Original Article

The roots of strategic failure: The Somalia Syndrome and Al Qaeda's path to 9/11

Robert G. Patman
Department of Politics, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand.
E-mail: robert.patman@otago.ac.nz

Abstract This article locates the origins of 9/11 in the increasingly globalized security context of the early post-Cold War period. In particular, it seeks to illuminate the causal connection between the disastrous US-UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992–1993 and the emergence of a permissive security environment that ultimately made the events of 11 September possible. It is argued here that the Somali crisis was a defining moment for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It generated the 'Somalia Syndrome' in Washington – a risk-averse approach to intervention in civil conflicts which, as the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2011 subsequently revealed, had unintended but far-reaching international consequences.
International Politics (2015) **52,** 89–109. doi:10.1057/ip.2014.39

Keywords: Somalia; 9/11; US foreign policy; Clinton; Al Qaeda

Introduction

The initial response of the Bush administration to 9/11 was to frame it as a transformative event that changed everything. As President Bush (2001) puts it in an address to a joint session of Congress on 20 September: 'All of this was brought upon us in a single day – and night fell on a different world'. Such a response assumed that the traumatic events of 9/11 had come out of a clear blue sky. While this diagnosis of 9/11 helped rally a shell-shocked American people, it had significant prescriptive implications and substantive consequences for the development of US policy and America's international position.

By effectively denying that the United States had little or no impact on the international circumstances that led to 9/11, the Bush leadership felt free to declare war on terror and emphasize the notion of US primacy in this transnational struggle. Bloody wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ensued and these conflicts cost billions of dollars and were financed largely from borrowing, which, in turn, contributed to the

global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Although the Obama administration has been able to improve the relative position of the United States in both security and economic terms since 2009, it has not been able to shake-off the narrative, articulated by Paul Kennedy and others during the Bush years, that the United States remains a superpower in long-term decline (Kennedy, 2007; Solman, 2010; Layne *et al*, 2012, pp. 410–411).

But there was nothing preordained about this trajectory. 9/11 was always a symptom, rather than a cause, of a new global environment. This environment had been radically changing since the end of the Cold War. This article locates the origins of 9/11 in the increasingly globalized security context of the early post-Cold War period. In particular, the article seeks to illuminate the causal connection between the disastrous US-UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992–1993 and the emergence of a permissive security environment that ultimately made the events of 11 September possible.

It is argued here that the Somali crisis was a defining moment for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It generated the Somalia Syndrome in Washington – a risk-averse approach to intervention in civil conflicts, especially if such involvement ran the risk of US casualties (Clarke, 1997, p. 3) – that had far-reaching international consequences. Because the United States had an enormous structural power in military and economic terms after the Cold War, the Somalia Syndrome had a very significant impact on the evolution of a transnational terrorist organization, Al Qaeda. In fact, we now know, there was a direct connection. Through its involvement in an episode popularized by Hollywood as Black Hawk Down (Weiser, 2000, 23 December; U.S. v. Usama bin Laden *et al*, 2001, pp. 4359–60; Scheuer, 2006, p. 148), the Al Qaeda leadership believed it had actually helped to create the Somalia Syndrome in American foreign policy. Thus, the Somalia crisis was an important catalyst in emboldening the bin Laden network to gradually escalate its terrorist campaign against US interests during the period after 1993. That is, policy choices made by the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush played a significant role in creating a strategic shortfall that enabled Al Qaeda to grow to the point at which it was capable of mounting the devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11.

The New Global Context and The Disintegration of the Somali State

Radical changes in the international system in the late 1980s challenged the traditional realist conception of security known as national security. This state-centred perspective had dominated international relations (IR) from 1945 to the end of the Cold War. It was characterized by the core belief that international security is essentially defined by the military interactions of sovereign states. But realist thinking failed to anticipate the demise of the Cold War and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Those events left the United States as the world's

only superpower and even prompted some observers to describe the post-Cold War era as 'the American unipolar age' (Ikenberry, 2004, p. 144).

At the same time, the end of the Cold War was both a symptom and a cause of deepening globalization. This term has been associated with the growth of international linkages driven by technological revolutions, an erosion of the autonomy of the state, and the emergence of a new security environment in which the pattern of conflict has moved beyond the protection of the state. Because the Cold War magnified a sense of external threat – be it international communism or capitalist encirclement – it tended to promote internal cohesion in many states by constraining pre-existing ethnic and sub-national aspirations (Taylor, 1995, pp. 66–67). However, the removal of this structural constraint in the late 1980s undermined the system of superpower patronage and unleashed centrifugal forces in states that no longer had the resources to keep various demand-bearing groups at bay or shield them from the powerful forces of economic and political liberalization.

Somalia exemplified the international transition that was occurring. The country was transformed in the space of a few years from an important Cold War player to the status of a geo-strategic discard. In 1989, the US Congress, citing gross human rights violations by Somalia's dictatorial regime under Siad Barre forced the George H.W. Bush administration to suspend military and economic aid to Mogadishu. By January 1991, Siad Barre was overthrown in an armed rebellion led by the United Somali Congress (USC). But instead of heralding stability, the regime change intensified a civil war that had started in 1988 and led to the complete collapse of central governance in the country.

America's Post-Cold War Security Debate and US-UN Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia

With the end of the Cold War the United States faced the challenge of constructing a new grand strategy. The familiar pattern of ideological enmity and superpower rivalry gave way to an international situation characterized by much greater moral and strategic uncertainty. The upshot was a debate concerning American global leadership that continued throughout the 1990s. Among other things, there was serious disagreement about the nature of the post-Cold War security environment, the identity of threats, and the priority of issues (Kitchen, 2012, pp. 135–136).

Four competing grand strategies emerged in the debate. First, there was the neo-isolationist perspective. Supporters advocated a basic restructuring of America's overseas commitments and a narrow conception of the national interest. The neo-isolationists were essentially realist in perspective and believed that the most vital national interest was the protection of the liberty and security of the American people at home. Many argued that, in the absence of a real threat to US sovereignty or territorial integrity, Washington should retrench its foreign policy in the post-Cold

War world. On this view, human rights promotion and democratic enlargement were expensive, unnecessary, and potentially counterproductive (Bowen and Dunn, 1996, p. 23). While there was limited support for neo-isolationalism among foreign policy specialists, it gained more traction among politicians and these included former presidential candidates Jerry Brown and Jesse Jackson, Democrats in Congress like Pat Schroeder and Richard Gephardt, and right-wing Republicans, such as Pat Buchanan and Jeanne Kirkpatrick.

