Book Reviews

Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World

"One spring day towards the end of the cold war, a time of surprises, my teleprinter shuddered into action. A colleague in Beijing was sending a message: members of an ethnic group called the Uygurs, of whom I had never heard, were demonstrating in the streets of Urumqi, capital of the northwestern Chinese province of Xinjiang. The protesters were denouncing the communist leadership in Beijing and chanting the name of an exiled leader said to be living in Turkey, a man named 'Isa'. My colleague had a simple and urgent question: Could I trace Isa down?"

In tracking down Isa Alptekin, the exiled leader of the ethnic group called Uighurs who died in 1995 in Turkey, Hugh Pope, the *Wall Street Journal*'s correspondent in Turkey and a long-time resident of Istanbul, got excited about and interested in the fact that the Turkic people had been overlooked for so long. Together they constitute more than 140 million people spread through more than 20 states, starting from the Great Wall of China to Europe and even a small community in the United States, and now they are on the edge of a revival. This runs all through his book, *Sons of the Conquerors: The Rise of the Turkic World*, selected as a Book of the Year (one of 45 chosen) for 2005 by the London-based weekly the *Economist*.

This book is the fruit of more than a decade of travel through the lands of the Turkic-speaking peoples and with the journalist's eye and ear for details (and very often anecdotes), Pope explores the legacy of the Turkic world, which has been bloody as well as glorious. For centuries Muslim lands were ruled by Turkic dynasties like the Moguls, the Safavids and the Ottomans, of which the later encompassed Turkey, the Balkans and the Middle East. Pope is observing and listening and the approach is foremost anthropological and cultural. Without any doubts the reader is provided with a fascinating and penetrating reportage as well as a thorough insight into the Turkic world. There are chapters entitled "The Army's Grip on Turkey", "Kemal Atatürk – Icon of the Secular Turkish Republic", "Islam Allaturca", and "The Turkic Problem with Human Rights" to mention a few. The book reaches its peak when the author invites the reader to human meetings, like the one with an Iranian Azeri engineering student on a plane to London from Istanbul. Pope was not able to persuade him of the progress of Turkey, even though he had a Turkish girlfriend, had spent 10 days being amazed in Istanbul and kept talking on the backwardness of Iran:

> "The Turks are just copying the West, he insisted. Yes just like Japan and China used to […], I replied. Really, he said […] He looked down back at his feet. No, sorry, I can't help it. Iran can't learn anything from Turkey, he went on. Only America can save us." (Pope 2005: 250)

However, as a reader one gets some difficulties thinking of the consequences of the

missing political perspective or what could be interpreted as a romantic plea for a unified Turkic identity. In 1992 the Turkish president of that time, Turgut Özal claimed:

> We are from the same root, we are a large family. If we make no mistakes, the 21st century will be ours. (Pope 2005: 369)

"He who lives will see," could be a humble comment on this statement. According to Samuel P. Huntington in his highly controversial and often debated book *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 1997), Turkey, having rejected Mecca and being rejected by Brussels, seized the opportunity in the early nineties to turn toward Tashkent. Turkish leaders including Turgut Özal held out a vision of a community of Turkic peoples and particular attention was directed to Azerbaijan and the four Turkic speaking Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Even with regard to Turkey's ambition to develop its links with the Turkic former Soviet Republics, and by doing so putting the Kemalist secular identity under challenge, Huntington's own conclusion was that Turkey did not meet all the minimum requirements for a thorn country to shift its civilizational identity.[1]

Of course this could be viewed as a qualified truth, as well as the often outspoken doubts from some European political figures that Turkey does not belong to Europe. However, in the foreseeable future the modern Republic of Turkey with its strong Kemalist mindset is a political reality like the ongoing negotiations, even though slow, between Turkey and the EU on a Turkish membership. It should be a rather unquestionable assumption that the EU negotiations have been and still are the real engine of the political reform process in Turkey.

During the political and constitutional crisis in Turkey in 2007-2008 we have maybe been witnessing the first real challenge to the secular establishment in terms of a promising step in consolidating Turkey´s fragile and guided democracy. Bearing this in mind, a unified Turkic political identity and configuration among Turkic speaking people seems neither realistic, nor urgent.

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Endnotes

1. See the discussions on Turkey in Huntington 2002 in chapter 6 on *The Cultural Reconfiguration of Global Politics* (The Free Press 2002, as an imprint of Simon & Schuster UK Ltd 1997).

Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism

By *Sinan Ciddi*
London and New York: Routledge, 2009, 196 pp., ISBN 9780415475044.

The title of this book is a misnomer: the title should have been "The Republican People Party and Kemalism" for the book aims to unravel why this leftist political party in

Turkey has consistently garnered a number of votes less than centre-right political parties have, and this failure is attributed to the party's close relationship with Kemalism rather than with the genuine left.

The book has an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion. In chapter one, it is noted that Kemalism has constituted a road block to the flourishing of leftist politics as a mainstream political movement in Turkey. In the following two chapters, it is pointed out that when in the 1970s the Republican People's Party (RPP) managed to be successful at the polls it was not due to its propagation of a genuine social democratic ideology; it was rather a consequence of clientalism and patronage supported by leftist slogans. In chapter four, it is indicated that the 1980 military intervention practically put an end to the left in Turkish politics, and the introduction of market economics and transformation of Turkish voters into a new generation of consumers in the 1980s added salt to the injury. In chapters five and six, the author argues that in post-Cold War Turkey, religiosity and ethnicity have become determinants of voter preferences, and during this period, instead of coming up with electorally attractive party programs and looking at government performance, the RPP has subscribed to "ultra-nationalism" and "ultra-secularism". Chapter seven shows that the party has been unable to maintain even the backing of the Alevis (which have always appreciated secular politics because of the Sunni threat to them), the trade union movement, and urban dwellers. In chapter eight and the conclusion, the author delineates how social democrats in Europe have moved from their attempts to undermine

the capitalist system to their coming to terms with global and competitive forces, and how the RPP has not been able to leave behind the "Kemalist roadmap" it has adopted all along.

This is a useful book for people trying to make heads or tails of the trials and tribulations of Turkish politics since the inception of the Republic (1923). It clearly shows how the RPP, which had set up the Republic, introduced important Westernizing reforms (under Mustafa Kemal Atatük), made significant contributions to ensuring the military interventions lasted relatively short periods of time (under Ismet İnönü), and then tried to distance itself from the centre (under Bülent Ecevit), and how in recent years the RPP as the main opposition has hardly developed socio-economic policies, let alone policies with a social democratic slant, and how it has instead focused on matters of political Islam and ethnic issues from radical secularist and ethnic nationalist perspectives, respectively (especially under Deniz Baykal).

On the other hand, it is not possible to agree with the author on several points regarding the way in which he endeavors to substantiate his basic argument mentioned above. Let me give only a few of such infelicities.

Some conceptual approaches of the author may be problematised. Above, this reviewer has suggested an alternative title for the book, keeping in mind what the author tries to do in his book and the meaning he attributes to Kemalism. There are problems with Kemalism itself, too, that is, with the manner in which the author (as well as some other students of Turkish politics)

employs this word/concept. First, it is not often realized that in the 1923-1938 era, the so-called 'Kemalists' did not use the word 'Kemalism'; in fact, there was no reference to that word/concept in the civics books of the era.[1] Secondly, in the book under review, Atatürk, İnönü, and Recep Peker are all placed in the same basket when it comes to Kemalism; however, on some matters these statesmen set for themselves different goals and thus they had somewhat different notions of Kemalism. Thirdly, Atatürk was careful not to turn the principles he had formulated into a closed ideology, and thus he diligently kept his distance from any kind of 'ism'. As the present author has suggested elsewhere, Ataturk's views, that is his world view, were turned into a closed ideology by the post-Atatürk intellectual-bureaucratic elite.[2]

There are some inconsistencies in the reporting of some issues. In regard to the efforts for the institutionalization of the Westernized reforms, on the one hand it is pointed out that some citizens were "punished by death sentences and executions dished out by the roaming Independence tribunals" (p. 25) and on the other hand it is noted that "compared with other regimes changes, the Turkish experience was relatively bloodless" (p. 28).

There are some critical omissions in the narrative offered: The 1960 Constitutional provisions concerning the powers of the National Security Council were amended so as to increase its powers not only in the post-1980 military intervention period, but also in the post-1971 military intervention period (p. 68). To the state institutions mentioned on p. 145, second paragraph, the author should also have added the Con-

stitutional Court and the Council of State. There are no endnotes for the conclusion, although the author did make references.

Some factual statements made are not correct. "Two of the main determinants of voting in post-Cold War Turkey" have *not* been "religiosity and ethnicity" (p. 8). If it was religiosity, the votes of the religiously oriented political parties in that country would not have decreased from time to time from 1971 to 2002, and the Felicity Party, which is more religiously oriented than the Justice and Development Party, would have garnered more votes than the latter in the 2002 and 2003 national elections. If another main determinant of voting in the same period was ethnicity, all of the ethnically oriented political parties would have cleared the 10% election threshold in all the elections at which they competed, which did not turn out to be the case, and at the 2002 and 2007 national elections, the Justice and Development Party could not have been so successful in the southeastern region of Turkey as it was. In the wake of the 1980 military intervention, political leaders were not sent off to "remote parts of the country", but to the same town (p. 69). The Welfare Party's success at the polls in 1994 was due the successful performance of the municipalities it controlled at the time, not because the key determinants of vote at the time were "religiosity and ethnicity" (p. 142). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was imprisoned for a speech he had made in Siirt, not in Sivas (p. 180, note 66).

Related to the above, at places the author reports some past events as if they still continue. The third paragraph on p. 107 gives the impression to the uninitiated that Ecevit is still the chairman of the Demo-

cratic Left Party; Ecevit left that party in 2002 and died in 2006. One comes across to a similar situation on p. 108, third paragraph.

There are also some simple mistakes: "Fetullah Gülen" should have been spelled as "Fethullah Gülen" (p. 101). "*[M]uassır medeniyet*" should have been translated as "contemporary civilisation", not as "advanced civilisation" (p. 103). The author should not have referred to all leftists in Turkey as socialists (p. 131).

