

# Book Reviews

## **The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World**

By *Graham E. Fuller*

Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008, 160 pp., ISBN 1601270194, US\$14.95 (paper).

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Graham Fuller's latest book on Turkey provides a critical account of Turkey's foreign policy in the post September 11 period and an insightful analysis of its structural features and domestic linkages. In fact, the challenges that Turkey faces in the post-Cold War era has been a focus of academic and strategic thinking in a series of recent studies.<sup>1</sup> The magnitude and the content of these studies reveal Turkey's increasing role and significance in the post-Cold War era, not only in the regional context but also from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy priorities. All of these studies have concentrated on resolving the puzzle of Turkey's new foreign policy identity and defining its new role in regional and global terms. Some accentuate the traditional Western orientation inherent in the logic of Turkey's Kemalist Republic, while others try to establish a link between Turkey's search for a new strategic role and the country's post-1980 transformation. The latter point to the ways in which Turkey has initiated a new form of political pluralism, prioritizing identity issues in domestic and foreign policy considerations. In both perspectives the changing nature and form of Turkey-U.S. relations occupy a crucial part of the analysis. The resolution of this puzzle becomes

even more urgent in the post-September 11 era when U.S. security concerns require more assertive policies, particularly in the Middle East. Some go so far as to argue that there is an urgent need to redefine Turkey-U.S. relations if Turkey is to be relevant in the 21st century.<sup>2</sup> However, there is also a growing acknowledgement that Turkey has been slipping from the U.S. orbit and following a relatively independent foreign policy. F. S. Larrabee, for example, states that "in the future, Turkey is likely to be an increasingly less-predictable and more difficult ally.... [and] the United States will need to get used to dealing with a more independent-minded and assertive Turkey – one whose interests do not always coincide with U.S. interests, especially in the Middle East."<sup>3</sup>

In this context, Fuller situates Turkey as a "pivotal state" in the Muslim world.<sup>4</sup> Different from the traditional concept of "ally," used frequently in U.S. foreign policy jargon to denote Turkey's status throughout the Cold War, the concept of "pivotal state" offers Turkey a renewed strategic value in the post-September 11 context. Acknowledging Turkey's relative autonomy from the U.S. strategic orbit by attributing to Turkey the role of "pivotal state," Fuller un-

derlines that the fate of the country is crucial for U.S. strategic interests in regional and global contexts. Showing an inherent linkage between Turkey's foreign policy and domestic politics, Fuller claims that the end of the Cold War has led Turkey to adapt itself to a new foreign policy environment. At the same time the crucial change in the strategic context creates challenges in Turkey's domestic politics that have serious repercussions for Turkey's foreign policy identity.

Fuller's book includes a broad overview of Turkey's past, including the Kemalist experience, Turkey's relations with the Muslim world, its foreign policy priorities such as relations with the EU, and finally the possible scenarios for the future, including an assessment of what the U.S. can do to contribute to the country's quest for alternatives in the new international context. Fuller determines that "Ankara had come to realize the considerable costs of its exclusive strategic orientation toward the West, in which sometimes appeared more pro-Western than the West itself" and that it had moved gradually to improve ties with the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the developing world by the mid-1960s (p.3). As Fuller details, this changing orientation led Turkey to initiate a number of openings towards the Muslim world, first in the economic realm (the Ozal era) and later in political and strategic domains (the Welfare Party's policies, Turkey's unofficial membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, its threatening of Syria to end its support of the PKK). However, with the coming of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, Fuller notes, this orientation gained a new momentum under the

stress of adapting to the post-September 11 world in which the U.S. launched a global war on terrorism with the clear expectation that Turkey, as a natural partner, would endorse its policies towards the Middle East. However, as Fuller recalls, these expectations did not materialize and Turkey's relations with the U.S. deteriorated markedly. *The New Turkish Republic*, which actually revolves around an analysis of the nature and the implications of the recent changes in Turkey-U.S. relations (p.7), directs itself to a U.S. audience by inviting its readers to be cautious towards Turkey's recent moves in the Middle East. Still, for Fuller, these autonomous moves and the appearance of Turkey in the eyes of the Middle East as an independent country would not necessarily mean bypassing U.S. security concerns and policy priorities. On the contrary, taking a long term perspective, Fuller argues that increasing the space for political maneuvering by Turkey would, in the end, serve the purposes of the U.S. in the region.

One of the most interesting parts of the book is chapter six, entitled "the Reemergence of Turkish Islam." This chapter provides a background for understanding the recent shift in Turkey's foreign policy identity; in Fuller's analysis, this shift mostly owes itself to the transformation in Turkey's domestic politics that resulted from the AKP's coming to power. Here Fuller underlines an essential contradiction between, on the one hand, the rising social and economic powers of the Anatolian business class, the traditional lower classes, and Islamist professionals and intellectuals, most of whom back the AKP and identify themselves with the Ottoman/Islamic past, and, on the other, the Kemalists who hold

this past in permanent contempt. The section also includes a substantive analysis of the Gulen movement. Emphasizing its statist orientation, Fuller distinguishes the movement from the rest of the Islamist movements, which perceive the modern state as un-Islamic, unjust and repressive, and reject it as an agent of the West seeking to support the corrupt domestic elites. Contrary to the anti-state character of these Islamists movements, Fuller states, “the Gulen vision of the Turkish experience represents a belief in the compatibility of the state, faith and modernity” (p. 61). This statist character explains why both the Turkish state and the U.S. would look at the Gulen movement with sympathy, and why it is at odds with the Islamist political parties as they bring down Kemalist anger not only upon themselves but also, indirectly, upon the movement. Fuller holds that instead of questioning the secular character of the state, as occurs in the rest of the Muslim countries, the political trends in Turkey are evolving toward a more comfortable relationship with the country’s past, and its cultural and religious traditions. This trend is also reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy. Fuller claims that Turkey, with its overall degree of development, its growing democratization and current government, provides a living demonstration of the new ideas and understandings of the role Islam could play in a democratic society. For this reason, Turkey is now being watched by the rest of the Muslim world with immense interest, “not just for what it is saying but also for what it is doing” (p. 55).

Another critical chapter addresses the AKP’s policies toward the Muslim world, showing how the new government departs

slightly from Turkey’s traditional approach toward countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran (pp. 69-80). Fuller considers that this slight deviation from the traditional line of thinking in foreign policy has provided Turkey with a valuable opportunity to communicate not only its policy priorities but also the issues crucial for U.S. interests in the wider Middle East. This is particularly true for Turkey’s relations with Syria and Iran, countries with which the U.S. has recently been experiencing a rather tense period of relations. The new policy line has positioned Ankara to offer its good offices to broker a Syrian-Israeli dialogue, and to pressure Damascus for domestic reform and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Similarly, Turkey has followed a constant policy to convince Iran to improve its relations with the U.S. Turkey’s foreign policy is not simply an echo of the west’s, however. Ankara differed radically from the West in its policies towards the new Palestinian government formed by Hamas, claiming that the government was elected democratically and should be recognized by the rest of the world. As the reactions from the Muslim world indicate, secular Turkey gained respect because of its independent views and actions in all these cases. And while Ankara’s leverage on all these issues is still low, the interested parties look for Turkey’s involvement and support. More and more, Turkey is becoming a platform for communicating various Western messages to these countries. Importantly, all these developments come coupled with Turkey’s closer linkages with the Gulf states, and with them the huge financial centers with international linkages. The Gulf countries’ increasing investment ties to Turkey con-

tribute to the AKP's power in domestic politics and legitimize its recent foreign policy choices.

