CIAO DATE: 04/2013
Volume: 16, Issue: 2
Fall/Winter 2012
U.S. Policy toward the Two Koreas after The U.S. and ROK Elections in 2012 (PDF)
Doug Bandow
This year’s presidential elections in both the U.S. and the Republic of Korea could have a significant impact on Washington’s policy toward both Koreas. Reelection of Barack Obama likely would yield continuity, with a commitment to a stronger alliance with the ROK and negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. However, the administration’s relationship with South Korea could be affected if the government in Seoul shifts to the left. Expectations for reaching agreement with the DPRK would remain modest, especially after the quick collapse of the aid/nuclear deal reached in early 2012. President Obama’s replacement by Mitt Romney, the Republican Party nominee, likely would tilt U.S. policy toward confrontation with the North, though the differences might prove more rhetorical than substantive. Romney’s professed policy prescriptions are consistent with the Obama administration’s approach, and he has demonstrated more than a little flexibility in his positions over time. He might follow the example of President George W. Bush, who eventually moved toward engagement with Pyongyang. However, a party and ideological shift in Seoul as a result of the ROK election could generate tension with a Romney administration similar to what occurred between the Kim Daejung and Roh Moo-hyun governments and Bush administration.
China's Korea Policy after the 2012 Leadership Transitions in Asia and America (PDF)
Gordon G. Chang
A turbulent leadership transition in China is fracturing the country’s political system. The result is that the country’s military is implementing its own external policies, often not coordinating with Beijing’s diplomats. Moreover, tumultuous internal events appear to be diverting policymakers from critical issues, such as those involving North Korea. Elections this year in the United States and South Korea will not substantially change the landscape in which Chinese policymakers operate because those countries are acting—and will continue to act—within tight constraints.
America's Pacific Power and Pacific Alliances in an Age of Austerity (PDF)
Michael O’Hanlon
The United States is reducing its military forces and budgets even as it “rebalances” towards Asia and attempts to send a signal to the region that it remains firmly committed to its security. But the process is not over. Further American budget cuts are possible. How far might they go? What would be too far? I begin this article with the assumption that allies will largely sustain, but not increase, their own current efforts in the region, that North Korea will do similarly, and that China will continue to increase its military resources and capabilities in a relatively predictable way. Thus, the main variable in the short term is the United States.
The Kim Jong-Un Regime's Survival Strategy and Prospects for the Future of North Korea (PDF)
Hong Nack Kim
The death of North Korea’s dictator, Kim Jong-Il, on December 17, 2011 aroused much speculation concerning the future of North Korea under his pand-picked successor, Kim Jong-Un. In view of the young Kim’s inexperience in political and military affairs, many wondered whether he would be able to consolidate his power as the new supreme leader of the North. At the same time, there was speculation on whether the change of top leadership would affect North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies. Under Kim Jong-Il, the key strategy of regime survival was based on the nuclear weapons development program and on “military-first politics” while neglecting the economic needs of the North Korean people. The purpose of this paper is to examine the Kim Jong-Un regime’s strategy for survival with an emphasis on three major strategic issues confronting the new North Korean government: (1) whether or not to retain its nuclear weapons program;(2) how to reform and revitalize its moribund economy; and,(3) whether or not to retain a policy of confrontation with South Korea. It is a basic contention of this paper that until such time as Kim Jong-Un consolidates his power, it is unrealistic to expect any major change in North Korea’s existing strategy or policies. Rather, it is more likely that the new regime will introduce incremental changes, while justifying its actions by invoking the “final wish” of Kim Jong-Il. Any significant change is likely to come after the presidential elections in the U.S. and South Korea in the fall of 2012.
Developments in the North Korean Asymmetric Threat: Missiles and Electronic Warfare (PDF)
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
This article will address how North Korea welcomed the Kim Chong-un era in 2012 with new developments in its military systems. Pyongyang conducted a largely unsuccessful test of the Taepo Dong 2 missile in 2012, and showed that it continues to plan for and develop its long-range ballistic missile systems - though many problems remain. North Korea also publicly displayed what may (or may not) be a new long-range missile, capable of being launched from a mobile transporter-erectorlauncher - which, if successful, will potentially raise the level of the missile threat that North Korea poses to the United States. Pyongyang also conducted electronic warfare attacks against GPS systems for both aircraft and maritime craft in South Korea during April and May of 2012. These new developments and ongoing provocative behavior prove that the new regime intends to carry on the policies of Kim Chong-il. Thus deterrence and readiness will remain an important aspect of the ROK-US alliance for the foreseeable future.
Jin W. Mok, Sung Gul Hong
The main purpose of this article is 1) to analyze the current status of the Russo-Korean pipeline natural gas (PNG) project; 2) to discuss major issues involved in this project; 3) to demonstrate costs and benefits of the projects from the viewpoints of various participants; and, 4) to forecast the future of this project. Mainly through literature review, the authors show that the idea of the Russo-Korean PNG project began to be discussed among the related parties in the early 1990s, and several feasibility studies have been undertaken since then. Though there has been a complex interplay among Russia, China, North and South Koreas, the pipeline from Vladivostok is ready to connect if North Korea can be viewed as a reliable partner. Although there is a fundamental convergence of interests among major participants from economic as well as political points of view, political risks will be incalculable, once the required investments are made. This is because North Korea will have additional leverage over South Korea by having the pipeline within its own territory. In addition, Russia, North Korea, and South Korea are in a situation of trilateral monopoly negotiation. In this situation, North Korea and Russia can demand to increase prices until the marginal benefits of South Korea equal zero. In addition, observers may argue that the separation of political and economic issues can reduce the risks involved in this project, but historical experiences strongly suggest that it will not be possible. Price volatility of the PNG and transit fees is another issue as shown in the Ukraine case, which increased the transit fees over 100% in less than two years. In short, the Russo-Korean PNG project may be seen as a very attractive business arrangement from an economic point of view, but the political costs will be insurmountable unless North Korea becomes a reliable partner, which may not be realized for a long time.
The United States and East Asian Regionalism: Competing Paths to Integration (PDF)
Claude Barfield
Though it has neglected the region for brief periods over the past two decades, U.S. trade policy, linked to U.S. diplomatic and security policy, has made East Asia a central focus. Secretary of State James Baker’s vow not to allow a line to be drawn the middle of the Pacific with the US on one side and the nations of Asian on the other has held steady. This article traces and analyzes U.S. trade policy toward East Asia since 1990. It describes the development of competing paths to Asian trade integration: a trans-Pacific vision, embodied now in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP); and an intra-Asian vision, embodied most clearly in the ASEAN Plus Three process. The article concludes with a detailed description of the major negotiating issues and challenges that have emerged in the ongoing TPP bargaining sessions.