Sovereignty, hegemony, and peace in Western Europe and in East Asia

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Abstract

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan wrote in volume seven of this journal that 'the main ideas in this discipline (of international relations) are deeply rooted in the particularities and peculiarities of European history, the rise of the West to world power, and the imposition of its own political structure onto the rest of the world.' Taking this claim as the starting point the intention of this article is to see where international relations theory over-generalizes and how it could learn from the alternative experience of East Asia. The main focus of the critique will be on two central ideas: first, the idea that unrestricted state sovereignty is necessarily a problem and a security dilemma in international relations; and second, the idea that there is a need for global hierarchy and hegemony in order to tackle the security dilemma. The article uses qualitative scholarship on the dynamics and structures of peace as the point of departure and then assesses the plausibility of these ideas quantitatively using two data sets, the Correlates of War and the PRIO/Uppsala data set (1946–2008).

1 Introduction

Amitav Acharya and Buzan (2007, p. 293) wrote that 'the main ideas in this discipline (of international relations) are deeply rooted in the particularities and peculiarities of European history, the rise of the West to world power, and the imposition of its own political structure onto the rest of the world.' For Acharya and Buzan, this lays the groundwork for two paths in the development of non-Western theories of international relations. One follows such great thinkers of Asia as Sun Tzu and Confucius, and the other follows the visions of Asian leaders such as Gandhi, Nehru, or Aung San. The intention of this article is to supplement these paths. Since international relations theory generalizes the European experience to the rest of the world, my intention is simply to see where it over-generalizes and how it could learn from the alternative experience of East Asia. As David Kang (2003/04, p. 166) has suggested doing, this article will study East Asian 'exceptions' to the well-known realist explanations of peace and conflict and make hypothetical suggestions based on these anomalies. In investigating whether international relations theory is based on European experiences, I will not examine the intellectual history of international relations theory, nor will I try to show that theorists were actually thinking of Europe when creating their generalizations. Instead, I will simply probe whether some selected central generalizations in international relations theory are useful only when explaining European war and peace, but misleading when analyzing realities in East Asia. The main theoretical ambition of this article is to falsify a few important globally generalized claims of cause and effect that are too stubbornly anchored in evidence drawn from Western Europe. Most, but not all of these classical generalizations belong either to the classical realist or to the neo-realist tradition of international relations scholarship. The article will not try to criticize theorists who have explicitly studied anarchy in East Asia, but instead will criticize 'universal theories' that are not advised by the study of East Asian experiences. The article will review these central international relations theories on the relationship between sovereignty and conflict and on hegemony and conflict. Then it will show that although they could be defended based on evidence from Europe, the East Asian experience is in clear contradiction with them. The article will suggest alternative generalizations that seem to fit better with the evidence from East Asian peace, and then link

these generalizations to existing literature on East Asian security. It will not attempt to prove that alternative generalizations are watertight. To do so would require a new study. Also, while the claim will be made that current generalizations regarding anarchy and conflict are Euro-centric, this article will not go into detail to defend their validity in the European arena.

A comparison of East Asian and West European post-World War II experiences of peace and war will be used as an empirical vehicle. In East Asia, a peaceful period started in March 1979.[1] For Europe, the period is longer, starting after the end of the Greek civil war in 1949. Thus, the article will consider the period from 1946 until 1949 as the belligerent period of Western Europe and 1950–2008 as the peaceful period. In East Asia, the belligerent period lasted from 1946 until 1979, and the period that will be considered peaceful runs from 1980 until 2008. Naturally, peace in East Asia and in Western Europe continues, but due to data availability, the last year of those peace periods studied in this article is 2008.

The article will probe the plausibility of some of the central ideas on global conditions for peace. The idea that anarchy is at the core of international insecurity frames much of our thinking on international relations. For many, the structure of international anarchy, a setting in which order cannot be enforced by any supranational force, is what defines the violent power realities of international relations.[2] Yet, some central, Western-biased ideas on anarchy make little sense when scrutinized against the backdrop of experiences of East Asian peace since 1979. This contradictory Asian evidence will be used to suggest modifications to our thinking on international anarchy, in general. Thus, what this article aims to do is to suggest not only that 'anarchy is what states make of it' (Wendt, 1992), but that the material foundations of anarchy have not been a source of conflict. Elements of anarchy have indeed been mobilized for peace in East Asia.

The main focus of the critique will be on two central ideas: first, the idea that unrestricted state sovereignty is necessarily a problem and a security dilemma in international relations; and second, the idea that there

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1 The revelations of East Asian Peace can be found in Tønnesson (2009). See also Kivimäki (2011), Svensson (2011) and Svensson and Lindgren (2011).

2 See, for example, Wight (1978).

is a need for global hierarchy and hegemony in order to tackle the security dilemma.

I will use qualitative scholarship on the dynamics and structures of peace as the point of departure and then assess the plausibility of these ideas quantitatively using two data sets, the Correlates of War (1816–2007) (Sarkees, 2000) and the PRIO/Uppsala data sets (1946–2008).[3] Unless otherwise stated, calculations based on these data are my own.

This study focuses on conflicts and leaves one-sided violence (genocide and terrorism) out of the focus. Battle deaths data used for this study refer to direct conflict fatalities only: soldiers and civilians killed in battle action between two or more militarized conflicting parties, one of which is the state. The decision to operate on a narrow definition of conflict and battle deaths was made due to the unavailability of reliable data on all battle deaths (especially on one-sided violence) for the entire period under scrutiny. The impact of operating on the basis of a narrow definition on conclusions on East Asian Peace has been analyzed in Kivimäki (2010a). For West European peace, the main impact is related to the battle deaths of the Basque Country, where many of the casualties of ETA are Basque civilians. These casualties cannot be considered conflict casualties, but instead, casualties of one-sided (terrorist) violence. On the contrary, for example in Northern Ireland, casualties tend to be conflict casualties as both Protestant and Catholic civilians have armed groups that claim their defense.