A second approach centred on the idea of US primacy. According to this perspective, a preponderance of US power was crucial to sustaining global peace in the post-Cold War era. If the United States had an imbalance of power in its favour it could confront all potential great power challengers and maintain a hegemonic peace. It was argued that both world order and US national security require that the United States maintain the primacy with which it emerged from the Cold War. That is, US hegemony was seen as the only reliable defence against a breakdown of peace and international order (Kristol and Kagan, 1996, p. 23). As a consequence, the United States should actively seek to prevent the rise of other international challengers by promoting international law, democracy, free-market economies, and precluding the emergence of regional powers. Proponents of this view included Joshua Muravchik, William Kristol and Robert Kagan in the intellectual community and Republican politicians like Dick Cheney who served as Secretary of Defence between 1989 and 1993 and Robert Dole, the 1996 presidential candidate (Posen and Ross, 1996/1997).

A third grand strategy perspective was the notion of selective engagement. This approach emerged from the realist tradition of international politics and its focus on the utility of the balance of power mechanism. According to this view, the United States in the post-Cold War era should endeavour to preserve peace among states that have substantial industrial and military potential – Russia, China, Japan, and the wealthier states of the European Union – because conflicts between them have the greatest chance of producing the large-scale resort to weapons of mass destruction or involving the United States against its will (Posen and Ross, 1996/1997). In the circumstances, the United States should engage in diplomatic balancing to minimize the prospect of war between the great powers in the international system. Long-established alliances such as NATO are seen in this context to play a key role in securing American national interests. But US engagement was to be centred on maintaining a balance between other leading states and this meant the United States would largely limit its involvement to issues that ran the risk of producing a great power war. Advocates of selective engagement included foreign policy specialists like Robert Art, Stephen van Evera, and Jonathan Clarke as well as conservative politicians like Robert Byrd (Democrat) and John McCain (Republican).

The fourth approach to grand strategy embraced the idea of cooperative security. This perspective was linked to a school of thought in IR called liberalism and maintained that peace in the post-Cold War world was essentially indivisible. On this view, the United States had a national interest in global peace and should therefore

pursue an internationalist foreign policy. Advocates placed a premium on international cooperation, particularly through institutions, to constrain, deter and thwart aggression in the international arena. Unlike the three previous strategic perspectives considered here, cooperative security assumed that in a globalizing world the security interests of all actors were interdependent and that threats to security could be multifaceted (Posen and Ross, 1996/1997; Kitchen, 2012, pp. 136–138). Among other things, this perspective recognized that there was a clear linkage between civil wars and global security. Violence at the intra-state level had sharply increased since the late 1980s and could spill over into inter-state conflict. Proponents included scholars and practitioners like Randall Forsberg, Ashton B. Carter, Anthony Lake, John D. Steinbruner, and Madeleine K. Albright (Posen and Ross, 1996/1997).

In the early stages of the post-Cold War era, US policy-makers leaned in the direction of a co-operative security strategy. President George H. W. Bush's 'new world order' declaration in 1991 and President Bill Clinton's initial support for 'assertive multilateralism' in 1993 pointed to this trend. America's new status as the sole superpower was a significant ingredient. To many of the foreign policy elite, the United States had not only defeated Soviet totalitarianism, but was also directing the process of globalization. The scene seemed set, according to Francis Fukuyama, for a new world system based on Western values of liberal democracy, market capitalism, and international co-operation. In a memorable phrase, Fukuyama (1989) argued that the end of the Cold War marked 'the end of history'. Indeed, the crushing military victory of the US-led coalition over Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 seemed to affirm a new global order based on the partnership of US power and UN authority.

But the new world envisaged by the administrations headed by George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton did not turn out to be quite the order they had expected. For one thing, the significance of the American-led victory in the Persian Gulf was exaggerated. It was, as Michael Mandelbaum (1994, p. 3) pointed out, less the harbinger of the post-Cold War future than the last gasp of a morally and politically clearer age when inter-state war was the dominant form of conflict in the international system. Moreover, Washington's vision of a 'New World Order' was anathema to, at least, one former partner in the Cold War battleground of Afghanistan. During the 1980s, the United States extended substantial financial and military support to the Afghan mujahedeen and the International Muslim Brigade–an fundamentalist Islamic group headed by a Saudi national, Osama bin Laden, and a Palestinian, Abdullah Azzam – that were fighting the Soviet invasion (Matzinger, 2002, p. 31; Scheuer, 2006, p. 115). With the winding down of the Afghan war in 1989, bin Laden formed a multinational insurgent organization, known as Al Qaeda or 'the base', to pursue jihad against the next major enemy of Islam, America.

Long angered by America's staunch support for Israel, a state that had occupied Palestinian territories since the Six-Day War in 1967, and embittered by the willingness of the Saudi government to station American troops on holy Muslim

territory after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden and his supporters were eager to confront the remaining superpower, the United States. An early opportunity to oppose Washington's vision of a New World Order presented itself in Somalia, a country that, in many ways, was a paradigm of the emerging security environment (Patman, 1997). In 1992, constant civil war and drought had combined to produce a catastrophic famine killing an estimated 300 000 Somalis.

On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council, recognizing that the situation in Somalia had become intolerable, authorized a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to use 'all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations' (UNSCR 794, 1992). The intervention was a landmark decision for both the UN and the United States. It was the first time the Security Council had sanctioned a major enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in a theoretically sovereign state. It was also the first time in the post-1945 era that the US military intervened to protect the lives and welfare of foreign citizens rather than promoting national strategic interests.

But the Al Qaeda leadership did not see things that way. It believed that the United States and its 'puppet', the UN, would use Somalia as a staging ground to attack or invade neighbouring Sudan where bin Laden was then based. As an upshot, bin Laden called on Al Qaeda members to kill or expel all 'infidels' from Islamic Somalia (U.S. State Department, 1998; U.S. v. Usama bin Laden *et al*, 2001, pp. 4359–4360).

