palgrave Macmillan decided to publish this book. Was the point to produce a neo-conservative distillation of anti-Syrian, anti-Hizbullah, and anti-Iranian prejudices in one volume? If that is the case, it has succeeded admirably. There are one or two good contributions, notably Mark Farha’s short but

balanced study of Lebanese demographics and Charles Paul Freund’s disquisition on Lebanese popular music. Tony Badran and Nimrod Raphaeli write knowledgeably, respectively, on Lebanon’s militias and its economic problems, but too many of these essays could have come straight out of an Israeli or American think tank. No sur-

prise, then, that this is the precise background of many of the contributors.

The accusations against Syria by Rubin and William Harris, a Professor at the University of Otago in New Zealand and the author of two chapters (“Reflections on Lebanon” and ‘Lebanon’s Roller Coaster Ride’), centre on the assassination in 2005 of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, and Syria’s alleged desire to dominate Lebanon by destabilising it. According to Rubin, Hariri was killed as an act of retaliation by Syria due to the pressure build up inside Lebanon because of the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Harris calls Syria the ‘patron’ of Hariri’s assassins. The basis for their accusations is the first report by Detlev Mehlis, the German prosecutor appointed by the UN International Independent Investigating Commission. The crux of this manifestly shoddy and unprofessional report is that as Syrian intelligence agents were everywhere in Lebanon, the assassination could not have happened without Syria’s knowledge and therefore, *ipso facto*, Syria must have organised it. Mehlis does not even cast a glance at other possibilities. Israel and the CIA have a long history of assassinations or attempted assassinations in Lebanon. Their agents are also everywhere. In March 1985, somewhere between 80 and 105 people were killed in an unsuccessful CIA attempt to assassinate Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, the so-called ‘spiritual mentor’ of Hizbullah, with a car bomb planted in Beirut near his apartment and the mosque where he preached every Friday. Mossad’s record of assassinations in Lebanon and elsewhere is too well known to require further comment. Detectives surely always begin their investigations by looking at all possible suspects. However, Mehlis never bothered. He directly accused

Syria. The assassination was the lever used by the US and Israel to get Syrian troops out of Lebanon. Would Syria have handed its enemies such a weapon, and having had its name blackened by the Hariri assassination, would it then have proceeded to kill even more ‘anti-Syrian’ political, military and media figures? On the basis of *cuo bono*, whose interests did the Hariri killing serve? Definitely not Syria’s.

The accusations against Syria in this book have been overtaken by some hard facts. In April 2009, a little over a month after the international tribunal took over the prosecution of the the four ‘pro-Syrian’ Lebanese security figures who had been arrested for alleged complicity in the Hariri assassination, Judge Daniel Fransen ordered that they should be released because of lack of evidence. No one else has been charged. No connection has been established between the assassination and the Syrian government that would stand up in court. As for Syria wanting to destabilise Lebanon, Rubin and Harris do not mention that Syria was invited into Lebanon in 1976 as a ‘deterrent’ force by the Arab League. No one was happier to see Syrian troops on the ground than the Maronite militias, which were at the point of a comprehensive defeat at the hands of the combined Palestinian-Lebanese leftist forces. Hafez al Assad’s objective was not to destabilise Lebanon but to stabilise it, and prevent any radical change in the power balance that that would give Israel a pretext for intervention. In October 2008, Syria finally extended diplomatic recognition to a country it supposedly wants to destabilise or take over. In December 2009, Hariri’s son and Lebanon’s recently elected Prime Minister, Saad al Hariri, visited Damascus, where he told President Bashar al Assad that he

was looking for a strategic relationship with Syria that would enable the two countries to defend themselves more effectively against Israel. Could it be Hariri himself is now having second thoughts about who it actually was that killed his father?

