CIAO DATE: 07/2011
Volume: 2, Issue: 1
Spring 2011
Editor's Note; An Iranian View on the Uprisings in the Arab World (PDF)
Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour
In the last couple of seasons, the Arab world has been engulfed by popular uprisings. What was sparked by a young Tunisian man’s self-immolation, by any definition in social science, has evolved into a turning point in the Middle East and North Africa. Some observers have compared recent events with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, resulting in the birth of a new regional order. All concerned players in international and regional politics have demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity to this indeed remarkable shift and have been trying to cope with a plethora of analytical as well as policy challenges. In this equation, how does the Iranian perspective on these developments look like? Taking into account that there are a wide range of views in the Iranian discourse on the Arab uprisings on the one hand, and the exigencies of Iranian neighborhood with the Arab world, on the other there is no single way to discern "the Iranian view". However, an Iranian perspective may be recognized by looking at Iran’s views on the nature and direction of the Arab uprisings, as well as the opportunities and challenges these developments pose for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The question of how to analyze the Arab uprisings has turned into a cognitive and analytical battlefield among competing Iranian views, some with monumental distances between each other. One analytical school is of the belief that these uprisings are nothing but the outcome of an American and Western grand social engineering devised outside the region. The other school focuses on domestic, social and political structures as the main reasons behind the Arab Spring. The dominant, official Iranian view is that the Arab uprisings are an ‘Islamic Awakening’ and a continuation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Obviously, the cognitive and practical outcomes of these schools’ views differ in a qualitative fashion. One of the opportunities for Iran born out of the Arab uprisings is the relative failure of Iranophobia. Let us not forget that the concept helped construct the security identities of regimes such as that of the ousted Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak. The collapse of Mubarak’s regime can be equated with the collapse of the "Iran as the Most Important Security Danger Project in the Middle East": a project designed by the United States, Israel and their Arab friends. The pro-western Arab elites manipulated fear of Iran to solicit international support for their very oppressive domestic agendas. During the last six months, Iran has not topped the security agenda in the region, though some players are trying very hard to repair the obsolete and tainted construction of Iranophobia in the regional and international strategic arenas. In addition to the lessening of the efficacy of Iranophobia, Iran has a special feeling that its revolutionary values have gained regional weight: a celebrated opportunity. The Arab uprisings are not, however, solely an opportunity for Iran; challenges are also significant in the new regional setting. The most vivid challenges stem from the nature of Arab political systems, which through the prism of Iranian interests have sharp structural differences. This can be seen in the cases of Bahrain and Syria. Furthermore, the Western stance towards the Arab uprisings is challenging; especially when the concept of an opportunistic wave riding by Western powers comes to the Iranian psychological mindset. Finally, Iran and other Middle Eastern states cannot be but concerned and worried about the dark side of these developments, which include civil war and regional instability. Whatever these Arab uprisings are, they have caused "surprises" and "shocks" for those involved in the policy community and scholarly circles. Yet, the surprise Iran felt and feels seems to be relatively less compared with other regional and global actors. The reason? More than three decades ago, Iran experienced what the Arab world is going through today.
Free and Confined: Iran and the International System (PDF)
Mohiaddin Mesbahi
The study of Iran’s interaction with the international system is predicated on three broad theoretical assertions. First, the international system is a tripartite system with three interrelated yet distinct structures, namely coercive-military, normative-social, and economic-developmental. Second, agency (state), Iran in this case, is simultaneously unitary and composite, interacting distinctly with corresponding structural components of the international system. Third, the net assessment of any state’s position within the international system, in this case Iran’s, must take into consideration the symbiotic impact of the interaction with all three structures, and the cross fertilization and cross compensatory dynamics between them; weakness and vulnerability in one might be compensated for by strength in another. The delicate balance of Iran’s interaction with the international system in the last three decades, and especially in the post-Soviet/post-9/11 era, has vacillated between a systemically permissible threat of war and the potential for a historical, though reluctant, systemic accommodation. In its brinksmanship interaction with the three layers of the international system, Iran by design and by default has been strategically “lonely” and deprived of meaningful alliances and great power bandwagoning. Nevertheless, Iran is not isolated but rather intensely engaged, relying on its own capability which is predicated on a native strategic culture. The protection of this strategic culture remains the most formidable challenge facing the Islamic Republic in the fourth decade of its life; a challenge that emanates partially from systemic pressure and no less significantly by domestic normative dynamics.
