CIAO DATE: 07/2012
Volume: 16, Issue: 1
Spring/Summer 2012
Embracing Multilateralism: A U.S.-ROK Alliance for Regional Security (PDF)
Mel Gurtov
Pessimism pervades most discussions of the security situation in Northeast Asia, particularly on the Korean peninsula where efforts to weaken the North Korean regime and stop its nuclear weapons program have failed. This article proposes a new approach to regional and Korean security: creation of a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue Mechanism structured so as to respond to any number of disputes and issues before they reach the point of serious confrontations. Policy changes are proposed in the U.S. South Korea alliance and by North Korea to promote agreement on a dialogue mechanism. The advantages for these parties, as well as for China, Japan, and Russia, in having a security dialogue mechanism are also discussed. North Korea’s nuclear weapons should probably not be the NEASDM’s first order of business. Rather, any of a number of other security concerns—for example, environmental protection, labor practices, and human rights—might better be addressed before tackling the most difficult issue of all.
Policy Implications of China-North Korea Relations (PDF)
Gordon G. Chang
Fundamental changes in the nature of politics inside China’s Communist Party are occurring at the same time the Kim-family regime is absorbed by succession politics. Specifically, we are seeing, in both states, not only transitions from one set of leaders to another but also transformations of the structures of both regimes, with the militaries of the two countries becoming more powerful. These momentous developments are happening while Beijing and Pyongyang are working out a new relationship. The result of all these realignments will, in all probability, be even greater uncertainty and much more turbulence on the Korean peninsula over the next several years. The implications will also be felt around the world as Pyongyang, with Beijing’s assistance, challenges global nonproliferation norms
The ROK-US Cooperation for Dealing with Political Crises in North Korea (PDF)
Yong-Sup Han
This article offers four scenarios on how the North Korean situation might evolve following a North Korean collapse after the fall of the Kim family regime and one more scenario of North Korea’s explosion, regardless of the fate of the Kim family regime. Analysis of the possible politico-military ramifications for the Korean peninsula, Northeast Asia, and the world has been done in light of each scenario. It also contemplates the need for bilateral cooperation between South Korea and the United States in the context of North Korea’s total collapse. It argues that it is important to research thoroughly and map out comprehensively a plan on how the North Korean situation might evolve following. It contends that it is important to foster an environment in which South Korea’s goals can be successfully accomplished rather than to respond to a situation passively after it has happened. It also points out how important it is for South Korea and the United States to dissuade China from unilaterally intervening in North Korea’s political turmoil, since China’s national power and influence would grow at such a time. Other necessary political and military considerations are also contemplated in this article.
Political Dimensions of North Korea's Third-Generation Succession and the Potential for Crisis (PDF)
Robert Collins
The death of Kim Jong-il leaves Northeast Asian regional actors concerned about the stability of the Kim rgime and leads to questions as to Kim Jong-un’s ability to consolidate power in a party-state already threatened internally by a lack of resources and a moribund economy. Projecting the potential for crisis in the new Kim Jong-un regime centers on leadership and continuity issues. Will the North Korean power elite support Kim Jong-un to preserve a system in which members of the power elite themselves became successful? Or will domestic economic shortcomings challenge Kim Jong-un’s ability to subsidize the power elite’s lifestyle and/or the integrity of the elite-led institutions of political power? Who supports the younger Kim and how? Understanding these issues is critical to preparations by the Republic of Korea – United States Alliance as well as regional actors such as China, Russia and Japan. Kim Jong-un’s youth and political immaturity provide justified concerns for all regional stakeholders. The complexity of Kim Jong-il’s leadership style leaves his son with serious challenges in trying to duplicate a similar leadership environment. Failure to match that leadership style in the near-to-mid term is a threat to not only stability in North Korea but to Northeast Asia as well.
Kangsong Taeguk and Political Succession: Problems and Prospects (PDF)
Greg Scarlatoiu
To celebrate the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday, the North Korean regime announced its goal of achieving “Kangsong Taeguk,” a “powerful and prosperous state,” by April 15, 2012. After the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, the North Korean regime confirmed his son, Kim Jong-un, as leader of the country. North Korea’s 2012 New Year editorial mentioned the term “Kangsong Taeguk“ only five times, while mention of Songun, North Korea’s “military first policy,” introduced by Kim Jong-il, was used fourteen. This article explores the meaning and likelihood of North Korea’s achieving its declared goal of achieving a “powerful and prosperous state,” under circumstances defined by a highly unpredictable hereditary transmission of power. Kangsung Taeguk is to be realized through the further crystallization of perennial distinctive features of the Kim dynasty rule: its cult of personality, distorted Confucianism, a partisan guerilla tradition, and an imported socialist model. Ultimately, transforming the Workers’ Party into the party of Kim Il-sung and the Kim family takes the personality cult to a new stage. North Korea’s relentless development of asymmetric military capabilities has been meant to achieve the “powerful state.” North Korea’s focus on legitimate and illicit foreign economic transactions that do not require significant internal reform has aimed to earn foreign currency while maintaining the political status quo. “Songun Chongchi,” the “military first” policy, diverts resources away from economic development and places an insurmountable burden on North Korea’s economy.
