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The closure case against the ruling AK Party pending before the constitutional court occupied the center stage of Turkish politics throughout the summer. After months of speculation on the fate of the party, the court finally reached a verdict in late July, deciding not to close down the AK Party, and averting what had otherwise promised to be an unprecedented level of political uncertainty, social and economic turmoil, and potential chaos. With the closure case now behind it, the AK Party is expected to be more restrained, and to act responsibly – as it did during the proceedings of the case – while building up its democratic and secular credentials through a reform policy in keeping with the EU accession process. For some time, the ruling AK Party had been under pressure for neglecting, if not abandoning, the EU membership process. In response to critics the government may refocus its energy on the issues that have stalled Turkey’s accession.

While still recovering from the closure threat, Turkey’s political leaders found themselves in the midst of a difficult diplomatic mission: calming the Caucasus down in the wake of the August war between Russia and Georgia. Paradoxically, the crisis in the Caucasus came both as a reminder of the foreign policy challenges that lie ahead in the region for Turkey, and of Turkey’s geopolitical capacity to address current and potential crisis spots in the volatile surrounding regions.

The conflict in the Caucasus involved three indispensable partners for Turkey: Georgia and the United States on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Georgia is the only land corridor linking Turkey with the Caspian region and Central Asia; moreover, the critical Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline runs through its territory. Maintaining cooperation with Georgia therefore remains crucial for Turkey’s strategic weight, as it provides the means for reaching out to the Caspian and Central Asian hinterlands. The close economic and military cooperation between Georgia and the United States, to the extent that the latter sought to demonstrate its support for the former, made Turkey’s response to the crisis part and parcel of Turkish-American relations.

Russia too, in recent years, has become an important economic partner for Turkey. Even more than a partner: Russia provides two thirds of Turkey’s natural gas imports, imports necessary for the consumption of its industry and for heating its major cities in winter. While the early tension between Turkey and Russia in the aftermath of the Cold War had been overcome by a strategy of cooperation in economic and political arenas, this mutual tolerance had been based on the non-assertive policy of both parties in the Caucasus and Central Asia. With the invasion of Georgia, it seems that Russia has now opted for an assertive policy in the region, reclaiming a zone of influence. Instead of confronting Russia bilaterally, Turkey has responded by utilizing channels of multilateral diplomacy, proposing a Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform. This idea sounds timely and useful, but may be unrealistic given the global and regional dynamics.

Developments in the Caucasus in general, and the attitude of Russia in particular vindicate Turkey’s search to diversify its energy resources and reduce its dependence on Russian gas. This has in fact been the rationale for Turkey’s increasing engagement with Iran in recent years on energy cooperation. Turkey’s positive relationship with Iran, one that includes energy deals, can set an example for European countries, provided that Iran settles its nuclear dispute with the West. If such a consensus arises, new energy pipelines running through Turkey will again occupy the agenda of Turkish domestic and foreign policies.

The crisis in the Caucasus has had the positive effect of provoking a rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia; Turkish President Abdullah Gül made a historic visit in early September to Yerevan on the occasion of a soccer match between the two countries. This highest level contact between Turkey and Armenia may open a new period of conciliation, understanding and cooperation if it is followed up by new initiatives. History can become a bridge, bringing the Turks and Armenians closer instead of driving them apart.

Another challenge for Turkish foreign policy is an old one: Cyprus. Renewed negotiations between Presidents Talat and Hristofias have raised hopes for the possibility of a final settlement. Such an outcome will certainly accelerate Turkey’s EU integration, an objective reasserted by the government as a priority. However, even if a settlement is reached it will not be easy to sell it to a Turkish public provoked by sentimental nationalism and disappointed by the EU’s reluctance to admit Turkey.

This new issue of Insight Turkey deals extensively with these issues and more. We hope you enjoy it.