

BOOK REVIEWS

Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance to Post-9/11

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This book is a collection of papers written by 10 military experts including four Japanese. The purpose of their studies is to verify broadly on what common basis British and Japanese maritime strategies were formed, and what international roles they could play during the post-Cold War period from the 1990s.

In the first part of this book, the authors examine British and Japanese navy histories from the second half of nineteenth century to World War II, analyzing the process of the conclusion, revision, and renunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the course taken to the state of belligerence. In addition, they try to see what currently relevant lessons are available from the facts. In the second part, focusing on the half-century from the beginning of the Cold War after World War II through the post-Cold War era, the process by which British and Japanese maritime powers came close to and cooperated with each other

and the significance of the facts are discussed. In the third part, the authors study British and Japanese ties since 9/11 through the United States–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and NATO under the current US-centered global strategy. On that basis, they examine the prospect of a possible British and Japanese alliance from a twenty-first-century maritime strategic point of view.

The British and Japanese relationship in the modern era was almost one sided. Turning to Western-style modernization from the mid-nineteenth century, Japan received substantial benefit from Britain in the course of promoting government policies aimed at increasing wealth and military power. At the beginning of the twentieth century, that same Japan was able to form an alliance with Britain at a nearly equal level due to the rise of hostility against Russia on both sides. Ferris, however, emphasizes the significance of the fact that the British navy helped the Japanese navy develop in the 1870s and 80s, contributing to Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War. He also points out that the aim of Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to contain not only Russian power but also Japanese power, causing Whitehall to become reluctant to help Japan during the hostilities. In fact, because of strategic uses to which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had been put, both countries were to seek out new alliance partners after the Russo-Japanese War. Furthermore, since British and Japanese military powers were well balanced during World War I, Britain developed an antagonistic mood against Japan, and Japan for its part, regarded Britain as a competitor. In this sense, the London Naval Treaty can be seen as producing Japan's political motivation for the Pacific War. Updated and diversified lessons can be drawn from these historical analyses.

Although the Britain–Japan relationship became hollow after World War II, by the 1980s, Japan was an economic superpower and its international contributions were of major diplomatic concern. First of all, Japan embarked on sea-lane defense. Japanese maritime defense policy, including coastal fortifications in the areas of the Japan Sea, the East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, reflected the nation's specific characteristics of economic dependence of overseas trade. At the same time, while also responding to US demands for burden-sharing in security against the Soviet menace, the Japanese defense efforts adopted the British model of an island-nation strategy. Moreover, once the Persian Gulf War broke out in the 1990s after the termination of the Cold War,

Japan, as an extension of its close military cooperation with the United States and Britain, for the first time, deployed the minesweeping vessels of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to the Middle East so as to meet the expectations of the international community. Afterwards, expeditionary operations of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) have become normalized, and it seems that without the JSDF, Japan's UN PKO would not be functional. Tohmatsu points out that the JMSDF looked especially to the Royal Navy as a mentor in its overseas operations. Here again, British and Japanese maritime strategies are overlapping. Although Japanese international contributions have thus changed drastically during the 20-year post-Cold War period, Delamotte points out that, in the defense policy and doctrine relating to expeditions, the legal and political constraints on Japan remain considerable. Delamotte notes, furthermore, that political confusion caused by the divisions within the LDP and the immaturity of the DPJ-led government have impeded progress.

As Patalano and Koda argue, British and Japanese maritime strategies have not a few common bases. Above all, they are both island nations with large maritime expanses separating them from neighboring continents; both gain significant national benefit from maritime trade and fisheries, and natural maritime fortifications offer homeland security to both. Adding to these common characteristics, the British and Japanese maritime forces are fostering mutual cooperation with US naval coordination in the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Somalia, and their current deepening international activities will surely contribute to future international security. For Japanese readers who tend to focus on the United States–Japan security system, this book reveals hitherto unnoticed views of contemporary studies and offers detailed suggestions that go beyond our current perceptions of a possible future relationship between Britain and Japan.

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