Original Article

Why do secondary states choose to support, follow or challenge?

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Abstract In this article we examine when and why secondary and tertiary states select a strategy that does not entail following the lead of the rising states. To address these questions we outline a simple model that examines systemic and sub-systemic (regional) constraints on and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states: how engaged in the region is the global hegemon, how many rising (and extra-regional) states are in the region, and which states are waxing and waning and by how much. These three characteristics create different opportunities for and constraints on secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influence the set of strategy choices of these states as they respond to the regional hegemon. Our model cannot account for the specific foreign policy strategies that secondary and tertiary states select. Such a model would require domestic and individual level variables. We leave it to the area specialists and experts in the following articles in the volume to introduce these variables and explain the specific strategies used. Instead, based on our model we can explain general tendencies toward accommodative strategies, resistance strategies and neutral strategies. It is important to note that secondary and tertiary states can use a mix of different strategies toward regional and global hegemons, such as resisting primary threats and accommodating secondary threats. Moreover, secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games – a strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level but reasonable and optimal at another level. Finally, in selecting a strategy secondary and tertiary states factor the systemic, sub-systemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.
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Introduction

When and why do secondary and tertiary states select to support, follow or challenge the regional rising states, such as Brazil, India, China and South Africa?[1] In response to these questions, realists suggest that secondary and tertiary states are likely to bandwagon with the regional hegemon rather than balance against it; liberals contend that secondary states will bind regional hegemons within international institutions, through interdependence, or by the special peace among democratic states; and constructivists maintain that secondary states will create new regional identities such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Plus Three or advance a distinct regional international society.[2]

To address these questions we outline a simple model that examines global/systemic and regional/sub-systemic constraints and opportunities on secondary and tertiary states: (1) how engaged in the region is the global hegemon?; (2) how many rising states (both regional and extra-regional) are in the region?; and (3) which states are waxing and waning and by how much? For instance, in Africa, the United States is a disengaged hegemon, South Africa is a waning regional hegemon and both Nigeria and China are waxing (potential) regional and extra-regional players. In Latin America, the United States is a semi-engaged hegemon, and Brazil is a regional hegemon, with China playing a role. Finally, in Asia, the United States is an engaged hegemon, and Russia, India and China are regional hegemons. These three characteristics create different opportunities and constraints for secondary and tertiary states, which in turn influences the range of strategic choices for these states as they respond to the rising states.

Our model cannot account for the specific foreign policy strategies that secondary and tertiary states select. Such a model would require domestic and individual unit-level variables (Barnett and Levy, 1991). We leave it to the area specialists and experts in the following articles in this special issue to introduce these variables and to explain why specific strategies were used. Moreover, our model does not explain non-power variables. Again, we leave it to the area experts to discuss these forces. For instance, in South America, Federico Merke (2015) maintains that a rising Brazil has pursued a strategy of *concertación* or a regional institution that blends hegemony/great power management and a culture of diplomacy. Instead, based on our model, we can explain general tendencies and broad patterns toward accommodative strategies (such as bandwagoning, binding and bonding), resistance strategies (balancing, balking) and neutral strategies (hedging or fence sitting) (Cooper and Flemes, 2013). It is important to note that secondary and tertiary states can use a mix of different strategies toward regional and global hegemons, such as resisting primary threats and accommodating secondary threats (on what is known as omni-balancing see David (1991) and Ayoob (1998)). Moreover, these strategies can change over time given shifts in the level of

hegemonic engagement and changes in the relative power of the global hegemon and/or rising states. In addition secondary and tertiary states are often engaged in multiple games in that a security strategy might appear to be costly and suboptimal at one level (that is, against the global hegemon, regional hegemon or domestic opponents) but reasonable and optimal at another level (for an explanation of complex threat identification see Lobell (2009)). Finally, in selecting a specific security strategy secondary and tertiary states will factor the global/systemic, regional/sub-systemic and domestic costs of the alternative strategies.

