International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Volume 10 (2010) 33–59
doi:10.1093/irap/lcp013 Advance Access published on 3 September 2009

Subaltern straits: 'exit', 'voice', and 'loyalty' in the United States–China–Taiwan relations

L.H.M. Ling[1], Ching-Chane Hwang[2] and Boyu Chen[2]

[1]*Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School, 66 W. 12th St., New York, NY, USA.*
E-mail: lingl@newschool.edu; and
[2]*Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan*

Abstract

Mainstream approaches perpetuate the Taiwan–China 'crisis'. They do so by following Cold-War concepts and prescriptions, despite the rise of new realities and new visions for cross-strait relations. We draw on Hirschman's identification of 'loyalty' and 'voice' to describe the mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations in Taiwan, mostly directed by the United States. But a third option is now emerging. It offers the possibility of a paradigmatic breakthrough or 'exit' based on articulations of a postcolonial subjectivity for Taiwan and its relations with China.

Received 6 March 2009; Accepted 27 July 2009

1 Introduction

The Cold War is far from over in the Asia-Pacific. Mainstream analysts continue to rely on Cold War concepts, strategies, and rhetoric to resolve what these have created and propped up for the past half century. Paradigmatic fixation alone does not account for such 'intellectual inertia' (Kuhn, 1962). It stems also from local leaders and analysts perpetuating US hegemony, not necessarily through foreign policy and interstate relations alone, but also in subtler, less formal ways that are just as institutionalized and binding: that is, ways of thinking about and solving problems.

A prime example comes from the Taiwan–China 'crisis'. It rests on an 'international' discourse of national security directed by the United States, but locally supported, distributed, and reproduced in the state's policy-making apparatus in conjunction with society's knowledge-producing institutions. This national security discourse casts Taiwan as a small, helpless, and feminized subaltern subject in need of protection from virile, liberal America against a rapacious, communist China intent on reclaiming 'lost' territory. What risks truly getting lost, we argue, is *transforming* cross-strait relations from 'crisis' to something akin to 'compatibility'. Indeed, new realities and new visions are emerging in Taiwan and these bear significant implications for future relations with China. But mainstream analysts in both Taiwan and the United States overlook, dismiss, or deny these developments due to their unreflective internalization of US hegemony.

We call this condition 'subaltern straits'. Subalternity refers to the subordination of a state, society, or group of people in service to a ruling master. The master can take various forms: for example, a military commander, a colonial metropole, a dominant market, a ruling ideology, an imperial infrastructure, or a global hegemon. Given these asymmetrical relations, subalternity often provokes a pattern of emulation or 'mimicry' (Bhabha, 1994). The subaltern mimics the master not just to survive but to survive well, given the hegemonic structure that dominates both. In today's US-led world politics, national or social mimicry can entail building major institutions like a 'parliament' or 'independent press', importing political rhetoric like 'democracy' and 'freedom', applying economic practices like 'liberalization' and 'privatization', copying cultural representations in fashion, film, and the like, and depicting personal identity as 'individual' and 'self-interested' (Ling, 2002b).

In this paper, we broaden these notions of subalternity and mimicry. We treat subalternity as a dynamic, not fixed, condition whereby the subaltern's mimicry of the master does not only destabilize their power asymmetry (as suggested by Bhabha), but also render it no longer relevant. That is, mimicry puts the subaltern in the master's place with the potential of *transforming* the relationship. Taiwan's mimicry of the United States, we argue, is doing just that.

We proceed accordingly. We begin by drawing on Hirschman's (1970) notions of 'exit', 'voice', and 'loyalty' to categorize the discourse on cross-strait relations. For Hirschman, these typologize the strategies available to unions during contract disputes with management. We apply this typology to negotiations between the United States and Taiwan, in particular, given similar structural asymmetries. 'Loyalty' and 'voice', for example, characterize Taiwan's mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations that follows the US lead, locking both in a Cold-War logic.[1] Most emblematic is the 'triangulation' model, originally formulated for United States–China–Soviet relations, now applied to United States–China–Taiwan, yet retaining the same colonizing frames for race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality. Nonetheless, an alternative sensibility is emerging in contemporary Taiwan. It disrupts the mainstream notion of the national security state to articulate nationhood, particularly in its postcolonial context, as a configuration of hybrid subjectivities. We examine the potential of this postcolonial discourse for a paradigmatic breakthrough or 'exit' in cross-strait relations. We conclude with its implications for the region's 'subaltern straits'.

2 Strategies for negotiation: exit, voice, and loyalty

Hirschman identified 'exit', 'voice', and 'loyalty' as three strategies for negotiation between two asymmetrical parties: unions and management. 'Exit' refers to leaving the situation altogether by quitting the scene, finding another job, transferring, or some other means of self-removal. 'Voice' articulates a specific program or counter-proposal to bargain with management on a peer basis. And 'loyalty' specifies just that: compliance

1 In this paper, we focus only on the cross-strait discourses in the United States and Taiwan, respectively. An examination of the same in China would be beyond the scope of this paper. One reason is that the People's Republic of China does not have a subaltern relationship with the United States.

with management demands. Each strategy represents a discrete act by workers (or their collectivity, the union) in relation to the more powerful and well-endowed managers.

This management–union analogy applies to United States–Taiwan relations. Taiwan received substantial US aid from the end of World War II to the 1970s (Jacoby, 1966; Wu, 1988), thereby enabling the United States to shape (one could say 'restructure') Taiwan in the areas of labor, security, and consumption, specifically, to accommodate America's needs and interests during the Cold War.[2] Taiwan has developed significantly since this initial period of tutelage under the United States, but the island-state remains deeply embedded within the US orbit politically, militarily, economically, and culturally. Indeed, Taiwan's sex industry epitomizes this workmanlike relationship in a subaltern context, most prominently during the Vietnam War, when local prostitutes and pimps systematically serviced US military bases stationed in Taipei, Kaohsiung, Keelung, and Hualien (Huang, 1976; Wang, 1984).[3] With the withdrawal of US bases in 1979, businessmen from the United States, Europe, and Japan have made up the difference in Taiwan's thriving sex trade (Human Trafficking Website, 2007–2008).[4]

To adjust Hirschman's strategies for a postcolonial Taiwan, we draw on Ling's (2002a) differentiation between 'formal' and 'substantive' mimicry to refine 'exit', 'voice', and 'loyalty' in cross-strait relations. Formal mimicry refers to superficial imitation by the subaltern of the master or hegemon; substantive mimicry *adapts* the hegemonic model to local traditions, norms, practices, and institutions to arrive at a new, hybrid way of thinking, doing, and being. It is the latter, we argue, that triggers the possibility of transforming the colonial or hegemonic relationship. Put in Hirschman's terms, formal mimicry personifies 'loyalty'; substantive mimicry, a new 'voice' that negotiates with the hegemon with self-confidence and self-respect. With maturation, 'voice' can help to foster a paradigmatic breakthrough or 'exit'. An 'exit'

2 The US impact is particularly evident in Taiwan's transition from an agriculture to industrial economy in the 1950s–1960s (Ho, 1978).

3 This same scenario was repeated throughout East and Southeast Asia in those countries serving as US-supported 'front lines' against Communism during the Cold War (Ling, 2002b).

4 (http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/Taiwan.htm).

discourse resonates in Taiwan today, softly at first but perhaps in full chorus over time.

To begin, let us review the mainstream discourse in the United States on relations between Taiwan and China.