In all these cases the crucial difference from the previous periods is that Turkey now follows a much more credible policy towards its Middle Eastern neighbors. As argued by the author, instead of being seen as a mere puppet of the U.S., Ankara has been able to develop an intermediary role and establish working relations with both sides in regional conflicts (pp. 174-175). With its more credible status, Ankara is now able to communicate Western messages regarding democratization, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, accountability, transparency and gender equality without falling into the trap of being viewed as too closely tied to Western interests. Turkey is showing its neighbors how a secular country with an Islamic population is able to consolidate democratic values. That is why, when he advises Washington to consult with and include Turkey in its policy planning towards the Middle East, Fuller states that "U.S. and Turkish interests may not be identical but Turkish concerns need to be taken seriously - not simply as a courtesy but because Turkey might actually have something of value to say even contribute" (p. 176). Still, Fuller warns that Turkey's credibility and influence in regional politics depends highly on how much it is perceived as an independent power by the rest of the players (p. 177).

Fuller follows the classical pattern in outlining the foundations of Turkey's regional influence. He underlines the role of the powerful Army, now increasingly attached to international peace-keeping

operations, and which also contributes its legitimacy to Turkey's domestic and foreign policy designs; the geographical location of the country as an energy hub; its control of the water resources; its labor supply to the other Middle Eastern economies; and finally its own economic and financial resources, these mainly connected to its agricultural reserves and highly liberalized economic structure (pp. 81-91). However, what makes Fuller's analysis more incisive than most is the linkage that the author spontaneously establishes between these sources of regional power and Turkey's future foreign policy scenarios with respect to the three dimensions recently formulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief foreign policy adviser to the AKP and Sedat Laçiner, director of the International Strategic Research Organization in Ankara (pp. 168-171): Washington-centric policy, European-centric policy and Ankara-centric policy. Further, Fuller masterfully shows the foreign policy projections of Turkey's domestic actors such as the socialist left, the Kemalist left, mainstream Kemalists, the Army, extreme nationalists and Islamists, asserting that Turkey's relations vis-à-vis the U.S. and the EU constitute one of the most crucial variables in the power struggle among these actors (pp. 172-173). Fuller argues that even though they represent different ideological points of departure, the impetus toward an increasingly independent Turkish foreign policy is shared by all of the above-mentioned groups. This powerful consensus, mainly motivated by absolute distrust of the West and a strong loyalty to Turkey, shows itself particularly in the quest for following an independent foreign policy towards the "Eurasian strategic alternative"

and the Middle East. Fuller argues that Turkey is actually conditioned to the tendency of following an independent foreign policy because of domestic, regional and global events. Disappointed by the EU's still ambiguous attitude toward its membership bid, and U.S. hesitancy to take effective measures to eradicate the PKK's bases in the Northern Iraq, Turkey turns more and more to Eurasia. For example, Turkey is now cooperating with Russia, establishing closer ties with the Turkic countries in the region, and formulating a policy of balancing the U.S. influence in Northern Iraq by collaborating with Iran and Syria. Turkey particularly opposes any external involvement which would radically destabilize the Middle East.

What can the U.S. do to offset Turkish concerns and contribute to the improvement of relations in the immediate future? The concluding section of the book aims to respond to this critical question. Fuller answers this question in two stages. First of all, he thinks that the improvement of Turkey-U.S. relations greatly depends on major policy changes from the U.S. side in several key areas: a determined push to eliminate the PKK presence in Northern Iraq, coupled with cutting support to the quasi-independent Kurdish state there; improving relations with Iran and Syria; hearing the Muslims' cries in Palestine and urgently pressurizing the parties to step towards a

settlement of the conflict that would extensively change the climate in the Middle East in general in positive way. However, Fuller knows very well that these kinds of radical changes in U.S. policy will not easily take place. Therefore, he advises that the U.S. work toward the improvement of economic and technological ties with Turkey, including the following: a guarantee of IMF support for Turkey's economic transformation and trade concession to U.S. markets, support for Turkey's EU bid, and direct contribution to overcoming a major foreign policy problem, the Cyprus issue. This is where the rationality behind Fuller's labeling of Turkey as a "pivotal state" for U.S. foreign policy towards the Muslim world is clearly revealed. Fuller insightfully recognizes that Turkey has been passing from an extremely delicate process of democratization, coupled with the necessity of redefining its foreign policy identity, under the pressure of adapting to a largely unstable international/regional environment. He sees that Turkey's new foreign policy identity clearly resonates with the evolution of the country's domestic politics. Therefore, the health of Turkey's current transition is crucial both for regional stability and the prospect of U.S. interests in the region. A democratic and prosperous Turkey, serving as an anchor of stability in the Middle East, would also better serve the United States' long-term interests in the largely unstable region.

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### Endnotes

1. D. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989); V. Mastny and C. Nation (eds) *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Power*, (Boulder: Westview, 1995); H. Barkey (ed) *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); A. Makowsky and S. Sayarı (eds)

*Turkey's New World* (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Foreign Policy, 2000); M. Abramowitz (ed) *The United States and Turkey: Allies in Need* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2003); L. Martin and D. Keridis (eds) *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.)

2. Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser and F.S. Larrabee, *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.)

3. F. S. Larrabee, *Turkey as U.S Security Partner* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), pp. 3-9.

4. The concept of “pivotal states” is important both in a methodological sense, in terms of ordering developing countries with respect to certain regionally and globally defined priorities, and in the sense of how U.S. policy makers approach those developing countries. The concept attributes a crucial role to a select group of developing countries, “poised at critical turning points”, and whose fate could “significantly affect regional, and even international, stability.” By placing a special emphasis on relations with these states – Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey – the U.S. can move from a reactive to a proactive stance in pursuing American interests in the developing world. See, R. Chase, E. Hill and P. Kennedy (eds) *The Pivotal states: A New Framework for United States Policy in the Developing World* (New York: Norton, 1999).

## The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey

By *Angel Rabasa, F. Stephen Larrabee*

Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation/National Defense Research Institute, 2008, 113 pp., ISBN 978-0-8330-4457-0, US\$ 24.50 (paper).

This review likely will sound like a paean to Rand, which, as always, has done its usual creditable job on this paper. If you have space for only one work on Turkey on your “shelf” (whether your book shelf or your e-shelf), make it this one. Just a glance at the Table of Contents will demonstrate how comprehensive the paper is. For those who have had the experience, it is like reading an expanded version of a U.S. Government National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Like a NIE, *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey* is laced liberally with references, as all scholarly works should be; as a measure of the quality of these, the references range from a good number of “personal interviews” (for which there is no substitute) to “You Tube,” a testament to the wide-ranging search conducted by the authors.

Do not be fooled by the seeming simplicity of the chronological style. As writers of such scholarly works will recognize full well, it is in the authors’ *choices* of events and people to include, and their explanation of their significance, that the *real* value of a product such as the Rand report lies.

Just one example of the illuminative quality of the writing, especially versus that of most media outlets, is found in the report’s treatment of the so-called Headscarf Issue. For weeks, months, most news coverage worldwide has accorded headscarves the seeming power of some sort of weapons system aimed at Turkey. In the Rand report, the reader will discover that the Sturm und Drang was over an issue that only 3.7% of the Turkish respondents surveyed said was the most important to them.

