

chapter six

**Japan's
Policy
Toward the
Two Koreas
in the
Post-Cold War Era**

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I

During the cold war era, Japan's Korea policy was geared to the preservation of the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula by way of supporting the Republic of Korea (ROK) both politically and economically, while refusing to recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, Japan's foreign policy in general and its Korea policy in particular had to make some significant adjustments in the aftermath of the collapse of the Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations, which ended the cold war in Europe, and a train of rapid developments on and around the Korean peninsula in the post-cold war era.

In order to cope with the changing international milieu in the post-cold war era on and around the Korean peninsula, Japan had to modify, first of all, its existing policy toward North Korea as Pyongyang expressed its willingness to normalize ties with Japan. Second, Japan also had to make adjustments to its policy toward South Korea, as many South Koreans began not only to question the terms of the settlement reached between Japan and South Korea in 1965 but also to criticize Japan's unwillingness to apologize and compensate for the victims of Japan's colonial rule over Korea (1910-1945). Third, Japan also had to map out a common strategy with South Korea and the United States to deal effectively with the threats posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine Japan's policy toward the two Koreas in the 1990s with special emphasis on analyzing major issues in Japan's relations with South and North Korea. It is the basic contention of this paper that Japan's Korea policy has been geared to the promotion of peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea and peaceful change on the Korean peninsula, for Japan fears the renewal of conflict on the Korean peninsula that could embroil Japan either directly or indirectly. Within such a framework, Japan wants to increase its influence in Korea by establishing diplomatic ties with not only the Republic of Korea but also the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

II

The security of Korea has long been a matter of substantial importance to Japan, not only for military reasons but for a full-range of political, economic, and cultural considerations. In the famous United States-Japan joint *communique* of 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku declared that the security of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is "essential" to Japan's own security.¹ Although Sato's successors have slightly modified the so-called "Korea clause" of the 1969 joint communique, such a modification in no way has changed the basic proposition that the security of Korea is

vital to Japan's own security, for the obvious reason that the renewal of conflict in Korea would have a more serious impact on Japan than conflict in any other Asian nation. In view of the existing security arrangements with the United States, Japan would be drawn into the conflict either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, in view of the two Koreas' existing ties with powerful major powers, such a conflict could escalate into a major nuclear confrontation imperiling Japan's security.

No less serious consequences could be expected if the conflict resulted in conquest of the South by the North. The communization of South Korea inevitably would undermine Japanese political and security interests in Korea. Economically, Japan would lose a lucrative market for its manufactured goods. It could also lose public and private credits it had extended to South Korea, plus its equity investment in Korea. Politically, communization of South Korea could mean the loss of a friendly neighbor that has cooperated closely with Japan without posing any threat to Japan's vital national interests. Undoubtedly, a communist conquest of South Korea would affect Japan's security more than its other interests. It would eliminate a valuable buffer zone between Japan and her potential adversaries and bring the nation face to face with an unfriendly neighbor with more than one million men under arms. Frequent and serious friction could develop between Japan and communist Korea in waters near the peninsula where fishing and shipping activities of Koreans and Japanese have generated past tensions.

To be sure, a truly neutral, unified Korea not closely affiliated with any of the major powers would not necessarily constitute a threat to Japan. But this has been regarded as at best a distant goal which could not be realized until relations among the big powers and between the two Koreas change enough to make it possible. During much of the cold-war era, the ruling LDP and other influential opinion makers in Japan believed that peaceful reunification of Korea could not be realized within a short span of time. Under the circumstances, they believed the best policy was to promote "peaceful coexistence" between South and North Korea by encouraging Seoul and Pyongyang to expand the scope of their contact and dialogue. At the same time, Japanese conservative leaders were willing to support simultaneous entry of North and South Korea into the UN as well as the cross recognition of the two Koreas by the four major powers (i.e., the U.S., Soviet Union, China and Japan). As originally proposed by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975, the cross-recognition plan called for simultaneous recognition of North Korea by Japan and the United States and of South Korea by China and the Soviet Union. The proposal, however, was rejected by North Korea which regarded it as a step toward perpetuating the division of Korea.

As a result, Japan was not able to make any significant progress for the realization of the cross-recognition plan, either in its original format or in a modified version. Nevertheless, the LDP government was willing to pave the way for "peaceful coexistence" between the two Koreas by seeking a general improvement in relations between the two Koreas and the four major powers through increased exchanges in economic and cultural fields. Thus, until 1990, Japan's Korea policy was geared to the preservation of the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula by supporting South Korea both politically and economically while refusing to recognize North Korea. Except for a small amount of trade carried out by private firms with North Korea, there were few contacts or exchanges between Japan and North Korea.

By 1990, Japan's foreign policy in general and its Korea policy in particular had to make significant adjustments in the face of the collapse of the Communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which brought about the end of the cold war in Europe. Although the residual elements of the cold war still persist on the Korean peninsula, "the last glacier of cold war confrontation" also could not be immune to the tides of change and reconciliation sweeping across the Eurasian continent. South Korea normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as well as most Eastern European nations by September 1991. In 1992, it also succeeded in establishing diplomatic ties with China. Meanwhile, North Korea declared its intention to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan in 1990, and by May 1991, Pyongyang decided to seek a separate seat in the United Nations, after opposing the simultaneous but separate entry of the two Koreas for nearly three decades. By September 1991, both South and North Korea were admitted to the UN as separate members.² Furthermore, by December 1991, Seoul and Pyongyang signed a joint agreement on reconciliation and nonaggression, which was ratified together with a joint declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in February 1992. These developments clearly indicated that the rigid patterns of inter-Korean relations as well as the two Koreas' relations with four major powers were undergoing transformation.

Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing political situation in and around Korea, Japanese conservative leaders had to map out a new strategy to cope with the changing political situation in Korea. Japan had to modify its existing policy toward North Korea, as the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four major powers was becoming a reality. In addition, Japan had to make necessary adjustments to its policy toward South Korea, as Koreans intensified their criticism of Japan's failure to apologize and compensate for the wrongs committed against Koreans in the aftermath of the democratization of South Korea's political system. The sue-

successful handling of these tasks was regarded as essential not only for improving Japan's ties with the two Koreas but also for the realization of Japan's aspirations to become a major political power commensurate with its economic power in the emerging new international political system.

III

In spite of close ties developed at the governmental level, a number of issues have plagued Japanese-South Korean relations in recent years such as: liquidating the legacy of Japan's colonial rule over Korea (1910-1945); the rectification of perennial trade imbalance; and the legal status of Korean residents in Japan.

