Power, trust, and network complexity: three logics of hedging in Asian security

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Abstract

Why do hedging strategies appear so pervasive in Asia? This article argues that hedging – not balancing or bandwagoning – is the central tendency in Asian international relations, offering three different lenses for making sense of this phenomenon, focusing in particular on the third: power transition theory, mistrust under multipolarity, and complex networks. Each perspective highlights different factors that explain the incentives for Asian states to hedge, what hedging looks like, and how long hedging is likely to endure. Power transition theory tells us that hedging is the result of uncertainty about a possible power transition between the United States and China. Multipolarity points us to uncertainty about the intentions of a growing number of states. And the logic of complex networks explains hedging as a response to the topology of Asia’s complex network structure – consisting of sensitivity, fluidity, and

† The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or US Government.
heterarchy – which makes it difficult for Asian-foreign policy elites to assess the future consequences of present day commitments.

Uncertainty and complexity are core features of the contemporary Asian security environment. The absence of rules-based institutions, a smattering of bilateral alliances, and the increasing inseparability of the ‘high politics’ of security from the ‘low politics’ of economic and cultural-historical issues contribute to a structure that is surely difficult for even astute statesmen to navigate. One scholar aptly described the state of the regional security order as a ‘complex patchwork’ (Cha, 2011). In addition to other factors, it is the attributes of this complex patchwork, I argue, that provides strong incentives for Asian states to adopt hedging strategies in their foreign policy approaches.

In this article, I problematize that which is too often uncritically assumed: what are the incentives leading to strategic hedging by Asian states? I offer three different ways of explaining why evidence of hedging is prevalent in Asia. Power transition theory and the concept of mistrust in multipolarity supply the dominant explanations for hedging. The third perspective I posit establishes a prima facie case that builds on insights from the network analysis and complex interdependence literatures, arguing that the fluidity and complexity of the region’s ‘security architecture’ compels states to hedge because incentives for alignment are unclear. Although each explanation makes different assumptions about how traditional conceptions of power affect regional tendencies, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive; it may be that there are multiple, compounding incentives compelling Asian states to hedge. But moving beyond more classical understandings of hedging, I posit that the networked nature of the regional security environment ensures that the hedging trend will continue long after questions are answered about the rise of China and the staying power of the United States.

In what follows, I first introduce the concept of hedging and highlight the various ways in which it is manifesting in Asia. In the second section, I describe power transition theory and mistrust under conditions of multipolarity, including the causal logic that supports these traditional approaches, to explain hedging as a regional trend. In the third section of this article, I offer an alternative framework for understanding Asian international relations, grounded in a new logic of complex networks, and explain how its expectations for the evolution of Asian security and
governance differ from the other approaches. In the fourth section, I derive some tentative implications from a complex network approach to understanding Asian international relations. Hedging is a rational response for decision-making in a complex structure fraught with multiple kinds of uncertainty. My argument is both a complement and a challenge to the conventional interpretation of Asian hedging as a function of uncertainty about China’s rise, or the staying power of the United States. If my argument is correct, hedging will be a longer term feature of the Asian security environment, even if states become convinced that China has good intentions, or that the United States is indeed an enduring ‘Pacific power’.

1 New trends for a new era

Hedging policies – whether declared or not – have emerged as a dominant trend in the Asia-Pacific security landscape over the last decade. Hedging can be understood as a way of coping with uncertainty; it is a strategy of pursuing opposing or contradictory actions as a means of minimizing or mitigating downside risks associated with one or the other action (Lake, 1996; Tessman and Wojtek, 2010). The ‘action’ referred to in this definition and for the purposes of this article is alignment behavior, the ideal-type extremes of which are balancing and bandwagoning.1 Except in cases of long-running historical enmity among middle powers, like that between North and South Korea, consistent balancing or bandwagoning behavior is far less prevalent in the Asia-Pacific than are weak elements of both alignment behaviors simultaneously. As other scholars have noted and I discuss below, the principal indicators of hedging include military strengthening (defense spending and qualitative improvements) without a declared adversary, increasing participation in voluntary (as opposed to rules-based) bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning, and the simultaneous/equidistant improvement in relations with the two greatest regional powers.

In Southeast Asia, hedging positions seem to take at least two forms. The first is the contrast of internal balancing through increasing military investments – which may be aimed at not only China but others in the

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1 Bandwagoning is the strategic alignment of one state with another. Balancing is alignment of one state against another, and can take at least two forms: internal (accumulation of military power) and external (alliances and military cooperation). For the most thorough discussion available of these ideal types of alignment, see (Schweller, 2007).
region – alongside deeper cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The second is the contrast between ASEAN-wide efforts to promote economic and diplomatic enmeshment with one another and a rising China, even as many members pursue increased military cooperation with the United States. Both forms of hedging have been well documented elsewhere, so I will review them only briefly here.

