CIAO DATE: 11/2013
Volume: 17, Issue: 1
Spring/Summer 2013
Obama's Asia Pivot and the Koreas (PDF)
Richard Weitz
The end of President Barack Obama’s first term provides an opportunity to assess what the administration’s “strategic rebalancing” toward and within the Asia-Pacific region (sometimes called the “Asian Pivot” or “Back to Asia” policy) has accomplished as well as what challenges and unmet opportunities remain. The administration has launched several successful multinational diplomatic initiatives in the region to supplement U.S. bilateral ties with key Asian partners; relations with ASEAN have clearly improved. The economic dimension of the Pivot has made progress as seen by the growth of support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights in Asia have proved far less successful, except perhaps for Myanmar, where the political transition remains a work in progress. The U.S. military has managed to establish a broader presence in the region, especially in Australia and Southeast Asia. U.S. officials have sought to impart new energy into the five existing formal U.S. bilateral defense alliances in Asia--with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea. But the main problem with the pivot has been the inability to overcome Chinese anxiety about U.S. rebalancing, which has complicated their cooperation over North Korea and other issues. Fortunately, relations between the United States and South Korea are also strong. The ROK is becoming an important U.S. partner in several dimensions of the Pivot, though ROK-U.S. differences over North Korea might emerge with the advent of a new government in Seoul.
China-North Korea Relations after Kim Jong-Il (PDF)
Hong Nack Kim
In the aftermath of Kim Jong-Il's death in December 2011, China clearly
wanted a more cooperative new North Korean regime which would help
stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Kim Jong-Il regime
had been a political liability and economic burden to China, as it defied
the international community by perpetrating numerous provocations and
crises. In order to avert a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula,
Beijing had to bail out the Kim Jong-Il regime by defusing the crises
created by North Korea's saber-rattling behavior and brinkmanship.
Clearly, China did not want to repeat or endure a similar relationship
with the new North Korean regime under Kim Jong-Un. This article
seeks to examine China's policy toward the Kim Jong-Un regime from
December 2011 to the present. In spite of initial optimism, Beijing has
been disappointed by the Kim Jong-Un regime's defiant actions, such as
the two ballistic missile tests in 2012 and the third nuclear test in
February 2013. These developments inevitably raise serious doubts
about China's ability to rein in the belligerent Kim Jong-Un regime. It is
a major contention of this paper that it will be difficult for China to
"tame" the Kim regime unless China is willing to reset its diplomatic
priorities from seeking to prevent the collapse of Kim's regime to halting
North Korea's provocations that may ignite a major conflict on the
Korean Peninsula. The surest way to achieve this change will be through
the effective utilization of economic sanctions to enhance the efficacy of
the diplomatic measures on which it has relied too long and too singlemindedly
The Right Steps to ROK Defense Reform: How to Overcome Constraints (PDF)
Bruce Klingner
Shaken by North Korea’s two deadly attacks in 2010, the Lee Myungbak Administration recalibrated ongoing defense reform plans to enable South Korea’s military to protect the country more effectively. President Lee’s Defense Reform 307 plan sought to redress many of South Korea’s security shortcomings, but Seoul remained hampered by demographic and fiscal constraints. Indeed, questions remained as to whether the government would fully fund South Korea’s defense needs, defense budget shortfalls having delayed previous reform efforts. However, South Korea does not bear its security burden alone and its alliance with the United States will continue to play an irreplaceable role in maintaining peace and stability throughout East Asia. Washington should therefore continue to ensure South Korea’s security through robust U.S. military deployments in the Pacifica and with an extended deterrence guarantee. While North Korean threats will remain the paramount focus of the U.S.–South Korean alliance, neither country should lose sight of the benefits of Seoul’s “going global” with its political, economic, and military capabilities.