Finally, a matter of style: one should remain faithful to the original spelling when quoting or giving a reference; thus, one should not change "Behavior" to "Behaviour", as the author does on p. 180, note 58. The journal there is an American journal, thus the American spelling of the word in question had been used.

Despite these reservations, as already noted, the book under review is a very useful addition to the literature on Turkish politics. It is recommended to both the uninitiated and the long-time student of Turkish politics.

Metin Heper, *Bilkent University*

Endnotes

1. Türker Alkan, "Turkey: Rise and Decline of Legitimacy in a Revolutionary Regime", *Journal of Southeastern and Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (1980): 37-48.
2. Metin Heper, "'Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a 'Historical Bureaucratic Empire' Tradition", 7, no. 4 (1976): 507-521.

The Museum of Innocence

By *Orhan Pamuk*, translated by *Maureen Freely*
New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2009, 536 pp., ISBN 9780676979687.

One of the most distinctive things about Orhan Pamuk's writing is the playful way he tantalizes his readers by constantly blurring the boundaries between truth and fiction. By having his first-person narrators include many well-known aspects of the novelist's own life in their tales, he keeps us guessing about which parts of the story actually happened and which are imaginary. When he published his first few novels, only people who were personally acquainted with the author or his family could participate in this guessing game. As he has become increasingly famous—and especially since the publication of his memoir *Istanbul: Memo-ries and the City*—many more of his loyal readers have been drawn in. Not only have his parents, his brother, his grandmother, and even the family servants become familiar figures, but fictional characters from his early novels, such as the wealthy merchant Cevdet Bey and the newspaper columnist Celal Salik turn up with such regularity in later works that they have come to seem equally real. With *The Museum of Innocence* Pamuk has taken this game to another level. The cover of the novel features a photo of four people parked beside the Bosphorus in a 1956 Chevrolet just like the one described in the novel as belonging to

the protagonist's father; two of those people are easily recognizable as Pamuk's parents. A note on the dust jacket attributes the photo to "Ahmet Isikci." Attentive readers will remember Ahmet as the character personifying the young Orhan Pamuk in his first novel, *Cevdet Bey and His Sons*. Even weirder is the fact that beginning next summer, if all goes according to plan, you will actually be able to visit the museum supposedly created by Kemal Basmacı, the protagonist of *The Museum of Innocence*, as a monument to his lost love, Füsun Keskin. That museum will contain many mementoes of Orhan Pamuk's own childhood and youth, such as his tricycle, as well as 4,213 cigarette butts allegedly smoked by Füsun, and many other, equally fascinating objects, such as the ceramic dog that once reposed on a doily on top of her parents' television set. I'm sure you'll agree that this is well worth the price of admission, but if you take your copy of *The Museum of Innocence* with you, you will get in free.

The Museum of Innocence is ostensibly a love story, but it is a very unconventional one, to say the least. Rather than portraying the relationship between the two lovers, it focuses on the transformation wrought in Kemal by his love for Füsun. Like most of Pamuk's female characters, Füsun is one-dimensional. That is because we see her only through the eyes of Kemal, and he doesn't understand her at all. He himself acknowledges this when he states that "like most Turkish men of my world who entered into this predicament, I never paused to wonder what might be going on in the mind of the woman with whom I was madly in love, and what her dreams might be; I only fantasized about her" (p. 253). Some

of the strangeness of *The Museum of Innocence* is due to the fact that it was to a large extent inspired by an equally bizarre love story, Nizami's twelfth-century Persian romance *Layla and Majnun*. Nizami's hero, Qays, became unhinged when separated from his beloved Layla, thus gaining the nickname "Majnun" (Madman). Majnun's hopeless love purged him of egotism and worldly desires and transformed him into a great poet and ascetic. By the standards of his time and place, Pamuk's Kemal also appears to have been driven mad by love. He falls head over heels in love with his impoverished distant relative, Füsun, who is twelve years his junior, but he cavalierly treats her with the same disrespect he has always shown toward women. When she breaks up with him and marries another man, Kemal breaks his engagement to his perfectly suitable fiancée, neglects his business, and during eight years spends most of his evenings with Füsun, her parents, and sometimes her husband as well. Additionally, he begins stealing and squirreling away objects Füsun has come in contact with, or that remind him of times he has spent with her; these will later constitute the nucleus of his museum, to which he devotes the last twenty years of his life.

The extreme suffering Kemal endures as a result of his separation from Füsun, and the guilt he feels for not having appreciated her as she deserved, sensitizes him to the plight of women in Turkey, which has one of the world's highest rates of domestic violence. Before he fell in love with Füsun, Kemal and his wealthy friends had spent their evenings prowling Istanbul for "liberated" women who would fulfill their sexual fantasies, but on the rare occasions when

they actually encountered such a woman, they despised her and made her life a living hell, while at the same time hypocritically demanding madonna-like standards of chastity from their wives and daughters. "Maddened" by love, Kemal now realizes that it is that kind of behavior, accepted as normal in his society, which is truly insane. Kemal's mother sums up the situation very accurately when she advises him that "in a country where men and women can't be together socially, where they can't see each other or even have a conversation, there's no such thing as love…By any chance do you know why? I'll tell you: because the moment men see a woman showing some interest, they don't even bother themselves with whether she's good or wicked, beautiful or ugly—they just pounce on her like starving animals. This is simply their conditioning. And they think they're in love! Can there be love in a place like this?" (450).

What is most remarkable about this novel, however, is that it manages to combine this somber view of Turkish sexual pathology with a deeply affectionate, Proustian longing to retrieve every minute detail of what life was like in the smaller, simpler Istanbul of Orhan Pamuk's youth. In comparison with the complexity of life there today, that Istanbul seems "innocent" indeed.

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Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey From Epic to Novel

By *Kenan Çayır*
New York and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 204 pp., ISBN 9781403977564.

This work's title *Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey From Epic to Novel* might give some readers the impression that this book is about different genres of Islamic literature available in Turkey today. It is not. Readers familiar with Bakhtin's essay, "The Epic and the Novel: Towards a Methodology for the Study of the Novel" will be better prepared for what is in this book. Çayır investigates Islamism and the changing compositions of Islamic identities in Turkey through a study of the Islamic literary fictions of the 1980s and 1990s. He explores the political and sociological processes of identity construction in the context of Turkey in that period. Instead of opting for breadth, the author examines Islamic novels in depth by focusing on two 'salvation novels' of the 1980s, *Müslüman Kadının Adı Var* and *Boşluk,* and two 'self-reflexive novels' of the 1990s, *Halkaların Ezgisi* and *Yağmurdan Sonra,* which have canonical status in Muslim circles and because they are the prototypes for the narrative structure for each time period.

There is an explicit gender perspective to the author's analysis. Each of the two sets includes male and female novelists. Çayır's careful study argues that the salvation novel as a genre represents a renewed interrogation of the secular narratives of modernization through a literary medium (p.88) The author effectively illustrates that the self-reflexive and self-exposing novels of the

1990s deconstruct the narratives of salvation novels and of collective Islamism of the 1980s. In the salvation novels of the 1980s, Islam is presented as the source of a value system. In these novels, "strong and stable" Muslim characters engage in a competitive dialogue with "degenerate" westernized characters. The westernized characters discover solution to their problems in Islam. (p.34) Male characters only need announce that "they believe" in order to transform into Muslim subjects. Female characters must also don the headscarf in order to become Muslim subjects. (p.50) In *Halkaların Ezgisi*, "A self-exposing" novel published in 1997, a woman writer who adopts the headscarf in the 1980s unveils herself a few years later. (p.116) The headscarf that she is required to wear by her Islamist circles becomes constraining when she is in public. She is no longer seen as an individual. Islamists and secularists have assumptions about how women wearing headscarves should behave in public and feel free to tell her so. She finds it unjust that men can be Islamists without being a symbol.

This work is a well-researched, articulate and precise work that adds yet another layer to a sophisticated academic discourse on Turkish identity. *Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey From Epic to Novel* demonstrates that Islamic identity is a "work in progress, a project," neither monolithic, nor static.

In addition to an introduction and a conclusion, the book is divided into four chapters. Chapter one "The Turkish Literary Field: A Space Of Struggle Over Islam, Secularism, Modernity" situates Islamic literature within the field of Turkish literature while relating the emerging salvation novels to the context of the 1980s. It addresses the issue of literary translation and other pertinent questions. The author is refreshingly precise. He defines his terms so there is never any ambiguity about his interpretation of terms or "isms." Chapter two, "Salvation Novels of the 1980s: The Islamic Ideal for a Total Islamization of Society" examines the two pertinent salvation novels narrative structure, focus on nature of the Islamic messages, on the representation of Islamic and secular identities, and the gender dimension of the novels. Çayır argues that these novels are indicative of a collective and epic Islamism of the 1980s, the dominant strand of Islamist politics. Chapter three, "The Concrete Performance of Salvation Novels on the Path to Collective and Epic Islamism," provides a more general understanding of salvation novels and relates them to non-literary Islamic writings of the 1980s. This chapter reveals how these novels provided Islamists with a repertoire of action and emotion that paved the way for the emergence of assertive and collective Islamic subjectivities. Chapter four examines the more self-reflexive and self-doubting narratives of the 1990s. Çayır reads *Halkaların Ezgisi* and *Yağmurdan Sonra* in the socio-political context of 1990s. He links the rise of the Islamic middle classes, the incorporation of Islamic actors into commercial and cultural life, to the emergence of self-critical Islamic voices over the excesses of Islamist politics. Inner conflicts of Islamic characters in the novels of the 1990s challenge the collective Islamic definitions of the previous decade. *Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey From Epic to Novel* through its study of changing narratives brings to light two coexisting and conflicting strands of Islamism.