Intra-regional cooperation and relative peace in Southeast Asia has garnered considerable scholarly attention (Khoo, 2004; Acharya, 2009). Through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Southeast Asia has found at least modest success in advancing a normative framework for regional security defining the boundaries of acceptable foreign policy behavior, which makes it easier for all members to observe and detect shifts in the intentions of one another, as well as norm violations (Heller, 2005; Katsumata, 2006). And although sometimes framed in pessimistic terms, the ARF has found practical success in promoting military cooperation on non-traditional security issues, principally humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Haacke, 2009). Regional cooperation has culminated institutionally in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), which pursues confidence building measures, coordinates defense policy, and even orchestrates some preventive diplomacy efforts. Some scholars have even observed the early stages of a security community forming based on common interests and identity, holding out the ambition that within ASEAN, armed conflict will one day become unthinkable (Acharya, 2009).

But an image of Southeast Asia moving inexorably, if slowly, toward some permanent intra-regional peace is somewhat at odds with the empirical reality that many states are engaged in an arms buildup, and most ASEAN governments are pursuing a transparent strategy of equidistant balancing between China and the United States. Although the militarization of interstate disputes among ASEAN members appears remote in the near-term, it would be overly sanguine to simply ignore that persistent mistrust and, in some cases, outstanding disputes exist between, for example, Thailand and Cambodia, Cambodia and Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, and Malaysia and Thailand. In a survey of foreign policy elites conducted between 2004 and 2007, 59.8% of

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2 For a review of this argument and its critics, see (Khoo, 2004). See also, (Acharya, 2009).

3 http://admm.asean.org. (1 November 2013, date last accessed). For a critical review of ADMM that still acknowledges the body’s functions, see (Tan, 2012).
respondents said they could not trust other ASEAN states to be ‘good neighbors’. On the question of outright trust of its neighbors, 37.5% of respondents answered affirmatively, while 36.1% were unsure if they could trust their neighbors, and 26.4% believed they could not trust all of their neighbors (Roberts, 2007a, b). With few exceptions, most of the largest ASEAN economies have increased military spending during the most recent global recession, up overall since 2008 (Defence Intelligence Organization, 2013). Richard Bitzinger, among others, has noted that Southeast Asian investments in military armaments represent more than ‘mere modernization’ of the sub-region’s militaries, suggesting some intra-ASEAN military competition as well (Bitzinger, 2010). Moreover, a tremendous amount of bilateral intra-ASEAN defense activity apart from ADMM is ongoing, which raises a natural question of what motivates such activity if not a desire to hedge against uncertainty (Cronin et al., 2013).

The second form of hedging in Southeast Asia consists of not only the absence of firm balancing or bandwagoning behavior, but the pursuit of dual-track, proportionate engagement with the region’s two greatest powers – the United States and China. Various forms of security cooperation have increased with the United States in the last decade. In the Philippines, the United States has formed a Joint Special Operations Task Force to counter terrorist activity, and there have discussions of a framework that would allow US military forces to operate from Filipino military bases (Pellerin, 2013). The United States and Thailand have re-affirmed their alliance treaty and, with US military support, Thailand is becoming a hub for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (Pellerin, 2012). In addition, at ASEAN invitation, the US Department of Defense has become a major participant in the ADMM+, the broader ADMM circle of multilateral defense ministry coordination (Rolls, 2011). The entire Southeast Asian region – and others from throughout Asia – has also become key participants in Rim of the Pacific, the largest US-led maritime military exercise in the world (Miles, 2012). Denny Roy, among others, has highlighted outreach to outside powers as one way that Southeast Asian governments try to hedge against uncertainty about China’s long-term intentions (Roy, 2005).

Southeast Asia’s increased integration with the US military presence and posture in Asia – a form of cooperation that might otherwise be construed as balancing against China – has occurred simultaneous with a longer term pursuit of economic and diplomatic enmeshment with China. This is one of the most familiar observations in the scholarly literature on
China–ASEAN interactions (Ba, 2006; Goh, 2007). One scholar describes this strategy as ‘omni-enmeshment’, a deliberate effort to entangle China (and the United States) in a web of interdependent economic and diplomatic relations in the hopes of influencing and forestalling any aggressive intentions (Goh, 2005).

In Northeast Asia, hedging has manifested in much the same way as in Southeast Asia: military modernization; an increase in generalized, multilateral security cooperation; the absence of any overt balancing; and simultaneous bridge-building with China and the United States. First, South Korea and Japan, two longstanding allies of the United States, have simultaneously pursued security cooperation throughout Asia as a means of diversification away from the US bilateral alliance structure even as those two alliances have strengthened considerably since the 2008 global recession (Park, 2011). Second, and rather overtly, South Korea and Japan have established separate trilateral mechanisms with the United States and China, respectively, and continue to integrate economically with China even as both governments have strengthened their respective security alliances with the United States.4 South Koreans in particular have voiced concerns about US–ROK–Japan trilateral cooperation on the grounds that Beijing might incorrectly perceive it as a balancing coalition against China (Kim and Glosserman, 2004).