2 Empirical generalizations on anarchy and peace

Historically, much of modern Western international relations theory and especially realist theories of various types have been occupied with questions of power politics between sovereign states that acknowledge no political power superior to themselves and that aim at protecting their individual sovereignty and power (see, e.g., Wight, 1978, p. 68). Sovereignty – to these scholars as well as in this study – refers to a state's

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3   Data on conflicts are based on Uppsala/PRIO Data, version 3.0. See Lacina, Bethany, 2009. The PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset, 1946–2008, Version 3.0, Lacina *et al.* (2006), Lacina (2006), Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). It can be found at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/. All calculations on conflicts in this article related to battle deaths are based on these data. Data on conflict termination are based on Kreutz (2010); The data are available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20termination%20v%202.1%201946-2007.xls.

ability to make independent decisions regarding its people and its policies toward other states at the national level without interference from international actors or from alliances between supranational and international actors (Waltz, 1979). The identification of international relations discipline as study of international anarchy[4] not only defines the focus of the investigation in international relations theory, but it also smuggles in ideas of the nature of international relations. This definition of the task of international studies seems to suggest that a causal generalization from the non-existence of a superior authority and the unrestricted sovereignty of self-interested nations to the outbreak of violent power struggles and anarchy is called for. These generalizations are the core of the two hypotheses that will be examined here in the context of Europe and East Asia:

1. is it necessarily the case that a weakened individual state sovereignty leads to more peaceful nations, and
2. is it necessarily so that strengthened supranational regulation of world affairs by a hegemonic state makes peace more likely?

The mechanism by which the lack of a superior power combined with the sovereignty of self-interested states produces violent power conflicts was modeled by John Herz (1950). Mobilizing the old prisoners' dilemma model, he explained how the quest for security by individual states creates a socially suboptimal situation where states try to strengthen their relative military capacities vis-à-vis each other in order to defend themselves against each other. In an anarchic setting, where no one works for social rationality or the common good, the safety and greater relative military capacity of one state presents a threat to the others. The resulting security dilemma, in which armament is a dominant strategy of each state, leaves every state in a suboptimal situation: they all must engage in an expensive process of armament in order to maintain their original relative positions of security. In the absence of a supreme regulator of each state's sovereign right to do as it pleases, each state wishes for all others to restrain the development of their capacities while

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4   This definition of the focus of international relations theory is not limited to realist scholarship, but is also common to most constructivist approaches, too (see, e.g., Wendt, 1999, pp. 9–10).

simultaneously feeling impelled to further strengthen its own relative military capability.

The theory of international relations does, naturally, admit to variations in the relationships between anarchy and peace. While some realist theorists are suspicious of the possibilities of limiting the sovereignty of states and the opportunities for the world to organize above the state level, they might still feel that peace, at least temporarily, is made possible by a paralyzing balance of power (Wight, 1978; Waltz, 1979) or balance of threats (Walt, 2005) between groups of sovereign states. Others feel that anarchy can be transformed into an international society with extreme (Mitrany, 1946; Wright, 1961) or modest limitations on selfish, socially sub-rational expressions of sovereignty (Bull, 1977). Alternatively, elementary order can be introduced to international relations through international rules and roles (regimes) that a hegemonic power may be able to maintain (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1982). Here, hegemony is defined as the leadership imposed by a global nation by means of either power (Kindleberger, 1975; Gilpin, 1981) or authority/legitimacy (Cox, 1983; Cafruny, 1990).

Much of international relations theory focuses on the first element of anarchy, namely the absence of limitations on state sovereignty and the resulting consequences for peace. One could almost say that the international relations theory debate during, between and since the two world wars has been dominated by the argument between classical idealist and realist scholars. The first felt that war as a competition between selfish, sometimes illegitimate, dictatorial state regimes could be prevented by universalist ideologues and a civil (supranational) world order (Angell, 1933; Mitrany, 1946). The other claimed that the power of state regimes makes wars inevitable (Carr, 1946; Morgenthau, 1948). In the opinion of the latter group, peace is occasionally possible, but only when: (1) international structures of power arise in which the selfish, rogue, nationalistic influence of each country is balanced out by the influence of other nations (neo-realism or structural realist position, Waltz, 1979); or (2) one nation becomes hegemonic and works for the preservation of a structural setting that is beneficial to itself (Kindleberger, 1973; Gilpin, 1981). Despite growing evidence that the number of wars and battle deaths was increasing mainly within state borders rather than between states, much of Western thinking was set on the thought that if there

were 'no countries' – no nationalism – then there was 'nothing to kill or die for' and people would be 'living life in peace'.[5]

Peace has been promoted by means of international bodies that, it was hoped, would develop into supranational organizations that could control the selfish states. The League of Nations and the United Nations have not quite lived up to these expectations, mainly strengthening the realist conclusion that peace is impossible due to the nature of man and the nature of states and anarchy.