This article consists of several sections. Recognizing the different types of states in the international system, we begin by providing definitions of secondary and tertiary states as related to global and regional hegemons. The next section begins with a brief discussion of the role of nested games and multiple games, followed by a discussion of the various security strategies that secondary and tertiary states can utilize in responding to global and regional hegemons: accommodation, resistance and neutrality. The constraints on and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states, and the costs of these as related to their strategy options, are examined in the section that follows. In order to assess the constraints and opportunities states encounter, we consider three factors: (1) hegemon's level of engagement in the region; (2) number of rising states in the region; and (3) the states that are waxing and waning.

Defining Secondary and Tertiary States

David R. Mares (1988) builds on Kenneth Waltz's (1979) structural realist theory regarding states' position in the international system. He notes that 'we need a definition of position which highlights the relationship among states in a system characterized by a highly unequal distribution of resources'. Moreover, 'Since a state defends its interests *vis-à-vis* other states, capability [which is relative in the international system] must be defined in terms of an ability to act in defense of one's own interests. Positions in the system are defined by clusters of states, distinguished by differences in capabilities' (Mares, 1988, p. 456). Given this, Mares argues that there are four (hierarchical) positions that can be distinguished in the international system. The first position, or those states at the top of the hierarchy, is the great powers. They are in first position 'because the balancing in the system will revolve around them. International systems, therefore, are defined by the number of great powers, that is, multipolar, bipolar, hegemonic'. In the second position are secondary powers, which are states that 'can disrupt the system, but not change it, through unilateral action'. Middle powers are in the third position – states 'that neither can affect the system individually' but 'have enough resources so that in an alliance with a small enough number of other states that they

are not merely "price takers", they can affect the system'. Small powers, those in the fourth position, also cannot affect the system individually and 'would have to ally in such large numbers in order to have an impact that any one small power loses its ability to influence the alliance' (Mares, 1988, p. 456). It is worth noting that such a classification mimics that of Robert Keohane (1969) and his idea that the international system is divided into four types of states: system-determining, system-influencing, system-affecting and system-ineffectual.[3]

Mares' definitions are quite similar to terms employed by a host of scholars for the past few decades. Annette Baker Fox (1959) writes about the position of small powers versus the great powers in the diplomacy leading up to the Second World War. She posits that the test of the position of a small state has historically been 'the capacity to resist great-power [sic] demands' (1959, p. 3). Importantly, Fox establishes that the success of small states *vis-à-vis* larger belligerents often depended upon the structure of the system, for example the number of competing great powers, the range of competing interests elsewhere for the great powers and so on (1959, pp. 183–184). Robert Rothstein (1968) builds upon some of these concepts, emphasizing that 'small powers are something more than or different from great powers writ small' (1968, p. 1). David Vital (1971) also instructs us to develop a terminology in which 'members of the classes of secondary and tertiary states are' simply not defined as the great powers lacking power, but rather as something truly different (1971, pp. 15–28). Rothstein seems to predate Mares in his focus on the ability of small states to seek large alliances in order to create collective security. Trygve Mathisen (1971) employs a four-fold distinction that also foreshadows Mares' work. Mathisen differentiates states into superpowers, former great powers (for example, United Kingdom), new middle powers (for example, Brazil, Turkey) and small powers. Karl Mueller (1991) asks us to consider that any definition of a state 'depends upon regional context' (1991, p. 66). Discussing Europe, he divides states into great powers, middle powers and small powers almost exactly along the definitional lines of Mares' use of the terms (substituting great power for secondary power).

In summary, defining differences between states and classifying them into a single typology has eluded political scientists for decades. Scholars create their own definitions and disagree on whether absolute or relative power is the key, the nature of influence on neighbors and/or the system, and many others factors. However, a common thread is a four-fold distinction. For the purposes of this volume we shall employ Mares' classification into Great, Secondary, Middle and Small, noting that these terms are system-specific (that is, that there is only a great power at the international system level and that a 'secondary' power is most likely the largest power in its region). Therefore, the terms secondary and tertiary as applied in a regional context typically equate Middle and Small states to the terms Secondary and Tertiary, respectively.