Hedging also manifests in the region’s increased militarization concomitant with the diffusion of cooperative bilateralism and multilateralism. Several studies have reported on the increased arms spending trend in Asia, to include Japan (Feng, 2009; Berteau et al., 2012). In what some scholars have described as Japan’s ‘dual hedge’ (Samuels and Heginbotham, 2002), Japan has strengthened economic ties with China to the point that Chinese imports to Japan already exceed those of the United States, and that trade with China is on pace to surpass US–Japan trade relations (Kang, 2007, p. 176). Yet, notwithstanding Japan’s pacifist constitution, since at least the early 2000s Japan has pursued military modernization and greater military ‘normalization’ in terms of its participation in multilateral security initiatives, as well as by investing in military capabilities that are technologically superior to its neighbors (Hughes, 2009). The United States has encouraged Japan’s gradual move toward military modernization (Parrish, 2013).

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4 For an early accounting of the evolution and limits of Japan and South Korea’s joint connections with China, see (Yeo, 2011).
Every instance of a nation’s military modernization and increased military spending has its proximate justification – Japan’s modernization is relative to its history of insufficient armament, South Korea faces an extent threat from North Korea, and China’s military spending increases are historically commensurate with its rate of economic growth (Jackson, 2008) – but the outcome nevertheless represents a trend that we should expect to continue into the future.5

In addition to these observable indicators of hedging, we can add two additional indicators that are evident by their absence: avoiding institutional commitments and avoiding new alliances. While Cold War era alliances have endured, no new alliances have appeared, and none are on the horizon. This is precisely what we would expect in a region where states seek to avoid the appearance of balancing or bandwagoning. Alliances represent the strongest form of commitment that one state can make to another, and are almost always initiated as an external balancing coalition against a commonly shared threat (Walt, 1987), even though their purpose can transform over time (Wallander, 2000).

Institutional commitments are also absent in Asia. Whereas institutions – defined as ‘persistent sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane, 1989, p. 3) – are a central feature of Asian international relations, the specific type of institutional form found in Asia is purely consensual. States participate in Asia’s institutional forms freely, every participant has veto power over institutional decisions, the decisions of Asia’s institutions are not legally binding, and there is no enforcement mechanism to act as recourse if the rules of the institutions are violated. This stands in stark contrast to Western Europe, where the legal-contractual institutional design of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization relies on binding rules and enforcement mechanisms (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). It has been argued that the binding commitments of rules-based institutions found in Europe are incompatible with either the identities or the prevailing norms in Asia, but this may not be the only reason why rules-based institutions do not and seemingly will not arise in Asia anytime soon. For states that seek to hedge by avoiding locking in to

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5 Although this discussion of Asia excludes Australia because it does not neatly fit within Northeast or Southeast Asian security dynamics directly, the hedging trend helps explain elements of Australian foreign policy as well. See (Rudd, 2013).
long-term alignment decisions today, it should not matter whether the ‘lock-in’ commitment takes the form of commitment to an alliance or commitment to an institution.

1.1 The hedging puzzle
The above makes clear that governments across Asia are pursuing hedging positions, whether or not they want to admit it, and that any number of scholars has already observed this phenomenon. But why is this occurring? The two most familiar incentives Asian governments have to hedge are structural: an ambiguous US–China power transition, and the pervasive mistrust associated with a long-anticipated shift to a multipolar system.

Perhaps the most popular theory used to explain hedging in Asia is power transition theory. The logic of power transition holds that when a weaker power begins overtaking the strongest power in terms of material capabilities the likelihood of conflict will become a function of the extent to which the rising power is dissatisfied with the status quo in relation to the stronger power (Organski and Kugler, 1980). For more than a decade, Asian scholars have applied this theory to the United States and China, contributing to debates about whether China would or would not overtake the United States, as well as whether China would or would not have revisionist intentions (Chan, 2007; Legro, 2007). In recent years, however, scholars have argued that the trajectory of power distribution between China and the United States is unclear. Ambiguity about whether China will overtake the United States, whether China will seek to change the regional order if it overtakes the United States, and whether the United States has the wherewithal to maintain primacy in the Asia-Pacific have all become motivations for East Asian states to hedge (Khong, 2004; Roy, 2005; Goh, 2007, 2008; Shekhar, 2012; Cronin et al., 2013). Implicit to this line of thinking is the assumption that if only the future trajectory of a rising China and US staying power were clear, Asian states would know whether they should be balancing or bandwagoning. The absence of balancing or bandwagoning, in other words, is interpreted as evidence that states do not know who the leading power will be, nor what its intentions will be.