3 The mainstream discourse: Cold War redux

3.1 The United States

Mainstream analysts in the United States maintain the official position of a 'one-China policy.' That is, the United States should abide by the United States–China communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982[5] and the Taiwan Relations Act (Lampton, 1986, 2003). The US analysts encourage Taiwan and China to engage in dialogue to resolve the cross-strait crisis 'peacefully' (Clough, 2001a, b, 2002, 2003). Three competing policies have emerged under this general rubric: (i) 'strategic ambiguity', (ii) 'double deterrence', and (iii) 'interim agreements'. Each accords the United States a different role in the region and relations with Taiwan and China, respectively.

'Strategic ambiguity' keeps them guessing, in other words. By refusing to declare whether it would aid Taiwan militarily should China attack, the United States could deter both from reckless endangerment to themselves and the region (Solomon, 1978; Oksenberg, 1982; Johnson, 1997; Tucker, 1998; Nathan, 2000). After all, mainstream analysts claim, the United States has no vested interest in the final outcome so long as the settlement is reached peacefully.

'Double deterrence' makes the above explicit. That is, the United States actively opposes China's resort to military force *and* any moves from Taiwan toward formal independence. Indeed, double deterrence links the two: that is, China's renunciation of force is contingent upon Taiwan's rejection of independence. In practice, double deterrence translates into 'no unification, no independence.' It requires the United States, also, to take on a direct, mediating role between Taiwan and China.

'Interim agreements' seek to normalize relations between China and Taiwan with signed 'contracts' (Tucker, 1998; Lampton and May, 1999; Nathan, 2000). Taiwan would abjure from seeking independence for 50 years in exchange for China's renunciation of military action on the

5 These are the Shanghai Communique (1972), the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (1979), and the 17 August Communique (1982).

island. Like strategic ambiguity and double deterrence, the interim agreements approach has zero tolerance of military force by China against Taiwan. But unlike the previous two proposals, the interim agreements would demand that Taiwan and China sign a formal concession.

Of the three approaches, double deterrence prevails primarily by default (Council on Foreign Relations, 1995; Robinson, 1996; Tucker, 2002). Neither Taiwan nor China supports strategic ambiguity given that each distrusts US intentions. China suspects the United States will not accept Taiwan's eventual return to the mainland, just as Taiwan questions whether the United States would support the island-state's bid for formal independence (Nathan, 2000). Nor does the interim approach fare any better. For Taiwan, this would entail *de facto* abandonment of any kind of independence based on an unenforceable and unreliable promise from China. As for China, how could it give up a sovereign right to arms, especially for a 'domestic' matter? Double deterrence, US analysts conclude, remains the only acceptable option for all three parties.

These approaches reproduce the Taiwan–China crisis. Each assumes (i) an immutable sovereignty that (ii) divides the two entities into eternally hostile camps, thereby (iii) disabling them from managing this problem for themselves. Taiwan and China are portrayed as perpetual enemies; accordingly, they treat each other in zero-sum terms. Moreover, all three approaches present the United States as the only arbiter available and capable of intervening in the region, either indirectly by framing the terms of debate and strategic interaction or directly through state-to-state mediation.

Still, mainstream analysts in Taiwan agree to United States prescriptions for cross-strait relations. Their compliance reflects two types of hegemonic loyalty at work: formal and substantive mimicry. The former subdivides additionally into positive and fearful loyalty.

3.2 Taiwan[6]

Mainstream analysts in Taiwan demand 'strong sovereignty' based on a sense of national dignity, not just right to exist. This position aims, in

6 A note on style: we list the names of scholars from Taiwan and China in both Chinese (i.e. surname first) and English formats (i.e. surname last), depending on how they list their names and the venues of their publication. For Taiwanese authors, names with a hyphen indicate the given name; accordingly, the name preceding them is the surname. For authors

particular, to differentiate Taiwan from its ideological Other, China.[7] Mainstream analysts proclaim Taiwan a model of liberal capitalism, democracy, and independence. Accordingly, Taiwan is/must/should be a prized member of the Club of (Western) Modernity. China, in contrast, is demonized as authoritarian, underdeveloped, and possibly a new colonizing master. Mainstream analysts believe that this dual strategy of mimicking the United States and demonizing China empowers the Taiwanese state, seen as key to resolving the cross-strait 'crisis'.[8] But, we argue, this construction of United States–China–Taiwan relations protracts the crisis by inflating the role of the US, provoking China, and, contrary to all avowed intentions, denigrating Taiwan – even with a new President and new Administration in office.

New president, new administration, old policies. President Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory in March 2008. Representing a new, post-Chiang generation of Kuomintang (KMT) leadership, Ma's election seemed to augur a new era in cross-strait relations. It upset the previous ruling party, the Democratic People's Party (DPP), which had vowed 'independence' for the island. Within two months, the Ma Administration initiated weekend charter flights between Taiwan and China. Taiwan also allowed more tourists from the mainland to visit. Constructive talks were held between the Strait Exchange Foundation (*haijihui)* and its counterpart on the mainland, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (*haixiehui*).

In his inauguration speech, however, Ma reiterated the longstanding US-sanctioned policy of 'no unification, no independence, and no use of force' (*butong, budu, buwu*).[9] Indeed, then Secretary of the State

from China, the last name is listed first in Chinese publications but listed last in English publications.

7 The Taiwan Strait separates Taiwan from China by 100 miles (161 km).

8 We place 'crisis' in scare quotes to indicate its contingent and constructed nature.

9 For President Ma's inaugural address, see (http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105499687 (Downloaded: 26 August 2008). For a transcript of his first presidential press conference, see (http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105499708) (last accessed on 26 August 2008). President Ma attended the inaugural ceremonies of the newly-elected presidents of Paraguay and Dominican Republic in mid-August 2008. In contrast to previous presidents, he did not make any provocative moves to upset the United States or China when he stopped over in the United States. This restrained behavior sought to make his 'diplomatic truce' more

Condoleezza Rice raised this issue in an interview in the *Wall Street Journal* on 19 June 2008.[10] Prominent China/Taiwan analysts in the US cautioned Taiwan to improve relations with China 'gingerly': that is, not to tilt toward the mainland.[11] They advised against 'free-riding'; hence, they urged the Ma Administration to continue purchasing weapons from the United States to demonstrate Taiwan's 'determination' to defend itself from China.[12]

Taiwan's defense intellectuals couldn't agree more.[13] For Edward I-hsin Chen (2008a–c), Taiwan cannot afford to ignore the United States given the former's complete dependence on the latter for diplomatic and cross-strait relations. He urges Taiwan to keep buying weapons from the United States and carefully consider the proposal for a 'diplomatic truce' to prevent China from taking advantage of Taiwan.[14] Lo (2008) used to criticize the United States for applying a double standard vis-à-vis Taiwan's democratic referendum but now harshly accuses President Ma of abandoning democratic values and embracing 'Chinese nationalism'. Many urge the new president to buy enough weapons to bolster Taiwan's

convincing. He elaborated on this policy when talking to several presidents of Taiwan's diplomatic allies in Central and South America.

10 See (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/106122.htm) (Downloaded: 26 August 2008).

11 See http://voanews.com/chinese/archive/2008-05/w2008-05-06-voa47.cfm?CFID=28406288&CFTOKEN=79856263 (last accessed on 19 August 2008). See, also, Glaser (2008).