While it is not easy to measure sovereignty, we will nevertheless need to define some time periods with varying levels of sovereignty in order to identify any correlative relationships between sovereignty and peace. Relying on existing research, one could say that in Europe the development of European institutions from the very beginning of the European Steel and Coal Community (ECSC) in 1952 constituted the pooling of national sovereignty to a supranational organization. Later progress along the path to regional sovereignty and the limitation of national sovereignty took a big step forward with the establishment of the European Union (EU) upon the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992 and the eventual expansion of the union to cover almost all the countries of Europe. Yet, one could treat the period of European integration since 1952 as a time of limited sovereignty; while the period preceding it, especially the era of nationalist world wars, can be seen as a period of unlimited national sovereignty. In the Warsaw Pact, the sovereignty of nations was limited by the solidarity of the socialist nations and submission to Soviet rule, until the end of the Cold War.

To East Asia, colonialism, US-led subversive counter-insurgency, and doctrines such as proletarian internationalism and the antagonism between new emerging forces and old, established ones, exemplify a concept in international relations that does not place national sovereignty at the center of world politics. Instead, alliances, classes, or transnational groups of people are given center stage. The consolidation of state sovereignty took place inside ASEAN at the signing of the ASEAN agreement, while in the rest of East Asia, the end of the US-supported fight against transnational communist forces and the end of Chinese and

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5 Citations are from the lyrics of John Lennon's 'Imagine', which may perhaps not be the most authoritative source of international relations theory, but which does reflect the common sense assessment of borders as a source of war in the West.

Soviet support of the class war in East Asia could be seen as steps toward greater respect for national sovereignty. We could thus consider that the period of respect for national sovereignty started with the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping's power in China in 1979 and was consolidated by the gradual phasing out of Chinese economic and political support of communist movements in Southeast Asia by the end of the 1980s.

The second generalization looks at the systemic power constellation within anarchy and assumes that a hegemonic imposition of common rules and procedures would be useful for peace. Nations benefit from stable norms and rules, but they are still occasionally tempted to take free rides and avoid contributing to these norms by not observing them or by not taking part in their defense. To remedy this, some structural realists (Gilpin, 1981; Gowa, 1989), neo-Gramscians (Cox, 1983; Cafruny, 1990), and neo-liberal institutionalists (Keohane, 1982) have suggested a political power structure, common hegemonic ideological orientations, or an institutional setting that offers leadership for the production of a stable order and for the supervision of the security regime with its rules. During the Cold War era, for example, the United States saw global deterrence of expansionist communism as a collective good for all Western powers (Bowles, 1954, p. 258; McNamara, 1968). However, the idea of the United States taking on a burden of leadership that benefits its subordinates disproportionally seems to spring from the specific historical context of post-Marshall aid to Western Europe, rather than from any universal empirical reference. Outside of the US-European relationship, that same logic is wearing thin (Wallerstein, 1982).

The coexistence of US and Soviet hegemonies in their respective spheres of influence has not been fully theorized, and the main geographical focus of this study is in East Asia and Western Europe. Yet, the Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe also seems to support the mainstream international relations ideas of hegemony. This examination of Soviet hegemony is based on the observation that even if the theory of hegemony often assumes global leadership, it seems that two hegemonic systems actually existed simultaneously in Europe, and that this coexistence was made possible by a mutual tolerance of the geographic division of Europe into two hegemonic spheres. Once Soviet hegemony was consolidated and the geographical division of Europe between the two

global hegemons was established, Eastern Europe, too, was conflict-free (although not entirely peaceful in the broader sense of the concept).

Hegemony can be identified as

1. superiority of the hegemonic power in relation to the power of 'ordinary states' (in the case of the United States, the period from 1900 to the present, with a decline since the 1960s; in the case of the Soviet Union, superiority can be identified from 1950 to 1990);
2. willingness of the powerful global state to lead other countries and impose a global order or to persuade others to follow this order and accept its interpretation of world politics (for the United States: from 1948/50 to the present, with a decline from the 1980s until 2001; for the Soviet Union, from 1950 to 1990);
3. willingness of the subordinate powers to follow the hegemonic leadership;
4. the relative uniformity of the interpretation of the world order and its norms, for example, the fight between communism/totalitarianism/fundamentalism and the free world on the side of the West (1950 to the present) and between imperialism and peoples' democracy in the Soviet sphere (1956–90).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers and the formal US allies in East Asia increased their adherence to the general US position in opposition to communism, thus strengthening the hegemonic order inside their territories. In the meantime, Warsaw Pact members, Yugoslavia, Albania, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam (after 1975, Vietnam), took an opposing view, some from an independent counter-hegemonic stand and some from a subordinate position in the Soviet hegemonic order.

US power and mission were clearly demonstrated in Western Europe in the Marshall Plan of 1948. Around the same time, it was demonstrated in Indonesia in a strong reaction to the communist/peasant Madiun Rebellion. In the rest of East Asia, US willingness to lead was consolidated after the Bangkok meeting of regional US ambassadors in February 1950. In some countries, it all started with a calculation of benefits to be accrued through cooperation with the United States/the Soviet Union if the country's leadership were to frame its policies as responses to the threat of communism/imperialism. It has, however, been claimed that this opportunistic practice became a reality through the process of

the socialization of the new generation of leaders in the Cold War discourse. This happened both with the United States' allies (such as the Philippines, see Kivimäki, 1995) and in neutral countries (such as Indonesia, see Kivimäki, 2003).