The legacy of bitterness and enmity left by Japanese colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945 has been reflected in the deep-seated Korean feeling that Japanese have not fully and properly acknowledged their past mistakes and wrongs committed against Koreans. Such feelings were expressed in violent protests in Korea whenever Japanese were perceived to display insensitivity, as was the case with demonstrations against distortions of facts in Japanese textbooks in 1982 and 1986 and intemperate remarks by Japanese government leaders (e.g., Education Minister Fujio Masayuki in 1986 who tended to justify Japan's colonial rule over Korea).³ Furthermore, many Koreans were bitter about the fact that Japanese leaders were not only reluctant but less than candid in acknowledging Japan's past misdeeds and mistakes.

Another difficult issue stemming from the past has been the legal status of about 700,000 Korean residents in Japan. Primarily a legacy of the colonial period, most of these people or their parents were forcibly taken to Japan for hard labor during World War II. These Korean residents in Japan suffered from social discrimination and legal disadvantages. One of the most resented legal provisions has been the requirement for Korean residents to carry identification cards all the time and be fingerprinted every five years. South Korea has consistently called upon Tokyo to do away with these unreasonable requirements. In April 1990, Japan agreed to abolish finger-printing requirements and to improve the legal status of the third-generation Korean residents. Furthermore, in November 1990, at Seoul's request, Tokyo agreed to suspend fingerprinting for first- and second-generation residents as well.⁴ Finally, in January 1991, Japan agreed to replace the alien registration system for Korean residents with a family registration system involving only photographs but no fingerprinting.

Although Japan's concessions have defused tension with South Korea on the thorny issues involving Korean residents in Japan, the controversy sur-

rounding the fingerprinting issue rekindled Korean antipathy and resentment toward Japan. Many Koreans felt that the Japanese had not changed their basic attitudes toward Korea and Koreans. Such feelings became stronger as other issues involving the victims of Japanese colonial rule over Korea began to surface in recent years, such as the compensation for the Korean victims of the nuclear bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (over 20,000) as well as the Koreans forcefully taken to Sakhalin for hard labor during the war but left there (some 43,000 in 1945) after Japan's surrender. In addition, other victims of Japanese colonial rule, such as Koreans drafted into military or war-related services, became also quite vocal. Of these, the demand for apology and compensation for Korean women forced into prostitution for Japanese soldiers during World War II, or the so-called "comfort women," has become the most embarrassing for the Japanese government.⁵

The Japanese government's initial reactions to the "comfort women" issue was that the Japanese government was not involved in recruiting, transporting and employing these women. Rather, private businesses or individual brokers had been responsible for the whole affair. However, during January 1992, Japanese researchers discovered a series of documents in official depositories, including the Defense Agency archives, which substantiated the Japanese government's involvement.⁶ Some Japanese who had been involved in the recruitment of "comfort women" also began to testify openly, detailing the government's role.

Against this background, the South Korean government decided to take up the issue with Japan during Prime Minister Miyazawa's visit to Seoul in January 1992. Miyazawa was greeted by street demonstrations demanding an apology and compensation for the crimes committed against Korean women. In his speech to the Korean National Assembly, Miyazawa expressed his "acute distress" over these past Japanese wrongdoings.⁷ He also promised South Korean leaders to investigate the matter fully, expressing his willingness to take proper action to rectify the situation. Against the backdrop of growing tension on the "comfort women" issue, in early July 1992, the Miyazawa government published its report in which it admitted that the wartime government systematically recruited women for front-line brothels, even though no evidence was found that forced recruitment took place. Subsequently, on 4 August 1993, the Miyazawa government issued a final report on the "comfort women" issue in which it admitted officially that many Korean women were coerced to serve as "comfort women" in brothels for Japanese soldiers during World War II. Although the majority of Korean "comfort women" were recruited by private brothel operators acting on the request of the Japanese military, "In some cases, military offi-

cials were directly involved in recruiting."⁸ Moreover, the report also acknowledged that the Imperial Japanese Army operated and managed some brothels directly, although most were run by private operators. At the same time, it indicated its willingness to adopt certain measures other than compensation to rectify the situation.

Against this background, anti-Japanese feeling became stronger among Koreans. According to a joint Japanese-South Korean opinion polls conducted by *Dong-A Woo* and *Asahi Shimbun*, among South Korean respondents, those liking Japan fell from 22 percent in 1984 to 14 percent in 1988 and only 5 percent in 1990.⁹ Those disliking Japan increased from 39 percent to 51 percent to 66 percent over the same period. On the other hand, Japanese responses barely changed between 1984 and 1990: In the 1990 survey, 12 percent of Japanese respondents liked Korea, while 23 percent disliked Korea. In the 1984 survey, 11 percent of the respondents liked Korea, while 19 percent did not. According to another survey conducted by a Korean research firm in February 1992, 67.4 percent of South Koreans disliked Japan, and 26.1 percent said the mere mention of the word Japan upset them.¹⁰

The problem of liquidating the past in Japanese-Korean relations was alleviated with the establishment of the new Korean government headed by President Kim Young Sam in February 1993 and a Japanese coalition government headed by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in August 1993. President Kim indicated his willingness to settle thorny issues, including the issue of "comfort women," with Japan if Tokyo would make a candid admission of its past wrongdoings and a sincere apology to South Korea. Provided that Japan would undertake such forthright actions on the "comfort women" issue, Kim indicated that his government would not seek material compensation from Japan.¹¹ He has also indicated his willingness to develop future-oriented relations with Japan rather than one constantly mired and haunted by the unfortunate and painful past. This forward-looking attitude of the new South Korean President was highly appreciated by Japanese leaders. However, it was not until the summer of 1993, when a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro put an end to thirty-eight years of unbroken LDP rule in Japan, that a meaningful new beginning in Japanese-South Korean relations began to take shape.

The reform-minded new Japanese Prime Minister projected a fresh image to Koreans by taking a more clear-cut position on Japan's responsibility and guilt for atrocities committed during World War II. For instance, in his first press conference after assuming the premiership, Hosokawa declared

among other things that "the Pacific War was a war of aggression as well as a wrong war committed by Japan."¹² In view of the fact that no former LDP leader had admitted forthrightly Japan's responsibility or guilt for the war, such a candid admission by the new Japanese Prime Minister was highly valued by Koreans. Clearly, such a statement bode well for the new Japanese-Korean relationship pursued by the Kim government.

Prime Minister Hosokawa also impressed his host and numerous other Koreans at Kyongju in November 1993 by making the most explicit apology to Koreans ever made by a Japanese leader. Unlike his predecessors, Hosokawa was not timid in acknowledging atrocities committed by Imperial Japan such as banning the Koreans from using their own language, forcing them to change their names into Japanese, mobilizing Korean women as "sex slaves" for Japanese troops and forcing numerous men into labor camps. He added: "We deeply repent our wrongdoings. We again apologize for the intolerable pains which Koreans suffered."¹³ President Kim highly praised the Japanese Prime Minister's statements, saying that he was "deeply impressed" by Hosokawa's frank attitude. At the same time, the two leaders agreed to seek to turn Korean-Japanese relations into truly neighborly ties from those of geographically-close but psychologically-distant nations. In addition to making important progress in liquidating the past, the Kyongju summit meeting was also important in tackling the thorny issue of trade imbalance and technology transfer between Japan and Korea. The two leaders also agreed to cooperate closely with each other in dealing with the threats posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons development program.