Another way to interpret the hedging trend is through the lens of multipolarity, often associated with a realist ontology. Like power transition theory, multipolarity gives pride of place to traditional conceptions of
material power as the defining element of system structure; that is, the distribution of capabilities determines the incentives states have to make alignment decisions such as balancing and bandwagoning (Waltz, 1993). But whereas power transition theory principally applies to a world in which there is one great power and one up-and-coming challenger, multipolarity describes an environment defined by the existence of three or more significant powers. For more than two decades scholars have argued that multipolarity is coming to Asia, and some have argued that Asia is already structured as such (Friedberg, 1993; Waltz, 1997). That the US National Intelligence Council claims multipolarity and the diffusion of power is already a reality only cements multipolarity as a kind of conventional wisdom (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2013). In a multipolar system, alliances are fleeting, the balance of power is ever-changing due to the ease with which alliances form and fade, and institutions do not meaningfully impact the likelihood of war (Mearsheimer, 1994). Hedging is rational because states can never be certain about the intentions of others; since states can never trust other states, they are incentivized not to wed themselves to a single other great power or coalition (Mearsheimer, 1994; Posen, 2009, p. 349).

Traditional approaches to international relations thus offer us two different reasons why Asian states might seek to hedge: states are uncertain about how competition between China and the United States will play out, and states are uncertain about the intentions of other states. If we already have two explanations for why Asian states are keen to hedge, why do we need a third? We should be open to an alternative perspective that explains the hedging trend for at least two reasons. The first is that we can only really know how well a theory explains reality by understanding how it performs relative to alternative theories (Lakatos, 1970, p. 119). There are several observable indicators of hedging, and neither power transition theory nor multipolarity is able to account for all of them. Second, for years the conventional wisdom has told us that the nature of international politics is changing and becoming more complex, power becoming more diffuse. Is it not possible that changes in the international system could change the incentives that states face when making alignment decisions?

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6 It should be noted that in the Waltzian tradition, multipolarity is expected to produce balancing coalitions, but this is an assertion of expectation, not an observation of fact. The logic of multipolar anarchy should be just as likely to produce hedging.
Might changes in the salient features of international politics ‘shape and shove’ Asian-foreign policy elites in ways not anticipated by a power transition or multipolar realist lens? In other words, if theories are nothing more than simplified explanations of reality, it is possible that the specific simplified rendering of reality that power transition theory and multipolar realism offer overlooks key factors that become more important for describing structural incentives as the world changes.

2 Explaining the ‘complex patchwork’

In this section, I articulate an alternative approach to understanding the logic of hedging in Asia. I maintain that hedging has at least three reinforcing incentives at present, two of which I described above: uncertainty about the regional distribution of power (between China and the United States), and uncertainty about the intentions of other states (in a multipolar environment). To these explanations I add a much more enduring source of hedging incentives, which I attribute to the complex network structure of the regional security environment.

2.1 What is a complex network?

Fundamentally, networks are nothing more than representations of linkages (relationships) among nodes (actors). The density and regularity of the pattern of interaction between nodes serves as a measure of the strength of the linkage. Networks are structures, meaning they provide a context within which actors make decisions; structures ‘shape and shove’ actor decisions in a certain direction, but do not necessarily determine them. As Kenneth Waltz explained, states are ‘… free to do any fool thing they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not’ (Waltz, 1997, p. 915). The key point of differentiation between a network structure and the traditional, Waltzian understanding of structure is that complex networks define structure in terms of linkages among nodes; a network structure is inherently derived from relationships, which are by their nature fluid, multidimensional, and sometimes interdependent. In contrast, the Waltzian understanding

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7 Networks can also be viewed as purposive actors, such as transnational activist networks that connect for some specific purpose, but purposive networks have a separate and distinct ontology. For a discussion of networks both ways, see (Kahler, 2013).
of structure focuses our attention on military power; the driving incentive for a state’s alignment with other states is based on the overall distribution of military power, not the overall web of relations it maintains.

A useful illustrative example of the importance of a relational approach to structure can be seen in the case of relations between Korea and Japan. Each shares a great-power ally in common with the other, and no large power disparity exists between them. Their inability to undertake meaningful cooperation with one another commensurate with some of their other international relationships has little to do with capabilities. On the contrary, the foreign policy of each toward the other is constrained by the nature of its relationship, which is defined in terms of conflicting historical memory (Jackson, 2011). The peculiar form of the interconnectivity between Korea and Japan constrains the foreign policies of each, even contrary to the preferences of a stronger (and shared) ally (Jackson, 2011). In this way, relationships and patterns of interactions among nodes are potentially much more revealing than simply knowing the distribution of power among actors.