You will also get a much better sense, a real sense, of the incessant pull in opposite directions that is felt by Turks – individually and collectively – as they live astride not only the “crossroads” between Islamic and non-Islamic cultures, but also the tug of war between tradition and modernity, East and West, public sector and private, urban and rural, military and civilian, secular and religious groups. By Page 74, while readers won’t quibble with Rand’s choice of titles, they will wonder why a subtitle along the lines of “Tug of War” does not also appear; it is the thread that runs through the entire work and is the most useful contextual image for the reader.

Another phrase borrowed from the American vernacular that will also provide a “roadmap” to the large and, at first, confusing number of groups, organizations, political parties, religious groups and sects is, “You can’t tell the players without a scorecard.” – This report will give you that scorecard in spades. The tension between Turkey’s traditionalists (many of them Kemalists) and the pull of modernity has been manifested in a number of sectors. Turkey’s military establishment, of course, views itself as the primary protector and guarantor of the continuation of the Kemalist tradition, and has intervened on a number of occasions to ensure that guarantee. Arrayed on the opposite side are a variety of groups, including political parties, religious figures, and entrepreneurs who wholeheartedly embrace Islamic principles, and minority groups with long-held animosity toward the establishment. The Rand report predicts a continuation of the same course that has obtained in recent years. Among other reasons, the more radical sects within

Islam, such as the Salafi school, have never taken root in Turkey and even Turks who identify themselves as being religious profess a desire for the continuation of the secular state. Nonetheless, it becomes clear in the telling that the tension between secularism and religion remains just below the surface, pulling and tugging as the opportunities arise.

The almost incessant creation and dissolution of Turkey’s political parties, with their short list of key personnel reemerging under yet another banner, is also a testament to the determination and the staying power of those who are resolute about wanting to chart a different course for the country, whether a moderately different course or a radically different one. I found Figure 3.1 on Page 46 – the Evolution of Religious-Right Parties in Turkey – to be a very helpful adjunct to the text, bringing me to the present in this ongoing process. Over the longer term, it will be movements such as the Welfare Party (RP), with its widespread local networks providing services to Turkey’s citizens that will prove to be the strongest opponent of the Secularists. It may not be titled the RP at the time, but the method is a very viable one; any party that steps in to fill in the gaps left by the establishment is bound to gain adherents. In the passages on political parties, you’ll see not only the names featured prominently in the news these days, but also their relatives and associates who also have exercised influence. In addition you’ll see the chronology of their lives and their political and social evolution over the years.

One Turkish institution to which more coverage, in my opinion, could legitimately

have been given in the report is the business sector. Turkey has become more and more integrated into the world's economy since I first visited in 1961. Indeed, Turkish business has become a more and more powerful instrument in the extension of Turkish political power into, for just one example, northern Iraq. Even a cursory reading of the trade agreements that the AK Party makes with other nations, Muslim and non-Muslim, announced on almost a daily basis, demonstrates conclusively that the party considers foreign trade to be an integral and critical part of its foreign policy. For that reason, the amalgam of entrepreneurs and politicians will prove to be a difficult force for the Secularists to resist should it one day come to that. The Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD), for example, combines entrepreneurship with a strong strain of Islamist belief, professing a religious as well as an economic agenda. Specifically, MÜSİAD espouses the expansion of the freedom to practice one's religion in the workplace and the elimination of anti-religious practices in the workplace. To rein in the religious "thread" in the overall MÜSİAD "fabric," then, could mean hampering the conduct of business and harming the overall economy. The prospect of a revival of the year 2001 and multiple currency devaluations, a banking sector that was "devastated," and an actual shrinking of the Turkish economy by almost ten percent will serve to buttress the efforts of the AK Party and MÜSİAD and serve as a warning to and a shield against the Secularists.

I hasten to add at this point that none of what I've said is intended to portray Turkey as different in any way from, or as being

more subject to the forces extant today than any other nation. A quick review of today's world headlines will confirm that a politically divided America, a fractious Near East and Middle East, Asian nations in conflict with each other and with themselves, a Latin America appearing to be at odds with itself at every turn, and an Africa seemingly prone to endemic bloodletting make Turkey seem at times, relatively speaking, to be an island of calm in the surrounding maelstrom.

As valuable as the foregoing sections of the Rand report are, serious readers, including policy makers, read and save such documents for their value in pointing the way forward. The *real* value of any and all products such as this one, of course, is found in the answer to the "So what?" Test – what does it tell me about the future and how much can I rely on what it tells me? Here again, the Rand report shines, beginning on page 91, Chapter Six– *Future Prospects and Implications*. Having been treated to the previous parts, and now having a much greater understanding of the context, the reader has been drawn into the situation and has become much more a participant and less a casual observer. In that guise, Turkey's possible future courses of action become fascinating rather than merely being reading matter. Of the four possible courses that the report suggests Turkey may take in the coming years, it is clear which one the authors believe will be the one most likely to happen. That is, essentially, a continuation of the present course on which the AK Party professes to have set Turkey – a moderate one that mixes secularism with people's wish for religion in their lives, one oriented toward

EU membership, and one that supports and nurtures the private business sector.

Perhaps the most important question at present, of course, is the future of the AK Party, the party presently in power in Turkey, the party founded by current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Readers will be aware from the barrage of media coverage that the AK Party is presently on the defensive in the Turkish court system, charged by Turkey's chief prosecutor with anti-secular activities. The Rand report states that "the AKP defines itself not as an Islamic party but as a conservative democratic party similar to Christian democratic parties in Western Europe." Secularists might respond that the AK Party's assertion is a smokescreen, citing, for just one example the headscarf issue in the case of the wife of Turkey's President, Abdullah Gül. In the final analysis of course, only time will tell whether the AKP's words are borne out by its actions. The AK Party, it should be noted as well, will have to live

with its words. Not only is Turkey's secularist establishment watching; Turkey's future membership in the EU, a professed AKP goal, will impose its own set of restrictions on the country.

On page 96 begins *Implications for U.S. Policy*, the section that I sincerely hope will be read, reread and taken very seriously by the U.S., the EU and other nations' policy-makers. I must say, though, that it is curious to this reader that the Rand report was done at the behest of the U.S. Department of Defense rather than the U.S. State Department. Notwithstanding the fact that the Turkish military establishment plays a crucial role in the country, the prescriptions given lie squarely in the realm of foreign policy, and are not restricted to the military sphere.

If readers of this review should feel the need for a negative comment for the sake of balance, I would have found a separate Glossary of terms (including individuals' names) to be helpful.

**Frank Hyland**, *The American Public University System*

## **The Politics and Poetics of Translation in Turkey, 1923-1960**

By *Şehnaz Tahir Gürçağlar*

Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2008, 331 pp., ISBN 978-90-420-2329-1, € 66.00 (paper).

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This book, based on a doctoral thesis written in the Department of Translation Studies at Boğaziçi University (submitted 2001) is a history of translation activity in Turkey from the foundation of the Republic down to 1960. It situates itself in relation to previous work in the field by identifying

what the author sees as three shortcomings of the latter (pp. 28-29). (1) The great majority of previous studies have an almost exclusive focus on the Translation Bureau, the institution established in 1940 under the auspices of the Ministry of Education to organize the translation into Turkish of

the classics of world literature. As a result, their scope is confined to the translation of canonical works; the field of popular literature, which in terms both of numbers of titles published and of copies sold, would appear to have constituted a much larger market, was more or less completely ignored. (2) Previous studies relied exclusively on what the author calls “secondary material”, i.e. official statements about the aims and programme of the Translation Bureau, and discussions of translation strategy by the translators themselves and others contributing to the lively intellectual debate on these issues. There was no empirical engagement with actual translated texts. (3) In so far as earlier works referred to the strategies employed by translators in approaching their task, there was a tendency to oversimplify the issue by treating concepts such as acceptability/adequacy, domestication/foreignization as binary oppositions, with no recognition of the compromises that translators are in practice constantly making between the two extremes.