As far as the United States was concerned the humanitarian intervention in Somalia proved to be a bitter disappointment. The turning point was a savage battle on 3 October 1993 between US forces and armed supporters of warlord General Aideed, which killed 18 US servicemen and more than 1 000 Somalis (Peterson, 2001, pp. 137–138). Although it was not known to Washington at the time, the stiff resistance of General Aideed's militia was linked, in part, to military assistance provided by the Al Qaeda, and the involvement of some of bin Laden's fighters in the actual fighting on the ground.

After the battle of Mogadishu, President Clinton responded to strong expressions of domestic outrage by quickly announcing the withdrawal of all US troops in March 1994. It was a decision that effectively ended the US-UN peace enforcement operation in Somalia. For the Al Qaeda leadership the central lesson of Somalia 'is that the Americans will leave if they are attacked' (U.S. v. Usama bin Laden *et al*, 2001, p. 5400).

Yet Somalia was not unique. With the end of the Cold War the mix of factors affecting national security had changed. In the 12-year period between 1989–2001, there were 57 different major armed conflicts in 45 locations. All but three of these conflicts occurred within states (SIPRI, 2002). Above all, the Somali crisis demonstrated that weak or failed states were now the main source of threat and instability in the world (Dorff, 2005, pp. 22–24), and that the capacity of the international community to respond to such challenges would depend in large measure on the stance of the United States, the sole superpower.

The Advent of the 'Somalia Syndrome'

If the Somali crisis epitomized the new security environment the Clinton administration struggled to adapt to it. The loss of American lives in Mogadishu in October 1993 was a deeply shocking event for Washington, and one that was to frame US foreign policy decision-making for the rest of the 1990s and beyond. Like the legacy of the Vietnam conflict before it Somalia generated a US foreign policy disposition that became known as a syndrome. The Somalia Syndrome, a term closely associated with harrowing TV images of dead American soldiers being dragged through Mogadishu's streets by Somali militiamen, was characterized by a deep scepticism of multilateral intervention in civil conflict situations, especially when such interventions endangered American lives (Clarke, 1997, p. 3).

The Somalia experience marked a turning point in the way the United States discharged its global responsibilities. In specific terms, the Clinton administration drew five pre-cautionary 'lessons' from the experience of the Mogadishu showdown. First, typically failed or failing states were not geo-strategically crucial to the United States and could not by themselves be allowed to define the United States's broader foreign policy strategy in the world. Second, multilateral institutions like the UN could not always be trusted when it came to matters of security and certainly could not be allowed to exercise any constraining effect or veto on issues relating to American security.

Third, Mogadishu seemed to show that in situations in which something less than vital national interests were at stake America's willingness to take casualties was extremely limited. In the post-Cold War era, domestic political pressures increasingly pervaded US foreign policy, a shift that was deepened by the Republicans gaining control of both Houses of Congress in 1994, the first time that had happened in 40 years. According to one American observer: 'If I have to choose between pictures of starving Somalian babies or dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, well, I don't want to see any more dead Americans' (Shalom, 1993). Fourth, Somalia demonstrated that the technological superiority of America's military could be neutralized by engaging in ground combat against a well-armed adversary that had a better knowledge of local conditions, especially in urban areas. Fifth, if the Clinton administration determined that a particular situation threatened the national interests of the United States or its global leadership, a distinctive new approach to applying US military power – consistent with the aforementioned lessons of Somalia – would have been employed. This new Clinton approach towards the use of force, fine-tuned in the post-Mogadishu period, manifested itself in a reliance on 'distant punishment' through the application of air power and/or the use of local allies, rather than US troops, to carry out much of the ground combat (Bacevich, 2002, pp. 148–149).

The memory and 'lessons' of Somalia were formally enshrined in the Clinton administration's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 25) of May 1994. It said

essentially that the United States would henceforth only participate in UN peacekeeping operations if they were in the American national interest and that largely depended on the extent to which conflicts were deemed by Washington to be a direct threat to international peace and security (Ward, 1994, pp. 23–25). In many ways, PDD 25 was the functional equivalent of the 1984 Powell-Weinberger Doctrine. Both formulations sought to apply limiting criteria for US engagement in the wake of major foreign policy reverses in Somalia and Vietnam, respectively. But PDD 25 was much broader in scope, and potentially even more constraining. After the Somalia debacle, there was a fixation in Washington of not 'crossing the Mogadishu line' and allowing engagement in intra-state conflict slide into nation-building exercises carrying the possible risk of US casualties. It signalled a clear retreat from Bush's 'New World Order' perspective – and what Clinton had called 'Assertive Multilateralism' (Albright, 1993, pp. 464–467) – towards a selective engagement strategy that emphasized a more traditional state centric approach to international security.

The Impact of the Somalia Syndrome on US Foreign Policy

The international effects of the Somalia syndrome were momentous, and marked the emergence of a dangerous gap between US threat perceptions and the transformed security environment of the post-Cold War world. The first casualty was Haiti. On 11 October 1993, just a week after the battle of Mogadishu, the first deployment of 200 US and 25 Canadian troops aboard the USS Harlan County was unable to land at Port-au-Prince because they faced angry supporters of the military regime threatening America with another 'Somalia!' Without even consulting the UN, the Clinton administration immediately ordered the Harlan County to leave Haitian waters and to return to the United States (Shawcross, 2000, p. 103; Halberstam, 2001, pp. 278–279). It was a year before the Clinton administration took firm action to bring an end to the crisis in Haiti.

The 'Somalia Syndrome' would prove to be even more serious for US decision-making in the face of two brutal genocides in the mid 1990s. Politically loath to risk casualties, the Clinton administration blocked an early deployment of UN peacekeepers in Rwanda (Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p. 191), and refused to classify the slaughter there as genocide until events had taken their course. At the same time, the Clinton administration declined to take an active leadership role in Bosnia until Serbian forces overran one of the UN-designated 'safe areas' at Srebrenica in July 1995 and murdered more than 7 000 Bosnian Muslim men. As a consequence, about one million people were murdered in ethnic cleansing: 800 000 in Rwanda and close to 200 000 in Bosnia (Otago Daily Times, 2000).

Meanwhile, the Clinton administration made it plain it wanted as little as possible to do with Somalia, the country responsible for the now debilitating syndrome in US foreign policy. After withdrawing US troops from the UN peacekeeping mission in

March 1994, and providing military support to evacuate the remaining UN forces from Mogadishu in early March 1995, the Clinton administration effectively abandoned Somalia. There were no known visits by US diplomatic or military personnel to Somalia between 1995–2001, and America did not maintain any diplomatic representation in the country during this period (Matzinger, 2002, p. 99).