This insight about the importance of relations as structure and eschewing a narrow focus on military power shares much in common with those—often in the context of globalization and international governance—who write about polycentricity and multinodality. Polycentricity ‘connotes many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other’ but causally linked in a non-linear way, describing a ‘system’ in which one is strained to reference discrete sectors or industries because of a complex relationship among them (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961, p. 831). Multinodality moves away from viewing actors as ‘poles’ because they should not be inherently viewed as opposing or antithetical to one another; it also recognizes greater diversity of what constitutes a node, distinguished along the lines of interests and values and the interactivity among them (Harding, 1997; Cerny, 2010). Both of these concepts move away from simple polarity and toward something we might loosely describe as ‘relationalism’. A complex network approach to Asian security similarly embraces the potential for a diversity of meaningful actors (that is, nodes) depending on circumstances and the anticipation of non-linear effects based on interaction among them. Where such an approach moves beyond these alternative structural concepts, however, is, as I describe more below, that nodes may seek relations that increase sensitivity to one another while nevertheless eschewing interdependence to some degree by
hedging. A complex network approach to Asian security also differs from these concepts in that while they make a presumption that diversified connectivity and cooperation among nodes almost follows a logic of embracing inclusiveness, my complex network approach views such actions as mitigating downside risk. By way of example, whereas the concept of multinodality tells us that simultaneously pursuing economic integration with China and security relations with the United States reflects a non-exclusionary imperative for cooperation in a globalizing world, my approach explains this as a function of issue-based heterarchy and the imperative to hedge that comes with strategic alignment decision-making in a complex and highly networked security environment, discussed below.

2.2 Why do complex networks produce hedging?

The complex network structure of the region presses Asian states toward adopting hedging positions. Three attributes of Asia’s complex network in particular – described as the ‘network topology’ in the language of network analysis – encourage this. The first is sensitivity; the second is fluidity; and the third is heterarchy. It is not only the presence of these three attributes, but the interaction among them that generates powerful incentives for nodal agents in a complex network to hedge.

The Waltzian realist conception of states is analogous to billiard balls on a pool table. The relationship of one ball to another is essentially irrelevant unless there is a kinetic clash; otherwise, there was little to connect the happenings of one state to another (James, 1989). When the Westphalian state system came into being half a millennium ago, this analogy was perhaps much more appropriate, but today states have become highly sensitive to the foreign and domestic policies of others. Sensitivity refers specifically to the extent to which one state is affected by the actions of another (Keohane and Nye, 1977). For centuries, relations among Asian states were geographically limited, and often hostile; short of moves toward war, states in Asia, for example, were little affected by the balancing and bandwagoning of states in Europe and vice versa; even within Asia, interstate disputes were largely

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8 Complex networks, as opposed to simpler lattice or binary networks, are strictly defined in terms of the number of nodes and linkages comprising the network. The attributes I describe here are specific to the definition of a complex network as applied to Asia. Not all complex networks are, for example, heterarchical; many networks are peer-to-peer or simply hierarchical. For a discussion of the attributes of a complex network in mathematical form, see (Newman, 2003).
dyadic, and as a consequence, there was little impetus for states to form balancing coalitions (Kang, 2007). During the Cold War, the division into two clear camps, with the non-communist camp being defined entirely in terms of the US-led ‘hub-and-spoke’ model (itself a simplified network), also meant that Asian states were not highly sensitive to the moves of one another; any sensitivity one ‘spoke’ might have had to another was mediated through the US ‘hub’, insulating them from the political movements of other states (Cha, 2009).

Yet, as even the former commander of US Pacific Command has observed, contemporary Asia is quite different (Blair and Hanley, 2001). Domestic political pronouncements in Japan reverberate in Korea, as South Korean reactions to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statements about Japan’s re-militarization reflect. North Korean missile and nuclear tests generate regular reactions by South Korea and Japan (US Department of Defense, 2013). And Asian states that are party to territorial disputes in the region are engaged in very careful and attentive signaling, leading to heated exchanges of threatening rhetoric in response to seemingly small incidents (Hagstrom, 2012; Rapp-Hooper, 2013). Dramatically enhanced intra-regional sensitivity compared with only a couple of decades ago is abetted by the growth of intra-regional trade and investment flows (United Overseas Bank of Singapore, 2012), but is made possible largely by the development and diffusion of technology. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) connect societies across national boundaries, for better or worse, even when national governments deliberately opt out of connectivity with other governments, as is the case with sanctions or diplomatic rows. The connectivity that ICTs foster heightens awareness by increasing both the speed at which information can flow, as well as the volume of information available (Eriksson and Giacomello, 2006).