This review will concentrate on those parts of the book that comprise the author’s efforts to remedy the first two of the above perceived deficiencies. (The third is addressed to some extent in the “case studies” in Chapters 6 and 7.) It is worth mentioning that of the previous historical surveys that she cites, all but one are in Turkish. The only one that is accessible to an international audience is Özlem Berk, *Translation and Westernisation in Turkey from the 1840s to the 1980s* (Istanbul: Ege Yayınları, 2004), and this was published in a limited edition of only 200 copies.

In addition to the critical review of

existing literature, Chapter 1 contains a discussion of the theoretical concepts underlying the present work. Those invoked most frequently throughout the book include ‘culture planning’ and ‘(poly)system’ (Even-Zohar), and ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu). Some readers may find the insistent recurrence of ‘polysystem’ and ‘habitus’ obtrusive, and question whether these terms add anything to a historical or sociological analysis that could have been expressed just as effectively in ordinary language. The more theoretically inclined will no doubt find the analysis enriched and solidified by this conceptual apparatus. It should be noted that the author has been critical and eclectic in her construction of it, in particular insisting on adding the notion of ‘agent’ to Even-Zohar’s “depersonalized” and “text-bound” polysystems theory (pp. 42-43).

In Chapter 2 the author provides the political context for the period 1923-1960, focusing on the cultural reform programme of the single-party period, the new emphasis on ‘humanism’ under İnönü’s presidency and the markedly changed climate after the transition to multi-party politics in 1946. Chapter 3 takes a closer look at comments and statements made by Turkish intellectuals and political figures on translation policy and practice in the period under review. We are shown how the foundation of the Translation Bureau followed a great build-up of demand from intellectuals from the late 1920s onwards for the state to rescue translation activity from the disorganization and low quality that resulted from its being at the mercy of commercial publishers (pp. 103-4).

In the remaining chapters, the author

fulfils her promise to take us beyond the world of the Translation Bureau, governed as it was by lofty ideals of cultural improvement, into the rough-and-tumble of the free market for translated books, which we learn was dominated by the kinds of work that appeal to a mass readership everywhere - detective and adventure stories and romantic and erotic fiction. The statement (p.144) that “[t]he biggest problem of publishers throughout the period under study, i.e. 1923-1960” was low sales figures” seems in need of modification when we read (p. 240) that all Mike Hammer translations (or pseudotranslations, i.e. indigenuous additions to the genre) sold around 100,000 copies each when they appeared in the 1950s. In the period before 1950 many popular translations, such as those of Sherlock Holmes stories, were extremely brief synopses that came out in the format of 16-page booklets published at weekly or monthly intervals and available from newspaper stands as well as bookshops (pp. 173-174). Gürçağlar stresses that these popular genres, referred to condescendingly in the 1930s and 1940s as “people’s books” (*halk kitapları*), never received any attention from the critical establishment apart from general disparagement. Nor did their translators take any part in the debates on translation strategy.

The last two chapters of Gürçağlar’s

book (just over 100 pages) are devoted to “case studies” of specific groups of texts. In Chapter 6 these are not even all translations, because the author wishes to demonstrate similarities or contrasts between a particular writer/translator’s approaches to (non-canonical) translation and to the construction of other kinds of texts. The phenomenon of ‘pseudotranslation’, in particular, is shown as clearly illustrating an attitude of indifference towards the issue of authorial originality. In this, and in their tendency to abridge, rearrange or make additions to the source text when performing an actual translation, the writer-translators catering to the popular market are seen to have followed practices that were in complete opposition to the norms of integrity and fidelity propounded by the people associated with the Translation Bureau. These contrasts are brought into a different kind of focus in Chapter 7, where canonical and popular translations of *Gulliver’s Travels* (or parts of it) are compared.

This book has undoubtedly extended the boundaries of our understanding of the overall picture of translation activity in Turkey in the first four decades of the Republic. Unfortunately the author’s rather laboured and repetitive style makes the reading of it less enjoyable than the intrinsic interest of the material deserves.

**Celia Kerslake**, *University of Oxford*

## Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party

Edited by Ümit Cizre

London: Routledge 2007, 238 pp., ISBN 041539645X, US\$130.00 (hardcover).

The coming of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in the November 3, 2002 general elections represented “a major turning point” for Turkish politics.<sup>1</sup> The first book-length attempt to analyze the party and its effects on Turkish politics was M. Hakan Yavuz’s edited volume, entitled *The Emergence of a New Turkey*.<sup>2</sup> Ümit Cizre and her colleagues now have written another book analyzing the roots, identity and policies of the AKP: *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. Cizre’s edited volume differs from Yavuz’s in that it puts forward some arguments which constitute the basis of the analyses in subsequent chapters; the resulting internal cohesion makes Cizre’s collection a more focused read than Yavuz’s volume.

Contributors to Cizre’s edited volume share the common goal of critiquing the AKP’s ‘u-turn from the politics of change/reform.’ This criticism traverses the entire book, stretching from Cizre’s introductory chapter to the other individual articles. In her introductory chapter, Cizre argues that “the conservative-nationalist instincts of the AKP seemed to reawaken” after 2005 because the AKP “shares with the conservative right-wing’s ... distaste for the politics of difference and a disregard for fundamental freedoms and minority rights” (10). She draws a sharp distinction between the first period, in which the AKP initiated

and sustained a politics of change, and the second period when it pursued a politics of retreat from its reformist agenda. All of the authors in the collection offer their own answer to account for this change, but Cizre raises a tumultuous question about the AKP’s cordiality towards democratization itself by asking “whether the 2003 democratic alterations in the civil-military equation [the AKP’s most important reform in accordance with democratization process] were motivated more by the mechanical preconditions for further alignment with the EU than a democratic discourse that originated from the party itself” (12).

The fact that ‘the new Islamism’ represented by the AKP has many differences from the old Islamism represented by the National Outlook Movement (NOM) is the second argument which traverses the entire book. This idea is most extensively analyzed in Menderes Çınar and Burhanettin Duran’s co-authored chapter, which can be read as a brief outline of Turkish Islamism with such subtitles as “the peculiarities of Turkish Islamism,” “Kemalism and Islam,” “The National Outlook Movement versus Kemalism” and “The AKP and transformation of Islamism.” After underlining the fact that “Islamist movements have been transforming their discourses and programs in every part of the Muslim world” and that there is a “newly emerging (post-)Islamist discourse” prone to share “universal values

like democracy, human rights, and civil societies,” Çınar and Duran present the story of the AKP “as an interesting case of transformation for Islamism” (20-21). The main problem in this chapter is the authors’ reduction of said transformation to the process of change from the National Outlook Movement (NOM) to the AKP, a reduction which comes at the cost of downplaying the intellectual, economic, and social roots of this transformation. Such a reading risks misrepresenting the latter factors; as a result, readers unfamiliar with Turkish politics might misconstrue the transformation of Islamism in Turkey. The authors also have a moral thrust of their own; they consequently depict the NOM as a problematic movement with problematic positions on democracy and liberalism. However, they fail to evaluate the new Islamism critically, not only with all of its virtues, but also in its vices and shortcomings. As such the reader is left with the impression that the old Islamism of the NOM is intrinsically bad, and the new Islamism represents progress toward a better order. Here the authors buy into the popular and uncritical notion that moderate Islam is essentially good and needs to be promoted.