In his own essay on Lebanon (“Hizballah in Lebanon: Between Tehran and Beirut, Between the Struggle with Israel and the Struggle for Lebanon”), Eyal Zisser writes that a ‘look’ at Lebanon after the attack by Israel in 2006 ‘reveals a shattered state on the verge of a civil war that threatens to tear it apart.’ With regard to Hizbullah, the fighting “brought the organisation’s era of glory and successes to an end.” In Zisser’s summary, “During and after the fighting the organisation found itself in a tough uphill struggle to preserve and restore its status - in the Shia community, in Lebanon and in the whole Arab World.” In fact, Hizbullah’s courage in standing up to Israel was supported across the Arab world throughout the war and afterwards by Sunni and Shia alike. There remains no more popular figure in Arab countries than Hasan Nasrallah. He was unpopular only with leaders who have no popular standing themselves, notably Husni Mubarak and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon, Hizbullah’s alacrity in providing aid to the victims of Israel’s aerial onslaught on the towns of the south and Beirut reinforced its standing amongst the Lebanese people in general. Hizbullah has since proceeded to develop ecumenical ties with Lebanon’s Christian communities and with the Druze, whose leader, Walid Jumblatt, recently abandoned the anti-Syrian alignment in favor of a political alliance with what is now the Lebanese mainstream. Hizbullah is now broadly seen as a national movement of defence and resistance, with prob-

ably 25 per cent of its support coming from Christians. Israel’s ‘allies’ and agents inside Lebanon, especially the Falangists, have been completely marginalised. Lebanon, far from falling apart, as one might expect from reading Eyal Zisser’s chapter, is united as never before, and for that reason is regarded by Israel as more of a ‘threat’ than ever before.

Nowhere does this book take into account Israel’s violent, destructive and subversive role inside Lebanon for the past six decades. Its invasions, incursions, and assassinations have taken the lives of tens of thousands of Lebanese civilians. There is no act of Hizbullah “terrorism,” which even begins to compare. What has confounded Israel is that none of its policies have led to a Lebanon divided or a Lebanon under the control of a puppet government but to a Lebanon that is much stronger than before. In the 1980s, Israel failed to impose its will on Lebanon because it could not understand what Hizbullah does understand: no faction can afford to step beyond the consensus that lies at the historic heart of Lebanese stability. In 2000, Israel’s long occupation of southern Lebanon was brought to end by Hizbullah’s . And not by the UN, whose repeated calls for withdrawal Israel had ignored. Its onslaught on Lebanon, in 2006, took the lives of 1400 people, one third of them children, an infamous performance to be repeated during its attack on Gaza (December 2008 - January 2009). To this day, nothing Israel has done in Lebanon has worked out. On the contrary, its enemies are stronger than ever before. Naturally this book ignores the Israeli origins of Lebanon’s serial crises, Palestine, and the expulsion of most of its people in 1948. Lebanon was always going to have its problems, as a consequence of

the curious ‘confessional’ system devised by the French in the 1920s, but once the Palestinians living in refugee camps inside Lebanon turned to armed struggle to regain their rights, as they inevitably would, it was the so-called ‘Palestine problem’, which would be far more accurately described as the problem of Israel, that almost destroyed it. During the onslaught on Gaza, the Israeli-born historian Avi Shlaim wrote that he found it “difficult to resist the conclusion” that Israel had become a rogue state.¹ Others would say it was a rogue state from the beginning. It has ignored international law, insofar as the human and civil rights of the Palestinians are concerned, and Lebanon no less than Gaza has suffered terribly as a consequence of its ruthless policies.

Sooner or later Lebanon’s newly-established unity will be put to the test. Israel is an extremely powerful country, which has never hesitated to use any means at its disposal, diplomatic or military, to achieve its ends. Senior figures in the Israeli military establishment have threatened that the enemy next time will not be Hizbullah but Lebanon itself and that the ‘Dahiyeh strat-

egy’ (Dahiyeh being the predominantly Shi’a suburb of Beirut that was pulverised from the air during the war of 2006) will be repeated on an even bigger scale. Notice has been served and both Hizbullah and Israel are preparing for the next round. Insofar as recent political history is concerned, all the elements that would enable the reader to reach a balanced understanding of the causes of the trauma through which Lebanon has passed in the past three decades are missing from this book. *Lebanon. Liberation, Conflict and Crisis* should be regarded for what, at its centre, it is, an ideologically focussed work that uses Lebanon as a platform to carry forward the regional and global campaign mounted in the US and Israel against Hizbullah, Syria and Iran.