This ICT-enabled sensitivity is a necessary but insufficient condition for interdependence to obtain, the other condition being vulnerability (Keohane and Nye, 1977). The upward trajectory of regional trade flows and diplomatic activity seems to indicate that Asian governments are willing to live with higher levels of sensitivity to one another than in the past, and even if they did not they at any rate lack the ability to eliminate

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9 Although Kang (2007) differs with me regarding the explanation for the lack of external balancing historically, he nevertheless aptly describes the lack of balancing phenomenon at great length.
or control the sensitivity they are exposed to because of ICT-enabled connectivity among civil populations, which can transcend international borders. But Asian states also seem keen to avoid vulnerability to those whom they are sensitive. As discussed above, even staunch US allies such as South Korea have sought greater diversification in diplomatic, economic, and military forms of cooperation with others in the region. Because it is the combination of sensitivity and vulnerability that creates interdependence, increased sensitivity should lead to states taking steps to decrease vulnerability if they seek to avoid interdependent relationships that harbor the risk of imposing significant harm on them. Heightened sensitivity to the behavior of others thus encourages hedging to avoid total interdependence. To put it simply, technology promotes linkages, linkages increase sensitivity, and sensitivity motivates hedging as a means of mitigating what would otherwise constitute vulnerabilities.

The second attribute of a complex network that incentivizes hedging is fluidity, which is closely intertwined with sensitivity. A fluid structure is a changing structure, which is to say it is not fixed or static (Lin, 2001, p. 38). Fluidity is not an attribute unique to complex networks—multipolar systems are also sometimes described as fluid. But again, a network ontology defines structure differently (as relational linkages) than a multipolar ontology (as the distribution of material power). During the Cold War, for example, there were very few shifts in regional alignments among Asian governments. China’s shift away from the Soviet orbit in favor of alignment with the United States is the most notable regional shift during a period of nearly half a century; smaller, still significant shifts took place as well, including both Vietnam’s asymmetric rivalry with China and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. Such realignments were infrequent, however. We might therefore observe that the alignment calculations of Asian decision-makers during the Cold War—whether cooperation or alliances with the Soviet Bloc, non-aligned governments, or the United States made the most sense for either their political identity or strategic situation—were easier because their security environment was much less fluid and much more static than today. In general, it is more difficult for decision-makers to have confidence in the incentives and consequences of their decisions in fluid structures than in rigid or fixed structures. Today specifically, the fluid structure of Asia’s complex patchwork does not provide clear incentives for states to make long-term commitments to balance against or bandwagon with others. Linkages are consensual in Asia and trust among
Asian states is generally low, so there is little reason for decision-makers to expect that the structural incentives for alignment today (if they could even be identified) will still be around tomorrow.

The third attribute of a complex network that incentivizes hedging is the presence of heterarchy. The term heterarchy refers to the existence of multiple, ranked hierarchies based on differentiating criteria (Donnelly, 2009). Hierarchy itself is a relational structure based on consensual domination and subordination within a given domain of affairs; it is a contingent relationship in which the dominant actor exercises legitimate influence over others – without coercion – within a given domain (Lake, 2007, p. 55; Goh, 2008, pp. 355–7; Cooley and Spruyt, 2009). Although networks are often thought of as peer-to-peer or egalitarian structures (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 8), stratification – in one or more domains – can also characterize a network, making it more ‘complex’ (Donnelly, 2009).

The concept of hierarchy has been an increasingly popular way to describe Asian international relations over the last decade (Lake, 2011), but when applied to Asia it is unclear on what basis (that is, on what criterion) a hierarchy forms. Even if states felt comfortable embracing a United States or China dominant order, it seems implausible that domination could be pervasive across all aspects of political life. As North Korea’s frequent defiance of China and the United States shows, even weak states have varying amounts of leverage across different domains of political life. If one state willingly subordinates itself to the preferences of another state, such deference need not be universal, but can instead be limited to one dimension of international affairs, such as foreign policy, weapons procurement, cultural affairs, or economic activity. It is based on this logic that some scholars have advanced the observation that Asia is increasingly characterized as a ‘dual-hierarchy’ led by the United States in only some respects.10 If the general proposition is true that power in international relations is diffusing or becoming less centralized, then it is increasingly likely that leadership and hegemony can and will be defined differently in different domains or in the context of different issues, which complicates a state’s ability to make firm balancing or bandwagoning calculations.

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10 Katzenstein (2005) identified Japan as the other leader of Asia’s dual hierarchy, while Ikenberry (2012) perceived a functionally differentiated division of regional leadership, with the United States as security leader and China as economic and trade leader.
If we acknowledge that Asia has multiple hierarchies governing security relations, economic relations, and cultural relations – to say nothing of technological leadership or hierarchical relationships that may form in new domains like cyberspace – then we are by definition acknowledging a heterarchical relational structure in Asia. It is this complex relational dimension that is missing from power-based analysis in traditional international relations. Complicating matters further is the reality that Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane famously highlighted decades ago, that over time decisions are increasingly difficult to categorize as belonging to the ‘high politics’ of national security or the ‘low politics’ of economics or domestic governance; issue-interdependence is becoming more the norm than the exception (1977). There are, in other words, economic and socio-cultural considerations embedded in many security decisions and vice versa (Keohane and Nye, 1977). For instance, on the Korean Peninsula there are debates about whether to remove the anti-personnel mines that have separated North and South Korea for decades, largely due to pressure from civil society. The international campaign to ban landmines is a normative issue driven by nongovernmental organizations, yet it has direct security implications in Korea. The US Trans-Pacific Partnership is a regional trade pact intended to govern economic relations, yet it has been criticized by some as promoting Western values and labor standards, leaving some Asian states to prefer arrangements that respect regional cultural preferences for how trade and investment are conducted.