Çayır's work makes use of literature for the purposes of sociology and political science. The epic plays a role in that the salvation narratives of the 1980s were characterized by their "epic discourse in a Bakhtinian sense." (p.156) I found it ironic that a work about a literature that repeatedly asks its readers not to "imitate Europeans," (p.11) a work where again the literature examined sees itself as a mode of self-defense against western values and norms, (p.22) is replete with literary theory that originates in the West. Theoretical frames can be very useful tools in analyzing materials but they should not become the dominant element. The texts themselves and Çayır's analysis of them in the Turkish context is fascinating. The intertextual confrontation between the novels of the 1980s and 1990s is both remarkable and revealing. This important work should be of interest to scholars of Turkish Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, Sociology but also to anyone interested in Islamist movements and the processes of identity construction.

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Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism

By *Cihan Tuğal*
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, 320 pp., ISBN 9780804761444 (hard-cover), ISBN 9780804761451(paperback)

While Islamic fundamentalism or "radical Islam" has attracted a great deal of public attention, some societies in the Muslim world have experienced the gradual evolution of radical Islam into "moderate" or "political" Islam. Although moderate Muslims in such societies still maintain a pious commitment to Islam in their daily lives, they are not necessarily against the idea of a market economy, democracy, or the West. Where does moderate Islam come from? Is it the outcome of structural changes such as the modernization and rationalization of Muslim society? Or is the emergence of moderate Islam largely contingent upon a complex interaction between politics, the economy, and everyday social life? Finally, how should we approach this newly emerging alternative to radical Islam?

Considering that many scholars have recently begun to view "moderate Islam" or "Muslim democracy" as a solution to radical Islam, there is a pressing need for better understanding this Islamist transformation. Cihan Tuğal, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, attempts to offer just that. To do so, he turns to Sultanbeyli, an urban district in Istanbul that has experienced a shift from radical to moderate Islam. Tuğal's ethnography of the changing relationship between political parties, local authority, and society in Sultanbeyli forms the core of his rigorous work, *Passive Revolution*. Tuğal's case study is complemented by a comparative analysis of Turkish, Egyptian, and Iranian experiences of political Islam.

Passive Revolution sets out to demonstrate that Antonio Gramsci's "hegemonic perspective" offers a more accurate account of Islamic politics than other existing theories. Tuğal argues that moderate Islam, which is characterized by its "market-oriented, at least partially democratic, and sometimes even pro-Western direction" (p. 3), is the outcome of a complex process of the absorption of Islamic radicalism into the extant hegemony. Hegemony, from a Gramscian perspective, is the power of presenting a particular class interest as the interest of all. By establishing hegemony in a society, the dominant class is able to gain and maintain moral and political leadership because the subordinate groups view the interest of the dominant class as their own interest. In other words, the establishment of hegemony enables a minority to dominate the majority through popular consent rather than direct exercise of force. To sustain its hegemonic position in society, the dominant class sometimes adjusts its position in concession to the subordinate forces. In such cases, the powerful elites can offer material incentives to buy the consent of the working class or incorporate oppositional challengers into the dominant class through co-optation. Thus, the dominant class is able to maintain its domination by allowing the faces of its hegemonic position to change through a "passive revolution." Tuğal's analyses center on this concept, which he defines as "one of the convoluted, and sometimes unintended, ways by which the dominant sectors establish willing consent ('hegemony') for their rule" (pp. 3-4). Applying this concept to political Islam, Tuğal claims that former radical Islamists in Sultanbeyli experienced the defeat of their radicalism in the struggle against the extant neoliberal and secularist forces. In response, they internalized the discourses and practices of their enemies in a process of passive revolution. The end result of this transformation was the rise of a moderate Islam that accepts capitalism and democracy as the common sense of the age.

Tuğal begins *Passive Revolution* by analyzing the struggle between the established secularist hegemony and the radical Islamist attempt at counter-hegemony (Chapter 2). The secularist regime, which had reorganized politics, society, and the economy to generate consent of the masses for its hegemony in the early years of the republic, faced an organic crisis, losing its grip on society as a result of socioeconomic changes and the decline of popular trust in the incumbent political parties and leaders. The organic crisis became an opportunity for Islamists to develop their own hegemony under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan's political parties. Erbakan and his followers strove to Islamize culture, urban space, and the economy based on an idea of "integral (tevhidi) Islam." These radical strategies for counter-hegemony and frontal attacks against the existing order contrast starkly with those of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which was formed by dissidents among the radical Islamists. The AK Party espouses neoliberal economic policies, supports democratization, and maintains a pro-U.S. stance while retaining faith in Islam. The AK Party maintains a delicate balance between Islamism and nationalism, secularism, and global capitalism. According to Tuğal, "The new leadership [of the AK Party] set the scene for the absorption of Islamism into

secular neoliberalism more or less successfully at all levels of the hegemonic formation" (p.51).

The subsequent chapters constitute the core of the book and answer how this process of absorption of Islamism worked on the streets. Tuğal pays particular attention to the role of Islamist political leadership in uncoupling civil and political society, and re-coupling them in their attempt at hegemony. On his first visit to Sultanbeyli between 2000 and 2002, Tuğal observed how the Islamist political party had challenged the secularist hegemony at various levels of power, and why it failed in its attempts. For instance, Tuğal notes that an interlocking problem of corruption, bourgeoisification, and deradicalization of the Islamist party caused popular disappointment among the Islamists in the community. He also argues that radical Islamism was unable to overcome the ethnic divide between Turks and Kurds as well as the dilemma between Islamic internationalism (Ümmetçilik) and Turkish nationalism as a vision of unity.

When Tuğal returned to Sultanbeyli in 2006, the political landscape had already changed. The AK Party had swept to power in Sultanbeyli after its landslide victory in the 2002 general elections. The locals of Sultanbeyli, which had been "the fortress of Islamism nationwide" (p.11), underwent a great transformation to conservatism. In contrast to the Islamist party previously in power in Sultanbeyli, the AK Party used the religious faith of individuals to naturalize the integration of Islam with a neoliberal economy and the West rather than to create an integral religion. This strategy succeeded in creating popular consent to the existing secular hegemony while keeping Islam

as an important component in its relation with society. The AK Party benefited from the dynamism and commitment of the remnants of radical Islamism suppressed by the 1997 military intervention, and was able to absorb former Islamic activists into the existing order of authority, capitalism, and democracy. In Sultanbeyli's market-oriented Islamic civil society, Islam is still widely practiced, but it becomes more individualized, rationalized, nationalist, and capitalistic, says Tuğal.

In *Passive Revolution*, Cihan Tuğal offers a rigorous analysis of the complex symbiotic relationship between politics, society, and the economy, and critiques the literature that overlooks the central role that political leadership plays in its challenges to the extant hegemony or in its attempts to preserve it. While he clearly acknowledges that changes in political and economic structures have had an undeniable impact on the Islamist transformations, he places more emphasis on the role of entrepreneurial political agents who are able to hold society together through "articulation." Further, Tuğal proposes a unique perspective to understand the rise of the AK Party as an ongoing economic process in which political Islam becomes absorbed into the extant secular, democratic, and capitalist hegemony, contributing to the creation of willing consent among religiously-oriented men and women to be subordinated to the logic of neoliberal global capitalism.

The present reviewer had one question in mind when reading this book: to what extent does the case in Sultanbeyli represent the recent transformation of political Islam and its relationship with politics, civil society, and the economy at the

national level of analysis? This question is of particular importance, as Tuğal carries out a comparative analysis on the Islamic transformations in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran (Conclusion). In this comparison, Tuğal refers to the transformations experienced in Sultanbeyli as representative of the transformations in Turkey as a whole. I do not see, however, that he persuasively justifies that what he observed in Sultanbeyli actually represents what is taking place as a nationwide phenomena. True, Tuğal briefly defends his "extended case method" (p.12) as a method emphasizing theory reconstruction over representativeness; however, his comparison would be more persuasive if he were able to establish a link between the particular (Sultanbeyli) and the general

(Turkey), or elaborate his discussion on the "extended case method."

Overall, Tuğal's *Passive Revolution* offers a powerful, fresh glance at political Islam. His fieldwork successfully situates personal experiences of Islamic absorption into a larger historical context. Tuğal's hegemonic approach to the transformation of Islamic politics will lead to further debate in the literature on political Islam. Readers unfamiliar with Gramscian concepts such as hegemony, absorption, and articulation, might struggle to grasp his argument, but the reward is well worth the effort. In short, I strongly believe that *Passive Revolution* deserves close reading.

Masaki Kakizaki, *University of Utah*

Debates on Secularism in Turkey: Secularism and State Policies towards Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey

By *Ahmet T. Kuru*
New York: Cambridge University Pres, 2009, 313 pp., ISBN 9780521741347.

The relationship between the state and religion, or the question of secularism, has always been one of the most hotly debated issues in Turkish politics, even more so since the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in 2002. Professor Ahmet T. Kuru, currently teaching at San Diego State University in the USA, has recently made a rich contribution to this debate. His book, published by the prestigious Cambridge University Press, is entitled *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey* (xvii + 313 pages). As its sub-title indicates, the book is essentially a comparative study of

secularism in the United States, France, and Turkey.

The book starts with a long and rich theoretical discussion of secularism in its historical, ideological, and policy-oriented dimensions, in which he criticizes the modernization theory, the civilizational approach, and the rational-choice theory. The modernization theory predicted the decline of religion's political role through economic development which, however, does not seem supported by the facts. The civilizational approach posits an inherent distinction between certain religions, and

consequently between state policies toward religion. The typical civilizational argument is to contrast the compatibility of Christianity and secularism, as opposed to the unity of state and religion in Islam and Judaism, often quoting the famous verse of the bible, "render unto Caesar the things which be Caesar's, and unto God the things which be God's." Against this rather simplistic dichotomy, one may argue, of course, that no great religion is a monolith, and that all three monotheistic religions have taken on different forms and interpretations at different times and in different places. Finally, Kuru criticizes the rational-choice theory since "it largely takes individual preferences as given," and it believes that individuals' "distinct preferences [are] shaped by their socioeconomic status regardless of their ideologies" (p. 21).