Jeremy Salt, *Bilkent University*

Endnotes

1. Avi Shlaim, ‘How Israel brought Gaza to the brink of humanitarian catastrophe’, *Guardian*, 7 January 2009.

Spies in Arabia, The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East

By *Priya Satia*

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 458 pp., ISBN 9780199734801.

Spies in Arabia is a much awaited book on the British in the Middle East during and in the aftermath of the First World War. It avoids focusing on Lawrence alone and gives a fine and comprehensive picture of the cultural background of British agents employed in the Middle East and in Iraq

in particular. Satia’s compelling narrative, clearly the outcome of extensive research and penetrating thinking, tells us how the preconceptions of Arabia and its inhabitants became the guiding principles that led the actions of British agents and officials in the Middle East from the beginning of the

twentieth century throughout the interwar era.

Satia's book is a work of British cultural history that intersects several fields – Middle Eastern history, military history, diplomatic history, and history of technology to mention a few – making it a relevant and stimulating work. Satia's main contribution is to expose the British creation of a "covert empire" after the end of the First World War in the Middle East and particularly in Iraq. She argues that this was a new strategy of colonial control implemented through the work of intelligence, newly created air control, and official conspiracy theories. The covert empire was, according to Satia, a more suitable and sellable concept of Empire to the general public opinion who was left in the dark in relation to foreign politics in the interwar period. Satia, in her work challenges the over-popular picture of Britain in the interwar period as a country where democracy was defended and developed against the emerging enemies of Bolshevik Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany. In two parts, as the book is divided, Satia at first discusses the foundations of the idea of covert empire, which according to her were generated in Arabia. In part two, Satia shows how the covert empire founded in Iraq worked, defended itself, and became a paradigm to be exported in other contexts.

This work follows a chronological-thematic approach: chronologically, Satia discusses the period from the pre-war era to the end of the First World War, but remaining within the historical boundaries of the 1930s. Thematically, she jumps back and forth from Britain to Arabia showing how British intelligence exploits in the region have been shaped by a particular definition of Arabia and how the outcome of

the work of the agents on the ground was used in the formulation of policy making on a large scale. As the reviewer is a historian of the Middle East, much of the focus of this assessment of Satia's work will be on British intelligence in the Middle East and air control implemented in the newly created nation-state of Iraq. The book opens with a thorough discussion of the British intelligence community at the beginning of the twentieth century and how their Edwardian imagination shaped the conceptualization of Arabia. Satia convincingly shows how these agents made Arabia and their adventure in the Orient a tool to exploit for launching their literary careers. (p. 61) The Arabia they built was mainly a fiction, an artistic space, which with the outbreak of the war also became a strategic region, a place that according to Satia only these agents were able to understand and interpret. These agents, using Satia's words, came 'to think like an Arab' (p. 100) claiming a knowledge that would give them access to power: their own power that would secure them a position of influence as well as the power of the state itself. These agents not only provided the British with knowledge that would enable them to dominate this space, but according to Satia their activities, modes, and reports normalized the idea of the Middle East as a space for intrigue and above all. As she shows in the second part of the book, the Arabs were portrayed as a race that saw violence as a central element of their culture, which they very much needed and invoked.

To Satia's credit, the first part of the book really represents an innovative approach to a popular subject: British intelligence in the Middle East that often only revolved around Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. Though Satia's narrative is fresh

and comprehensible, at times the reader may feel overwhelmed by quotes and side-stories that are a little bit redundant and superfluous. What Satia really achieves in this first part is to profoundly analyze the exploits of the British intelligence community and to see how these have been employed in the long term. The exploitation of intelligence gathering in the formation of the covert empire is the focus of the second part of the book. Satia opens this part discussing how the understanding of Arabia turned into conspiracy theories and how contemporaries made sense of those events. (p. 203) Using the tools of a deep cultural analysis, Satia exposes the ways in which British officials and media tried to explain Arab rebellions against the same British rule. Conspiracy theories came to be official theories supported by the same agents, who operated in the region during the war and remained the expert ears and eyes in the Middle East. This environment, according to Satia produced and immanent paranoia, which was partly defied through a new technology of surveillance: air control. This new means of surveillance was not only cheaper and more convenient but as Satia explains, its development also had cultural reasons, as agents on the ground defined Iraq as a suitable place for