Ahmet Yıldız’s chapter focuses on the differences between the NOM and the AKP in the context of their differing political stances. Yıldız analyzes several critical questions, such as the content of the AKP’s political identity (i.e. conservative democracy), how that identity is used as “a tool of political legitimacy” (45), the relationship between the AKP and new Islamist concepts, and the factors that explain the change from the NOM to the AKP. Yıldız then concludes that the current situation is

not the result of “a voluntary change... but one encouraged by structural conditions” (51). However, Yıldız leaves several questions unanswered, such as what these structural conditions are and how they underpin the transformation of Islamism in Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, Yıldız tests his argument that “the AKP’s Islamism is quite different from that represented by” the NOM (56) by comparing the policies of these two movements toward secular red lines, and in terms of the country’s heated debates about education, women, the consumption of alcoholic beverages in public, secularism and nationalism.

Kenan Çayır’s chapter can be read as the complement of the previous one. Like Yıldız, Çayır also focuses on the difference between the NOM and the AKP, but differs significantly from Yıldız and the other contributors in his approach. Çayır seeks to explain the AKP’s changes “not merely [in] the ‘political’ sphere but in the ‘non-political’ ones” (75). He calls the 1970s and 1980s a period of “collective Islamism” which he defines as a perspective that understands the West and Islam as separate entities. To approach the “non-political” sphere, Çayır studies characters represented in Islamic novels, and the writings of Islamic intellectuals (64-68). After comparing the discourses of the Islamic novelists and intellectuals of the 1990s and 2000s with their predecessors, Çayır reaches the conclusion that there now exists a new interpretation of Islamism which can be termed “self-critical Islamism.” Such a reading of the change in Islamism makes possible the argument that the 28 February Process is not the only dominant factor behind the changes in the perception of Islamic actors (75). The

first three chapters of the book thus aim to explain the transformation of Islamism in Turkey, but present insufficient analyzes with which to explain the structural factors behind the transformation because they do not sufficiently address “the political economy of Islamic discourse”.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to their co-authored chapter, Burhanettin Duran and Menderes Çınar, in their independent chapters, bring strong criticism to bear against the AKP. Duran focuses on the international dimension rather than the domestic one in explaining the reasons behind the AKP’s search for legitimacy in the eyes of the secular establishment. He calls the international developments which have favored the AKP as “opportunity spaces” (81) and underlines his contention that they existed only up until the beginning of the EU accession process in October 2005. According to Duran’s analysis, the new international relations “no longer provide an ‘opportunity space’ to the AKP (89). Duran’s conclusion, which stems from a comparison of these two periods, is that the use of foreign policy for domestic transformation is insufficient and has limits. According to Duran, “inter-elite consensus is a *sine qua non* of the consolidated democratic rule in Turkey” (101) and therefore the AKP should focus on “desecuritizing the identity issues of Turkey” such as secularism and the Kurdish question by engaging in “politics of consensus” with the secular elites (93). Duran also makes the most provocative argument of the book by introducing the AKP as a party keeping “some affinity with the Islamist ontology” and not cutting “ties with Islamic movements in Turkey” (85). The fact that Duran underlies the continuities while other

chapters focus on the differences between the NOM and the AKP proves a valuable contribution in explaining why the AKP leadership chooses conservative democracy as an identity for the party (86).

Menderes Çınar directly links the transformation of Islamism to the 28 February process in the introductory part of his chapter. This signals reductionism and a problematic approach, since overemphasizing the importance of the 28 February process may lead to the claim that the AKP is a masked party with a hidden agenda. In the rest of the chapter, Çınar argues that both the secularist state elite and the AKP have produced their own exclusive communities. By means of the phrase ‘the communization of state’, Çınar indicates that for the secular elite, the criteria for legality is to be “devout believers of Kemalism” (114) and for the AKP, it is the Friday prayer and having a wife with headscarves, possessions and practices which yield “important merit in recruiting personnel for the bureaucracy” (126). Turkish society is thereby divided into two communities which are mutually exclusive. The secular community manifests itself in mass protests or the so-called Republic Rallies organized by “the new middle class... [responding] to perceived threats to their lifestyle.”<sup>4</sup> The AKP’s community manifests itself in the fact that the AKP gives some concessions to the secular establishment on democratic issues (124) in order not to lose its previously hard-won political and bureaucratic gains. For Çınar, the main reason behind the AKP’s concession strategy is its “inadequate understanding of democracy, its lack of a strategy for democratization, and its consequent inability to pursue Europeanization consistently”

(126, 122-123). Çınar thus shares the view that the AKP “is a culturally conservative movement that harbors strong authoritarian tendencies and a vigorous nationalistic vein.”<sup>5</sup>

Analyzing the relationship between the AKP and the military, Ümit Cizre divides the AKP’s policies toward the military in this period into two phases. For Cizre, while the AKP demystified “national security” and changed the civil-military balance by realizing the August 2003 Harmonization Package in the first period, the “second period of minimal or no engagement with the democratic management of the military” (145) represented the “erosion of the AKP’s oversight over the military” (153). Cizre holds the military responsible for the differences between the two periods. In her view, “the armed forces are on the offensive, counterbalancing [the military’s] partial loss of political influence by actively creating new instruments” (147). The conditions which encourage the military in sharpening “its attempt to shape public discourse against the AKP” are related to the reversal of international support for the government by the EU and the United States (150). Nor is the AKP innocent in this process, for it “attaches a higher premium to avoiding a possible threat of a coup from the military than on establishing democratic civil-military relations” (154). Cizre concludes the chapter optimistically, however, by expressing her sense that the AKP “is now [being] forced to... reposition itself towards a more realistic, constructive and democratic strategy” (161).

Ali Resul Usul’s chapter analyses the transformation by citing the perception of

Islamic groups towards the EU. This chapter focuses on the differences between the attitudes of the NOM and the AKP toward the West and toward Turkey’s integration with the EU. Despite the AKP’s Euro-enthusiasm, Usul underlines some difficulties which are likely to constrain the progress of the AKP’s EU policy (183). Among these, Cyprus and the Kurdish issue are the foremost.

İbrahim Dalmış and Ertan Aydın’s co-authored chapter illustrates the social profile of the AKP’s deputies, supporters and members by using opinion poll data collected by ANAR and Pollmark. Another reviewer of the book, Şaban Kardaş, believes that the empirical data presented in this chapter disconfirm the analyses of the earlier chapters. For Kardaş, Aydın and Dalmış’s research clearly shows that the AKP is situated within the center-right position in Turkish politics, and indicates that studies that focus exclusively on the transformation of Islamism lead to an incomplete account of the AKP and its policies.<sup>6</sup> Kardaş is right on the grounds that Aydın and Dalmış depict the AKP as a representative of right-wing politics, and not a rigid follower of a particular ideology, as was the case with earlier parties of the NOM (220). This broader basis for analysis comprises a major distinction between this chapter and previous ones which analyze the AKP more narrowly in terms of the transformation of Islamism. However, Aydın and Dalmış accept that “the AKP’s identity was based on the leadership cadre [of the party]” (220) and that, all in all, this cadre is the outcome of the “evolving discourse” of the NOM and the “remarkable changes in the mentality” that came about as a result of the develop-

ments of the 1990s (208). Therefore, the chapter can be read as empirical evidence for the arguments presented in the previous chapters as well.