Strategies

Structure and strategy: Multiple-level games

When discussing how to define states in the previous section, we allude to the presence of context. In other words, states are engaged in different 'systems' of relationships. These systems may overlap in a hierarchical order (for example, a middle state interacting with a global hegemon in a global system while also interacting with a regional hegemon in a regional system), may be created by a multitude of 'equal' relationships (for example, a small power surrounded by a number of middle powers), and/or may be derived from domestic factors (for example the leadership of a state concerned about general elections and domestic political rivals). George Tsebelis (1990) develops the idea that a state may be involved in multiple 'games' into a single framework known as 'Nested Games', a model derived from Game Theory. Tsebelis establishes that it is important for an observer to be cognizant of all the multiple games in which an actor (in this case a state) may be involved, because the appearance of sub-optimal choice or outcome most likely is because of a 'disagreement between actor and observer … in which the observer's perspective is incomplete' (1990, p. 7). One key reason for the difference in actor/observer perceptions is a misreading by the observer on the importance that the actor places into each game or arena. Robert Putnam (1988) derives a similar framework in what he terms the 'two-level game' in which states interact with each other at the international level while also engaging in an intra-national (that is, domestic level) game with domestic actors.

In other words, the state has two or more games or arenas in which it must choose between alternate strategies seeking to maximize beneficial outcomes. The opposing actor in each game will be different and will have its own set of strategies and outcomes. Each game can be thought of as a different arena in which a particular factor is the overriding concern. For example, Pakistan plays a game with the United States that has security at its core (global anti-terrorism for the United States and direct aid for Pakistan). Pakistan is also engaged in an international game with its neighbor India that centers on security and border issues with nuclear deterrence considerations a part of the game. Further, the Pakistani leadership finds itself dealing with a complex domestic game (or games) in which multiple domestic actors have interests unaligned with the interests of the Pakistani government and/or the United States. Explaining Pakistan's accommodation or resistance to the United States must take into consideration all the games in which the Pakistani leadership participates.

The utility of such a theoretical framework is to point to the complex structure of the relationships in which a state is engaged. A state must balance its interests, and possible outcomes, across the multiple games. The emphasis that a state places on one arena versus another may determine in which game they seek to maximize their possible outcome. For example, a state may be disobedient *vis-à-vis* a global or

regional hegemon, even incurring costs from such behavior, because the state's leadership seeks to appease a domestic actor. It is important to note that the emphasis that a state places on any game or arena is derived internally to that state and typically is idiosyncratic. Likewise, the exact strategies, payoffs and outcomes of multiple-level games are derived from multiple factors, some of which originate in the international system and others that originate domestically. No single generalization can be made about what a state will do when confronted by such a multiple game structure, for each state must navigate its own particular and unique games. For example, Kai He (2015) argues that the rise of China has intensified competition in a number of regional orders in the Asia Pacific. China participates in bilateral relations with the United States and a regional set of multilateral relations. In the case of South America, Flemes and Wehner (2015) examine the different responses to Brazil's regional hegemony by Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, given the United States's less prominent presence in the region. They demonstrate that while systemic-level factors are important, domestic factors are the main 'drivers' that account for the varied responses to Brazil (including soft-balancing, balking and binding).

The use of multiple-level game theory as an analytical tool in international relations is ubiquitous and we choose not to elaborate on the broad range of such research here. The articles in this volume explore and utilize the concept of multiple-level games, even if they do not directly address the analysis as such, tacitly providing explanations of state behavior that rely on this concept.

Strategies of resistance, accommodation and neutrality

States' foreign policies can tell us much about a hegemon's power and influence (and the secondary and tertiary states' perceptions of the hegemon's intentions and capabilities). As such, scholars have focused on various strategies available to these states in response to the hegemon's dominance. We consider three main categories of strategies: accommodation, resistance and neutrality.

