CIAO DATE: 01/2009
Volume: 10, Issue: 2
Fall/Winter 2006
The U.S.-ROK Alliance: American Perspectives (PDF)
David I. Steinberg
Non-specialist Americans, if they think of the Korean Peninsula at all, focus on the crisis that the U.S. faces with North Korea over nuclear and missile issues. Yet there are two crises facing the U.S. in that volatile and dangerous location that has been for two millennia a nexus of regional conflict. The first is the more obvious one with North Korea that the Bush administration has yet seriously to address on a bilateral basis, and still seems unwilling to do so at the highest levels; and the second crisis, a stealth one between South Korea and the U.S.– one that is obscured by both a lack of transparency on relations on the part of both governments and by the media in the United States that has under-reported the issue. The prospect of the Bush-Roh summit did raise its visibility, but the meeting itself and its aftermath were poorly reported in the United States and the subsequent limited official statements lacked depth and implied substantial disagreements.1 The second crisis with South Korea is arguably as profound as the first for longer-range relations and stability in Northeast Asia. Although both are related, they are not coterminous
Force Restructuring in the ROK-US Military Alliance: Challenges and Implications (PDF)
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
The foreign policy issue regarding the ROK-US alliance that dominated the news headlines in South Korea for much of the spring and summer of 2006 focused on Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) of ROK and US forces and how this command and control relationship would change in coming years. Unfortunately, this issue has received almost no attention in the United States, where security concerns relating to other regions in the world have consistently dominated the headlines. In the view of the author, this has the potential to be extremely dangerous, as South Korea is Washington’s 7th largest trading partner, a staunch and loyal ally for six decades, and a country that has become culturally, economically, and politically linked to many aspects of society in the United States.
This article will analyze the issue of changing Wartime OPCON, and the potential impact that this issue will have on the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. Thus, it will be important first to engage in a discussion of the vulnerabilities that the ROK military has and will have in the near future to the North Korean threat as command and control of ROK and US forces transitions to a new infrastructure. As such, it will be important to address the gaps in the capabilities of ROK military forces. It will also be important to discuss the realities of Combined Forces Command (CFC) and how changes to this structure are likely to impact the capabilities of South Korea and the United States to fight a conflict with North Korea. Once this has been determined, I will turn to an analysis of the North Korean threat, how it has evolved in reaction to economic realities, and how that has impacted the capabilities of ROK and US forces to fight a successful war if such a crisis were to occur.
The U.S. East Asia Strategy and the Korean Peninsula: Retooling Alliance, Asymmetry, and Balancing (PDF)
Young Whan Kihl
A popular Korean saying right after World War II in 1945, as shown below, attests to the Korean people’s generally distrustful sentiment toward outside powers. This sentiment of realism also seems to be reflected in both North and South Korea today.
Ssoryon saramege sokchimalko,
Miguk saram mitchimalla,
Ilpon saram ironani,
Choson saram chosimhara!
(Don't be deceived by the Soviets,
Don't count on the Americans,
The Japanese will rise again soon,
So, Koreans, look out for yourselves!)
The current agenda of the “strained” U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S.-DPRK Nuclear Standoff typify the status of the United States-Korea relations in 2006 and may share something in common with this deep-rooted nationalistic sentiment of the Korean people. The test-launching of missiles by North Korea on July 5, 2006, together with its underground nuclear testing on October 9, that led to the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 censuring of the North, may also contain an element of the nationalistic protest by the Kim Jong Il regime.3 Quoting a Japanese source C. Kenneth Quinones writes that it was no accident that North Korea chose July 4 (U.S. time) to test-fire its seven missiles, the American Independence Day as well as the 34th anniversary of the signing of the North-South Joint Communique in 1972.4 Both North and South Korea today are in search of an identity—both individual and collective (i.e., national)—as to who they are and how they, as divided halves of the Korean nation, can relate to each other through promoting.
Inter-Korean Relations and the Future of the U.S.–ROK Alliance (PDF)
Choong Nam Kim
Relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are undergoing dramatic changes. So is the security alliance between the United States and South Korea, which was established to deter a common threat from North Korea. The change in South-North Korean relations has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the United States’ North Korea policy. At the same time, progress in inter-Korean relations depends to a significant extent upon Washington’s North Korea policy. In addition, the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia and the political environment on the peninsula has changed significantly. The foundation of the U.S.–ROK alliance is being undercut by social and political change in South Korea and by a widening gap in the allies’ threat perceptions and security priorities. The question of alliance legitimacy and durability has become more pressing than ever before.
C. Kenneth Quinones
North Korea’s July 4 launching of ballistic missiles declared its leader Kim Jong Il’s determination to secure its nation’s national defense irrespective of the international community’s concerns and opposition. Initial international reaction ranged from stunned disbelief to rage. Japan was particularly outraged and took the initiative, with strong support from the United States, to press for UN Security Council passage of a resolution that called for economic sanctions against North Korea. Even China took the rare step of supporting a moderated version of the UN Security Council resolution that censured North Korea, but without reference to sanctions. Absent from most reactions was perspective. RRather than attempting to decipher the consequences, governments focused on punitive measures. How could North Korea and its leader Kim Jong Il be so audacious and foolheardty as to disregard the international community’s warnings against launching a single ballistic missile. Here we pursue perspective to better understand Kim Jong Il’s motives so that we might better know how to influence his future actions. Whether Kim acted in an appropriate or moral manner is not our concern. In matters of national security, morality, issues of right and wrong, are of secondary concern. Foremost must be the goal to better understand our adversaries so that we can deal most effectively with them. Otherwise, our security will be at greater risk in the future.
China's Approach to the US-ROK Alliance— Background, Status, Outlook (PDF)
Robert Sutter
Among China's neighbors in Asia, Chinese leaders have given highest priority to relations with the governments of northeast Asia, Japan and the administrations of North and South Korea. The salient reasons have included the strategic location of these nations close to the economic centers of China's modernization, their economic, political, and military power and importance to China, and their close involvement with the United States. In terms of the last factor, Chinese leaders have long recognized the central importance of the US alliances with Japan and South Korea, and the related importance of the US military presence in both countries as enabled by the respective alliances.