After US disengagement from Somalia, the most militant Islamist group, Al Itihaad Al Islamiya consolidated its role as an active civil and military player in what was a stateless society. However, whereas other factions were essentially clan armies battling for territory and resources, Al-Itihaad's core objective was more ambitious: namely, to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa (Pirio, 2007, pp. 61–62). As part of this agenda, Al Itihaad targeted what it is saw as the 'infidel' pro-American EPRDF government in Addis Ababa. With training, materiel, and financial support from Al Qaeda, Sudan, Iran, and other international jihadist groups, Al Itihaad launched a series of small-scale armed actions in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in late 1993. These incursions subsequently broadened into a campaign of terrorism inside Ethiopia. Among other things, Al Itihaad bombed hotels in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa as well as assassinating a senior Ethiopian Defence official, General Hayelom Araya, in 1996.

To be sure, the Clinton administration began its moderate strict adherence to PDD 25 model of selective engagement as it became apparent that the 'new wars' of the 1990s could directly threaten the strategic interests of the United States or its global leadership. It became increasingly plain to the Clinton team that the price for continued inaction in the face of the worsening crisis in Bosnia would be a severe blow to US leadership claims both in Europe and on the international stage generally. The new Clinton approach towards the use of force typically relied on 'distant punishment' through the application of air power and the use of local allies.

In September 1995, after the massacre at Srebrenica, President Clinton authorized Operation Deliberate Force, a NATO programme of air-strikes – largely carried out by US aircraft – directed at Bosnian Serb targets. It combined with a ground offensive by a US trained and equipped Croat army to annex the Krajina region from Serb control. This 'gunboats and Gurkhas' strategy seemed to work (Bacevich, 2002, p. 165). US diplomats subsequently pushed through the Dayton Accords in December 1995, which formally held Bosnia together as a single country.

Moreover, the Clinton administration supported the establishment of *ad hoc* tribunals charged with the indictment and prosecution of individuals accused of crimes against humanity and genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Indeed, in a visit to Rwanda in August 1998, President Clinton publicly apologised for US inaction during the 1994 genocide (Schabas, 1999, pp. 6–7). The NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo and the Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) operation in 1999 also seemed symptomatic of a broader approach towards security. Meanwhile, in Somalia, the Clinton administration from

1996 on tacitly supported a number of military interventions by Ethiopia to seriously degrade the military and terrorist capabilities of Al Itihaad.

Thus, by the end of Clinton's first term, Washington had moderated its commitment to the PDD-25 criteria for international engagement, but its reliance on a 'gunboats and Ghurkhas' approach to the use of force showed it still felt constrained by the 'Somalia Syndrome'.

Al Qaeda's Global Jihad against America (1992–2001)

The advent of the 'Somalia Syndrome' also coincided with the emergence of a new and enigmatic threat to the US from Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization. Between 1992–2000, the Al Qaeda leadership launched an ideological and terrorist offensive against the United States and its allies.

It attacked Somalia-bound US troops in Aden in December 1992; murdered two people at a CIA gatehouse in Langley, Virginia, in January 1993; killed six people in the bombing of the New York World Trade Centre building in February 1993; provided military assistance and training to General Aideed's forces during aforementioned the Black Hawk Down episode in Mogadishu in October 1993; and invested personnel and money in a jihadist operation in Bosnia between 1992 and 1994. In November 1995, Al Qaeda agents bombed the Riyadh headquarters of the US military training mission to the Saudi National Guard, killing five Americans. Then, in June 1996, a US Air Force high-rise housing complex near Khobar, Saudi Arabia, was truck-bombed by bin Laden's followers. Nineteen Americans were killed in what was a devastating terrorist attack (Scheuer, 2006, pp. 151–154, 209–210). Two months later, bin Laden publicly declared a war or jihad 'against the Judaeo-Christian alliance which is occupying Islamic sacred land in Palestine and the Arabian Peninsula' (Lawrence, 2005, p. 33).

However, the Clinton administration made only halting progress towards recognizing the Al Qaeda threat. It was not until 1995 that it became apparent to the White House that Osama bin Laden might be much more than a bankroller of Islamic terrorism. For the first time, bin Laden's name appeared in the State Department annual publication, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, of that year. In January 1996, the CIA established Alec Station in Washington DC, an 'interdisciplinary' intelligence unit whose sole brief was to track and monitor the activities of Osama bin Laden. By the end of Clinton's first term, the president and a relatively small number of senior officials such as Richard Clarke, John O'Neill and Michael Scheuer became convinced that Al Qaeda presented a clear and present danger to the United States, but it was a view that was not widely shared in the federal government bureaucracy as a whole (Wright, 2006, p. 6).

During its second term, the Clinton administration intensified its efforts to address the Al Qaeda threat but this focus was somewhat constrained by more

conventional foreign policy concerns such as the enlargement of NATO and a hostile domestic arena where a Republican controlled Congress constantly questioned Clinton's foreign policy. Thus, there were political limits to how far the Clinton administration was prepared to go to counter Al Qaeda. In the Middle-East, for example, Washington continued to tolerate Israeli repression of stateless Palestinians while seeking to secure Palestinian rights (Gaddis, 2007, p. 532), and publicly blamed Yasser Arafat's PLO for refusing to accept the peace deal offered by Israel's Labour-led government in 2000. There was little or no recognition in Washington that such a stance could be seen as something of a political gift for bin Laden's terrorist organization, which presented itself as a staunch defender of Palestinian rights.

Meanwhile, Al Qaeda steadily escalated the violence of its attacks on the US. On 7 August, 1998, Al Qaeda agents attacked the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, with suicidal car bombings within minutes of each other; 12 Americans died and 7 were wounded while 291 Africans were killed and nearly 5100 were wounded (Miniter, 2003, pp. 170–172). Osama bin Laden publicly praised the suicide bombers for their courage and for managing 'to rid the Islamic nation of disgrace' (Scheuer, 2006, p. 211).