In terms of *resistance* strategies (that is, balancing, blackmail, leash-slipping and so forth), states challenge the hegemon's leadership and dominance. For neo- or structural realism, because the international system is anarchic and states are concerned first and foremost about their security, states will balance against a state seeking dominance, balancing internally (procure arms) and/or externally (form alliances with other states) (Waltz, 1979, p. 118). In building on Waltz's balance of power theory, Stephen Walt (1987) argues that states balance against threats (rather than capabilities only). Levy and Thompson (2010) examine the balancing behavior (defined as alliance formation) against leading land powers and sea powers. They found that states (primarily examining the European continent) were more likely to balance against leading land powers than sea powers. Such structural realist theories

are focused on hard balancing as a strategy. Yet states can also engage in a soft balancing strategy, using diplomacy, economic statecraft, international institutions and international law to constrain the actions of the hegemon.[4] For instance, reflecting this range, according to Nicolas Blarel and Hannes Ebert (2015), Pakistan's response to India, the regional hegemon, included open resistance, indirect resistance and reluctant acquiescence. In the case of Africa, Timothy Shaw (2015) argues that soft-balancing against South Africa within the Southern African region (but not the entire African continent) is occurring.

In a further refinement of balancing behavior, Christopher Layne (2006) puts forth the strategy of leash-slipping: 'States engaging in leash-slipping do not fear being attacked by the hegemon. Rather, they build up their military capabilities to maximize their ability to conduct an independent foreign policy' (2006, p. 9). Such a strategy is not hard balancing because other states do not view the hegemon as 'an existential … threat'. He notes that 'at the same time, it is a form of insurance against a hegemon that might someday exercise its power in a predatory and menacing fashion' (2006, pp. 29–30).

Other strategies of resistance, as described by Walt (2005), include undermining the hegemon's power through attacking its legitimacy as the hegemon. States attempt to convince others that the hegemon's actions – in this case, the United States – are 'selfish, hypocritical, immoral, and unsuited for world leadership, and its dominance harms them'. This strategy does not seek to challenge American power, but rather 'resent and resist US supremacy' (2005, p. 116). For example, Schweller and Pu (2011) examine China's response to US hegemony and argue that China is not balancing against the United States at the present time but is engaging in 'delegitimating activities' (2011, p. 71).

In the case of blackmail, states can attempt to gain concessions from the hegemon through the threats of 'undesirable consequences'. Both adversaries and allies can use this strategy. For example, Walt notes that countries might use blackmail in attempting to convince the United States that their regime will collapse without additional support. He cites the example of Afghan president Hamid Karzai, who pushed America to increase support for his regime from the threat of collapse (2005, pp. 112–115).

Using a strategy of balking, a state can ignore or refuse the hegemon's demands. This is a particularly effective strategy, 'because even a country as powerful as the United States cannot force every state to do its bidding all the time. And the more some states balk, the more overextended the United States becomes – making it easier for other states to balk as well'. Walt provides the example of Turkey's refusal of allowing the use of its airbases for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (2005, pp. 115–116).

With regards to *accommodation* strategies, states can bandwagon with the stronger state (Waltz, 1979, p. 126).[5] Concerns with regional threats, rather than threats posed by the hegemon, may lead states to accommodate the hegemon. Whereas bandwagoning assumes utilitarian support for the hegemon regardless of one's own different

immediate stakes in the situation at hand, accommodation may also stem from a real sense of shared interests (Walt, 2005, pp. 110–111). Another accommodation strategy is bonding, which refers to the use of the close relationship between the hegemon and secondary states as a way to influence the hegemon (Walt, 2005, pp. 191–192).[6]

As in many cases states have both shared and conflicting interests with the hegemon, they can constrain the hegemon's power through membership in institutions. According to the logic of liberal institutionalism, international institutions can provide the necessary conditions for states to reach cooperative agreements and arrangements (Keohane and Martin, 1995; March and Olsen, 1998; Ikenberry, 2001). The hegemon plays a role in creating these institutions and, as a way to maintain its power, is willing to bind itself to these institutions. The secondary states then get a voice and a means to influence the institution, and perhaps the behavior of the hegemon as well (Ikenberry, 2001, pp. 51–57, 63; Walt, 2005, pp. 112–115). Walt cautions, however, that binding the hegemon is more likely to be successful in the economic sphere than in the security sphere given the greater interdependence in the international trading order relative to the security order (2005, pp. 115).