IV

After normalizing relations with South Korea in 1965, Japan virtually ruled out diplomatic relations with North Korea and limited Japan's contacts with the DPRK to the bare minimum. Except for a modest amount of trade carried out by private Japanese firms, there were few contacts between the two countries.¹⁴ In a sense, Japan's Korea policy strongly reflected the influence of the United States, which has guaranteed South Korea's security, while not recognizing North Korea. In view of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, it was natural for Japan to maintain a basically pro-Seoul and anti-Pyongyang policy throughout the cold war period.

Until 1990, Japanese-North Korean relations remained chilly with little change in their "abnormal relations" due to a number of factors, such as Pyongyang's unwillingness to pay its 80 billion *yen* (\$790 million) trade debt to Japan, North Korean terrorist attacks against South Korea in the

1980s, and Pyongyang's refusal to release Japanese seamen seized in 1983.¹⁵ By the summer of 1990, however, there was a growing feeling among Japanese leaders that Japan should explore the possibility of improving relations with North Korea. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki expressed the desire to "contact North Korea without any precondition attached."¹⁶ He also indicated his willingness to dispatch an LDP delegation to Pyongyang for improving relations with North Korea. The Kaifu government's positive posture toward Pyongyang could be attributed to a number of factors, including the Soviet-South Korean summit meeting held in San Francisco in June 1990 which had indicated the imminent normalization of Moscow-Seoul relations. North Korea responded by extending an invitation to the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) to send a joint delegation to Pyongyang.

An LDP delegation headed by Kanemaru Shin and a JSP delegation led by Tanabe Makoto visited Pyongyang in September 1990. On the basis of talks held with North Korean officials, including Kim Il-Sung, Japanese leaders worked out a joint declaration with North Korean leaders, which was issued on September 28.¹⁷ In the eight-point declaration, representatives of the LDP, the JSP, and the Korean Workers Party (KWP) agreed that Japan should apologize and compensate North Korea not only for the damage caused during the thirty-six years of colonial rule but also for the "losses" suffered by North Korea in the forty-five years following World War II.¹⁸ In addition, Japan and North Korea agreed to set up satellite links and inaugurate direct air flights to improve bilateral ties. In the declaration, Japanese leaders also endorsed the North Korean position that "there is only one Korea." The declaration stipulated further that signatories "urge" their respective governments to initiate diplomatic talks in November 1990 for the early establishment of diplomatic ties between the two nations.

South Korea and the U.S. voiced concern about the terms and conditions of the proposed normalization between Tokyo and Pyongyang. South Koreans were apprehensive because of the risks normalization could pose for their national security. If Japan provided massive compensation and economic assistance to North Korea, and if the money were used to upgrade North Korea's military capabilities, the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula could be adversely affected. The U.S. shared South Korea's apprehension.

Japan agreed to accommodate both South Korean and U.S. requests in dealing with North Korea in the full-dress normalization talks. In January 1991, Japan adopted four basic principles to guide its normalization talks

with North Korea: (1) to conduct negotiations so as to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula; (2) to normalize relations with Pyongyang in such a way as not to undermine Japan's existing friendly relations with South Korea; (3) to make compensation for thirty-six years of colonial rule but not for the post-1945 "losses"; and (4) to seek Pyongyang's acceptance of international inspection of its nuclear facilities in view of the importance of the matter to Japan's national security.¹⁹

From the end of January 1991 to 5 November 1992, eight rounds of Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization talks were held. However, little progress was made in resolving a number of issues between Japan and North Korea. First, Japan and North Korea could not narrow the gaps on the compensation issue. North Korea insisted that "normalization of diplomatic relations is out of the question unless Japan admits and apologizes for her past criminal deeds in explicit terms and makes sufficient compensation for them."²⁰ According to Pyongyang, Japan's colonial rule over Korea was illegal and invalid, for the annexation treaty as well as other related agreements were forced on Korea. North Korea also demanded that Japan make "reparations" to North Korea, for Korea and Japan were in a state of war in the pre-1945 period.²¹ Japan maintained, however, that since Japan was not in a state of war with North Korea before and during World War II, Pyongyang's demands should be dealt with in terms of North Korea's claims to Japan for property damages in the pre-1945 period. Japan applied such a principle in settling similar issues with South Korea in 1965. For this purpose, the Japanese requested North Korea to present documentary proof of damage caused by Japan during the colonial days. Rejecting the Japanese viewpoint, North Korea declared that Pyongyang would never accept the settlement formula used by Japan with South Korea in 1965, for it sidestepped the problems of apology and compensation for human and property damages Japan had inflicted on the Korean people from 1910 to 1945. For its part, Japan rejected North Korea's demand for compensation for the losses incurred after 1945, maintaining that there was no legal basis for Japan to compensate for the alleged losses arising from "abnormal relations" between Japan and North Korea in the postwar period.²²

Second, another major obstacle was the inability of both sides to work out an agreement on the question of the international inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities. Japanese negotiators told North Korea that the current bilateral talks should be aimed not only at normalizing diplomatic relations but also at promoting peace and stability in East Asia, including the Korean peninsula. Japan urged North Korea to open its nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea, however, rejected the Japanese demand on the grounds that

the nuclear inspection issue was not a proper topic for normalization talks, and that such an issue should be discussed between North Korea and the U.S., since a similar inspection should be conducted of the nuclear weapons stored in South Korea by the U.S.²³

Third, starting in the third round of normalization talks, Japan's request for information concerning a missing Japanese woman, Yi Un Hye (pseudonym), also became a contentious issue. The identity of the missing Japanese woman was verified by Kim Hyun Hee, a former North Korean agent then living in South Korea, who planted a time bomb that destroyed a Korean Airlines (KAL) plane in November 1987. According to Kim, she was taught Japanese in North Korea by the allegedly abducted Japanese woman in preparation for her assignment in Japan as a special agent. Kim identified the missing Japanese woman (Taguchi Yayeyo) from photographs of missing Japanese provided by the Japanese police to the South Korean authorities.²⁴ North Korea's response was that the Yi issue was not only "fabricated" but also irrelevant to the normalization talks. In fact, North Korea became so irritated by Japan's persistent demand for information on the Yi issue that it walked out of the normalization talks twice, including the eighth round of normalization talks in November 1992. The North Korean delegation denounced the Japanese request as a serious "insult" to North Korea and ruled out any possibility of resuming the talks as long as Japan would not drop the issue.²⁵ To be sure, there were other issues, including permission for Japanese wives of North Koreans to visit Japan, and strengthening the legal status of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan. However, they were not quite as troublesome as the first two issues: the international inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities and the scope and nature of Japan's compensation to North Korea.