Instead of trying to measure hegemony in any sophisticated accurate manner, this article will simply refer to existing studies of US hegemony (Kindleberger, 1975; Gilpin, 1981; Cox, 1983; Cafruny, 1990; Kivimäki, 2003) and claim that the bipolar leadership consisting of US hegemony in the anti-communist world and Soviet hegemony in the communist, anti-imperialist one started in the beginning of the 1950s and continued until 1990, after which US hegemony became more unipolar. The willingness of subordinate powers to follow hegemonic leadership declined from the early 1960s until 1990 (hegemonic decline, Gilpin, 1981), while US willingness to lead declined, at least temporarily, after the Vietnam War (hegemonic minimalization, Cafruny, 1990). This latter tendency lasted until the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001. The attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in New York reinvigorated US willingness to lead. For the sake of simplicity, however, it is not necessary for this study to make sophisticated measurements of the level of hegemony. Instead, hegemony is examined as existent or non-existent. US hegemony existed both in Western Europe and in East Asia since 1950, and Soviet hegemony was found in Eastern Europe from 1956 to 1990.

In addition to the development of US leadership over time, this article will look at how variations in the legitimacy of US leadership affected variations in the peacefulness between countries. Somehow, US leadership becomes more real for countries that fully accept it and react to it by committing themselves to Western military alliances. For the sake of identifying different hegemonic spheres, one can divide Europe in the following manner:

1. the inner circle of US hegemony: the NATO countries;
2. the non-communist neutrals (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland);
3. the independent communist challengers of capitalist hegemony (Yugoslavia and Albania);
4. the Soviet allies: the members of the Warsaw Pact.

Similarly, East Asia can be divided into three hegemonic spheres:

1. the inner circles of US hegemony: US bilateral allies and friends (Suharto's Indonesia, Singapore since 1980s);
2. the neutrals: China after the Sino-Soviet Split (1964–), others;
3. the Soviet sphere: North Korea, China (until 1964), North Vietnam, Vietnam 1950–54, 1975–90.

Before proceeding to examine how sovereignty and hegemony affect peace in East Asia and in Western Europe, I will shortly describe the re-gional contexts of the East Asian and West European peace periods.

3 Dependent variable: peacefulness in East Asia and Western Europe

Peace in this study is defined in negative terms as absence of conflict. The definition of conflict follows the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/ PRIO definition in which conflict is 'a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths' (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005).

Both Europe and East Asia pacified their inter-state relations at the same time as their intra-state relations. Since sovereignty affected both types of relations, peace in this study is focused both on inter-state and intra-state levels. Both in East Asia and in Europe, intra-state and inter-state conflicts after the Second World War have been mixed, since many intra-state security challenges affected international relations and since international powers occasionally participated in domestic conflicts. Since most of the realist generalizations on the relationship between sov-ereignty and hegemony, on the one hand, and peace, on the other, concern inter-state relations, this study will distinguish between intra-state peace and intra-state peace and show results both on all con-flicts and on inter-state conflicts. In this way, the article will at least address the danger which arises from a comparison of oranges and apples. Some realist writings (Tilly, 1978; Collier *et al.*, 2003) do not dis-tinguish between different types of conflicts, though. Political realists like Kissinger (2011) and McNamara (1968), for example, felt that strong US hegemony was needed against the transnational and sometimes sub-national threat of communism. US hegemony also works against the do-mestic threat of communism. In East Asia, for example, US power and leadership were needed to prevent developments similar to the 'fall of

China' as a consequence of a civil war (McNamara, 1968). Yet, I will show that hegemony and the lack of respect for sovereignty are, in East Asia, associated with inter-state conflict as well as with intra-state conflict.

Western Europe and East Asia have both experienced periods of peace that continue at present, but which were preceded by extremely violent periods. After the world wars, Western Europe (that is to say, the Europe that did not become communist) experienced an unprecedented turn in conflict dynamics wherein the old archenemies, France and Germany, formed a political and military alliance and abandoned hostilities for decades to come. As a result, compared with the previous period of five decades, the number of average annual conflict dyads with at least 25 battle deaths during the five decades after 1949 declined by 88%, while the drop in average annual battle deaths was 99.99%.[6] If we compare the peaceful period after 1949 with the immediate post-World War II period, the reduction of casualties was still 99.7%.[7] Armed conflict between West European countries ended with the Second World War, excluding the Greek involvement in Cyprus. Modest inter-state conflict involvement still took place in non-European states in the Falkland Islands (Argentina), in the Turkish-Cypriot conflict (1974), in Iraq, Vietnam and Korea. The main European conflicts (conflicts that were fought in Europe), in order of seriousness, were in France, Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Spain. In France, the conflict in 1961–62 was launched by a secret army group (Organisation de l'armée secrète) that resisted the government's soft policies toward Algerian independence. The conflict caused 2,000–12,000 casualties, according to low and high estimates of PRIO, battle deaths data, version 3.0. The conflict in Northern Ireland between government authorities (NI and central UK), loyalist groups, and republican groups cost 562–3,149 fatalities, while conflict in Cyprus cost 373–592 fatalities. In Cyprus, the battle was originally about

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6   Calculated on the basis of annual averages from Correlates of War intra-state and inter-state data sets (v 3.0). The exact period after 1950 is 47 years, not 50. In this calculation, two-thirds of World War I casualties were estimated to be West European, while only one-third of those in World War II were estimated to be West European. Even without this correction, the percentage would be the same at this level of accuracy.

7   Calculated on the basis of Uppsala/PRIO Data (version 3.0). However, it should be mentioned that the Civil War of Greece before year 1950 contributed disproportionally to this difference.

separation from the UK, and then between the Turkish and Greek parts of the island. In Spain, Marxist separatists are fighting for the independence of the Basque Country. This battle has resulted in 202–248 conflict fatalities (and many other fatalities of one-sided violence).[8] Figure 1 summarize Europe's peacefulness after the Second World War by showing the number of fatalities directly caused by war and conflict.