This observation leads Kuru to "unpacking individuals' preferences through the analysis of their ideologies" (p. 21). Indeed, a major part of the book is devoted to the role of ideologies in shaping their policies toward relations between the state and religion. As he puts it, "the emergence and dominance of ideologies on state-religion relations is a complex process that requires a qualitative analysis of historical trajectory for each case" (p. 22). Particularly important are the ideological struggles during the state-building period that create "a path-dependence concerning state-religion interactions." Thus, "the marriage between the old monarchy and religious hegemony" during the *ancien régime* is likely to produce an "anticlerical (or antireligious) movement against it, and "the *ancien régime* becomes the basis of polarization between the anticlericals and conservatives" (p. 23). In con-

trast, "in countries where there is no *ancien régime,* the anticlerical movement does not exist or is marginal" (p. 25).

"The existence or absence of an *ancien régime* is a crucial factor" in Kuru's three cases, the United States, France, and Turkey (p. 27). In the United States, as a result of the absence of an *ancien régime* with no local monarchy and a great diversity of Protestant denominations, "secular groups were not against religion's public role," and "religious groups were open to church-state separation." In contrast, in France and Turkey, the presence of an *ancien régime* based on the alliance of monarchy and a hegemonic religion (Catholicism and Islam) led secular groups to a stand against religion's public role, while religious groups sought to preserve the establishment of religion. As Kuru states, "in France and Turkey, the *ancien régime* deeply affected the ideological backgrounds of secular and religious movements, as well as their relations. In both countries, religion was an important pillar of the monarchy, which made the republican elite anticlerical; in a sense they opposed religion's influence over society and polity. Moreover, Catholicism in France and Islam in Turkey were hegemonic religions. Therefore, conservative Catholics and Islamists sought to preserve religious establishments… Severe conflicts between the two was foreseeable. The dominance of assertive secularism, in a nutshell, meant the victory of the secular movement over its religious rival" (pp. 27-30).

These two different historical trajectories have predictably produced two different concepts or understandings of secularism, "assertive secularism" and "passive secularism" as Kuru calls them. Obviously,

there have been other scholars who have distinguished these two types of secularism by using different labels, such as secularism based on a "religious common ground" versus secularism as a "political ethic independent of religion" (Charles Taylor), or "negative secularism" versus "positive secularism" (Wilfred McClay), or "*laicité de combat*" versus "*laicité plurielle*" as they are called in France. Briefly, "assertive secularism requires the state to play an 'assertive' role to exclude religion from the public sphere and confine it to the private domain. Passive secularism demands that the state play a 'passive' role by allowing the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism is a 'comprehensive doctrine,' whereas passive secularism mainly prioritizes state neutrality toward such doctrines" (p.11). Obviously, these two are dichotomous or "ideal" types and important variations can be observed within each of them. Thus, Kuru rightly argues that "even the dominance of assertive or passive secularism is a matter of degree." While both France and Turkey are in his assertive secularism category, they "still differ from each other with regard to the levels of the exclusion of religion from the public sphere. Certain policies, such as the ban on private religious education and the prohibition on wearing headscarves at universities and private schools, indicates that the Turkish state has a more exclusionary attitude toward religion than does the French state" (p. 32).

Passive secularism, characterized by state neutrality toward all religious and other faith-based groups and the absence of discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs, is now the dominant model in liberal democracies. Even some countries which had followed assertive secularist policies at some stages of their historical development (for example, Mexico, Spain, Portugal, and to some extent even France) have more recently moved toward passive secularism (pp. 24-25). Therefore, it is difficult to understand at first sight the irritation of certain ultra-secularist circles in Turkey when this distinction came to the attention of the media in recent weeks. Or perhaps, it is not so surprising, given the absence of serious, rational, sober, and objective discussion on secularism in Turkey. This issue continues to be the deepest source of political polarization which precludes any such discussion. Therefore, works like Ahmet Kuru's are most welcome.

The book, following the introduction, which I have analyzed in some detail, is divided into three parts dealing, respectively, with the United States, France, and Turkey. Each part gives a rich and detailed account of state-religion relations and their historical developments in each of the three countries with reference to the theoretical distinction between assertive secularism and passive secularism. The part on Turkey offers a detailed analysis of the emergence of assertive secularism (1826-1997), and the Islamic challenge against it (1997-2008), covering the current controversies between assertive and passive secularists, such as the compulsory religious education, state funding of private schools, the headscarf ban, the Imam-Hatip schools, and Qur'an courses. Kuru concludes that "policies in Turkey have been even more restrictive than those in France due to the combination of the assertive secularist ideology and the semi-authoritarian military and judiciary in Turkey. The Kemalists have

defended the existing dominance of assertive secularism… The conservatives, however, have defended passive secularism as an alternative" (p. 198).

Professor Kuru's book is, no doubt, a major contribution to the international literature on the subject, as well as being a much-needed scholarly contribution to the current debates in Turkey, which often presents a picture of a dialogue of the deaf. I hope that the book will be translated into Turkish as soon as possible and read widely by all members of the interested public.

Ergun Özbudun, *Bilkent University*

Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974, A Multidisciplinary Analysis

By *Ahmet Akgündüz*
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008, 221 pp., ISBN: 9780754673903.

Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe is a detailed multidisciplinary study of the labor migration from Turkey to the West during the official recruitment period between 1960 and 1974. The book endeavors to that make use of all available sources in four languages and draws on both historiography and social science research in the field. The 221-page book consists of six chapters. Following the introduction, it first looks at the causes of migration pressure in chapter two. Chapters three and four subsequently analyze the push and pull processes. Chapter three is titled "The Migration Process: Aspects Related to the Sending Country" and the chapter four is "The Migration Process: Aspects Related to the Receiving Country". Before the conclusion, the book devotes 35 pages to analyzing the migrants and their characteristics in chapter five. It has also an extensive bibliography listing primary as well as secondary sources in four languages, which will be useful for other researchers in the field.

The book is an attempt to tackle misperceptions and erroneous assessments of the studies, especially of the 1960s and 1970s, that stemmed from either a lack of available hard evidence or a narrowness of methodology. Thus, this book critically evaluates assessments of the previous research. How the Turkish labor migration came unto the demand side's agenda and how it developed are evaluated by taking into the account major variables in the process. Country-to-country variations in the sectors where foreign workers were employed are also given due attention.

In chapter two, the book addresses causes of migration pressure—the push factors—in the light of a critical discussion of the previous studies on the subject. The chapter details economic and industrial growth rates, wages, and distribution of income during the migration period. By evaluating the characteristics of the labor market, the forms of unemployment, registered job seekers, unfilled job vacancies, and real wages, the chapter argues that the

unemployment argument is only helpful to a limited extent. The chapter looks also at the socio-economic transformations taking place in Turkey when analyzing the push factors. In conclusion, the chapter argues that four additional factors should be taken into account when analyzing the push process.

Chapter three addresses the role of the sending state and tries to explain why the state's role was important in the process; on which grounds sending workers was justified; how the nature of the migration was defined; and the initial system of sending workers and amendments made in the system. The chapter then analyses the attitudes of the Turkish people towards migration and characteristics of the labor outflow. The chapter finally conceptualizes the role played by social networks.

How and under what circumstances Turkish labor migration to the West was initiated and developed is the dealt with in chapter four. This chapter looks at the state of international migration in the post-war years; the structure of registered unemployed and unfilled vacancies in each of the receiving countries; their migrant employment policies; and the position of Southern European countries on sending laborers abroad. The chapter also looks at the sectors that Turks were employed in and shows that foreign policy or historical reasons did not play direct roles in Germany's preference for Turkish workers.

Chapter five analyses the migrants. It first of all critically evaluates the Turkish official figures and statistics and then details the geographical origins of the migrants. The chapter also looks at employment situation of migrants before going abroad. The

chapter finally evaluates the levels of qualifications of the migrants before migrating to the West. In this context, the chapter highlights the concept of "being skilled" by providing the proportional number of skilled workers who went abroad.

The book shows that the claim that the main justification for sending laborers abroad was to alleviate unemployment in Turkey is wrong. The state's justification was based on the modernization and industrialization of the country, the rationale being that unskilled and rural people would gain skills that were needed in Turkey. That is why Turkish officials tried to institute measures to prevent skilled workers from migrating. In addition, migrants would contribute to economy by sending their hard currency to Turkey. The book challenges the misperception of Turkish migrants as an "unskilled and rural populace who mainly originated from central and eastern Anatolia" and shows that that was an imagined construction as far as the majority of migrants were concerned.

Turkey is a candidate country to the European Union and is having accession talks. One of the crucial issues that occupy the minds of Europeans is a possible Turkish labor mass flow in several millions to the Western European cities. The findings of the book suggest that these fears could be groundless and based on invalid assumptions and thus the issue should be analyzed more carefully in the light of scientific data and evidence. In this context, this book is an important and very timely contribution that will help academics and policy makers in their future forecasts and evaluations.

İhsan Yılmaz, *Fatih University*

The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thoughts

By *Cemil Aydın*
New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 299 pp., ISBN 978-0231137782.

Based on extensive literature and fieldwork research in international relations, intellectual history and political thought, Cemil Aydin has written an exceptionally detailed account of the boundaries and horizons of pan-Islamic and pan-Asian thoughts on world order. Although his research on the intellectual journey of these two main anti-Western movements only covers the period from the early nineteenth century through to World War II, it still has relevance to today as we speak of "the rise of the rest" and/or "the Second World".

Consisting of eight chapters, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia* explains how both Muslim and Japanese intellectuals first viewed the West as "universal", then as "imperialist", and finally they rejected the West, a rejection that paved the way for the rise of pan-Islamic and pan-Asian visions of world order. The main question of the book is whether anti-Western critiques are reflections of discontent with the international order or a nativist rejection of Western-originated universal modernity (p. 3).

Aydin contends that the pan-Islamic and pan-Asian visions of world order emerged during the late nineteenth century partly in response to the perceived rejection by the West of its own claims of universality; therefore, in their early stages the two anti-Westernist visions were directed at criticizing the "uncivilized" acts of European imperialism. For that reason, it was not surprising that most of the Muslim reformers in the Ottoman state saw Western values, norms and institutions as universal and could be used, shared and owned by the world, and were not particular to Christianity (p. 21).