V

In the spring of 1993, as tension increased in the wake of Pyongyang's refusal to comply with international inspection of its nuclear facilities, Japan reaffirmed its intention to cooperate fully with the U.S. and South Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa expressed his willingness to cooperate fully with South Korea in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Japan was particularly apprehensive about Pyongyang's development of medium range missiles (e.g., *Nodong-1*) which could reach part of Japan.²⁶ It was, therefore, in full agreement with Seoul and Washington that North Korea's attempts to develop nuclear weapons should be prevented through effective international inspection of its nuclear facilities, and that Pyongyang should fulfill its pledge to make the Korean peninsula nuclear free. During President Kim Young Sam's state visit to Japan on

24-26 March 1994, Hosokawa reassured Kim that Japan would undertake responsible measures and actions within the framework of Japanese constitution in the event the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against North Korea.²⁷ Hosokawa's successor, Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, retained Hosokawa's Korea policy until he was replaced by Murayama Tomiichi in June.

The inauguration of the SDPJ-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi at the end of June 1994 aroused immediate speculation that Japan's Korea policy might undergo changes under the socialist-led coalition government, despite his professed intention to maintain cooperative relations with South Korea. According to the policy agreement signed among the SDPJ, the LDP, and the New Party Sakigake, in forming the new coalition government, the new government was to develop its policy on the basis of previous policy agreements adopted in conjunction with the establishment of the Hosokawa and Hata coalition governments during 1993-1994.²⁸ However, in the area of foreign policy, the Murayama government proved more "dovish" than its predecessors. Regarding the Korean peninsula, it stressed its intention to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program and to accept international inspection of Pyongyang's nuclear facilities by the IAEA. If North Korea refused international inspection again and if the UN Security Council adopted a sanctions resolution, Japan should adopt whatever measure necessary within constitutional limits. Thus, the Murayama government tended to emphasize the indispensability of the UN endorsement in conjunction with Japan's participation in sanctions against North Korea.

Nevertheless, the Murayama government's policy toward South Korea remained basically similar to its predecessors. On July 1, Murayama called President Kim Young Sam to assure South Korea that the new government would follow basically the same policy toward South Korea as its predecessors. Furthermore, during his visit to South Korea a few weeks later, Prime Minister Murayama promised to continue working closely with South Korea, the U.S. and China to resolve the nuclear issue and to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. He also expressed deep remorse and apology for Japan's misdeeds and mistakes committed against Koreans during Japan's colonial rule over Korea.

Despite the Murayama government's commitment to continuity in foreign policy, speculation persisted regarding the possibility of change in the new government's policy toward North Korea. Murayama indicated his interest in the resumption of the Japanese-North Korean normalization talks, as Washington and Seoul began to prepare high-level talks with Pyongyang

following the agreement worked out between Kim II-Sung and former President Jimmy Carter in Pyongyang in June 1994. With the signing of the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework on the nuclear issue at Geneva on 21 October 1994, the environment for the resumption of Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization was substantially improved, for it removed a major stumbling block that had stalemated the talks. The Murayama government welcomed the signing of the Geneva accord between Washington and Pyongyang. It also indicated its willingness to share the cost of converting Pyongyang's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors to light-water reactors. Murayama also indicated his willingness to hold normalization talks with Pyongyang without any conditions attached.²⁹

In the spring of 1995, Japan renewed its effort to explore the possibility of resuming normalization talks with North Korea. At the invitation of the North Korean Workers' Party (KWP), a joint delegation of the ruling coalition parties (the SDPJ, the LDP, and the Sakigake party) headed by former Deputy Prime Minister Watanabe Michio (LDP) arrived in Pyongyang on March 28 to discuss the resumption of the Tokyo-Pyongyang normalization talks. On the basis of talks held between Japanese and North Korean leaders, an agreement was signed on 30 March 1995.³⁰ Among other things, it stipulated that no preconditions would be set for resuming normalization talks, and that each party would urge its government to resume negotiations as soon as possible.

Apparently, North Korea decided to resume the normalization talks with Japan, for a number of reasons. First, the Murayama government was the friendliest Japanese regime North Korea had to deal with in the postwar era. It was headed by a Socialist Prime Minister whose party had maintained close ties with North Korea since 1963. Second, North Korea is sorely in need of Japan's capital and technology to reinvigorate its stagnating economy. If North Korea succeeds in normalization talks with Japan, it can expect huge compensation from Japan, possibly as much as \$10 billion.³¹ The infusion of such a huge amount of capital from Japan could clearly strengthen North Korea's economy and enhance the prestige and power of the Kim Jong-II regime. It could also alleviate growing popular discontent about economic hardship in North Korea. Third, the establishment of diplomatic ties with Japan could also improve the Pyongyang regime's international position vis-a-vis South Korea. It could compensate in part for the diplomatic losses incurred by North Korea as a result of the successful implementation of South Korea's northern policy, which brought about normalization of Seoul's diplomatic relations with Beijing and Moscow.

To be sure, there were a number of factors which prompted the Murayama government to resume negotiations with Pyongyang. First, the breakthrough in U.S.-North Korean relations on the nuclear issue had removed the major stumbling block in the resumption of Japanese-North Korean normalization talks. Second, Japan did not want to be left behind in the evolving situation driven by Washington and Seoul. Rather, it wanted to establish its diplomatic foothold in North Korea and to expand its commercial ties with Pyongyang. Third, Japan could not postpone indefinitely the task of normalizing relations with North Korea, one of the few remaining issues arising from Japan's defeat in World War II. Fourth, Japan believed that the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea was necessary if Japan was to play a major role in the emerging new international system in the post-cold war era. If Japan wanted to have significant participation in international politics, the logical place to begin would be Northeast Asia, its backyard. Without mending fences with its close neighbor, it would be difficult for Japan to contend for a leadership position in East Asia. Fifth, Japan believed that the establishment of diplomatic ties between Tokyo and Pyongyang would contribute to a reduction of tensions on the Korean peninsula and promote peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea. As the possibility for Korean reunification through the South's absorption of the North (or the German model) has decreased in the wake of Washington-Pyongyang rapprochement, Japan believed a period of peaceful coexistence would be necessary for the peaceful reunification of Korea.