The Clinton administration immediately retaliated with cruise missile strikes against Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan—as a kind of symmetrical answer to the attacks of bin Laden's group on two American embassies (Miniter, 2003, p. 185). In 1998, Osama bin Laden was secretly indicted by a New York Federal grand jury on charges of murdering Americans in Somalia in 1993 and in Riyadh in 1995 (Clarke, 2004, p. 142). Thereafter, the CIA was authorized by the US government from 1998 to either conduct a snatch operation to put bin Laden on trial in New York or use lethal force against the Al Qaeda leader if that proved impossible (Congress Joint Inquiry, 2002, pp. 8–9).

Politically, the Clinton administration wanted to maintain the appearance of a selective engagement strategy even if it was discretely moving towards a more expansive conception of security during its second term. But plans for a covert operation to take bin Laden, dead or alive, ran into strong institutional resistance from the CIA and the Pentagon. There was either in the CIA's view a lack of 'actionable intelligence' to justify a missile strike or the Pentagon, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, repeatedly opposed the use of Special Forces to conduct a snatch operation against bin Laden because of the fear of military casualties (Congress Joint Inquiry, 2002, p. 88; Clarke, 2004, pp. 196–200).

While Defence Secretaries William Perry and William Cohen and Pentagon spokesmen generally had frequently spoken of the need for a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in order to meet the new challenges of a security environment transformed by globalization, there was a growing gap between the rhetoric and the substance of US military policy. As Bacevich (2002, pp. 137–138) pointed out, the

US military establishment of 2000 bore a striking resemblance, in organizational terms, to its Cold War predecessor.

The dangers of this strategic mismatch were highlighted in October 2000 when two suicide bombers from Al Qaeda launched an assault on the USS Cole in Aden harbour. The attack left 17 US sailors dead and 39 wounded in what was the most deadly attack on a US warship since World War II (Miniter, 2003, pp. 216–219).

Three months later, Clinton left office with bin Laden still free, but his administration had demonstrated 'an evolving awareness' of the Al Qaeda threat and had authorized actions to arrest or eliminate the leadership of this terrorist organization. President Clinton had greatly increased funding for counterterrorism and publicly identified terrorism as a major enemy of the United States in the post-Cold War, a point he emphasized to President-elect George W. Bush during the transition (Clarke, 2004, pp. 225–226).

However, the new Bush administration publicly rejected a co-operative security approach and embraced a grand strategy that combined elements of the selective engagement and primacy perspectives on security. Yet there was little evidence that Al Qaeda's jihad against the United States was diminishing. From the moment it became apparent that George W. Bush would become president, the new president received numerous high-level warnings about the imminent danger presented by Al Qaeda. In January 2001, Clarke had strongly warned members of the new administration that 'Al Qaeda is at war with us' while George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, said in his February 2001 testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee that Al Qaeda was 'the most immediate and serious threat' to US national security (Leopold, 2006; Scheuer, 2006, p. 232).

How did the Bush administration respond to such warnings? Dr Condoleezza Rice, the then National Security Adviser, decided to downgrade the position of National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, held by Richard Clarke, so that the Coordinator would no longer be a member of the powerful inter-agency Principals Committee (Leung, 2004). As a result, the Principals Committee did not meet to discuss the Al Qaeda threat until 4 September, 2001.

According to Clarke, key Bush officials like Dr Rice and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, were still working from the 'old Cold War paradigm' that focused almost exclusively on nation-state threats. Indeed some officials like Paul Wolfowitz were openly dismissive of the Al Qaeda threat because it lacked a state sponsor (Leung, 2004). According to one source: 'The notion that nonstate actors, failed states, and civil conflicts should dominate America's attention was simply not accepted by the Bush team. They found it inconceivable that Bin Laden could threaten the mightiest power in world history. They couldn't imagine it, so they didn't prepare for it' (Chollet and Goldgeier, 2008, p. 311).

Instead, the main Bush focus in early 2001 was on confronting China, minimizing America's multilateral obligations, and countering the alleged threat of ballistic missile attacks from 'rogue' states through the establishment of an antimissile

defence system (Bacevich, 2002, pp. 198–204; Rogers, 2008, p. 362). It would be difficult to conceive, therefore, of a great shock for the Bush team than that caused by the suicidal terrorist attacks of 11 September.

The Causal Association

The global security environment had been radically changing since the end of the Cold War, and 9/11 can – and perhaps must – be seen as part and parcel of longer-term patterns of Al Qaeda opposition to the enhanced power position of the United States in the post-Cold War period. Yet, if we concede that Al Qaeda's terrorist campaign against the United States did not appear overnight, a major question remains: how was it possible for Al Qaeda since 1992 to intensify its terrorist attacks on the United States to the point that it could launch 9/11? The central answer lies in the distorting impact that the Somalia Syndrome had on America's conception of international security in the post-Cold War era. But, to be plausible, this causal connection must be substantiated. It is important here not to confuse correlation and causation. Without supporting evidence it would be wrong to presume one development (the rise of Al Qaeda) that largely followed another event (the Somalia Syndrome) occurred as a necessary result of the preceding development. So what is the evidence for the connection posited here? For the remainder of this article, four types of causal association between the Somalia Syndrome and the rise of Al Qaeda will be identified.[1]

Consistency of association

With the end of the Afghan War in 1989 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, bin Laden had established Al Qaeda to purse jihad against what he saw as the new major enemy of Islam, America. The first Al Qaeda attack occurred at the beginning of the US-UN intervention in Somalia in December 1992. The Somali crisis proved to be a landmark event for the development of Al Qaeda in the 1990s.

Although it was not apparent to Washington at the time, the stiff resistance of General Aideed's militia in Somalia was linked, in part, to military assistance provided by bin Laden's multinational insurgent organization, Al Qaeda, and the involvement of some of bin Laden's fighters in the Black Hawk Down episode that eventually prompted Clinton to withdraw US troops from the country.

The Somalia Syndrome, as it became known, found formal expression in the Clinton administration's PDD 25 of May 1994. This measure signalled the return of a more traditional state-centric approach to international security, and a clear retreat from the idea that the United States had a national interest in participating in multilateral intervention in failed states. The advent of the Somalia Syndrome marked the emergence of a gulf between US security policy and the transformed

security environment of the post–Cold War era. Between 1992–2000, American interests and personnel or those of allies were on the receiving end of steadily escalating terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda in places such as Somalia, the United States, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen.

