led them into national defeat and humiliation does not alter the fact that they needed to craft their own intellectual strategy – *staatslehre tradition* – well described by Inoguchi – to marry traditional Japanese culture to the requirements of industrial civilization.

I draw two conclusions from this fascinating collection of essays. The first is that to remain relevant western IRT will gradually have to accommodate itself to a more culturally diverse set of intellectual approaches. The second and more important conclusion is that governments will need to invest more resources in their diplomatic services and in learning how each other think than they have done since the end of the Second World War.

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Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East

Etel Solingen
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For those who live in the American International Relations community, Etel Solingen's *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia & the Middle East* undoubtedly represents a stunning success of the study of nuclear proliferation. In 1994, Solingen published an influential article in this field of research, 'The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint', in *International Security*, and argued that countries with ruling coalitions pursuing economic liberalization have stronger incentives to refrain from developing nuclear weapons than those with 'inward-looking, nationalist, and radical-confessional coalitions'. Based on the review of cases in South Asia, on the Korean Peninsula, in the Middle East, and in Latin America, she concluded that the former are internationalist in nature

and are unwilling to damage international trade and investment by going nuclear, whereas the latter are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons because they care much less about the economic costs of nuclearization. In *Nuclear Logics*, Solingen expands such findings of her 1994 article and argues even more persuasively that 'internationalizing models of political survival make the development of nuclear weapons less likely than inward-looking models' (p. 46). Starting from 'the puzzle of contrasting historical trajectories' across East Asia and the Middle East since the late 1960s (p. 4), Solingen conducts the first ever 'systematic efforts' (p. 11) to explain why East Asia has largely moved toward denuclearization while the norm among the core Middle East powers has been nuclearization. Criticizing four alternative theories of nuclear choices of states, i.e. neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, and 'theories about democracy and foreign policy', as insufficient to solve her puzzle, Solingen insists that the study of nuclear proliferation must pay more attention to the effects of internationalization on domestic politics and nuclear policy. According to Solingen, '[w]hereas inward-looking models might have regarded nuclear weapons as assets in the arsenal of building regime legitimacy, outward-oriented ones regarded them as liabilities' (p. 277) and the two distinct patterns of nuclear choices in the Middle East and East Asia during the 'second nuclear age' can be well explained by the heavy regional concentrations of respective models in respective regions. In East Asia, the concentration of leaders who stake their political survival on economic growth through integration into the global economy reinforced individual, domestic incentives of leaders to avoid nuclearization across the borders. In the Middle East, the concentration of leaders who resist internationalization by trade protection, import substitution, and state entrepreneurship had the opposite effect. In fact, Solingen's careful case studies of four 'nuclear aspirants' in East Asia and five in the Middle East successfully demonstrate that '[t]he nuclear choices of all pertinent cases' in the two regions since the 1960s 'are compatible with domestic survival models' (p. 277).

As an academic enterprise to explore old and newer paradigms regarding nuclear behavior of states, nobody can fail to admire the theoretical rigorousness and the methodological consistency of Solingen's focused comparison between East Asia and the Middle East. Nobody can reject the validity of her main conclusion that the older four theories suffer from various inadequacies, such as the problem of underestimation

in the case of neorealism, and need to be supplemented by her domestic survival model. As a work about International Relations theories of nuclear decisions, there should be little, if any, to be added to this remarkable achievement by Solingen.

For this reviewer, who lives outside of the academic world of American International Relations theories, however, this book also left a sense of frustration, because the findings from Solingen's endeavor are, generally speaking, not counterintuitive. For example, since the early 1990s, a number of Japanese security experts, including the reviewer himself, have repeatedly pointed out the serious disaccord between power-based neorealist prediction of Japan's nuclearization and the resilience of Japan's non-nuclear policy. They have argued that such resilience, and the consistency and persistency of public attitudes in Japan against nuclearization that have buttressed it, rests on two major factors: a strong anti-nuclear norm and sober cost–benefit calculations.

There has been a near-consensus among Japanese experts that the origin and the sustenance of Japan's non-nuclear stance cannot be properly understood without paying sufficient attention to the role of the anti-nuclear norm widely and consistently shared among the Japanese public, transcending differences in political ideology or belief. They have, however, recognized the limitation of the norm-based explanation of nuclear behavior of states, because in most other countries in the world, including those which have renounced nuclear weapons, the anti-nuclear norm is much weaker than in Japan, the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks. Even in the case of Japan, most security experts have believed that anti-nuclear sentiment does not represent the sole factor behind Japan's non-nuclear stance. It has been commonsense among Japanese citizens that Japan's decision to go nuclear would surely undermine the stability of the international environment in which the country lives. As a resource-poor country, the Japanese believe that friendly International Relations are their country's only hope to maintain its security as well as prosperity. To put it another way, Japan's domestic political landscape has been so dominated by outward-oriented, anti-nuclear coalitions that a decision to go nuclear will carry a political liability for any Japanese leaders throughout the second nuclear age (or since even before the start of that age).

Among the mainstream foreign policy and security thinkers in Japan, such has been the commonsense view about the causes of the

longstanding non-nuclear stance of their country. Japanese International Relations scholars have made little efforts to polish and weave such arguments into a sophisticated theoretical fabric, and that is what Solingen has successfully done in *Nuclear Logics*. Practically speaking, however, Solingen's enterprise has not been able to, at least so far, add much to our understanding about the reason why Japan has chosen and maintained a non-nuclear policy. This is the source of the frustration the reviewer has felt about this book. And the reviewer wonders whether readers from other countries dealt with in this book feel similar frustrations or not.

Despite such a shortcoming, *Nuclear Logic* is undoubtedly a theoretical masterpiece which deserves the variety of awards it has received. At the same time, however, this book may indicate the limitation of American theories of International Relations as tools to enhance our understanding about specific foreign policy decisions by specific countries.

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