12 Although President Ma announced a 'diplomatic truce,' the Chinese representative to the UN emphasized yet again that Taiwan has no right to participate in any UN affiliated organizations (*The United Daily* 29 August 2008: A10). Taiwan's mainstream establishment interpreted this response as hostile to Ma's friendly initiative; consequently, Ma was criticized for his seeming submissiveness toward China (*The China Times* 29 August 2008: A13). Raymond F. Burghardt, head of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), unofficial 'embassy' for the United States in Taiwan, expressed concern that while Taiwan is negotiating with China on Taiwan's international space, Taiwan cannot relax its position on the matter of sovereignty. That is to say, according to the United States, there are two 'nos' in the new negotiation: no claim of sovereignty over Taiwan for China and no right for China to approve of Taiwan's international activities (*The Liberty Times* 28 August 2008: A1).

13 Here, we use the term 'defense intellectual' to refer to those who contribute to the public discourse on defense in Taiwan: e.g., officials, scholars, journalists. Carol Cohn (1987) popularized this term in feminist analyses of IR but her usage included a specific techno-muscular rationality that we do not presume for our case.

14 In Ma's 'diplomatic truce,' neither Taiwan nor China would sabotage the other's diplomatic ties with allies through coercion or co-optation. One source mentioned a country that currently recognizes the Republic of China (Taiwan) but sought some considerable compensation for switching diplomatic recognition. China refused to do so (Liu 2008).

self-defense while not alienating the island's two chief allies, the United States and Japan (Zhang, 2008a, b; Lan, 2008; Li, 2008; Liu, 2008). Demonizing China also continues in official circles. The newly elected Chair of the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen, compared the Beijing Olympics with the 1936 Berlin Olympics, thereby analogizing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to Hitler's Nazi regime (Tsai, 2008).

These positions reflect a longstanding policy of loyalty to or formal mimicry of US 'leadership' in the Asia-Pacific.

Loyalty (formal mimicry). 'Loyalty' or formal mimicry in Taiwan seeks closer ties to the US, even under conditions of subalternity. These include mimicry in concepts, methods, policies, and rhetoric, as well as the mainstream's internalization of US neocolonial attitudes toward themselves, the Taiwanese Other.

Two versions of loyalty or formal mimicry pertain:

- Positive loyalty

Positive loyalty fully mimics the US mainstream discourse for the region. Yang (2006) takes loyalty to the maximum by prioritizing US interests above Taiwan's. He calls for a variation of the double deterrence strategy, so the United States could sell more weapons to Taiwan. High profits from these sales, he contends, would save the United States the trouble of sending troops to Taiwan should China attack. Yang (2006, 215) adds that this would help the United States avoid any 'awkwardness' by seeming to 'discipline' Taiwan when the latter is so eagerly pursuing democratization. Yang (2007) further agrees with the United States that Taiwan should cease and desist from a public referendum on gaining membership in the United Nations (UN). Should this referendum pass, he warns, the United States will regard Taiwan as 'an ideological fundamentalist' and 'trouble-maker' (Yang, 2007, A15). He implies, of course, that Taiwan cannot afford to fall under either label. Chang (2007) concurs that should this referendum pass, he declares, the United States should 'punish' Taiwan by recalling the US representative from Taipei. (The referendum failed in March 2008.)

Time and again, Chang (1999) has promoted proposals for Taiwan advocated by US mainstream analysts. Many of them (e.g. Joseph Nye, Kenneth Lieberthal, Darryl Johnson, Susan Shirk) have worked for the US government as high-level officials or advisors. Chang has argued that

Taiwan should sign the 'interim agreements' because the United States wants it. To be fair, Chang also has presented his own proposals, drawing on Germany's unification treaty for inspiration. But he did so without regard to the strong negative reactions within both Taiwan and China to such agreements. His argument rested solely on the United States whose superpower status, he hoped, would pressure Taiwan and China into signing the agreements.

A new generation of mainstream analysts in Taiwan now embrace a post-9/11 US foreign policy directive, i.e. 'transformational diplomacy' (Rice, 2006). It aims to 'transform' enemies into friends through the diplomatic promotion of 'free, open, and democratic societies'. US agencies reach out to foreign citizens and countries to help them 'reform' their political systems, to build 'partnerships' with major powers, and to enhance the ability of US diplomats to 'work with' colleagues and agencies in foreign governments.

For Huang (2006), 'transformational diplomacy' gives Taiwan an effective means to democratize China. After all, Taiwan has excelled at taking on US-style democracy. Who better than Taiwan, he asks rhetorically, to serve as America's helpmate in transforming China? Lo (2007, 72, 75) adds that Taiwan should emphasize its 'common values and interests' with the United States as a basis for advertising itself a 'success story', the better to help the US democratize China.

Casting Taiwan as a junior partner to the United States has an established history. For over a decade, Chen (1997, 13) has been calling for Taiwan to 'deepen' and 'enrich' its democratization so as to demonstrate its capacity to become an important partner for the United States, particularly vis-à-vis China in the areas of international human rights, democratization, and peaceful evolution. This will be key that Chen (2009) reiterates today in securing the Obama Administration's support for Taiwan.

Yet fear also motivates a subset of mainstream analysts in Taiwan. They share common ideas with the positive loyalists but often proceed from a basis of insecurity and anxiety, particularly at the possibility of abandonment by the United States of Taiwan.

- Fearful loyalty

Fearful loyalists reflect an anxiety-inducing hypothetical, i.e. what if the US betrays Taiwan due to increasing pressures from China? Chen (2000)

and Chang (2004) worry about a potential sell-out of Taiwan by the United States when it plays a 'double-handed' policy. This applies especially to any 'interim agreements' that could be signed without concrete guarantees (Chen, 2000). Lo (2007) fears that the United States and China would 'co-manage' Taiwan, thereby deeply compromising and damaging the island-state's vital interests.

This concern has longstanding roots. A decade ago, Arthur Ding (1998) urged the United States to upgrade its relationship with Taiwan to prevent any misimpressions to China that the United States did not care about the island-state. He further cautioned the United States not to be 'naïve' about China given the many conflicts that plague their relationship.

Still, a new 'voice' or substantive mimicry is also apparent in Taiwan. It accepts the dominant framework set by the United States, but challenges it at the same time with a new, albeit still establishment, discourse on cross-strait relations.

Voice (substantive mimicry). 'Voice' or substantive mimicry in Taiwan comes primarily in the form of warnings and/or criticisms. These build on US norms of liberal capitalism, democracy, and self-determination but adapt them to Taiwan's own needs, interests, and aspirations. Sometimes, this new 'voice' overlaps with those of 'loyalty', whether positive or fearful. Lo (2007), for example, may accept the US strategy of double deterrence, but questions its rigidity and calls for a more flexible and lenient policy toward Taiwan. Others criticize the United States for its inconsistencies on Taiwan's democratic demand for independence. Many argue that Taiwan's efforts to 'indigenize' should merit US recognition and appreciation (Yang, 2000, 2006; Chang, 2004; Lin and Lin, 2006).[15] They urge the United States to redefine the region's *status quo* given Taiwan's newfound democratic status.

For example, Lin and Lin (2006) charged that the Bush Administration's policy toward Taiwan was self-contradictory. Bush hailed Taiwan as a model of democracy for other countries, they note, but discouraged, it from writing a new constitution because it would suggest a move toward formal independence. Furthermore, Lin Cheng-yi

15 Some analysts in the US echo these sentiments (Shambaugh, 1996; Yahuda, 1996; Clough, 1996; Sterling-Folker and Shinko, 2005; Nathan, 2000, 2007).

regards the US disapproval of Taiwan's referendum for UN membership as a double standard.[16] Twenty years ago, he notes, the United States pressured Taiwan to end martial law; today, it wants to dictate Taiwan's democracy.