aerial surveillance. (p. 240) Air control was intended to be driven by intelligence and to provide the basis of an empire's hold by agents and not military troops. Clearly air bombardment was very much a regime of terror, which proved very difficult to defend vis-à-vis public perception, though Satia shows how paranoia remained a very strong rationale to defend covert colonial power. (p. 277)

"Spies in Arabia" clearly points the finger at the British and exposes how state led terror campaigns were the byproduct of the culture produced in war-time Britain and the Edwardian mentality. Satia's work, though lacking a discussion on the recipients of British policies, clearly not the focus of *Spies in Arabia*, persuasively tells us of how Arabia and more precisely Iraq was exploited as a guinea pig in the new business of covert empire building. Though Satia closes the book reminding the readers that history does not repeat itself, she clearly suggests that in light of current events in the region it would be wise to draw some lessons from playing imperialism in Arabia.

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Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in 20th Century Egypt

By *Yoav Di-Capua*

Berkeley: University Press of California, 2009, 389 pp., ISBN 9780520257337.

To study historiography as a prism that elucidates a society's wider developments has experienced a remarkable upsurge

over the last decades and has produced a number of fascinating works. In the Middle East, it is especially history writing in

modern Egypt that has been studied by authors such as J. Crabbs, Y. Choueiri, and I. Gershoni. Consequently, the work under review raises the question of why we need yet another study on this subject. And, indeed, the author sometimes embarks on a well-trodden path and repeatedly discusses material that is all too well known. However, he succeeds in producing a unique and original account of the field by setting this material into a sophisticated framework and by integrating the relevant theoretical scholarship into his analysis.

The first chapter “Historicising Ottoman Egypt, 1890-1906” deals with the formative period of modern Egyptian historiography and outlines the book’s main argument. The author proposes ‘historicism’ as the single explanatory framework for the disparate trends that started to emerge during this period. Historicism – or as he repeatedly describes it – the mode of “thinking *with* history,” revolutionised historical thinking and changed the perception of time, space, and subjectivity in society at large. In this period, traditional forms of history writing (such as chronicles) came to an end and the nation became a central concept. Closely intertwined with the rise of the nation as the subject of historical inquiry, the “founder paradigm” was developed, which set Muhammad Ali’s reign as the starting point of modern Egypt.

This transformation of historical thinking is traced in more detail in Chapter 2 (bearing the rather enigmatical title “Talking History, 1906-1920”). With the de-Ottomanization of the Egyptian-Ottoman elites, writers created a firm link between the concepts of nation, history, and modernity. Based on a new political language and acting within a new semantic field, influential historical works favoured Repub-

licanism, undermined the monarchy and set new rules for the politics of historical representation.

The third chapter on the ‘Abdīn archive in Cairo focuses on the crucial space for royalist historiography in the 1920s and 1930s. This is one of the book’s most fascinating sections and it shows in detail how the archive was represented as the metaphor of a modern Egypt. At the same time, it served as a workshop for the massive royal project of producing an authoritative account of the emergence of modern Egypt. The author convincingly argues that the organisation of the collections, the daily working processes and the underlying assumptions all fed into the production of historical knowledge that prioritised European influences and royal agency. Concomitantly, the exclusion of specific sources (such as endowments records) mirrored a view of history where subaltern groups played no role.

The following chapters discuss the period from the 1930s up to the end of the monarchy in 1952. Here, the author discusses the intense rivalry between royalist and nationalistic interpretations of history centred on the figures of Shafīq Ghurbāl and ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Rāfi‘ī. Despite the fierce conflicts – often accompanied by state intervention in terms of censorship and restricting access to sources – the two ‘schools’ shared the basic assumptions of the ‘founder paradigm’. In this period Ghurbāl was able to control the emergence of a professional historiography with its nexus of university departments, libraries, conferences, specialised journals etc.