Afghanistan, NATO and the Regional States: Challenges and Responses (PDF)
Shirin Akiner
Ambiguous, often contradictory, assessments of the achievements of NATO/ISAF operations in Afghanistan make it difficult to form a clear picture of the situation on the ground. However, despite the rhetoric of politicians and military leaders who speak of ‘sticking it out’ till the job is done, there are unmistakable signals that the endgame has started. The emphasis now is on fashioning an exit strategy that will justify the claim of ‘mission accomplished’. It is ironic that it is only now, with the dawning awareness that ‘a victor’s peace is impossible’, that the importance of involving the regional states is finally being recognized. With the exception of Pakistan, which from the outset played a strategic role in Western-led operations, there was an implicit reluctance, amounting to a virtual ban, on cooperating with these states as equal partners. China, Russia and Iran were largely ignored, while the Central Asian states were regarded mainly as transit routes. Yet by geography, history, ethnic ties and culture, Afghanistan is an integral part of the region. The ‘neighbourhood’ states are neither unaware nor indifferent to what happens there. Before and since 2001 there have been regional initiatives aimed at promoting stability and development in Afghanistan. This paper gives an overview of the main initiatives, bilateral and multilateral which seek to promote the country’s re-integration into regional cultural, economic and security networks.
Sanctions against Iran: War and Containment (PDF)
Mostafa Zahrani
While completing a general assessment of the fourth round of international sanctions imposed against the Islamic Republic of Iran, this paper assumes that even if the sanctions successfully target the country’s economic sector, they will not reach their main objective, which is to suspend the Iranian nuclear energy program within the timetable desired by the West. Based on such an assumption, the alternative to sanctions is war (with different aims and various degrees of intensity) or containment. In this review, it will be indicated that as war is rejected during the period in question, U.S. policy in the last three decades, i.e. containment through dexterity and with newer dimensions, will continue and severe sanctions will be used as the main element of containment. This paper includes sanctions, containment and war as three fundamental concepts. As sanctions are futile in stopping the Iranian nuclear program, the questions then are why and how Washington is stepping up sanctions within the framework of its containment policy alongside talk of war? The hypothesis is that the talk of war as a means to support diplomacy will remain as the main pillar of U.S. containment policy.
Iran and the Persian Gulf Security (PDF)
Reza Simbar, Arsalan Ghorbani
The Arab uprisings, and the one in Bahrain in particular, have caused tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Bahraini government’s Saudi-backed crackdown on pro-democracy protests has caused ties between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to turn somewhat hostile in nature. However, just a few years ago, the situation was very different, with Iran being invited to a GCC summit. This paper intends to give context to the aforementioned development by analyzing its background and dynamics of Iran-GCC relations. To this aim, this paper will examine, review and analyze Iranian foreign policy with regard to the security geopolitics of the Persian Gulf. In the course of history, the countries in the region have undergone political, economic, security and even ideological ups and downs, which have led them to become the focus of major powers' attention. The region has also attracted attention due to its decisive role from geopolitical, security and economic points of view. A look at the background of security arrangements in the region establishes that all designs by outside powers' and all extra-regional interference have been futile in bringing security and stability to the region. Iran is among the Persian Gulf littoral states which, due to their strategic location and possession of huge crude oil and natural gas reserves, enjoy a special status. Any form of insecurity in the region will directly impact Iranian interests. Therefore, the strategy of the Iranian government vis-à-vis the security of this important region is based on the expansion of regional cooperation and intra-regional security-building. In this regard, there has been a remarkable growth in political exchanges and interaction at high levels between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other Persian Gulf states.