As foreign policy issues are increasingly multi-dimensional, states are incentivized to conform to multiple, sometimes contradictory or competing hierarchies, which equates to a hedge. Normative, economic, and security issues are often intertwined in this way, which may not be problematic if one state is considered the leader along every dimension of an issue. However, when different aspects of a single issue are governed by different hierarchical relationships, rendering a decision is not so simple. This complexity makes it difficult for states to make broad, long-term alignment decisions, preferring to hedge when making strategic decisions and instead preferring to address discrete, near-term decisions on a case-by-case basis, which may on occasion take on the outward appearance that a state is pursuing contradictory policies or working at cross-purposes with itself. Under conditions of heterarchy with high degrees of issue-interdependence, therefore, statesmen will tend to myopically focus on the near-term and make decisions
astrategically. If they are willing or able to make a strategic alignment decision, it should tend toward hedging, not balancing or bandwagoning.

2.3 Hedging in a complex network

In the first section of this article, I described various indicators of Asian hedging, including the absence of balancing and bandwagoning, strengthened diplomatic and economic relations with China concurrent with strengthened security cooperation with the United States, increased military spending and modernization, diversification of cooperative relationships and increased participation in consensual multilateralism, the avoidance of institutional commitments, and the avoidance of new alliances. While I argue that these are all forms of hedging, they are not all explained equally well by the three logics for hedging I advanced in the previous section. Table 1, below, compares the logics of hedging based on uncertainty about a power transition and uncertainty about the intentions of others with the logic of hedging based on uncertainty deriving from the topology of a complex network (that is, the interaction of sensitivity, fluidity, and heterarchy).

Table 1  Three logics of hedging in Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause of hedging</th>
<th>Complex networks</th>
<th>Power transition theory</th>
<th>Multipolarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observable indicators</td>
<td>High sensitivity; fluid alignment incentive structures; issue complexity/heterarchy</td>
<td>Hierarchical ambiguity; who will become the regional hegemon</td>
<td>Intentions of other states; whom to ‘trust’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disconfirming evidence</td>
<td>Arms builds; multiplicity of consensual networks; avoiding new alliances; avoiding institutional commitments</td>
<td>Arms builds; strengthened relations with the two greatest powers</td>
<td>Arms builds; dissolution of alliances; avoiding new alliances; avoiding institutional commitments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clear balancing/ bandwagoning; rules-based institutions</td>
<td>Balancing or hedging after only one great power remains</td>
<td>Persistent alliances; rules-based institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the above table makes clear, the logic of hedging in a complex network is the only logic that explains all the forms of hedging appearing in Asia. But Table 1 also makes clear that the other logics may explain some of the motivations for hedging as well. My goal in contrasting these logics is to show that all three offer explanations for aspects of what we see in Asia, and
it is quite plausible that all three sources of uncertainty are encouraging Asian states to hedge.

3 Implications

Although sketching out the logical implications of a theory can be something of an interpretive art, there are several considerations for policymakers and academics based on the above discussion. For example, for how long will the hedging trend endure? What will incentivize states to move away from hedging and toward making self-restraining commitments, either to rules-based institutions or to new alliances? Each of the three logics described here points to different conditions to answer these questions. In addition, viewing the region through a complex network lens also leads to other distinct insights about security dilemmas, initiatives to build partner military capacity, and multilateralism.

3.1 Will hedging endure?

The logic of hedging based on an uncertain power transition tells us that Asian states will stop hedging as soon as states are confident that either China or the United States will become the regional hegemon for the foreseeable future. At that point, the incentive to hedge fades and the incentive to bandwagon with the identified regional hegemon grows. In contrast, viewing hedging through the lens of multipolar realism tells us that hedging should quickly give way to overt balancing in a multipolar environment, and that balancing alliances will form as quickly as they are expected to fade. In this way, hedging will cease and balancing will arise as soon as a clear threat is identified.

The complex network perspective of the regional security environment, however, suggests that hedging will be around for some time to come. The combination of issue complexity – the interdependence among security, economic, and social-normative factors – with unprecedented levels of ICT-enabled sensitivity and the fluidity of relationship patterns is what makes picking sides, whether balancing or bandwagoning, impractical in the contemporary security environment. These attributes are the new normal in Asia.