Here, Lin echoes a 'positive loyalist' like Chen (2007). Chen argues that the United States underestimates the degree of democratization in Taiwan. The more democratic Taiwan becomes, predicts Chen, the less effective US pressures will be to follow its leadership. Taiwan's civil society is already too active and self-confident to allow 'business as usual'. Yet the Bush Administration never missed an opportunity to push sales of military hardware onto Taiwan despite downplaying its international status.

'Voice' analysts seek an alternative agency for Taiwan. Nonetheless, it is built on US definitions of sovereignty, civil society, liberal capitalism, and democratic governance. And a cost comes with such 'voicing'. The US official and academic circles often marginalize these analysts who, in turn, react by strengthening conventional strategies like double deterrence, thereby entrenching the region further in 'crisis'.

'Loyalists' and 'voice' analysts alike remain shackled to US definitions of cross-strait relations. In so doing, they perpetuate racialized and sexualized stereotypes of relations between the United States, China, and Taiwan, most explicitly expressed in the Cold-War inspired security discourse of 'triangulation'.

3.3 Triangulation

Dittmer (1981, 2005) articulated a 'strategic triangle' model for United States–China–Soviet Union relations during the Cold War. He proposed three, likely policy scenarios: (i) 'ménage à trois', (ii) 'romantic triangle', and (iii) 'stable marriage'. Ménage à trois refers to symmetrical amities among all three actors ('we love one another'). Romantic triangle binds one 'pivot' to two 'wing' actors, but enmity divides the latter two ('I, Pivot, love the two of you, Wing A and Wing B, but you two hate each other'). And stable marriage binds amity between two actors to the exclusion of a third ('I, Pivot, am morally and legally obligated to love only Wing A, and *vice versa*. There is no room for Wing B'). According

16 Lin made these remarks at the Taiwan Think Tank International Affairs Forum, National Taiwan University, 1 September 2007.

to Dittmer, 'ménage à trois' provides the most desirable scenario. It 'benefits' all three players with no 'cost' to any one. Nonetheless, Dittmer conceded, 'romantic triangle' and 'stable marriage' tend to prevail in practice because each player prefers being the 'pivot'. It offers the greatest benefits while keeping the other two actors in 'balance' or 'containment'.

Wu (1996, 2000, 2005) applies Dittmer's 'strategic triangle' to United States–China–Taiwan relations.[17] Along with other mainstream analysts (Yang, 1996; Chi, 2005; Shen, 2006), Wu contends that this model gives Taiwan a sovereign presence equal to that of the United States' and China's. Triangulation allows Taiwan to claim an independent status, thereby signaling its difference from the People's Republic. Wu (2000) refines the model to cast the United States as an 'unwilling' pivot in the romantic triangle with China and Taiwan. The United States seeks not to take advantage of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Wu explains, yet it is actively, albeit awkwardly, courted by the two 'wings' to intervene. If the United States 'tilts' towards Taiwan, it is not due to a mean-spirited calculation of US interests but the institutional and ideological similarities that the United States shares with Taiwan. This 'romantic triangle' between the United States and Taiwan, Wu predicts, will transform eventually into a 'stable marriage' despite China's rise in world politics. A 'stable marriage' with the United States will turn China, not Taiwan, into the outcast or 'pariah'.

Bao (1999) offers a precedent to this interpretation. The United States recognized China in 1979, thereby severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But Bao thinks this relationship is still a 'romantic triangle', rather than a 'stable marriage', because the United States 'protects' Taiwan with the Taiwan Relations Act.[18] The 1980s saw a 'ménage à trois' between the United States, China, and Taiwan, Bao contends, due to the 'goodwill' extended to Taiwan by China. But when China threatened military action across the straits in 1996, this 'ménage à trois' shifted into a 'stable marriage' between the United States and Taiwan. In effect, China exiled itself from this triangular relationship. The United

17 Wu is one of the Taiwan's most distinguished scholars and Director of the Institute of Political Science at the Academica Sinica, the most prestigious and influential research institution in Taiwan.

18 One wonders why such 'protection' would be missing in a 'stable marriage.'.

States and China may 'flirt' with each other to rebuild mutual cooperation but, Bao maintains, once relations between Taiwan and China warm up, the strategic triad between the United States, China, and Taiwan will return, once again, to a happy, swinging 'ménage à trois'.

Such racialization and sexualization of the Asian Other in the West is a tale overly-told (Said, 1979, 1994). Cultural productions from 'Madame Butterfly' to 'The World of Suzie Wong' to 'Miss Saigon' have long cast the Asian Other as a sultry, supine prostitute to a wealthy, militarized West that is no less desirable for its fickleness and infidelity (Ling, 1999). Indeed, this imagery remains alive and well today. Noah Feldman, for example, a senior advisor to the draft constitution in Iraq, warns against the seductions of democratization in that country. Elections, he writes, can offer an 'embrace' from the occupied (Iraq) to the occupier (the United States) that is 'both pleasurable and terrifying', tantalizing the occupier with visions of 'successful consummation, the seed of democracy implanted and the door opened for subsequent withdrawal' (Feldman, 2004, 95). The occupier thinks he can simply 'buil[d] and leav[e]'; instead, a possible quagmire awaits where the occupier finds that he 'cannot extract himself [yet] he cannot remain without suffering unmanning damage' (Feldman, 2004, 95).

What distinguishes Taiwan's mainstream discourse is its unreflective internalization of such Orientalized racism, sexism, and classism. Taiwan's mainstream analysts fret not, it seems, about accepting Taiwan as a desperate *femme fatale* clinging for dear life to manly (albeit fickle) United States for protection against big, bad, he–she China. Theoretically, the triangulation model holds that all three parties could be considered either 'pivot' or 'wing'. But disparities in size, resources, economic development, and military capability allow Taiwan to play the 'wing' role only; the United States, a definite 'pivot'; and China, somewhere in-between 'pivot' and 'wing,' depending on the variable at stake (e.g. population versus development). Triangulation discourse, in effect, hypermasculinizes the United States to protect small, helpless Taiwan from a China that could never gain respectability or legitimacy given its shady ambiguities due to possibly deviant proclivities.[19]

19 Asian-American playwright, David Henry Hwang, explored these issues in his play, *M. Butterfly* (1988).

Put differently, the United States always stays on top. Unlike China, the United States is a 'catch'. A desiring subject, it is also an object of desire to all. Accordingly, the United States 'pivot' enjoys full decision-making power: it can enter into an affair ('ménage à trois', 'romantic triangle') or try marriage ('stable marriage') or dabble in both at the same time. More importantly, the United States can exit such arrangements at will.

Yet this construction of Taiwan does not end mainstream anxieties. Taiwan's defense establishment hopes that a 'stable marriage' between the United States, the 'senior' partner, and Taiwan, the 'junior' one, would ensure stability for the region and favorable policies for Taiwan. But this strategy renders Taiwan even more vulnerable. It must depend on the United States *completely* to prevent abandonment or worse, betrayal, especially with China enticing the United States on the other side of the strait. The only policy option for Taiwan, then, is to cater to the United States in every way to prevent abandonment or betrayal. These analysts seldom believe that Taiwan could play 'pivot' to the United States or China by taking advantage of their mutual conflicts and contradictions and be courted by them, instead. More profoundly, Taiwan's mainstream analysts could not conceive of repudiating such a racist, sexist, and ultimately colonial model for United States–Taiwan relations. Their concepts, methods, and arguments remain subordinate to those in the United States – even when such dependence becomes counterproductive.