From the 1940s onwards historiography became – also due to a more radicalised political landscape – increasingly politicised. This politicisation found its expression in

the rise of Marxist historiography and the increasing tendency of historical texts to function as “national allegories.” Chapters 7 and 8 deal with historical writing under Nasser’s regime. After the 1952 revolution history turned into a practise of justifying and celebrating the political present. Within a historical field that reduced the Egyptian past to a series of key events (1798, 1882, 1919, 1952) and that was not able to develop a pan-Arabist past, Marxist historiography became the most innovative approach. This historiography was able to fill to some extent the void left by the dismantling of liberal networks of historiography and at the same time successfully kept its distance from Nasserite historiography. When the rather sterile Nasserite historiography entered into crisis in the 1960s, it was consequently Marxist-orientated approaches that were able to step in. In his final chapter “Authoritarian Pluralism, 1970-2000” the author argues that new and previously marginalised groups could insert themselves into Egyptian historiography. However, the regime’s practices led to a historiographical field that was methodologically poorer and culturally more provincial.

This is a well-written book that is in most parts convincingly argued. At some points the author tends to ascribe too much importance to his chosen field of study. Many historians certainly would wish that history writing was for instance, “the foremost medium through which [modernity] was articulated,” but the author does not offer convincing proof for such assertions. Slightly irritating is as well the focus on historical works that study the modern period. A large part and arguably the most important part of Egyptian historical scholarship was devoted to pre-

modern periods (the author himself cites the overwhelming number of MA and PhD theses on premodern subjects in the first half of the 20th century). The reader wonders why the author does not turn to these works that have yet not been studied in detail.

As the historians, who are studied, wrote in the 20th century many of them are still alive or at least their family members and students would have been available for interviews. However, considering the author’s background it might have proven difficult for him to gain access. Another of the book’s weaknesses is that it remains in some places strangely abstract and often lacks detail that could have been filled with fieldwork. My final quibble is that the author shows in much detail the schematic periodization of many historians that subscribe to a top-down view of history. At the same time, the periodization that Di-Capua himself adopts follows the main political events of modern Egyptian history. This leaves very little room for historiography and other fields of intellectual activity as autonomous rooms of human activity. Rather, the periodization implies that historians and history writing developed in dependence on political developments.

However, Di-Capua has produced a challenging and highly informative account of modern Egyptian historiography. He makes an interesting set of arguments that will be of interest for students of the modern Middle East and for students of intellectual history more particularly. The author deserves special praise for his wide reading of secondary literature, especially in Arabic, that he puts to very good use.

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Speaking of Jews: Rabbis, Intellectuals, and the Creation of an American Public Identity

By *Lili Corwin Berman*

Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009, 266 pp., (Including 59 pages of notes, a select bibliography, and index). ISBN 9780520256 811.

Speaking of Jews chronicles how Jews explained themselves to non-Jews in the United States from World War I through the Civil Rights era. The basic thesis is that in considering how to talk about being Jewish to non-Jews, the Jews were also searching to find a definition for themselves as to what exactly it meant to be Jewish in contemporary America. Lila Corwin Berman, therefore, focuses on non-Orthodox Jews, because their lives are not principally focused on following the precepts of religious law, to the relative exclusion of secular society. Her study relates to the overwhelming majority of Jews in America, who wish to be thoroughly involved and integrated into American society.