Overall, *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party* makes an important contribution to the literature on contemporary politics in Turkey. The reader who has the

advantage of hindsight to evaluate the arguments in the book and compare them with the developments that took place after the presidential election would find many prophetic clues to help decipher Turkey's current crisis. All things considered, readers may come to accept Duran's observation: "it is a Herculean task to solve the identity problems of Turkish politics without creating tension and conflict" (90).

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### Endnotes

1. Ali Balci and Nebi Miş, "Turkey's Role in the 'Alliance of Civilizations': A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, (September 2008) (forthcoming).

2. M. Hakan Yavuz, *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006).

3. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chapter 4; Ahmet Insel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No. 2-3, (Spring/Summer 2003), p. 279.

4. M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, "Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 14, (Fall 2007), p. 122.

5. Insel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", p. 301

6. Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey under the Justice and Development Party: Between Transformation of 'Islamism' and Democratic Consolidation?," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, (Summer 2008), pp. 175-187.

## Human Rights in Turkey

Edited by Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat and foreword by Richard Falk

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007, 376 pp., ISBN 978-0-8122-4000-9, US\$69.95.

*Human Rights in Turkey* provides a comprehensive picture of the present conditions of human rights issues and government policies in Turkey. It consists of eighteen essays focusing on a wide range of human rights, including freedom of the press, religion, and association; religious and ethnic minority rights; the rights of the displaced; and women's rights. Domestic

factors such as human rights education and international influences particularly from international human rights organizations are also examined. The academic backgrounds of the contributors are diverse, with the authors ranging from political scientists to policy specialists, which leads to a lack of theoretical uniformity across the chapters. Nevertheless, the variety of ap-

proaches yields a depth of analysis rarely achieved; this edited volume indicates that various forms of human rights conditions and violations in Turkey should be studied with special reference to historical and domestic contexts, political culture, the level of economic development, and international human rights regimes.

The book is split into six parts. The first part, consisting of five essays, discusses freedom of the press and the minority rights situation in Turkey. Dilruba Çatalbaş demonstrates that, while the press in Turkey has frequently been subjugated to political constraints imposed by the state, its freedom has now fallen under new economic pressures in the current period of economic liberalization. Although economic liberalism contributes to “end the state monopoly in broadcasting,” brings about “the mushrooming of private satellite channels,” and allows open debate on some controversial issues, Turkey’s liberal economic policies also increase the level of corporate control of the media and promote its “tabloidization.” In the second essay, Baskın Oran examines how the Turkish government has interpreted the minority concepts and rights recognized by the Lausanne Treaty, analyzes to what extent the government has protected or violated minority rights, and discusses the impact on minority rights of Turkey’s bid for European Union membership. Prodromos Yannas’ essay on the human rights condition of the Rum orthodox argues that the Greek minority community in Turkey has diminished due to violations of the human rights of minority granted by the Lausanne Treaty. In the period between 1923 and 1945, he explains, the state’s nation-building project was pursued at the

expense of the rights of all minority groups, including the Rum Orthodox. In the post World War II period, international security issues, particularly the Cyprus problem, played a critical role for the fortune of Turkey’s Rum Orthodox population. In her discussion on the Kurdish struggle for recognition, Mary Lou O’Neil emphasizes the significance of language both for the Turkish state and its Kurdish population. For the state, any languages other than Turkish are perceived as a threat to the unity of the nation. For Kurds, their own language is a cornerstone of their ethnic identity. Thus, O’Neil pays particular attention to the linguistic human rights of the Kurds and points out that Turkey has failed to fulfill its obligations to respect the language rights stipulated under international law. Finally in this section, Özlem Denli’s essay summarizes the history of the state’s attempts to control and manipulate Islam, and explores the recent transformation of Islamic discourse via its adoption of human rights norms and the concepts of diversity and pluralism.

The three essays in Part II are devoted to an analysis of social and economic rights. Weisband and Oner’s essay on Turkish labor reveals that freedom of association and workers’ rights in Turkey are fragile due to political and structural constraints and economic liberalization. In particular, workers in the informal economy such as women, immigrants, and children are the most vulnerable to job insecurity. Gök and Ilgaz provide a nice summary of the situation of the right to education and the education system in Turkey, and examine the causes of such persistent problems as quality of education and unequal educa-

tional opportunities, contending that the privatization of education results in further diminishing the chance to be educated for the more economically vulnerable. Parlak's essay on environmental rights presents domestic and institutional arrangements for environmental protection and the development of public awareness in regard to environmental concerns. Parlak suggests that state officials as well as citizens in Turkey rarely discuss environmental issues within the framework of human rights discourse.

Part III, called 'The Rights of the Displaced,' is composed of two essays, and examines the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum seekers. Özerdem and Jacoby focus on the displacement problem in southeast Anatolia, the causes of internal displacement, and the state's policies toward IDPs. Kemal Kirişçi analyzes Turkish asylum policy and practice, discusses the *Jabari v. Turkey* ruling of the European Court of Human Rights that highlighted Turkey's human rights violations of asylum seekers; he then turns to an assessment of the recent collaboration between the Turkish government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that has improved Turkey's asylum system.

In the next section, which focuses on women's rights, Yıldız Ecevit's essay describes the dynamic interaction between the state and various women's organizations in Turkey, and shows that women have actively participated in their struggle for gender equality and rights, and in posing challenges to the discriminatory regulations and practice of the state. Yasemin Çelik takes up the effects of the Conven-

tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted in the UN General Assembly in 1979, which Turkey ratified in 1985. Celik claims that CEDAW has played a significant role in inducing legislative changes for furthering women's rights, despite delays in the attitudinal and cultural changes that are also required for improving women's status in society.

Part V, entitled "Civil and Education Efforts," includes two essays. The first, written by Başak Çalı, brings to light the role of domestic human rights organizations in transforming human rights discourse in Turkish history, and argues that while this discourse was originally formulated according to the domestic sociopolitical milieu, it has now started to intermingle with international human rights movements, policies, and ideas. Kenan Çayır's essay deals with human rights education for school children and civil servants in Turkey, and suggests that the improvement of human rights conditions and effective implementation of human rights protections require not only legal reforms, but also attitudinal and cultural changes among citizens in a pro-human rights direction.

The final part of the book delivers two essays on Turkey's place in the international human rights regime. Exploring Turkey's response to external pressure to comply with international human rights norms, Füsün Türkmen posits that Turkey's participation in the realm of international human rights is based on a utilitarian calculation of realpolitik rather than a moral commitment. Thus, he suggests, it may be assumed that the Turkish government is more likely

to get involved in the protection of human rights only when such involvement works to promote national self interest in international politics. Thomas Smith then discusses the growing significance of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – which has received a number of applications and petitions from Turkish citizens – on Turkish law and practice with regard to human rights issues. Although the Kemalist understanding of rights is in conflict with the liberal norm of the European human rights regime, Smith observes that the ECHR has been influential enough to induce the Turkish government to reform its laws and regulations to align them with international human rights norms. Arat's concluding essay is important in that it not only summarizes common themes across the collection as a whole, but also attempts to locate the Turkish case in international and theoretical contexts.