But although President Clinton eventually recognized that globalization created enormous transnational security challenges for the United States, he was reluctant, for political reasons, to re-define US national security policy to squarely address these new challenges, which included the threat of Islamic terrorism. Among other things, Clinton did not want to further alienate an already hostile Republican Congress that generally regarded terrorism and the troubles of failed states as a bit of a strategic sideshow (Chollet and Goldgeier, 2008, p. 310). So while Clinton was prepared to use apparently low-risk force through the application of air power and the use of local allies to deal with problems like genocide, ethnic conflict, and terrorism emanating from weak or failed states, he was distinctly unwilling to place US troops at risk in such situations. Thus, the United States' Somalia Syndrome was refined, not abandoned, when it bumped against the underlying political and strategic realities of a globalizing security environment in the second half of the 1990s.

Moreover, the new Bush administration did much less than its predecessor to dissuade groups like Al Qaeda from waging jihad against the United States. Convinced that the real lesson of the Black Hawk Down disaster was that it had highlighted the dangers and limits of intervening outside the realm of the American national interest, the Bush White House in effect offered a reinvigorated 'Somalia Syndrome' that strongly rejected the idea of nation-building, reaffirming the traditional view that security was fundamentally determined by the military means of the sovereign state. Hence, there was a conceptual reluctance within the Bush administration to even recognize that non-state terrorist groups like Al Qaeda could seriously threaten the United States.

Strength of association

The 'Somalia Syndrome' had a tremendous impact on the evolution of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It not only sensitized the Clinton administration to the political dangers of putting US military personnel at risk for UN-backed humanitarian missions in civil conflicts or failed state situations, but also helped to shape, in situations where US strategic interests were deemed to be under threat, a risk averse doctrine of US military force, which relied heavily on the coercive application of air power and/or the use of local allies, rather than US troops, to carry out much of the ground fighting in situations. Force protection became a constant concern for the White House after Somalia (Clarke, 2004, pp. 222–224). Despite these constraints, the Clinton administration and the Bush team, conscious of

America's overwhelming pre-eminence, remained convinced, albeit to differing degrees, that the United States could prevail internationally on its own terms.

To the Al Qaeda leadership, the Somalia Syndrome appeared to reveal a significant chink in the otherwise enhanced position of the United States after the Cold War. Such a perception must have inspired a forward-leaning attitude within the Al Qaeda network. It came at a time when bin Laden and his Islamist followers were utterly outraged by America's expanded international role. After the Cold War, bin Laden noted: 'America escalated its campaign against the Muslim world in its entirety, aiming to get rid of Islam.' Two factors, in particular, loomed large in bin Laden's call for a 'holy war' against the 'Crusader-Jewish alliance.' First, he fiercely condemned what he said was 'a calamity unprecedented in the history of our umma [community], namely, the invasion by the American and other foreign troops in the Arabian peninsula and Saudi Arabia, the home of the Noble Ka'ba, the Sacred House of God, the Muslim's direction of prayer, the Noble Sanctuary of the Prophet, and the city of God's Messenger, where the Prophetic revelation was received' (Lawrence, 2005, p. 16).

Second, the plight of the Palestinians featured strongly in bin Laden's rhetorical attacks against the United States and Israel. Denouncing the 1993 Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO leadership 'as a disaster for Muslims … which was praised and lauded by the prime minister of the Zionist enemy … [and] the traitorous and cowardly Arab tyrants', bin Laden observed: 'The legal duty regarding Palestine and our brothers there – these poor men, women and children who have nowhere to go – is to wage jihad for the sake of God, and to motivate our *umma* to jihad so that Palestine may be completely liberated and returned to Islamic sovereignty' (Lawrence, 2005, pp. 9–10). Thus, according to bin Laden, the Islamic world had no option but to confront the 'terrible aggression' it faced from the United States and its allies.

Specificity of association

While the US response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait confirmed America as the main enemy in bin Laden's eyes, it was the Somalia Syndrome, more than anything else, that convinced him that a global jihad against the United States was viable. The Al Qaeda leadership apparently believed that America had experienced a setback of global proportions in Somalia. Although the United States had enormous structural power in military and economic terms in the post-Cold War international system, the Somalia Syndrome seemed to suggest to Al Qaeda leaders that the superpower's political resolve to protect its interests was limited when the going got tough.

In an interview on Al Jazeera, bin Laden said the Somali experience had been illuminating: 'Based on the reports we received from our brothers who participated in

the Jihad in Somalia we learned that they saw the weakness, frailty, and cowardice of US troops. Only eighteen troops were killed. Nonetheless, they fled …' (Wright, 2006, p. 189). However, in an internal Al Qaeda communication retrieved from a computer, an analyst provided much greater insight on the strategic lessons that Al Qaeda had learned from Somalia:

> The Somali experience confirmed the spurious nature of American power and that it has not recovered from the Vietnam complex. It fears getting bogged down in a real war that would reveal its psychological collapse at the level of personnel and leadership. Since Vietnam, America has been seeking easy battles that are completely guaranteed. It entered into a shameful series of adventures on the island of Grenada, then Panama, then bombing Libya, and then the Gulf War farce, which was the greatest military, political and ideological swindle in history … America wanted to continue this series of farces. It assumed that Somalia was an appropriate space for another ridiculous act. But the Muslims were there-so the great disaster occurred. They fled in panic before their true capabilities could be exposed (Pirio, 2007, p. 60).

Given the uproar on Capitol Hill after the Black Hawk Down incident, the Al Qaeda leadership probably calculated that after Somalia, Washington would show greater restraint in international conflicts and crises. More specifically, because some Al Qaeda operatives were involved in the Mogadishu showdown in early October 1993, the Al Qaeda leadership probably believed it had actually helped create the Somalia Syndrome that induced such American caution. Somalia also seemed to reinforce a lesson that had been learned by the Arab Afghans in Afghanistan. The clout of a superpower was not limitless. The Soviet Union had not prevailed in Afghanistan, and events in Somalia seemed to suggest to bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders that the United States was not even as tough as the Russians when it came to fighting, despite their considerable material advantages. According to bin Laden, warriors of faith 'must rest assured that life is only in the hands of God', and in that sense, a struggle against America was seen as winnable. The change of the presidency in 2000 did little to disturb bin Laden's conviction that the United States remained the principal adversary and had to be confronted. If anything, that conviction grew with the advent of a president whose family had close links with the ruling regime in Saudi Arabia (Unger, 2004, pp. 19–36), and who seemed even less interested than his predecessor in the fate of the Palestinians.