In addition to resistance and accommodation strategies, a state can also pursue a strategy of *neutrality*. In this case, a state chooses not to ally with other states and instead pursues an independent foreign policy (Karsh, 1988a). The key point is that the neutral state tries to remove itself from the security calculus of one or more stronger neighbors. While the neutral state may provide some positive benefits to other states, even belligerent ones, it does not seek to advantage any state, maintaining impartiality in the international or regional security system.[7] Neutrality, thus, is an unlikely strategy for states already previously allied with the hegemon.

Constraints and Opportunities

The relationships and interactions between states differently positioned in the international system are a function of constraints and opportunities available to the states. In this section we examine three main factors: how engaged is the global hegemon; how many regional hegemons (or potential regional hegemons) are there in the region; which states are waxing and waning, and by how much?

How engaged is the global hegemon?

How engaged or involved is the global hegemon in regional affairs? The hegemon's level of engagement or disengagement in the region is important in influencing the permissiveness and restrictiveness of the environment, or the constraints and opportunities for both the rising states and the secondary and tertiary states.[8] The more engaged the hegemon and the more public goods it provides in the region,

the fewer the opportunities for the rising states, but the more permissive the environment or the weaker the constraints and the greater range of strategies for secondary and tertiary states (Gilpin, 1981). Alternatively, the less engaged the hegemon and the fewer services it provides, the greater the opportunities for the rising states, but the more restrictive the environment or the stronger the constraints and the narrower the range of strategic choices for secondary and tertiary states.

Engagement in a region can be measured in several different ways. High hegemonic engagement includes commitments such as sustained overseas bases and military installations, formal military alliances and security guarantees, trade treaties and agreements, active participation and membership in regional institutions and organizations, and direct involvement in regional policing and peacemaking.[9] Low hegemonic engagement in a region entails minor or no military installations or troop presence, no alliances and perhaps even few trade treaties, limited involvement in regional institutions and governing bodies, and reliance on international institutions rather than direct hegemonic participation in policing and brokering peace agreements.[10]

Scholars and policy makers differ on whether (or not) high hegemonic engagement is self-defeating and will provoke counter-balancing against the hegemon (Lieber and Alexander, 2005; Posen, 2006). Scholars who contend that high hegemonic engagement is counter-productive maintain that the rising states, such as Brazil, India, China or South Africa, will counter-balance not by traditional means of hard balancing such as alliances or domestic military buildup but rather by means of soft-balancing that, as noted earlier, entails using international institutions, diplomacy and economic statecraft to resist and restrain the hegemon (Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005). In either case, we maintain that where the global hegemon is highly, or deeply, engaged, the rising states will have less room and freedom to maneuver. For instance, China must take US regional engagement into account when making major military, political and economic choices. Beijing must ask whether the actions will provoke the United States to push back (Ross, 2006). In fact, the United States engages in soft balancing against other states. As an example, 'In 2011 Washington coordinated action with a number of Southeast Asian states to oppose Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by highlighting established international law and norms to deny China's claim legitimacy' (Brooks *et al*, 2012/2013). Similarly, according to Blarel and Ebert (2015), in South Asia, the United States had significant interest in de-escalating the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, using a pivotal deterrence strategy to influence the strategic choices of the regional states.

For secondary and tertiary states in such regions the implication is a more permissive environment and a greater range of strategic options. Specifically, for secondary and tertiary states high hegemonic engagement in the region means there is a viable alternative player in the region to the rising state(s). In this permissive environment, strategic responses for the secondary and tertiary states include

accommodative strategies with the global hegemon, resistance strategies to the regional hegemon, and neutral strategies such as hedging or fence-sitting. Of course, the secondary or tertiary state can follow the lead of the regional hegemons/rising states too.

Where the global hegemon is less engaged and provides few public goods, the rising states will have more opportunity to engage in political, economic and military statecraft and without great power repercussions.[11] Moreover, in buck-passing to the rising states, the regional hegemon(s) will have fewer opportunities to free-ride on the hegemon, though as discussed below, might engage in buck-passing and free-riding on each other if there is more than one rising state in the region. For the rising state, this might entail providing for regional public goods, creating friendly regional organizations or bullying local states. For instance, according to Burges (2015), American disengagement in South America allowed the Lula administration to act as a consensual hegemon, though given Brazil's limited resources, it failed to become a cooperative hegemon, providing more of the public goods.

