CIAO DATE: 02/2014
Volume: 17, Issue: 2
Fall/Winter 2013
The Sixty Years of the Korea-U.S. Security Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (PDF)
Bruce Bennett
The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States have maintained a strong security alliance for 60 years. Throughout that period, North Korea has posed continuing threats that have evolved significantly in recent years. Because North Korea is a failing state, the ROK and the United States must seek to deter, and, if necessary, defeat a range of North Korean challenges, from provocations to major war. They must also be prepared to deal with a North Korean government collapse. All of these challenges potentially involve a ROK/US offensive into North Korea to unify Korea, with significantly different force requirements than the historical defense of Seoul. North Korea has made all of these challenges more dangerous by developing significant weapons of mass destruction and especially nuclear weapons. The ROK and the United States must do more to collect intelligence on these threats and must field robust offensive and defensive capabilities against them. ROK demographics will complicate future Korean security efforts. The ROK has experienced low birthrates for several decades now and cannot sustain the historical or current size of its military. The current twenty-two active duty ROK Army divisions are scheduled to be reduced to twelve or so in 2022, which likely is insufficient for successful offensive and stabilization operations in the North. The ROK has several options available for offsetting the loss of ten active duty divisions, but these options tend to involve financial and political costs that the ROK government will be reluctant to accept. Regardless of whether the ROK provides adequate forces, China is likely to intervene into North Korea in any of the scenarios involving ROK/US intervention into the North, forcing the ROK/US to work more closely with China to avoid the possibility of an accidental but disastrous conflict.
U.S. and Japan: New Policies toward the Korean Situations (PDF)
Richard Weitz
The new national security leaders in Japan, the United States, China and the two Koreas have assumed office at a precarious time. Despite the recent relaxation of tensions, conditions are ripe for further conflict in Northeast Asia. The new DPRK leadership is as determined as its predecessor to possess nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while resisting unification or reconciliation with South Korea and its allies. The new government in Tokyo is also augmenting its military capabilities. Meanwhile, despite Chinese efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks, the Obama administration has refused to engage with the DPRK until it demonstrates a willingness to end its nuclear weapons program and improving intra-Korean ties. But this policy of patiently waiting for verifiable changes in DPRK policies may be too passive in the face of North Korea’ s growing military capabilities, leading the new South Korean government, striving to maneuver between Beijing and Washington, to consider new initiatives to restart a dialogue with the North even while reinforcing its own military capabilities.
North Korea's Strategic Goals and Policy towards the United States and South Korea (PDF)
Sue Mi Terry
Pyongyang under the Kim dynasty has pursued three broad and consistent strategic goals: (1) The pursuit of nuclear weapons program in order to gain international acceptance of the North as a bona fide nuclear weapons state; (2) securing a peace treaty in an effort to remove U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula; and, (3) reunification with South Korea on its own terms—the ultimate if increasingly unrealistic objective. To achieve these goals, the North has followed a policy of brinksmanship with the U.S. and South Korea: provoke when Washington or Seoul seem preoccupied, up the ante in the face of international condemnation, and pivot back to a peace offensive, which usually ends with some form of dialogue and negotiation, culminating, finally, in concessions for the North. This article reviews in detail how such policies have been pursued by Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un. It shows that, while there have been changes in North Korean policy, they have been primarily tactical not strategic—the North has changed how it pursues its goals (sometimes using military forces, at other times covert actions, or even negotiations), but it has remained consistent in its objectives. Not even the regime’s literal bankruptcy has convinced the regime to change course, and for good reason: such brinkmanship tactics have paid off for the North by making possible the regime’s survival for more than sixty years. Kim Jong-un, accordingly, has continued this strategy. This article ends by suggesting how the U.S. and South Korea should deal with the North’s militaristic foreign policy. In brief, the two allies need to break the cycle of provocation by making clear they will no longer reward North Korea’s destabilizing behavior while pursuing a longer-term goal of their own
The North Korean Military Under Kim Jong-un Evolved or Still Following a Kim Jong-il Script? (PDF)
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.
