CIAO DATE: 01/2009
Volume: 2, Issue: 1
Fall / Winter 1998
Democratization in Korea: The United States Role, 1980 and 1987 (PDF)
William Stueck
"Transition" is surely the most hackneyed concept among commentators on Korea over the last decade. In this post-modern world of increasingly rapid change, it is fair to say that the Republic of Korea (ROK) is in a constant state of transition from one thing to something else. The two broad areas that most frequently appear in discussions of Korea's transition are economic and political development. In the first case, analysts trace the transition of the ROK from a backward, largely agrarian economy to an industrial and now even post-industrial powerhouse that competes at a high level in the world marketplace. In the latter case, scholars examine the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic one. Until the economic slide of last fall and the subsequent election to and assumption of the presidency by former opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, most observers would have conceded that the political transition is at an earlier and more precarious stage than the economic. Kim's smooth rise to the ROK's highest office demonstrated powerfully that the way Koreans in the south conduct themselves politically has changed fundamentally over the last generation.
This paper compares two incidents in Korea's recent past that represent flash points on different sides of the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The first case involves the process by which Chun Doo Hwan seized power between October 1979 and August 1980; the second encompasses the series of events leading up to Roh Tae Woo's dramatic announcement of June 29, 1987, that the next president would be chosen in a popular election rather than by a small electoral body carefully selected at the top. My approach is to examine the role of the United States in both incidents with the idea of drawing some tentative conclusions about why Korea's transition toward democracy experienced a setback in 1980 but a giant leap forward seven years later.
Korea's Relations with China and Japan in the Post-Cold War Era (PDF)
Ilpyong J. Kim
The visit of Jiang Zemin, president of the People's Republic of China (PRC), to the United States to meet with President Bill Clinton in October 1997, and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's meetings with Russian President BorisYeltsin and Chinese President Jiang, on November 10, changed the international environment. Hostilities among the major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula are being transformed by an atmosphere of reconciliation and confidence building.
Yeltsin spent November 9 and 10, 1997, in China, returning Jiang's April visit to Russia. The two leaders discussed mutual interests and cooperation between their countries. The meeting on November 10, coming so soon after Jiang's visit to the United States, was held with warming relations between China and the United States in the background. The presidents played down any geopolitical significance to their talks except for agreement on the demarcation of the 2,800-mile border between their countries. They declared that the time of alliance aimed "against third countries" had passed. "China is an independent country that does not take part in any alliances," Jiang stressed. "Its relations with individual countries may have a specific flavor, but in general it treats all equally." Even so, a strategic partnership was established that obviously aimed to counter the New Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation, formulated in 1995 but still not ratified by the Japanese Diet. Chinese Premier Li Peng is scheduled to visit Japan for discussions with Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto on the guidelines and on the future of Taiwan and the issue of Tiaoyutao (Senkaku) Island.
North Korea's "New" Nuclear Site: Fact or Fiction? (PDF)
C. Kenneth Quinones
Sensational stories in the American and international press since mid-August have abruptly transformed North Korea from a feeble, impoverished nation on the verge of famine and political collapse into an awesome, secretive, irrational nuclear power. The New York Times on August 17 reported that "spy satellites have extensively photographed a huge work site 25 miles northeast of Yongbyon," North Korea's nuclear research facility. "Thousands of North Korean workers are swarming around the new site, burrowing into the mountainside, American officials said," the report continued. "Other intelligence," according to the same story, cites unidentified officials as saying that U.S. intelligence analysts told them "they believed that the North intended to build a new (nuclear) reactor and reprocessing center under the mountain."
Presidential Elections and the Rooting of Democracy (PDF)
David I. Steinberg
Since 1987 presidential elections have been the defining political moments in Korea. Although local elections may be more illustrative of the democratic process, for it is that level at which citizens are in intimate contact with their government and gauge its effectiveness, presidential elections command more attention because of the nature of Korean political culture. The Korean president has been half king, half chief executive. The cabinet has been his plaything, changeable at his whim; the legislature to date at most a modest thorn in his side. His phalanx of staff in the Blue House (the presidential residence) rarely questions his decisions. In his society he is far more powerful than the president of the United States is in his. There is no vice president in Korea.
Democracy and Economic Development in South Korea and its Application (PDF)
WheeGook Kim
The South Korean economy has been highly praised by foreign economists as a successful model of development and proudly joined OECD in late 1996 as the world's eleventh-largest economy, with per capita annual income of over $10,000. Since then, a series of business bankruptcies and a financial crisis resulting in the imposition of IMF supervision on December 3,1997, has caused a shift in political power. The new administration began to work for systemic reforms, which have been interrupted by the political opposition, the entrenched chaebols, and labor unions.