A paradigmatic breakthrough or 'exit' discourse hovers on the horizon in Taiwan. Most promising is a burgeoning postcolonial scholarship on cross-strait relations that offers (i) a new sense of being or subjectivity for Taiwan and its people based on (ii) actual, on-going exchanges between Taiwan and China that today's policies are addressing finally yet only partially, thereby laying down the foundation for (iii) new visions for cross-strait relations. These have the potential to transform the 'crisis' by, first, excising Cold-War subalternity from Taiwan.

4 Paradigmatic breakthrough: postcolonial 'exit'

4.1 New realities

Relations between Taiwan and China have been intensifying through daily intimacies. These range from the concrete (trade and investment,

transportation and tourism) to the sociological (popular culture, family ties, religious bonds, academic exchanges) to the ideological (revival of Confucianism).

Concrete exchanges: On 30 June 2009, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that China can now invest in Taiwan. Specifically, Chinese investment may involve '64 sectors in manufacturing, 25 in services and 11 public infrastructure projects' (Sung and Ong, 2009). These include real estate (both commercial and residential), transportation (airports and harbor facilities but limited to less than 50 percent of any venture), and energy industries (oil and natural gas exploration services, petroleum products wholesaling, and fuel retailing).

This development peaks recent trends. In 2007, China was Taiwan's biggest trading partner, accounting for 28 percent of Taiwan's cross-strait trade valued at slightly over $130 billion (Chao, 2009). That same year, China became Taiwan's largest export market, accounting for 41 percent of the island's total exports; the mainland was also Taiwan's second-largest import source at 14 percent of its total (Chao, 2009). Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs estimates that, as of August 2008, 57 percent of investments from the island went to the mainland, amounting to approximately $71 billion (Chao, 2009).

Transportation and tourism show similar signs of integration. In April 2009, Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait agreed to direct flights across the Taiwan Strait.[20] Direct weekend flights were announced only a year before, after nearly 60 years of prohibition of any official contact (*Asian Economic News* 7 July 2008).[21] In 2007, almost 5 million Taiwanese visited the mainland (Chao, 2009). Chinese tourists to Taiwan peaked in 2007 with almost 82,000, compared with nearly 54,000 in 2008; however, the 'mini three links' policy has more than offset this drop.[22]

20 They agreed to 110 scheduled flights and 25 charter flights per week, starting in August 2009 (http://n.yam.com/chinatimes/china/200906/20090602780902.html) (last accessed on 6 July 2009). See, also, http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/cc3/index.htm (last accessed on 30 June 2009), and http://taiwanjournal.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=53312&ctNode=413 (last accessed on 30 June 2009).

21 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2008_July_7/ai_n27971965 (last accessed on 31 July 2008).

22 See, for example, http://www.taiwansig.tw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=837&Itemid=117 and http://www.nownews.com/2008/11/28/301-2372584.htm (last accessed on 1 January 2009) and the official website of Taiwan's National Immigration

Sociological Ties: Audiences in China and Taiwan idolize the same film stars, singers, and other media celebrities, regardless of national origin (Kristof, 1991; Lin, 2002). In comparison to the 1960s–1970s, shows from the United States have declined significantly (Jing, 2008). These connections in popular culture reflect new technologies as much as greater migration across the Taiwan Strait. Since 1987, over 2 million Taiwanese have moved to the mainland, including 750,000 Taiwanese businessmen (*China Times* 12 November 2007). With marriages between Taiwanese and mainlanders increasing by 40 percent per year (*Ibid.*), brides from China now comprise 65% of total 'foreign spouses' (*waiji peiou*) in Taiwan, numbering some 290,000 couples (Chao, 2009), far exceeding marital unions with other nationalities (Zhuang, 2007).

The Sichuan earthquake of 12 May 2008 also solidified cross-strait relations. Ordinary citizens and civic groups donated more than 1 billion *renminbi* to China to aid the missing or killed in the earthquake. The Chinese government subsequently re-opened negotiations for weekend charter flights and other policies in light of this generous and genuine outpouring of aid and public sentiment in Taiwan.

Religion plays a role as well. Followers of the Mazu religion have been interacting between Kinman/Matzu (islands belonging to Taiwan) and Fujian (a province in China) for decades (Tsai, 2001).[23] In 2002, over 100,000 pilgrims traveled from Taiwan to Meizhou in Fujian province, despite government prohibitions (Li, 2007). Today, the 'mini three links' policy formalizes what had been common practice between the two sites.

And the academy offers a quasi-governmental yet semi-private site for cross-strait relations. Faculty and students routinely lecture or conduct research across the Strait. Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council reports that such scholarly exchanges jumped 1,000 fold in 2007 compared with just a decade before.[24]

Ideological affinities: Confucianism is returning to post-Mao China (Bell, 2008).[25] Note, for example, the Chinese Communist Party's recent

Agency (http://www.immigration.gov.tw/aspcode/allinfo_97.asp) (last accessed on 1 January 2009).

23 There are more than 3000 Mazu temples scattered throughout Taiwan. See, Song (2007).

24 http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/index1-e.htm (last accessed on 27 September 2008).

25 See, for example, http://www.zgrj.cn/p_info.asp?PID=2465 (last accessed on 31 December 2008).

call for a 'harmonious society' (*hexie shehui*), based on the Confucian precepts of unity, morality, and respect for authority (Guo and Guo, 2008).[26] Chinese foreign policy applies another Confucian notion, 'harmony with difference' (*he er bu tong*) (Cao, 2007), to deflect anxiety, especially in the West (Ikenberry, 2008) about a newly resurgent, 'muscular' China (Wang, 2005).

With China's return to Confucianism comes the greatest potential, so far, of an ideological affinity with Taiwan. Both revere Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1911 and founded China's contemporary republican state.[27] No longer subject to the seemingly immutable divide between Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong thought on the mainland and liberal–capitalist–Confucianism in Taiwan, the two governing bodies may now have a common language to talk to and approach each other.

These developments offer new visions of cross-strait relations. They help to break out of the *status quo* paradigm of Taiwan versus China, 'strong sovereignty' versus 'weak sovereignty', 'wing' versus 'pivot'.

4.2 New visions

The Cold War, Chen Kuan-Hsing (2002a, b, 79) points out, constituted Taiwan. This meant a 'worldview, political and institutional forms, the system of popular knowledge and its classifications' shaped by a pro-United States and anti-Communist China ideology. Chen (2007, 47) offers an alternative framework for Taiwan based on the 'multiple nodal points' (*zhidian*) of its location in overlapping and intersected 'life networks' (*wangluo*), e.g. 'local Taiwan' (*taiwan zaidi*) within 'cross-strait relations' (*liang an guanxi*) within a 'Mandarin international' (*huawen guoji*) within an 'Asian region' (*yazhou quyu*) within a 'globalized region' (*quanqiu quyu*). Through globalization and the hybridization that results from it, these new connections reflect Taiwan's mix of colonial and hegemonic legacies with indigenous cultures and their values (Chen, 2006). Taiwan needs to restore its relationship with China, Chen stresses.