It was the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, Aydin argues, that reflected upon the legitimacy crisis and structures of the imperialist world order promoted by the West. This war was not only a turning point in the history of anti-Western critiques but also ended the legitimacy of the existing Eurocentric world order (p. 91). According to Aydin, it was this very legitimacy crisis that led to the boom in the search for alternatives and the rise of both pan-Islamic and pan-Asian thoughts. Seen from this angle, Aydin convincingly argues that pan-Islamism was accepted by both secular and Islamist intellectuals as a foreign policy option during the World War I, not for the creation of Islamic unity but rather as "a realist policy option" (p. 94), and that the main reason behind the creation of a new vision of world order, pan-Islamism, was the legitimacy crisis that the Eurocentric world order was facing due to a claim of superiority of the Aryan race and the rejection of others, like Muslims, as possible parts of international order.

Before World War I, pan-Islamic and pan-Asian thoughts were increasingly seen as alternatives not only in intellectual circles but in foreign policy ones as well. However, in the wake of the World War I the international environment and the elements of legitimacy changed, making pan-Islamic and

pan-Asian visions of world order lose their appeal, especially with the rise of nationalist movements influenced by Wilsonianism, socialism, and the principle of self-determination (p. 127). The Turkish Republic was based on these new ideas, leaving the pan-Islamic vision in vain, while Japan followed another path based on a pan-Asian vision until the World War II.

Aydin's book is timely and sheds lights on the current discussions on global order, pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism as it brings a much-needed historical background to the world order debate. Returning to the main question of the book, he argues that it was the legitimacy crisis of a single, globalized, international system represented by the West that produced both the pan-Islamic and pan-Asian visions of world order and not a nativist rejection of the West. From Aydin's historical accounts, one can infer that whenever a dominant vision of global order loses legitimacy, alternatives rise. In other words he implicitly argues that for a better understanding of "the rise of rest" or resistance, one should look inside the West and its policies that created the legitimacy

crisis of its existence in the eyes of "the rest" rather than focusing and blaming "the rest". However, this observation also points to a weakness of the book in that he does not explicitly touch upon the significance of both the pan-Islamic and pan-Asian visions of world order in the twenty-first century. Had a chapter on the meaning and the significance of both visions today been added, Aydin's study would not only bring an historical background to the debate but also relate it to the current discussions, thus making it a must-read book.

Despite this minor deficiency, Aydin's work is extremely well researched and well argued, and full of details and insights that are crucial for those who are interested in East-West relations and contextualizing anti-Westernism. If for nothing else, the author must be credited with his immense expertise in discussing two difficult fields, Asian and the Middle Eastern studies, and his ability to present it in a Western context with its terminology and understanding without losing the essence.

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The Ghazi Sultans and the Frontiers of Islam

By *Ali Anooshahr*
London: Routledge, 2009, 196 pp., ISBN 9780415463607.

The title of this new volume is perhaps misleading suggesting as it does a discussion of imperial expansion and its impact on conqueror and conquered alike. It is, to be sure, a study of ghaza and its organization by pre-modern Muslim dynasts.

Anooshahr prefers the term itself, ghaza, to "holy war" with its thorny, tangled associations (p. 14). His particular interest lies with Mahmud of Ghazna (Ghaznavid dynasty, d.1030), Murad II (Ottoman dynasty, d. 1451) and, especially, Babur Muhammad

Zahir al-Din (Timurid dynasty, founder of the Mughal state, d. 1531) all of whom engaged in warfare of the sort.

But Anooshahr is little interested in the stuff of battles and empire-building per se, not to speak of the day-to-day messy politics of each reign. (One result is that readers with little background in the "Middle Period" of Islamic history, the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries, will likely struggle with the many allusions scattered throughout). Rather, Anooshahr's aim is to understand how would-be Muslim monarchs "evoked the memory of the ghazis of yore" in a project of fashioning themselves as "ghazi kings" (p. 2). It is a study, in sum, of ghaza as an instrument in a process of "self-fashioning" by men of power and ambition. The project was one of wielding symbols and language drawn directly from Islamic history, tradition and, especially, texts in an effort to legitimate. It is, in a word, a study of imagery, discourse, of careful propaganda.

But the book is also, and principally, a study of the books produced by and about the rulers in question, notably the remarkable Baburnama, about which Anooshahr has much to say. He is clear in indicating his desire to contribute to a still lively debate over what is clumsily termed "Islamic" historiography. He is, in his opening chapter, broadly critical of the efforts of predecessors. Among the merits of the book is reliance on a wide range of sources, in at least five languages; Anooshahr appears to know Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish and Chagatay. Instructors in Islamic and Central Asian history may find the book a useful source as Anooshahr translates extended passages from a number of texts.

The evidence, as marshaled here, leaves little question but that each of the dynasts exerted considerable effort at convincing all who would listen – including, of course, their own retainers and fighting men – of their proper heroic role. They fought with horse and drawn sword but no less with signs, symbols and language (p. 57). It was Babur's gift that he wielded sword and sign with equal verve; Anooshahr argues that Babur's skill in fashioning a public image is the best explanation for his success in overrunning India. His achievement lay, first, in producing a body of Persian-language propaganda (in the form of sermons, proclamations and his own memoirs) then, secondly, in having the material communicated to the elite of South Asian Muslim society (pp. 50-57).

The effort, of fashioning the image of "ghazi king," was of several parts. First, the princes had to read or, at least, have others read for them. Babur and his illustrious predecessors turned (or had others turn) to appropriate texts from which language and lessons were drawn. In Babur's case, it was reliance, often and directly, to works produced by the courts of, precisely, Mahmud of Ghazna and Murad II. Second, the dynasts then turned to the project of self-imagery itself, using what they found in the texts but driven by the ideological and political demands before them. Finally, and crucially, these same rulers shaped their conduct in the field to fit the written word. It is this last idea that drives much of the discussion and, indeed, Anooshahr wishes it to be his central contribution. It is that Babur, like his earlier counterparts, was driven to act, in his case, by what had he had produced in the pages of his great

memoir. We are, in sum, to read the Babur-nama, as we are the books associated here with the Ghaznavid and Ottoman rulers, as virtual scripts.

This is a provocative and intelligent book, and promises to engage specialists in various disciplines of Near Eastern, Central Asian and Islamic studies. But questions remain. Anooshahr wishes to see a common effort at work in the representation of a series of Turkish/Central Asian princes, an effort, in other words, that joins works written across Near Eastern and Islamic history. But the Baburnama is quite a different sort of book – on several levels – than, say, the chronicles of al-Tabari (d. 923) and al-Mas`udi (d. 956) (pp. 75-83). The latter works were produced earlier and in quite different socio-political circumstances than even, say, those of Nizam al-Mulk and Abu Nasr al-Utbi (both eleventh century). Too little effort is made here in marking such distinctions. But, more to the point, Anooshahr is perhaps too eager to press his sample texts to the mold. This reviewer wondered, for example, if al-Mas`udi really intended

to craft an image of the ninth century Abbasid commander – a Turkish slave officer, Bugha the Elder/al-Kabir (Anooshahr's reference to him as "Bugha the Great" misses the point that a second Bugha, the Younger/al-Saghir was on hand) – and, by extension, "the noble foreign warrior" (p. 81).

Also, one balks in reading that Babur's political and military successes and presumably, by extension, those of earlier dynasts, are to be largely understood as the fruit of propaganda (that is, self-fashioning, pp. 38-39, 57). In Babur's case, previous scholarship perhaps placed too great a stress on the role of gunpowder in the founding of the Mughal state. But to set aside consideration of battlefield success, however achieved, not to speak of such other patterns of empire-building as patronage and economic development, seems reckless. The effort to manipulate information and imagery certainly must have been necessary but it is quite a different matter to assign it a solo performance.

Matthew S. Gordon, *Miami University*

Exil unter Halbmond und Stern - Herbert Scurlas Bericht über die Tärigkeit deutscher Hochschullehrer in der Türkei während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus

By *Faruk Şen* & *Dirk Halm* (eds.)
Essen: Klartext, 2007, 230 p, ISBN-10: 3898617688, ISBN-13: 978-3898617680.

German-Turkish relations in the twentieth century were at times very good and very close, at times cold, semi-colonial, and often difficult, but always complex and never black and white. Even when rela-

tions were friendly, as before and during World War One, the German side often tried to dominate the Ottoman Empire in some way which led to resentment among those who became aware of this—most

prominently perhaps Atatürk. And at times when interactions between the two peoples seemed to focus prominently on such aspects as education and academia, as during the National Socialism period when a number of German academics found a temporary home in Turkey, some Germany were not happy about this new kind of closeness between the two peoples. A good history of German-Turkish relations still needs to be written, and there is much to disentangle and uncover until then, but this edited volume by Şen and Halm is another step towards a better understanding of this highly entangled history and inserts itself into the ever growing body of literature on the subject.[1]