Negotiating with South Korea and the U.S.: North Korea's Strategy and Objectives (PDF)
Cheon Seongwhun
North Korea has held a representative negotiating strategy. It is basically a double-strategy whose rhetoric masks its true intentions. Under this strategy, North Korea is good at launching a charm offensive in public, and, at the same time, buying time and preparing for a war or military provocation. In the North-South Korean relations context, this double strategy can be named the digging tunnel strategy. While shaking hands with South Korea and agreeing on historically important principles for peaceful unification in the early 1970s, the North Korean leadership ordered its military to dig up an invasion route and open a secret attack corridor. For the last twenty years of nuclear negotiations, North Korea
has been persistent and consistent in applying its digging tunnel strategy whenever and wherever possible. As a result, all major nuclear agreements signed in this period have been betrayed by North Korea. North Korea'snegotiating objectives have been two-fold. Strategically, it has aspired to win a constitutional struggle vis-à-vis South Korea. Tactically, North Korea has placed enormous efforts to undermine American's extended deterrence and alliance with South Korea. For
North Koreans, removing the U.S. presence in South Korea has been the highest political and military objective. They consider the ROK-U.S. alliance as the most serious stumbling block to ending the constitutional struggle on their terms.
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
This article will address exactly how North Korea has gradually, but quite clearly, changed the focus of its forces in order to meet the challenges of sustainment, aging equipment, and a prosperous, militarily well equipped neighbor to the south. In addition, it addresses recent (since the mid 2000's) advances North Korea has been able to initiate in its military forces that directly threaten the ROK-US alliance, and the ROK-US ability to defend the South Korean landmass. Finally, this article will address the (often unpredictable and often highly unusual)process of the planned hand-over of power from father to third son in Pyongyang - and how this will affect military readiness and the stability of the military command structure now that Kim Jong-il is dead. A consideration of the threat from North Korea as it stands at the end of the Kim Jong-il era, shows a two-headed threat; a military that clearly managed to adjust to resource constraints and was able to "re-invent itself" as an army that focused on asymmetric forces, and a government(including the military) that in many ways was fighting to stave off instability, striving to avoid collapse, and ultimately absorption by the South.
Jung Ho-Sub
A new security environment in Northeast Asia is calling for fresh thinking and changes in terms of the security policies of the Republic of Korea, the US, and Japan. Especially, a series of provocations by North
Korea in 2010 and a new assertiveness manifested in the rise of China provide a rationale for closer defense cooperation among the three countries. A bolstered trilateral defense arrangement among the ROK, the US, and Japan could provide the best platform to deter further provocations from the North, and to prepare for potential instabilities in the current power succession inside North Korea. At the same time, tighter trilateral defense cooperation can deter China's one-sided support of North Korea in its efforts to relate to future provocations by the North. It also puts indirect pressure on Beijing to hold Pyongyang accountable for its hostile actions. Given the asymmetric threats from the North, in particular, trilateral naval cooperation in the future should be focused on the following three categories: sea-borne Missile Defense (MD) and Proliferation Strategy Initiative (PSI), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and, Mine Warfare (MIW), and preparation for contingencies in North Korea. Furthermore, the three navies should put more efforts behind regional maritime security activities, such as HA/DR and anti-piracy. In doing so, the three navies also should try to engage China in these efforts because the future of maritime security of the region depends on how to engage China in the international security system. Doing so is also a way to contribute to the building of multilateral cooperative mechanism for maritime security in the region.
Downfall of the North Korean State Economy (PDF)
Un-Chul Yang
North Korea operates its system based on a strict adherence to socialism and its "military-first" policy but its economy has failed. Without government subsidies, the ordinary people have no choice but indulge in illegal economic activities. Now, a portion of the economic shortages is fulfilled by private earnings in the markets. The appearance of the market is a bottom-up process rather than a top-down process engineered by the state. As the market grows, the harsh regime confronts the decreasing influence of its power. To restore the state economy, North Korea implemented currency reform. However, it failed, leading to far greater mistrust of the government by the North Korean people. Though new leader Kim Jong-un inherited the “military-first” policy, the poor economy cannot support its military ambitions. The misallocation of resources aggravates its economy and the legitimacy of regime. The pressure from the bottom of society to provide reform measures will almost certainly increase. This will likely mark the beginning of genuine transition of North Korea.