Peace in East Asia[9] can be characterized for this study to have started after the devastating war in Vietnam. Peace has also been spectacular in East Asia since 1979, with the average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia declining by 95% compared with the annual level of battle deaths from 1946 to 1979,[10] while the region was the most conflict-prone area in the world after World War II and before 1979. Compared with averages throughout the twentieth century before 1980, battle death averages after 1979 are just 1%.[11]

The success of East Asian pacification can be summarized with Fig. 2.

4 Does unrestricted sovereignty lead to violent anarchy?

When examining variations in the practice of unrestricted sovereignty and incidences of conflict, it is easy to see that the European experience supports the mainstream assumption: that there is a causal association between unrestricted sovereignty and conflict.

The Second World War seemed to be related to the problem of an expansive exercise of unrestricted sovereignty. Inter-state peace in Europe after the war was brought about by means of a military occupation of Germany. Furthermore, from early on, military sovereignty was constrained using military alliances: the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, the NATO in 1949, and the European Defence Community in 1952.

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8 US Institute of Peace report (Espiau Idoiaga, 2006, p. 4) notes that 'Since its inception, ETA has caused more than 800 deaths, left hundreds of people wounded ... .'

9 East Asia is defined here as those countries whose capital cities are either in Southeast Asia or in North East Asia (this excludes Russia, for example), including current ASEAN members, China (and Taiwan and Hong Kong), Japan, Mongolia, and the two Koreas.

10 Note that the estimate for conflict in the 1980s has changed between Uppsala/PRIO data set versions 2.0 and 3.0. This is why one can calculate from the data set version 2.0 that the annual average has declined by 98%, while calculations based on the most recent version of the data set (3.0) suggest that the decline has been a bit more modest.

11 This calculation is based on Correlates of War data, See Sarkees and Wayman 2010.

Figure 1 Battle deaths in Western Europe.

Politically, the Jean Monnet Plan of 1950 explicitly sought to curb German political sovereignty, while European integration aimed at flexibility in sharing competences between the Community/Union and the member states right from the start. An example of this is the establishment of the ECSC, ratified in 1952. The community was explicitly intended to limit the capacity of European states to build national power without checks and balances exercised by other European states.

If one compares developments in Western European sovereignty with the above-mentioned curve of battle deaths, it is easy to see that empirical evidence in Europe seems to support the generalization that peacefulness is associated with a strategy that pools regional sovereignty. Measured by the decline in battle deaths, there is a drastic change to be seen during and before sovereignty compromises. Examining the

Figure 2 Battle deaths in East Asia in internal and international conflicts.

post-Second World War period and considering the year 1952 as the first year of sovereignty compromises, we can calculate that Western European average annual battle deaths were reduced by 98–99% (low–high estimate) after such compromises. If one takes into account the years of world wars before the sovereignty compromises, the decline would be even greater, and it would offer evidence even if the examination was restricted to inter-state conflicts only. More importantly, historical analysis reveals a plausible mechanism showing a causal relationship between sovereignty compromises and peace. Common trust between nations could have been built on mechanisms yielding control over national militaristic development to supranational entities.

Domestic criteria (the Copenhagen criteria) were later defined as conditions for the EU membership. A stable democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are all part of commonly accepted principles of membership. And all this is monitored and verified by a supranational body, the European Council (European Commission, 2005). These criteria, implicitly in existence already at least a decade before their consolidation in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, could very well be

related to the emergence of a strong identity-based democratic peace in Western Europe. Transnational 'subsidiary democracy', where sovereignty operates on various levels depending on the issue area, has been associated with success in several of Europe's secession conflicts. If national sovereignty is relative and regions – as well as the EU – all have their share of sovereignty, then the battle for sovereignty and national independence is not as absolute as it would be if only nations had sovereignty. The Copenhagen criteria and the development toward fluid and flexible forms of democracy could be associated with the pacification of Northern Ireland. This pacification clearly affected European levels of conflict fatalities.

Supranational pooling of sovereignty is not only related to conflict prevention, but also to conflict resolution. The Cyprus conflict has always smoldered under the influence of Turkey and Greece, but the main mechanism offered by the EU in an attempt to motivate both parties toward peace has been the condition linking conflict resolution with Cyprus's EU membership prospects (European Commission, 2005). Resolution and post-conflict peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave the international community an extremely intrusive role, while the country's wish to join the EU has provided the main leverage to persuade it to accept such an intrusive role in its domestic affairs on the part of the EU and the international community (International Crisis Group, 2011). Similarly, internationalization, together with arbitration, political pressure, and economic conflict transformation (Fund for Ireland), was among the main instruments of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland (McCarter, 2008).

Peace in East Asia has also been built on experiences gained in the preceding wars. However, for most East Asian countries, the wars themselves were different from those waged in Europe.[12] Thus, the lessons were different, too. I will not be able to prove in this study that commitment to sovereignty and the norms that emphasized non-interference caused peace to grow in East Asia. However, empirical evidence shows a clear correlative relationship between sovereignty and peace, and there

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12 Only in Japan was peace built out of the basis of the same war which had provided the starting point for Western European peace – that is, World War II. This is why it was only in Japan that constitutional, military, and political foundations were not laid on the foundations of norms of non-interference and sovereignty.

are plausible causal mechanisms linking the two. Even though it may be impossible, based on these, to prove a causal relationship between sovereignty and peace, it is still possible to reject the Euro-centric generalization that sovereignty and peace always have a *negative* correlative relationship.