This volume revolves around the report of Herbert Scurla, who was sent to Turkey by the Nazis in May 1939 to investigate the activities of the German academic émigrés there. Although not true for all, the great majority of the German academics in Turkey had gone there as a direct result of Nazi persecution. The 60-page report is reprinted here, along with an introduction by Klaus-Detlev Grothusen as well as a critical analysis of it by Fritz Neumark. The report as well as the two essays were already published once in 1987.[1] The new edition is enhanced by the inclusion of an article by Christiane Hoss tracking the paths of emigration and persecution of those mentioned in the report, an article by Faruk Şen on the academic landscape in Turkey today, as well as a documentational appendix including, amongst others, a reprint of the questionnaire the German emigrants to Turkey had to fill out. The fact that each edition of the Scurla book is introduced by a prominent German politi-

cian—in the 2007 edition it was the current Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and in 1987 it was then President Richard von Weizsäcker who spoke to the readers through an excerpt from one of his speeches—shows that this seemingly historical, perhaps even marginal topic, is of great political interest even today. In 1987 the Scurla book was inserted into the German guestworker debate and in 2007 it added a perspective to the continuing EU-Turkey debate. As a sub-section of the history of German-Turkish relations, the study of the "*haymatloz*-emigration",[3] the emigration of German refugees to Turkey in the time of the Third Reich, has flourished in the last decades.[4] It serves to show that there is a different Turkey, a Turkey which has helped Germany, a Turkey which has shown humility and provided a safe-haven in times of national and European disaster and darkness. As a result of this focus some of the *haymatloz* literature exhibits the tendency to be slightly uncritical of the relationship between the two countries at the time. Given Turkey's difficult position during World War Two on the one hand and its overall rather pro-German politics at the time on the other, this period is much more multi-faceted than this volume and others suggest.[5] Unfortunately this singular focus in scholarship obscures many other important aspects of German-Turkish relations, even positive ones. Thus when the editors write that the "roots of German-Turkish university cooperation... lay in the darkest periods of the German past", they fail to acknowledge that German professors had been in Istanbul even before World War One and that the project of a German-Turkish university, which is

discussed again today, was first envisaged shortly before that war

The Scurla report is an important document. It illustrates how a Nazi saw Turkey, Turkish university life, and the work of the German professors there. It provides valuable information on the composition of the German academic emigrant communities in Istanbul and Ankara, the emigrants' backgrounds, the conditions under which they worked, and what kind of problems they were facing. Scurla also describes the reforms that had taken place in Turkey and how the universities and faculties he visited functioned. The chapter by Hoss, which traces the biographies of the individuals mentioned in the report, make this book an especially fascinating read. She uncovers why these academics had left Germany, what they did in Turkey, and their fate after World War Two. Many of these biographies illustrate the extent to which many individuals retained connections to Turkey even long after their stay there had ended. And except for their partially biased discussion of the controversial person of Herbert Melzig, author of a biography of Atatürk,[6] the chapters by Neumark, Grothusen, and Hoss guide the reader critically and well balanced through the report, its background and the topic in general. As an additional piece of historical background the volume includes pictures of Ankara University taken by one of the German academics, Otto Gerngroß. His photo album, from which 27 pictures are reproduced here, bore the fitting title "Research and Teaching under the Protection of Crescent and Star." The documentation and discussions in Şen and Halm's volume add superbly to Arnold Reisman's study "Turkey's Modernization—Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk's Vision", which was published in 2006.

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Endnotes

1. Cf. for example: Malte Fuhrmann, *Der Traum vom deutschen Orient. Zwei deutsche Kolonien im Osmanischen Reich, 1851-1918.* (Frankfurt am Main / New York: Campus Verlag, 2006); Gisbert Gemein; Metin Oezsinmaz: *Deutsche und Türken in der Geschichte* (Münster: Aschendarff Verlag, 2001); İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998); *Atatürk Zamanında Türk-Alman İlişkileri, 1924-1938*, (Ankara: Almanya Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1981); Ingeborg Böer, Ruth Haerkötter, Petra Kappert (eds.), *Türken in Berlin 1871-1945 – Eine Metropole in den Erinnerungen osmanischer und türkischer Zeitzeugen* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002).

2. Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Der Scurla-Bericht - Bericht des Oberregierungsrates Dr. rer. pol. Herbert Scurla von der Auslandsabteilung des Reichserziehungsministeriums in Berlin über seine Dienstreise nach Ankara und Istanbul vom 11. - 25. Mai 1939: 'Die Tätigkeit deutscher Hochschullehrer an türkischen wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen'.* Frankfurt am Main 1987.

3. "Haymatloz" (also *haymatlos*) is a pseudo-Turkish spelling of German "heimatlos" (without home) and has become the iconic term describing the German academic emigration to Turkey during the Third Reich.

4. See for example Sabine Hillebrecht, *Haymatlos. Unterrichtsmaterialien zum Exil in der Türkei 1933 bis 1945* (Berlin: Haus der Wannsee Konferenz, 1999); Sabine Hillebrecht, *Haymatloz – Exil in der Türkei 1933-1945, Eine Ausstellung des Vereins Aktives Museum und des Goethe-Institutes mit der Akademie der Künste* (Berlin, 2000); Kemal Bozay, *Exil Türkei. Ein Forschungsbeitrag zur deutschsprachigen Emigration in die Türkei (1933-1945)* (Münster/Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 2001).

5. Cf. for a different perspective: Barry Rubin, *Istanbul Intrigues* (Istanbul, Bosphorus University Press, 2002).

6. Herbert Melzig, *Kamâl Atatürk – Untergang und Aufstieg der Türkei* (Frankfurt am Main: Societats Verlag, 1937).

Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic

By *Arshin Adib-Moghaddam*
London: Hurst & Company, 2007, 272 pp., ISBN9781850659037.

Adib-Moghaddam's engaging analysis of the Iranian politics is an effective antidote against the widespread characterizations of the Islamic Republic as the center of Shi'i crescent and a regime ruled by messianic fanatics who are soon-to-be armed with nuclear weapons. He explicitly states his purpose: "Ideally, this book equips you… with the necessary tools to widen and fill the gaps between lines next time you read a newspaper article about Iran" (p.2). "My idea in this book is to employ critical theory in order to place Iran out of the reach of their awesome propaganda" (p.3).

The book has six sections. The four sections offer case studies of the making of Iranian foreign policy, the Iran-Iraq War, and the anti-Iranian activities in the US, and the reform movement in Iran. The most ambitious section of the book is Part One where Adib-Moghaddam aims to present "insights into the 'mindset' of Iran's foreign policy elite" (p. 25). He claims that the foreign policy culture of the Islamic Republic is permeated by a 'utopian-romantic' meta narrative "formulated during the revolutionary years, and institutionalized as central norms of the Islamic Republic," which "inform the contemporary grand strategic preferences of the Iranian state" (p. 35). The foreign policy culture "functions as the guardian of identity, represents a web of shared ideals, images, norms and institutions, and provides for the foreign policy elites a coherent, if systematically abstract, overall orientation in the conduct of inter-national affairs" (p. 71). Adib-Moghaddam argues that this culture affects strategic preferences and behavior as a result of four-dimensional dialectic: "(1) it is through externalization that culture is a human product; (2) it is through objectification that culture becomes a reality *sui generis*; (3) it is through internalization that we are products of culture; and (4) it is through introjections that culture constitutes our identities, interests and preferences" (p. 42).

Based on this theoretical discussion, he then argues how the "socialist, third-wordlist and revolutionary Islamic *Zeigeist* in the 1970s" (p.52) has become central to the post-revolutionary Iranian foreign policy. The revolutionary elite strongly believe that prevailing international law, institutions, and norms are based on hypocrisy and seek to perpetuate the hegemony of dominant powers. This cultural framework, which entails pro-Palestinian sentiments, anti-Zionism, anti-Imperialism, and Islamic communitarianism, facilitated the storm the US Embassy in November 1979 (pp. 59-62) and underlined Khomeini's *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie in 1989 (p. 63). It also explains the Islamic Republic's withdrawal from the CENTO, prolonged war with Iraq, support for the PLO, sympathy with Latin American leftist movements, decision to end its relationship with South Africa, and continuing hostility toward the US policies (p. 67). At the same time, Adib-Moghaddam claims, this cultural frame-

work prioritizes "the preservation of the post-revolutionary, Islamic character of the Iranian system and the projection of Iranian power both regionally and domestically" (p. 74). Hence, "from the perspective of contemporary Iranian decision makers there appears to be no contradiction between the utopian-romantic *Leitmotif* of the revolution and multilateral engagement and détente" (p. 70). According to Adib-Moghaddam, revolutionary did not really betray their ideals, when they arranged arms deal with the US and Israel during the war with Iraq, backed the US invasion of Afghanistan, kept silent when Russians brutally suppressed Chechen resistance and China crashed Muslim opposition in its western provinces, and did not oppose the US invasion of Iraq. These actions all exemplify "instances when diplomacy and the anarchic spaces of world politics are/ were exploited in support of Iran's grand strategic preferences" (p. 74).

There are several problems with Adib-Moghaddam's discussion of Iranian foreign policy. The first one is methodological: his thesis is basically unsubstantiated because he neither conducted interviews with the decision-makers nor analyzed internal debates taking place among the elite. It remains unclear whether Iranian foreign policy elite, based in seven different institutions, share a cognitive consensus that prioritizes certain types of behavior and marginalize alternative options. He actually concedes this point when he says, "How deterministic is culture in setting grand strategic preferences? The method explored here suggests that it is difficult to discern *a priori*…this needs to be investigated in conjunction with empirical analysis" (p. 80). Yet this concession undermines his main objective of understanding

"the way Iranian foreign policy elites perceive the outside world" (p. 34). The second issue concerns the way in which how culture shapes preferences and behavior. From Adib-Moghaddam's narrative, one gets the impression that foreign policy elite are prisoners of their cultural outlooks. He does not systematically discuss how this culture sustains and reform itself, and eliminate or cultivate dissident opinions. Finally, Adib-Moghaddam's articulation of culture is too broad and all-encompassing to provide much analytical utility to understand how preferences are formed and decisions are made. If "Iran's current strategic preferences" does not "represent a break from the ideals of the revolution" (p. 72), as he claims, then every decision made by elite is justifiable within the boundaries of the revolutionary heritage. A simple realist account that prioritizes state interests would reach the same conclusion.

Part Two offers a convincing and empirically rich account of how the Iran-Iraq war was avoidable. "[W]ithout the invention of Ba'thist Arab nationalism and its anti-Iranian precepts; without its institutionalization and reification as Iraq's preferred state identity during Saddam Hussein's rule; without its internationalization by the Ba'thist elites; and without the implicit objectification of this invented garrison state identity by the international community before and during the conflict, the Iran-Iraq war would not have 'happened'" (p. 116). Part Three is a sharp critique of the activities of the US neoconservatives who "will continuously and rather relentlessly exert pressure to derail any type of diplomatic engagement between" the US and Iran (p. 153). At the same time, Adib-Moghaddam does not offer any insights regarding how the

neoconservative ideology has become that powerful and whether it is able to sustain its influence with the change in the US government. Part Four discusses the reformist Iranian civil society and "its achievements vis-à-vis the state" (p. 160). One obvious shortcoming of this chapter is its reliance of a rigid state-society dichotomy that ignores the realms of interaction and cooperation among state and society actors.