In the aftermath of the signing of the new agreement between Japanese and North Korean political leaders in Pyongyang, the Japanese media reported the imminence of the resumption of Pyongyang-Tokyo normalization talks. However, talks did not materialize for several reasons, including the ongoing U.S.-Japanese negotiations on the implementation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework,³² and South Korea's opposition to any hasty Japanese move to mend fences with North Korea. Seoul advised Tokyo not to make an impetuous move toward Pyongyang until there was significant progress in South-North Korean relations.

VI

In the summer of 1995 the deepening economic crisis in North Korea prompted Pyongyang to dispatch its officials to Japan to secure Japan's help in procuring rice. In his meeting with Watanabe Michio and other coalition leaders, on May 26, Li Song Rok, chairman of North Korea's International Trade Promotion Committee, requested Japan's aid for rice to alleviate a food shortage.

On the basis of consultation carried out among the coalition leaders, the Murayama government decided to provide rice aid to Pyongyang, not unilaterally but in cooperation with South Korea. It was the consensus of the Murayama government that it would be imprudent for Japan to provide unilateral rice aid to North Korea, which had turned down South Korea's earlier offer of similar aid to Pyongyang. Under the circumstances, it was necessary for the Murayama government to secure Seoul's understanding. It also wanted to see the outcome of the U.S.-DPRK negotiations at Kuala Lumpur before acting on Pyongyang's request.

When South and North Korea worked out an agreement on 150,000 tons of rice to be supplied by South Korea following a series of talks carried out in Beijing in June 1995,³³ Japan moved swiftly to finalize its version with North Korea. By then, the U.S. and North Korea had also reached an agreement on implementing the Geneva framework agreement. On June 30, a formal agreement was reached between Tokyo and Pyongyang on Japan's rice aid to North Korea. It was signed in Beijing between Kawashima Yutaka, head of the Asian Affairs Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Li Chong Hyuk. According to the pact, Japan would provide 300,000 tons of rice to help alleviate North Korea's food shortage. Pyongyang would have thirty years to pay for half of the shipment, starting after a ten-year grace period. The annual interest would be two percent during the grace period and three percent thereafter. The remaining 150,000 tons, forwarded through the Japanese Red Cross, would be free of charge.³⁴ Kawashima reportedly secured a verbal assurance that all rice shipped from Japan would be used exclusively for North Korean citizens' livelihood.³⁵ The Murayama government was apparently hopeful that the signing of the rice aid agreement would facilitate the resumption of normalization talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang.

In early September, as North Korea renewed its request for additional assistance for rice to Japan, citing severe drainage caused by floods in North Korea, the Murayama government decided: (1) to offer \$500,000 in humanitarian aid through the United Nations for North Korean flood victims; and (2) to supply additional rice to Pyongyang.³⁶ On October 3, Japan signed an agreement with North Korea in Beijing to provide an additional 200,000 tons of rice to North Korea. The terms of payment were somewhat similar to the ones stipulated in the previous agreement: two percent interest during the ten-year grace period and three percent interest annually for the next ten years.³⁷

Meanwhile, starting in April 1995, Japan and North Korea carried out a series of informal working level discussions in Beijing in the hope of

paving the way for the resumption of bilateral normalization talks.³⁸ By the end of May, according to Japanese sources, North Korea indicated its willingness to resume such talks.³⁹ However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to wait for the outcome of the ongoing U.S.-DPRK negotiations at Kuala Lumpur and also to seek South Korea's understanding before taking any decisive move on the normalization issue. Despite Prime Minister Murayama's professed intention to seek the normalization of relations with North Korea in his policy speech delivered before the parliament on 29 September 1995,⁴⁰ there was no resumption of the normalization talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang in the fall of 1995.

VII

Japan's direct contacts with North Korea have always been watched closely by South Korea. Although South Korea indicated its willingness to welcome Japan and other friendly powers' improvement of relations with North Korea after President Roh Tae Woo's special declaration on northern policy on 7 July 1988, South Korea has been wary of Japan's approach to North Korea, lest such a move would undermine South Korea's interests. Due to Tokyo's willingness to accommodate Seoul's request in dealing with North Korea, many South Koreans became seriously concerned with the potential negative impact of Tokyo-Pyongyang rapprochement on North-South Korean dialogue. There has been a widely held perception in South Korea that Japan is attempting to play the North against the South to hamper a real breakthrough in South-North Korean relations, because Japan's offer of economic assistance to North Korea would diminish the incentive for the North to cooperate with the South. Many South Koreans (over 79 percent in the January 1994 *Dong-A Woo* poll) believe that Japan does not favor Korean reunification for fear that a united Korea may pose a serious threat to Japan. Insofar as the South Korean government is concerned, Japan's willingness to consult closely with South Korea in conducting normalization talks with North Korea from 1991 to 1992 alleviated its initial misgivings about Japan's intentions.

Following the inauguration of the Kim Young Sam government in February 1993, Seoul placed importance on cultivating close cooperation with Japan in dealing with North Korea. At every summit meeting between South Korea and Japan since 1993, the issue was discussed at length with general agreement on the necessity of continued cooperation between the two nations. Despite the initial apprehension over SDPJ's close ties with North Korea, President Kim was willing to accept Prime Minister Murayama's assurance that the socialist-led coalition government would follow the same basic policy toward South Korea as its predecessors.⁴¹

However, a series of Japanese moves to improve relations with North Korea aroused apprehension among South Korean leaders. In the spring of 1995, South Korea cautioned Japan not to make impetuous moves toward North Korea at a time when the U.S. and North Korea had to work out details on the implementation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. Again, in the summer of 1995, South Korean leaders advised the Murayama government not to make any unilateral move toward the North in connection with Pyongyang's request for rice, but to wait until a deal on rice could be struck between South and North Korea. Japanese leaders nominally heeded these South Korean requests by holding consultations with Seoul.

However, the Murayama government's obsession with normalizing relations with North Korea clearly undermined South Korea's plan to bring about the resumption of North-South Korean dialogue through economic cooperation. Partly because of Japan's offer of rice aid, North Korea did not take South Korea's offer of rice seriously. Moreover, North Korea acted defiantly toward South Korea in implementing the rice agreement. For example, North Korea forcefully hoisted its flag on a South Korean ship which was to enter a North Korean port to unload rice earmarked under the North-South rice aid agreement,⁴² and furthermore, in August 1995, Pyongyang detained a South Korean ship carrying 5,000 tons of rice for North Korea, charging that the ship's crew was engaged in espionage activities.⁴³

In spite of the fact that North Korea sorely needed additional grain from abroad, the DPRK suspended further talks with South Korea on the economic cooperation issue. Had Japan not offered 500,000 tons of rice to North Korea in the summer of 1995, it is inconceivable that North Korea would have acted in such a defiant and high-handed fashion toward South Korea.