26 See the Chinese government's website on *hexie shehui* (http://news.sohu.com/s2006/hexie2006/) (last accessed on 31 December 2008).

27 For instance, a public plaza in Taipei still commemorates the memory of Dr. Sun whereas a similar site for Chiang Kai-shek was renamed two years ago but regained its original name after Ma came to the presidency.

For too long, Taiwan has treated China as an enemy. Improved cross-strait relations could help Taiwan exert its presence, at last, in Asia and the world (Chen, 2006). For this reason, Chen (2002a, b, 80) calls for an intellectual as well as policy move to 'de-colonize' (*qu zhi min*), 'de-imperialize' (*qu di guo*), and 'de-Cold War' (*qu leng zhan*) the region.

Indeed, Shih (2003) reminds us, 'Taiwan' comes not from the realist logic of inter-state relations where the state remains a fixed, unitary, and eternal 'black box'. Rather, 'Taiwan' qualifies more as an idea constructed by its leaders. Taiwan has its own agency and desires irrespective of United States strategic interests, plans, or goals – and has always acted on them, contrary to its portrayal as helpless and fragile. The 'rules of the game', Shih emphasizes, are not decided by the United States alone. For example, former President Chiang (1978–1988) disrupted the US role for Taiwan in relation to China when he ended martial law in 1987 and allowed family visits across the straits. With such social porousness dissolving the divide between China and Taiwan, the likelihood of military action from either side would diminish over time. This would give Taiwan the geopolitical space, Shih argues, to 'find its own way', with or without formal independence.

Taiwan, in short, is not what mainstream analysts presume it is. The island-state is not a self-enclosed, unitary actor with singularly definable interests like hating China and loving the United States, maximizing 'pivots' and minimizing 'wings'. Taiwan is neither exclusively Chinese nor Japanese nor American nor, even, 'indigenous' but an amalgam of all these ethnicities, histories, and politics – and more. A mix of 'tradition' and 'modernity', 'democratic debate' and 'authoritarian rule', 'patriarchal standards' and 'feminist challenges', Taiwan serves as a dynamic indicator of contemporary Asia rather than a relic of Cold-War power politics (Shih and Ling, 1997; Ling and Shih, 1998). Old political divisions have not only given way but also morphed into new hybrid subjectivities as traffic in people, goods, capital, ideas, and cultures increase. The geopolitical space between Taiwan and China is not just shrinking; it is also being transformed.

This postcolonial sensibility suggests an alternative approach to cross-strait relations. Elsewhere, we draw on Ang Lee's 2007 film, 'Lust/Caution', as an allegory for Taiwan and China (Chen *et al.*, 2009). The film tells of the painful consequences to the bifurcated national security state ('KMT, nationalist government' versus 'Japanese-run, puppet

regime'), personified by the film's two principals, Wang and Yee, who are lovers but committed to killing each other. In the end, both die: one physically (by order of her lover); the other, spiritually (due to this order). No one wins, in other words. What the paper explores are the liminalities or 'borderlands' that bind Wang and Yee – much akin to the 'new realities' identified above for Taiwan and China – even as they operate within circumscribed circumstances ('subaltern straits'). These 'borderlands,' we propose, need to be re-centered in our analyses and policies for Taiwan and China, if we seek a sustainable peace. A passage from this paper merits quoting at length:

> The affair between Wang and Yee stands for the private, social relations ('borderlands') that unfold and persist, even involuntarily, between two national security realms ('free China' versus 'Japanese-occupied Shanghai', 'Taiwan' versus 'China'), each claiming to destroy the other . . . A thought takes hold: perhaps we could put this abstract legacy of the Cold War, the national security state, on the back burner for now, lower the temperature, and leave it. We could prioritize, instead, what's before us that is immediate and material, even physical and personal. In so doing, we begin to strengthen the infrastructure around the 'borderlands' of Taiwan/China rather than continue cleaning up the spills and burns of the national security state. This analytical shift may be temporary, a mere moment of speculation. But even a pause from 'business as usual' offers the possibility of emancipation (Chen *et al.*, 2009, 761).

This approach to Taiwan–China relations may shock, at most titillate, establishment thinkers and analysts. But it can help shift cross-strait discourse from 'crisis' to 'compatibility'. Postcolonial 'exit' means resistance to and redress of the hegemonic discourse, replete with its connotations for race, gender, sexuality, class, and nationality for both hegemon and subaltern. Local participants can now abide by their own sensibilities, histories, and experiences rather than the hegemon's. Taiwan is not, if it ever was, the helpless, hapless *femme fatale* waiting for a hypermasculinized United States and China to duke it out for the island's destiny. Half a century of this racist, sexist, and neocolonial narrative is long enough.

5 Conclusion

Cross-strait analysts, whether from Taiwan or China, need to retrieve their *analytical* agency. As demonstrated by the reality of 'borderlands' between Taiwan and China, ordinary people have always acted on their own agency in daily life. Some analysts recognize this fact and 'voice' new challenges to the complacency and complicity of 'loyalty'. But more radical change awaits us. A paradigmatic breakthrough or 'exit' looms on the horizon.

Recent moves by both sides indicate as much. Since Ma's election, the heads of the Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (*haijihui*) and China's Association For Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (*haixiehui*) have met in Beijing as well as Taipei. They have signed agreements on commerce, trade, investment, and transportation. And both now emphasize a new orientation that highlights 'talks' (*xieshang*) rather than 'opposition' (*duili*).

The region's subaltern straits may be unraveling, at last.

References

Bao, T.-H. (1999) 'Zhanluesanjiao jiaose zhuanbien yu leixing bianhua fenxi: yi meiguo han taihai liangan hudong weili' [Analyzing role changes and typological transformations in the strategic triangle: taking the US–China–Taiwan triangular interactions as an example], in T.-H. Bao and Y.-S. Wu (eds), *Zhengbian zhong de liangan quanxi* [*Contending Approaches to Cross-Strait Relations*], pp. 337–363. Taipei: Wunan.

Bell, D.A. (2008) *China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bhabha, H. (1994) *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Cao, Q. (2007) 'Confucian vision of a new world order?', *International Communication Gazette*, 69(5), 431–450.

Chang, Y.-C. (1999) 'Liangan weilai: yoguan qianshu "liangan jichu xieding" de si kao' [The 'Cross-Taiwan strait basic agreement' and the future of Taiwan and mainland China], *Wenti yu Yanjiu*, 38(9), 1–28.

Chang, L.J. (2004) 'New dimensions of U.S.–Taiwan relations', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26, 309–315.

Chang, Y.-C. (2007) '*Meiguo buying "guangshuo buzuo*"' [The US should not be 'All talk and no action'], *CCTV*, 23 December (available at http://news.cctv.com/taiwan/20071223/100626.shtml).

Chao, C.-M. (2009) 'Mainland China policy and cross-strait relations', Keynote speech delivered to the graduate students' conference on 'Cross-strait relations and China studies', 9 June, Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University.

Chen, W.-H. (1997) '*Meigou yu zhonggong zhanlue hudong xia de taiwan anquan: yijiouqiling niandai yilai de guancha*' ['Taiwan's security under US–China strategic integration'], *Wenti yu yanjiu*, 36(6), 1–14.

Chen, E.I.-H. (2000) '*Mei zhong tai sanbian guanxi yanjiu zhi huigu yu zhanwang*' ['Retrospection of and prospects for studies on US–China–Taiwan relations'], in S.-Y. Ho and Y.-S. Wu (eds), *Mairu ersh yi shiji de zhengzhi xiao* [*Political Science: The State of the Discipline in the 21st Century*], pp. 315–357. Taipei: Zhongguo zhengzhi xiaohui.