In its conclusion, Adib-Moghaddam writes, "[t]his book will have been successful in arguing that any reduction of Iran along a set of easily digestible propositions has a political purpose (pp. 188-9). One can say that it is only partially successful as Adib-Moghaddam is not immune from the habit of reducing Iran to a single argument. He claims that the Iranian Revolution "granted Iranians the absolute right to rise up and criticize those who exercise worldly power and claim transcendental authority at the sam e time" (p. 169). Hence he tends to offer his particularistic reading of the lasting legacy of the revolution and denies its inherently pluralistic and highly contested meanings.

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Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn

By *Asef Bayat*
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 291 pp., ISBN 100804755957.

In this book, Asef Bayat explores Islam and democracy especially with regard to what he calls the "post-Islamist" movement in the Muslim world. Instead of asking whether Islam and democracy are compatible, he asks, "under what conditions can Muslims instigate democratization within their countries?" He challenges the Orientalist view on Islamic exceptionalism by not only contesting the validity of the question about the compatibility of democracy and Islam, but also through a very thorough investigation of the post-Islamist movement in Iran and the Islamist movement in Egypt. He defines post-Islamism as a "condition" and a "project" that emphasizes change through religiosity and rights that arises after Islamism runs its course as a legitimate source of hope for political and economic development (p. 10-11).   Through his in depth case studies he demonstrates that the state has been successful in suppressing the post-Islamist social movements and their secular and reformist demands for political change in Iran. While the state has been equally successful at suppressing opposition (the political Islamist movement) in Egypt, the Egyptian state has not been able to quell society's turn to Islamism.

Bayat argues that despite the lack of a democratic transition in Iran and in Egypt, these regimes did not succeed in the suppression of the every day resistance that ordinary citizens wage against these authoritarian regimes. The book evaluates citizen participation, especially among women and

youth, in order to assess their co-existence with or resistance to the authoritarian regimes. He also examines the politically oriented social movements that oppose these regimes. Ironically, in Iran, where there is a theocratic regime, the resistance takes a secular form and in Egypt, where there is a secular authoritarian regime, the resistance takes an Islamist form. He concludes that the "major challenge is to forge intellectual and social mobilization in nations with a Muslim majority in order to challenge both the authoritarian (religious or secular) regimes and the 'fundamentalist' opposition" (p. 188).

Despite their differences, in both Iran and Egypt, the efforts by intellectual secular reformists to achieve democratization have failed. The winners of these political struggles have been the fundamentalist Islamists and the state authoritarianism. Yet, Bayat ends on a positive note believing that through active citizenry these states may ultimately become democratic. He bases this optimism on the fact that there still exists political and social resistance to the authoritarian regimes carried out by a diverse set of actors. The book challenges the dominant interpretation of Islam and Muslims and makes a strong argument about the diversity of Muslims in life style, ideology, interpretation of Islam, and all forms of economic, social and political variables.

Bayat's book is organized into six chapters. After the first chapter, which sets up the central argument of the book, the remaining chapters follow the historical developments in political and social movements chronologically, dividing them into different sub-groups including the youth, women, intellectuals, the clergy and po-

litical movements. Chapter two focuses on the 1960s-80s in Iran and Egypt. Bayat explains that there was a revolution in Iran and not in Egypt, which can be understood by making a "link between popular mobilization and revolutions." In modern Iran, the policies of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) disadvantaged the clergy and some of the merchants, creating a strong group of dissidents without a mass base of support. After the revolution, the clergy with the support of the merchant middle class, was able to consolidate its power despite their lack of mass appeal. In contrast, in Egypt under the secular authoritarian regime, there was widespread Islamist activity. This was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1970s and 80s and included media operations, and educational and social services. "Thus Egypt experienced the persistence of an Islamic movement without an Islamic revolution, whereas Iran underwent a revolution without a strong Islamic movement" (p. 47).

Chapters 3 and 4 explain the post-Islamist movement in Iran that strengthened after the end of the Iran-Iraq war. While the revolution had imposed a strong public-private divide along gender lines, the post-Islamist reformists started to challenge this state imposition of religious edicts in personal behavior. Yet, unlike their predecessors in the 1960s and 70s with an anti-imperialist outlook and political goals, the new movements of 1980s and 90s lacked unity. While the reformists wanted to challenge the absolute power of the state, including the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, post-Islamist activities did not amount to a strong unified movement. Instead it was an intellectually

diverse group of people including women, youth, students and some religious clergy engaging in acts of defiance against the regime. In chapter 4 Bayat argues that as the pro-reform government of Khatami took over, there was some relaxation of the repression against civil society and the media. Yet, the conservatives struck back severely denouncing democracy and pluralism as notions against Islamic morals. The Islamist elites had total control over political and economic institutions. The reformists were caught in a legal system that was virtually impossible to reform without conservative consent. Without grassroots support and with a growing indifference from the middle class, the reformists failed to reach their goals of tolerance and rule of law.

The fundamentalist conservative Islamist forces were among the opposition to the state in Egypt, in contrast to the state power and control they had in Iran. Chapter 5 explains that Egypt had a "passive revolution" starting in the 1990s. Bayat argues that "perhaps the Egyptian method of working toward socioreligious reform by building pervasive social movement through da'wa and associational work was what the Iranian post-Islamism needed to pursue" (p. 136-7) to succeed in changing state's policy and power. In Egypt, Islam spread through societal means first under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'a al-Islamiya. These tactically different movements initially enforced moral codes and provided social services to the poor. Following the poor, the rest of Egyptian society became more immersed in Islamist practice and moral piety in their every day life under preachers like Amr Khalid and the *halaqat* movement. As the Isla-

mist ideology seeped into the public sphere through dress codes and public expressions of piety, the state was forced to incorporate Islamist ideology into state policy; otherwise they could have lost power. At the same time, the state used violent tactics to suppress Islamist movements and political parties. The state was successful in incorporating Islam and nationalism under what Bayat calls the "seculareligios" state. Even though the Muslim Brotherhood made some token gestures by speaking about pluralism and by describing themselves as "a party with Muslim membership as opposed to a Muslim party", liberal thinking Islamists remained marginal, intellectualism was in decline and critical thinkers were silenced. While Bayat expresses hope for a new Kifaya movement that calls for a new democratic discourse, he also admits that it is too early to tell if this will make a difference at all.

This book contributes to our understanding of the relationship between different social groups and political power. It explores how groups challenge authoritarian state forces and when they can facilitate a more pluralistic democracy. By looking at two majority Muslim states, Bayat adds the relevant question of the relationship between religion and democracy. Based on his argument we can conclude that Muslims can have positive as well as negative influences on democracy and democratization, thus we cannot essentialize Islam as being incompatible with democracy. The book is rich in its discussion of the history of social movements and civil society from the 1960s to the present in Egypt and Iran. It gives a detailed account of influential groups and intellectuals. It is full of insights on the

position and demands of different social movement groups and civil society organizations. Instead of treating all groups the same, he demonstrates the diversity between and even within these groups.

Yet, his optimistic conclusion is unconvincing given that both Iran and Egypt are still controlled by uncompromising authoritarian regimes. The reader is left with an uncertain understanding of the author's conclusion. Despite the fact that the post-Islamists lost hope for change in Iran and post-Islamism never expanded throughout society as a mass movement large enough to instigate change in the Iranian regime, Bayat ends on the note that change toward a more pluralistic and secular society is still possible. The Council of Guardians vetoed the bills passed by the Iranian parliament to reform the power structure; thousands of reformists have been prevented from running for office; and what little mobilization there was among the middle class has been broken. In Egypt Bayat also ends on an optimistic note despite massive election fraud, continuing repression, and prevention of opposition Islamists from running for office. Thus in both cases the conservative Islamists and the authoritarian forces triumphed and the secular pluralist forces were defeated. Regardless of this unexpectedly positive conclusion, the book is well worth a detailed reading by scholars of social movements, religion and politics as well as Middle East area specialists.

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The Ashgate Research Companion to the Politics of Democratization in Europe

Edited by *K. Palonen*, *T. Pulkkinen* & *J. M. Rosales*
Aldershot: Asghate Publishing Limited, 2008, 421 pp., ISBN 978075467250.

This edited volume brings together 23 articles by various authors who examine different aspects of European democratisation under four headings: Concepts, Practices, Changes and Contexts.

In the first section, "Concepts," contributors tackle different definition of democracy, drawing on discussions in classical literature and examining contemporary challenges to democratization in the global age. In the opening article, "Representative Democracy: Rosanvallon on the French Experience," Frank R. Ankersmit claims that representative democracy has advantages over direct democracy, as the laws governing the former provide foundational bases for a political order. In the following article, "Direct Democracy, Ancient and Modern," Mogens H. Hansen looks at direct democracy more closely. The author points out that direct democracy existed only in Ancient Greece and that several centuries after the Hellenic era, scholars introduced the concept of representative democracy and institutions but no serious debate took place regarding the democratic character of these institutions. Hansen discusses the prospects of revitalizing the institution of

direct democracy through the use of modern tools. In her article, entitled "Neither Ancient nor Modern: Rousseau's Theory of Democracy," Gabriella Silvestrini discusses Rousseau's perception of democracy and concludes that it had very little relevance to majority rule. In "Representative Government or Republic? Sieyes on Good Government," Christine Faure focuses on controversial thinker Abbe Sieyesm, and argues that, in his time, he suggested an elected king who would resemble the modern institution of the President of the Republic.

The remaining articles in this section look at the contemporary contexts of democratic theory. In "Democratic Politics and the Dynamics of Passions," Chantal Mouffe argues that democracy is not necessarily a clash between two antagonistic sets of interests. Advancing her own notion of agonism, she maintains that democracy may well be an effort to find the most reasonable solution between pros and cons in a debate. In "Disobedient State and Faithful Citizen? Relocating Politics in the Age of Globalization," Olivia Guaraldo notes that democratic systems try to keep violence away from democratic debates, but argues that they exercise their monopoly on violence by using the state structures. In "The Gendered 'Subjects' of Political Representation," Tuija Pulkkinen examines the concept of 'subject' in the context of contemporary feminist political theory, in an effort to highlight how the history of democratization has created 'women' as a political subject.