Before the change toward peace in East Asia, there already were non-interference principles that East Asian nations were nominally committed to (The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and UN Charter). Yet, the principles of non-interference did not apply to all countries, all conditions, and at all times. China under Mao Tse Tung's regime and Pol Pot's Kampuchea were also committed to the principles of proletarian internationalism,[13] which, instead of respecting a construction with international relations based on states, emphasized class struggle. President Sukarno of Indonesia, too, was committed to the principles of the non-aligned movement, yet Indonesia also fought a battle on behalf of the new emerging forces of developing country nationalists and communists in the developing nations against colonialist and imperialist powers (Modelski, 1963). Finally, Western counter-insurgency and containment of communism in Asia's main conflicts showed little respect for national sovereignty.

Afterwards, consensus was built on ideas of coexistence between nations with different social systems. It seems that the principle of non-interference was among the main rhetorical changes that took place when East Asia found its peaceful mode of international relations after 1979. This change began at different points in time around the year 1979 in East Asia (earlier for ASEAN, just before for China, and a bit later for Indo-China) and translated into a course of action in which nations gradually stopped their subversive support of regional insurgencies and started accepting the idea of state-based international relations. Perhaps more importantly, though, the promotion of ideas that explicitly articulated class-based or international group-based ideas on constructions in international politics ended at the close of the Cultural Revolution and with the collapse of the Sukarno and Pol Pot regimes.

The commitment to the ASEAN principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of all bilateral and multilateral East Asian partners of

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13 A good summary of the main ideas of the doctrine can be found at http://www.marxists. org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch02.htm.

ASEAN clearly testifies to the existence of this commitment on the level of commitment. Non-interference is the central theme of the first three of the six fundamental principles defined by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.[14] These principles can be considered the legal cornerstone of ASEAN peace, and they have also become central in the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN 10 with Korea, Japan, and China) cooperation. Clearly, ideological commitment to sovereignty has not been a source of instability.

Before 1979, East Asian states were engaged in 35 conflict dyads after the Second World War in which they supported the enemy (domestic or international) of another East Asian state with military troops. However, after 1979 this stopped, and there was no longer a single dyad in which one East Asian state lent military support to an enemy of another East Asian state. It would be easy to hypothesize that this kind of non-interference prevents intra-state conflicts from becoming inter-state wars, while at the same time reducing the intensity of rebellions. The role of such norms in the pacification of East Asia has been convincingly argued by some of the constructivist scholars of East Asian security (Acharya, 2001; Alagappa, 2003; Ba, 2009). After the Second World War, 45 of the 50 most deadly conflict dyads were from conflicts that had internationalized. All of them were before 1979. However, despite the fact that I have shown the correlative relationship between this norm and peace, it is not within the limits of this study to show the mechanism by which the norm of non-interference constitutes or causes peace.

In terms of inter-state warfare, East Asia does not have a single country that has suffered more battle deaths during the period where sovereignty has been respected than during the time when sovereignty was not respected. This minimal respect for sovereignty reflected in the cessation of military support for enemies of fellow East Asian countries was associated with a drop in battle deaths caused by inter-state conflicts (after 1979, compared with 1946–79) by 98.3–99.5% (high and low estimates). The cessation of Chinese military aid and political support to communist parties has been associated with the total disappearance of inter-state conflicts from East Asia after 1987. The share of battle deaths

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14 'Treaty of amity and cooperation in Southeast Asia', Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976. The text is available at the ASEAN Secretariat pages, http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm.

that disappeared after 1979 (compared with the post-World War II period) was 95%, while the share of battle deaths that disappeared after 1987 (compared with the period from 1979 to 1987) was 75–80% (high and low estimates). Without tracing the process from these norms to peace, it is possible to prove the positive association between sovereignty and peace in East Asia. However, the apparent correlative relationship clearly rules out the possibility that sovereignty has been negatively associated with peace in East Asia (as seems to be the case in Europe).

A comparison of the regional normative building blocks of East Asian and Western European peace models suggests that we should take a more careful look at the merits of non-interference. In the Korean War, the Malaysian Confrontation, and the Vietnam War, as in most of the domestic conflicts of East Asia, the conflict diagnosis was often tied to a lack of national integration, rather than to an excess of the same. In addition, the interference of outsiders in wars that started on the domestic level only multiplied the violence of the conflicts. Thus, the antithesis of these wars was to adopt principles of non-interference as a central tenet.

However, it may seem as though a clear consensus coupled with a sense of ownership of the terms of peace is also what explains the peace in Western Europe, rather than the specific conditions of that peace. Since the will to keep the peace was created by the mutual injuries of war, it is not surprising that the form of peace and the idea of what threatens peace were molded by the experiences of preceding wars. A clear consensus, with a sense of ownership, of the normative terms of peace is linked to the specific experiences of war that preceded that peace. The Western European experience of ultra-nationalism as the main threat to peace should not, therefore, be over-generalized and applied to places where peace has ripened following upon wars caused by imperfect nation-building and magnified by the interference of other nations in domestic disputes.

5 Is hegemony always good for stability?

Hegemony can be useful to the cause of peace in many ways. However, for it to be proven as universally important as is suggested in the realist, institutionalist, and neo-Gramscian theories of hegemonic stability, the numbers of casualties and conflicts should be substantially lower in hegemonic than in non-hegemonic periods. Casualties and conflicts should

also be fewer in countries where the hegemonic rationales have been socialized. This seems to be the case in Europe, but not in East Asia.