For secondary and tertiary states the import is a restrictive environment and less freedom of action. Specifically, for such states, there are few alternative major powers to the rising states in the region. The secondary and tertiary states are likely to engage in accommodative strategies such as bandwagoning, binding and bonding rather than resistance strategies such as balancing or balking. Resistance strategies would mean that the secondary and tertiary states risk falling prey to the rising power, especially given the lack of a great-power patron or hegemonic balancer.

How many rising states are in the region?

How many rising states are located in the region?[12] Specifically, is the regional distribution of power unipolar, bipolar or multipolar? The import for this special issue is that different distributions of power will affect the opportunities and constraints for secondary and tertiary states in the region. For instance, according to Blarel and Ebert (2015), the tripolar regional distribution in South Asia has led India to ramp-up its nuclear capability against China, thereby provoking Pakistan.

For most realist IR scholars, bipolar and multipolar distributions are more stable than unipolar distributions (Copeland, 1996; Mearsheimer, 2001). The rationale is that if one state becomes too powerful it can impose its will and dominate the others, thereby risking their sovereignty and survival. For Waltz (1979) the import is that balances will recur and the equilibrium will be restored through counter-balancing alliances or internal military buildup. Hegemonic stability, long cycle and power transition theories maintain that hegemonic distributions are more stable. They counter that the hegemon will provide the public goods that are necessary for stability such as a liberal international trading order.

For Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), for example, independent of the level of a global hegemon's regional engagement, a unipolar regional distribution of power creates an unconstrained and permissive environment. This distribution means that the BRICS states will contend with no other major power or BRICS balancer. Freedom of action is further enhanced if the global hegemon is disengaged. Alternatively, bipolar and multipolar regional distributions entail a more constrained and restrictive environment for the BRICS states. Specifically, the BRICS states must consider the other rising powers in the region when designing political, economic and military statecraft or risk provoking repercussions, pushback and counterbalancing. As a number of IR scholars contend, in a multipolar distribution there might be greater opportunities than in a bipolar distribution given the temptation of buck-passing and free-riding among the BRICS.

For secondary and tertiary states, bipolar and multipolar regional distributions of power are permissive environments and translate into a wider range of opportunities for accommodative strategies, resistance strategies or neutral strategies than a unipolar distribution. In both a bipolar and multipolar distribution, the secondary states can play the BRICS states off of each other by threatening to defect or join the other side, as the secondary states did to the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (that is, the tail wagging the dog). If there is an engaged global hegemon this creates further alternatives and opportunities. In contrast, in a unipolar regional distribution, there are few alternatives for secondary states, especially if the global hegemon is disengaged (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008; Ikenberry *et al*, 2011). In this restrictive environment, the range of alternative strategies for secondary states is narrow.

Which states are waxing and waning, and by how much?

In considering which states are waxing and waning, and by how much, three trends matter. Specifically, the questions arise as to whether the global hegemon is on the rise or decline; whether the global hegemon is increasing or decreasing its engagement in the region; and whether the BRICS states, for example, are waxing or waning in the region. These trends will affect the security strategies of the local states in the region. It is also important to consider the perception of the secondary and tertiary states of these trends.

In general, when the hegemon and/or BRICS states are waxing, there is opportunity for secondary and tertiary states to utilize a strategy of accommodation. When the hegemon and/or BRICS states are waning, there is opportunity for secondary and tertiary states to engage in strategies of resistance and neutrality. As noted earlier, as there is a nested game, or multiple games, being played by different types of states, the three trends will matter. There is, in essence, an

interaction effect as the international system (and specifically the region) is shifting, or changing. As Mares (1988, p. 460) notes about change, 'Change must come from the actions of a great power responding to the fact that the regional hegemony game is a subgame of the worldwide balance-of-power game'. Consequently, it is important to consider the balance of power at the international system level as well as the regional balance of power, and the shifts that may be occurring, that influence the constraints and opportunities for secondary and tertiary states. For example, at the global/systemic level, a waning global hegemon and a waxing BRICS will mean a narrower range of strategies for the secondary and tertiary states. With the potential number of alternatives to the BRICS' power declining, the secondary and tertiary states will retreat from erstwhile accommodative strategies with the global hegemon. Given the trend, they will likely reject resistance strategies to the BRICS and even neutral strategies such as hedging or fence-sitting. The outcome might be following the lead of the BRICS.