Berman begins her analysis by focusing on the manner in which Reform rabbis and leaders of the Jewish Chautauqua Society, an organization formed in 1893 whose mission is “to provide knowledge and education about Jews and Judaism, to bring about an appreciation of the Jewish people, their history, religion, and culture, and to build bridges of understanding between peoples of all faiths and cultures.” (http://nftb.org/national_programs/jcs.shtml, accessed September 15, 2010). They viewed Judaism as the basis for American values. The dilemma for the Jews was how to justify their existence without having the explanation undermine the continued existence of a separate people. Jewish missionaries and Chautauqua activists placed

Judaism at the center of modern day ethics and formulated it as a guide for Jews and all people wishing to adopt democratic principles. Rituals and religious practices were downplayed inasmuch as they separated Jews from the larger society. Berman points out that the emphasis on ethics as an argument for acceptance could have set the stage for the demise of the Jews as a separate people. Instead, this group advocated that being Jewish and being American were defined as almost one and the same. The fact is, though, that the Jews were not accepted as equals, and the negative experience they underwent as a non-Christian minority in the United States ensured their continuity as a separate entity.

Following this very perceptive analysis, Berman then moves to the heart of her book, and talks about how Jews utilized the social sciences, and in particular, sociology, to help define Jewish existence in the United States. The basic argument is that Jewish sociologists studied and discussed the role of Jews as part of an American ethnic pattern that sought to categorize the Jewish experience in universal and American terms. The upshot is that Jews had a legitimate place in American society as a separate, but equal group. The independent existence of the Jews was based on sociological Jewishness—a central concept of the book - meaning the manner in which Jewish patterns and behaviors distinguish Jews from non-Jews. Berman focuses on this impor-

tant idea throughout the book and discusses the problematics of such a formulation of Jewish identity, as the sociological basis for Jewish existence as a separate group undergoes change over time. Indeed, it can disappear completely. The issue of intermarriage for Jews is particularly relevant to this as it becomes difficult if not impossible to justify a preference for endogamy once the basis of sociological Jewishness breaks down. That is to say that when there is really little religious or social distinction between Jews and non-Jews, how does one frame a preference for in-marriage as a legitimate claim? This is an issue that American Jewry has to grapple with, and, as Berman discusses quite thoroughly, it has led the Reform and Conservative denominations to reconsider their definitions of Jewishness and how to reach out to non-Jews and to welcome religious converts.

Lila Corwin Berman's study is a very insightful analysis of how Jews in the United States react to their environment and seek to be accepted as equals. In her very significant contribution to understanding the construction of Jewish identity in the

United States, she points out constantly how the explanations that Jews give to their non-Jewish neighbors become an important element in their definition of Jewishness for themselves. Such a process can be expected to take place for other religious groups and in other societies as well, and it is for this reason that the value of this book extends beyond the specific case it studies. For example, in recent years Muslims in the United States and in Europe have had to explain their religion in an environment that is at times quite hostile to them. This volume sensitizes us to the analysis that can be done to inquire whether the definition of Islam undergoes change in light of the explanations given to non-Muslim neighbors. Berman also provides us with an interesting theoretical basis for undertaking a comparative study of Jews (and members of other religions) in various societies, to see how explanations affect religious definitions and lead the same religious movements to develop variations in form and content in different societies.

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Archaeology of Religions, Cultures and Their Beliefs in Worldwide Context

By *Sharon R. Steadman*

Walnut Creek, California: Left Coast Press, 2009, 348 pp., ISBN 9781598741544, \$34.95.

The archaeology of religion has generated increased interest among social scientists involved in the scientific study of religion. Sharon Steadman recognizes that most of the cultures discussed in this interesting text did not recognize the existence

of "religion." It is largely Western intellectuals who have sought to elevate "religion" as a phenomenon of human society in need of clarification by social scientists. However, Steadman rightly explores the world views of ancient cultures insofar as they overlap

with what contemporary anthropologists recognize as religion.

The text is divided into six parts, with varying numbers of chapters per part. Part I introduces Method and Theory in the Archaeology of Religion. In three chapters it introduces the reader to the Archaeology of Religion, an overview Anthropology of Religion, and Interpreting Religion in the Archaeology Past. These chapters provide the reader with a context within which the archaeology of religion is viewed, as a vital framework for understanding what modern social scientists view as religious and cosmological world views.

Part II discusses the emergence of religion in human culture, beginning with Shamanism and following through with a study of the Neanderthals and the Rock Art of Africa and Australia. In each case, the focus is upon how artifacts can be used to infer the world views of the cultures represented by the residuals of cultures long past.