It was against this background that President Kim expressed South Korea's displeasure with Japan's impetuous moves toward North Korea. In his interview with an influential Japanese newspaper, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, on 9 October 1995, Kim stated that "when there is no progress in the South-North Korean dialogue, Japan's attempts to improve relations with North Korea in defiance of South Korea's wishes can be construed by South Koreans as attempts to obstruct Korean reunification." After pointing out that Japan was partly responsible for a divided Korea, Kim emphasized that "it is desirable for Japan to leave the North-South Korean issue to the Koreans, and that Japan's attempts to improve relations with the North by jumping over the head of South Korea will not serve Japan's own interests."⁴⁴

Strained Seoul-Tokyo relations were exacerbated further when South Koreans became infuriated by a series of statements issued by leaders of the Murayama government, including the prime minister, who attempted to justify Japan's colonial rule over Korea or gloss over Japan's guilt and responsibility for acts of aggression committed against its neighbors. Already, in the summer of 1995, many Koreans including President Kim Young Sam were deeply disappointed by the Japanese Diet's handling of the so-called "No War Resolution" in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, for it did not contain an explicit apology nor any promise of compensation to the victims of prewar Japanese imperialism.⁴⁵ According to a public opinion poll jointly conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Dong-A Ilbo* in the summer of 1995, 69 percent of Koreans disliked Japan, while only 6 percent indicated that they liked Japan. Those results represented a sharp increase in the percentage of Koreans who disliked Japan as compared to results of the same poll conducted for the first time in 1984 (i.e., 39 percent disliked the Japanese).⁴⁶ Regarding the question as to whether Japan had done enough to compensate South Korea for Japan's past wrongdoings, 56 percent replied that it had not. Furthermore, 87 percent of Korean respondents believed that Japan "has not done enough to rectify for its past mistakes," 58 percent of Korean respondents indicated that Japan should compensate the "comfort women" and 97 percent believed that Japan "has not shown its good faith" in dealing with this matter. Insofar as Japanese attitudes toward Korea were concerned, little change was indicated: 11 percent of Japanese respondents liked Korea, while 21 percent disliked it.

In an attempt to ease tensions between Tokyo and Seoul, at the Japanese-South Korean summit meeting in Osaka in November 1995 Prime Minister Murayama assured President Kim that Japan would consult closely with South Korea and that it would try to: (1) conduct normalization talks with Pyongyang without undermining existing Tokyo-Seoul ties; (2) link the pace of normalization talks to the progress of the inter-Korean dialogue; and (3) refrain from providing any further economic assistance to the DPRK prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations.⁴⁷ These policy guidelines would constitute constraints on the new LDP-led coalition government headed by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro, which replaced the Murayama government in January 1996.

VIII

Since the inauguration of the Hashimoto coalition government in January 1996, Japan's foreign policy in general and its Korea policy in particular has tended to reflect the policy orientation of the LDP. Basically, it has main-

tained cordial relations with South Korea, while displaying a more cautious approach to North Korea than its predecessor.

In the spring of 1996, Japanese-South Korean relations were strained as a result of a territorial dispute over a small island, Tokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese. Both countries claim that the island is historically theirs. According to South Korea, the island was claimed by Korea as early as 512 A. D.⁴⁸ Since the early 1950s, the island has been inhabited by South Korean residents, and a coast guard detachment has been stationed since 1956. Japan, on the other hand, maintains that the island was officially incorporated into Japan's Shimane prefecture in 1905.⁴⁹ Although Japan contends that Korea did not raise objections at the time, such a contention is brushed aside by Koreans because the Korean government in 1905 was under Japanese control even if it was not officially annexed until 1910. The dispute flared up in February when both Tokyo and Seoul announced plans to declare 200-nautical mile economic zones off their respective shores as allowed under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The zones would overlap part of the Sea of Japan (the East Sea to Koreans) where the disputed island is located. When Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko asked Koreans to stop building a wharf on the island, claiming that the island was Japanese, infuriated Koreans in Seoul burned a Japanese flag together with the effigy of Ikeda. President Kim Young Sam was quoted as "indescribably outraged" at the Japanese demand. "This is our territory and we will defend it no matter who says what," said South Korean ambassador to Japan Kim Tai Ji.⁵⁰ To be sure, Japan has decided to resolve the issue through patient dialogue with South Korea.

In an attempt to defuse the crisis, on 2 March 1996, a summit meeting was held in Bangkok between Hashimoto and Kim, both then attending the Asia and Europe Summit Meeting (ASEM). In his meeting with President Kim, Hashimoto maintained that the island belonged to Japan. However, President Kim countered directly by saying that South Korea "cannot recognize Japan's claim to the island."⁵¹ Nevertheless, they agreed to undertake negotiations on setting the exclusive economic zones and dealing with the fisheries around the disputed island, without touching island ownership. With regard to Japan's policy toward North Korea, Hashimoto told Kim that Japan's basic objective is to normalize "abnormal relations" with North Korea and to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. Hashimoto also promised Kim to maintain close consultation with South Korea in dealing with North Korea.

At a trilateral consultation conference involving assistant foreign ministers of the U.S., South Korea and Japan, held on Cheju island in May 1996, Japan

agreed to press Pyongyang to accept the four-party talks proposed jointly by the U.S. and South Korea.⁵² They also agreed that, although North Korea had a serious food shortage, the situation was not likely to lead to disastrous famine as seen in Africa. In addition, they have agreed to continue consultation among themselves in dealing with North Korea.

Japanese-South Korean relations improved noticeably by the summer of 1996. At the Japanese-South Korean summit meeting held on Cheju island in June 1996, Hashimoto reiterated Japan's unequivocal support for the four-party talks proposed by the U.S. and South Korea to work out a permanent peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement in Korea.⁵³ Hashimoto also reaffirmed his intention to maintain close consultation with South Korea in dealing with North Korea. Both Hashimoto and Kim also agreed to make common efforts to develop "future-oriented relations" and to achieve a "common goal" in jointly hosting the World Cup soccer finals in 2002. In addition, they agreed to expand youth exchange programs and to set up a joint study group to conduct research on historical issues involving Japan and Korea.