Coherence of association

There was a definite connection between the Somalia Syndrome and Al Qaeda's journey to 9/11. After the Somali debacle, a new foreign policy disposition emerged in Washington that deemphasized the strategic significance of failed or failing states to US national security and helped elevate a new doctrine of military force that

sought to minimize the role of US ground forces when it was determined that American strategic interest were at stake.

The Somalia Syndrome had a marked effect on the leadership of Al Qaeda. America's semidetached attitude towards the UN and its reluctance to get involved in messy civil conflict situations emboldened the bin Laden network and gave it the time and the space to build and expand a multinational insurgent organization in the 1990s with links to more than 60 countries. These links enabled Al Qaeda to steadily escalate its violence globally against the United States as the 1990s unfolded.

While the Clinton administration gradually came to recognize the deadly threat posed by Al Qaeda, it was always playing catch-up in this regard. Despite some energetic covert efforts to weaken the bin Laden network, the Clinton presidency was unable or unwilling to build a political consensus that would realign US national security policy to directly and publicly confront the Al Qaeda threat. The fact the George W. Bush administration largely ignored the Al Qaeda danger, despite repeated high-level warnings, made 9/11 all but inevitable. Ultimately, then, the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York were more about a failure of policy than about the limitations of America's intelligence agencies or the laxity of its airport security. The roots of this policy failure lay in the emergence of the Somalia Syndrome in 1993–1994.

Explaining America's Strategic Shortfall

A question remains: if there was a connection between the 'Somalia Syndrome' and the emergence of Al Qaeda's global offensive against the United States during the 1990s, why did the Clinton and Bush administrations fail to realize this and make the necessary policy adjustments – such as moving towards a cooperative conception of security – to address the growing Al Qaeda threat?

Three factors help to explain this strategic shortfall. First is the powerful influence of tradition on American military identity. The terms 'national security' or 'national security interests', which were repeatedly invoked after the promulgation of PDD 25 by the Clinton administration, assumed that American security fundamentally relates to the military dimensions of interactions between nation-states (Smith, 2006, p. 35). Threats from nonstate terrorist groups, by definition, tended to be almost overlooked in this conception. 'Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world,' Powell noted at the beginning of the Clinton administration, 'we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win the nation's wars. That's what we do … We're warriors' (Bacevich, 2002, p. 135). As an upshot, there was a startling lack of attention given by many military professionals in the United States to the rise of irregular warfare in 1990s, an omission that was probably linked to America's unhappy past encounter with unconventional war in Vietnam.[2]

Second, although US policymakers and federal government employees recognized in the abstract that the Cold War was over, it was not immediately clear what the new security paradigm might look like. With respect to the intelligence community, for example, Clarke said that 'it was difficult to figure out how you take an institution whose whole existence was predicated for 50 years on the Cold War and change the way they do business and the way they think at the operator and analyst level' (Congress Joint Inquiry, 2002). Besides, many Americans, especially those working in the security sector, felt that the existing national security infrastructure had proved itself by 'winning' the Cold War against the Soviet Union and thus assumed, as the world's sole superpower, that the United States was on the right side of history and would shape, rather than be shaped by, the emerging post-Cold War security environment. After the Somali crisis in 1993, the first instinct of a rather shaken Clinton administration was thus to fall back on a familiar Cold War conception of national security and appease domestic critics rather than to directly engage with the new transnational security threats of the post-Cold War period. That reflex diminished during Clinton's second term in office, but the continued emphasis on 'force protection' in the Pentagon as the White House tried to grapple with the Al Qaeda threat highlighted the limits of strategic change.

Third, the end of the Cold War and the process of deepening globalization enhanced the impact of domestic politics in the making of US foreign policy. Because the United States had no real geopolitical competitors in sight, and because it was located in an increasingly interconnected world in which foreign policy increasingly affected domestic affairs, President Clinton found that the US Congress demanded a greater say in foreign policy than had generally been the case during the Cold War, especially when the policy appeared to be in trouble. After the disturbing TV images of death and desecration in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, President Clinton faced immediate and tremendous pressure from the US Congress to terminate American involvement. Within days, Clinton bowed to such pressure, subsequently adopting PDD 25 in a further bid to quell pressure from Congress. While the advent of the 'Somalia Syndrome' worked in domestic political terms for Bill Clinton – he was reelected in 1996 – it critically slowed the administration's recognition of the Al Qaeda threat, and then shackled an effective response by reinforcing risk adverse tendencies within the CIA and the military.

Conclusion

The Somalia Syndrome substantially contributed to the permissive international environment between 1994–2001 that enabled Al Qaeda to embark upon the road that led to 9/11. The idea that 9/11 suddenly heralded a new security environment was false. The environment had been radically changing since the end of the Cold War, but policy-makers in Washington were either reluctant or unable to see this

transformation. Instead, they persisted with grand strategies that failed to recognize the impact of a globalized security environment. Thus, a dangerous gap formed between the state centred threat perceptions of the United States and a transformed security environment where the pattern of conflict went well beyond the state.

In this article, evidence has been presented of a causal association between the 'Somalia Syndrome' and the rise of Al Qaeda. This association was expressed in terms of its consistency, strength, specificity, and coherence. While it is unrealistic to claim the 'Somalia Syndrome' was the sole cause of Al Qaeda's global offensive against America – bin Laden's organization had America in his sights by the time of the Persian Gulf war of 1990/1991 – it certainly proved to be a major catalyst in the development of an international insurgent organization that had the capability to seriously damage the United States.

About the Author

Robert G. Patman is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. Since completing his PhD in International Relations in 1987, Professor Patman has authored or edited seven scholarly books, including more recently *Globalization and Conflict* (2006), *The Ethics of Foreign Policy* (2007) and *Strategic Shortfall: The Somali Syndrome and the march to 9/11* (2010).

Notes

1 The criteria used here for deriving a causal association were adapted from Hill (1965, pp. 295–300).
2 General Jack Keane, former Vice Chief, US Army, *Lehrer News Hour*, April 16, 2008 cited by Evans (2009).

References

Albright, M. (1993) Myths of Peace-Keeping. Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Washington DC, 24 June, US Department of State, Dispatch 4.