Despite popular pressures for reform, the lack of driving forces reduced direct foreign investment, which caused the stock index to fall from the mid-500s in late February to the low 300s by mid-June 1998, coinciding with President Kim Dae Jung's official visit to Washington. The victory of the president's party in local elections and the promise of strong United States supports energized the Kim Dae Jung administration to expedite reform programs. However, progress may take longer than expected due to the weakened political coalition; the lack of "new blood" among political appointees; the unrelenting resistance of special interest groups; the enduring old habits, particularly in politics;2 and the unhealthy economic environment in the region, including Japan.
Change and Continuity in Korean Political Culture: An Overview (PDF)
Hong Nack Kim
The South Korean political system has undergone drastic changes since the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948. Following the authoritarian Syngman Rhee regime (1948-1960), South Korea had to endure over a quarter-century of military rule, from 1961 to 1987. In the wake of massive student demonstrations against the Chun Doo Hwan regime in 1987, the historic June 29th declaration was issued to accommodate popular demands for the democratization of the political system. It promised drastic democratic reforms, including popular direct election of the president. Following the presidential election of 1987, South Korea embarked on a new era of democratic politics.
The purpose of this paper is to examine change and continuity in South Korea's political culture since the establishment of the Republic of Korea. The first section will analyze the components of traditional (authoritarian) Korean political culture, followed by an analysis in the second section of subsequent changes induced by American influence, rapid industrialization, and socioeconomic development between 1961 and the 1980s. The third section will discuss how traditional political culture still influences the political behavior of South Koreans and what implications this has for the future of Korean democracy.
Ilpyong J. Kim, Dong Suh Bark
After three decades of military rule in South Korea, civilian democratic government was inaugurated in 1992 with direct election of the president. The political culture in South Korea, therefore, is still in the process of developing; and the transformation from authoritarian to democratic politics may take a long time.
In the five years following 1993, the Korean government under the leadership of Kim Young Sam introduced more than two hundred bills and measures to transform the government from an authoritarian system to a democratic one. But these laws and reform measures were not fully implemented, due largely to the authoritarian political culture prevalent in the body politic of South Korea.1 This paper will focus on three areas that the Korean government has attempted to change through political reform: decentralization of political power, deregulation of economic institutions, and development of democratic values.
The Economic Crisis of South Korea and Its Political Impact (PDF)
Hang Yul Rhee
The spectacular performance, until recently, of East Asia's emerging economies, popularly known as the Asian tigers,1 has fueled wild speculation in the West about the so-called "Asian Century." "Never before in world history," noted the Economist in March 1997, "has any region sustained such rapid growth for so long." The GDP per capita of Taiwan ($13,200) and South Korea ($11,900) were already impressive enough in 1997 to place them at the gate of the advanced industrialized nations of the world. Japan, of course, has long been an acknowledged super-economy, often said to have led the flock of economic "flying geese" before they turned into what Chung-In Moon ten years ago called the "swarming sparrows" in Asia.2 Then suddenly last summer, seemingly as if from the blue, came the financial crisis in Pacific Asia. In reality, however, it followed what had been a decade-long period of sclerosis in the Japanese economy.
The awe inspired by the image of the Asian "miracle" has been quickly replaced by derisive commentaries in the Western media about "crony capitalism" and its "bubble economy." The close government-bankingbusiness connections which once inspired admiration in the West as a driving force behind the alleged miracle are now said to have been its nemesis. The current popular image of Asian countries is that they have bubble economies characterized by reckless overinvestment, carried out by favored Asian business groups who have received corrupt government protection against the competitive discipline of the free, open, and fair markets of the world. To many observers, the bottom has dropped out of debt-financed Asian economic growth as the capital flow into the region has abruptly reversed its course. A dark cloud now hangs over much of East Asia, with structural adjustment programs demanded as the condition for IMF loans. With rising unemployment in Asia, with daily reports of business and bank failures, and with both blue- and white-collar layoffs, the world wonders if the Asian miracle indeed is over, or if it ever existed.
The Intergenerational Gap in Korean-Americans' Attitudes toward Unification of Korea (PDF)
Gon Namkung
To provide a better picture of Korean-American attitudes toward the unification of the two Koreas in this essay, I have employed a more definitive assessment of the generation gap in Korean- Americans' attitudes toward Korean unification issues. By using a regression analysis of survey data, this study reports and explores the intergenerational gap in perceptions of Korean unification among Korean-Americans. In operational terms, I seek to understand the generation gap by employing a multi-regression analysis of Korean- American postures on various issues concerning Korean unification. A regression analysis permits analysis of age groups without the need for panel data. It is proposed that intergenerational contrasts emerge on a number of Korean unification issues. I assume that the younger Korean-American generation tends to hold different views from those of their elders about the two Koreas and their unification. The purposes of this study are: (1) to identify socioeconomic characteristics of the younger Korean-American age groups by comparing their responses on various social values to those of their elders, (2) to develop and to test some hypotheses concerning plausible impacts that this intergenerational population replacement in the Korean-American community has on its members' postures toward the unification of their motherland, and (3) to present major findings and suggest some policy implications.