3.2 Other implications of Asia’s network structure

Security dilemmas in international relations are typically conceived in dyadic terms: state A’s actions to secure itself against state B end up
undermining both sides’ security because it introduces escalating steps by each that reduces the security of the other (Jervis, 1976; Tang, 2009). In a complex network with a muddled patchwork governing structure, increased military spending and modernization – even absent a clear enemy – should be commonplace. If hedging strategies manifest in this way, as they seem to be currently, the structural pressure for non-hedging states to hedge will only grow. As a state’s neighbors build up arms, even if only as a hedge, the incentives for all states to do the same increase. As a result, security dilemmas may come from an individual state’s concerns about a single state, but may now also come from an individual state’s need to keep up with region-wide militarization.

On the question of regional security arrangements or ‘architecture’, the complex network perspective tells us that Asia’s ‘soft’ form of institutionalism is an enduring feature of the region. This is not a statement that the region is doomed to a primal sort of anarchy. In networks, diffusion of information and influence are exercised through linkages between nodes (Janssen and Jager, 2003; Cowin and Jonard, 2004). States in a network thus seek linkages with others. The consensual institutions operating in Asia – such as ASEAN, APEC, EAS, and even the Proliferation Security Initiative – promote consensually based linkages and order of a kind, even if it is different from the structure of order in Europe. But Asian states desire these kinds of institutions because they foster connectivity – which is necessary for both knowledge and influence – without the imposition of long-term commitment (what some might call ‘surrendering sovereignty’). How the complex patchwork came into being over time is a distinct question that merits inquiry. What matters for our purposes though is that the complex patchwork has attributes that I associate with a complex network, and that the interplay of these attributes ‘shapes and shoves’ states to hedge by avoiding new long-term commitments, whether to new allies or new institutions because these attributes of states’ security environment makes unclear the future consequences of present day commitments.

The final implication of adopting a network perspective bears on how the United States builds the military capacity of foreign partners. If states prefer to hedge and are reluctant to make long-term commitments, then they are likely to want and need sufficient military capabilities to defend themselves from coercion. Such a structural imperative for armaments would be in addition to the needs for internal stability in the face of separatists, as in Thailand and Indonesia. Security cooperation policies
that align themselves with this trend are more likely to find receptivity – and by extension, influence – in the region. This is not a statement about what the United States will do, or even should do per se, but to the extent that security cooperation is a finite resource, prioritization of some kind must prevail and that prioritization of security cooperation – what kind, with whom, and how much – must be based on something. Security cooperation takes many forms and has many purposes (Reveron, 2010), but if one of those purposes is to secure influence with security cooperation partners, then a network approach reveals new questions on which a security cooperation strategy should be based that other approaches to international relations might logically overlook. First, do the intended capabilities strengthen connections between the recipient government and other states sharing a normative consensus on discrete security issues with the United States? Second, do the intended capabilities promote or inhibit the recipient government’s ability to form linkages with states outside the influence orbit of the United States? And finally, when specific terms or conditions are placed on the transfer of capabilities, can the recipient government acquire comparable substitute capabilities from other actors without explicit conditions? Questions such as these offer new ways to think about and consequently measure the efficacy of security cooperation policies in the region, and they logically flow from viewing the complex linkages in the region as an important structural determinant.

4 Conclusion

There are layers of potentially reinforcing incentives for Asian states to adopt hedging strategies, each obeying a distinct logic. At a basic level, states may be uncertain about a potential power transition between China and the United States, leading them to hedge because they are uncertain with whom to bandwagon. A different perspective holds that Asian states are uncertain about the intentions of other states, and it is no longer only the United States and China to which they must be attuned; the region may have only two ‘great powers’ in a realist sense of the term, but power is diffusing and the ability of smaller states (and non-state actors) to influence international outcomes is growing. Uncertain about whom to trust, and being concerned with mistrust of many rather than only one or two great powers, states cope by hedging. Viewing the region in an altogether different way, Asia’s ‘complex patchwork’ is comprised of a web of
relationships of varying degrees of strength and a wide range of purposes. In a security environment structured thusly, states are inclined to avoid balancing and bandwagoning, and are similarly inclined to avoid submitting themselves to rules-based institutions. The network perspective tells us states should be inclined to hedge, because the attributes of Asia’s ‘complex patchwork’ make it difficult to assess the future consequences of present day commitments.

Asia’s ‘complex patchwork’ does not promote balancing, and it does not promote bandwagoning; it promotes hedging. This is an insight we can explain in terms of power, mistrust, and, most importantly, network complexity. Only the latter of these explanations expects that incentives for hedging will endure over time, though all three explanations may help us understand why hedging is currently happening. But at the end of the day the ‘complex patchwork’ is a structural pressure, and does not determine individual foreign policy decisions nor specific decisions of alignment. Wars may still break out, balancing may still occur, and a singular hegemon may emerge in time. Foreign policy elites in Asia will continue to be free to do ‘any fool thing they like’, but the structural incentives will continue to favor maintaining a hedging strategy that retains existing commitments to allies but avoids new long-term commitments to others, whether states or institutions.

References