This paper will address many issues and challenges that have occurred in the North Korean military since Kim Jong-un has taken over as the leader in North Korea. There have been numerous issues relating to strife in the North Korean military since 2011, and some have opined that this is because of Kim Jong-un’s lack of control over this key institution within North Korea. The evidence confirms that there remain many challenges to Kim Jong-un gaining total control – and loyalty over the military. Largely to make up for this weakness, we have seen numerous purges and movement of officials within the North Korean leadership structure during the early stages of the Kim Jong-un regime. Kim Jong-un showed the world that he would use his military to conduct the same types of saber rattling that his father engaged in during the spring of 2013. But perhaps most importantly, North Korea has continued to advance its weaponry and capabilities since Kim Jong-un took over as the leader of the country. In fact, the country as a whole has not evolved - not in any way that can be easily seen. Quite to the contrary; it appears that the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-un is following a script laid out for it by Kim Jong-il and his advisors - many of whom are now in the power circle of Kim Jong-un. What has obviously been different in the early stages of the Kim Jong-un regime is the fact that, unlike his grandfather and his father, Kim Jong-un does not appear to have a strong grip on the military. This has led to large-scale purges and movement of officials from one position to another - even more so than occurred during the early years of his father's rule. But one thing is for certain, in following a script already laid out for him, Kim Jong-un will continue to maintain and upgrade the conventional military forces, the asymmetric forces, and the nuclear capabilities of his country.
Some "New Wicked Problems" of the Asia-Pacific Regional Maritime Security: Can Solutions be Found? (PDF)
Captain Sukjoon Yoon
Regional maritime security has clearly wanted improved structures and mechanisms since early 2010. In 2011 Dr. Sam Bateman published an article, “Solving the ‘Wicked Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?” identifying a number of intractable problems. Recently, Bateman’s list has been overshadowed by a variety of new ‘wicked problems’ and all parties continue to dig the hole deeper. These new issues faced by the East Asian nations include: the impact of domestic politics upon maritime security, the difficulty of striking a balance between the US and China, the struggle for self-reliant defense through rearming, the dearth of alternative models for maritime cooperation, the blurring of operational roles between navies and coastguards, and the reluctance to turn to legal mechanisms of dispute resolution. In Bateman’s original exposition, the ‘wicked problems’ were directly applicable to current maritime security, but denoted some negative outlook. This paper is hopeful that the nations of the region might be willing to put the past behind them, so that some of the mounting catalog of issues can be resolved. If effective solutions are ever to be found, then the nations in dispute will inevitably have to adopt a more flexible mindset and break out of the perilous and unproductive cycles of action and reaction. The key aim of this paper is to identify trust-building strategies through which the nations of the region can mitigate their quarrels and collaborate in solving the challenges of regional maritime security, including both old and new ‘wicked problems’.
Prospects of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation and North Korean External Trade (PDF)
Eui-Gak Hwang
This article will describe the recent status of the North Korean economy and its external trade as well as the derailed North-South economic interaction. Despite several attempts by North Korea to introduce change involving the term ‘economic reform’, North Korea has not yet advanced during the last thirty years. Its economic deadlocks are owed, first, to its very principles in which economic reform must be permissible only within the set of basic values held by the monoparty about “juche (self-reliant)” socialism. In other words, even partial decentralization is itself being centrally directed and eyed with military-first targets. Second, the North Korean leadership and its supporting elites, the final arbiters deciding how far it is permissible to open its system, are apprehensive that a change in its system would actually lead to the collapse of their established power structure. The fear of reform arbiters regarding a revolutionary bottom-up movement has played a role in inhibiting action. North-South economic cooperation as well as the resistance to North’s external openness must also be considered for its potential positive and negative effects on the people in the monarchic hermit kingdom. North Korea is likely to remain little changed as long as Kim’s family continues its current rule. The only chance for real change may occur if the young and liberal Kim Jung-eun wakes up and agrees to unite with South Korea.
WooJin Kang
What sources of information do individuals turn to in making the decision to participate in elections? Do the contextual factors matter in this decision? This study attempts to answer these important but understudied questions in electoral politics in emergent democracies. Based on the 2004 Korean legislative election, this study elucidates the relevance of the contextual model: in particular, the role of political discussions with others in explaining citizens’ decisions to vote. The main findings of this study have implications for the future study of comparative political behavior