If we look at the development of security in Europe (Figs 1 and 2), we can see that before the United States consolidated its power and leadership in the West, Western Europe was conflict-prone. On the other hand, after the fascist challenge to hegemony had been defeated in the Second World War and once the communist challenge was destroyed in Greece, the non-socialist countries of Western Europe experienced a period of relative peace. This peace was challenged only by relics of old hegemonic settings or agents of other co-existing hegemonic systems. In Greece, and in Spain, political systems did not allow non-violent channels of protest, while at the same time the bipolar setting of world politics made it possible for the ETA and the Democratic Army of Greece to create an illusion of communist power that could, even in Western Europe, match the power of the non-communist governments. In France and in Northern Ireland, the use of militia proxies was justified by references to the past colonialist setting. This made conflict possible as a marginal exception to peace in Western Europe.

Even for the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the consolidation of Soviet leadership in the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 brought about 'peace', although perhaps in a very negative sense. However, after the decline of Soviet regional hegemony in Eastern Europe, the region first experienced a drastic increase in non-violent protests (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011) – and after the collapse of the hegemon, violent conflicts as well (although these were mostly in communist, neutral Yugoslavia). The regional and national power settings there were no longer clear, and potential violent challengers to the status quo could imagine situations where they felt confident of their power advantage. On the other hand, the collapse of communism and the emergence of US unipolar world hegemony further reduced the conflict potential in the West. With no challenging hegemonic system, there was no longer any group that could possibly imagine winning over a government, as they no longer could get help from the Soviet bloc. As a consequence, even the remaining political conflicts (Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Basque Country) became less intensive, with only 138–304 casualties after 1989 (PRIO data, version 3.0, low and high estimates).

Thus, it seems that the rise of hegemonic power contributed to the pacification of the region. The fact that the remaining violence was experienced

in countries allied to the United States, rather than in the neutral states, only weakens this conclusion slightly. It must also be noted that once Western Europe had become pacific, the demise of the rationale for American Cold War leadership did not adversely affect Western European peace. Neither did the rise of a hegemonic mission caused by the tragedy of September 11, 2001 affect Western European peace positively.

It is not known whether hegemony directly contributed to peace or was this impact mediated through socially constructed realities such as common identities among Western countries, and the perception of the US support to states (rather than subversive movements) in Western Europe. The influence of a clear base for hegemonic power in relation to which no challenging group could become confident of its position vis-à-vis the hegemon made it possible for Europe to stay at peace for such a long time. This makes many classical and structural realists conclude that the greater the influence of a global hegemon in a region, the more peace there will be. This interpretation has been widely applied in East Asia, too (Leifer, 1989; Mearsheimer, 2001). But the East Asian development in battle deaths does not support this.

If we look at the impact of the beginning of the Cold War on East Asia in 1950 and the subsequent actions of the United States to strengthen its leadership with alliances and a military presence in the region, one can see that the effect of the emergence of the Cold War hegemony on battle deaths in East Asia has been varied rather than systematic. If one looks at the average number of conflicts engaged in by each nation before and since 1950, one can see developmental patterns.

It seems that about half of the nations experienced more and half less conflicts (conflicts here are defined as those that took at least 25 lives), measured as annual averages. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, and China experienced smaller average annual number of conflict dyads during the Cold War than during the preceding post-World War II period, while Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and the two Vietnams experienced a greater number. Japan had become pacific already immediately after the Second World War and Mongolia had already done so before that.[15] The East Asian average remained the same during the Cold War and before it –after World War II.

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15 Mongolia had border clashes with China in 1947–48, but the Uppsala data do not list them as conflicts, presumably because of the low number of casualties.

If we look at battle deaths as the best indicators of conflict violence, more conclusive evidence emerges. Only Malaysia/Malaya, China, and Taiwan were better off during the American Cold War leadership than before it, while Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Korean peninsula lost, on annual average, more people in conflicts than they had before the rise of US leadership. The Malayan Emergency could be seen as a war that belonged to the logic of the Cold War. Yet, its casualties were most intensive before the emergence of US leadership in 1950. China lost an enormous amount of people in the Korean War, but this did not change the fact that its average annual number of casualties in 1946–49 was higher than in 1950–89.[16] What is more disturbing for the theory of hegemonic stability is the fact that countries that decided to follow the United States were all harmed by the rise of US power: both the number of conflicts and the number of battle deaths were higher in the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam during US hegemony than before it; and for Indonesia, the move from a neutral position, first to the anti-American side (1957–65) and then to the pro-US camp, ensued in a massive increase in conflicts and battle deaths (Kivimäki, 2010b). If battle death statistics revealed information on authoritarian one-sided violence, this change would have been even clearer.

Also, if we look at battle deaths in inter-state conflicts, only the association between Cold War hegemony and conflict continues to be clear. Hegemony, especially Cold War hegemony, was associated with greater inter-state violence: hegemony in general – from 1950 and onward – was associated with almost five times the level of inter-state battle deaths, while Cold War hegemony (1950–89) was associated with more than five times the level experienced before the rise of hegemony, but after the Second World War (1946–49). The analysis of inter-state conflicts only further strengthens the conclusion according to which it was especially US allies that experienced more battle deaths after the rise of US power. These observations discourage us from trying to explain the difference in which US hegemony affected conflict in East Asia and in Western Europe could be attributed to the fact that US hegemony was more complete in Europe than in Asia.

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16   Due to the huge population of China, the East Asian average number of casualties was still greater before than after the rise of US global leadership.