At the regional/sub-systemic level, a waning or waxing regional hegemon will also shape the secondary state's range of strategic choices. As discussed above, a distribution of regional power shifting from unipolar to bipolar or multipolar will entail a more permissive environment and a wider range of options for secondary states. Alternatively, a distribution of regional power shifting from bipolar/multipolar to unipolar will mean a more restrictive environment and fewer strategic options. Alden and Schoeman (2015) argue that South Africa's waning standing among Western states creates more freedom of movement for secondary and tertiary competitors in Africa.

Conclusion

This article focused on the general strategies, as well as the constraints and opportunities available to secondary and tertiary states in regions in which a global hegemon and rising states are present. In order to assess the constraints and opportunities, and hence strategies available to these secondary states, it is important to determine the shifts (if occurring) in the level of the hegemon's engagement in the region as well as whether states, such as the BRICS, are waxing or waning in the region. Of course, while these systemic factors (both at the international system level and regional balance of power) matter, any specific foreign policy decision as to which strategy a secondary and tertiary state will pursue is contingent on domestic and individual unit-level factors. Thus our model does not account for the specific strategies that these states will pursue. The articles in this special issue examine these variables and explain the choice of the specific strategy or strategies in the case studies that follow.

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Notes

1 Portions of this article are excerpted from Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell, and Neal G. Jesse (eds.) (2012) *Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge*, by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr University. All rights reserved. With the permission of Stanford University Press, www.sup.org. For background information on rising powers, see Zakaria (2009); Kupchan (2012); Nau and Ollapally (2012); Willams *et al* (2012).
2 ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and formed an additional grouping, ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea). See ASEAN (2012).
3 Note also that Keohane's definition implies an emphasis on the international system as the key framework for understanding state action. Mares' definition does not necessarily imply such an emphasis.
4 See also Layne (2006), Pape (2005), Paul (2004), and Paul (2005). For a critique of soft balancing see Brooks and Wohlforth (2005), Lieber and Alexander (2005), and Pape (2005).
5 See also Schweller (1994). Nabers (2010) examines the 'hegemonic discourse' that determines whether followers will, in fact, follow (accommodate) the leader, using the case of China and Japan within the East Asian region.
6 See also Ikenberry (2001, pp. 62–63).
7 For good discussions of neutrality as a foreign policy see Karsh (1988b), Keatinge (1984), Chay and Ross (1986). For recent work on neutrality, see, for example, Beyer and Hofmann (2011), Devine (2011), and Agius (2011).
8 For a discussion of permissive and restrictive environments, see Taliaferro *et al* (2012).
9 What we are calling 'high engagement' is sometimes referred to as deep engagement or forward engagement. See, for example, Brooks *et al* (2013), Brooks *et al* (2012/2013).
10 Low engagement can also be understood as selective engagement or offshore balancing. For works on selective engagement and offshore balancing, see Gholz *et al* (1997), Layne (2006), Posen (2013) and Art (2003).
11 Mares (1988, pp. 457–458) focuses on intra-alliance behavior between the hegemon, regional (middle) and secondary (lesser) powers, utilizing game theory. He argues that 'In a multi- or bipolar system, a middle power which confronts a threat to its sovereignty from one great power will seek an alliance with the challenger's rival(s) to offset the initial power disparities it confronted. But if the other great powers accept their rival's primacy in a region (that is, it is a regional hegemon), middle powers in that region will find eliminated the possibility of balancing one threatening power with a rival great power. Because a weak state can only confront a stronger state without an alliance only at great risk, weak states (including our middle power) in a regional hegemony will tend to bandwagon with the regional hegemon … '.
12 On regional sub-systems see Binder (1958), and Kerr (1971).

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