The second section, "Practices," undertakes several case studies to demonstrate how democratization has become a product of rhetorical struggles not only among political actors but also historians. In "Political

Rhetoric and the Role of Ridicule," Quentin Skinner looks at one form of rhetoric, ridicule, pointing out that political discourse closely follows the rules of rhetoric set out in the textbooks of Roman and Greek authors. In "Political Times and the Rhetoric of Democratization," Kari Palonen focuses on how political leaders learn to perform rhetoric properly in the public sphere. Given the centrality of time to democratic politics, he presents politicians as individuals seeking to utilize time as a political tool. The subsequent articles turn to an inquiry into rhetorical struggles among intellectuals in relation to democratization. In "Democratization and the Instrumentalization of the Past," Irene Herrmann compares Switzerland and Russia from the democratisation standpoint and concludes that in both of these countries historians have taken part in politics through their own work in reference to history. In "The Rhetoric of Intellectual Manifestos from the First World War to the War against Terrorism," Marcus Llanque looks at the use of manifestos by intellectuals who assume the role of representing a public position, although they are not in fact elected representatives. The final two articles by Anna Schober and Simona Forti study rhetorical actions by feminist non-professionals, and the residual totalitarian practices in contemporary European democracies, respectively.

The third section, "Changes," studies the various processes of change that contemporary European democracy has gone through. The section starts with articles that delve into the changes that have affected the status of women, resulting in greater female participation in politics. In "Women's Partial Citizenship: Cleavages

and Conflicts Concerning Women's Citizenship in Theory and Practice," Claudia Wiesner claims that, in practice, in many contemporary European democracies gender equality does not exist, and that women's citizenship is only a 'partial citizenship.' The following article, "Gendering Political Representation? The Debate on Gender Parity in France," by Laure Bereni takes up a case study of France, where the issue of gender parity was addressed through legal regulations in the 1990s.

The next two sections examine another major transformation in the democratization process: how the notion that delegates participating in democratic decision-making should not be economically dependent produced the institution of professional representatives. In "Political Professionalism and Representative Democracy: Common History, Irresolvable Linkage and Inherent Tensions," Jens Borchert identifies a sort of paradox for contemporary democracies: while the professionalization of political offices is almost inevitable, it also poses many threats to the underpinnings of democracy and violates democratic principles. In "Democratization and Professionalisation: The Disappearance of the Polling Officer in Germany and the Introduction of Computer Democracy," Hubertus Buchstein looks at another aspect of professionalization: polling practices. He argues that the new electronic polling systems diminish the importance of voting officers, and undermine people's belief in democratic principles. In "The History of Parliamentary Democracy in Denmark in Comparative Perspective," Uffe Jacobsen takes a broader comparative perspective and looks at the evolution of European democratization by using a case

study of Denmark. Jacobsen claims that a scholarly study of the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule reveals a remarkable similarity between Eastern and Western Europe.

The last section, "Contexts," focuses on manifestations of democratization in different contexts through detailed case studies. In "A Long and Hard Process of Democratization: Political Representation, Election and Democracy in Contemporary Spain," Gonzalo Capellan examines Spain's uneven and challenging democratic experience. In "Do Political Parties Matter? Direct Democracy and Electoral Struggle in Switzerland in the Nineteenth Century," Pierre-Antoine Schorderet points out that despite the strong existence of direct democracy at the cantonal level in Switzerland, the country has in fact developed representative institutions and presents a combination of both systems. In "The Breakthrough of Universal Suffrage in Finland, 1905-1906," Jussi Kurunmaki studies early stages of democracy in Finland and offers an explanation for the rather anomalous case of how Finland became the first country to introduce universal suffrage in 1906, even before other more advanced democracies of the time. The final two essays of the section continue to look at specific cases. In "Nationalism, Constitutionalism and Democratization: The Basque Question in Perspective," Jose Maria Rosales examines how ethnic conflict and separatism have affected the broader democratization process in Spain. In "The Dis-/Appearance of the Demos", Meike-Schmidt-Gleim examines the effects of societal violence on democratization. She revisits the *banlieue* revolt of 2005 in France and argues that the way the

French government responded threatened to undermine France's democratic principles. The book ends with "Postscript: The Past, Present and Future of Democratization," in which Kari Palonen concludes with a positive note on the future of democracy.

Although democratization experiences have become one of the key areas of interest in European politics in recent decades, no scholarly analyses had tackled the conceptual problems associated with democratization and the widely-held assumption that the contemporary European experience presents a reference point for democratization experiences elsewhere, in an in-depth manner found in this study. *The Ashgate Research Companion to the Politics of Democratization in Europe* provides an incisive inquiry into the foundations and evolution of the European democratization experience through a good mixture of specific case studies and conceptual analyses. It promises to be reference reading for scholars and students of political science alike. It also offers valuable insights for practitioners actively involved in the making and re-making of the democratization experience in Europe and elsewhere.

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Hezbollah: A Short History

By *Augustus Richard Norton*
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. vi + 199 pp., (paperback),
ISBN 978-0-691-14107-7.

The purpose of Augustus Richard Norton's book— authored by the co-editor of the "Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics" series—"is to offer a more balanced and nuanced account of this complex organization [Hizbullah]... an honest account of the leading Shi'i political party in Lebanon—Hezbollah" (pp. 8, 198). In spite of that, there seems to be nothing fundamentally new in Norton's book.

It is true some mistakes were corrected in the subsequent reprints, but many mistakes of principle were left unattended. For instance, the map on page one in the "Prologue" is deeply flawed. Norton insists that the Kura district, below Tripoli, is Greek Catholic, when the Kura is represented in the legislature by three Greek Orthodox members of parliament (MPs), which unequivocally implies that that region is predominantly Greek Orthodox. In fact, the latest figures in light of the June 2009 elections reveal the composition of the Kura population as 60% Greek Orthodox, 17% Maronite, 21% Sunni, and 2% Shi'a. Where did the overwhelming majority of Greek Catholics come from?

The book is composed of six chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one surveys the "Origins and Prehistory of Hezbollah"; chapter two deals with "The Founding of Hezbollah." The parachuted in chapter three entitled "Being a Shi'i Muslim in the Twenty-first Century" seems unrelated to

the main thrust of the argument. It is basically a summary of Norton's 2001 book *Shi'ism and the 'Ashura Ritual in Lebanon*. Undeniably, the chapter is very well written, but it is very detailed, longwinded, and an unnecessary digression in a book aimed at giving a short history of Hizbullah, not Shi'ite rituals. Thus, removing the chapter would not diminish the value of the book. Chapter four discusses the topics of "Resistance, Terrorism, and Violence in Lebanon" and chapter five, "Playing Politics," shows how Hizbullah abandoned its revolutionary fervor and started integrating in the political system through its participation in electoral processes. Finally, chapter six, "From Celebration to War," addresses the July 2006 war and its repercussions.

Norton's book provides a fairly good synopsis of what is known about Hizbullah, even though it does not offer any new startling insights. Nevertheless, Norton's elegantly written compact book has drawbacks in terms of inaccurate facts and information. This applies also to the newly added afterward (pp. 161-172). He asserts, "Although Hezbollah has tried to downplay the hostility of the Sunni groups, it is noteworthy that the party's attempts to reach a rapprochement with the most powerful Sunni Islamist groups have failed, at least through the summer of 2008 [*sic*]" (p. 171). Norton seems to be unaware of the August 18, 2008 eight-point understanding between Hizbullah and Salafi movement, where, for instance, article five calls for mutual defense in case of any foreign or domestic aggression.

Based on his lack of knowledge, Norton comes up with a flawed conclusion: "It is a good bet that new parliamentary elec-

tions in May [*sic*] 2009 will only replicate the divisions and animosities represented in the post-Doha government" (p. 171). By the concession of international observers and election watchdogs, the June 7, 2009 elections were the most successful elections after the end of the civil war in 1990, and were unprecedentedly held on one day without any bloodshed or serious feuds. So reading Norton's statement in light of the 2009 legislative elections reveals just the opposite: the elections were neither an epitome of disorder nor did Hizbullah close the door to compromise with its opponents. On the contrary, one day after the elections, the party's secretary general, Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, conceded defeat, called for burying the hatchet and placing skeletons in the closet, congratulated and extended a hand to the victorious March 14 ruling coalition to form a national unity government, and stressed that bygones are bygones. Rapprochement between Nasrallah, the March 14 Druz leader, the seasoned politician Walid Jumblat, and the parliamentary majority leader Sa'd al-Hariri, seemed to be inevitable after the elections. In marathon meetings, after a freeze of almost three years, many misunderstandings and mutual fears were addressed.

So many tensions were defused. In accordance with the dictum of "I'll scratch you back, if you'll scratch mine", Nabih Berri was elected as speaker for a fifth consecutive term since he first assumed that office in 1992. Since he received 90 votes out of 128, when the Hizbullah-led opposition controls only 57 seats, it means that 33 MPs from the March 14 coalition voted for him. This was reciprocated when Sa'd al-Hariri was nominated as incumbent prime minis-

ter by 86 MPs when the March 14 coalition only controlled 71 seats of the legislature, which implies that the 13 members of the Berri parliamentary bloc along with two Armenians from the Hizbullah-led opposition nominated Sa'd al-Hariri. This along with the groundbreaking meetings between Nasrallah, Jumblatt, and al-Hariri serve as indicators of national unity and reconciliation.

In light of the above, Norton's future prospects in the closing paragraph of his book are also far off the mark. He contends that Hizbullah's "recent 'victories' have been costly on every level that matters. The Shi'i party is as much constrained by its successes as its adversaries have been enlivened by its rise" (p. 172). On the contrary, Hizbullah's reconciliatory discourse and strategy of reaching out to allay the fears of the other after its defeat in the elections were conducive in defusing chronic tensions that had almost succeed earlier in igniting another civil war.

In the fifth reprint of his book, it seems Norton only corrected some embracing mistakes that might tarnish his reputation as an authority "for close to three decades" (Back cover) on the Lebanese Shi'a and Hizbullah, but also committed other factual and analytically short-sighted blunders, which seem to downgrade the overall value of his book and scholarship.

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