A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea's Provocations (PDF)
David S. Maxwell
This article argues that to deal with North Korean provocations, the Alliance must take a holistic strategic approach to the entire North Korean problem. As long as the Kim family regime continues a strategic approach focused on regime survival, reunification of the peninsula under its control, attaining recognition as a nuclear power and trying to remove US forces from the peninsula, it will continue to use provocations as part of its strategy while oppressing its people and conducting illicit activities around the world. The Alliance has taken a piecemeal or stovepipe approach to the complex problems posed by North Korea with various organizations and senior officials responsible for a specific portfolio with no apparent effective synchronization among them. All activities of the Alliance must be focused on achieving an overall end state that is in concert with the 2009 Joint Vision Statement emphasizing peaceful reunification and ultimately answering the socalled “Korea Question” that the 1953 Armistice said must be answered. By synchronizing ways and means toward this end, the Alliance can effectively deal with provocations while working to shape the conditions necessary for reunification. However, it must be understood that the foundation for the Alliance strategy rests upon readiness of the combined military forces.
The Impact of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement On Both Economies (PDF)
Yoon-Shik Park
Four and a half years after the agreement between the U.S and Korean governments, the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA or KORUS) was finally approved by both the U.S. Congress and the Korean Parliament in late 2011 and has been in effect since March 15, 2012. KORUS is the most important free trade agreement for the U.S. since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into force in 1994. Korea has become an important trade partner of the United States, for which Korea is the 7th largest trading partner, 5th largest export market for agricultural products, 2nd largest market for U.S. services in Asia, and 10th largest market for information technology products. The total U.S.-Korea trade volume tripled over just two decades between 1990 and 2011. However, the relative importance of two countries’ bilateral trade has declined in recent decades. This trendline decline is expected to be reversed in the coming years because of the KORUS. Several studies have been conducted to estimate the potential effects of KORUS. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) study in 2007 estimated that U.S. GDP would increase by $10 to $12 billion (about 0.1%) and U.S. exports would rise by $9.7 billion to $10.9 billion, if KORUS were fully implemented. A University of Michigan study, commissioned by the Korea Economic Institute, estimated that U.S. GDP would increase by $25 billion (0.14% of GDP). This estimate was larger than the US ITC result, in part because the study included the effects of liberalization in services trade. The Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) estimated the potential economic impact of KORUS on Korea’s economy. The study concluded that KORUS would lead to an increase of 0.42% to 0.59% in Korean GDP according to a static analysis and 1.99% to 2.27% according to a dynamic analysis. A study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 2009 found that America would suffer a net loss of more than 345,000 jobs, $35 billion in lost export sales and U.S. GDP failing to grow by $40 billion, if KORUS were NOT implemented while the European Union and Canada moved forward to implement FTAs with Korea.
The Abductions Issue in Japan and South Korea: Ten Years after Pyongyang's Admission (PDF)
Celeste Arrington
Nearly all foreign nationals allegedly abducted by North Korea (DPRK) were Japanese or South Korean citizens. Suspected abductees’ families mobilized in Japan and South Korea in the late 1990s to raise awareness of the abductions, seek information about their loved ones, and hold their own governments responsible for not having protected citizens. But public and political concern for abductee and their families has differed greatly in Japan and South Korea (ROK). The abductions have dominated Japanese public consciousness and policymakers’ decisions regarding North Korea for the past decade, since the late Kim Jong-il admitted North Korean involvement in the abductions of thirteen Japanese nationals. Although more than five hundred South Korean abductees remain detained in North Korea, the abductions issue has received less attention in South Korea. What accounts for such variation in the trajectories of the abductions issue and related activism in Japan and South Korea? This article posits that the divergence in the efficacy of families’ activism in Japan and South Korea is the product of families’ interactions with each country’s distinctive media and activist spheres. Thus, this article elucidates key features of the Japanese and Korean public spheres that affect each country’s North Korea policy.
The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis (PDF)
James I. Matray
This article describes the events surrounding the Second North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 2002. It focuses attention particularly on identifying the reasons President George W. Bush decided to abandon the Agreed Framework of October 1994, as well as questioning the validity of his claim that Pyongyang’s development of a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program justified the initiation of this confrontation. The article begins with a description of the factors that explain the Bush administration’s adoption of “Hawk Engagement” as a strategy to achieve regime change in North Korea. It then covers the ongoing efforts to end the crisis, tracing negotiations at the Six-Party Talks beginning in August 2003 in Beijing. The article presents evidence to substantiate the judgment that Bush’s hardline advisors were responsible for implementing a militant and aggressive policy that, rather than toppling Kim Jong Il’s government, strained relations with South Korea, elevated the status of China in East Asia, and forced North Korea to expand its nuclear weapons program as an act of self-defense.