Chen, H. (2002a) 'Why is 'great reconciliation' impossible? De-cold war/decolonization, or modernity and its tears (Part I)', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 3(1), 77–99.

Chen, H. (2002b) 'Why is 'Great reconciliation' impossible? De-cold war/decolonization, or modernity and its tears (Parts II)', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 3(2), 235–251.

Chen, H. (2006) *Qudiguo: Yazhou Zuowei Fangfa* [*Towards De-Imperialization: Aisa as Method*]. Taipei: Flaneur.

Chen, W.-H. (2007) Taiwan Thinktank International Affairs Forum, Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1 September 2007 (http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/ttt/servlet/OpenBlock?Template=Article&lan=tc&category_id=63&article_id=780&BlockSet) (last accessed on 13 August 2008.).

Chen, E.I.-H. (2008a) '*Wending liangan be lengluo taimei waijiao*' ['Do not cold-shoulder diplomatic ties with the US while stabilizing cross-strait relations'], *The United Daily*, A13. 5 August.

Chen, E.I.-H. (2008b) '*Shenshen leguan xia de taimeizhong xinnanti*' ['New Hard Problems in Taiwan-US-China Relations under Prudent Optimism'], *Apple Daily*, A 24. May 22.

Chen, E.I.-H. (2008c) '*Didiao fangmei nengyingde huafu zhichi waijiao xiubing*?' ['Can a low-key attitude make Washington support a diplomatic truce?'], *China Times*, A10. 18 August,.

Chen, W.-H. (2009) Taiwan Thinktank Peace Forum. National Taiwan University, 1 September 21 January 2009; (available at http://www.taiwanthinktank.org/ttt/servlet/OpenBlock?Template=Home&category_id=62&lan=tc&BlockSet) (last accessed on 13 February 2009.).

Chen, B., Hwang, C.-C. and Ling, L.H.M. (2009) 'Lust/caution in IR: democratising world politics with culture as a method', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 37(3), 739–762.

Chi, K.-l. (2005) '*Guolibuduideng zhanluesanjiao hudongmoshizhiyanjiu: yi lengzhanshiqi meizhongsusanjiao yu holengzhanshiqi meizhongtaisanjiao weili*'

['*Asymmetrical Triangles: Cold War US–China–Russia and Post-Cold War Washington–Beijing–Taipei Triangular Relations*']. Taipei: Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University.

Clough, R.N. (1996) 'The enduring influence of the Republic of China on Taiwan today', *The China Quarterly*, 148, 1054–1071.

Clough, R.N. (2001a) 'Growing cross-strait cooperation despite political impasse', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 23, 99–107.

Clough, R.N. (2001b) 'The U.S. view of Taiwan's future', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 23, 35–39.

Clough, R.N. (2002) 'The Chen administration acts to expand cross-strait economic relations', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 24, 159–164.

Clough, R.N. (2003) 'Progress and problems in Taiwan's cross-strait relation', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 25, 241–245.

Cohen, A.J. (1978a) 'Normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China', *American Bar Association Journal*, 64, 940–941.

Cohen, A.J. (1978b) 'Recognizing China', *Foreign Affairs*, 50(1), 30–43.

Cohn, C. (1987) 'Sex and death in the rational world of defense intellectuals', *Signs*, 12(4), 687–718.

Council on Foreign Relations (1995) *Managing the Taiwan Issue: Key Is Better U.S. Relations with China*. New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Ding, A.S. (1998) '*Yijiujiuliounien sanyue yihou meigou, taiwan yu zhonggong guanxi de fazhan*' ['US.–ROC–PRC Relations Since March 1996'], *Zhongguodaluyanjiou*, 41(12), 77–96.

Dittmer, L. (1981) 'The strategic triangle: an elementary game-theoretical analysis', *World Politics*, 33(4), 485–516.

Dittmer, L. (2005) 'Bush, China, Taiwan: a triangular analysis', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 10(2), 21–42.

Feldman, N. (2004) *What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Glaser, B.S. (2008) 'If not now, when? Will China seize the opportunity to improve cross-strait relations?' PacNet Newsletter, *Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)*, April (http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/2008?PacNet-0408.htm) (last accessed on 18 August 2008).

Guo, S. and Guo, G. (eds) (2008) *China in Search of a Harmonious Society*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefied.

Hirschman, A.O. (1970) *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ho, P.-T. (1978) *Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huang, M. (1976) *Xiaoguafu (The Little Widow)*. Taipei: Yuanjing.

Huang, B. (2006) 'Transformational Diplomacy and Washington–Beijing–Taipei relations.', *Views & Policies*, 2 (4), 43–63.

Human Trafficking Website (2007–2008) (http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/Taiwan.htm) (last accessed on 13 August 2008).

Ikenberry, G.J. (2008) 'The rise of China and the future of the west: can the liberal system survive?', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87102/g-john-ikenberry/the-rise-of-china-and-the-future-of-the-west.html).

Jacoby, N.H. (1966) *U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Jing, Y. (2008) *'Shaopian Taiwan de dalure'* [*'Mainland China Fever in Taiwan'*], (http://www.shtwo.gov.cn/gb/newscontent_big.asp?id=443) (last accessed on 4 July 2008).

Johnson, C. (1997) 'The China way', *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 53, 20–25.

Kuhn, T. (1962) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kristof, N. (1991) 'A Taiwan pop singer sways the mainland', *New York Times*, 19 February.

Lampton, D.M. (1986) 'China policy: interests and process', *World Affairs*, 149 (3), 139–142.

Lampton, D.M. (2003) 'The stealth normalization of U.S.–China relations', *The National Interest*, 73, 37–48.

Lampton, D.M. and May, G.C. (1999) *Managing US-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center.

Lan, N.-L. (2008) '*Bubi zifeiwugong lai biaoda shanyi*' ['We Do Not Need to Self-Demilitarize to Express Good Will'], *The United Daily*, A13. 21 August.

Li, X. (2007) '*Cong tianshang mazu dao zhonghua mazu*' ['From Heavenly Mazu to Chinese Mazu'], *Taiwan Yuanliou*, 41, 129–140.

Li, H.-Q. (2008) '*Ma nengfou kaiqi liangan xinju*' ['Can Ma Open Up New Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations?'], *Apple Daily*, May 21.

Lin, E. (2002) 'The cross-strait entertainment industry: competition or complementarity?', *Taiwan Panorama*, 27(12), 68–76.

Lin, W.-c. and Lin, C.-y. (2006) '*Taiwan xiuxian yu taimeizhong sanjiao guanxi*' ['Taiwan's Constitutional Amendment and US–China–Taiwan triangular relations'], *Taiwan Foundation for Democracy*, l3 (4), 125–164.

Ling, L.H.M. (1999) 'Sex machine: global hypermasculinity and images of the Asian woman in modernity', *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique*, 72 (2), 1–30.

Ling, L.H.M. (2002a) 'Cultural chauvinism and the liberal international order: "West versus rest" in Asia's financial crisis', in G. Chowdhry and S. Nair

(eds), *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class*, pp. 115–141. London: Routledge.

Ling, L.H.M. (2002b) *Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ling, L.H.M. and Shih, C.-Y. (1998) 'Confucianism with a liberal face: the meaning of democratic politics in contemporary Taiwan', *Review of Politics*, 60 (1), 55–82.

