

contrition. This unique system combined with the especially stable and strong leadership of Adenauer and de Gaulle contributed to the reconciliation in Europe. The leadership made the 'nonaccusatory approach' possible and successful. The European integration together with the security arrangement of NATO anchored the process in the right direction. These elements were not observed in the Japan–Korea relationship.

As Lind admits, the results of this book cannot serve as the last word on the effects of remembrance on interstate reconciliation. However, this bold comparative analysis offers several materials for future research. In this sense, *Sorry State* contributes to opening new research fields of historical reconciliation.

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Citizens and the State: Attitudes in Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia. Routledge Innovations in Political Theory 29

Takashi Inoguchi and Jean Blondel

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After *Political Culture in Asia and Europe* (2006), this is the second volume by these authors exploring the results of a survey conducted in 18 countries of Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia in the year 2000. Examining the views of approximately 1,000 respondents in each country, they use factor analysis to group countries according to their citizens' perceptions of the state. In particular, they scrutinize the

respondents' identification with the nation-state, support for political and administrative authorities, and satisfaction with life. Based on factor loadings, they divide the countries into six types.

The first type comprised Spain, France, Sweden, and Germany, whose citizens the authors characterize as 'happy non-nationalists'. Respondents from these countries gave relatively little importance to nationality, but expressed confidence in state authorities and contentment with life. One of the few consistent regional differences separating the European and Asian cases was the lower level of nationalism in Europe. Otherwise, the findings confirmed the results of the earlier study that there are no consistent inter-regional differences in public opinion or general cultural orientation.

The UK and Taiwan constituted the second type, in which citizens were 'mildly uneasy' about the state. Though citizens' identity with the nation was somewhat stronger than in the first group of countries, respondents were more ambivalent in their views of political authorities. Only 22% of British informants had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in political institutions (parliament, parties, the government, and political leaders), compared with 34% of respondents from all countries. Only 42% of Taiwanese expressed such confidence in administrative institutions (police, civil service, and the courts), versus 51% in the survey as a whole. Alas, one general finding of the survey was that citizens everywhere tend to think more favorably of administrative than political authorities.

Japan and Indonesia exhibited a third type of citizen who was 'difficult to satisfy'. The two countries differed in that the Japanese expressed relatively little confidence in state authorities ('don't know' responses were numerous), whereas Indonesia was slightly above the average on that point. However, they shared relatively low satisfaction with life and a low level of national identity. The fourth category of 'frustrated patriots' included the Philippines, South Korea, Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Here, respondents expressed a high degree of national identity, but little confidence in the authorities and low satisfaction with life.

Thailand and Ireland shared citizens who were 'happy with development'. They enjoyed a comparatively high level of national identity and average level of confidence in the authorities and satisfaction with life. Finally, there were the 'optimists', which included Malaysia, Singapore, and, with qualifications, China. Questions concerning satisfaction with

political authorities were excluded from the questionnaire administered in China. Malaysians and Singaporeans, at least, manifested strong national identity, confidence in the authorities, and high satisfaction with life. To put it mildly, the survey did not produce sanguine perceptions of democracy. Not only did respondents across the board hold more favorable views of administrative than political authorities, but the citizens most satisfied with the nation, the state, and their lives hailed from non-democratic countries.

The authors further explored the relationship between their typology based on perceptions of the state and their respondents' assessments of public policy and general societal values. The relationship in both cases was not particularly strong when all groups were considered. Data on policy performance reinforced the troubling negative views that the survey unearthed about democracy. Favorable views of policy performance in seven areas were most numerous (71%) in the non-democratic group of Malaysia, Singapore, and China, when compared with 43% in the group of Germany, Spain, Sweden, and France, and 28% in the lowest group of Japan and Indonesia.

The authors did a great deal of background research in order to offer sophisticated interpretations of the data on each country; experts on this or that country will find it interesting to expand upon those interpretations. One must speculate in many cases as to the causes of public opinion (state propaganda? colonial history? the Asian financial crisis?) and regarding the intensity with which opinions were held. One must speculate as well regarding the relationship between opinions and political behavior in each case. While the authors' analysis focuses on the comparative dimension of the study, some of the findings on individual countries were intriguing in themselves. To give just one example, there was minimal identity with Chinese nationality in Taiwan.

The authors are open about the limits of their study, and, where possible, they worked hard to overcome those limits. For instance, while recognizing that a time series of surveys would be ideal, they included several questions asking their informants how their views had changed during the last decade.

This is one of the most ambitious comparative survey projects ever undertaken, and surveys on this scale can produce some striking findings that would not come to light in studies limited to one country or one region. I was especially impressed by the subjective nature of opinions

when compared across nations. Indeed, the surveys produced some remarkably counter-intuitive results. Japanese respondents hold a comparatively poor opinion of their government's policies related to crime and unemployment, even though Japan's levels of both have been among the lowest in the world, and they expressed a below-average level of national identity, even though Japan is one of the oldest and most homogeneous nation-states in the world. It would be fascinating to probe the origins of such views by means of in-depth interviews or focus groups, to find out why popular opinion in so many cases appears divorced from objective societal conditions. Constructivists will be much happier than rational choice theorists with the results of this study.

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