CIAO DATE: 01/2015
Volume: 51, Issue: 5
September 2014
Escaping a security dilemma: Anarchy, certainty and embedded norms
Alan Collins
This article is a response to a significant development in the security dilemma literature contained in the work of Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler; their re-conceptualisation of the security dilemma. They correctly identify that what many writers call the security dilemma is actually a paradox and they seek to disentangle the dilemma from the paradox. This enables them to argue, without contradiction, that it is possible to transcend the security dilemma but not escape it. Indeed, they argue it is inescapable. The inescapable claim is based on uncertainty in state relations being omnipresent and uncertainty being the defining feature of a security dilemma. In this article I argue that certainty, in some cases misplaced, more accurately explains state interaction. Where that certainty is grounded in deeply embedded norms and beliefs about the other, and their relationship, the security dilemma has been escaped.
The Air-Sea Battle 'concept': A critique
Amitai Etzioni
In May 2013 the Pentagon released an unclassified summary of the top-secret Air-Sea Battle (ASB) Concept. ASB serves to focus the Pentagon’s efforts to organize, train and equip the armed forces against advanced weapons systems that threaten the US military’s unfettered freedom of access and action in the global commons. While officials claim ASB is merely improve service interoperability and could be applied in any number of conflict situations, this article argues that in fact the doctrine represents the Pentagon’s plan for confronting China’s increasingly capable and confident military. This raises two urgent questions: how does ASB fit into an overall US foreign policy toward China – and, if a military confrontation cannot be avoided, are there less risky alternatives, such a maritime blockade, that can achieve the same ends as ASB?
Constructing great powers: China's status in a socially constructed plurality
Catherine Jones
As a rising power, increasing attention is focused on what China does on the world stage. The growing number of books and articles on China’s rise, whether it is sustainable, whether it is a model for other developing states, and most importantly whether it is likely to change the current international order, highlights the level of interest in this phenomenon. This article suggests that focusing on China alone is not enough; instead it is essential to view the rise of China exemplifying the relationship between international order, great powers’ status, and the shaping of the roles and responsibilities of great powers. It argues that when seen as a part of the construction of international order, great powers are also constructs within international order; as a result, China as a ‘great power’ does not exist apart from the international order it is rising into. This perspective broadens the range of possible questions that can be asked in relation to China (and other rising powers).
International relations between war and revolution: Wilsonian diplomacy and the making of the Treaty of Versailles
Alexander Anievas
The Peace Treaties of 1919 retain a prominent place within the study of International Relations (IR).The theoretical significance of Versailles for IR can hardly be overstated. For much rests on the question of whether the post-war settlement was problematic due to its liberal nature or in spite of it. Yet, explanations as to why Versailles diplomacy was so problematic vary significantly. What were the central factors affecting policymaking at Versailles? And what does Paris Peace diplomacy tell IR theory about modern foreign policymaking processes? This article provides a critique of standard IR interpretations of Wilsonian diplomacy at Versailles, illustrating how realist and liberals’ uncritical acceptance of Wilson as the quintessential ‘idealist-liberal’ statesman glosses over a core contradiction at the heart of Wilsonian diplomacy: the wielding of power politics to transcend power politics. In doing so, it examines the effects of the Bolshevik revolution as a paradigm-rupturing event transforming the nature and dynamics of the First World War and the post-war settlement. This traces the unique sociological patterns of uneven and combined development thrown up by the war and the geopolitical problems this created for Wilson and the Allies in forging a new international order.
Why the crime of aggression will not reduce the practice of aggression
Davis Brown
The new crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court poses a puzzle for constructivism. Although the norm against aggression has the support of a critical mass of states for it to cascade, the crime against aggression is predicted to have no significant effect. The reason is that the crime is overbroad; it makes no provision for humanitarian intervention and other quasi-legal but arguably legitimate operations. Despite the intent of the crime's drafters, the statutory safeguards that prevent prosecutions for such operations are actually illusory. The crime as codified chills such quasi-legal but necessary operations, therefore it will not garner the support of a critical mass of frequent users of force that would be necessary for this norm to cascade also. Furthermore, the history of double-standards in other UN political and judicial bodies erodes confidence in the crime's impartial application.