Parts III through VI discuss religions in the Americas, Europe, South and South-eastern Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Each region is treated with a balanced perspective of what archaeologists know and what they can reasonably speculate about the religious and cosmological beliefs associated with these regions. The organization of the chapters in Part III is both geological and chronological making for an effective structure and summary of a massive amount of information that is more than effectively presented in a succinct fashion.

Throughout the text, Steadman draws parallels between the beliefs of various cultures. For instance, students who are likely familiar with the story of Noah's ark will be perhaps surprised to find that it bears

a remarkable similarity to Ut-napishtim's account of the flood story in Gilgamesh. However, Steadman wisely acknowledges such parallels without demeaning the value of flood narratives in any tradition. Likewise, parallels between the early life of Moses and that of Sargon, King of the Akkadians are acknowledged with the reader left to infer reasons for such close parallels. The exploration of cannibalism in various ancient traditions is seen as a reasonable outcome of cosmological beliefs, however distant from those acceptable to modern sensibilities. The overall effect is to present the reader with the fact that religious and cosmological beliefs are not simply derivative from a single set of discreet empirical facts, but form the raw material from which archaeology seeks to illuminate the institution, values, and ideal of societies perhaps distant from our own in chronological time, but no less mirrored in their religions and cosmologies than our own.

Sharon Steadman has produced a highly readable and instructive text. It is most suitable for use as a primary text in the archaeology of religion and as a supplementary text in courses dealing with the social scientific study of religion. It is a richly illustrated, and also provides valuable maps for each of the major geographical areas discussed in the text. In addition, it provides a brief list of useful sources for each of the major chapters of the text. Finally, there is also a useful reference list and index at the end of the text. This is a student friendly text in every way and the publication of a reasonably priced paper edition will hopefully make this a text many instructors will adopt to the benefit of their students.

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Turks in Europe, Culture, Identity, Integration

Edited by *Talip Küçükcan* and *Veyis Güngör*

Amsterdam: Türkevi Research Centre, 2009, 625 pp., ISBN 9789077814130, €30.

Turks in Europe, Culture, Identity, Integration, is a book of collected works comprising 23 articles written by experts from a variety of fields such as sociology, political science, anthropology and cultural studies. It is the largest collection of articles printed so far based on original research and field work about residents of Turkish origin residents in Europe. It is obvious that in view of the title of the book, readers would have different expectations from the book based on their point of interests, particularly those dealing with history or international relations as well as political science. By looking at similar titles published so far, like John Russell's *The Establishment of the Turks in Europe, An Historical Discourse* (1828), Noel Buxton's *Europe and the Turks* (1907), William David Allen's *A Sketch Study: the Turks in Europe* (1919) or Gaston Gaillard's *The Turks and Europe* (1921), one's findings from this book is different based on his/her expectations due to area of expertise and research interests. In contrast to the studies cited above, which are in fact mainly written with orientalist perspectives, focusing on history, collected essays in this book deal with recent issues facing Turkish migrant population in Europe.

Turks in Europe is divided into four parts. The first part of the book is about the Turks as new citizens of Europe in which the authors mainly discuss about the formation of Turkish population in various European countries such as Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany and Greece. The second part, consisting of six articles, are discourses related to the young generation

in Europe which focuses on their effort to integrate into the societies they are currently living as well as with their continued ties in homeland while trying to protect their ethnic origins and national identities. The third part of the book consists of four articles, all written by female authors, and mainly bringing discussions related to the gender issues from the point of women immigrants in Europe while the articles in the last part focus the Euro-Turks and their entrepreneurship as well as new identity formations as important concerns in the recent debates related to Turkey's membership to European Union.

Generally speaking, authors in the first chapter, challenge previous perspectives on the formation of a Turkish population in European countries and offer new insights about their integration into the host societies by developing somewhat new identities as new citizens of these countries. Contributors to this volume also look at the problems of adaptation to the new environment as well as the creation of new individualities in countries of current residency. One of the main concerns of the young generations, as argued in the book, is their identity problems since almost many of them feel themselves isolated.