Liu, P. (2008) '*Meizhongtai sanfang siwei feibianbuke*' ['Thinking by the US, China, and Taiwan Must Change'], *China Times*, A4, July 31.

Lo, C.-C. (2007) '*Meiguo 'yizhongzhengce' de neihanyushijian*' ['America's One-China Policy: Implications and Practice'], in C.-C. Lo and Y.-W. Song (eds), *Jiegou yige zhongguo goujimailuo xia de zhengcejiexi*, pp. 57–77. Taipei: Taiwan Zhiku.

Lo, C.-C. (2008) '*Ma zhengfu zhanlue zhuanxiang tairimei tongmeng piaoyi*' ['Ma Government's Strategy Shifting; Taiwan–Japan–US Ally Drifting']. Xingqizhuanlun (Weekly Column), *The Liberty Times*, A4. June 22.

Mainland Affairs Council (2008) *Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly*, no. 184. Taipei, Taiwan (http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/csexchan/rpt/index.htm) (last accessed on 19 August 2008).

Nathan, A.J. (2000) 'What's wrong with American Taiwan policy', *The Washington Quarterly*, 23 (2), 93–106.

Nathan, A.J. (2007) *Congjiquantongzhi dao renxingweiquan: zhongguo zhengzhi bianqianzhilu* [*Political Change in China: From Totalitarian Rule to Resilient Authoritarianism*]*, translated by Ho Da-Ming*. Taipei: Juliu.

Oksenberg, M. (1982) 'Decade of Sino-American relations', *Foreign Affairs*, 61 (1), 175–195.

Rice, C. (2006) 'Transformational diplomacy'. Speech at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, (http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm) (last accessed on 18 February 2008).

Robinson, T.W. (1996) 'America in Taiwan's post cold-war foreign relations', *The China Quarterly*, 148, 1340–1361.

Said, E. (1979) *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.

Said, E. (1994) *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Shambaugh, D. (1996) 'Exploring the complexities of contemporary Taiwan', *The China Quarterly*, 148, 1045–1053.

Shen, C. (2006) '*Meizhongtai sanjiaoguanxi: gailiangde zhanluesanjiao fenxifa*' ['The US–China–Taiwan Triangle: An Improved Analysis of the Strategic Triangle Approach'], *Zhanwangyutansuo*, 4 (3), 20–40.

Shih, C.-Y. (2003) '*Qishouwuhei dazhangfu: mishizai yifuzhe nengdongxingde meizhong zhanlue qipan* '['No Play, No Game: Sino-U.S. Strategy Calculus Lost in Taiwan'], *Yuanjing jijinhei jikan l.*, 4 (2), 39–60.

Shih, C.-Y. and Ling, H.-M. (1997) '*Taiwan minzhuhualichengzhongde 'xianren' qidai'* ['Expectations of the 'Wise man' in Taiwan's democratization process'], *East Asia Quarterly*, 28(3), 124–140.

Solomon, R.H. (1978) 'Thinking through the China problem', *Foreign Affairs*, 59 (2), 324–356.

Song, C. (2007) '*Mazu xinyang zai taiwan*' ('The Mazu Faith in Taiwan'), *XunGen*, 4, 4–11.

Sterling-Folker, J. and Rosemary, E.S. (2005) 'Discourses of power: traversing the realist-postmodern divide', *Millennium*, 33 (1), 637–664.

Sung, C. and Ong, J. (2009) 'Taiwan opens 100 industries to Chinese investment (update 2)', *Bloomberg News*, 30 June (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=aFeN1SK55G7U) (last accessed on 30 June 2009).

Tsai, H.-m. (2001) '*Xiaosantong dui liangan hudong de yingxiang*' ('The Impact of Mini Three Links on the Interactions across the Taiwan Strait'), *Yuanjing Jikan*, 2 (2), 135–161.

Tsai, I.-W. (2008) '*Morang beijng lunwei nacui aoyun de fanban*' ('Do Not Let the Beijing Olympics Become A Copy of the Nazi Olympics'), *China Times*, A14. August 10.

Tucker, N.B. (1998) 'China–Taiwan: US debates and policy choice', *Survival*, 40 (4), 150–167.

Tucker, N.B. (2002) 'More of the same: the impact of Taiwan's elections on the U.S.–China–Taiwan triangle', *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 24, 237–242.

Tucker, N.B. (2005) 'Taiwan expendable? Nixon and Kissinger go to China', *The Journal of American History*, 92 (1), 109–135.

Wang, Z.-H. (1984) *MeiguiMeigui Wuoaini* [*Rose, Rose, I Love You*]. Taipei: Yuanjing.

Wang, J. (2005) 'China's search for stability with America', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050901faessay84504/wang-jisi/china-s-search-for-stability-with-america.html).

Wu, M. (1988) '*Meiyuan yu taiwan jingji fazhan*' ['U.S. Aid and Taiwan's Economic Development'], *Taiwan shehui yianjiu jikan*, 1 (1), 145–158.

Wu, S. (2000) '*Feiziyuan de shuniu: meiguo zai huashengdun-taibei-beijing zhijian de diwei*' ['Unwilling Pivot: the US in Triangular Relations between Washington, Taipei and Beijing'], *Chengzhikexueluncong*, 12 (June), 189–222.

Wu, S. (2005) 'From Romantic Triangle to Marriage? Washington–Beijing–Taipei Relations in Historical Comparison', *Issues & Studies*, 41 (1), 113–159.

Wu, Y.-S. (1996) 'Exploring Dual Triangles: The development of Taipei–Washington–Beijing relations', *Issues & Studies*, 32 (10), 26–52.

Yahuda, M. (1996) 'The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan.', *The China Quarterly*, 148, 1319–1339.

Yang, Y.-C. (1996) '*Wanquande sanjiao yu buwanquande canyuzhe: taiwan yu meizhong de hudong jiagou*' ['Complete Triangle and Incomplete Participant: the Interactive Structure of Taiwan–US–China'], Paper for a conference on China studies, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei.

Yang, P. (2000) 'Taiwan's legal status: beyond the unification-independence Dichotomy', in G.W. Gong (ed.), *Taiwan strait dilemmas: China–Taiwan–U.S. policies in the new century*, pp. 80–93. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Yang, P. (2006) 'Doubly dualistic dilemma: US strategies toward China and Taiwan', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 6(2), 209–225.

Yang, Y.-M. (2007) 'Rulian zhihou meigou tueichang jizhi: meizhung gong-guan,' [After the Referendum for Entering the UN, the US–China Condominium as the Mechanism for the US to Exist], *United Daily*, A15. December 24.

Zhang, Z.-Y. (2008a) '*Mahu zhihang xieshang gongshou yiwei*' ['The Negotiation of Direct Transportation between Ma and Hu: The Changing Positions of Trading'], *Apple Daily*, A26. 23 May.

Zhang, Z.-Y. (2008b) '*Mei yung junshou wenti tixing mazhengfu*' ['The US Makes the Ma Government Pay Attention by Raising the Issue of Arms Sales'], *Apple Daily*, A17. July 21.

Zhuang, Y.-X. (2007) '*Jing ershinianlai liangan tonhunmoshi de lanjing ji chushi tansuo*' ['An Analysis of Intermarriage between Mainland China and Taiwan Over the Past Twenty Years'], *Nanfang Zhenkou*, 6 (23), 23–31.