In stark contrast to the improvement in Japanese-South Korean relations, there has been little progress in breaking the stalemate in Japanese-North Korean relations. Although the Hashimoto government has indicated its willingness to explore the possibility of resuming normalization talks with North Korea, it has not taken any major initiative to break the impasse so far. Except for holding a few rounds of working level-talks on the resumption of normalization talks with North Korea in Beijing in March and August 1996,⁵⁴ Tokyo has not held any high-level talks with Pyongyang. Furthermore, with the exception of offering \$6 million in humanitarian relief aid through the United Nations in June 1996, the Hashimoto government has not provided any economic assistance to North Korea, despite Pyongyang's persistent request for additional rice. Furthermore, the Hashimoto government has cooperated closely with South Korea in dealing with North Korea. For example, in addition to supporting the four-party talks jointly proposed by the U.S. and South Korea in April, in May LDP leaders indicated their intentions not to meet with the North Korean delegation scheduled to visit Japan at the invitation of the SDPJ unless North Korea would accept the four-party talks.⁵⁵ As a result, the high-level North Korean delegation representing the KWP decided to cancel its scheduled visit to Japan at the last minute. Apparently, several factors have influenced the Hashimoto government's generally cautious policy toward North Korea. First, it is reluctant to resume normalization talks with North Korea as the DPRK has yet to settle the succession problem since the death of Kim II Sung in July 1994. Furthermore, North Korea's economy remains on the

verge of collapse. These developments in turn have aroused much speculation concerning the imminent collapse of the Communist system in North Korea. Under the circumstances, there is no real incentive for the Hashimoto government to rush into normalization talks with North Korea.

Second, there is a growing reluctance among nationalistic Japanese conservatives to admit Japan's wrongdoings committed before and during World War II or to apologize or compensate for the atrocities committed by Japan against its neighbors. For example, the resolution adopted by the Japanese Diet in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II fell far short of the expectations of many Koreans and Chinese, as it failed to acknowledge that Japan had committed aggression against its neighbors in Asia. Instead, it tried to shift blame to other countries by referring to "many colonial rules and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world." To be sure, it contained a passage which states: "We recognize and express deep remorse for those acts our country carried out in the past and unbearable pains inflicted upon people abroad, particularly those in Asia."⁵⁶ However, the statement was regarded by many Koreans as far from being an adequate apology or atonement for the atrocities and horrors Japanese troops perpetrated in Asia. Unlike the Germans, who have not only apologized but also compensated adequately to the victims of Nazi Germany at the total cost of over 120 billion marks (or \$180 billion),⁵⁷ Japanese conservatives have attempted to evade the responsibility of making proper compensation to the victims of Japanese militarism. Even in the case of compensation for the highly publicized "comfort women" Japan has tried to dodge its responsibility by offering to compensate the victims through a private fund established with contributions from nongovernmental sources. Furthermore, several Japanese cabinet ministers have openly attempted to justify Japan's colonial rule over Korea rather than apologizing to the Koreans. In view of the fact that the more candid apology contained in the original draft of the Japanese Diet's "No War Resolution" of 1995 was watered down largely due to the opposition of the LDP members,⁵⁸ and that most of the Japanese cabinet members who have angered Koreans with "gaffs" have been LDP members, there is no incentive for the Hashimoto government to take a bold initiative toward North Korea, which will require an explicit apology plus substantial compensation to Pyongyang.

Third, there is no incentive for the Hashimoto government to resume normalization talks with North Korea, as it is disturbed by the Kim Jong II regime's dangerous acts of provocation against South Korea which have heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula in recent months. For example, in early April 1996, a few hundred armed North Korean soldiers on

several occasions entered into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea in dear violation of the armistice agreement of 1953 that ended the Korean War.⁵⁹ At the same time, the official North Korean Central News Agency announced that the North would no longer abide by the terms of the armistice agreement. South Korea expressed outrage at the incursions and put its forces on the highest alert. Against the backdrop of heightening tension on the Korean peninsula, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto voiced Japan's apprehension about North Korea's actions, saying "such acts were very dangerous."⁶⁰ In September 1996, tensions on the Korean peninsula reached the highest point in years as twenty-six North Korean armed commandos came ashore from their submarine which had run aground near the eastern coastal city of Kangnung. It was the deepest penetration into South Korean territory by North Korean troops in recent years. All but one of the commandos were killed, or found dead, with one captured alive. "This is an armed provocation, not a simple repeat of infiltration of agents of the past," President Kim Young Sam told the officials of his party, adding that North Korean authorities will have to pay a due price for the provocation.⁶¹ North Korea's response angered South Koreans further. Breaking a five-day silence, Pyongyang demanded the return of the submarine and its crew, including those dead, claiming that the craft drifted into South Korean waters because of engine trouble. South Korea rejected the claims as a "deceptive ploy,"⁶² and Japanese Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko "condemned" North Korea's reckless acts of provocation toward South Korea.⁶³ Unless North Korea adopts a more conciliatory policy toward South Korea, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the Hashimoto government to make a bold move to mend fences with Pyongyang.

Last but not least, Japan is disturbed by North Korea's ongoing strategic weapons development program, including medium-range ballistic missiles. In fact, in the 1995 and 1996 editions of *White Paper on Defense* issued by the Japanese Defense Agency, North Korea is listed as the "major destabilizing factor" for the security of the East Asian region.⁶⁴ Japan has been concerned about not only North Korea's nuclear weapons development program but also its strategic missile development. Already in the summer of 1993, then Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa declared that North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles "will be a matter of grave concern to Japan," as such development "will pose direct threats to Japan."⁶⁵ Although the signing of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework somewhat alleviated Japan's apprehension, it has by no means dissipated such a fear. For these reasons, there are no incentives for the Hashimoto government to resume talks with Pyongyang, unless Pyongyang adopts a policy of rapprochement toward South Korea and demonstrates its commitment to peaceful coexistence with its neighbors.

IX

From the foregoing analysis, a few basic conclusions can be drawn. First, Japan's Korea policy has been geared to the preservation of the *status quo* on the Korean peninsula by promoting peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas and peaceful political change on the Korean peninsula. In view of the geostrategic importance of the Korean peninsula, Japan does not want to see a renewal of conflict.

Second, Japan has cooperated closely with the United States and South Korea in dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Partly because the SDPJ has become more pragmatic in its policy orientation, and partly because the LDP has been its major coalition partner controlling a majority of cabinet portfolios including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, both the Murayama and the Hashimoto coalition governments have basically adhered to the Korea policy they inherited. They have retained friendly policies toward South Korea, while exploring the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Third, Murayama government's North Korea policy was a source of irritation in South Korean-Japanese relations. South Korea is not opposed to Japan's attempts to improve its relations with North Korea, so long as the pace of Japan's move takes into consideration the state of North-South Korean dialogue. However, when Japan's move disrupted South Korea's game plan toward North Korea, Seoul wanted Japan to reconsider its planned action so as not to create unnecessary problems for the South. As was demonstrated in the case of Japan's rice deal with North Korea, Tokyo's offer of economic assistance clearly diminished any incentive for North Korea to become more cooperative toward South Korea. As Japan's move engendered a dampening effect on ongoing inter-Korean negotiations on economic cooperation, Seoul became irritated by the move.