Thus, the train of thought that follows on a study of the European experience and makes the assumption that US/hegemonic leadership guarantees peace does not seem to gain empirical support from the experience of East Asia. Since the associations between hegemony and conflict are not systematic and conclusive, it would be pushing our luck to try to explain any mechanisms in which US power and leadership explicitly prevented or fueled conflict. It seems likely that the US effort to encourage economic stability and a developmental orientation contributed to peace, while the American willingness to take its battles against the Soviet Union to Asia contributed to conflict. But as US power and leadership were not correlatively associated with conflict in any systematic or significant manner, the generalization of the positive impact of hegemony and hegemonic power on peace does not apply to East Asia as it does to Europe.

6 Conclusions

The theory of international anarchy can possibly be supported by European, but not by East Asian, experiences. Supranational control over states seemed acceptable to Europeans; they had suffered under conflicts caused by expansive nationalism, and thus integration was greeted as a commonly accepted remedy and the foundation of a peaceful, commonly accepted normative order in Western Europe. However, since the Asian experience was different, a sense of ownership could not be infused into their normative order by simply copying the European recipe based on European experience. On the contrary, a clear, commonly accepted normative regional order could only be built in East Asia by reacting to the East Asian history of war and by remedying the problems that were seen as causes of war there. After decades of Chinese export of revolution and colonial and hegemonic interference in the domestic affairs of East Asian states, East Asian regional order could only be built on respect for – rather than control over – state sovereignty.

On the systemic level, hegemony brought power-political clarity and stability to Western Europe, while in East Asia, it produced confusion and instability (although it also created prosperity), especially in those countries that followed US leadership. Furthermore, the hegemonic relationship between the United States and Europe was one in which identity

and civilization were more similar (this is also the case for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); while in East Asia, the United States never considered its partners as similar and equal (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). Even the structure of the alliances (multilateral in Europe and bilateral in East Asia) demonstrates the difference between hegemony in East Asia and in Europe (Duffield, 2001). As a result, East Asian alliance dynamics did not create the acceptable, stable, and clear power constellation that hegemony created in Europe. It could thus be hypothesized that hegemony can reduce conflict and bring peace, even if in a negative sense (as in Eastern Europe from 1956–89), only if it manages to win the hearts of the majority and overwhelm opposition to the order promoted by that hegemony. In Europe, the Soviet Union could overwhelm resistance to socialism, while in Western Europe, US hegemony won the hearts of Europeans and helped overwhelm

Table 1 Battle deaths, annual averages, all conflicts, and best estimates

1946–49	1950–89	1990–2000	2001–		1950–2008	Winner (W) or loser (L) of hegemony
–	1	0	0	1	Brunei	L
1,637	6,293	4,609	278	5,164	Burma	L
5,182	9,263	1,564	0	6,572	Cambodia	L
302,438	1,211	0	0	821	China	W
1,916	3,540	1,273	218	2,667	Indonesia	L
0	0	0	0	0	Japan	0
64	12,438	0	0	8,432	Korea, North	L
64	12,438	0	0	8,432	Korea, South	L
512	783	2	0	532	Laos	L
505	282	0	0	191	Malaysia	W
	0	0	0	0	Mongolia	0
50,000	34,787	–	–	36,526	North Vietnam	W
1,077	2,204	1,077	557	1,771	Philippines	L
–	17	0	0	10	Singapore	0
16,667	42,640	–	–	44,772	South Vietnam	L
2,188	435	0	0	295	Taiwan	W
47	181	0	258	158	Thailand	L
0	15	0	0	787	Vietnam	L

revolutionary opposition to capitalist democracy. However, in East Asia before 1980, the Soviet Union and the United States (and China) participated in a power battle that only gained strength from these external powers; thus, hegemonic influence did not bring the clarity that could have overwhelmed violent opposition to this order in East Asian countries. Perhaps, this is why the experience of hegemony is so different in East Asia than it is in Eastern Europe.

Table 2 Battle deaths, annual averages, inter-state conflicts and best estimates

1946–49	1950–89	1990–2000	2001–	1950–2008		Winners (W) and losers (L) of hegemony
0	0	0	0	0	Brunei	0
0	0	0	0	0	Burma	0
512	8,456	91	0	5,614	Cambodia	L
2,188	2,171	0	0	1,472	China	L (if Chinese victims of Korean War counted)
20,974	41,947	–	–	41,947	French Vietnam	L
958	197	0	0	134	Indonesia	W
0	330	0	0	0	Japan	0
64	18,750	0	0	0	Korea, North	L
64	18,750	0	0	0	Korea, South	L
512	835	3	0	566	Laos	L
505	235	0	0	159	Malaysia	W
0	0	0	0	0	Mongolia	0
–	34,787	–	–	34,787	North Vietnam	L
0	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0
–	0	0	0	0	Singapore	L (if Singapore's casualties in the Malaysian confrontation counted)
–	40,613	–	–	40,613	South Vietnam	L
2,188	435	0	0	295	Taiwan	W
0	2	0	0	1	Thailand	L
–	1,785	0	0	765	Vietnam	L
27,964	168,964	94	0	126,353	East Asia	L

More generally, it seems that while perceptions of an acceptable and strong order are important for stability and peace, the objective characteristics of the settings of order and power are less important. This is bad news for those who seek easy ways to measure objective regularities in world politics. If the foundation for stability lies in the consensus of the people and in their sense of ownership of the context-specific cultural and institutional instruments of power, then most of the objective indicators correlated with stability and non-violence must be temporary, at best. Instead of agreeing on objectively optimal mechanisms of pacification, we will also have to relate our wisdom on peace and war to the socially constructed realities of the locations we are studying. The Western way is not the only one, even though it might be best for the West (Tables 1 and 2).

Acknowledgements

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