Several themes and contentions are shared by the contributors to this volume. First, that human rights movements are likely to be repressed or ignored by the state as long as their claims are perceived by state elites as a threat to the principles of national and territorial unity and indivisibility. Reflecting the fact that the so-called Sevres syndrome is widely and deeply rooted in Turkey's political culture, there have been a series of cases in which advocates seeking to further cultural and linguistic rights have not only been denied those rights, but accused because their perspectives threaten a monolithic and corporatist concept of nation. Advocacy networks that collaborate with activist international human rights organizations are suspected of being spies for foreign countries. In other

words, human rights issues which are essentially cultural and social, and thus could be handled through ordinary procedures of political debate, are instead interpreted as being related to and challenging national security. As some contributors to this book imply, the human rights claims and identity assertions of minorities are understood and framed as existential security threats by the state establishment, while the environmental movement, which does not directly address the issue of territorial and national unity, is less vulnerable to being securitized by the state. By locating dissent voices within the discourse of security, the state apparatus justifies the use of extraordinary means to deal with a perceived security problem outside of parliament. Such a "securitization" process repeatedly appears in this volume as a major obstacle to progress with respect to the protection of human rights in Turkey.

Second, many of the essays in this volume indicate that the EU and other international human rights regimes have positively influenced the Turkish government toward improving human rights protections, although legislative and legal reforms driven by external pressure may not be enough. Human rights protection requires both institutional change from above and attitudinal change from below; this volume lacks a rigorous analysis of the latter. Thus, we need further research to determine a causal relationship between institutional reform and cultural change on human rights conditions. Does institutional change cause attitudinal change among citizens? Or, should cultural shift occur first in order to change institutional settings organically? Or, are institutional and sociological changes mu-

tually constitutive?

Third, the impact of neoliberal economic policies is debatable. There are several scholars in the literature of Turkish politics who argue that the shift from etatism to a neoliberal economy in the 1980s is the most important factor for empowering civil society organizations, including human rights advocacy networks. On the other hand, other scholars attribute the declining conditions of social and economic rights to market forces that affect income distribution across social class and regions. In addition, they continue, economic liberalization may counter the positive effects of the legal reform on Turkey's human rights situation by undermining the socio-economic foundations of civil society. Thus, the relative benefit of a neoliberal economy

for human rights is an empirical question raised by the volume, and one which awaits further study.

Turkey's current human rights situation stands at a historic crossroads in which both pro-human rights forces, including on the one hand international human rights regimes and domestic social movements, and on the other, reluctant actors of the state apparatus grudgingly responding to the former, are dynamically contesting each other. In this sense, *Human Rights in Turkey* is a timely contribution that will be a standard reference on the subject for years to come. It not only provides in-depth analyses of Turkey's human rights situation from different angles; it also poses various theoretical and empirical research questions for future agendas.

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## Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism

By *Kent E. Calder*

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 340 pp. ISBN 978-0-691-13143-6 (hardcover) ISBN: 978-0-691-13463-5 (paper)

In recent years, particularly after the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been an increase in debate on the politics of the U.S. and the concept of "American Empire." The debate on this concept in the literature is not a new phenomenon. The question of U.S. imperialism has been the subject of many debates since the Spanish-American War of 1898. However, the more recent discussion has focused on

the United States' technical military capabilities, its hard power so to speak, rather than the political and economic strength which might be described as its soft power. Military bases are the most controversial part of these discussions as far as American influence beyond the U.S. borders is concerned.

As a result of the foreign policy it has pursued in recent years, the U.S. now faces

an increasingly complex basing problem. Even U.S. allies have become skeptical about the presence of American bases on their sovereign territories, and have begun putting pressure on Washington to withdraw or move its troops. In *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*, Kent E. Calder examines various aspects of U.S. base politics, analyzes the current situation by means of a comparative perspective, and tries to establish a ground from which to answer the question of “how and where to best keep them.” In his introductory chapter, Calder focuses on the effects of American military presence overseas, and considers the ways in which the strategic and geopolitical functions of America’s foreign bases have changed over the past few centuries. Calder argues that after World War II the bases took on a new political and economic function: that of stabilizing national ties across both the Atlantic and the Pacific. According to his analysis, the bases perform this function by promoting interdependence in trade and investment, as well as political-military relations.

For Calder, however, the roles of the military bases in international affairs are not limited to their stabilizing functions. The bases also deter aggression, reinforce alliance relations, inhibit balance of power conflict, provide formidably efficient global logistics networks, assure smooth resources flows and, most recently, help to combat terrorism. In the last decade, however, increasing political and technological pressures and growing anti-Americanism have come to threaten worldwide American military presence. Calder sees the American basing structure as a vital guarantor of

stable global political-economic interdependence, and he draws the lines of a “save the bases” project in subsequent chapters, claiming that “there can be a policy science of basing.” In order to understand how base politics works, Calder traces its historical trajectory by comparing the experiences of different imperial powers. The book thus provides a comprehensive analysis of the history of base politics and proposes the use of this historical legacy as a key to the intelligent application of future base politics.

At the end of chapter one we learn that once bases are established, they tend to remain in place for long periods of time. However, despite their longevity, bases always find themselves subject to the winds of change that surround them. The second chapter thus addresses the question of how emerging political and technological pressures affect conservative military structures and considers the kinds of transformations to which such pressures lead. Calder answers these questions by summarizing the current situation of American overseas basing through historical and cross-national perspectives. He concludes that the U.S.’s overseas deployments are vulnerable, embattled and challenged by political and technological transformations. In short, the American forward military presence is currently under siege. Calder contends that the U.S. needs to retain a global basing presence so as to stabilize the world political economy and to confront terrorism. Developing a policy science of base politics by analyzing the different variables that play crucial roles in determining the political viability of bases is offered as a solution through which the bases might be retained.

In the following chapters, Calder focuses on the variable factors that can affect the presence of overseas bases. He compares anti-base movements and pro-base forces to determine group characteristics. The main question Calder tries to answer in these chapters is how a host nation's specific characteristics contribute to the stability or instability of a forward deployment. For him, the position of the host nation in regard to bases depends mainly on two variables: the political tendencies of decision makers, and public opinion. Demography and local population density are mentioned in this context as factors that must be taken into consideration. Calder concludes that military bases should be established far from densely populated areas, especially in countries with decentralized, democratic political systems; in his view, discouraging interaction between local citizens and soldiers would prevent conflicts, crimes and environmental disruption.

The author supports his theories by providing tables, numbers and figures as evidence. Calder also develops key concepts such as "liberating occupation" with which to understand the prospects of long-term base stability. He argues that it is not easy to sustain a long-term base presence in places where the historical heritage of European imperialism is strong. On the other hand, he contends that the "liberating occupations" of the U.S. in countries such as Germany, Japan, Italy and South Korea have promoted broad social reform and succeeded in liberating those country's citizens. As a result of this success, the backlash against American forces is less virulent in these countries than it is in other areas where American presence is smaller. Thus,

Calder believes that the U.S. must establish itself clearly as a "liberating occupier" in order to hold bases for the long-term. He offers this model to solve the policy problems confronting the U.S. in the Middle East today. In the same chapter, Calder explains why, ironically, the "liberator" U.S. backs dictators' host nations when bases are involved. Rather than shying away from the harsh realities of base politics, Calder explains the financial factor as another instrument used to stabilize base presence. He presents four financial models in base relations: compensation politics, bazaar politics, fiat politics and affective politics, ultimately arguing that the bazaar model will be a more successful tool for the U.S. in the future.

In *Embattled Garrisons*, Calder analyzes different options to find ways of dispelling the anti-American clouds hanging over U.S. forward deployment. To those who argue that the U.S. does not need to deploy its forces overseas because new technological and geopolitical developments and economic trends encourage the U.S. to decrease such deployments, Calder offers a dissenting voice. For Calder, these approaches largely ignore the diplomatic function of the bases and their role in host nation politics; in his view, the world needs American guidance. Thus, although the U.S. may need to downsize its global presence and act less audaciously, Calder nonetheless insists that the need for its global leadership is enduring.