Iran and China - Looking for an Alliance and Regional Power Status (PDF)
ERZSÉBET N. RÓZSA
It is widely held that the 21st century will be China's century on the global stage, while Iran, in the beginning of the 21st century, is becoming a regional power in the Middle East even if the limits to its power can be questioned. Both countries stand practically alone, without allies in a world that looks upon their expansion unfavourably, if not with outright hostility. The 21st century, however, will not be the period of gaining influence by military means, even if the use of military force cannot be excluded. One of the main characteristics of both the Chinese and the Iranian expansions is economic expansion. Chinese presence is booming in the Middle East. Iran has developed a significant economic activity in Western Afghanistan, then in Iraq. Both countries look back on ancient civilisations, to which they frequently refer to and which contributes to their perceptions of the surrounding world. China has traditionally perceived itself as the centre of the universe. Iran, by the right of its Islamic revolution of 1979, wishes to be the leading power of the Islamic world. Ayatollah Khomeini was speaking of Islam, in spite of the fact that the Islamic government put forward by him is rooted in Shiite Islam. This leading role seems to return under the presidency of Ahmadinejad – even if in a new form. 11 September 2001 has created the moving space for Iran in which it can become a regional power.
EU Policy and US Strategy towards the Persian Gulf – Different Approaches for Common Goals? (PDF)
Michele Brunelli
Despite deep differences shown during 2003 Iraqi crisis, European Union expresses a joint policy towards the Persian Gulf. This is essentially based on the equation: “economy” = “development” and so “security and stability”. Economy is the tool which is really trans-European: it means that despite some different approaches on few geopolitical issues of its members, it remains fundamental pillar on which a real “European Foreign Policy”, can be built. During last years, this particular approach allowed EU: i) to start a fruitful discussion with GCC countries about a Persian Gulf currency union, ii) to include in its Agenda establishment of a free trade area with the GCC countries, iii) start negotiations for an EC-Iran Trade and Cooperation agreement, iv) to involve Iran, Iraq and Yemen in this process. All these actions will allow EU to create an area of dialogue, cooperation and exchange, which is one of the EU top priorities. A new wider space of cooperation composed of the countries belonging to the MENA region, GAFTA, Persian Gulf, Iraq and Yemen. While European Union has chosen a “more economic” approach, US policy towards the Persian Gulf is “more political”. US equation is: “freedom and democracy” – even coercively imposed = “security and stability for a specific area” = “security and stability for the US”. But in some parts of the world this strategy showed some imperfections (Afghanistan), demonstrating its fallacy (Iraq). In some cases US applied political model which doesn’t reflect social, political realities and doesn’t respect historical roots and heritages of the area.
Foreign Policy Planning in Iran in Twenty Year Outlook Plan (PDF)
Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour, Ardeshir Nourian
Foreign policy is influenced by structural elements, internal, regional and international political dynamics. The decisive role of human factors in decision making and orientation as well as the role and priorities in the path taken by nation-states in foreign relations also have an impact on foreign policy. The most considerable reflection of the elites' will in determining the orientation of foreign policy and international planning is embodied in the formulation of national outreach documents like national strategic plans, long-term strategic plans or perspective plans. As a regional power, the Islamic Republic of Iran, after three decades of struggle for its independence and national sovereignty, codified the 2025 National Perspective Document in 2003 after lengthy debate and a consensual decision making process. It serves as a key outreach document in which the framework of domestic and foreign policies aimed at turning Iran into a superior power in the southwest Asian region takes form. While explaining the link between foreign policy planning and economic development both from domestic and international perspectives, as explained in the document, this paper stresses the indivisibility of the two concepts. By emphasizing the structural and human elements at the same time, an explanation of the two concepts and the link between them are also considered. The theoretical framework of this research is based on constructivist theory, it holds that becoming a regional superpower is dependent on a developmentalist foreign policy. Moreover, it argues that from a normative point of view, simultaneous consideration of domestic sources of development and positive action and engagement with the international community is essential.