The second chapter of the book with the subtitle "Young Turks, Identity Practices and Integration", is mainly dealing with the young generation living in European countries although one of the articles is related to the Turkish migrants in the United States of America. This brings to mind a little criticism for the title of the

book whether it had to be titled as Turks in West rather than Turks in Europe.

Paul Tkachenko's article deals with musical activities of young generation, particularly males, focuses on the traditional values rather than integration into the European culture as the preferred musical instrument is Turkish 'saz'. It is interesting to read the contradictions between the younger generation, mainly born in England, who attended the musical classes where they met their peers in a small coffee place and practice music in a classroom where they usually converse in English language whereas the instructor does not at all communicate in English. Tkachenko also suggests that Turkish music schools in London are similar to the folk-houses (Halkevleri) once opened in Anatolia upon the instigation of Atatürk while the majority of the instruction is based on the *Alevi* traditions.

The third chapter of the book titled as "Turkish Women between Tradition and Modernity" discusses women issues in four articles. The article written by Mona Fransén and Margareta Bäck-Wicklund is an interesting one which provides a comparative insight about the young couples who have different views, aims and concerns in the process of starting a family and their preference to select governmental facilities or family aid to take care of newly born babies highlighting western and eastern cultural differences in family matters. Another article written by Maria Carlson also discusses the issue of gender roles of the Turkish females by merely taking into consideration a certain group, the ones attending the language courses to learn Belgium so as they could integrate into the society. Although this is one important aspect to enable them being part of the society and utilize the public facilities, or at least to car-

ry on their daily life in the working environment, their family responsibilities and domestic priorities seem to prevent them attending language.

The last chapter of the book contains seven articles which are mainly on the European Union issues where the role Turks in Europe as a bridge between Turkey and Europe is discussed. Although most of the articles in this chapter contribute to a better understanding of Turks in Europe, one particular article comparing the restaurant owners and lawyers in England can not escape criticism. From a methodological perspective, I argue that setting up a comparative work between the two groups is problematic because each requires different skills, for example, the restaurant owners, need to spend more physical effort and energy, and have less language requirement and no essential requirement for higher education while being a lawyer requires higher skills in language, law education and specialization approved by the British Bar. Perhaps textile and clothing industry could have been a better group for a comparative work with the restaurant owners.

An interesting issue of the book is the concept of 'Turk' which is referred to in most articles. The authors classified Turks as the ones migrated from the mainland and Cyprus whereas the other Turkic countries are excluded from the book. However the Kurds are considered as Turkish citizens in some cases while their origin in the sense of ethnicity is denied in others. Perhaps a chronological categorisation of people of Turkish origin would yield other results. Migration of Turkish Cypriots was intensive in 1950s and 1960s, and in the 1980s some Turkish Cypriots considered moving back at least for their retirement or for establishing businesses. In the 1990s howev-

er, increasing the number of migrants from Turkey, both Kurdish and Turkish origins came to England due to political and economic reasons.

The issue of identity runs throughout the book. As Daniel Faas shows in his article young Turks in England and Germany do not know where they really belong to. Although they live in Europe and have European education, they feel that they are treated as immigrants and inferior citizens in Germany and England while they are considered as 'others' in Turkey referred to as 'Londoners' or German Turks. Gender differences are also noted as far as the impact of traditions on young people is concerned whereby young females feel more pressurized on matters pertaining to love and sexuality. One other recurring theme in the book is the integration problems of the Turkish society due to language and di-

allect differences as well as religion, which are considered as the most important obstacles for the young generations to have better education or scholarship opportunities. Although articles in the book mainly look at the Turkish community in Europe as immigrants and as second class people, very little of the educated Turks is covered. In this context, an article about 'brain migration' and integration of such classes with their colleagues and social circle could have been an important contribution to the book. In conclusion, with its depth and extensive coverage, *Turks in Europe* is a welcome addition to the literature on identity, culture and integration of migrants of Turkish origin both from mainland Turkey and Cyprus.

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