As must be apparent by now, Calder discusses the U.S.'s overseas deployment from a strongly nationalist perspective. While he provides useful data with which

to understand the historical development of base politics, the author totally ignores the imperialistic inflection of such policies. Calder sees the U.S. system of bases as a stabilizing tool which works for the advantage of all sides. In his perspective, the U.S. does not want to dominate the world through its military power; rather, it works benevolently in the interest of everyone's happiness. For Calder, the world needs a global stabilizer and the U.S. cannot avoid assuming that role.

Although Calder does analyze the prob-

lems that result from American presence in host nations, he does not go deeply into the negative impact of overseas deployment. He tries to find solutions for these problems only in order to keep the bases, and thus fails to address the larger picture. Despite its ideological parochialism, however, *Embattled Garrisons* is a useful source book on American military history as far as U.S. foreign policy regarding overseas bases is concerned. It also provides an informative glimpse at the ways in which American expansionism is legitimized.

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## **Oil, Islam and Conflict: Central Asia since 1945**

By *Rob Johnson*

London: Reaktion Books, 2007, 272 pp., ISBN 1861893396, £15.95 (paper).

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*Oil, Islam and Conflict: Central Asia since 1945* provides an excellent introduction to the region, especially for service people arriving in Turkestan for the first time in their lives. The region that has been known as Turkestan since at least the 6th century CE has seen both bright and dark ages in its long history, and Rob Johnson's volume gives it its due. Host to the famous Göktürk Kaganate, the Seljuk Empire, the Mongol Empire, and the Empire of Tamarlane, Turkestan has always been one of the major political, cultural and social centers both of the Islamic world and the Asian continent. The Russian Empire absorbed the region in 1865; from that time until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, i.e. for 126 years, Turkestan was a colony first of the Russian and then the Soviet Empire. Al-

though the Russian conquest was achieved by means of the unquestionable technological superiority of the conquerors, the native response was always resistance. Turkestani resistance started at the very moment that Russia's expedition regiments were seen at the horizon, and continued until 1991 via different means. Throughout the 19th century, dozens if not hundreds of uprisings of various scales typically resulted in the slaughter of the natives by the Tsarist armies. By the time of the 1917 revolution and the Civil War in Russia, rebellion had already become a tradition in Turkestan. With the coming of the Russian revolution, Turkestanis saw an opportunity for freedom and independence. Yet after the short-lived Khokand and Alash Orda Turkestan governments, many Turkestanis were forced

to retreat to the mountains to carry out guerilla warfare; this movement was called the Basmachi (i.e. bandit) movement by the Russians. Basmachis continued their resistance until the 1930s, unable to stop the Red Terror in Turkestan which took the lives of tens of thousands of Turkestanian intellectuals. Then came WWII. The vaporization of millions of Turkestanian young men, drafted to defend the Soviet fronts against the Germans, left nothing at home but a tradition of opposition, which now took the form of passive resistance. The post-war history of Soviet rule in Turkestan is full of scandals involving party officials, corruption at all levels, and the linguistic and social isolation of the Russian colonists from the Turkestanian natives. The only difference between Turkestan's 1991 independence and its autonomous governments of 1918 was the fact that this time there were five different "nations" instead of one single and united Turkestan.

As even this brief sketch suggests, the history of the region is complex and full of confusing accounts; understanding its contemporary politics is an even more complicated task. Rob Johnson's volume takes up this challenge in ten chapters, beginning with a survey of regional issues and their history through the 1990s. Johnson's general descriptions, and his thoughtful elucidation of such concepts as clan loyalties in the region are more than praiseworthy. Johnson is concerned primarily with the historical continuation of old clan and tribal loyalties within the context of the new "Great Game" (to adopt the phrase from Lutz Kleveman's eponymous 2003 book on the region). Johnson provides a microscopic analysis of each republic, including the

major problems each now faces. In doing so, Johnson also points out the potential economic wealth of the regional countries, sometimes slightly exaggerating the extent of their natural resources. The chapter on the Chechen and Caucasus wars might seem irrelevant when the geographical scope of the book is concerned. However, the author, well aware of the close interactions between the governments and the oppositions of all post-Soviet countries, is justified in his inclusion of the Caucasus in his analysis. Indeed, it enables the reader to think more comprehensively about the region at large.

*Oil, Islam and Conflict* also provides a comprehensive analysis of the current Islamic-religious movements in the region, relying largely on the available English-language resources. Johnson's outlines of the Tajik civil war and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan are based completely on the Ahmed Rashid camp of English-language authors. In spite of this limitation, however, Johnson does a very good job of drawing a clear map while still managing to provide hundreds of names of warlords, mujahedeen commanders, etc., without ever confusing the reader. His chapter on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is one of the best accounts ever written on this organization. However, even these strengths reflect Johnson's journalistic approach to the matter, and his volume could not be called a scholarly survey of the material it addresses. Further, Johnson's journalistic method sometimes creates problems, leading him at times to repeat certain allegations from some very marginal and untrustworthy sources. Although Johnson occasionally repeats himself at other times as well, these

more innocuous repetitions help the reader remember the details of the context.

It has become a new trend in most of the recent English-language books published on Turkestan to include a chapter on Eastern Turkestan, and Johnson's book is no exception. Eastern Turkestan (or Xinjiang, to use the name given by the Chinese colonial administration) is a focus of interest and concern for several important reasons, as explained by the author. It is considered to be the soft belly of the People's Republic of China, with a Muslim/Uygur majority almost always out of sync with the Beijing administration. There have been allegations by the PRC that there is a serious El Qaeda-connected threat stemming from the region and directed towards China, due to the existence of Uygurs in Islamic Movements all over the world. For this reason, the PRC's own "war against terror" is automatically directed against the Uygur majority in Eastern Turkestan. Also, Eastern Turkestan represents the only mineral and energy-rich region of China, neighboring "energy rich" Western Turkestan and former Soviet Central Asia. Rob Johnson approaches the region through the lens of an Anglo-Saxon rational choice model; it therefore seems consistent to him and most likely to his target readers to connect oil and gas wealth with historically-rooted clan and tribal loyalties, and to link this conjunction in turn with the threat of global Jihad. This perspective probably explains why Johnson's ninth chapter focuses on hydrocarbons and great

powers. Here Johnson's analysis is based on the "energy security" concerns of the great powers which led to the new Great Game in the region. In his conclusion, to his credit, Johnson draws the attention of the reader to dozens of other problems, such as water supplies, trans-border crime gangs, human trafficking, drugs, and so on.

In conclusion, a number of caveats are in order. Firstly, Johnson provides no conclusions at the end of each chapter. The reader is thus left standing with the question of what all this means in reality. On the bright side, this decision of Johnson's part turns the book into an easy-to-read novelistic account, in which you expect to solve the very complicated detective fiction at the end. And this is in fact true. Secondly, although Johnson includes a good reference section and has clearly read most of the best material, an overdependence on English-language sources threatens to impose the construction of an artificial world onto the region, leading to a perspective warped by the lenses of a uniformly educated, quite orientalist crowd of authors. Lastly, the reader has been left in darkness on the subject of whether or not the author himself has been in the region extensively, and thus to what extent he draws his conclusions on any direct observations. Despite these caveats, *Oil, Islam and Conflict* is nonetheless an important contribution to the study of the region, especially given Rob Johnson's unique handling of a long list of parameters and his meticulous selectiveness.

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