Fourth, Japan does not believe that its plan for the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea will have a detrimental effect on Korean reunification, for it maintains that cross recognition of the two Koreas by four major powers is desirable not only for the reduction of tension between South and North Korea but also for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. Since the possibility of reunifying Korea through the German model has drastically diminished in the aftermath of a Pyongyang-Washington rapprochement, peaceful reunification of Korea will require a period of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. In order to promote this coexistence and reduce tension on the peninsula, it is necessary to induce North Korea to open its doors and lead it into the main arena of the international community rather than isolating it from that communi-

ty. In this respect, cross recognition by the four major powers can facilitate this process. While such an approach was supported whole-heartedly by South Korea during the cold war days, South Korea does not necessarily subscribe to the same approach at present. Seoul wants Tokyo to take into consideration the pace of South-North Korean relations in dealing with North Korea.

Fifth, although North Korea is eager to resume normalization talks with Japan as soon as possible, even if talks were resumed, they are likely to drag on because of a number of thorny issues. Although the nuclear issue is no longer the major stumbling block, there is still a substantial gap between Tokyo and Pyongyang concerning the scope and nature of compensation to be made by Japan. Pyongyang has not abandoned its demand for compensation for the "45 years of losses" incurred in the postwar period, despite Tokyo's rejection of the demand. To hammer out a mutually acceptable compromise solution on the compensation issue is likely to be difficult.

Finally, it will not be an easy task for the Hashimoto government to undertake any bold initiative toward North Korea in the near future in view of the fact that following the general election for the House of Representatives, held on 20 October 1996, the LDP has formed a minority government under Prime Minister Hashimoto. The LDP has won 239 out of 500 seats in the lower house, while maintaining 109 out of 252 seats in the upper house. After the election, the SDPJ and the New Party Sakigake have refused to join the new government as coalition partners. Although the LDP has secured an agreement on policy cooperation with its long-standing coalition partners (the SDPJ and the Sakigake party), such an agreement is limited in scope and nature because it is not a covenant made among full-fledged coalition partners in the new government. Under the circumstances, unless North Korea either accepts the four-party talks proposed jointly by the U.S. and South Korea, or adopts a policy of rapprochement toward Seoul, it seems doubtful that the Hashimoto government will resume normalization talks with North Korea. It remains to be seen how the Hashimoto government will steer its diplomacy toward the two Koreas in the future.

notes for chapter six

1. *New York Times*, 22 November 1969.
2. For a detailed analysis, see Hong Nack Kim, "The Two Koreas' Entry into the United Nations and the Implications for Inter-Korean Relations," *Korea and World Affairs* (Fall 1991): pp. 397-414.
3. For Fujio's remarks, see "Hogen daijin oini hoeru," *Bengei Shunju* (October 1986): pp. 122-33. See also, *Korea Herald*, 10 September 1986.
4. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 11 January 1991.
5. Brian Bridges, *Japan and Korea in the 1990s; From Antagonism to Adjustment* (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Co., 1993): pp. 133-134.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
7. *Japan Times*, 18 January 1992.
8. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 5 August 1993.
9. *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 June 1988 and 1 August 1990. See also *Dong-A Ilbo*, 16 June 1988 and 1 August 1990.
10. *Japan Times*, 2 March 1992.
11. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 21 February 1993.
12. *Asahi Shimbun*, 11 August 1993.
13. *Japan Times*, 7 November 1993.
14. Hong Nack Kim, "Japanese-Korean Relations in the 1980s," *Asian Survey* (May 1987): pp. 497-514.
15. For a detailed analysis, see Hong Nack Kim, "Japan's North Korea Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *Korea and World Affairs* (Winter 1994): pp. 672-73.
16. *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 June 1990.
17. For the text of the joint declaration, see *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 September 1990.

18. Ibid.
19. *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 January 1991.
20. *People's Korea*, 8 February 1992. See also, *Pyongyang Times*, 23 May 1992.
21. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 15 May 1992.
22. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2 March 1992.
23. *Pyongyang Times*, 2 February and 30 March 1991.
24. *Hanguk Woo*, 17 May 1991.
25. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 6 November 1992. See also *People's Korea*, 14 November 1992.
26. For the Japanese Defense Agency's assessment of the implications of North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons development programs, see *Boei Hakusho Heisei 5-nen ban* (Tokyo: Boeicho, July 1993): pp. 63-4. According to the agency's annual white paper on defense for 1994, North Korea "constitutes a main destabilizing factor for the international community...including Japan and Northeast Asia." *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 16 July 1994.
27. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 25 March 1994.
28. Ibid., 1 July 1994.
29. Ibid., 26 & 29 October 1994.
30. Ibid., 31 March 1995.
31. Masao Okonogi, *Nihon to Kitachosen: korekara no 5 nen* (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1991): p. 173.
32. *Mainichi Shimbun*, 14 & 16 April 1995.
33. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 June 1995.
34. Ibid., 1 July 1995.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 16 September 1995.

37. *Mainichi Shinbun*, 4 October 1995.
38. *Ibid.*, 8 and 16 April 1995.
39. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 31 May 1995.
40. *Ibid.*, 30 September 1995.
41. *Ibid.*, 2 July 1995.
42. *Hankuk Ilbo*, 1 July 1995.
43. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 12 August 1995.
44. *Nihon Keizai Shinbun*, 10 October 1995. See also *Hankuk Ilbo*, 12 October 1995.
45. *Asahi Shinbun*, 29 July 1995.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Chosun Ilbo*, 20 November 1995. See also *Mainichi Shinbun*, 27 November 1995; and Samuel S. Kim, "North Korea in 1995," *Asian Survey* (January 1996): p. 67.
48. "Japan and South Korea: Remember the Noses," *The Economist*, 17 February 1996, pp. 35-36.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
50. Sebastian Moffett and Jae Hoon Shim, "Oceans Apart," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 March 1996, p. 16.
51. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 3 March 1996.
52. *Ibid.*, 15 May 1996.
53. *Ibid.*, 24 June 1996.
54. *Ibid.*, 3 April 1996. See also, *Tokyo Shinbun*, 17 August 1996.
55. *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 22 May 1996.
56. For the text of the resolution, see *Asahi Shinbun*, 10 June 1995.

57. Masayoshi Shimizu, "Sengo hosho no kokusai hikaku," *Sekai* (February 1994): pp. 133-43, esp. p. 139.
58. "The Japan That Cannot Say Sorry," *The Economist*, 12 August 1995, p. 31.
59. *Facts on File*, 11 April 1996, p. 233.
60. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 September 1996.
61. Jae Hoon Shim, "Submarine Shocker," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 October 1996, p. 18. See also, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 25 September 1996.
62. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 28 September 1996.
63. *Ibid.*, 25 September 1996.
64. *Ibid.*, 20 July 1996 and 1 July 1995.
65. Miyazawa's statement as quoted in Tsuyoshi Yamamoto, "Kita Chosen o kataru zentei to wa," *Sekai* (October 1993): p. 260.

34. *Ibid.*, 1 July 1995.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, 16 September 1995.