Bacevich, A.J. (2002) *American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of US Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bowen, W.Q. and Dunn, D.H. (1996) *American Security Policy in the 1990s: Beyond Containment*. Brookfield: Dartmouth.

Bush, G.W. (2001) Address to a joint session of congress and the American people, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 20010920-8.html, accessed 20 September.

Chollet, D. and Goldgeier, J. (2008) *America between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 – the Misunderstood Decade between the End of the Cold War and the Start of the War on Terror*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations.

Clarke, R.A. (2004) *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York: Free Press.
Clarke, W. (1997) Failed visions and uncertain mandates in Somalia. In: W. Clarke and J. Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 3–19.
Dorff, R.H. (2005) Failed states after 9/11: What did we know and what have we learned? *International Studies Perspectives* 6(1): 20–34.
Evans, M. (2009) Mastering Krulak's children: Land warfare challenges in the early 21st Century. Paper presented at Chief of Army's Conference on Enduring Conflict: Challenge and Responses; 2 September, Massey University, Palmerston, North, New Zealand.
Fukuyama, F. (1989) The end of history? *The National Interest* 16(Summer): 4–19.
Gaddis, J.L. (2007) Setting right a dangerous world. In: R.R. Griffith and P. Baker (eds.) *Major Problems in American History since 1945*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Halberstam, D. (2001) *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*. New York: Touchstone.
Hill, A.B. (1965) The environment and disease: Association or cause? *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine* 8(5): 295–300.
Ikenberry, G.J. (2004) Illusions of empire: Defining the new American order. *Foreign Affairs* 83(2): 144–154.
Johnston, H. and Dagne, T. (1997) Congress and the Somalia crisis. In: W. Clarke and J. Herbst (eds.) *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 191–207.
Kennedy, P. (2007) Wiedervorlage: Amerika im Niedergang? ("Is America in Decline? A Resubmission") *Blatter fur Politische und internationale Politik*, August, http://www.blaetter.de/archiv/jahrgaenge/2007/august/wiedervorlage-amerika-im-niedergang, accessed 28 July 2013.
Kitchen, N. (2012) Bush's legacy and Obama's conception of American leadership. In: D. MacDonald, D. Nabers and R.G. Patman (eds.) *The Bush Leadership, the Power of Ideas, and the War on Terror*. Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 133–153.
Kristol, W. and Kagan, R. (1996) Towards a neo-Reaganite foreign policy. *Foreign Affairs* 75(4): 20–31.
Lawrence, B. (eds.) (2005) *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. New York: Verso.
Layne, C., Wohlforth, W. and Brooks, S.G. (2012) US decline or primacy? A debate. In: M. Cox and D. Stokes (eds.) *US Foreign Policy*, 2nd edn. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 409–427.
Leopold, J. (2006) Bush ignored 9/11 warnings. *Truthout Report*, 31 January, www.truthout.org/article/jason-leopold-bush-ignored-911-warnings, accessed 17 March 2009.
Leung, R. (2004) Clarke's take on terror. *CBS News, 60 Minutes*, 21 March, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/19/60minutes/main607356.shtml, accessed 17 March 2009.
Mandelbaum, M. (1994) The reluctance to intervene. *Foreign Policy* 95(Summer): 3–18.
Matzinger, L.A. (2002) The American connection: United States foreign policy and terrorism in Somalia. MA thesis, Alliant International University, San Diego, USA.
Miniter, R. (2003) *Losing Bin Laden: How Bill Clinton's Failures Unleashed Global Terror*. Washington DC: Regnery.
Patman, R.G. (1997) The Australian answer to the Somali syndrome. *Current Affairs Bulletin* 74(1): 4–11.
Peterson, S. (2001) *Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda*. London: Routledge.
Pirio, G.A. (2007) *The African Jihad: Bin Laden's Quest for the Horn of Africa*. Trenton: The Red Sea Press.
Posen, B.R. and Ross, A.L. (1996/1997) Competing visions for US grand strategy. *International Security* 21(3): 5–53.
Rogers, P. (2008) Global terrorism. In: M. Cox and D. Stokes (eds.) *US Foreign Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 359–373.
Schabas, W. (1999) The Genocide Convention at Fifty. *Special Report*, United States Institute of Peace, 7 January, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr990107.pdf, accessed 17 March 2009.
Scheuer, M. (2006) *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America*, rev. edn. Washington, DC.: Potomac.

Shalom, S. (1993) Gravy train: Feeding the Pentagon by feeding Somalia. *Z Magazine,* February, http://www.zmag.org/Zmag/articles/shalomsomalia.html, accessed 17 March 2009.

Shawcross, W. (2000) *Deliver Us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict*. London: Bloomsbury.

SIPRI Yearbook (2002) *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, S. (2006) The concept of security in a globalizing world. In: R.G. Patman (ed.) *Globalization and Conflict: National Security in a 'New' Strategic Era*. New York: Routledge, pp. 33–55.

Solman, P. (2010) Is the U.S the latest world power in decline? *PBS NewsHour*, 2 March, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/jan-june10/kennedy_03-02.html, accessed 28 July 2013.

Taylor, T. (1995) Security policy in a world of complexity. In: K. Schwab (ed.) *Overcoming Indifference: Ten Key Challenges in Today's Changing World*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 66–70.

The Otago Daily Times (2000) 27 March.

Unger, C. (2004) *House of Bush House of Saud: The Hidden Relationship Between the World's Two Most Powerful Dynasties*. London: Gibson Square Books.

United Nations Security Council (1992) *Resolution S/RES/794*, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/794(1992), accessed 17 March 2009.

U.S. Congress: U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (2002) *Joint Inquiry Briefing by Staff on U.S. Government Counterterrorism Organizations (Before September 11, 2001) and on the Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and U.S. Response: 1986–2001*. 107th Cong., 1st sess., 11 June, http://intelligence.senate.gov/clarke.pdf, accessed 17 March 2009.

U.S. State Department (1998) Press Release on the Indictment of Bin Laden and Atef. *News Release* 4 November.

U.S. v. Usama bin Laden, et al (2001) S (7) 98, Cr. 1023.

Ward, G. (1994) Peacekeeping: An essential tool. *New Zealand International Review* 19(3): 23–25.

Weiser, B. (2000) *Papers Shed Light on Informer's Role in Terror Inquiry*. New York Times, 23 December, p. A-26.

Wright, L. (2006) *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.